Taada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette.
The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to
rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized
as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber
that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

FACTS:

Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet
on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The
heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before
the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue
Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the
workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions.

RULING:

The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmens
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V.

FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch
39 of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Manila, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE LIQUIDATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS
BANK, respondents

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?

This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary
Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with
Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the
Philippine Veterans Bank, the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the Philipppine
Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V.
Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court in SP-
32311.[1]

After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were
made. However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid.[2]

On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the above
case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.[3]

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the
rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank.[4]
 Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for
reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.[5]

Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to
reopen.[6]

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent
judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that
respondents were set to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of another
lawyer, while petitioners claims have been frozen to their prejudice.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus
officio, and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.

In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case.

On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards filed
a Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion before Branch 39
of the RTC of Manila, in SP-No. 32311, praying that said court order PVB to pay their backwages
and salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders No. NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and
Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A; and, that said court, in an Order dated June 5, 1992,
approved therein movants case and directed the bank liquidator or PVB itself to pay the backwages
and differentials in accordance with the computation incorporated in the order. Said intervenors
likewise manifested that there was an error in the computation of the monetary benefits due them.

On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated July 6, 1992,
filed their Comment opposing the Motion for Leave to File Intervention and for exclusion from the
operation of the T.R.O. on the grounds that the movants have no legal interest in the subject matter
of the pending action; that allowing intervention would only cause delay in the proceedings; and
that the motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal basis and would render
moot the relief sought in the petition.

On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention praying for the issuance of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in connection with the
issuance by respondent judge of several orders involving acts of liquidation of PVB even after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7169. PVB further alleges that respondent judge clearly acted in excess of or
without jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.

We find for the petitioners.

Republic Act No. 7169 entitled An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created
Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes, which
was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which was published
in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine
Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years from the date of the
reopening of the head office.[7] The law likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation
committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same. [8]
 Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed
Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a
Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the
respondent judge praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the
passage of R.A. No. 7169.

On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which
approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee.

Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen.

On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation
Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent judge.

As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, issued a temporary restraining
order in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the liquidation
of PVB.

On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started
regular banking operations.

Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has
rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped of
the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.

Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors.
[9]
It is the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive
them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or
loss.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or

reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort
to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency.
[10]

It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the
concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the
liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and,
the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on
the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view
that both contentions are bereft of merit.

While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the
legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause unless otherwise
provided.

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
 Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its
approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino
on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No.
7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published
in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central
Bank and Liquidator.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN

DUE COURSE and GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
further proceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Appeals
G.R. No. 80718 (1988)

Facts:
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners Feliza P. De Roy and Virgilio Ramos
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the respondent Luis Bernal
resulting
in injuries to private respondents to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to
the
weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross
negligence.
The trial courts order was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. On the last day of the 15 days
period
to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied because it was no
longer
within the grace period. Petitioners now contend that the rule in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non- publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official
Gazette at
the time of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding.

HELD:
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the
fifteen-
day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court
en
banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of
counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest

G.R. No 127882

Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796
authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon
appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines
the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and
approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern
financial or technical assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times,
two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP
covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20,
1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that
the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen
days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and
null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in
DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as
unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining
Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.

Issue :

Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

Ruling :
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for
purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral
processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said
section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance
agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical
assistance agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to
convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a
financial and technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing
provisions and cannot stand on their own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical
assistance agreement.

Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance
agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical
assistance agreement proposals;

Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a
financial and technical assistance agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said
contractors;

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature
would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March
1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were
declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before
the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979
and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August
1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be
declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with
Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC
found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for
doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:

SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought
damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact,
that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise
suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a
situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so,
would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an
action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.

Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting
and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2
children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.