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Manalo vs.

CA Case Digest
Manalo vs. CA
G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001

Facts: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his
wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all of legal age. At the time of his
death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province
of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop.

The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the
respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and
for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners
therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside
herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who were granted then 10 days within which to
file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein
petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion.

Issue: Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members
of the same family have been made.

Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit. petitioners may not validly take refuge
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation
of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter
provision is clear enough.

This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy
which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right,
whether at law or in equity.

2. Te vs CA (Te v. Choa)G.R. 126746November 29, 2000

FACTS:Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on September 14, 1988. They
did not live togetherafter marriage although they would meet each other
regularly. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to agirl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped
visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted a second marriage whilemarriage
with Liliana was subsisting. Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and
subsequentlyan administrative case (revocation of engineering license for
grossly immoral act) against Arthurand Julieta Santella (2ndwife of Arthur).
Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage withLiliana.RTC and Board
rendered decision while the petition for annulment of fi rst marriage
waspending.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Marriage annulment case is a prejudicial question


and had to be resolved firstbefore criminal and administrative case be
rendered judgment?

HELD:NO. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed


valid until declaredotherwise in a judicial proceeding. Thus, it cannot be used
as a prejudicial question to the priorcriminal case and administrative case
against the petitioner. Moreover, the second marriage wasclearly a void ab
initio. Lastly, Article 40 of the Family Code is the prevailing rule: the
absolutenullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.

3. IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBISvs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS

TOPIC:

FACTS:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-
affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

ISSUE:Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

RULING:No. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration
of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, it was held that the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by
analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was
contracted rests upon the defense,but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy
case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may
be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court,
therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.

Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage
ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he
thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question
for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution.

5. Philippine Rabbit vs. People


G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court
further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused,
petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and
executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The
CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the
institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus,
once determined in the criminal case against the accused-
employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in
the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment
of conviction independently of the accused.
Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the
appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an
appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime
charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that
is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced
by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted
out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the
civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se, but not
those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the
offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor --
still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to
the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although
in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While
they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now
accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters
insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the
trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability
of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In
effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction
surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of
their employees without the latters consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The
decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding
and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The
liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the
employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final
and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the
primary civil liability.

6. People vs Odilao

People v. Odilao

[G.R. No. 155451. April 14, 2004]

Facts:

Herein respondent David S. Odilao, Jr. together with two other persons was charged
with the crime of Estafa committed sometime during the latter part of 1997in Cebu
City. In the information, it stated that after having received in trust from Trans Eagle
Corporation a luxury car valued at P1,199,520.00, with the agreement that they
would buy the same if they are interested and to return the said car to Trans Eagle
Corporation if they are not, the accused took possession of the said luxury carand
despite repeated demands, they have failed and refused to return the car and
instead denied to have received it.

A warrant of arrest was then issued by the RTC judge. Upon motion of the accused,
a reinvestigation was ordered where the trial prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the information against him and filed a motion to dismiss. Private
respondent Carmen G. Bugash, however, appealed the reinvestigation report to the
DOJ and the RTC held in abeyance the arraignment of the accused and the
resolution on the motion to dismiss until the DOJ shall have resolve the petition for
review. After the lapse of one year, the RTC directed the implementation of the
existing warrant of arrest against the accused, but the CA, on certiorari, directed the
RTC to defer proceedings to await the resolution by the DOJ.

Issue:

WON the trial court can order proceedings to continue despite the pendency of an
appeal with the DOJ.

