Stronghold Insurance Company Inc. vs.

Cuenca

Facts:

Maraon fled a complaint against the cuencas and tayactac for the collection of sum
of money and damages, his complaint included an application for the issuance of
writ of preliminary attachment which granted by the RTC on the conditioned upon
posting bond of 1m. Maraon posted a Stronghold Insurance bond in the amount of
1M issued by the Stronghold Insurance. After serving of the summons the writ was
enforced, the sheriff levied upon the equipment, supplies, material and various
other personal belonging to Arc Cuisine, Inc. upon appeal the CA annulled and set
aside and hereby dismissing the complaint of in Civil case of the RTC for lack of
jurisdiction. The CA remanded to the RTC for hearing and resolution of the Cuencas
and Tayactac's claim for the damages sustained from the enforcement of the writ of
preliminary attachment. After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment, holding Maraon
and Stronghold Insurance jointly and solidarily liable for damages to the Cuencas
and Tayactac.

Issue: WON respondent Cuenca et al, are the proper parties to claim any damages
even there are not the owner of the properties attached.

Ruling: There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy on attachment
belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to the Cuencas and Tayactac in their own
right. They were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a personality
distinct and separate from that of any or all of them. The damages occasioned to
the properties by the levy on attachment, wrongful or not, prejudice Arc Cuisine,
Inc., not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the substantive
law to claim and recover such damages.
TILESTON v. ULLMAN, State's Attorney, et al.
318 U.S. 44 (63 S.Ct. 493, 87 L.Ed. 603)

PER CURIAM.

This case comes here on appeal to review a declaratory judgment of the

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut that 6246 and 6562 of the
General Statutes of Connecticut of 1930 prohibiting the use of drugs or
instruments to prevent conception, and the giving of assistance or counsel in
their useare applicable to appellant, a registered physician, and as applied
to him are constitutional. 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582, 588.

The suit was tried and judgment rendered on the allegations of the
complaint which are stipulated to be true. Appellant alleged that the statute,
if applicable to him, would prevent his giving professional advice concerning
the use of contraceptives to three patients whose condition of health was
such that their lives would be endangered by child-bearing, and that
appellees, law enforcement officers of the state, intend to prosecute any
offense against the statute and 'claim or may claim' that the proposed
professional advice would constitute such an offense. The complaint set out
in detail the danger to the lives of appellant's patients in the event that they
should bear children, but contained no allegations asserting any claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment of infringement of appellant's liberty or his
property rights. The relief prayed was a declaratory judgment as to whether
the statutes are applicable to appellant and if so whether they constitute a
valid exercise of constitutional power 'within the meaning and intent of
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting a state
from depriving any person of life without due process of law'. On stipulation
of the parties the state superior court ordered these questions of law
reserved for the consideration and advice of the Supreme Court of Errors.
That court, which assumed without deciding that the case was an
appropriate one for a declaratory judgment, ruled that the statutes 'prohibit
the action proposed to be done' by appellant and 'are constitutional'.
We are of the opinion that the proceedings in the state courts present no
constitutional question which appellant has standing to assert. The sole
constitutional attack upon the statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment is
confined to their deprivation of lifeobviously not appellant's but his
patients'. There is no allegation or proof that appellant's life is in danger. His
patients are not parties to this proceeding and there is no basis on which we
can say that he has standing to secure an adjudication of his patients'
constitutional right to life, which they do not assert in their own behalf.
Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 114, 24 S.Ct. 219, 220, 48 L.Ed. 365;
Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 550, 32 S.Ct. 784, 786,
56 L.Ed. 1197; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 395, 35 S.Ct. 345, 348,
59 L.Ed. 632; Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed.
979; The Winnebago, 205 U.S. 354, 360, 27 S.Ct. 509, 511, 51 L.Ed. 836;
Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 220, 23 S.Ct. 498,
501, 47 L.Ed. 778. No question is raised in the record with respect to the
deprivation of appellant's liberty or property in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor is there anything in the opinion or judgment of
the Supreme Court of Errors which indicates or would support a decision of
any question other than those raised in the superior court and reserved by it
for decision of the Supreme Court of Errors. That court's practice is to
decline to answer questions not reserved. General Statutes 5652; Loomis
Institute v. Healy, 98 Conn. 102, 129, 119 A. 31; John J. McCarthy Co. v.
Alsop, 122 Conn. 288, 298, 299, 189 A. 464.

Since the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that appellant has no
standing to litigate the constitutional question which the record presents, it
is unnecessary to consider whether the record shows the existence of a
genuine case or controversy essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction of
this Court. Cf. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 259, 53
S.Ct. 345, 346, 77 L.Ed. 730, 87 A.L.R. 1191.

Dismissed.
PEOPLE v. VERA

FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was
elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of.
Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in
the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec
1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this
also constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting
freedom, as in pardon.

HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply
only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may
have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces
where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits such
denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust
and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.
People of the Philippines vs
Jose Vera
65 Phil. 56 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Probation Law

Separation of Powers Undue Delegation of Powers Power to Pardon

Constitutionality of Laws May the State Question Its Own Laws

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The
matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu
Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the
petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the
hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that
courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have
no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act
No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with
probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if
construed as a province, has no designated probation officer hence, a Manila court
cannot grant probation.

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to
apply the probation law if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it
gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law
however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executives
power to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in
effect encroached upon the executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution
agreed with the issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the non-
applicability of the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in
provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing
the State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like
Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of
Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).

ISSUE:

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had
been using an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of
the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the
law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a
probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the
provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should
provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their
province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its
whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress
to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant
pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties
while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.

Cuyegkeng v Cruz

Facts:

Among the 12 nominees for the Board of Medical Examiners, only 6 were shortlisted
by the President, which includes Dr. Pedro Cruz, a government physician. The
petitioners, who are among the nominees cut by the president, prayed for two
causes of action. The first, being that any of them is qualified for the position and
that Dr. Cruz's appointment be rendered illegal, thus null and void. While the
second, prays for a writ of preliminary injunction, ceasing, desisting and refraining
the respondent from assuming and performing the role of Board Medical Examiner,
and for the responded to pay for the costs of this suit.
The petition for preliminary injunction was dismissed. The Council of Philippine
Medical Association, and incorporated association intervened enjoining the
petitioners in their prayer for relief.

Issue:

WON petitioners' have valid causes of action.

Held:

No. The Court ruled that responded has a good a valid right to his title on the
grounds that one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another cannot question his title by quo warranto.
This suggests that petitioners have no cause of action against the responded. While
the intervenors have no right to question the title of respondent. Hence, the petition
for quo warranto has no merit.

Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937)

Background
In August 1937, President President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Senator Hugo Black to the
Supreme Court. In March of that year, however, Congress had passed an act "permitting Justices to
retire at full salary after a period of specified service, thereby increas[ing] the emoluments of the
office ... while [Black] was a Senator." The ineligibility clause bars on Senators being "appointed to
any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which ... shall have been increased during
such time...." Nevertheless, Black was confirmed and appointed.
Shortly thereafter, citing the ineligibility clause problem, Albert Levitt filed a pro se motion in that
court requesting leave to petition for an order requiring Black to show cause why he should be
permitted to serve as an Associate Justice of this Court.

