DRAGON AND ELEPHANT: RELATIONS BETWEEN VIET NAM AND SIAM, 1782-1847 EILAND,s MICHAEL DENT DEGREE DATE= 1989 UMIThis is an authorized facsimile, made from the microfilm master copy of the original dissertation or masters thesis published by UMI. The bibliographic information for this thesis is contained in UMI's Dissertation Abstracts database, the only central source for accessing almost every doctoral dissertation accepted in North America since 1861. - l ‘M- Dissertation Information Service ‘University Microfilms International A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 800-521-0600 OR 313/761-4700 Printed in 1990 by xerographic process on acid-free paper 1416Order Number 8913207 Dragon and elephant: Relations between Viet Nam and Siam, 1782-1847 Eiland, Michael Dent, Ph.D. ‘The George Washington University, 1989 Copyright ©1989 by Elland, Michael Dent. 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University Microtdms intemabonal ‘ABell & Howell Information Company ‘300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1246 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY The Graduate Schoot of Arts and Sciences | Weshingron, D.C. 20052 | (202) 994.6210 January 30, 1989 I hereby certify that Michael Dent Biland has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy on September 26, 1988 and that this is the final and approved form of the dissertation. Dissertation Research Committee: William Reid Johnson, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Director Peter Proal Hill, Professor of History and International Affairs, Reader Richard Thorntot Professor of History and International Affairs, ReaderDRAGON AND ELEPHANT: RELATIONS BETWEEN VIET NAM AND SIAM, 1782 - 1847 by Michael Dent Biland B.S, June 1961, United States Military Academy M.A. May 1969, Georgetown University A dissertation subaainted to The Faculty of ‘The Graduate School of Ants and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy February 19, 1989 Dissertation directed by William R. Johnson Associate Professor of HistoryACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....0...0000+ i NOTES ON USAGE...sessseeseseoseen v Introduction Rama I and Nguyen Anh, 1780 - 1802 CHAPTER FOUR ......0.--+44+ Relations Between. Gia and the Courts of Rama I and I 55 iia Long 78 FIVE .. iz Gia Long, Minh Mang, and Rama Siam and Viet Nam at War CHAPTER EIGHT .. ‘The War in Cambodii ‘The More Things Change APPENDIX I... Chronology APPENDIX 11... ‘The Reigns BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ...... BIBLIOGRAPHY .....sssseeseseeeseeees 201ACKNOWLERGEMENTS As with any venture of its kind, this paper would not have been accomplished without the support and guidance of many people. First, Professor William Johnson of George Washington University, who contributed critical comment and — above all = patience. Nayan Chanda provided a feast of inteilectal stimulation and the incentive to pursue new lines of thought that bring the paper to much different conclusions than the author would have thought at the outset. The same is true of Professor Sukhumpand Paribatra of Chulalongkorn, although he may not even realize it, Mrs, Teunchai, a patient teacher of Thai, unknowingly provided the original interest in this particular subject by kindly presenting as a gift a copy of Thanom Anamwat's book. Professor David Wyatt of Comell University offered insights, criticism, and suggestions, as did Professor Joseph Zasioff of the University of Pinsburgh. Nguyen Dith Vinh and Phd Bé Long were invaluable in helping probe and, I hope, understand the Vietnamese sense of historical continuity, Alan Dawson and other old Asia hands from the foreign correspondents. ‘corps in Bangkok helped put the historical perspective into contemporary context. ‘The staffs of the National Library of Thailand, the Thailand Information Center at Chulalongkorn (especially Mrs. Kultida), the Siam Society library, and the Wason Collection at Comell were of immeasurable assistance. Will Tuchrello of the Southeast Asia section of the Library of Congress was most kind to assist in providing access to documents held by the Library. Finally, my thanks to the ‘United States Army for six months academic leave, the bulk of which was spent in the Manuscripts Division section of the National Library of Thailand.Typing and production assistance were provided by Carolyn Hottle, Rachani Jittjaeng, Patcharee Sritham, and Bob Woodhead, Ranee Suchtep and the staff of EDC. My wife and children continuously tried to get me away from my books, papers and computers to spend more time with them. 1 thank them for this and hope they will never change. Obviously any errors are my responsibility alone. MDE. Bangkok, October, 1987NOTES ON USAGE "Siam" will be used for the historical period under consideration, even though it was referred to by different names during that period, including “Ayuthya” and "Muang Thai.” “Thailand” will refer to the post-1932 period. "Cambodia" will be used consistently, rather than the variants Kampuchea, Kambuja, Cambodge, etc, in reference to the country, while "Khmer" will be used co refer to the people, language and politics of Cambodia (even though it must be acknowledged that there are languages and people other than Khmer in Cambodia). “Viet Nam" is also used consistently although the country was variously known also as Dai Nam, Nam Viet, Bai Viét, etc. The name is written as two words, as the Viemamese write it, rather than the common Wester convention of "Viemamn.” Place names are generally rendered according to the modern times, regardless of variants used by non-natives; for example, Ha Tién (modern Vietnamese), rather than Phuthaimat (Thai); Phnom Penh (Khmer) rather than Nam Vang (Vietnamese), and so on, Exceptions, notably in the case of Lao principalities, are noted as they occur. Important personages of the time generally had one or more royally bestowed titles in addition to a given name. For example, the king of Cambodia from 1806 to 1834 was known as Phra Uthairacha, the title bestowed by the King of Siam, but his given name was Chan. The emperor of Viet Nam from 1802 to 1820 was born as Nguyéh Anh, commonly known as Gia Long after he ascended the throne, and had the reign name of Thé'T6. Reference to such people will be according to their appellation during the particular time under discussion. For example, "Chan" before 1806, “Phra Uthairacha' after 1806; "Nguyéa Anh" before 1802, "Gia Long” after 1802.‘The romanization system used for translations from the Thai language is my own, intended to aid those not familiar with linguistic notation to make the approximate sounds involved.le 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- 7 8- 9- 10- le 12- 13- 14- 1S- 16- W7- 18- 19- 20- 2- Annam Atopeu Ayuthya Bangkok Bassac/Long Xuyén Bién Hea 56- Neh An Nakhon Phenom Nakhon Ratchasima (Korat) ‘Oudong Phnom Penh Phu Quée Plaine des Jarres Poulo Panjang Pouthisat Quing Tei Qui Nhén Rach Gia Sadéc Saigon Saraburi Siem Reap Sipsongehuthai Stung Treng ‘Thonburi Tonkin Tonle Sap ‘Tran Ninh / Xieng Khouang Trt ‘Vam Nao (Wamanao) canal Vientiane Vinh Long Vinh Té canal Xodi Mut /Rach Gim—— =Approximate Modem Boundaries viiCHAPTER ONE. Jnsoduction ‘This paper examines the evolution of relations berween Viet Nam and Siam berween 1788 and 1847. More specifically, itis an examination of the conduct of relations between the first three reigns of the Nguyéa and the Chakai dynasties, respectively. Those relations evolved from proper, if not warm, friendship to outright war and enduring hostility in the span of twenty years, because of both different leadership styles in the two courts and differing views of what constinuted acceptable conduct by a powerful neighbor. in the Siam-Viet Nam wars the Khmer and Lao peoples suffered as much as anyone. Aside from three Siamese forays into Vigt Nam, they provided the battlegrounds and much of the soldiery ~ a situation not unlike that of today. In its concluding chapter this paper will therefore leap 140 years to show some broad intertemporal comparisons, and show that modern problems have their roots directly in the period covered by the balance of the study. ‘The concept of “watershed” is probably a dangerous one in historical analysis, but it comes very close to applying in this case. ‘The main thesis of this paper is that in the first half of the nineteenth century Vigt Nam expanded into Cambodia and Laos primarily for security reasons; cultural imperialism was strong, but resulted from the Vietnamese presence in those two countries at that time ~- it did not motivate that presence. Siam, on the other hand, was primarily motivated by reasons of prestige to oppose the Vietnamese. A secondary thesis is that the way in which Siam and Viét Nam interacted with regard to Cambodia and Laos was very much a matter of personalities and capabilities of the respective monarchs ~ for present purposes called leadership style.‘Siam-Viét Nam relations evolved in three phases from 1785, when Rama I first lent his support to a refugee from the Tay Son rebellion named Nguyén Anh, until 1845, when terminal exhaustion brought the Siam-Viér Nam wars in Cambodia to a close. The three phases roughly coincided with the reigns of the ‘Siamese kings, but were determined just as much by Viemamese behavior. ‘The first phase ~ 1785-1809 — was one of friendly, if not intimate relations based on the bonds developed between Emperor Gia Long — ie., Nguyéa Anh — and Rama I. Pragmatism dominated. Neither side was particularly “ideological,” in that Rama I was not especially religious, at least compared to his successors, and Gia Long was not seized by the perceived requirement to replicate a Chinese- style meritocratic bureaucracy to anywhere near the extent that his successors were. ‘The relationship between the states was essentially determined by the relationship between these two Southeast Asian soldiers, each of whom was preoccupied with the work of beginning a dynasty. In the case of Gia Long, the Tay Séa rebellion needed to be put down once-and-for-all, and the task of setting up adntinistrative machinery for Annam, Tonkin, and Cochinchina — united for the first time in history under a single ruler — was almost all-consuming. For Rama I, the threat from Burma persisted and left no incentive to think about altering the relationship established with the fonner refugee in his capital. The second phase -- 1809-1827 — saw Viét Nam dominating the relationship. Part of this was certainly due to the continuing threat to Siam from Burma. But the heaviest factor in the equation of that period was the difference in leadership styles in the two countries, Rama If, the poet-king, could not command respect from Gia Long, much less the warmth that had characterized his relationship with Rama I, the soldier-king. Furthermore, Gia Long essentially turned over Conduct of relations with Siam to Lé van Duyét, a strong personality who had noequal on the Siamese side. Lé vin Duyét had a crony-like (if sometimes tense) relationship with his emperor which gave him almost free rein to administer southem Viét Nam from Gia Dinh, In the absence of effective challenge from Bangkok, it also gave him free rein to administer Cambodia ~ also from Gia Dinh. ‘The third phase ~ 1827-1847 — revealed the preoccupation of Viét Nam with territorial security, sometimes masked by pseudo-Sino Confucian rhetoric. Where the Vietnamese essentially made rational calculations of their national security interests, the Siamese responded to perceived Viemamese aggressiveness and impolite behavior in a visceral, emotional way. Extemal Environment Viét Nara really had no perceived extemal threats during the period covered by this study. It was a rare time in Vietnamese history, when China was not a major concern. Indeed, Vietnamese histories covering this period rarely mention China at all, Although Viét Nam continued to send triennial tribute to China throughout this time, the only significant direct involvement of Chinese in Vietnamese affairs was mid-way in the Tay Sdn rebellion, when 2 Chinese expeditionary force was defeated in a surprise attack on Tét, the Viemamese lunar new year, by the Tay Sén emperor Quang Trung (Nguyéa Hud). The reason for the relative absence of Chinese attention to Vigt Nam, and vice versa, was of course that China itself, under sustained pressure from European powers, was at or approaching the weakest condition of its history. Viét Nam, on the other hand, remained blissfully ignorant of the extent of the approaching challenge from the West. Siam, however, was preoccupied with an external challenge. Burma was a major concern until the third decade of the nineteenth century. Under King Bodawpaya (1782-1819), Burma was mostly unified, and spent much energypursuing somewhat inconclusive wars with Siam. One consequence was that the Siamese were not free to devote significant resources to Cambodia, which in a sense served as a strategic rear for Siam. Bodawpaya’s successor, Bagyidaw (1819-37) faced severe domestic unrest, and compounded his problems infinitely by invading Bengal — an action which opened the door wide for British intervention. During his reign Burma rapidly ceased to be a problem for Siam. As the Burmese threat receded because of British pressure on Burma, the British themselves became a worrisome factor in ‘Siamese calculations. While it was a potential military threat, the British presence ‘was in large part containable through a combination of European-style diplomacy (e.g, an 1826 treaty and commercial agreement concerning Burma) and Siamese- style diplomacy (e.g., surrendering some sovereignty at the margins of the kingdom in order to safeguard the center). Existing Litera David Chandler's dissertation is the only significant full-length treatment of the period, but it focuses on Cambodia and teats the two bigger countries as exogenous. Alexander Woodside's Viét Nam and the Chinese Model has a lot to Say about some of these subjects and concludes that cultural imperialism was indeed the primary motivation for Viemamese expansionism. Michael Cotter’s article "Toward a Social History of the Viemamese