CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
material. Not the truth or falsity behind them. It
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
NEAR v. MINNESOTA
F: Near is the owner of The Saturday Press. The
county attorney of Hennepin brought this action
to enjoin The Saturday Press for publishing
articles charged, in substance, that a Jewish
gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging,
and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law
enforcing officers and agencies were not
energetically performing their duties. Most of the
charges were directed against the chief of police;
he was charged with gross neglect of duty, illicit
relations with gangsters, and with participation in
graft. The county attorney was charged with
knowing the existing conditions and with failure
to take adequate measures to remedy them. The
mayor was accused of inefficiency and
dereliction. On member of the grand jury was
stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. A
special grand jury and a special prosecutor were
demanded to deal with the situation in general,
and, in particular, to investigate an attempt to
assassinate one Guilford, one of the original
defendants, who, it appears from the articles, was
shot by gangsters after the first issue of the
periodical had been published. There is no
question but that the articles made serious
accusations against the public officers named and
others in connection with the prevalence of
crimes and the failure to expose and punish
them.
Defendants claim that the facts arent sufficient
to constitute a cause of action and that the
statute was in fact unconstitutional.
Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota for
the year 1925 provides for the abatement, as a
public nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical. It criminalizes any person who is a
member, employee, participant in a corporation
or business engaged in the circulation,
production, and publication of malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory print materials.
The Court found the publication in violation of the
provision. An appeal was made with the Supreme
Court:
I: W/N the Saturday Press and its freedom of
speech are protected by the 14th Amendment
H: Clause (b) of section one is unconstitutional.
-The law is aimed at the distribution of scandalous
requires the proof by the state of malice.
-The object of the statute is not punishment, in
the ordinary sense, but suppression of the
offending newspaper or periodical. The reason for
the enactment, as the state court has said, is that
prosecutions to enforce penal statutes for libel do
not result in 'efficient repression or suppression of
the evils of scandal.'
-that it is better to leave a few of its noxious
branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by
pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those
yielding the proper fruits.
-Public officers, whose character and conduct
remain open to debate and free discussion in the
press, find their remedies for false accusations in
actions under libel laws providing for redress and
punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain
the publication of newspapers and periodicals.
-The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very
reason for its existence, does not depend, as this
court has said, on proof of truth.
-Judgment reversed. We should add that this
decision rests upon the operation and effect of
the statute, without regard to the question of the
truth of the charges contained in the particular
periodical.
-In the first place, the main purpose of such
constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been
practiced by other governments,' and they do not
prevent the subsequent punishment of such as
may be deemed contrary to the public welfare.
-The preliminary freedom extends as well to the
false as to the true; the subsequent punishment
may extend as well to the true as to the false.
This was the law of criminal libel apart from
statute in most cases, if not in all.
-The exceptional nature of its limitations places in
a strong light the general conception that liberty
of the press, historically considered and taken up
by the Federal Constitution, has meant,
principally although not exclusively, immunity
from previous restraints or censorship.
-"the protection even as to previous restraint is
not absolutely unlimited."
FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND
F: Freedman is the owner of a Baltimore theatre
who showed Revenge at Daybreak in said
theatre. Maryland State Board of Sensors requires
that every movie to be shown within their
jurisdiction be screened for any obscenity, and
because of his violation, Freedman was
CONVICTED. The State admits that the unlicensed
movie does not violate any of the standards, only
that it was not subject to scrutiny and given the
approval for screening. The issue isnt about the
prevention of the first showing of a film (whether
or not obscene), it is that the law presents PRIOR
RESTRAINT because it presents A DANGER of
unduly suppressing protected expression:
particularly on the procedure for an initial
decision by the board which effectively, without
judicial participation BARS the exhibition of the
film, and even, in this case convicts the exhibitor.
I: W/N Maryland motion picture censorship
stature is constitutional
H: NO. The court reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland due to the fact
that the statute presents prior restraints.
-In the area of freedom of expression it is
well established that one has standing to
challenge a statute on the ground that it
delegates overly broad licensing discretion to
an administrative office, whether or not his
conduct could be proscribed by a properly
drawn statute, and whether or not he applied
for a license.
-In substance his argument is that, because
the apparatus operates in a statutory context
in which judicial review may be too little and
too late, the Maryland statute lacks sufficient
safeguards for confining the censor's action
to judicially determined constitutional limits,
and therefore contains the same vice as a
statute delegating excessive administrative
discretion.
-The ability of the Censor Board to convict
goes well beyond their jurisdiction that it
steps on the right to freedom of expression.
-Applying the settled rule of our cases, we
hold that a noncriminal process which
requires the prior submission of a film to a
censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it
takes place under procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system.
-First, the burden of proving that the film is
unprotected expression must rest on the
censor. As we said in Speiser v. Randall,
"Where the transcendent value of speech is
involved, due process certainly requires . . .
that the State bear the burden of persuasion
to show that the appellants engaged in
criminal speech." Second, while the State
may require advance submission of all films,
in order to proceed effectively to bar all
showings of unprotected films, the
requirement cannot be administered in a
manner which would lend an effect of finality
to the censor's determination whether a film
constitutes protected expression. The
teaching of our cases is that, because only a
judicial determination in an adversary
proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity
to freedom of expression, only a procedure
requiring a judicial determination suffices to
impose a valid final restraint.
-Therefore, the procedure must also assure a
prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the
deterrent effect of an interim and possibly
erroneous denial of a license.
-It is readily apparent that the Maryland
procedural scheme does not satisfy these
criteria. First, once the censor disapproves
the film, the exhibitor must assume the
burden of instituting judicial proceedings and
of persuading the courts that the film is
protected expression. Second, once the
Board has acted against a film, exhibition is
prohibited pending judicial review, however
protracted. Under the statute, appellant
could have been convicted if he had shown
the film after unsuccessfully
seeking a license, even though no court had
ever ruled on the obscenity of the film. Third,
it is abundantly clear that the Maryland
statute provides no assurance of prompt
judicial determination. We hold, therefore,
that appellant's conviction must be reversed.