Opinion of the Court

In a brief per curiam opinion, the court dismissed the case for want of standing:
The grounds of this motion are that the appointment of Mr. Justice Black
by the President and the confirmation thereof by the Senate of the United
States were null and void by reason of his ineligibility under Article I,
Section 6, Clause 2, of the Constitution of the United States, and because
there was no vacancy for which the appointment could lawfully be made. The
motion papers disclose no interest upon the part of the petitioner other
than that of a citizen and a member of the bar of this Court. That is
insufficient. It is an established principle that to entitle a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of
executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public. Tyler v. Judges, 179 U.S. 405,
406; Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534; Newman v. Frizzell, 238
U.S. 537, 549, 550; Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129; Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488. The motion is denied.

TOPACIO vs ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY SANTOS ONG Case Digest

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO v. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. It cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul
or set aside order.

FACTS: Petitioner Ferdinand Topacio implored the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate
post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Gregory Santos Ong. He points out that natural-born
citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong
has failed to meet the citizenship requirement. Ong, on the other hand, avers that the RTC already
granted his petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen. The decision having become final,
he caused the corresponding annotation thereof in his Certificate of Birth.

The OSG informed Topacio that it cannot favorably act on request for the filing of a quo warranto
petition until the RTC case shall have been terminated with finality. Topacio assails this position of
the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a
petition for quo warranto

HELD: The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the
OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been
terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply
because the affected party disagrees with it.

The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its
officials or agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best
interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law.

In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of
an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons.

Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the
management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in
court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but
always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at
hand.

It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same
issue of Ongs citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to
mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to
the issue as it merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

Paguia vs. Office of the President

FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original
action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos
nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent
Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of
1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination
in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his
argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner
theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or
non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks discriminates
against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

ISSUE:

Petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

Ruling:

An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners

suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience."Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted
arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of
statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed
conduct.

A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for
moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.
Custodio vs Senate President

Fast facts: Simplicio Custodio, a former guerrillero (I suppose a HUKBALAHAP member?),

filed a petition for prohibition against the Senate President, the Speaker of the House,
the Insular Treasurer and the Insular Auditor to prohibit them from authorizing and
approving the disbursement of P3,000,000.00 appropriated for the back salaries of the
Congressmen. He likewise prayed that the act be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Sadly, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the following grounds:
1) Custodio does not have the requisite personality to attack the constitutionality of the
act. The elementary doctrine of constitutional law is that the constitutionality of a
legislative act is open to attack only by a person whose rights are affected thereby, that
one who invokes the power of the court to declare an Act of Congress to be
unconstitutional must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has
sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally.
2) Appropriation is a political question. Tribunals are not called upon to decide questions
of political character. It must be decided by the people at the polls.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC

Facts:

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the
proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of
the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a
motion to prohibit such plebiscite.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.

HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission
to the people. Such is not allowed.

The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election
at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is
singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one
plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper frame of reference in
arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the
revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the
proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the Doctrine of
Submission which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be
presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.
Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain

G.R. No. 1833591,

October 14, 2008

Decision:

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in
pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on
the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the
country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is
tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the
bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must
do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the
freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely
to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.

Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize,
however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases
before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of
several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the
GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace
Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year,
they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol
filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding
of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official
copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is
concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the
finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of

public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article
II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is an appropriate remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state,
or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of

Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte
in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable
question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid
commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Held:

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and
Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts

decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or
mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual
cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed
to the other branches of government.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest
or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-
intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with
the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and
the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the
Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and
academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved;
(b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the
need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out

the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF
back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one
drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared
to the original.

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public
concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of
real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate
notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public
employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to
public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the
identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern.
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern,
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and
in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty
and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only
its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF

Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326
December 18, 1965
Facts:

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836

insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The
provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of
salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class legislation because
it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them
a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in
case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the
government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which
is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed
24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received,
insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute
forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable
vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing
the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their
salary.

Issue:
 whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads
as follows:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by
law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per
diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from
their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

Held:

Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a
special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to
approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the
power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to
the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to
whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term
other emoluments.

Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received
as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and
perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a

part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.
Kilosbayan v. Guingona
Facts:

This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of
Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the
on-line lottery system, also know as lotto.

Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and
ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as
amended by B. P. Blg. 42.

Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of
1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond
the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of
the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the
ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic
organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts,
decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities.

As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one
of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of
the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the
provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of
the instrument.

Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary
to law and invalid.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC
leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of
ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of
lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition
was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is
violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's
reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have
funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing
because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same
one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense
be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in
a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the
Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at
issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL
PARTIES in INTEREST.

AMIN vs. Exec. Secretary

Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.)
Nos. 364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

E.O. No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued on September 27,
2004, reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364

TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM

WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo

administration is Social Justice and Basic [N]eeds;

WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social justice is

asset reform;

WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban land

reform, and ancestral domain reform;
WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential
Commission [for] the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral domain reform
is a concern of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP);

WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo

administration is Anti-Corruption and Good Government;

WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo

administration is rationalizing the bureaucracy by consolidating related
functions into one department;

WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of

the Philippines has broad powers to reorganize the offices under her
supervision and control;

NOW[,] THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the powers

vested in me as President of the Republic of the Philippines, do hereby
order:

SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is

hereby transformed into the Department of Land Reform. It shall be
responsible for all land reform in the country, including agrarian reform,
urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform.

SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision and

control of the Department of Land Reform . The Chairman of the
PCUP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land
Reform for Urban Land Reform.

SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision and

control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of the NCIP
shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for
Ancestral Domain Reform.

SECTION 4. The PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to the services
provided by the Departments Finance, Management and Administrative
Office; Policy, Planning and Legal Affairs Office, Field Operations and
Support Services Office, and all other offices of the Department of Land
Reform.
 SECTION 5. All previous issuances that conflict with this Executive
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately. (Emphasis

and underscoring supplied)

E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No. 364 a month later or on October 26,
2004, reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED

TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371 created the National Commission on

Indigenous Peoples;

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the President

has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the National Government.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President

of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution and existing laws, do hereby order:

Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364. Section 3 of

Executive Order No. 364, dated September 27, 2004 shall now read as
follows:

Section 3. The National Commission on Indigenous

Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the
Department of Land Reform.

Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no diminution in

rank and salary.

Section 3. Repealing Clause. All executive issuances, rules and

regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Executive
Order are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.
 Section 4. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Petitioners contend that the two presidential issuances are unconstitutional for
violating:

- THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF

POWERS AND OF THE RULE OF LAW[;]
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME AND POLICIES FOR
AGRARIAN REFORM, URBAN LAND REFORM, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS AND ANCESTRAL DOMAIN[; AND]
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR
ORGANIZATIONS TO EFFECTIVE AND REASONABLE
PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING, INCLUDING
THROUGH ADEQUATE CONSULTATION[.] [1]

By Resolution of December 6, 2005, this Court gave due course to the Petition and
required the submission of memoranda, with which petitioners and respondents
complied on March 24, 2006 and April 11, 2006, respectively.