Southward Movement" comes to much the same conclusion. These are about the only specific works on the subject in English, Thai language ceatments tend to take a defensive and chauvinistic view of Viemamese motives — and Viemamese works conveniently hardly mention the period ar all. General works and overviews more or less assume that both Vict Nam and Siam were almost mindlessly expansionist; most ~ those on Laos and Cambodia, especially ~ understandably seem to take theviewpoint of the victim, which may not be the best indication of motives of the expansionist. For example, a Cambodian historian in 1973 explicitly compared Vietnamese expansion to the 20th century German search for lebensraum and the American manifest destiny, with the difference being the Viemamese version is more inexorable: “The westward movement (of Viét Nam) in all of its characteristics, is comparable to water flowing downhill. The plain is Cambodia. No natural obstacle can prevent this Viemamese flow."1 ‘Western writers have also used the hydraulic allusion: "Viemamese history has flowed across Indochina like a flood, carrying off other peoples wherever they occupied a lowland ricefield or where it could be put under rice.”2 Inexorability (‘population pressure, thrusts from China, political instability led to spontaneous popular movement in search of new lands"3) and lebensraum ("Vietnam's rapidly growing population could not all be supported by intensive cultivation of the Tonkin delta. Landless peasants as well as refugees form local wars and other outcasts of society drifted south along the narrow coastal plain, farming colonies that were in due course annexed and transformed to Vietnamese provinces”4) also recur in Western treatments. (It is significant in the present context that the author Of this latter quotation does not go on to impute Viemamese expansion into present- day Cambodian territory to land shortages in Cochinchina ~ in fact, the lebensraum argument does not hold for this case, at least in the 18th and 19th centuries.) Finally, there is the cultural imperialism argument for Vietnamese expansion; “The Vietnamese emperor and his bureaucracy ... could see their mission in the world as constituting a continuation of that culture-spreading process in which the Chinese had indulged .... But ... by the 1800's Chinese-style culturalwas profoundly defensive in its institutional arrangements in China. When it was anslated into Vietnamese terms, it often generated expansionist impulses."S Most observers then, credit - if that is the right word — the Viemamese with Prior intent to impose their culture on their neighbors through purposeful expansionism, which brought it into direct contact with an antithetical culture from the Siamese side. In fact, the so-called mission civilgstrice of the Viemamese was more effect than cause of their excursions into Laos and Cambodia (although the distinction would probably be lost on most Khmer and Lao then and now). Although Minh Mang differed greatly from his father Gia Long in temperament and attitude toward Confucian precepts and the moral imperative of establishing a meritocracy, he basically only moved armies on the basis of perceived threat to his country. He talked a good deal about reciprocal duties between vassal and ruling state, and undoubtedly believed what he was saying (there is more than enough evidence from his domestic political-cultural behavior to support his commitment to the Confucian way). But when stripped of this veneer his decisions to support Chao Anu of Vientiane against the Siamese in 1827 or to back with armed force various Khmer aspirants to the throne of Cambodia were based on considerations of security. It is therefore ironic that the Viemamese downfall in Cambodia in the 1840's was due to the intensive imposition on the Khmer of Vietnamese cultural ways and bureaucratic institutions by Trvéng Minh Gidng. To be sure, much of his direction came from Minh Mang, but his enthusiasm and commitment to the venture were so great that he probably would have carried through with the attempt to revamp Cambodian society even without such firm guidance from his emperor. On the other hand, absent the Siamese invasion in 1833 of Viet Nam in support of the rebellion of Lé vin Khéi, Triéag Minh Ging would have had noreal reason or opportunity to intervene in Cambodia. This is not to say that Cambodia would have been anything more than a Viemamese vassal (or under combined Viemamese-Siamese overlordship), but the indirect style of Lé vin Duyét would have been sufficient to insure Vietnamese security needs without suffocating Cambodia. In short, Vietnamese cultural imperialism followed the Vietnamese flag, itdid not lead it. ‘Cultural misunderstandings did, however, contribute greatly to the original clashes of arms between the two countries, and accelerated hostility and emotion, particularly on the Siamese side. The Siamese had no real security problem ~ Chao Anu was not a threat to them, nor for that matter were the Vietnamese. What concemed the Siamese, especially Rama II, was mainly the form of relationships. ‘Viemamese concern for form was rhetorical, self-conscious, and secondary to security needs. For the Siamese, on the other hand, etiquette, equality of status, and honor were everything. This was true in spite of the fact that some of the more “deceitful” acts were perpetrated by the Siamese under Rama I, ¢.g., the massacre of a Vietnamese embassy at Nakhon Phanor, the support of the internal rebellion of Lé van Khéi. The concem of Rama III for protecting Siamese honor was operationalized by armies marching across Laos and Cambodia against Viét Nam. ‘The Viemamese sought ritualistic acknowledgment of their "superiority" from the ‘Siamese without concrete demands for fundamental political concessions. ‘The following three chapters of this study deal with the first phase of Siam- Vier Nam relationships noted above. The groundwork is laid to distinguish later between the purposeful expansion of Viét Nam into Khmer territory in the Mekong delta (present-day southern Viét Nam) up to the mid- eighteenth century and the later search for a security buffer between Viet Nam and Siam. The contacts between Siam and Vidt Nam after the beginnings of the Chakri and Nguyén dynasties,respectively, are shown to be based on the personal relationship that Rama I and Gia Long developed partly out of apparent genuine mutual regard and partly to handle a potentially difficult political relationship. Chapter five deals primarily with the period corresponding to the rather passive reign of Rama Il, which saw the rise of Lé vin Duyét and virtually unchallenged — but essentially indirect — Vietnamese control of Cambodia. The focus in on how the change in leadership style and behavior in Bangkok affected the bilateral relationship, Chapters six and seven cover the watershed events in Siam-Viét Nam relations — the rebellion of Chao Anu of Vientiane that resulted in abiding and deep- seated Siamese hatred of Vi€t Nam, and the Siamese intervention in the Le van Khoi revolt, which pushed Viér Nam into full-scale war and gave tise to the ill- starred attempt to revise Khmer society and institutions. Again, the focus of these two chapters is on how differing leadership styles — in this case of Minh Mang and Rama III -- and their reactions to external and intemal pressure determined the relations between their countries, Chapter eight then deals with the results of these watershed events ~ the twelve-year war in Cambodia. Here the protean loyalties of the beleaguered Khmer people played a central role, Both Siam and Vietnam altemately (sometimes simultaneously) sought their favor or attempted to kill or abduct as many as possible. Most important, however, the death of Minh Mang and the juxtaposition of Thigu Tri ~ who wanted out of Cambodia as soon as possible -- with the committed Rama II and his dogged general Chao Phraya Bodin, underlines the notion that individual leadership styles and behavior determined the course of Siam- Viet Nam relations as much as cultural or political institutions.Chapter nine then makes a leap of 140 years to show the contemporary relations between Thailand and Viét Nam, especially with respect to Cambodia, have their roots direcdly in the period discussed in the first eight chapters - and in fact may be only an extension of that period following a break for the colonial period in Indochina and its messy aftermath of the French and American wars there, Before beginning to examine the behavior of the Nenyds and Chakri dynasties, however, it is necessary to set the scene for their meeting by drawing the background of Siamese and Vietnamese expansion into Cambodian territory.NOTES - Chapter One 1 Muon Khoeun, quoted in Jerry M. Silverman, "Historic National Rivalries and Interstate Conflict in Mainland Southeast Asia,” in (University of Bnkish Columbia Institute of International Relations: Anchor Press, 1974) p. 66. 2__ Paul Mus, “Sociologie d'un Guerre,” quoted in Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986). p. 49. 3. Michael Couer, “Towards a Social history of Vietnamese South-ward Joumal of Southeast Asian History, Vol Movement," in lume IX, Number 1, March 1968, p. 14. 4° Ashok K, Dutt, "Indochina: Physical Setting and Evolution of the Tonkin Core Area," in Dutt, cd., Southeast Asia: A Realm of Contrasts (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1985), p. 172. 5 Alexander Barton Woodside, Vi (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.253.Setting the Scene - The Growth of the Siamess and Viemnamese Empires Tnmreduction ‘The Viemamese and Siamese empires first came into contact with each other because of their respective expansions into the Khmer empire, In this chapter a sketch of goals and methods of Vietnamese and Siamese expansion is undertaken to establish the background for later exposition of the development of relations between the two empires. In this sketch it is established that both Siam and Viét Nam had finite limits to their expansion — Siam seeking Khmer acknowledgment of superiority across a geographically and culturally amorphous frontier, the Viemamese seeking agricultural land within relatively well-defined geographic boundaries. A secondary theme is to adumbrate the role of Cambodian factionalism in bringing Siam and Viet Nar into conflict because of Khmer nobles seeking support or succor from one side or another to offset internal rivals. Internal political actions in one country produced reactions in one or both the others. For example, civil strife in Viét Nam reinforced the determination to exert control over the court of Cambodia. And merely the rumor of problems in the court in Siam could cause a victorious Siamese army to do an immediate reverse march and abandon Cambodia altogether. The inclination of Khmer leaders to seek support of either Siam or Viét Nam in internal and external matters became a ritual of Cambodia statecraft. The loyalties of members of the Khmer court changed with spectacular speed. It is impossible to derive precise motivations for these shifts from the chronicles. Most appear to have stemmed from personal ambition, or the perceived. requirement to counter rivals in the court. The instinct for preservation of the realm MWthrough seeking a powerful guarantor must also have played a part, but to the extent that it did, this instinct was vitiated by the resulting effects of increased factionialism, disorder, and degradation of court authority, Most important, the temptation or necessity to seek external intervention required compensatory surrender of independence and/or territory. On the Viemamese side, the need for a submissive, or at least non- threatening, Cambodia was underlined. Even when mortally threatened by the Ty ‘Sda the Nguyén were involved militarily and politically in Cambodia, For example, the year 1779 was a dark one for the Nguyén. Yet they played a significant role in assisting in the overthrow of the reigning king and the succession of a more acceptable ruler. G icand C f Expansi Toward the end of the first millennium of the Christian era, when the peoples who were to become known as Siamese and Viemamese began their southward migrations, the kingdom of Cambodia already covered most of present day Thailand, Laos, and southem Viét Nam. The Siamese filtered into this empire, living apparently contentedly under Khmer rule for some centuries before a series of revolts brought them gradually to control of the Chao Phraya basin and surrounding principalities, and to the eventual creation of Siam. The Viemamese, by contrast, rather than creating a new state from under Khmer control, expanded their already-existing country at the expense of the Khmer and Cham in the process they called “slowly-eating silkworms."