The Maryland scheme fails to provide
adequate safeguards against undue
inhibition of protected expression, and this
renders the 2 requirement of prior
submission of films to the Board an invalid
previous restraint.
NEW YORK TIMES CO v. US
F: The New York Times and Washington Post were
enjoined from publishing contents of a highly-
classified study entitled "History of U.S.
Decision- Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." The
lower courts who adjudged the cases for New York
and The Washington Post share the sentiments
laid down in Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe that: The Government "thus carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition
of such a restraint." Supreme Court agrees.
Background story: The Nixon administration tried
to repress the leakage of pentagon papers as it
criminalized and besmirch the name and cause of
Ellsberg.
I: W/N the prevention of the publication was legal
H: NO. The burden that the state bears to show
justification for the imposition of such restraint
was not proved.
PEOPLE v. PEREZ
F: Perez was a municipal secretary of polar,
Sorsogon. On April 1 1922, he was engaged in a
discussion with several persons about the then
administration where he said "we must get bolos
and cut off Wood's head for having recommended
a bad thing for the Philippines." He was charged
in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having
to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or
other persons in authority. 2 witnesses were
presented for prosecution and 3 for defense. The
two witnesses reiterated that he did in fact say
things in violation of Art. 256. The witnesses to
the defense said that prior to that there was an
altercation with a severo Madrid. The latter
saying the lack of independence and the situation
of the Philippines is due to the Nacionalista Party,
while Perez retorted that it was Governor-General
Wood as the one in charge, who brought the
Philippines to its state.
I: W/N Perez should be convicted for the violation
of Art 256
H: No. He should be convicted for violating Art
292, committing acts of sedition. His words were
not merely in contempt of the crown and it's
ministers. It was seditious (and treasonous) in
that it was inciting public disturbance.
-It is of course fundamentally true that the
provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted
so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of
grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate
even to the foundations of Government. Criticism,
no matter how severe, on the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range
of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious. But when the intention and
effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of
assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence of
the State.
DENNIS v. US
F: In1948, petitioners were indicted for the
violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith
Act. The motion to quash that consequently
assails the constitutionality of the provisions was
dismissed both by lower court and the CA.
Section 2 makes unlawful the following acts:
advocating, teaching the duty or necessity to
overthrow the government, prining such
materials for the advocacy, and to organize a
group or society that advocate the same.
Section 3 makes it unlawful to attempt to,
conspire to, or actually do acts prohibited in the
provisions.
Petitioners were found conspiring to organize a
Communist Party, and teaching and advocating
the teachings that tend toward the overthrow of
the government. The evidence gathered
amounted to 16,000 pages in record.
I: W/N the means employed, by Congress in
enacting such laws, were in conflict with the First
Amendment
H: NO. We hold that 2 (a) (1), 2 (a) (3) and 3 of
the Smith Act do not inherently, or as construed
or applied in the instant case, violate the First
Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, or the First and Fifth Amendments
because of indefiniteness. Petitioners intended to
overthrow the Government of the United States
as speedily as the circumstances would permit.
Their conspiracy to organize the Communist Party
and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the
Government of the United States by force and
violence created a "clear and present danger" of
an attempt to overthrow the Government by force
and violence. They were properly and
constitutionally convicted for violation of the
Smith Act. The judgments of conviction are
affirmed.
The law gives way to discussion, as what
petitioners claim to have been doing. The law
only punishes the advocacy of overthrowing the
government. The basis of the First Amendment
is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech,
propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate
of ideas will result in the wisest government
policies.
-Justice Holmes: The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has the right to prevent.
-The clear and present danger standard is not
neat nor mathematical, but like all verbalizations
it is subject to criticism on the score of
indefiniteness.
-Success or the probability of success in
overthrowing the government should not be the
criterion.
GONZALES v. COMELEC
F: An action for declaratory relief with
preliminary injunction was instigated by
petitioners wherein the latter assails the
constitutionality of 2 new provisions in the
Revised Election code under RA 4880. The
assailed provisions were described to be limiting
of the campaign period as well as allowing of
early nomination of candidates. Petitioner
Gonzales came as a Filipino citizen, taxpayer, and
voter, where hi co-petitioner Cabigao was running
for Vice Mayor of Manila.
-In the answer of the respondent as well as its
memorandum, stress was laid on Republic Act No.
4880 as an exercise of the police power of the
state, designed to insure a free, orderly and
honest election by regulating "conduct which
Congress has determined harmful because if
unrestrained and carried for a long period before
elections it necessarily entails huge expenditures
of funds on the part of the candidates,
precipitates violence and even deaths, results in
the corruption of the electorate, and inflicts
direful consequences upon public interest as the
vital affairs of the country are sacrificed to purely
partisan pursuits." Evidently for respondent that
would suffice to meet the constitutional questions
raised as to the alleged infringement of free
speech, free press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association.
- Freedom of speech and of the press thus means
something more than the right to approve
existing political beliefs or economic
arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, to take refuge in the existing climate
of opinion on any matter of public consequence.
So atrophied, the right becomes meaningless.
The right belongs as well, if not more, for those
who question, who do not conform, who differ. To
paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the
thought that we hate, no less than for the
thought that agrees with us.
- Thus: "These are the 'clear and present
danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule.
The first, as interpreted in a number of cases,
means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be 'extremely
serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high' before the utterance can be
punished. The danger to be guarded against
is the 'substantive evil' sought to be
prevented." It has the advantage of establishing
according to the above decision "a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be published."
-The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other
test, the "dangerous tendency" rule and
explained it thus: "If the words uttered create
a dangerous tendency which the state has a
right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent."