The issue on the transformation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) into
the Department of Land Reform (DLR) became moot and academic, however, the
department having reverted to its former name by virtue of E.O. No. 456 [2] which
was issued on August 23, 2005.

The Court is thus left with the sole issue of the legality of placing the
Presidential Commission[3] for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the supervision and
control of the DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
under the DAR as an attached agency.

Before inquiring into the validity of the reorganization, petitioners locus standi or
legal standing, inter alia,[4] becomes a preliminary question.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of respondents, concedes that
AMIN[5] has the requisite legal standing to file this suit as member[6] of Congress.
Petitioners find it impermissible for the Executive to intrude into the domain of the
Legislature. They posit that an act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
questioned by a member of Congress.[7] They add that to the extent that the powers
of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.[8]

Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain

inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.[9]

The OSG questions, however, the standing of MDOI, a registered peoples

organization of Teduray and Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi and South Upi
in the province of Maguindanao.
As co-petitioner, MDOI alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of
NCIPs becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral
domain claims. It fears that transferring the NCIP to the DAR would affect the
processing of ancestral domain claims filed by its members.

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[10]

It has been held that a party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have
a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about
to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.[11]
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show
that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
[12]

An examination of MDOIs nebulous claims of negative impact and probable

setbacks[13] shows that they are too abstract to be considered judicially
cognizable. And the line of causation it proffers between the challenged action and
alleged injury is too attenuated.

Vague propositions that the implementation of the assailed orders will work
injustice and violate the rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the
requisite standing. Neither would its status as a peoples organization vest it with
the legal standing to assail the validity of the executive orders.[14]

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, [15] which MDOI cites in

support of its claim to legal standing, is inapplicable as it is not similarly situated
with the therein petitioners who alleged personal and substantial injury resulting
from the mining activities permitted by the assailed statute. And so is Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[16] for the indigenous peoples
leaders and organizations were not the petitioners therein, who necessarily had to
satisfy the locus standi requirement, but were intervenors who sought and were
allowed to be impleaded, not to assail but to defend the constitutionality of the
statute.

Moreover, MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance to justify a

relaxation of the rule on legal standing. To be accorded standing on the ground of
transcendental importance, Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita [17] requires that the
following elements must be established: (1) the public character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The presence of
these elements MDOI failed to establish, much less allege.
Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando[18] more specifically declares that the transcendental
importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of the petition.

This Court, not being a venue for the ventilation of generalized grievances, must
thus deny adjudication of the matters raised by MDOI.

Now, on AMINs position. AMIN charges the Executive Department with

transgression of the principle of separation of powers.

Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and the
Judiciary may not encroach on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of
laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and
controversies. The principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the
executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government and calls for
them to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit.[19]

AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes,
[20]
they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere
executive orders.

While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President [21] who,
as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices,[22] it posits that this broad power of control including the
power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner
contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty[23] of the President to ensure that the
laws, including those creating the agencies, be faithfully executed.

AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an

extension of the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an independent agency
under the Office of the President.[24] It thus argues that since the legislature had
seen fit to create these agencies at separate times and with distinct mandates, the
President should respect that legislative disposition.

In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these administrative

agencies should be the subject of a statute.
AMINs position fails to impress.

The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over

executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays
down a limitation on the legislative power.

The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is not
indistinct. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to
make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the will of
the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested
this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative
body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any
power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly
or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to
matters of general concern or common interest.

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President
executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the President. It is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief

Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the
functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere
with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to
enable him to discharge his duties effectively.[25] (Italics omitted,
underscoring supplied)
The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an
executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of
law.[26]

In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full

knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject.[27] It is thus
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the
Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence
on the Presidents power to reorganize.

In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature

necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative
structure. Such determination is primary,[28] but subject to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or
offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify
the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may
expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures.[29] The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law:[30]

SEC. 30. Functions of Agencies under the Office of the President.

Agencies under the Office of the President shall continue to operate and
function in accordance with their respective charters or laws creating
them, except as otherwise provided in this Code or by law.
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President

Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by
abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and
 (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments or agencies.[31](Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped to
assess whether an executive agency ought to continue operating in accordance with
its charter or the law creating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable
of making a similar assessment and appropriate action within its plenary
power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores the need to provide
the President with suitable solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of
the service that may call for the exercise of the power of control.

x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition of the

recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the
nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient,
the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the
command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President.[32]

The Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and the
agencies under it.[33] It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed as
agencies under the Office of the President.[34] The Agencies under the Office of the
President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President,
those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the
administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to the
Office for policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or
order creating them under any special department.[35]

As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of
the President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. Gauged against these guidelines,[36] the challenged executive orders may
not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in violation of the
rule of law.

The references in E.O. 364 to asset reform as an anti-poverty measure for social
justice and to rationalization of the bureaucracy in furtherance of good
government[37]encapsulate a portion of the existing policy in the Executive
Office. As averred by the OSG, the President saw it fit to streamline the agencies
so as not to hinder the delivery of crucial social reforms.[38]

The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the objectives of

simplicity, economy and efficiency as gathered from the provision granting PCUP
and NCIP access to the range of services provided by the DARs technical offices
and support systems.[39]

The characterization of the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the
President does not remove said body from the Presidents control and supervision
with respect to its performance of administrative functions. So it has been opined:

That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the
President in all instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides
that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, like those of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although
independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress under the
office of the President and, as such, is still subject to the Presidents
power of control and supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution with respect to its performance of administrative
functions[.][40] (Underscoring supplied)

In transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached agency, the President

effectively tempered the exercise of presidential authority and considerably
recognized that degree of independence.
The Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative relationships into (1)
supervision and control, (2) administrative supervision, and (3) attachment. [41] With
respect to the third category, it has been held that an attached agency has a larger
measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one
which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the lateral relationship between the Department
and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program
coordination.[42] Indeed, the essential autonomous character of a board is not
negated by its attachment to a commission.[43]

AMIN argues, however, that there is an anachronism of sorts because there can be
no policy and program coordination between conceptually different areas of
reform. It claims that the new framework subsuming agrarian reform, urban land
reform and ancestral domain reform is fundamentally incoherent in view of the
widely different contexts.[44] And it posits that it is a substantive transformation or
reorientation that runs contrary to the constitutional scheme and policies.

AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of ordering the law [45] which, so it alleges,
can be said of the Constitutions distinct treatment of these three areas, as reflected
in separate provisions in different parts of the Constitution. [46] It argues that the
Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of agrarian reform to
encompass the two other areas, and that how the law is ordered in a certain way
should not be undermined by mere executive orders in the guise of administrative
efficiency.

The Court is not persuaded.