! ‘The rise of the Siamese from within the Khmer empire seemed to have natural limits. To be sure, aggressive wars with Cambodia were fought after the ‘Siamese had carved out their own kingdoms. But while these wars contributed tothe enervation of the Khmer expire, after the fourteenth century they did not greatly expand the territory directly governed by the kingdoms of Siam.2 There was also.a certain merging at the frontiers, where common cultural institutions and environment could be shared by Siamese and Khmer. There was therefore little of the cultural friction to Thai actions that underlay the Viemamese contacts with the Khmer, if anything, it was the reverse, since the Siamese assumed many of their cultural and religious customs and institutions from the Khmer. Another important factor that operated as a Limit on Siamese expansion was that there was a large and continuous expanse of cultivable land on the central plain of the Chao Phraya River on which population growth could take place3: Jebensraum was not an issue, as it was during Viemamese expansion from the Tonkin Delta. In the case of Viét Nam, by contrast, it must have seemed to Khmer that there were no natural limits or attenuators to Vietnamese expansion. While the Siamese and Khmer dominions overlapped at their margins, the extent of ‘Viemamese advance could be measured more or less precisely by the cultural fault line between Vietnamese Confucianism and Khmer Theravada Buddhism. Simply put, Viet Nam was more concemed with security of its land frontier because it was long and narrow and the regions of the country could be easily cut off from each other by an attacker. As the population grew it had to expand from the Red River Delta to the Mekong Delta because of land scarcity. Vide Nam expanded north-to-south, with no uniting geographical feature -- on the contrary, the two fertile deltas were isolated from each other by geography. Siam, on the other hand, was united by a north-south river (the Chao Phraya), and the population grew on a continuous lowland area. 13This led to regionalism and political fragmentation in Viét Nam, while Siam's institutions grew in an environment of relative stability. It also led to the city becoming much more important in terms of political control in Siam than in Viét ‘Nam. In the former, the capital could dominate politically — if loosely and symbolically — the continuous geographical expense of the kingdom. In Siam, control over the most distant regions of the kingdom was readily delegated to provincial governors who were able to exercise almost unfettered power. Only at the center was the king's power truly absolute. Beyond the palace walls his power generally diminished in proportion to the distance from the capital, In contrast to Viét Nam, Siamese rulers and courts tended to accept that the border regions were uncertain and porous.4 Viewing relations with the periphery in this way, turmoil in the frontier regions was not necessarily regarded as a security problem in Bangkok. In some important aspects of their behavior towards their neighbors the Siamese ‘were more like Chinese than were the Viemamese: they were more self-assured, and not so concemed with the physical control of frontier regions. In Siam, when the capital fell ~ as in the case of Ayuthya in 1767 ~ political credibility and the ability to govern was lost (conversely, when Taksin established a new capital at Thonburi it was a sign the country was reestablished).5 Even today, ‘Thailand does not react strongly to incursions at its borders, but if the capital were threatened it would be a clear threat to the existence of the country. In Viét Nam, however, control of the countryside, rather than the city, determined political control. For example, the Chinese several times occupied Hanoi after 939, but were not able to subdue the country. But the Vietnamese “heartland” is under imminent threat as soon as an invader approaches the western frontier.Another explanation for regionalism and disunity in Viet Nam, and unity in Siam, has to do with religion. In Siam Theravada Buddhism is universal and essentially non-secular. It is a common reference point for all Siamese of all stations in life. viet Nam has never had a dominant true religion. Confucianism provides an idealized code of conduct and relationships, but was of real concem only to the elite — a dividing, rather than uniting factor, Ancestor worship contributed to regionalization and localization by promoting attachment to clan, and to ancestral lands and gravesites. Regionalism had institutional aspects, as well. In one sense, there was greater tendency toward regionalism in Siam than in Viét Nam, in that there were areas where local authorities ("princes") enjoyed considerable autonomy from central authority in the capital. The Siamese kings were generally content to tolerate this independence, as it posed no physical, cultural, or institutional threat. ‘Vigt Nam, however, had developed via China a rather elaborate and stylized conception of central authority which implied frontiers and responsiveness to the revealed wisdom of the emperor. This was the ideal as conceived by the central bureaucracy, of course, and did not necessarily conform to the ideas or intentions of those outside the capital, where the saying “the emperor's mandate stops at the village fence" more accurately described practice. The Viemamese rural population was at least as inclined toward regionalism as the Siamese, but the Vietnamese court was much less tolerant of such inclinations than the Siamese court, The result was that institutional panems in Viét Nam reinforced the geographical underpinnings of ‘Vietnamese security concems, and led to tension and disharmony. ‘These different geographical and institutional environments would naturally led to different psychologies. The geographical liabilities and the resultant tendencies toward regionalism in Viét Nam made the court ~ or courts ~ constantlynervous about a security threat from the west, including external support to indigenous rebellions. Their worst fears in this regard were realized when the Siamese invaded the Viemamese frontier in support of the L Van Khdi rebellion of 1833, The stable and politically and geographically united Siamese would have been (and are) relatively complacent about their security situation and self-confident about their ability to deal with security threats. A contemporary situation is illustrative: When Viét Nam suffered raids from Pol Pot forces on its border in 1978, it mobilized to overrun and occupy Cambodia. Thailand, suffering the same depredations at the hands of Pol Pot, undertook virtually no military reaction at all, but pulled its population back from the border in the affected areas. It has even been suggested that the Thai roil up trouble on their borders as a tactic to enhance security by keeping potential adversaries occupied. 6 Cultural Effects if the March to the South One of the effects of the Vietnamese “March to the South” was the imposition of the existing order of the patterns of beliefs and institutions they derived from their Chinese heritage. A uniquely Vietnamese component of this expansion, however -- that became stronger as time went on -- was the impulse to ensure domination of its model, a consequence of the adoption of Sinic conceptions of universality by a nation so small that it could not ignore or rationalize the existence of adjacent “barbarian” countries. As the Khmer empire shrank in size and power a sense of superiority began to characterize behavior of Viet Nam in contact with its more loosely organized "Hinduized" neighbors. Itis an exaggeration to say, as Coedes does, that the "Vietnamese destroyed rather than assimilated cultures that differed from theirs."7 To a certain extent, the‘Viemamese actually borrowed Khmer and Cham forms, and the distinctly Khmer nature of many localities in the Mekong delta of southern Viét Nam persists even today.8 But the Viemamese model assuredly dominated and its distinctiveness was emphasized wherever it 100k root. ‘The cultural facets of Viemamese expansion, however, were derivative, As in the Siamese case, geography and demography played the dominant role in determining the nature and extent of Viemamese expansion, although in a different ‘way. Where the Siamese were advantaged with a relatively continuous expanse of arable land sufficient to support population growth, Viét Nam's topography meant that it suffered from land scarcity and fragmentation. With historically the highest rate of population growth in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese early found the fertile but relatively smali Red River basin too small and began to expand beyond it9 The first victims of the march to the South were the Chams, but the land that they occupied was also cramped and unattractive, being hemmed in between the ‘Annamite Cortillera and the sea. So the piston-like southward search for cultivable land continued, this time at the expense of the Khmer. ‘The pioneers of Viemamese southward movement into Khmer territory were generally societal outcasts. Viemamese adventurers, criminals, and vagabonds not part of the agricultural economy of an established village in Viét Nam proper migrated to the southern areas in search of land and formed colonies, which were then natural objects for annexation and quasi-military administration. 10 (As noted below, Ming refugees from China are a special example ~ they originally landed in Da Neg, but Emperor High Viiéng moved them to the southem frontier regions.)5 E Pia? Despite the cultural similarities the Siamese encroachment on the Khmer empire was actually somewhat less subtle than that of the Viemamese. In the early part of the Ayuthya period (1350-1767) the Thai repeatedly attacked Cambodian territory. In 1315 Thai forces invested the capital of Angkor for seven months; after killing the Khmer King they appointed one of his sons as the new ruler.!1 In 1431 the Thai again artacked Angkor. The Thai king (Ratchathirat I) appointed his own son as King Phra Nakom In of Cambodia. He ruled only a short time before being assassinated, after which the Khmer moved their capital to Basan for a short time, and then to Phnom Penh.!2 The Khmer capital shifted several times thereafter between Phnom Penh, Lovek, and Oudong, localities relatively close to each other south of the Tonle Sap. The administrative center of gravity had irreversibly snigrated from the northwest. Nevertheless, for over a hundred years the Thai made no attempt to administer the area from which they had evicted the Khmer.13 ‘The Khmer did not go quietly, however, and mounted frequent raids into ‘Siamese territory to kidnap the inhabitants and bring them back to Cambodia. After ‘one such foray the Siamese retaliated and, although the Khmer surrendered without a fight, brought one of their princes to Ayuthya as hostage;14 this would be a familiar device in subsequent centuries, and would lead to entanglement of Siamese and Khmer courts that would produce varying effects on relations between Cambodia, Siam, and Vier Nam. Again in 1593, during the reign of King Naresuan, the Siamese were able to overrun the capital of Lovek in a combined land and naval campaign.5 Naresuan then governed Cambodia through Khmer nobles that he appointed.Despite these instances of Siamese aggressiveness, Siam was so beset by the Burmese during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the military initiative was often with the Khmer. At the same time the momentum of Vietnamese expansion increased, The continuing southward movement of the Viemamese under the regional overlordship of the Nguyen meant to the Khmer substantial loss of territory and population, but also provided opportunities for a counterweight to Siam. Almost all major Khmer-Siamese battles after 1700 or so involved some Vietnamese participation (often naval) on the Khmer side, whether sanctioned by the Viernamese court or not. Some of the Viemmamese participation was underwriten by Chinese who settled in the coastal towns of the southem Mekong delta, particularly Ha Tiéa. Goals of Expansion The goal of Siamese expansion into Cambodia was to secure acknowledgement of superiority within a common cultural framework. The fact that Siam emerged from within the Khmer empire assured this. As Chandler says, ....Phnom Penh’ (or ‘Lovek' or ‘Oudong’) and ‘Ayuthya’ considered themselves not separate polities, but participants in a hybrid culrure... Brought into contact with each other through wars, immigration, and a shared religion, the Thai and Khmer blended with each other and developed differently from their separate forebears." 16 ‘The primary means by which Siam's domination would be acknowledged was through appointment of Cambodian kings. ‘The Vietnamese on the other hand, sought territory - more specifically agricultural land. They were not satisfied with acknowledged suzerainty, but with something close to the modern concept of sovereignty. With the “March to the South" ending at the sea at Ha Tién, this would have been an advantage of sorts for Cambodia. With stable borders established and arable land acquired, the 19Vietnamese could tum to less direct ways of dealing with Cambodia - i.e., establishing a more traditional tributary relationship. Where borders were ill-defined or non-existent between Siam and Cambodia, they were relatively well defined in the east ~ not only geographically but culturally a line between Ha Tién and Tay Ninh defined the border in the more or less populated regions, and the Annamite Cordillera beyond that.17 In general, therefore, the 1750's and 1760's were a period of relative success for the Khmer in maintaining essential independence by balancing Siamese and Viemamese, 18 in spite of loss of territory, especially to the latter, The operative word is relative: when dominated by one side, the Khmer would invite the other to intervene, then attempt on their own resources to limit the influence of the replacement. The degree of Khmer success in this attempt was relative and by no means altered the obvious fact that by the middle of the eighteenth century Cambodia was a pale vestige of the Khmer empire and was still under pressure. ‘The shrinkage that had begun in the east with Siamese uprisings from within had pushed the political and population center of gravity to the Phnom Penh area. The Vietnamese "March to the South” had devoured all the east coastal and delta areas. Devi E dinthed D ‘Three fateful events occurred in the seventeenth century that gave the ‘Vietnamese a firm foothold in the Mekong delta at Cambodia's expense. The first was the marriage of Ngoc Vén, the second daughter of the Nguyéa lord Sai Vudng, to King Chettha II of Cambodia in 1620.19 In short order she obtained permission for a Vieamese customs station at Prey Nokor - now Saigon. While that was her most visible accomplishment it was by no means the extent of her influence. A French observer at the time commented on her influence as queen: 20"The Khmer peopte love and respect her very much. This means when Khmer want to revolt or cause trouble they will not do so if the queen forbids. Sometimes groups of Khmer who are bent on gaining power ty to get close by her and curry favor to get her to Support them for king by using the influence of her father. If after starting a rebellion Khmer cannot agree on who will be king, the ‘Vietnamese will send forces 10 seize the government of Cambodi: and the Viemamese commander will have power to determine who