- ". . . the evil apprehended is so imminent that it
may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion. If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence."
- The Bill of Rights as thus noted prohibits
abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the
press. It likewise extends the same protection to
the right of the people peaceably to assemble. As
was pointed out by Justice Malcolm in the case of
United States v. Bustos, 30 this right is a
necessary consequence of our republican
institution and complements the right of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs. From the same Bustos
opinion: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and
the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion."
I: W/N the provisions of RA 4880 are violative of
the freedom of speech and freedom to assemble
H: PARTLY YES. (But the provisions were not
struck down)
Freedom to assemble VALID: the political parties
are given less freedom as to the time in choosing
their representatives or candidates because of
the time limit imposed by the law. BUT it does not
curtail their other rights to assemble.
Freedom of speech VOID for VAGUENESS: to
engage in an election campaign or partisan
political activity except during the period of one
hundred twenty days immediately preceding an
election involving a public office voted for at large
and ninety days immediately preceding an
election for any other elective public office. The
term 'candidate' refers to any person aspiring for
or seeking an elective public office regardless of
whether or not said person has already filed his
certificate of candidacy or has been nominated
by any political party as its candidate. The term
'election campaign' of 'partisan political activity'
refers to acts designed to have a candidate
elected or not or promote the candidacy of a
person or persons to a public office . . ."
-More specifically, in terms of the permissible
scope of legislation that otherwise could be
justified under the clear and present danger
doctrine, it is the considered opinion of the
majority, though lacking the necessary vote for
an adjudication of invalidity, that the challenged
statute could have been more narrowly drawn
and the practices prohibited more precisely
delineated to satisfy the constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the
clear and present danger doctrine.
-It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the
governmental purposes be legitimate and
substantial, they cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. For
precision of regulation is the touchstone in an
area so closely related to our most precious
freedoms.
Under the circumstances then, a majority of the
Court feels compelled to view the statutory
provisions in question as unconstitutional on their
face inasmuch as they appear to range too widely
and indiscriminately across the fundamental
liberties associated with freedom of the mind.
-that such provisions were deemed by the
legislative body to be part and parcel of the
necessary and appropriate response not merely
to a clear and present danger but to the actual
existence of a grave and substantive evil of
excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption
as well as violence that of late has invariably
marred election campaigns and partisan political
activities in this country. He did invite our
attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that
in the choice of remedies for an admitted malady
requiring governmental action, on the legislature
primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the
cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to
fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded.
- We recognize the wide discretion accorded
Congress to protect vital interests. Considering
the responsibility incumbent on the judiciary, it is
not always possible, even with the utmost
sympathy shown for the legislative choice of
means to cure an admitted evil, that the
legislative judgment arrived at, with its possible
curtailment of the preferred freedoms, be
accepted uncritically. There may be times, and
this is one of them, with the majority, with all the
respect to a coordinate branch, unable to extend
their approval to the aforesaid specific provisions
of one of the sections of the challenged statute.
The necessary two-third vote, however, not being
obtained, there is no occasion for the power to
annul statutes to come into play.
AYER PROD PYT LTD. V. JUDGE CAPULONG
F: Australian film maker and owner of Ayer
Productions, Hal McElroy, envisioned, sometime
in 1987, the filming for commercial viewing and
for Philippine and international release, the
historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA.
-The proposed motion picture would be
essentially a reenactment of the events that
made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed
to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television
play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating
four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background.
On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile
replied that "[he] would not and will not approve
of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television
production, film or other medium for advertising
or commercial exploitation" and further advised
petitioners that "in the production, airing,
showing, distribution or exhibition of said or
similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether
written, verbal or visual) should be made to
[him] or any member of his family, much less to
any matter purely personal to them." The
petitioners obliged.
-However, Enrile had the crew and the production
subject to a preliminary injunction for his
unwarranted involvement in the film. Ayer
answered that Enrile was not in fact included. The
court still issued a TRO partially enjoining the
implementation of the respondent Judge's Order
of 16 March 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued therein, and allowing the
petitioners to resume producing and filming those
portions of the projected mini-series which do not
make any reference to private respondent or his
family or to any fictitious character based on or
bearing substantial resemblance or similarity to
or identifiable as private respondent.
I: W/N petitioners right to freedom of speech is
being infringed
H:
-Motion pictures are important both as a medium
for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse.
-Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be
invoked to resist publication and dissemination of
matters of public interest. 8 The interest sought
to be protected by the right of privacy is the right
to be free from "unwarranted publicity, from the
wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and
activities of an individual which are outside the
realm of legitimate public concern."
- Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as
radio, television and the movies, is the
'balancing-of-interests test' (Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970
ed., p. 79). The principle 'requires a court to
take conscious and detailed consideration
of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation or type of situation.'
- Because of the preferred character of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of
expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity
vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the
exercise of such freedoms. 14 The invalidity of a
measure of prior restraint does not, of course,
mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be
imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such
constitutional freedoms.
- The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution"
relates to the non-bloody change of government
that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
in February 1986, and the train of events, which
led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject
matter is one of public interest and concern.
-The extent of the intrusion upon the life of
private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile that would
be entailed by the production and exhibition of
"The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be
limited in character. The extent of that intrusion,
as this Court understands the synopsis of the
proposed film, may be generally described as
such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep
that film a truthful historical account. Private
respondent does not claim that petitioners
threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution"
any part of the private life of private respondent
or that of any member of his family.
- A public figure has been defined as a person
who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of
living, or by adopting a profession or calling which
gives the public a legitimate interest in his
doings, his affairs, and his character, has become
a 'public personage.'
Such public figures were held to have lost, to
some extent at least, their right of privacy.
- Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely
because, inter alia, of his participation as a
principal actor in the culminating events of the
change of government in February 1986. Because
his participation therein was major in character, a
film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that
fails to make reference to the role played by
private respondent would be grossly unhistorical.