The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of social justice is not
something implausible or unlikely.[47] Their interlocking nature cuts across labels
and works against a rigid pigeonholing of executive tasks among the members of
the Presidents official family. Notably, the Constitution inhibited from identifying
and compartmentalizing the composition of the Cabinet. In vesting executive
power in one person rather than in a plural executive, the evident intention was to
invest the power holder with energy.[48]
AMIN takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform areas in marked
provisions of the Constitution. It is a precept, however, that inferences drawn from
title, chapter or section headings are entitled to very little weight. [49] And so must
reliance on sub-headings,[50] or the lack thereof, to support a strained deduction be
given the weight of helium.

Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt.[51] AMINs

thesis unsettles, more than settles the order of things in construing the
Constitution. Its interpretation fails to clearly establish that the so-called ordering
or arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was consciously adopted to imply
a signification in terms of government hierarchy from where a constitutional
mandate can per se be derived or asserted. It fails to demonstrate that the ordering
or layout was not simply a matter of style in constitutional drafting but one of
intention in government structuring. With its inherent ambiguity, the proposed
interpretation cannot be made a basis for declaring a law or governmental act
unconstitutional.

A law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it to be nullified, it

must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The
ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. [52] Any reasonable
doubt should, following the universal rule of legal hermeneutics, be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a law.[53]
Ople v. Torres[54] on which AMIN relies is unavailing. In that case, an
administrative order involved a system of identification that required a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies properly lodged in the legislative
arena. It was declared unconstitutional for dealing with a subject that should be
covered by law and for violating the right to privacy.

In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by
executive fiat would hamper the exercise of citizens rights and privileges. It rested
on the ambiguous conclusion that the reorganization jeopardizes economic, social
and cultural rights. It intimated, without expounding, that the agendum behind the
issuances is to weaken the indigenous peoples rights in favor of the mining
industry. And it raised concerns about the possible retrogression in DARs
performance as the added workload may impede the implementation of the
comprehensive agrarian reform program.
AMIN has not shown, however, that by placing the NCIP as an attached agency of
the DAR, the President altered the nature and dynamics of the jurisdiction and
adjudicatory functions of the NCIP concerning all claims and disputes involving
rights of indigenous cultural communities and

indigenous peoples. Nor has it been shown, nay alleged, that the reorganization
was made in bad faith.[55]

As for the other arguments raised by AMIN which pertain to the wisdom or
soundness of the executive decision, the Court finds it unnecessary to pass upon
them. The raging debate on the most fitting framework in the delivery of social
services is endless in the political arena. It is not the business of this Court to join
in the fray. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political
questions and, as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or
hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and cases that have become moot.[56]

Finally, a word on the last ground proffered for declaring the unconstitutionality of
the assailed issuances that they violate Section 16, Article XIII of the
Constitution[57] on the peoples right to participate in decision-making through
adequate consultation mechanisms.

The framers of the Constitution recognized that the consultation mechanisms

were already operating without the States action by law, such that the role of the
State would be mere facilitation, not necessarily creation of these consultation
mechanisms. The State provides the support, but eventually it is the people,
properly organized in their associations, who can assert the right and pursue the
objective. Penalty for failure on the part of the government to consult could only be
reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify government action.[58]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Executive Order Nos. 364 and 379
issued on September 27, 2004 and October 26, 2004, respectively, are declared not
unconstitutional.
 SO ORDERED.

Senate vs. Ermita

on 7:00 AM in Case Digests, Political Law
0
G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006

o Requisites of Judicial Review

o Legislative Inquiry vs. Executive Privilege
o Executive Privilege, defined
o Kinds of Executive Privilege
o Executive Privilege as applied to an official
o Constitutionality of EO 464

FACTS:

This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with
the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity
of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date
arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and
 opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten
the Senate Committee on its investigation. Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among
others, mandated that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the
Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting
since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col.
Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the
investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Hence, these petitions.

ISSUES:

o Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry

vested in Congress
o Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
o Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of
discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its publication in
a newspaper of general circulation
RULING:

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:

1. there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of

judicial power;
2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised as the earliest
opportunity; and
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

LEGAL STANDING

Standing of the Senate

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for
intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound
legislation is not disputed. EO 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members
of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate,
including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome
of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of EO 464.
Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Standing of an ordinary citizen

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders and other regulations must be
direct and personal. In Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when
the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the funds (that it
is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised.

ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY

The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent
or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the
existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as EO 464 is concerned. For EO 464
does not require either a deliberative withholding of consent or an express prohibition
issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of
officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no
sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for
adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now
refrain from passing on the constitutionality of EO 464.
The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21, Art. VI. But as early
as 1950 (the 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision) in Arnault v.
Nazareno, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the
power to legislate. xxx

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may
be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry...is co-extensive with the power
to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which
may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation.

xxx the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of the
information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials
on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by
parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel
the disclosure thereof.

The power of inquiry is subject to judicial review

xxx the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less
susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial
review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Sec. 1, Art. VIII.

For one...the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the
constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions.
Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result...is to indicate in its
invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible
needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its
investigations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the
part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Sec. 21, Art. VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative
power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the
Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the
constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure.
Sec. 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

Exemption to power of inquiry

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which exemptions falls under the rubric of executive privilege.

Executive privilege, defined

Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold

information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as
the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.

Kinds of executive privilege

One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets privilege...on the ground that the
information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations
of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for
internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily

mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the
validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the
requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.

The principle of executive privilege

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

xxx

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of
inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each
member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the
fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any
reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application
to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision
of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxx

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is

only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI,
the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries

in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of
the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
 Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states that executive
privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive
privilege...is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to
categories of persons.

The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific allegation of basis

thereof

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an
authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not
overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in
terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the
executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose

information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted xxx

Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is
no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether,
given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected xxx

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of
particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination xxx

The claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is thus invalid per se.
It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons
for the claim, it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the
President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine
whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case.
It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated.

EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine
certain information as privileged

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office
determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to
bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing
before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is
allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the

privilege. Executive privilege...is recognized with respect to information the confidential
nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary
to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive
privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations (sic) must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest
in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to
limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive
Secretary must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that
he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.

How executive privilege should be applied in the case of an official

xxx when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time
to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the
privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary
with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive
privilege. If, afer the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Right to Information

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force
as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers
belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry,
the people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public,
however, any executive assistance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in
such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The
citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their
own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other governmental officials through various
legal means allowed by their freedom of expression xxx

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures
power of inquiry.

Implementation of EO 464 prior to its publication

While EO 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the
same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those
statutes that do not directly apply to people in genera, Tanada v. Tuvera states: The
term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply
directly to all the people. The subject of the law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in courts of justice.

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the
challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above,
EO 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic
may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have
been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.
Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada vs
Commission on Elections
120 SCRA 337 Political Law Vacancy in the Legislature

Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus
compelling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the
vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on
Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a
regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within
sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.

COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant
petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has
no jurisdiction to entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: No. The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the
latters decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of
the New Constitution which reads:

Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be
reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted
provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the
Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where
vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa
(BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may
neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to
exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special
elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the
initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the
vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled
through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of
the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now
BP, not to the IBP.

IBP VS ZAMORA

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines
in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise,
their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of
the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task
of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Planters products inc. vs fertiphil

QUESTION: What is Locus Standi? ANSWER: The right to stand before the court to
bring action against another party for collection and damage because it was the
affected party.