becomes king. But one thing must be: the queen from Viet Nam will Join in the ruling of Cambodians."20 Later one of her sons became King Batom Reacha, installed after a coup supported by his cousin, the Nguyén lord High Vung, deposed his half-brother Ang Chan. ‘The second major event also occurred in the 1620's. The Nguyén under Sai Vung broke completely from the northem L€ dynasty in Hindi and began to govern southem Viét Nam on their own from Hué. Not only did this focus authority in the region, which was still sparsely populated, it emphasized the need for the Nguyén to have a secure southern flank in anticipation of inevitable reprisals from the north. A prerequisite to security was physical control, which of course reinforced the migratory forces already at work. This control was immeasurably enhanced by the third major event, the arrival of Ming Chinese refugees beginning in 1679. At this time Saigon was still nominally under a Khmer ruler. When he could not control the new refugees he called on Nguyéa ruler High Ving for assistance.2 The Chinese were quickly put in order and put in settlements in Gia-Dinh, Bign Ha, and MY Tho. The price for the assistance was acknowledgment of Nguyéa suzerainty in Saigon. In 1688 High Vudng’s successor Nghia Vucng suppressed another group of Ming inside Cambodia and further extended Vietnamese sway, this time at the expense of King Chettha IV.22 2‘The most important Chinese refugee connection, however, was that with the group under Mac Cu, who settled in the Ha Tién area around the tum of the eighteenth century. Originally Mac Cui placed himself under the king of ‘Cambodia. But seeing the success of the Nguyen lord Minh Vuoog in manipulating and protecting his clients on the Cambodian throne he later shifted his loose allegiance to the Viemamese. When Siamese forces attacked Ha Tiéa in 1714 as part of their support of their own candidate for king of Cambodia, Mac Ci fled to Hue’ and offered Hi Tién to Minh Viiéng as a gift. Minh Vitdng accepted, then formally invested Mac Cult as govemor of the region. The Nguyéa now were in direct control of Saigén and Ha Tién, the northern and southern extremities of the Mekong delta region. If the seventeenth century saw the Viemamese gain a foothold in the Mekong delta, the first half of the eighteenth century saw them formalize it. In 1747 the Cambodian ruler was overthrown by a rival and fled to Viemamese protection at Gia Dinh. The Nguyéa ruler VE Vildng (nee Nguyéa Phifde Khost) gave him a military escort back to the Cambodian capital, but after only a few months Siamese troops supporting the son of that rival, known to the Vietnamese as Nac Nguyén, forced him to flee again to Gia Dinh, where he died. Nac Nguyén apparently had his own Vietnamese contacts, but they were with the rival Trinh lords in the north. Believing that Nac Nguyéa and the Trinh were conspiring to attack the Nguyéa provinces, V6 Vildng in 1753 launched his own attack against Cambodia. For some reason Nac Nguyen did not flee towards Siam, but to HA Tién (now ruled by Mac Cult's son, Mac Thiéa Tich). From here he sought to placate V8 Vu8ng by offering the Cambodian districts lying between Hi Tién and Saigon. V6 Vuldng then allowed him to return to Cambodia, where he died in 1759.23Jn that year, the Cambodian King Ang Ton formally asked V6 Viddng for protection, tendering in the process the area including modem Vinh Long, Sadéc, and Chéu Déc. In addition he offered the area of Kampong Som and Kampot to Mge Thién Tich, who had supported him with troops against Thai-supported rivals. Mac Thién Tich in tum presented them to Vo Vidng, who formally incorporated them into the “pacified area” (Tra) of Ha Tién, govemed by Mac Thiéa Tich.24 By 2 In 1770 Siam and Viét Nam were each on the threshold of epochal events. In Siam, after the Burmese sacking of Ayuthya, King Taksin was reconstituting the nation from the new capital at Thonburi, and would shortiy be replaced by the Chakai dynasty of Bangkok. In Viét Nam, discontent and natural centripetal forces were about the erupt in the Tay Sdn rebellion. This was a complex time of dynastic change in Siam, the beginning of civil war in Viét Nam, and turmoil in Cambodia which in tum was partially the result of changes in the other two countries, and it produced a complex set of relationships between the three countries. The following ‘example illustrates this complexity and the rapidly changing nature of the relationships. Blood. Jat Shifting Lovat C : The Vietnamese presence in the Mekong delta added to the constant intrigues and rifts in the Khmer court. While these affairs had their own dynamics, an effect of Vietnamese proximity was that internal Khmer squabbles developed into one side seeking support from the Siamese and another from the Vietnamese. 23When Taksin came to power he demanded that the Khmer king (whose given name was Ang Ton, but on whom the Thai had bestowed the title Phra Narai Racha) send gifts of mibute as had been rendered the Ayuthya kings, Phra Narairacha refused, however, saying that Taksin was a commoner and that wibute could be sent only to one of royal blood.25 Taksin therefore dispatched in 1770 a major expedition under Phraya Aphai Ronant to restore Siamese prestige ~ a theme Rama I would literally take up with a vengeance 60 years later — and the acknowledgment of Siam's moral overlordship. But after occupying Siem Reap, Battambang, and Pouthisat the Siamese forces withdrew on hearing a false rumor that Taksin had been killed in Nakorn Sri Thammarat26 Another army under the same command was launched the following year, this time with the aim of replacing Phra Narairacha with Nak Ang Non, a Khmer noble who had sought refuge in Thonburi, As the Siamese forces converged on Phnom Penh from the west and through Ha Tign in the South, Ang Ton appealed for Viemamese support. Phra Narairacha's Viemamese-sponsored return to the throne was short- lived. When the TAy Sén rebellion broke out in Vit Nam his patrons became preoccupied, Siamese forces still controlled western Cambodia as well as Ha Tien. ‘Ang Non was still a threat. Phra Narairacha therefore voluntarily abdicated and became uppavorat (deputy king) to Ang Non, whom Taksin appointed as King Phra Ramathibodi.27 Intrigue took its toll in the new king's court28 A false report of a coup planned by the heir appareat led Phra Ramathibodi to order his assassination, the emotional effects of which hastened the death of Phra Narairacha, Later, a Siamese army on its way to attack Laos passed through Cambodia and ordered Phra Ramathibodi to conscript a large number of soldiers as well as provide food. The 24king was willing, but most of the would-be conscripts, including several nobles, immediately deserted, Officials sent by Phra Ramathibodi to punish the deserters were killed, and the errant nobles fled, predictably, to Viét Nam. Phra Ramathibodi set out at the head of an army to capture them, but no sooner had he left the capital than nobles Jeft behind there struck up their own alliance with the Vietnamese and invited Nguyén armies in. With this support, the Khmer rebels killed the children of Phra Ramathibodi and appointed Nak Ang Eng, the seven-year old son of the late Phra Narairacha, as ‘cing, Phra Ramathibodi was tracked down and executed by drowning in a weighted cage. The nobles who had fled to Viét Nam returned to take up high positions in the new regime; one Mu, who had earlier been governor of Bassac (in the area of modern Long Xuyen) 29 became regent. This rebellion of course outraged Taksin. His first reaction was to demand that Mu send to Thonburi one of Phra Ramathibodi's close aides, Baen, to be punished for not having protected the king (Baen had been spared execution by Mu because of a friendship with Su, one of the principal plotters). Mu, who had just completed an essentially anti- Siamese rebellion, complied! As later events would Prove, Mu’s forbearance was a literally fatal mistake for both himself and Su. Baen was clapped into prison in Thonburi where, it was reported, he was well cared for and happy.30 Taksin then dispatched a large army against Cambodia. One part of this, army was led by Taksin's son, whom he hoped to have assume the crown of ‘Cambodia. The leader of another part, Somdet Chao Phraya Mahakasatsuk, or Chao Phraya Chakai, asked that Baen be released from prison to accompany the invasion force, While this expedition was pushing across Cambodia, Taksin's increasing eccentricity inspired a revolt against him. The Thai forces in Cambodiaretumed to Siam, and Chao Phraya Chakri became Rama I, the first king of the Bangkok dynasty. Baen retained his freedom in Siam. Meanwhile, in Vigt Nam the Nguyen were reeling from the effect of the great Tdy Sdn rebellion. A succession of abdications, and TAy Sdn occupations of and retreats from the Nguyén stronghold of Gia Diah, had left young Prince Nguyéa Anh the only male survivor of the house. He proclaimed himself king in 1780, When Gia Dinh was again attacked by Tay Son general Nguyén Hué in 1782, Nguyéa Anh asked for Cambodian assistance. The five thousand Khmer troops which Mu and Su sent were decimated along with those of Nguyéa Anb. Naguyéa Anh retreated temporarily to Phi Qué¢ Island, but retumed to Saigon after his follower Chéis Vin Tiép successfully counterattacked the Téy Sdn, Back in Cambodia, the ever-scheming Su sent word to Baen in Bangkok that the two of them should overthrow Mu and rerum Cambodia from Vietnamese to Siamese vassalage. Baen returned and Mu was executed, But in an act of surpassing, if delayed, revenge, Baen then assassinated Su and everyone who had been pary to the execution of his patron King Ang Non.31 Shortly after Baen assumed power, however, a strong force opposed to him marched on Phnom Penh. Baen gathered up the children of former King Phra Narairacha, the predecessor and once the adversary of Baen's patron Phra Ramathibodi, and fled to Bangkok. Among the children were two princesses who ‘became consonts of the heir apparent, and Nak Ang Eng, at ten years of age a three- year veteran of this dizzying series of intrigues, Although Ang Eng had been sponsored for kingship by anti-Siamese forces with Vietnamese support, he was taken as adopted son by Rama I himself.32 26Changing loyalties was not a characteristic unique to the Khmer. The effects of revolts and intrigue were most drastic in Cambodia because of their intensity and because of Cambodia's essential powerlessness, but such were common in Siam and Viet Nam as well, usually involving violent death, The deposition of Taksin, and the Tay Son rebellion are obvious examples. Examples of lesser scale abound as well. Rama I executed the man who actually overthrew Taksin and petitioned him to assume the crown, reasoning that such a man could obviously not be musted to remain loyal to the throne.33 Dé Thanh Nhéin, the key figure in early Neuyéa counterattacks against the Téy Sdn (and who assisted Mu in overthrowing Ang Non) was executed by Nguyéa Anh at the time where he was needed most; Nguyéa Anh's motive was either simple jealousy, or suspicion that Nhin had personal ambitions. Furthermore, changing allegiances were not confined to internal relationships. For example, when Nguyéa Anh sent naval forces to assist the anti- Siamese Khmer rebels in 1781 his forces came into direct confrontation with Chao Phraya Chaizi, leading Siamese forces to quell the rebellion. The following year, however, Nguyén Anh was a privileged guest as a refugee at the court of Chao Phraya Chakri, newly-crowned as Rama 1. Another exampte: In 1769, Mac Thiéa Tich, the ruler of Ha Tién, sracked Chantaburi and Trat in an ill-advised scheme to install his own candidate as King of Siamn instead of Taksin. But in 1777 Mac Thiga Tich came to Taksin's court at the king's invitation, after Tich deserted the Nguyéa cause that he had been supporting,?5 Then three years after this invitation Taksin had Mac Thién Tich and his sons executed 36NOTES - Chapter Two 1 Alexander Woodside, Viemam and the Chinese Model (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 247. 2 See, for example, the maps accompanying the review article by Larry Silverstein, ", An Historical Atlas of Thailand = ‘Touma of the Stam Siete sol LI, part 1, April 1964, pp. 7-20. 3_R. B. Smith, “Thailand and Viét-Nam: Some ‘Thoughts Towards Comparative Historical Analysis,” Journal of the Siam Society, volume 60, part 2, July 1972, p. 3. 4 Milton Osborne, i (Sydney, Australia: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 738. $ Smith, “Thailand and Viemam," p.21 6 This hypothesis of Professor Kraisak Choonhawan was communicated to the author by Kraisak's colleague, Professor Sukumphand Paribatra. 7G, Coedes, The Making of South East Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 218. 8 Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, Bp, 23-24, and Jerry Silverman, "Historic’ National Rivalries and Interstate Conflict in Mainland Southeast Asia,” in Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia (University of British Columbia: Anchor Press, 1974), p. 69. 9 Ng Shui Meng, The Population of Indochina (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Field Report Series No. 7), Tuly 1974¢p. 12, 10 Milton Osborne, borne, The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia Comell University Press, 1969), p. 13, and D.G.E. Hall, A History of Sautheas Ada (New You Se aries hes, ane BE Autos ition of Ro: micles} (Ban; Hang Hun Suan Publishers, 1968) 8 259, fi 12 Fine Arts Department, Phraratchapongsawadan Krung Gao Chabab {Luang Prasert Edition of Chronicles of Ayuthya] (Bangkok: publisher unknown, 1965), p. 13 David Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 80-81.