- The line of equilibrium in the specific context of
the instant case between the constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture
must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events. There must, in other
words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of
truth in depicting the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There
must, further, be no presentation of the private
life of the unwilling private respondent and
certainly no revelation of intimate or
embarrassing personal facts. 17 The proposed
motion picture should not enter into what Mme.
Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to
as "matters of essentially private concern." 18 To
the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits
itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those
events, which are directly and reasonably related
to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the
intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot
be regarded as unreasonable and actionable.
Such portrayal may be carried out even without a
license from private respondent.
-Lawyers of Honasan and Enrile not charged of
forum shopping.
ADIONG v. COMELEC
F: 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 2347. The provisions provide: It is unlawful to
post in any place, whether public or private,
mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
common posted areas and/or billboards, at the
campaign headquarters of the candidate or
political party, organization or coalition, or at the
candidate's own residential house or one of his
residential houses, if he has more than one:
Provided, that such posters or election
propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three
(3) feet in size."
-Petitioner, a senatorial candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of
decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars
and other moving vehicles.
I: W/N COMELEC can prohibit the posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to
the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
H: NO.
-The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III) There is no public
interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of
restriction involved in this case.
- It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections
may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and
to convince or persuade is denied and taken
away.
-The so-called balancing of interests individual
freedom on one hand and substantial public
interests on the other is made even more
difficult in election campaign cases because the
Constitution also gives specific authority to the
Commission on Elections to supervise the
conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
-When faced with border line situations where
freedom to speak by a candidate or party and
freedom to know on the part of the electorate are
invoked against actions intended for maintaining
clean and free elections, the police, local officials
and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom.
For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the
citizen and the State's power to regulate are not
antagonistic. There can be no free and honest
elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the
freedom to speak and the right to know are
unduly curtailed.
-The posting of decals and stickers in mobile
places like cars and other moving vehicles does
not endanger any substantial government
interest. There is no clear public interest
threatened by such activity so as to justify the
curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free
speech and expression. Under the clear and
present danger rule not only must the danger be
patently clear and pressingly present but the evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as
to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing
instrument to be stilled.
-For these reasons any attempt to restrict those
liberties must be justified by clear public interest,
threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by
clear and present danger. The rational connection
between the remedy provided and the evil to be
curbed, which in other context might support
legislation against attack on due process grounds,
will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer
foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would
restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear
support in public danger, actual or impending.
Only the greatest abuses, endangering
permanent interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation.
-Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed
by the question prohibition is not so much that of
the candidate or the political party. The regulation
strikes at the freedom of an individual to express
his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to
convince others to agree with him. A sticker may
be furnished by a candidate but once the car
owner agrees to have it placed on his private
vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by
the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody
else.
-A statute is considered void for overbreadth
when "it offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms."
-The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2)
inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length
in any place, including mobile places whether
public or private except in areas designated by
the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where
the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately-owned
vehicle.
-The provisions allowing regulations are so loosely
worded that they include the posting of decals or
stickers in the privacy of one's living room or
bedroom.
-In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated
by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
SWS v. COMELEC
F: RA 9006 is being assailed by petitioners for
section 5.4 which PROHIBITED the publication of
surveys affecting national candidates fifteen days
before an election, and surveys affecting local
candidates seven days before an election, was a
prior restraint on the exercise of the freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint.
Petitioner is a private non-stock, non-profit social
research institution conducting surveys in various
fields, including economics, politics, demography,
and social development, and thereafter
processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the
results thereof.
-Election surveys refer to the measurement of
opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards
a candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms
or a matter of public discussion in relation to the
election, including voters' preference for
candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period (hereafter referred to as
"Survey").
I: W/N section 5.4 is unconstitutionally violating
freedom of speech.
H: YES. 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it
is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only
for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom
of expression.
-It lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech,
expression, and the press by prohibiting the
publication of election survey results affecting
candidates within the prescribed periods of
fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a
national election and seven (7) days before a
local election. Because of the preferred status of
the constitutional rights of speech, expression,
and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a
weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, "any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity. . . . The Government
'thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such
restraint.'" 3 There is thus a reversal of the
normal presumption of validity that inheres in
every legislation.
-OBRIEN TEST- A government regulation is
sufficiently justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and
press] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, it
should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is "not unrelated to the suppression of
free expression."
-5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of
opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other
opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a
particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by
preferring personal opinion to statistical results.
-The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the
curtailment of the right of expression is direct,
absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total
suppression of a category of speech and is not
made less so because it is only for a period of
fifteen (15) days immediately before a national
election and seven (7) days immediately before a
local election.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC
F: 2013, posted two tarpaulins within their
property but was within public view. One said
ibasura ang RH Law, and the other presented a
classification, coined Conscience Vote, of the
candidates who were either TEAM BUHAY and
TEAM PATAY. The size of the tarps were 6x10 ft.
The tarps werent sponsored by any candidate.
- Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of
Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials for being oversized
(requirements for campaign materials were 2x3),
within 3 days. Petitioners asked to be given a
specific provision from COMELEC law and that
while pending, they be given the freedom to
continue displaying. Court issued a TRO.
-In fear of being subject to prosecution,
petitioners submitted a writ of certiorari and
prohibition.
I: 1. W/N the letters sent to petitioners were final
and executory, determining the jurisdiction of the
court to try
2. W/N the hierarchy of courts was violated
3. W/N the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all
with its acts threatening imminent criminal action
effectively abridging meaningful political speech
H: 1. The letters were enforcing a law, which is
the subject matter of the case. The court can
determine whether those laws are impeding the
exercise of fundamental rights.
Political Question: to be sure, the force to impugn
the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble
in light of the new Constitution which expanded
the definition of judicial power as including "the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
2. NO. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not
an iron-clad rule. A direct resort to this court is
allowed when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time.