Petitioner PLANTERS PRODUCTS INC. and respondent FERTIPHIL CORP. are private
corporations engaged in importation and distribution of FERTILIZERS, PESTICIDES &
other Agricultural Products.

Then President Marcos issued a Levy Tax through a Letter of Instruction (LOI No.
1465) imposing capital recovery component of P10 per bag of fertilizer to be
remitted to FERTILIZER & PESTICIDE AUTHORITY (FPA). The levy was to continue till
adequate capital was raised to make PPI financially viable.

So FertiPhil remitted the same to said agency, which was then remitted to the
depository bank of PPI. FertiPhil paid roughly P6M to FPA from 1985 to 1986. Ito
yung kasagsagan ng EDSA Revolution.

After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10
levy. FertiPhil therefore demanded from PPI a full refund of the amount it remitted,
however PPI refused.

As a result FertiPhil filed a complaint for collection and damages questioning the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was an unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and unlawful tax imposition that amounted to a denial of due
process.

PPI argues that FertiPhil has no LOCUS STANDI to question the constitutionality of
LOI No. 1465 because it doesnt have a personal and substantial interest in the
case. Meaning FertiPhil did not suffer any damage from the imposition because
incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not
on the seller fertilizer company.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FERTIPHIL has Locus Standi to question the constitutionality of LOI
No. 1465. (What is POWER OF TAXATION & POLICE POWER?)

RULING:

FERTIPHIL has Locus Standi. It suffered direct injury because it was a TAX PAYER.

Actually the doctrine of Locus Standi is a mere procedural technicality which may be
waived. In the Abaya vs. Ebdane case the court even took a liberal stance stating
that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract in order to challenge its
validity

I think this is more of a question of whether the imposition operated under the basis
of POLICE POWER or the POWER TO TAX which are 2 of the inherent powers of the
state.

Police Power is the power of the state to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in or to promote the general welfare, while Power of
Taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose.

The main purpose of each:

Police Power = Regulation of Behavior or Conduct for the Public Welfare

Power of Taxation = Revenue Generation for the Public Welfare

These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. The lawful subject
and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under
the Police Power. The power of Taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by
inherent and constitutional limitations.

While it is true that the power to tax can be used as an implement of Police Power,
the primary purpose of the levy was revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily
revenue then the exaction is properly called a tax.
FertiPhil wins this case.
GARCILLANO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(G.R. No. 170338 , December 23, 2008)

FACTS

-Garcillano (in G.R. No. 170338) filed a Petition for Prohibition to restrain the House
Representatives Committees from using the tape recordings of the "illegally
obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other
purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be
ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House
Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House
proceedings.

-Ranada and Agcaoili (in G.R. No. 179275), retired justices of the CA, filed a Petition
for Prohibition to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry.
They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200
and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.

-Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene
as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
While both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House
and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to
prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

ISSUES

(1) WON petitioners have legal standing. [YES]

(2) WON there is an actual case or controversy. [NO: against the House of Rep.
YES: against the Senate]

HELD (The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the
second, G.R. No. 179275.)

LOCUS STANDI

General Rule: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus, generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Exception/Liberal application: However, considering that locus standi is a mere

procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent
direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo articulates that a "liberal policy
has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.

Garcillano = direct injury. Ranada and Agcaoili = concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
members of the IBP. Intervenor Sagge = alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being
apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the
conduct of the questioned hearings.

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the
laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, they
satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely
being citizens of the Republic.
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and
intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are
of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to
the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all. 34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has
shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court
recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge.

ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

Versus House of Representatives

Court dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly
stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual
cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate
or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the
decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial
inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot
question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot
when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have
any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.

The Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and
heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee
reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by
these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and
academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.

Versus the Senate

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
Francisco v. Fernando

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the
writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin
respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development

Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its wet
flag scheme (Flag Scheme).
 Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the
MMDAs governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates
the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3)
disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman
punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes pedestrians to
various potential hazards.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was valid.

HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question
only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will
likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must
specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the
requirements under either category. Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the
Court should relax the standing requirement because of the transcendental
importance of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing
requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the
merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the
presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner
has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation. On the Flag Schemes
alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within the
MMDAs jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking
ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation.
Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents implementation of schemes, or
ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations.
After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of
rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-
jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion
absent any proof that respondents implemented the FlagScheme in that city.

Chavez vs JBC

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress,
it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case?

2. Is the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an
act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true
that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say
that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the
JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land.
A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for
a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that
the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and a representative of
Congress.

The use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal

and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one
(1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words
of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into
half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process, especially in the event a tie is
reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise
mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume
that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded
because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended
a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually
adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in
the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes

no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)

Case Digest: Galicto v. President Aquino

G.R. No. 193978 : February 28, 2012

JELBERT B. GALICTO, Petitioner, v. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.

AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, Respondents.

BRION, J.:
FACTS:

Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged
excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the
Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its
standing obligations. Subsequently, the Senate conducted an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of
GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). Based on its findings, officials
and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have been granting themselves
unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits as
well as other irregular and abusive practices. Consequently, the Senate issued
Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the immediate suspension of
the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and
other perks of members of the governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs. Heeding the
call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled
Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification
System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the
guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position
classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.

EO 7 was published and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers
of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the
board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional
benefits and allowances to their employees.

The respondents pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds for the
petition's dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi; and (2) certiorari is not
applicable to this case.

Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149,
otherwise known as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149
expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs
and GFIs.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy.

HELD: Petition is dismissed.

REMEDIAL LAW: formal and procedural infirmities

Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is
not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition
is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to
assail the validity of EO 7.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: locus standi

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.

In the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that he has a personal
stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is
speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future
increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as
contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary
increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal
standing to assail EO 7.

The petition has been mooted by supervening events.

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present
case has already been rendered moot by the enactment of R.A. No. 10149
amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their
board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of
the grant of authority to the President to perform this act. With the enactment of the
GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

DISMISSED.