\4 Fine oy artment, nt, Phraraichaponesawadan Sci_Avuthva Chabab Phra Chakrapad pad Edition of Chronicles of Ayuthya] (Bangkok: Maha Makutarat Wityalai, 1959), pp. 32-35. oe 15 King Phrachomklao, Phrarathchapongsawaden Chabab 9p, 173-179, The naval mancuver was made through Banteay Meas (Puthaimat in the Thai transliteration), later known by its Viemamese name of Ha Tien. This was the first demonstration of many to come over the next several hundred years of strategic importance of this port. 16 Chandler, A History of Cambodia, p. 80 17 Osbome, The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia, p. Coincidentally or not this comesponds with ihe cifferng conceptions of peundacies in the "Hinduized” system compared to the "Sinic” system, ie., vaguely defined borders in the former and relatively clearly defined borders in the latter. Cf. Silverman, "Historical National Rivalries and Interstate Conflict in Mainland Southeast Asia,” op.cit., p. 53. 18 Chandler, op. cit. p. 96. 19 Nguyéh Huyéh An, Viet Nam Danh Nhin Df biéa (A Dictionary of Famous Viemamese} (Saigon: Hoi Van Hda Birth Dan, 1960), p. 207. 2 Quoted in Thanom Anamwat, Kamen nai Samaj Rattanskosin Tawn Tone (Relations Between Siam, ai and Ter pea tee ae eenecee ens (Bangkok: Phrae Pittaya, » P. 21 D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981) p. 44-45. 2 Nguyén Huyda Anh, Viet Nam Danh Nhén TEDIEy, p.210. Chertha was the great-grandson of Chettha Hf, who married Ngoc Vin ‘a great-aunt of may Vuéng. 23 Nguyéa Huyéa Anh, op. cit., pp. 205-6, 2% Mae Thigh Tich was born as Mac Thién Td, by which he is generally known in Wester publications, 25 Chao Phraya Thipakorawong, Phraratchapongsawadan Krung Raanakosin Ratchakan Thi Nung (Chronicles of the First Reign of the Ratanakosin Period) (Bangkok: Kuruspa, 1961), p. 32. 26 Ibid., p. 33. 27 Ibid., p. 37. 2928 The events in this paragraph are distilled from ibid., pp. 38-42. 29 Hall, op. cit, p. 405. The kingdom of Champassak in what is now southern Laos is sometiraes abbreviated as Bassac in Thai chronicles, but should not be confused with this Bassac in the Mekong delta. 30 Chao Phraya Thipakorawong, op. cit, p. 43. 3 Ibid. pp. 45-46. 32 Ibid. 33 bid. 34 Neuyén Huyén Anh, op. cit., p. 62, says Nguyén Anh had-D6 Thanh Nin executed because he was extortng the citizenry. 7 part 71, Pongsawadan Yuan [Viet Chronicles} (Bangkok: Krungthep Banakan, 1928), compiled while Nguyén Anh was in Bangkok relaugs events possibly concerned with Nnda's death. According o this version Nguyén Anh discovered that Nhan was plotting a coup and had him executed, 35. Hall, op. cit. p. 405. 36 Nguyén Huyén Anh, op. cit., p. 141. 30PLEASE NOTE: Page(s) not included with original material and unavailable from author or university. Filmed as received.as Rama{and Nguyén Anh, 1780-1802 Inmoduction ‘The last half of the eighteenth century saw the first sustained contacts berween members of Siamese and Viemamese courts. In the last two decades the new ruler of Siam, Rama I, gave refuge and support to the last prince of the Nguyen overlords of southern Vide Nam to survive the Tay Sén rebellion, Nguyéa Aah, In so doing Rama I established two precedents: first a personal relationship with the furure ruler of unified Viet Nam'that would govern relations between the two countries until 1820; and second, a strategy of supporting challengers to the Viemamese throne in order to dilute potential threats to Siamese interests from a strong Vigt Nam ~ a strategy that would be especially important in the calculation of Rama I's son fifty years later. This chapter examines the development of the personal relationship berween Rama I and Nguyéa Anh up to the time that the latter became Emperor Gia Long in 1802, laying the groundwork for later discussion of the conduct of relations between the two courts during the reign of Gia Long. A secondary theme is the growing importance of control of Cambodia to Viér Nam and Siam alike, Early Contacts Between Siam and Viet Nam Prior to the mid-1700's the major contacts between Siam and Viét Nam had been between opposing forces on the battlefield of Cambodia, and between traders at Hi Tién, There is no evidence of any “embassies” having been exchanged between Hué and Ayuthya before 1750. The first diplomatic contact came in that year, when the head of the Nguyén overlordship of southem Viét Nam, Vé Viéng, sent a lenter to Ayuthya accusing the Siamese of inciting rebellion in Cambodia. 32‘There was apparently no reply. Five years later Siam sent a leter requesting exemption from customs daties for its ships doing business in Nguyeh territory; the request was refused. ! So the two countries really had litle knowledge of each other atthe time of the first face-to-face contact between representatives of ruling houses. This occurred in about 1775, atthe beginning of the Tay Séa rebellion in Viét Nam, Téa ‘That Xun, a NeuyéA prince, came with retainers and members of his family to the ‘Thonburi court of King Taksin after fleeing the Tay Sdn advance against the south. ‘They were joined in 1777 by Mac Thien Tu and members of his retinue from Ha Tién, Taksin was initially hospitable, but events in Cambodia and his deteriorating mental condition ended his cordiality by 1780. During the see-saw bartles between Nguyéa and Téy Sén forces for Gia ‘Dinh, Prince Nguyén Anh, a young nephew of Tén That Xun and of the ill-fated Nguyén king of the south, Binh Vuthng, became leader of the Nguyén house by virtue of being one of the few survivors of the Tay Son, In 1777 Nguyéa Anh, then fifteen years old, fled Gia Dinh with several hundred followers for the island of . Poulo Panjang? From Poulo Panjang Nguyéa Anh sent a lener and gifts to Taksin with a request that Siamese troops assist in suppressing the Téy Sdn and restoring the Nguyén. Taksin refused on the excuse that Siam was atthe time engaged in an expedition against Vientiane.3 As it tured out, Taksin's help was not needed at that time, The remarkable 4 2 ~ Nguyén general D6 Thanh Nhan, recaptured Gia Dinh at the end of 1777. Nguyén Anh retumed and proclaimed himself king.* He remained in Gia-Dinh until the Tay Sdn, after several attempts, drove him out again in 1782. 33‘The Position of Cambodia between Tay Son, Neuyén, and Siam Cambodia was important to all sides of this oriangle in the 1770's, despite the profound problems that each faced. Then, as later, it was crucial to control ‘Cambodia for security, as a source of troops, and -- especially to Siam -- for the sake of pride. Although the Siamese were diverted by tensions with Burma and a mad king, they mounted several punitive campaigns in Cambodia to ensure the submissiveness of the Khmer court. Both the Nguyéa and the Téy Sén paid considerable antention to establishing a political and military position in Cambodia as a means of securing leverage against each other. As noted in Chapter Two, the reigning Cambodian king during the early 1770's, Phra Narairacha, owed vassalage to Viét Nam, whose armies had reinstalled him after he had been deposed for a slight of the Siamese crown, Nevertheless, Phra Narairacha refused a Nguyen demand for assistance in fighting the Tay Sdn in about 1772, reasoning that since the Siamese held Ha Tién, Kampot, Battambang, and Siem Reap, and Viét Nam was in disorder, the odds were already against the Nguyén. He was unable to fend off Taksin from his own resources, however, nor could he counter the Cambodian factions that looked to Siam for patronage in their own aspirations for power. In 1776 the “ruler of Saigon” (presumably Nguyén Ank's uacle, King V6 Vudng) again requested troops and supplies from Cambodia to help in the fight against the Tdy Sdn. The new king replied that he would not comply, as Cambodia was no longer under ‘Viemamese vassalage. This prompted a brief and indecisive Viemamese attack. Phra Ramathibodi reigned only five years before he fell victim to palace intrigue. He was executed by plotters who had the support of Vietnamese forces under BS’Thanh Nhin and Hé vch Lan, When Nak Ang Eng, the seven-year old son of Phra Narairacha, was declared king, H6 van Lan was appointed as viceroy.6News of this rebellion enraged Taksin. His rage at the rulers of southern Viet Nam was compounded by two events that were really out of the hands of the Nguyda. The first occurred when two Nguyé& officials sent to Taksin's court to placate him arrived at about the same time as information that a Siamese trading ship had been attacked by Viemamese naval forces near Ha Tién. The second was the result of a neat piece of Tay Sdn disinformation. The Tay Son forged a letter from 8 Thanh Nhin to Tén That Xudn and then saw that it fell into Siamese hands. The letter urged Tén Thit Xuan and other Vietnamese and Sino-Vietamese refugees at Taksin's capital in Thonburi to take up arms against Taksin in support of an imminent Nguyen naval artack. Coincidentally a Nguyén fleet of 100 ships ‘was at that time lying at anchor in a Cambodian bay, and Taksin was convinced that the “intercepted” letter was genuine, He had Tén That Xuan, the two envoys from Gia Dinh, and fifty other Vietnamese then in Thonburi, including Mac Thiéa TW, put to death.7 Taksin then in 1781 sent an army of twenty thousand men to return Cambodia to Siamese vassalage — again, despite the mortal threat from Burma, As noted in the previous chapter one of the three commanders of this army was Somadet Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk, soon to ascend to the throne of Siam as Rama I. In response, the anti-Siam supporters of the boy-king Nak Ang Eng ordered the evacuation of much of the western part of the country, and turned to Nguyéa Anh forhelp. Nguyén Anh sent a sizeable naval force to assist the rebels.8 Before the forces of Somdet Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk and Nguyelt Anh made significant contact, however, word reached the Siamese commander of a revolt against Taksin in Thonburi, He withdrew his armies from Cambodia, proclaimed himself king in place of the deposed Taksin, and began the process ofmoving the capital from Thonburi across the Chao Phraya river to Bangkok, Nguyéa Anh was unable to take advantage of the situation, however, as the Tay Séa once again made a major attack on Gia Dinh, forcing hin and his followers to flee to the island of Phil Quéc.? Newwél. Anh = Vagabond Pinos Thai, Viemamese, and western sources diverge on the chronology of Nguyén Anh’s peregrinations, particularly the date of his fist arrival in Bangkok It seems most likely that Nguyéh Ahh sent emissaries from his various island refuges several times, and personally spent three extended visits there. Although he had earlier sent messengers to Taksin, he himself arrived in Bangkok early in the reign of Rama I, after the Tay Sdn victory in mid-1782. He left with a Siamese force to attempt to recapture Gia Dinh in 1783, and retumed to Bangkok after failing in that attempt. He then undertook an even more disastrous expedition in 1784 and retumed to Bangkok yet again in 1785, According to the Siamese chronicles of 1782, from Phi Quéc the Nguyén. ‘Anh group went to Koh Krabu, where they were discovered by two patrolling Thai officials, the governors of Rayong and Chonburi, They invited Nguyéa Anh 10 Bangkok, an invitation which he was understandably reluctant to accept. The recorded reason for his reluctance is that he recalled the death of his uncle at the hand of Taksin, He may also have been mindful of the fact that only the previous year he had sent forces to do batue with the Siamese under the command of the a current king.!0 (Nguyén Anh had, however, apparently sent a mission across Cambodia to Bangkok to request aid while he was enroute to Phi Quéc.)!1 36A Vicmamese Refuges at the Siamese Court In any event, with only a small force, and plagued by food shortages, Neuyén Anh had litle choice. He arrived in Bangkok in mid-May, 1782. There he was literally treated royally by Rama L He and his family were given choice accommodations, servants, a sizeable allowance, and accouterments of high rank. Nguyéh Anh was permitted to attend the king's daily audience, where he was allowed to sit with his legs crossed after the Vietnamese style (which would have been instant lese majeste for a Siamese subject).12 Nguyéa Anh was not the only guest of the court of Rama I during this time, Nak Ang Eng was caught up in the welter of factional fighting in Cambodia and taken to Bangkok in 1782 by fleeing court members on the losing side. Nak Ang Eng was raised as a son by Rama 1, with presumably the same privileges and perquisites as Nguyés Alnh.13 Ang Eng remained in Bangkok for twelve years, until he was installed on the Cambodian throne by a patent from Rama I. As his son ‘Ang Dildng was to note in a lerer to Napoleon [Il in 1854, Ang Eng and Nguyén Anh became well-acquainted while both were in the Siamese court, and continued to have contact well after Nguyén Anh had permanently returned torule Viét Nam as Gia Long.'4 In 1783 and 1784 Rama I provided Nguyén Anh with troops and supplies with which to attempt to recapture Gia Dinh from the Tay Sén, Each expedition was an utter failure. The first attempt, under the command of Phraya Nakhon Sawan, was almost ludicrous. The Siamese army, which included a sizeable ‘component of Cambodian conscripts, met the Tay Sdn forces at Sadec. The battle ‘was a standoff, but after it was over Phraya Nakhon Sawan inexplicably reumed 37captured troops and equipment to the Tay San side. When he retumed to Bangkok, Phraya Nakhon Sawan and twelve of his staff were executed for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.15 ‘Viemamese sources mention Siamese participation in this campaign only in passing. It was a temporarily successful venture, in that Nguyéa Anh actually entered Gia Dinh and stayed for about three months before being driven out once again by the Téy Sén. Nguyén Ahh did not remm directly to Bangkok, but retraced the path of his earlier retreat to Phu Quéc, On the way he picked up a dissident Siamese referred to by the Vietnamese as "general" Vinkv-li-ma and two hundred troops. But Nguyéa Hué pursued Nguyén Anh vigorously, and was able to caprure ‘Vinh-li-ma as well as the younger brother of Nguyén Anh.16 ‘The rerum of Nguyéa Anh to Bangkok was tortuous. His wake was dogged by Nguyén Hud, forcing him to bounce between Pit! Quéé, Koh Rong, and Poulo Panjang. In January 1784 he made his way back to Bangkok and retumed to the court of Rama 1.17 The second Siamese expedition in support of Nguyéa Anh resulted in a decisive victory for the Tay Sén, and has played a particularly prominent rote in Vietnamese communist historiography ~ a 1971 history book refers to the battle as, a high point in the "resistance against Siamese aggression” (Khang Chiés Chéng Xan Lutte Xiém].18 Rama I chose his nephew, Chaofa Kromluang Thepharirak, to lead a ‘combined naval and ground force against Gia Dinh. The land force of about ten thousand, made up of equal parts Siamese and Cambodian conscripts, advanced across Cambodia and forced the western most Tay S&n positions to withdraw. 