7. SALVADOR BENEDICTO (deceased). ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO vs. COURT OF


APPEALS and VICENTE A. HERAS. G.R. No. L-22733 September 25, 1968
FACTS: The adjoining properties of the Heras and the defendant Benedicto
formerly belonged to HEDRICK. On Septebmer 29, 1917, HEDRICK sold a
portion of the above described property, particularly Lots Nos. 8, 9, 22 and 23
to RECTO. At the time of the sale, the following buildings were located on the
respective properties of Claro M. Recto and Miriam R. Hedrick. The sale to
RECTO as evidenced by the Escritura de Compra-Venta (Annex "B") was
subject, among others, to the condition that they would equally share in
providing a 3 to 4 meter easement for vehicles both at the sides of their
properties and that both parties agree that the dividing line between the
portion sold to Recto remains in the domain of Hedrick fall and that line will
be perpendicular to the San Marcelino street. RECTOs properties were
subject to a series of transfers, which eventually ended up with SALVADOR
BENEDICTO. HEDRICKs properties were subject to a series of transfers but
was ultimately acquired by VICENTE HERAS. Sometime in 1941, the Heras
demolished the entire building situated on his property. The trial court
likewise found that the easement of way was found entirely within the
property of Benedicto, contrary to the stipulation in the deed of sale between
Hedrick and Recto that it should be between their properties, with each
contributing an equal portion of his property. Accordingly, the court directed
both parties to contribute equally to the maintenance of a three to four-
meter-wide passageway between their properties, with the property line
running at the middle of the passageway. It rejected Benedicto's claim that
the easement had been extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the
necessity for a passageway. Both parties appealed to the CA, which rendered
a decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court, and denied the MR
filed by the parties. Benedicto argues that the easement was originally
constituted because the buildings then erected on the respective properties
of Hedrick and Recto so adjoined each other that the only way the back
portions of the properties could be reached by their owners from San
Marcelino street was through the passageway. He claims that when the
respondent Heras had his building demolished in 1941 the property gained
direct access to San Marcelino street since then there has been no need for
the passageway. ISSUE: Whether or not the easement has been extinguished
by nonuser. RULE: Article 631 of the Civil Code provides in part: Art. 631.
Easments are extinguished: x x x x x x x x x (2) By nonuser for ten years,
with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed from
the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place; (3)
When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement
cannot be used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates
or either of them should again permit its use, unless when the use becomes
possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the
provisions of the preceding number; . . . . For the purposes of this decision we
do not find it necessary to determine whether the appropriate period of
nonuser in this case is 20 or 10 years. For one thing, there is no indubitable
proof of nonuser. Benedicto merely assumes that the passageway in question
had not been in use since 1941 because the property of Heras has since
gained direct access to San Marcelino street with the demolition of his house.
For another, even if we assume that the period of prescription based on
nonuser is 10 years, the very testimony of the petitioner Benedicto shows
that it was only in 1946 that he had the passageway walled in by
constructing a fence, and since the present action was filed in 1955, granting
that article 631 of the Civil Code is applicable, the prescriptive period has not
yet elapsed. Nor can presumptive renunciation by Heras of the use of the said
passageway be inferred. It would appear from the record that Heras started
the construction of an apartment building on his parcel of land after the
demolition of his house in 1941, and that although interrupted by World War
II, construction was continued in 1955. Since it is patent from the stipluation
of facts that the easement in question is mainly a vehicular passageway, the
obvious need for such passageway to the rear portion of the projected
apartment building negates any presumptive renunciation on the part of
Heras. Moreover, the easement in this case is perpetual in character (using
google translate: for all the time and all the needs of each of the two
properties, sold by the present Claro M. Recto and which is held by Miriam R.
Hedrick, this agreement being obligatory for everyone after acquire by any
title mentioned farms) and was annotated on all the transfer certificates of
title issued in the series of transfers from Hedrick through to the respondent
Heras, and in the transfer certificates of title issued in the series of transfers
from Recto through to the petitioner Benedicto. Since there is nothing in the
record that would point to a mutual agreement between any of the
predecessors-in-interest not between the petitioner and the respondent
themselves with respect to the discontinuance or obliteration of the
easement annotated on the titles, the continued existence of the easement
must be upheld and respected. The fact that the easement here is one of
necessity does not detract from the conclusion we have reached. For even
assuming that with the demolition of the house on Heras' property the
necessity for the passageway ceased (a point traversed by Heras who claims
that he demolished his house precisely in order to build an apartment
building in its place). ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
at petitioner's cost.

12. Potot vs. People

Facts: Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the
charge. Thereupon, the trial court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner filed a
manifestation with motion that he is not appealing from the Decision. However, the wife of the
victim, filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that
the case be heard again because there were irregularities committed before and during the trial
which caused miscarriage of justice. The trial court granted private complainant's motion and
set aside its Decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the corresponding charge.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
issue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the said order would place the
accused in double jeopardy. This was denied for the reason that the State is not bound by the
error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against double
jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same case.

Ruling: Affirmative. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or
set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when
the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

Only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And
this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Such
judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by
the accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b)
when he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to
appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for
probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered the
judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it.

In this case, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom.
Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterable. Thus, it was
beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order setting aside its Decision which had
attained finality.

A judgment which has acquired the status of finality becomes immutable. Any error, assuming
one was committed in the judgment, will not justify its amendment except only to correct clerical
errors or mistakes.

The assailed orders would violate the constitutional right of the petitioner against double
jeopardy. Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he
has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the
peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.

To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has
pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.