(4) NECESSITY of Deciding Constitutional Question

cases:

Salvador H. Laurel, petitioner, vs. Ramon Garcia, as head of the Asset Privatization
Trust, Raul Manglapus, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Catalino Macaraig, as
Executive Secretary, respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
_
Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by
the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan,
the Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government
through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the
Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building
needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan.
The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on
his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a
law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is
indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated
prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all
Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related
properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on
conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

SPS MIRASOL VS CA

Facts:

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols'
sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed
Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB.
The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds
to the payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree
directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that
the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of
the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make
unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and
demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en
pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties.
PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D.
No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar
pertained to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held:

It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or
the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny
the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must
stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions
involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in
"any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words
used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due
process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be
before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the
Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have
standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Zandueta v. Dela Costa
November 28, 1938 G.R. No. L-46267

NATURE
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the
Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be
illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is
entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with
costs to said respondent

FACTS
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising
solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance
of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in
his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise
known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the
President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this
time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of
Manila and Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on
Appointments having acted on said ad interim
appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said
petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his appointment and qualification as
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge,
performed several executive acts-On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner-On
August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable
Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside
over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of
Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments

ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to
repossess the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the
assailed statute
HELD
When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial
district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over
the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same
category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court
of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and
receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it
or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been
issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts
an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is
incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the
functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by
executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by
virtue of his former appointment (46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence,
166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of
the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason
of legal exigencies. In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the
ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in
accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth
Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him
or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of
obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted
with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.-The
petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of
the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the performance of the duties
inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he
voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be stopped from
questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his
appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied
and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc.
G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009

Facts:
Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI), operator of Dream Broadcsating System, delivers a digital
direct-to-home (DTH) television satellite to its subscribers all over the Philippines, was granted a
legislative franchise under Republic Act 8630 and was given a Provisional Authority by the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to install, operate and maintain a nationwide DTH satellite
service. When it commenced operations, it offered as part of its program line-up, together with other paid
premium program channels, ABS-CBN Channels 2 and 23, NBN, Channel 4, ABC, Channel 5, GMA,
Channel 7, RPN, Channel 9, and IBC, Channel 13, pursuant to Memorandum Circular 4-08-88 which
mandated all cable television system operators, operating within the Grade A and B CONTOURS to
carry out the television signals of the authorized television broadcast stations.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN), a licensed television and radio broadcasting network,
demanded PMSI to cease and desist from rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23. In its reply, PMSI
contended that the rebroadcasting was in accordance with the authority granted by NTC under its
obligations under NTC MC 4-08-88.

Negotiations were ensued between the parties in an effort to reach a settlement; however, the same was
terminated by ABS-CBN allegedly due to PMSIs inability to ensure the prevention of illegal
retransmission and further rebroadcast of its signals, as well as the adverse effect of the rebroadcasts
on the business operations of its regional television stations.

ABS-CBN filed with the Intellectual Property Rights Office (IPO) a complaint for Violation of Laws
Involving Property Rights, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction alleging that PMSIs unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 infringed
on its broadcasting rights and copyright. The TRO was granted by the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of
IPO. PMSI, pursuant to the TRO, suspended the retransmission of PMSI of Channels 2 and 23 and
likewise filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
of PMSI and reversed the decision of the BLA. ABS-CBN filed its appeal however it was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals. Furthermore, ABS-CBNs motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue:
1. Whether or not PMSI violated the Laws on Property Rights.
2. Whether or not the issuance MC 4-08-88 by the NTC is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State.

Held:
1. NO. PMSI did not violate the Laws on Property Rights because it is not engaged in rebroadcasting
Channels 2 and 23. Rebroadcasting has been defined as the simultaneous broadcasting by one
broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization. It is also the
transmission by wireless means for the public reception of sounds or of images or of representations
thereof; such transmission by satellite is also broadcasting where the means for decrypting are provided
to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent. PMSI is only engaged in the carrying of
signals of ABS-CBN coming from ABS-CBN and transmitting signals. PMSI is not the origin nor does it
claim to be the origin of the programs broadcasted by the ABS-CBN. PMSI did not make and transmit on
its own but merely carried the existing signals of the ABS-CBN. When PMSI subscribers view ABS-CBNs
programs in Channels 2 and 23, they know that the origin thereof was the ABS-CBN.

The nature of broadcasting is to scatter the signals in its widest area of coverage as possible. On this
score, it may be said that making public means that accessibility is undiscriminating as long as it is within
the range of the transmitter and equipment of the broadcaster. That the medium through which the PMSI
carries the ABS-CBNs signal, that is via satellite, does not diminish the fact that it operates and functions
as a cable television. It remains that the PMSIs transmission of signals via its DTH satellite television
service cannot be considered within the purview of broadcasting.

Furthermore, there is no rebroadcasting on the part of the PMSI of the ABS-CBMs programs on
Channels 2 and 23, as defined under the Rome Convention, which defines rebroadcasting as the
simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting
organization. ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals; PMSI merely carries such signals which
the viewers receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does not produce, select, or determine the programs to be
shown in Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as the origin or author of such programs.
Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely retransmits the same in accordance with
Memorandum Circular 04-08-88. With regard to its premium channels, it buys the channels from content
providers and transmits on an as-is basis to its viewers. Clearly, PMSI does not perform the functions of a
broadcasting organization; thus, it cannot be said that it is engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.

Therefore, the retransmission of ABS-CBNs signals by PMSI which functions essentially as a cable
television does not constitute rebroadcasting in violation of the formers intellectual property rights under
the IP Code.

2. YES. The law on copyright is not absolute. The carriage of ABS-CBNs signals by virtue of the must-
carry rule in Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 is under the direction and control of the government
though the NTC which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and control
telecommunications and broadcast services/facilities in the Philippines. The imposition of the must-carry
rule is within the NTCs power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may
require, to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television
broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities in these activities
whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible.

The Must-Carry Rule is in consonance with the principles and objectives underlying Executive Order No.
436, to wit:

The Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information, education, sports
event and entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and afforded television
programs to attain a well informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-
economic growth.

Moreover, radio and television waves are mere franchised which may be reasonably burdened with some
form of public service. It is a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in
accordance with the constitutional provision that any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject
to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.

The must carry rule is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. It favors both broadcasting
organizations and the public. It prevents cable television companies from excluding broadcasting
organization especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television
companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs available to city viewers.
In fact, this Office finds the rule more burdensome on the part of the cable television companies. The
latter carries the television signals and shoulders the costs without any recourse of charging. On the other
hand, the signals that are carried by cable television companies are dispersed and scattered by the
television stations and anybody with a television set is free to pick them up.
DEMETRIA V ALBA

13 MAR
G.R. No. 71977 | February 27, 1987 | J. Fernan
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general
interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the primary grounds that
Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys,
amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the
safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners
and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its
performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become
moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant
thereof), which states that No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the Presidentmay by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional

2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering
the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department
to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as
to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards
the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught.
Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has assumed
to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the
judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no
judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.
Gobenciong v CA

Velasco, J. (2008)

Facts:

Dr. Pedro Gobenciong was Administrative Officer IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical
Center (the hospital), a public hospital.
In 1996, the hospital planned to buy a hemoanalyzer/particle counter.
A public bidding was had, where Alvez Commerical, Inc. won. A Purchase Order was issued
for 2 nebulizers and 1 particle counter.
The nebulizers and hemoanalyzers appeared to have been delivered, as per:
o Certification of Acceptance signed by Engr. Jocano and Supply Officer Babula.
o Sales Invoice signed by Supply Officer Babula acknowledging receipt of the goods in
good condidion.
o COA Inspection Report certified by Engr. Jocano and Gobenciong attesting that the
goods had been inspected as to quality and quantity.
As it turned out, the hemoanalyzer was never actually delivered.
Dr. Flora dela Pena, head of the hospitals Laboratory Unit, filed an administrative complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) charging Gobenciong, Babula,
Jocano, and 3 other persons with Falsification of Public Document and Misconduct.
Upon Dela Penas motion, Ombdusman placed respondents, save one, under a six-month
preventive suspension and directed the proper DOH Officer to immediately implement the
Order.
Gobenciong sought reconsideration of this order, but without awaiting the Ombudsmans
action thereon, Gobenciong filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
o CA denied Gobenciongs petition for certiorari on the strength of Sec. 24 in relation to
Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which expressly empower the Ombudsman, under defined
conditions, to preventively suspend, for a maximum period of six months, all but
three categories of public officials and employees under investigation by his office
and to direct the immediate implementation of the corresponding suspension order.
Ombudsman eventually found Gobenciong, et al guilty of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and imposed a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay.
o Gobenciong filed a motion for reconsideration, which Ombudsman denied, prompting
Gobenciong to appeal to the CA.
o CA partially granted Gobenciongs appeal and set aside the Ombudsmans Decision
in insofar as it imposed the penalty of 1 year suspension without pay. Relying on
Tapiador v Office of the Ombudsman, it held that the disciplinary power of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases is limited only to recommending to the
disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out.