38Viemamese Headquarters (My Tho) @ Rach Gén @ Xoai Mut © MY Tho River Siamese Headquarters (Sadec) ‘Vietnamese Infantry a a ——} Siamese Advance a BD Viemamese Artillery > ‘Viemamese Counter Attack The Battle of Rach Gam / Xoai Mut 39However, this auacking force apparently stopped well inside Cambodia and did not continue the advance. Chaofa Kromluang Thepharirak took the naval force to Hi Tién, where he conscripted additional reinforcements. This augmented fleet then established a beachhead and supply base at Rach Gid, and sailed upriver to the Wamaneo canal. The combined Siamese-Cambodian force numbered about twenty thousand, with three hundred boats, along with three or four thousand of Nguyéa Anh's own troops.19 ‘The Siamese advance to the Wamanao canal was egregiously slow, taking from August until the middle of November. At least part of the reason for the slow progress was the propensity of the Siamese troops for plundering the local populace. After they reached the canal, this propensity, along with Nguyen Ank's cautionary desire to recruit even more soldiers, and constant harassment by numerically inferior Tay Sdn forces, kept the Siamese forces in place at the ‘Wamanao canal for an additional two months. ‘The Siamese slowness gave the Ty Sdn leadership in Qui Nhdn time to lay plans and assemble its own forces. In January 1785 the Tay Sén fleet under NguySa Hud arrived at MY Tho and prepared to lay a tap for the Siamese. Nguyén Hué did not attack the Siamese force directly, as it was still much larger numerically and situated at a part of the Tiéa Giang River where the currents would have favored it in the defense. Instead, he planned to lure the Siamese to an ambush position further to the east. He chose a six-kilometer section of the northem bank of the Mj Tho River between the canals of Rach-gam on the west and Xoai-mut on the east. Xoai-mut lay six Kilometers west of the headquarters of Nguyén Hué at MY Tho. The large island of Théi-sdn and several smaller islands dotted the riverway, but the channel between them and the northern bank of the MY Thd River was wide enough to 40accommodate all of the three hundred ships of the Siamese forces. Unlike most of the other waterways in the Mekong delta area, there were no small streams or canals that could be used as escape routes by forces ambushed between Rach-gam and Xoai-mut, Nguyén Hug hid is own ships in the two canals, and deployed artillery and infantry on both banks of the river and on Théi-son island. His plan worked to perfection. On January 18, 1785, 2 small Ty Sda force went upriver to make contact with the Siamese at Sadec. The entire Siamese force pursued the Tay Sdn into the ambush area and was decimated. The Siamese commander, Kromiuang ‘Thepharirok, survived and fled through the flooded flelds into Cambodia on the back of a water buffalo captured by an aide, The Siamese contingent that had earlier advanced overland fled without making further contact with the Ty Sda. Of the Siamese force of twenty thousand, about two thousand survived. According to Siamese chronicles the TAy Sdn did not pursue the Siamese. It hardly seemed necessary. On his eventual retum to Bangkok Thepharirak and members of his staff were imprisoned by an angry king, (At the request of his older sisters, the king later pardoned them. Thepharirak went on the distinguish himself in the Burma wars.)20 Of the contingent of Nguyéa Anh, roughly 650 survived of the original three or four thousand. Nguyén general Lé va Quan escaped with about six hundred, but it was over a year before he was able to rejoin Nguyéa Anh in Bangkok. Nguyén Anh himself, with twelve others, escaped to CAi Thd. There he was joined by fifty other survivors, including three generals, Nguyén Hu did pursue Nguyes Anh. The Nguyéa group fled from C&A ‘Thé to Ha'Tién, thence to Con-khoi and Poulo Panjang, There they rumed to piracy to sustain themselves. When the Tay Sdn discovered them these in April, Nguyén 41‘Anh, now with about two hundred people, moved to Koh Kut and finally back to Bangkok. ([t is from this time that westem writers date Nguyén Anh's arrival in Bangkok, but itis clear that he had been there for extended stays at least once and possibly twice before.21) The Tay Sdn broke off the pursuit, and Neuyén Hué withdrew his forces all the way to Qui Nhén. Nguy€h Hud's withdrawal to Qui Nhdn was dictated by unfinished business in the Tay Sdn consolidation of power and by intemal tensions in Ty Son ranks. Had he appreciated the tenacity of Nguyén Anh, however, he may have paid more attention to protecting his southern flank. During the periods when they held sway in Gia Dinh the TAy Sh had some success in enlisting Cambodians to their support. In 1782 three Cambodian fleets of about thirty boats each pursued Nguyéa Anh and his supporters, capturing and killing one of his important lieutenants.22 The following year Tay Sén general ‘Tring vin Da (who also played a prominent role at the battle of Rach-gam) responded to a Cambodian request for assistance in repulsing “Malay” invaders and sent them fleeing back to Siam.23 Nguyen Anh and his followers settled down in Siam for the next two years, and apparently made no more forays against the Tay Sn. By one account Nguyen. Anh gave up one of his sisters as a wife for Rama 1.24 He led Vietnamese soldiers in Rama I's several difficult campaigns against the Burmese in 1785-8725 and against "Malay pirates."26 Many of his followers took up farming and shopkeeping in the area known then as Kok Krabeu to the Siamese and Long Kj to the Viemamese (present day Sam Sen; their descendants still live in that area, along with those of Vietnamese who came in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). On 42the invitation of Rama I the Viemamese taught Siamese dancers to incorporate four ‘Vietnamese dances into their repertoire.27 Nguydh Anh was obviously a man who commanded exceptional loyalty from a number of talented men. And, at least in the case of his benefactor Rama [, he was exceptionally loyal in return.28 Among those who went with him to Bangkok, Lé vén Cau was particularly effective in fighting against the Burmese.29 ‘Chiu vin Tiép was able to recapture GiaDinh briefly in 1782 before being chased back to Bangkok; he was killed when he jumped aboard a Tay Sén ship during skirmishing before the battle of Rach-gam.30 A Khmer named Duong (named Neuyéa vin Téa by the Viemamese) played an important part not only in the various campaigns launched by Nguyén Anh from Bangkok, but in the later governing of Cambodia.31 V6 Duy Nghi went to Bangkok in 1784, and when Nguyéh Ahh started his final campaign against the Téy Sdn, kept the mother and other relatives of Nguyén Anh under protection at Phu Qué until Gia Dinh was recaptured in 1788.32 One of the most striking examples of this loyalty was that of Nguyén Huynh-Due. Duc and 500 of his soldiers were captured by the Tay Sén in 1783. Nguyen Hud so admired the military prowess of Dulé that he offered to untie his hands personally if he would surrender voluntarily. Although Dic refused, Nguyéa Hiué spared him anyway and pressed him into service fighting the Trinh lords of the north in 1786, He was then put in charge of the defense of Nghé An along with a trusted Téy Sén general. After a time, Dilc ticked his Ty Sén colleague and escaped into Laos with a unit of cavairy, intending to go on to Bangkok to rejoin 43Nguyéa Anh. When he arrived in Bangkok Nguyéa Anh had already left, so Die and his band followed him on to Gia Dinh.33 ‘When he left Nghé An, Duc left behind a lener for his erstwhile Tay Son counterpan, demonstrating the loyalty that Nguyéh Anh could command: “Every slave must have a lord. You wholehearedly serve the Tay Sén, I must sacrifice to help my Nguyéi lord. Each one of us has & lord, as heaven has decided. For my part, I sincerely thank you for helping me escape the Tay Sdn to return to my former lord. . ."24 Nguyén vali Nhdn had also been captured by the Téy Sdn, a year before Neuyéa Huynh-Dde, He also spent three years with the Tay $do before escaping. While crossing Cambodia toward Bangkok, he met an agent of Nguyéa Anh going in the opposite direction, and learned that Nguyéa Anh had already departed for Viét Nam. Nhén tumed around and accompanied the agent to the vicinity of Long Xuyén, where they recruited oops for the Nguyéa cause.35 Despite the comforts and privileges he enjoyed in Bangkok, Neuyéa Anh had obviously not abandoned his ambition to recover power from the Tay Sdn. At the beginning of 1787 he was tempted by an offer of assistance from Goa: the Portuguese would put at his disposal fifty-six ships to assist him in fighting the Tay Sdn, Rama I objected to the arrangement, however, so Neguyéa Anh refused it36 In 1786 Nguyén Anh had decided to retwm to Viet Nam to try once again to ‘oust the Tay Sdn. This time the odds seemed a bit more in his favor, even though he had decided to eschew the dubious benefits of the assistance of Siamese and ‘Cambodian troops. Tay Sdn unity began to crumble in that year. Rising jealously on the part of Nguyen Nhac, brother of Neuyén Hu, led to a falling out berweenthe two. Nguyén Anh’s agents, and Siamese and Chinese merchants who traded at Ha Tign and elsewhere kept him informed of the situation and inspired him to wy to capitalize on it37 Unfortunately the only detailed account of Nguyén Anh's departure from Bangkok is in the Siamese chronicles; as Wenk notes, the primary value of this rendition is to give the Siamese viewpoint on the incident — it is unlikely that the Siamese would be able to obtain the detail on Vietnamese actions and attitudes that the chronicles contain.38 It is clear, however, that Nguyén Anh and many of his followers did leave Bangkok surreptitiously after kidnapping three security aides of Kromluang ‘Thepharirak. Why Nguyén Anh felt that he had to sneak out of town is puzzling in view of the considerable assistance that Rama I had already provided him in his efforts to return to power in Viet Nam. It is possible that he felt that over the preceding three years he had become such a part of the Siamese court, and that his soldiers had become such a highly valued addition to the Siamese armies fighting the Burmese, that he would not be permitted to leave openly. (Many of his soldiers elected to stay in Bangkok anyway.39) Nguyén Anh, his family and followers sailed first from Bangkok to Koh ‘Sichang in four small boats that the Siamese had allowed the Viemnamese to keep for fishing. The Siamese account tells that he was pursued by the king's younger brother. Just as they were about to be caught, a wind came up that enabled the Vietnamese sailing craft to outdistance the Siamese oar-powered ships, If true, this ‘would have been the second time that Nguyén Anh was saved by an adventitious breeze -- the first being when the Tay Son fleet was about to catch up with him in 1782.40 45 ReyerNeuyén Anh left behind a leter for Rama I explaining in rather obsequious terms his reasons for leaving.4! He promised that he had no intention of causing rouble for Siam in the future. This promise did not set well with the king's younger brother, who was suspicious of the Vietnamese who had gained intimate knowledge of Siamese affairs of state. He predicted trouble for furure generations of Siamese if Nguyén Anh were not captured. The king refused to take any action against Nguyéa Anh, but did direct construction of a fort at the mouth of the Chao Phraya River at Samut Prakan to defend Bangkok against attack by a hypothetical enemy from the sea.42 ‘The Nguyén Anh party went first to Koh Kut, reasoning that since it was Siamese territory they would be relatively safe from Tay Sdn patrols for a while. But food was scarce, and Nguyén Anh was forced to come out of hiding to approach a ship taking rice from Chantaburi for sale at Camau. The ship captain “donated” the rice to Nguyén Anh and returned to Chantaburi, As a result, the information that Nguyén Anh was hiding at Koh Kut soon reached Bangkok and Rama L The king ordered that several ships equipped with weapons be delivered by officials at Trat to Nguyén Anh. Nguyén Anh used these ships to attack and seize ‘Camau, and to capture a number of Viemamese pirates. As a token of good will, he had the head of one of the pirates delivered to the governor of Ha Tién to be sent to Bangkok. He also sent a message to the king returning the accouterments of rank which had been given to him (a sword with a gold handle, a gold water pitcher, and a gold betel nut tray), and promising to retum the boats and weapons he had received after his campaign was complete. The king responded by sending even more boats and weapons.43In the Camau-Phii Quéc area Nguyén Anh recruited an army of volunteers, Tay Son deserters, Chinese pirates, and Cambodian mercenaries.44 He took his force to Long Xuyén, where his supporter Nguyéa vin Nhdn was already in place, and then down the Can Gid River, where he engaged the Tay Son under Pham vin Tham. Despite the Tay Sdn disunity, Nguyén Anh was in imminent danger of being defeated once again when he enlisted the support of V6 Tahh, a powerful southern military leader who had until then been opposed to both the Tay Sda and the Nguyén45 After that it was a relatively easy campaign until the capture of Gia Dinh in August 1788. Nguyén Huynh Duc and his force joined Nguyén Anh for the last part of that campaign, bringing still more gifts of weapons and ships from Rama 146 Neuydn Anh as Siam’s Vassal. In November 1788 Nguyén Anh sent a letter to Rama I advising that he had captured Gia Dinh, and sending the first of a series of gold and silver "trees" to the king, These gold and silver trees were the