3.NO. Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a
campaign material in their issuances. The above
provisions regulating the posting of campaign
materials only apply to candidates and political
parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
-These provisions show that election propaganda
refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in
coordination with candidates and political parties.
The tarps werent paid for by any candidate.
-In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to
give a commentary on the candidates for the
2013 national elections because of the COMELEC
notice and letter. It was not merely a regulation
on the campaigns of candidates vying for public
office.
-Communication exists when "(1) a speaker,
seeking to signal others, uses conventional
actions because he or she reasonably believes
that such actions will be taken by the audience in
the manner intended; and (2) the audience so
takes the actions." "[I]n communicative action[,]
the hearer may respond to the claims by . . .
either accepting the speech act's claims or
opposing them with criticism or requests for
justification."
Speech is not limited to vocal communication.
"[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech
sometimes referred to as 'symbolic speech[,]'"
such that "'when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of
conduct,' the 'communicative element' of the
conduct may be 'sufficient to bring into play the
[right to freedom of expression].'"
-We distinguish between political and commercial
speech. Political speech refers to speech "both
intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue," 200 "foster[ing]
informed and civic-minded deliberation." 201 On
the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction."
The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
-While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates
and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda.
The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in
return for consideration" by any candidate,
political party, or party-list group.
-"speech serves one of its greatest public
purposes in the context of elections when the free
exercise thereof informs the people what the
issues are, and who are supporting what issues."
-The right to freedom of expression is indeed not
absolute. Even some forms of protected speech
are still subject to some restrictions. The degree
of restriction may depend on whether the
regulation is content-based or content-neutral.
223 Content-based regulations can either be
based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the
subject of the expression.
-Size limitations during elections hit at a core part
of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used
the clear and present danger rule as measure.
228 Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a
heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured
against the clear and present danger rule. The
latter will pass constitutional muster only if
justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor
vague. 229 (Citations omitted)
-Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to
time and place. They are fundamentally part of
expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of
the Constitution.
-Because of that, the size regulation is not
unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting
the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render
ineffective petitioners' message and violate their
right to exercise freedom of expression. (in
violation of the OBrien test)
xxx
-In an equality-based approach, "politically
disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,]
but regulation promoting political equality
prevails over speech."
-Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be
constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of
persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party if they are
not candidates, only if what is regulated is
declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for
its principal object the endorsement of a
candidate only. The regulation
(a) should be provided by law,
(b) reasonable,
(c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be
heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and
(d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to
achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the
time, place, and manner of the rendition of the
message. In no situation may the speech be
prohibited or censored on the basis of its content.
For this purpose, it will not matter whether the
speech is made with or on private property.
-Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property
of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.
-Freedom of expression can be intimately
related with the right to property. There
may be no expression when there is no
place where the expression may be made.
COMELEC's infringement upon petitioners'
property rights as in the present case also
reaches out to infringement on their
fundamental right to speech.
-With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the
church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are
not binding upon this court.
-Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are
opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a species
of expression protected by our fundamental law.
It is an expression designed to invite attention,
cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be
motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of
their ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner's
actions will have very real secular consequences.
1-UNITED v. COMELEC
SWS v. COMELEC
F: In Feb 2013, SWS and Pulse Asia conducted a
survey, asking voters which senators they would
vote for if on the day of the survey, it was the day
of casting votes.
-Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution
No. 9674 directed Social Weather Stations, Inc.
(SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as
"other survey firms of similar circumstance" 4 to
submit to COMELEC the names of all
commissioners and payors of all surveys
published from February 12, 2013 to April 23,
2013, including those of their "subscribers."
-Tiangco recounted that on February 28, 2013, he
wrote to SWS requesting, among others, that he
"be furnished the identity of persons who paid for
the [pre-election survey conducted from February
15 to February 17, 2013] as well as those who
subscribed to it." 12 Sometime in March 2013,
SWS supposedly replied to Tiangco, "furnishing
[him] with some particulars about the survey but
[without] disclos[ing] the identity of the persons
who commissioned or subscribed to the survey."
-COMELEC issued the resolution ordering the
survey firms to release the names of all
commissioners and payors of the surveys.
-In the letter 24 dated April 30, 2013, SWS and
Pulse Asia informed COMELEC Chairman Brillantes
that they had not received a copy of Resolution
No. 9674. They also articulated their view that
Resolution No. 9674 was tainted with
irregularities, having been issued ultra vires (i.e.,
in excess of what the Fair Election Act allows) and
in violation of the non-impairment of contracts
clause of the Constitution. They also expressed
their intention to bring the matter before this
court on account of these supposed irregularities.
Thus, they requested that COMELEC defer or hold
in abeyance Resolution No. 9674's enforcement.
-COMELEC issued a notice enforcing the
resolution, and a subsequent subpoena for a
criminal case.
-The survey firms uphold that they never received
any of the documents pertaining to the decision
of the COMELEC and the subsequent criminal
action filed against them.
-Petitioners file for a TRO, and they were given
the chance to file their own Memoranda.
I: 1./W/N the Petitioners rights to due process
were violated.
2. W/N it was beyond the jurisdiction of COMELEC
to ask for the names of the commissioners and
payors of the surveys
H: 1. YES. The petitioners were not given any
copies of the Resolution and criminal complaint.
2.___. Congress . . . give[s] highest priority to the
enactment of measures that . . . reduce . . .
political inequalities . . . by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good."
-The inclusion of election surveys in the list of
items regulated by the Fair Election Act is a
recognition that election surveys are not a mere
descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing
surveys are a means to shape the preference of
voters, inform the strategy of campaign
machineries, and ultimately, affect the outcome
of elections. Election surveys have a similar
nature as election propaganda. They are
expensive, normally paid for by those interested
in the outcome of elections, and have
tremendous consequences on election results.
-bandwagon effect "electors rally to support
the candidate leading in the polls."