Issues:

1. Whether a preventive suspension ordered by the Ombudsman is immediately executory,

notwithstanding a pending motion to reconsider the corresponding order?
2. Whether the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman is merely recommendatory?
3. Whether RA 6770, on the ground of undue delegation of legislative authority and under the
equal protection clause, is unconstitutional?

Held:

1. YES. Reading and harmonizing together Sec. 27(1) of RA 6770 and Sec. 8, Rule III
of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, it is at once apparent that the immediately
executory quality of a preventive suspension order does not preclude the
preventively suspended respondent from seeking reconsideration of such order. The
existence and availment of the right to move for reconsideration does not motu
proprio stay the immediate execution of the provisionary order of preventive
suspension. An order of preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. And it is usually made immediately effective and
executory to prevent the respondent from using his/her position or office to influence
prospective witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital to the
prosecution of the case.

2. NO. CAs cited portion of the Tapiador case is a mere obiter dictum which cannot be
cited as a doctrinal pronouncement of the Court. Furthermore, the refusal, without
just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an
erring officer or employee, which is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong
indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature
but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. By stating that the Ombudsman
recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the
provisions of the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of
the order be coursed through the proper officer (Ledesma v CA).

3. NO. The Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient
bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the people
against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. They, however, left it to
Congress to invest the office with more broad powers to enforce its own action.
Clearly then, the espoused theory of undue delegation of authority is untenable. For,
in the ultimate analysis, it is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed
the grant by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary
powers to the Ombudsman. Furthermore, the issue of constitutionality was not
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; this means before the Office of the
Ombudsman, or at least before the CA.
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands

Nos. 564 and 573

Argued April 10, 1928

Decided May 14, 1928

277 U.S. 189

Syllabus

1. Acts of the Philippine Legislature creating a coal company and a bank, the stock of
which is largely owned by the Philippine government, provide that the power to vote the
stock shall be vested in a "Committee," in the one case, and in a "Board of Control," in
the other, each consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Held, that the voting of the stock in the
election of directors and managing agents of the corporations is an executive function,
and that the attempt to repose it in the legislative officers named violates the Philippine
Organic Act. P. 277 U. S. 199.

2. In the Philippine Organic Act, which divides the government into three departments --
legislative, executive, and judicial -- the principle is implicit, as it is in state and federal
constitutions, that these three powers shall be forever separate and distinct from each
other. P. 201..

3. This separation, and the consequent exclusive character of the powers conferred
upon each of the three departments of the government, is basic and vital -- not merely a
matter of governmental mechanism. Id.

4. It may be stated as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system that,
unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the
legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power, the executive cannot
exercise either legislative or judicial power, and the judiciary cannot exercise either
executive or legislative power. Id.

Page 277 U. S. 190

5. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make
laws, but not to enforce them or to appoint the agents charged with the duty of enforcing
them. The latter are executive functions. P. 277 U. S. 202.

6. Not having the power of appointment unless expressly granted or incidental to its
powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since
that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection.Id.

7. The appointment of managers (in this instance, corporate directors) of property or a

business in which the government is interested is essentially an executive act which the
legislature is without capacity to perform, directly or through its members. P. 277 U. S.
203.

8. Whether or not the members of the "board" or "committee" are public officers in the
strict sense, they are at least public agents charged with executive functions, and
therefore beyond the appointing power of the legislature. Id.

9. The instances in which Congress has devolved on persons not executive officers the
power to vote in nonstock corporations created for governmental purposes lend no
support to a construction of the Constitution which would justify Congressional
legislation like that here involved, considering the limited number of such instances, the
peculiar character of the institutions there dealt with, and the contrary attitude of
Congress towards governmentally owned or controlled stock corporations. P. 277 U. S.
204.

10. The powers here asserted by the Philippine Legislature are vested in the Governor-
General by the Organic Act -- viz., by the provision vesting in him the supreme
executive power, with general supervision and control over all the departments and
bureaus of the government; the provision placing on him the responsibility for the faithful
execution of the laws, and the provision that all executive functions of the government
must be directly under him or within one of the executive departments under his
supervision and control. P. 277 U. S. 205.

11. Where a statute contains a grant of power enumerating certain things which may be
done, and also a general grant of power which, standing alone, would include those
things and more, the general grant may be given full effect if the context shows that the
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. P. 277 U. S. 206.

12. In 22 of the Organic Act, the clause in the form of a proviso placing all the
executive functions directly under the Governor-General or in one of the executive
departments under his direction
Page 277 U. S. 191

and control, and the proviso preceding it which grant certain powers to the legislature,
are both to be construed as independent and substantive provisions. P. 277 U. S. 207.

13. An inference that Congress has approved an Act of the Philippine Legislature
reported to it under 10 of the Organic Act cannot be drawn from the failure of
Congress to exercise its power to annul, reserved in that section, where the Act
reported contravenes the Organic Act, and is therefore clearly void. P. 277 U. S. 208.

Affirmed.

Manila Motor Co., Inc. vs. Flores (1956)

Manila Motor Co., inc vs flores

Facts

Manila Motor Company filed a complaint in Municipal Court of Manila to recover

from Manuel Flores the amount of P1047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which
fell due in September 1941.

-Defendant pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954 (Note: prescription is

acquiring/losing ownership/ real rights thru the lapse of time).

-The complaint was dismissed.

Manila Motor appealed to CFI, with the contention:

Petitioner's contention:

1. Moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period and that
deducting the time during the operation of the law (moratorium law runs only for 3
years & 8months). Hence, the 10-year term had not yet elapsed when complaint
sued in 1954.

Defendants' Contention:

1. Moratorium laws did not suspend the period of limitations because it is

unconstitutional (he based on Ruther vs esteban case)

2. when a statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had never

been passed, and no rights can be built upon it.

Issue: WON the moratorium law suspended the period of prescription.

Ruling:
The court decided in favor of the petitioners. Although it has been ruled in the
Esteban's case that the moratorium law is unconstitutional, there are several
instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation or qualified its
effects 'since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an
operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored and a
realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine.

League of cities of the phil. Vs comelec

FACTS:
Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood
Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied
by the Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was
also denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the judgement
became final and executory.

The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly

reversed its decision upholding the constitutionally of the
Cityhood Laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already
rendered.

RULING:
Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or
constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative
fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional,
but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine
affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law,
not the unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present

case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they
violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the
effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and
supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or
execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and
effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for
they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these
unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity
and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the
presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
declaration of their unconstitutionality.
Castro vs. Deloria
The facts are of record.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with
Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which reads,
as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior
thereto, in the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court,
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such,
was in the custody and possession of public funds in the amount of
P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her
collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by
reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position,
with deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate,
embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit said
amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon
her account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16,
2001.

On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the

grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the
Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege
her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[4] petitioner
further argued that as she was a public employee with salary
grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC
and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public
prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial
power was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.[5]

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an

Order dated September 7, 2001. It held that the jurisdiction of
[6]

the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of
petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the
offense charged.[7] Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial
authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing outthat in Uy,
upon motion for clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court
set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001
Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and
investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by
the RTC.

The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary
to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not
guilty under the Information.[8]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [9] which the RTC

denied in its December 18, 2001 Order.[10]
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[11] with the CA, but the
latter dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration [12] was also denied.

Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the

following:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information
for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the
authority to file the same in light of this Supreme Courts ruling in the First Uy
vs. Sandiganbayan case, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court

dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made
applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without violating the constitutional
provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.[13]

Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation

on August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the
time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court
in the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the
Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable
by the RTC. As the investigation and prosecution against
petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26,
2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable,
notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the March
20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence, the
Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that
time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial
powers over the case.
 The petition lacks merit.

The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, [14] wherein
accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court
in Uy[15] in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that were filed against
them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon
petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and held:

In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same

resolution promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman
extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and

held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only
graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but
also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted

by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It
has been held that the clause any illegal act or omission
of any public official is broad enough to embrace any
crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section
15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section
11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should
not be construed as confining the scope of the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman
to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman

primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction
as authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases. The grant of this authority
does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its
jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by
the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with
the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute
other offenses committed by public officers and
employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers
granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very
broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the

Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA
6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only
act under the supervision and control and upon authority
of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly,
the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory
and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types
of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on
all complaints against officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence
warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to
 utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work
under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows
him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases
outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance
with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.

We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority

to investigate and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to
385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos,
Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by
him with the regular prosecutors.

WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional

Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the same. (Emphasis
supplied)

Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v.

Hon. Breva,[16] in which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision
in Uy, the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before
it by the Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, given the
Courts Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial
courts assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal
support and must, therefore, be set aside.

It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution

in Uy, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases
cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed
or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was
the operative ruling on the issue.
 Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001
Resolution in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it
would amount to an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally
proscribed.[17]

Petitioner is grasping at straws.

A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act,

constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage.
Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a
pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous
legislative intent of that law.[18] Hence, the March 20, 2001
Resolution of the Court in Uyinterpreting the Ombudsman Act is
deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity
on December 7, 1989.

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or

abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court,
recognizing that acts may have been performed under the
impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its
interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact
cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the
nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can
only have a prospective application. [19] But where no law is
invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of
the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its
legislation.[20]

In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution

in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor
did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by
the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent
interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August
9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has therefore been
held by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and
prosecutorial processes conducted by the Ombudsman, such as
the filing of the Information against petitioner.

With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 Hacienda Luisita vs PARC
Case Digest GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011
Facts:

In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and
private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by
this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse
straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish
owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled by Jose
Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit against
TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the
land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it,
but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm
worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in
distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option
of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate
stock acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by
then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-
12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.

From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim
was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI
Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR
asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they havent
actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives havent really
improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA
and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the
DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2)
the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme.
Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by
the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC
was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it
affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright
agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for
being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution.

W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of
RA 6657

No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at
the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when
PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time thereafter.

Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC,
the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions of the groups
representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is the non-compliance of the HLI with the
SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving into the
constitutionality of RA 6657.

Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the executive or
legislative departments have not been met in this case.
 Cocofed vs Republic
Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012
Full Text
Facts:

In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought
to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the
national association of coconut producers having the largest membership.

When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:

PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds
of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus
stabilizing the price of edible oil.

PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid
coconut seed farm.

In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut and palm oil industry.

Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily
available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section
2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial
bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only
when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all
levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or
fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government.

Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a
special and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund
shall pertain to coconut farmers in their private capacities.

Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco
72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that
Danding Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as
consideration for PCAs buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal
option to buy the FUB shares.

The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It
later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.

While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers,
the corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of
and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended
up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by
any of the agreements.

Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects
and/or was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their
use to acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding
companies, of a large block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.

Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be
construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid

No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should
revert back to the general fund.

Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected
on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only, and if the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds
of the Government. Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced exactions with the end-goal of
developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore, the subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a
private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961
and 1468 is unconstitutional.

Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which the coco
levy fund was created.

Issue 2:

W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities

No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They
cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the
money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.

Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of
stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may
promulgate is unconstitutional.

It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and
second, it allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and
unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the
CCSF to the undefined coconut farmers, which negated or circumvented the national policy or
public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.

Hence, the so-called Farmers shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private
capacities, but to the Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any property
purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public
property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.
ROQUE FLORES, petitioner

Vs

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NOBELITO RAPISORA, respondents

FACTS:

In an election held in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, on March 28, 1989, the
Petitioner Roque Flores was deemed to have the highest number of votes for a
kagawad position, which was proclaimed by the board of canvassers. During the
1982 elections, he was voted as punong barangay in accordance with Section 4 of
Rep. Act 6679. However, private respondent Nobelito Rapisora protested the
election before The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, contending that the ballot
in question which only indicated Flores should be declared stray votes and should
not be divided equally to the other candidate who has the same surname. He
further stated that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned
votes should be counted in his favor by virtue of the equity of incumbent rule, which
states, in the event that there would be 2 or more candidates having the same full
name, if the ballot only states such full name, the vote would be entitled to the
incumbent. For that reason, the lower court sustained the private respondents
contention and afterwards declaring him as the punong barangay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule

RULING:
 The court maintained that the position of punong barangay is different from that of
kagawad. A kagawad assumes a position that is legislative in nature, whereas a
Punong Barangay is mainly an executive officer. Therefore, the petitioner can not
insist that he was running for punong barangay when in truth, what was stated in
his certificate of candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay. As a
result, the 4 votes in question can not be counted in his favor on the erroneous
grounds that he was still the incumbent punong barangay at the time of the
election. It then follows that the petitioner losses the title of being the incumbent
punong barangay on the election day making him not entitled to the benefits of
equity-of-the-incumbent rule. The result was that the 4 contested votes were
considered stray, declaring the private respondent as the punong barangay of
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra for garnering the highest number of votes for a kagawad
position. Petition is dismissed.

Romulo Macalintal vs
Commission on Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent
to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must
be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;

2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim

winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.

HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is
a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does
not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to
allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by
virtue of RA 9189.