traditional gifts of tribute to Siam by her vassals ~ Nguyén Anh would have been perfectly aware of the symbolism involved from having seen them delivered at the court in Bangkok. He was specifically, if temporarily, declaring himself a vassal of Rama I. Declaring this inferior relationship imposed obligations on Rama I, as well, and so was a strategic move on the part of Nguyén Anh calculated to obtain certain advantages for himself. Siamese sanctuary and material assistance had been directly responsible for his success, if not his survival, and he would need that backing even more in his continuing struggle against the Tay Sdn. Indeed, accompanying the first gold and silver trees was a request for thirty armed ships and an army of three thousand men from Chaophraya Aphaiphubet in 47 At AsapCambodia to assist Nguyén Anh in fighting Tay Sdn remnants who had fled to Long Xuyén from Gia Dinh. (Nguyén Anh specified that the Cambodians should have their hair cut after the Siamese fashion.) The Viemamese mission that brought the request was only able to find five serviceable ships among those offered by the Siamese, but Rama I did command Chaophraya Aphaiphubet to provide troops as requested. The combined forces surrounded the Tay Séa at Long Xuyén, who surrendered without a fight.47 Thanks to Rama I, Nguyén Anh was now in effective control of all of southem Vig Nam. Continuing to call on that assistance, Nguyén Anh would thirteen years later join southern, central, and northem Vidt ‘Nam in a single political entity for the first time.48 Several interesting pieces of correspondence passed between Gia Dinh and Bangkok in 1789. In response to a recent request from an unidentified minister, Nguyén Anh sent a large quantity of rice as a gift to the king 49 Another letter from Bangkok was a request froma Phraya Phrakhlang that Nguyén Anh, when he had a respite from battle, build sixty or seventy ships, including one outfitted for the king's personal use, and send them to Bangkok. The letter also contained assurances that Rama I would continue to furnish military assistance when asked by Nguyén Anh,50 In a letter from Gia Dinh, Nguyén Anh advised Rama I that he had ‘been approached by a representative of the Raja of Tani to provide a fleet to attack Bangkok (apparently he sent the Raja's letter to Rama I), Rama I sent an expedition to capture the Raja, and imprisoned him for life.51 Indeed, the only evidence of any tension between Nguyén Anh and Bangkok in that period is in an exchange of letters conceming the conduct of Siamese officials in Gia Dinh, and the anti-Vietnamese attitude of Chaophraya Aphaiphubet, de facto ruler of Cambodia. Two Siamese officials who had been 48accused in Gia Dinh of abducting Viemamese women apparently concocted a plot for revenge after they retumed to Bangkok. A third official brought to Gia Dinh an official letter with a seal conveying the king's anger and demanding that all of the weapons that had been provided to Nguyén Anh be returned. According to Nguyén. Anh's reply to Rama I, he had complied with the letter, but the Siamese messenger was so taken up with gambling and women that he did not follow through. The same lener advised Rama I that Nguyén Anh had discovered a plot on the part of Chaophraya Aphaipbubet to attack Viét Nam. Nguyéa Anh was reluctant to strike a preemptive blow because he knew that Chaophraya ‘Aphaiphubet was under Bangkok's sponsorship. Rama I replied that he was not influenced by Chaophraya Aphaiphubet's accusations against Nguyén Anh, but that he was reassured to get the latter’s direct explanation of the situation. He told Nguyén Anh of his plan to replace Aphaiphuber, a commoner, with Nak Ang Eng when Eng came of age. The king's conciliatory reply made no mention of the incident of abduction of Vietnamese women or the demand to retum weapons; in fact that demand was probably spurious, cooked up by the Siamese officials without the knowledge of the king. Rama I then sent lavish gifts to Nguyén Anh, and the tension dissolved.52 Inside Vidt Nam, Nguyén Aah was continuously growing stronger against the Tay Sdn, but still he could not dislodge them from their stronghold at Qui Nhén. In July 1793 he requested from Rama I and was immediately granted seals to assist him in passing through Laos to attack the Tay Sdn from the rear.53 ‘The Tay Son, realizing their declining\position, belatedly requested friendly relations with Bangkok, and asked that if Nguyén Anh were to rerum to Siamese territory he be arrested and held. Rama I ordered a royal leter of reply to the Tay 49Sdn which was artful, if not entirely ingenuous. It said that Nguyén Anh had indeed sought refuge in Bangkok, just as a small bird would find shelter in a large tree. Since he had become strong enough to fly on his own the court had no control over him. Conversely, the king could not retract his earlier favors to Neuyén Anh without suffering disgrace in the eyes of the world. Furthermore, events in Vidt Nam seemed very remote to Siam, and Bangkok could not get involved in disputes between two Viemamese parties, particularly as such involvement might lead to a clash with the Tay Sén. However, Bangkok would be happy to serve as a neutral mediator between Nguyén Anh and the Tay Sdn. The king then had the correspondence copied and sent to Nguyén Anh.54 In view of all that he had already invested in Nguyén Anh, it is doubtful that Rama I's professions of neutrality were heartfelt. Nor could he reasonably claim ignorance of the military situation in Vige Nam, as a steady stream of emissaries from Nguyén Anh kept him informed. He was clearly supporting Nguyén Anh against the Téy Sdn, who — at least originally -- seemed a larger potential threat to Siamese interests than the Nguyén. Indeed, three years prior the Téy Sdn, along with troops from the Lao principality of Phuan, had unsuccessfully anacked the tertitory of Vientiane. Tay $én prisoners captured in that operation had been sent to Bangkok and handed over to Nguyén Anh’s representatives.55 On the other hand, in 1794 the ultimate victory of Nguyén Anh was by no means assured (indeed, he would suffer several more defeats in his attacks on Qui Nhdn before final success). It probably scemed prudent to Bangkok that it hedge its public diplomatic position by not admining its opposition to the Tay Sdn.; eae Rama I also skillfully handled the accession in Cambodia, When Nak Ang Eng reached age in 1794, Rama I bestowed on him the title of Phra Narairamathipodi and invested him as king of Cambodia, The caretaker ruler, Nguyén Anh’s nemesis Chaophraya Aphaiphubet, was given authority of the territories of Battambang and Siem Reap, which were detached from Cambodia and placed directly under Bangkok's administration.56 Many of the new Cambodian king's family were kept in Bangkok, another prudent hedge by Rama I. Unfortunately, Phra Narairamathipodi only reigned for two years before dying in 1797. His former guardian, Pok, was named regent. Cambodia's subordinate relationship to Siam at that time was a potential, and sometimes actual, benefit to Nguyéa Anh, In 1799 he requested that Rama [ have a Cambodian areny raised to assist in attacking Nghé An. Rama I instructed Pok accordingly, and five thousand unenthusiasie Cambodians under Phraya ‘Wang set out in the general direction of Ngh¢ An. When they reached Rumdvol the bulk of them deserted. According to the custom of the day, Phraya Wang was executed, Another five thousand men were conscripted under Phraya Kalahom and sent to Neguyéa Anh's aid.57 Phraya Kalahom was at best a mixed blessing to Nguyén Anh. At least some of the former's troops apparently fought alongside his own during the final battle for Qui Nhén in 1802, but Phraya Kalahom himself was secretly informing the Tay Sdn on Nguyén Anh's intentions. Nguyén Anh was informed of Phraya Kalahom's treachery by other Cambodian officers. His reaction was curious, even after Tay Sdn captives confirmed the relationship. After the battle for Qui Nhdn was won, he arrested Phraya Kalahom, but then released him, distributed money to him 51and his officers and allowed them to return to Cambodia. He then reported the events to Rama I. The king, who had already been informed by five Cambodian officials who had deserted Phraya Kalahom, replied that he would ensure that Phraya Kalahom was punished when he came to Bangkok to report on the expedition. Phraya Kalahom was arrested by Pok and taken to Bangkok, where the king ordered him imprisoned. There is no further mention of him in the chronicles. By that time Nguyén Anh, who was about to launch the climactic campaign which would unify Vigt Nam under his rule, was probably too preoccupied with that to give much thought to Phraya Kalahom,58 ‘Neuvdn Anh Becomes Emperar Gia Long On May 2, 1802, Nguy&a Anh deciared himself emperor of unified Vigt Nam, with the tide Thé-T8 Cao Hoing-d8. He would be popularly known as Gia Long. His relationship with Rama I would thenceforth be one between royal equals, with attendant changes in tone, Indeed, Gia Long would feel compelled to give advice on Siamese matters of state such as the appointment of an uparaj, or deputy king, and war with the Burmese, Towards the end of the reign of Rama I tension over Vietnamese intentions in Cambodia would begin to be felt. Nevertheless, the amicable personal relations that had begun in 1782 endured while Rama I was alive, and state-to-state relations were cordial, Even though they did not meet again after 1787, the gifts they exchanged B0t progressively more expensive on both sides. Gia Long was at pains to keep Rama T continuously informed on the progress of his military campaigns, even When the report did not include a request for additional military assistance, ‘The European Role Much has been written about the help given Nguyén Anh in his struggle for Power by Frenchmen, particularly Pigneau de Behaine, Bishop of Adran, To be 52sure, the moral support was considerable, and Nguyén Anh formed his own strong loyalties to Pigneau, especially. Several Frenchmen who assisted Gia Long were given Vietnamese names, and Nguyéa Aah placed his son in Pigneau's care for a mission to France in 1787. That mission was intended to secure official French support for Nguyén Anh’s venture. An agreement was indeed signed, but the contrast to the generous and unconditional assistance provided by Rama I could not have been greater. The French king agreed to provide four warships, 1,200 French and 250 African soldiers, and ammunition. This meager help was given on conditions that Nguyén Anh cede Da Nang and Poulo Condore island, grant a trade monopoly to France, and respond within three months whenever France requested men, food, or supplies for its own military operations. The French government withdrew the agreement when Pigneau and the French Govemor of Pondicherry who was assigned to implement its terms had a falling out. Pigneau retumed with three ships loaded with supplies and volunteers, which constituted the vast bulk of European support. Pigneau himself was killed in one of the unsuccessful attacks ‘on Qui Nhda.59 After he took power, Gia Long largely ignored Westerners. In any case, Siamese material and manpower assistance — provided unconditionally -- was several orders of magnitude greater than that from European sources. Without it, Nguyén Anh could not have become Emperor Gia Long. ‘Why the Rama L- Gia Long Relationship? Shifting loyalties and what we would call treachery were common in Indochina at the time, so it is not self-evident that the bonds between Rama I and Gia Long should have persisted as they did. The explanation probably lies in a combination of self-interest and personal affinities. For Gia Long, the self-interest 53is obvious: Rama I provided not only sanctuary when he literally had no place to tum, but thousands of troops on repeated occasions, dozens of warships, many thousand weapons of various sons, powder, rice, and other supplies. For Rama I the self-interest was less obvious, but may have lain along these lines: In the early 1700's the Tay Sdn were clearly on the move south, Their momentum could, and in fact did, propel them into Cambodia and Laos, over which Siam claimed vassalage. The Tay Sdn had shown no apparent interest in establishing any sort of relations with Siam. They were aggressive and obviously skilled in war, To have a friend on the opposite side who might preoccupy them could not have suck Rama I as a bad idea. Beyond that, the two men clearly got on well together personally. They had many attributes in common, Both were soldiers who had proved themselves in baulle several times over. Neither had apparent ambitions for the crown before events thrust them toward it. Each had qualities that compelled other men to take substantial risks to throw in their lots with them. Both were exceptionally loyal. Gia Long rewarded his supporters and kept many in his court long after their usefulness had expired (the execution of D3 Thanh Nhin when Neuyéa Anh was a youth was an apparent aberration). Rama I himself was a man with a highly developed sense of loyalty. He had even ordered executed the leader of the overthrow of King Taksin that had led to his own rise to the throne. Although it had been obvious that Taksin had to go, the act of overthrowing him was a violation of loyalty. (Rama { had also had Taksin executed in strict adherence to cu-~ wan, particularly Rama J, wor hat Gia Long had previously and of loyalty.In the ensuing twenty years the dominant effect of that personal relationship on the conduct of court-to-court relationships would be strained, but not broken — even, as the next chapter discusses, over the status of Cambodia. 33NOTES - Chaprer Three 1 Trdh Trong Kim, Vigt Nam $i Lilde, (A Summary History of Viét Nam), Saigon: Ministry of Education, 1971 reprint of 1928 ‘riginal edition), p. 334, at La Thanh Khéi, Histoire du VietNam, (Paris: Sudestasie, 1981), p. 314. 3 Thanomt Anamwat, [Relations between ok Cambodia, and wis ‘Nama during the first Part of the Ratanakosin Period) (Bangkok: Phrae Pitaya, 1973), p 18; Chingho A. Chen, "Mac Thien Tu and Phraya Taksin- A Survey on ‘litical Stand, Conflicts and Background,” in (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1977), v. 2, p. 1560. 