-underdog effect where "electors rally to support
the candidate trailing in the polls."
-motivating effect where "individuals who had not
intended to vote are persuaded to do so,"
-demotivating effect where "voters abstain from
voting out of certainty that their candidate or
party will win.
-behavior known as strategic voting where
"voting is influenced by the chances of
winning[.]"
-theory of a free-will effect where "voters cast
their ballots to prove the polls wrong[.]"
-There is a self-aggrandizement scheme in
politics that gives the elite the upper hand.
-It is necessary that the Fair Election Act be
appreciated for what it is: a mechanism for
ensuring equality.
-IN AN EQUALITY-BASED APPROACH, "POLITICALLY
DISADVANTAGED SPEECH PREVAILS OVER
REGULATION[,] BUT REGULATION PROMOTING
POLITICAL EQUALITY PREVAILS OVER SPEECH."
-Concededly, what is involved here is not election
propaganda per se. Election surveys, on their
face, do not state or allude to preferred
candidates. As a means, election surveys are
ambivalent. To an academician, they are an
aggrupation of data. To a journalist, they are
matters for reportage. To a historian, they form
part of a chronicle. Election surveys thus become
unambiguous only when viewed in relation to the
end for which they are employed. To those whose
end is to get a candidate elected, election
surveys, when limited to their own private
consumption, are a means to formulate strategy.
When published, however, the tendency to shape
voter preferences comes into play. In this respect,
published election surveys partake of the nature
of election propaganda. It is then declarative
speech in the context of an electoral
campaign properly subject to regulation.
-WHILE IT DOES REGULATE EXPRESSION (I.E.,
PETITIONERS' PUBLICATION OF ELECTION
SURVEYS), IT DOES NOT GO SO FAR AS TO
SUPPRESS DESIRED EXPRESSION. THERE IS
NEITHER PROHIBITION NOR CENSORSHIP
SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT ELECTION SURVEYS. THE
FREEDOM TO PUBLISH ELECTION SURVEYS
REMAINS. ALL RESOLUTION NO. 9674 DOES IS
ARTICULATE A REGULATION AS REGARDS THE
MANNER OF PUBLICATION, THAT IS, THAT THE
DISCLOSURE OF THOSE WHO COMMISSIONED
AND/OR PAID FOR, INCLUDING THOSE
SUBSCRIBED TO, PUBLISHED ELECTION SURVEYS
MUST BE MADE.
-Petitioners' free speech rights must be weighed
in relation to the Fair Election Act's purpose of
ensuring political equality and, therefore, the
speech of others who want to participate
unencumbered in our political spaces. On one
hand, there are petitioners' right to publish and
publications which are attended by the interests
of those who can employ published data to their
partisan ends.
-This case does not involve a "capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable" 140
regulation. We have demonstrated that not only
an important or substantial state interest, but
even a compelling one anchors Resolution No.
9674's requirement of disclosing subscribers to
election surveys. It effects the constitutional
policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to
opportunities for public service" 141 and is
impelled by the imperative of "fair" elections.
DAVAO CITY v. ARANJUEZ
F: Petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD) is
a government-owned and controlled corporation
in Davao City represented by its General Manager
Engr. Rodora N. Gamboa (GM Gamboa).
Petitioners are officers and members of
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water
District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with
several administrative cases due to acts
committed during the anniversary celebration of
DCWD such as wearing of t-shirts with
inscriptions "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir.
Braganza Pahawa Na!" and posting of bond
papers outside the designated places. The
inscriptions and postings bore employees'
grievances. Said officers have been found prior
to said stunt to have staged pickets, airing their
grievances about the non-payment of their
Collective Negotiation Payment.
-As a consequence of their actions, GM Gamboa
sent a Memorandum dated 14 November 2007
addressed to the officers and members of
NAMADACWAD, requiring them to explain the
reasons for the attire they wore during the
anniversary celebration. Through a collective
letter dated 19 November 2007, the officers and
members explained that the Memorandum only
required the employees to wear any sports attire,
though theirs were with additional inscriptions
containing grievances. They countered that the
inscriptions were but manifestations of their
constitutional rights of free speech and freedom
of expression. Administrative cases were filed
against them for the violation of civil service laws.
Respondent filed an MR. He then filed for the
violation of fundamental and constitutional rights
with the CSC.
CSC said the act of wearing the t-shirts werent
punishable since it doesnt fall within the ambit of
prohibited mass action for there was no stoppage
of work. However, posting papers of their
grievances were in violation of the office rules. .
On the other hand, and contrary to the assertions
of DCWD, the violations committed by the private
respondents are not serious in nature due to the
lack of any abusive, vulgar, defamatory or
libelous language. CA affirmed and said: The
appellate court was likewise in agreement with
the CSC which considered as simple violation of
office rules the posting of banners outside the
designated posting areas by Cagula. Also like the
CSC, it ruled that such offense is not punishable
with the penalty of dismissal. DCWD now files this
petition with the SC.
I: W/N CA erred in determining the officers to be
at fault and in violation of Resolution No. 021316
H: NO. Resolution 021316 provides a specific
guideline as to what constitutes a prohibited
concerted activity. A prohibited concerted activity
must be one undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their
association, with the intent of effecting work
stoppage or service disruption, in order to realize
their demands or force concessions.
-Though the appeal before the CSC lacked a
notice of appeal as required by CSC Resolution
No. 991936 or the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), 27 the Consolidated Memorandum
filed by the private respondents was enough to
be considered as a sufficient compliance with the
rules.
-When substantial justice dictates it, procedural
rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just
disposition of a case.
-The operative phrases are "any collective
activity" and "work stoppage or service
disruption." Without the intent at work stoppage
or service disruption, the concerted activity is not
prohibited.
-It is clear that the collective activity of joining
the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA
incentives was not to effect work stoppage or
disrupt the service. As pointed out by the
respondents, they followed the advice of GM
Gamboa "to be there" at the fun run.
Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun
run. They were in sports attire that they were
allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government
employees would be deprived of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.
-Pursuant to this mandate, the former General
Manager of DCWD issued an office memorandum
designating the bulletin board at the motorpool
area below the Office of the Purchasing Division
and the side of the office building beside the
guard house where the bundy clock is located as
the designated areas for posting of grievances.
45 Clearly, the DCWD Office Memorandum hews
close and faithfully to MC No. 33. It is a
reasonable rule issued by the heads of the
agencies in order to regulate posting of
grievances of the employees.
-It is correct to conclude that those who enter
government service are subjected to a different
degree of limitation on their freedom to speak
their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the
relinquishment of their constitutional right of
expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by
reason of their employment. 45 Unarguably, a
citizen who accepts public employment "must
accept certain limitations on his or her freedom."
But there are some rights and freedoms so
fundamental to liberty that they cannot be
bargained away in a contract for public
employment. It is the Court's responsibility to
ensure that citizens are not deprived of these
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the
government.
-Thus, in line with the civil service rules and
jurisprudence, we conclude that a violation of an
office memorandum, which was issued as an
internal rule to regulate the area for posting of
grievances inside the office premise, is only a
light offense punishable by reprimand.
RUBIN v. COORS BREWING
F: Because 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act (FAAA or Act) prohibits beer
labels from displaying alcohol content, the federal
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)
rejected respondent brewer's application for
approval of proposed labels that disclosed such
content. Respondent filed suit for relief on the
ground that the relevant provisions of the Act
violated the First Amendment's protection of
commercial speech. The Government argued that
the labeling ban was necessary to suppress the
threat of "strength wars" among brewers, who,
without the regulation, would seek to compete in
the marketplace based on the potency of their
beer. The District Court invalidated the labeling
ban, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Although
the latter court found that the Government's
interest in suppressing "strength wars" was
"substantial," the court held that the ban violates
the First Amendment because it fails to advance
that interest in a direct and material way.
I: W/N the FAAA was in violation of commercial
speech
H: YES. We conclude that the ban infringes
respondent's freedom of speech, and we
therefore affirm.
-For commercial speech to come within [the First
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest."
-The Government identifies two interests it
considers sufficiently "substantial" to justify
205(e)(2)'s labeling ban. First, the Government
contends that 205(e)(2) advances Congress' goal
of curbing "strength wars" by beer brewers who
might seek to compete for customers on the
basis of alcohol content.
-THE GENERAL THRUST OF FEDERAL ALCOHOL
POLICY APPEARS TO FAVOR GREATER
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION, RATHER THAN
LESS.
-The Government here has a significant interest in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens by preventing brewers from competing
on the basis of alcohol strength, which could lead
to greater alcoholism and its attendant social
costs. Both panels of the Court of Appeals that
heard this case concluded that the goal of
suppressing strength wars constituted a
substantial interest, and we cannot say that their
conclusion is erroneous. We have no reason to
think that strength wars, if they were to occur,
would not produce the type of social harm that
the Government hopes to prevent.
-One State's decision to permit brewers to
disclose alcohol content on beer labels will not
preclude neighboring States from effectively
banning such disclosure of that information within
their borders.
- IT DID NOT PASS THE TEST OF THE
GOVERNMENT INTERESTS FURTHERED WITH
REASONABLE MEANS EMPLOYED.
-As only 18 States at best prohibit disclosure of
content in advertisements, App. to Brief for
Respondent 1a-12a, brewers remain free to
disclose alcohol content in advertisements, but
not on labels, in much of the country. The failure
to prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content in
advertising, which would seem to constitute a
more influential weapon in any strength war than
labels, makes no rational sense if the
government's true aim is to suppress strength
wars.
-Other provisions of the FAAA and its regulations
similarly undermine 205(e)(2)'s efforts to prevent
strength wars. While 205(e)(2) bans the
disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels, it
allows the exact opposite in the case of wines and
spirits. Thus, distilled spirits may contain
statements of alcohol content, 27 CFR 5.37
(1994), and such disclosures are required for
wines with more than 14 percent alcohol, 27 CFR
4.36 (1994). If combatting strength wars were the
goal, we would assume that Congress would
regulate disclosure of alcohol content for the
strongest beverages as well as for the weakest
ones.
-Even if 205(e)(2) did meet the Edenfield
standard, it would still not survive First
Amendment scrutiny because the Government's
regulation of speech is not sufficiently tailored to
its goal. The Government argues that a sufficient
"fit" exists here because the labeling ban applies
to only one product characteristic and because
the ban does not prohibit all disclosures of alcohol
content - it applies only to those involving
labeling and advertising.
POLICARPIO v. MANILA TIMES
F: Policarpio, a member of the Philippine Bar and
was also executive secretary of the local UNESCO
National Commission., seeks to recover moral,
exemplary and correctional damages for the
publication in the Saturday Mirror of August 11,
1956, and in The Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956,
of two (2) articles or news items which are
claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and
false, and to have exposed her to ridicule,
jeopardized her integrity, good name and
business and official transactions, and caused her
grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral,
mental and physical anguish and incalculable
material, moral, professional and business
damages.
The subject of grievance comes from a strained
relationship with a subordinate, Reyes who is a
confidential assistant. She filed charges against
Reyes that caused the latters separation from
UNESCO. Ryes filed counter-charges for alleged
malversation of public funds and another
complaint for alleged estafa thru falsification of
public documents. It was scheduled for
investigation. Saturday Mirror and The Daily
Mirror published the same articles with her
picture.