4 Tran Trong Kim, op. cit,, p. 356. 5 Thiphakorawong, Chaophraya, Phraratchapongsawadan Krung [Royal Chronicles of the First Reign of the Ratanakosin Era] (Bangkok: Kuraspha , 1960), pp. 35-37. 6 Chingho A. Chen, op. cit., p. 1561. 7 Pid, pp. 1562-63. In Thiphakorawong, op. cit., pp. 58-59, the death of Tén ‘Xuan ("Ong Chiang Sun") is recounted somewhat differently. It has Taksin dering ‘Xuan's disembowelment in search of a diamond that a dream had. told him was in the visitor's stomach. Taksin then sent Xuiin's daughter to be raised in the palace. 8 Thiphakorawong, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 9 Tran Trong Kim, op. cit, p. 357. 10 Thiphakorawong, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 11 Nguyén Lutdng Bich and Pham Ngoc Phung, Tin Hdl Thin Ta Cun ugha Nanda (Ant Inquiry into the Military Genius of Nguyen Hu 1¢} (Hanoi: Nha Xudt Ban Quan Déi han Din (Peoples Army Publishing House}: 1966), pp. 69-70. 12. Thiphakorawong, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 13 Ibid., p. 47. 14 ‘The letter is translated from French in M. L. Manich Jumsai, History of (Bangkok: Chalermnit, 1970), p. 93.15. Thiphakorawoag, op. cit, pp. 72-74. 16 Nguyén Luéng Bich, op. cit, pp. 80-81. 17 Ibid., pp. 80-82, 88. 18 For example, among other indications, the joumal Nehitn Cufu Lich Si (Historical Research] had six articles on various aspects of the battle, including river currents, between 1964 and 1981. The 1985 bicentennial of the battle was widely noted in Hanoi journals. 19. Descriptions of the battle from both the Siamese and Viemamese points of view, which diverge only slightly, are found in Thiphakorawong, op. cit, pp. 77-79; Nguyén Luldng Bich, op. cit, pp. 89-100, inter alia. 20 Thiphakorawong, op. cit., 129 et seq. 21 Klaus Wenk is one who perperrates this inaccuracy, in The Restoration translated from German by Grecley Stahl (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1968), p. 111. 22 Neuyén Ludng Bich, op. cit, p. 71. 23 Tbid., p. 83; Jumsai, op. cit, p. 62. 24 Poole, Peter A., The Viemamese in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 14, 24. 25 Witraya Wetchachiwa (Compiler), Ruam Ruang Kieo Kap Yuan lee i. iL in (Ratchakan thi Nung teung Ratchakan thi Si) (Compilation of documents concerning Vietnam and Cambodia during the first through fourth reigns of the Ratanakosin Period] - (Hergafter RR.Y.K.) (Bangkok funerary volume, 1964), p, 252; Nguyen Huyen Anh, Vi Dien (A Biographical Dictionary of Famous Vietnamese] (Saigon: Hoi Van Hoa Binh Dan, 1960), p. 119. 26 Lé Thanh Khéi, op. cit,, p. 333. 21 Thiphakorawong, op. cit, p. 146. 28 Nguyén Anh, at least, did not always reciprocate. As noted earlier, in 1781 he ordered his illustrious. general D6 Thanh Nhan assassinated for somewhat vague reasons — either he suspected Nin of plotting against him, or Nhan became excessively corrupt, or he just got too big for his britches in the eyes of Nguyén Anh. This occured when Nguyén Anh was still a teenager, however, and may not be representative of his basic attitudes and behavior. 29 Nguyén Huyén Anh, op. cit, pp. 118-119.30 Nguyan Ludng Bich, op. cit, p. 93. 32 Nguyén Huyén Anb, op. cit., pp. 241-2. 32. Ibid. p. 367. 33 Ibid, p. 188, 3 Ibid. 35 Ibid, p. 239. 36 Tra Trong Kim, op. cit, pp. 146-7; Lé Thanh Khéi, op. cit,, p. 333. 37 Trin Trong Kim, op. cit., p. 146. 38 Thiphakorawong, op. cit, pp. 146-151; Wenk, op. cit, pp. 112-13. “Thiphakorawene presents the story in the chronicies for the year 1786, Trin Tro Kim and other Viemamese sources date the flight of Nguyén Anh as July 1787. 39 Poole, op. cits . 24, apparently from oral accounts of Vietnamese in ‘Thailand, Ccing wrinen Viemamese sours he also notes tha ro thirds of the roughly five thousand troops of Ngu} fuynh elected to stay in Ban; join the Saroese army when Sui departed to concinue his earch for Ny tne 40 Nguyén Ludng Bich, op. cit, p. 78. 41 The Siamese readition of the lenter is found in Thiphakorawong, op. cit, p. 150, Like Wenk, I tried unsuccessfully to find the original of the letter in the Thai archives; it apparently has been lost. 42 Thiphakorawong, op. cit, p. 151. Ironically, the only time this fort was confronted with an enemy was when a French fleet subdued it and sailed up the Chao Phraya River in 1893. 43 Thiphakorawong, idid., pp. 163-7. 44 L& Thanh Kh6i, op. cit., pp. 333-4. 45 Nguyéa Huyéa Anh, op. cit, pp. 370-2. 45 ‘Thiphakorawong, op. cit., pp. 179-80. 47 ‘Wid., pp. 181-2. 3848 Following the capture of Gia Dinh, Siamese began to refer to Nj Anh as “Chao Annam Kok" (Prince of the Kingdom of Annam) instead of "Onj a Chiang Su,” their proper name for him. 49 50 su Thiphakorawong, op, cit. p. 189. Ibid., pp. 200-1. The ships were delivered in 1791 Ibid., pp. 208-9. Ibid., pp. 201-2. Ibid RRY.K,, p. 39, ‘Thipakorawong, op. cit., p. 239; R.R.Y.K., pp. 39-41. RRY.K, p. 34 ‘Thipakorawong, 9p, git. p. 243. RRY.K, p. 45. RRY.K,, pp. 46-47, ‘Trin Trong Kim, op, cit, pp. 151-152. 59CHAPTER FOUR. Relations Between Emperor Gia Long and the Courts of Rama Land IT After Gia Long took the throne as the first Viemamese emperor to rule a unified country from the Chinese border to Ha Tién, relations between him and the Bangkok court changed in form if not in substance. From the outset of his reign they changed from the temporary vassalage into which he had entered in the 1780's and 1790's to a more formal, but still respectful and friendly format, When Rama I died Gia Long's attitude toward his successor was considerably less respectful and friendly, The relationship between Hué and Bangkok during the period that the respective reigns of Rama II and Gia Long overlapped was marked by such growing strain and tension over Cambodia that armies were mobilized against each other by both sides, although there was no real fighting, Vigt Nam substantially controlled the relationship, largely because Siam was concemed about the threat from Burma, but also because of the change in style from Rama I to Rama Il, As this chapter shows, that change in style worked to the Siamese disadvantage, especially in the solidification of Viemamese dominance over Cambodia. ane ei sen tar: Siamese assistance to Nguyén Anh had begun to diminish somewhat in the 1790's because of Bangkok's preoccupation with the war with Burma. Indeed, in 1792 Rama I had turned down a request from Gia Long for a combined artack on the Tay Sdn because of campaigns against Ava and Rangoon,! But less than two years after Gia Long unified Viét Nam, Bangkok was requesting his help in fighting the Burmese. In 1804 Rama I conceived a plan to attack Mergui, Tavoy, Martaban, and Rangoon. He wrote to Gia Long outlining his plan to have Siamese troops attack by land, and naval forces drawn from seven southern principalities,including Songkhla, Tani (i.e., Pattani), and “Indians” from Saiburi (Kedah) to interdict sea lines of supply. He was concerned about the fighting abilities of the prospective navy, and asked Gia Long to send two or three hundred ships with cannon in 1809.2 But the nature and tone of communication between now co-equal monarchs changed. The compilation of diplomatic activity ordered by Thigu Tri, Gia Long's successor twice removed, lists a total of six embassies sent by Hué to Bangkok between Gia Long's accession in 1802 and the death of Rama I in 1809; three embassies sent by Siam to Viét Nam were recorded in the same period.3 (A ‘Siamese compilation records six embassies received from Viet Nam and five sent from Bangkok.)4 Never again would Gia Long include gold and silver trees as "gifts" to Bangkok. ‘That the terms of the formal relationship had changed fundamentally was demonstrated by Gia Long in receiving the embassy sent by Rama I to congramlate him on his accession to the throne. The large assortment of gifts included a tall ‘Siamese-style crown. While the Viemamese records make no mention of the crown, the Siamese note that Gia Long refused to accept it, making the excuse that it was much too exalted a gift.5 Whether Rama I had some ulterior purpose in sending a crown to Gia Long cannot be known. And it is indeed possible that Gia Long returned the crown with this diplomatic excuse. It is more likely, however, that the true reason for his refusal to accept it was to avoid the appearance of Siam conferring to him his authority, As both Rama I and Gia Long have known, both the Siamese kings and the Vietnamese emperors customarily denoted the subordination of the Khmer kings they coatrolled by awarding a crown at the beginning of a reign.6 Personal friendship and gratitude for past favors aside, the new emperor of a mini-Middle Kingdom could not afford the negative symbolism 61Erabassies between the two countries got progressively larger and more elaborate. In 1807 Gia Long moved to puta limit on the size of diplomatic missions to and from Viét Nam. Viemamese embassies travelling by sea were to be limited to fifty persons; those going by land could have only twelve. If only a letter was to be transmitted, it would be given to the Khmer to forward. Siamese missions were to have similar restrictions, They were required to stop in Gia-Dinh before proceeding to Hué, Those continuing on by sea would be limited to fifty persons; those by land to fourteen, "in order to reduce the burden of carrying heavy things along the way.” Ig Bangkok only wanted to transmit a letter, five people would be allowed to carry it to Gia Dinh, from where the local authorities would have responsibility for forwarding to Hue.” In 1811 Gia Long expanded the restriction to include not only Siamese but Khmer "and foreign” (presumably meaning all but Chinese) diplomatic missions. Original and translation copies of all diplomatic communications would be forwarded to Hue while their bearers were accommodated in Gia Dinh, waiting for word as to whether they would be allowed to proceed to the capital or not In imposing these restrictions Gia Long was clearly guided by Vietnamese experience as a tributary of China. Vietnamese embassies to Beijing, for example, were required to stop in Kwangsi before proceeding to the Imperial court. In keeping with the Chinese “Forbidden City" model Gia Long was probably motivated to limit the size of diplomatic missions in order to withdraw his administration and people from unnecessarily close contact with the outside world. As a matter of necessity, Gia Long had formed relationships with a wide variety of non-Vietnamese: Europeans, Chinese, Khmer, and Siamese. While he apparendy remained grateful in a personal sense for their assistance he moved to restrict the mobility of foreigners after he became secure as emperor. His methods and attitudesmobility of foreigners after he became secure as emperor. His methods and attitudes ‘were not so obdurate as those of his successors (or of the Tay Sdn), but the general approach was consistent, Gia Long's T {Fore In his teannent of European friends and supporters who remained with him after his accession, he was at least outwardly gracious and attentive, Several were given mandarin ranks and tiles and governmental stipends. Accounts by visiting European missions remark on the graciousness of Gia Long. The Barrow mission reported that "his conduct to foreigners is affable and condescending." Perhaps the contemporary connotation of the word “condescending” is the most appropriate, For all of his affability and willingness to include French officers in hunting partics and other superficial occasions, they were cut off from the apparatus and processes of government; they were used as a buffer between Gia Long's bureaucracy and other foreigners, and contributed (less than they advertised) to the construction of citadels around Hue and provincial cowns.10 Gia Long's attitude toward the Chinese in Vigt Nam was ambivalent, although he had made great use of them during his campaigns against the Tay Sda. Perhaps he was less self-assured in his approach than he was with Europeans, who ‘were at the time not perceived as a historical threat. Gia Long was clearly concemed to maintain good relations with China, and to avoid the sort of pressures to which Vietnamese had become accustomed over the preceding centuries. Previous (and successive) Vietnamese dynasties placed restrictions on ethnic Chinese at least partially because of apprehensiveness that they would represent a fifth column for Chinese designs on Vigt Nam. Gia Long, however, tied to ensure security by promoting amicable relations with the Qing through the use of ethnic Chineseenvoys.!1 It was apparently Gia Long, however, who established the beng system, by which ethnic Chinese were classified according to province of origin and listed in the census record for control purposes. He also made a point of obligating every Chinese in Viemam to become a soldier, although the order was never enforced fully.12 So while his treatment of ethnic Chinese was probably more lenient than that of any Viemamese ruler before or since, Gia Long did take certain steps to keep them under control, and to distinguish them from the Viemamese by differential treatment, favorable or unfavorable, In the same way that he indirectly and diplomatically, but perceptibly, fenced in his European friends and utilized the Chinese in Vietnam as agents of influence with China, Gia Long moved to restrict the access of the Siamese who had been his patrons but who were now at least no better than equals, and were potential adversaries. Containing Initants in the Bangkok-Hué Relationship. Some minor difficulties between Siamese and Vietnamese were already cropping up in border regions. While not important in themselves, and while smoothed over by exchanges of embassies bearing gifts and explanations, they presaged the more severe tensions to come between two self-confident powers. For example, in 1806 Siamese troops under Phraya Chieng Ngoen clashed with Vietnamese forces while going to Luang Prabang to escort back to Bangkok some Siamese citizens who had recently escaped from Burma. Phraya Chieng Ngoen was captured

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