Plaintiff alleges that the portions "WOMAN
OFFICIAL SUED" and "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO
ON FRAUD" are not true. Similarly, the statement
in the first paragraph of the article, to the effect
that plaintiff "was charged with malversation and
estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's
office by the Presidential Complaints and Action
Commission" otherwise known as PCAC is
untrue, the complaints for said offenses having
been filed by Miss Reyes. Neither is it true that
said "criminal action was initiated as a result of
current administrative investigation" as stated in
the second paragraph of the same article. Plaintiff
maintains that the effect of these false
statements was to give the general impression
that said investigation by Col. Alba had shown
that plaintiff was guilty, or, at least, probably
guilty of the crimes aforementioned, and that, as
a consequence, the PCAC had filed the
corresponding complaints with the city fiscal's
office.
I: W/N The defendants published in bad faith
H: YES.
-Again, it is obvious that the filing of criminal
complaints with the city fiscal's office by another
agency of the Government, like the PCAC,
particularly after an investigation conducted by
the same, imparts the idea that the probability of
guilt on the part of the accused is greater than
when the complaints are filed by a private
individual, specially when the latter is a former
subordinate of the alleged offender, who was
responsible for the dismissal of the complainant
from her employment. It is only too apparent that
the article published on August 11, 1956,
presented the plaintiff in a more unfavorable light
than she actually was.
It goes without saying that newspapers must
enjoy a certain degree of discretion in
determining the manner in which a given event
should be presented to the public, and the
importance to be attached thereto as a news
item, and that its presentation in a sensational
manner is not per se illegal. NEWSPAPER MAY
PUBLISH NEWS ITEMS RELATIVE TO JUDICIAL,
LEGISLATIVE OR OTHER OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS,
WHICH ARE NOT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATURE,
BECAUSE THE PUBLIC IS ENTITLED TO KNOW THE
TRUTH WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PROCEEDINGS,
WHICH, BEING OFFICIAL AND NON-
CONFIDENTIAL, ARE OPEN TO PUBLIC
CONSUMPTION. BUT, TO ENJOY IMMUNITY, A
PUBLICATION CONTAINING DEROGATORY
INFORMATION MUST BE NOT ONLY TRUE, BUT,
ALSO, FAIR, AND IT MUST BE MADE IN GOOD
FAITH AND WITHOUT ANY COMMENTS OR
REMARKS.
-In the case at bar, aside from containing
information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article
published on August 11, 1956, presented her in a
worse predicament than that in which she, in fact,
was. In other words, said article was not a fair
and true report of the proceedings therein alluded
to.
-Defendants maintain that their alleged malice in
publishing the news items in question has not
been established by the plaintiff. However, Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
"Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
"1. A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
"2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or
of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of other functions."
LOPEZ v. CA
F: Petitioner Lopez is the owner of The Manila
Chronicle. On January 1956, an article was
published front page about a a sanitary inspector
assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz
sending a distress signal to a passing United
States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the
message to Manila. He was not ignored, an
American Army plane dropping on the beach of
an island an emergency-sustenance kit
containing, among other things, a two-way radio
set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila
that the people in the place were living in terror,
due to a series of killings committed since
Christmas of 1995. Losing no time, the Philippines
defense establishment rushed to the island a
platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer-
menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major
Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the
alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who
merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In
view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion
branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive
word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term
employed by the other newspapers when
referring to the above-mentioned incident
-The newspaper then edited by petitioner Juan T.
Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its
issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that
while Fidel Cruz story turned out to be false, if
brought to light the misery of the people living in
that place, with almost everybody sick, only two
individuals able to read and write, food and
clothing being scarce. Then in the January 29,
1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January
News Quiz" included an item on the central figure
in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who
nevertheless did the country a good turn by
calling the government's attention to that
forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic.
-The magazine on both occasions carried
photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel
Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were
published on both occasions were that of private
respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-
contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan.
- The newspaper sent out a correction, however.
I: W/N the petitioners are liable for libel
H:YES
-It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners
would stake their case to demonstrate that no
action for libel would lie arising from the
publication of the picture of respondent Cruz
identified as responsible for the hoax of the year,
when such was not the case at all. It is easily
understandable why. No liability would be
incurred if it could be demonstrated that it comes
within the wellnigh all-embracing scope of
freedom of the press. Included therein is the
widest latitude of choice as to what items should
see the light of day so long as they are relevant
to a Matter of public interest, the insistence on
the requirement as to its truth yielding at times to
unavoidable inaccuracies attendant on
newspapers and other publications being subject
to the tyranny of deadlines.
-"Publication of a person's photograph in
connection with an article libelous of a third
person, is a libel on the person whose picture is
published, where the acts set out in the article
are imputed to such person." 8 In support of the
above statement, he made reference to several
cases. 9 Other decisions to the same effect have
been promulgated since the fourth edition of
Newell published in 1924. 10 Why libel law has
both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by
Hale in his Law of the Press thus: "On the one
hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of
his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing; of
value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches,
an impairment of it is a personal wrong.
-"The interest of society and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on
the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an
unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not to be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only
thus can the intelligence and dignity of the
individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does
not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an
individual is less than the State, so must
expected criticism be born for the common
good."
-"SO LONG AS IT IS DONE IN GOOD FAITH,
NEWSPAPERS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO HAVE
AND EXPRESS OPINIONS ON LEGAL QUESTIONS.
TO DENY THEM THAT RIGHT WOULD INFRINGE
UPON THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS."
-A newspaper, it is stressed, "should not be held
to account to a point of suppression for honest
mis takes or imperfection in the choice of words."
BUT
-there is the added requirement of reasonable
care imposed by such decision which from the
facts here found, appeared not to be satisfied. It
cannot be concluded then that the plea of
petitioners is sufficiently persuasive. The
mandate of press freedom is not ignored, but
here it does not speak unequivocally. It is not
decisive of the basic issue. By itself, it does not
have a controlling significance.
MILLER v. CALIFORNIA
F:
I:
H:
GONZALES v/ KALAW-KATIGBAK
F:
I:
H:
PITA v. CA
F:
I:
H:
BAYAN v. ERMITA H:
F:
I: