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Author(s): B. D. Singh
Source: Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Apr., 1999), pp. 515-524
Published by: Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27767621
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IJIR, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1999 COMMUNICATION
B.D.Singh
INTRODUCTION
Horns of Dilemma
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516 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations
Both the horns of the dilemma have their own justifications and
require to be resolved.
At the same time, no civilised society will allow one of its sections
to be exploited by the other one, either in the name of business
imperatives or something else. Exploitation is bad, whether it is by
the employer or the organised employees and must go.
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Comminications 517
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518 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations
THE CONCERNS
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
The Act, after abolition, leaves the contract labour in lurch.
Naturally this has been resented by contract labour since
beginning. But because of inadequate support from trade unions
and strong opposition from employers, their voice was
suppressed all these years. The judiciary has also been deliberating
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Comminications 519
and debating on one or the other technical and legal issues without
providing answer to this vexed question as to what should happen
to contract labour after abolition?
Some of the trysts of judiciary with the contract labour issue are
as follow:
3. Deena Naths Vs. N.L.F. - S.C. 1995 brought out that High Court
has no jurisdiction to decide the abolition of Contract Labour.
4. Since 1994, the trend of judiciary has been that of anguish and
anxiety and it has displayed unconventional wisdom, going beyond
the boundary of law. In the cases like R.K. Panda Vs. SAIL (Sc-94),
Railway Porters, Vendors and Bearers Union (S.C.-95). PC. Raha
(95) and many other judgements, contract labour working in statutory
canteen, railway canteens and postal services, etc. were ordered to
be absorbed.
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520 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations
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Comminications 521
POSSIBLE APPROACHES
Approach One
Approach Two
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522 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations
Approach Three
Approach Four
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Comminications 523
Not exactly similar, but something like this, has been tried
in Indian Iron & Steel Co. (IISCO Experiment). The contract labour
gets "an agreed wage" which is higher than the minimum wage.
They get D.A., though per point neutralisation is less than for
the regular employees. There is a 'Contract Labour Cell' which
ensures the safety and welfare measures of contract labour.
Besides statutory safety and welfare, the contract labour gets
HRA, LTC, Medical Benefits, VRS, etc. which is, of course, less
than the regular employees. The PF and Gratutity, etc. are also
taken care of by the Principal-Employer. Such an arrangement
has been agreed by the operating trade unions. The incidents of
abolition and other types of agitations have been far less, though
the contract labour have been deployed in permanent
departments for long. IISCO experiment provides a via-media
and a sort of balanced approach to this vexed issue. It is not the
ultimate model. It requires much improvisation in almost all
the areas.
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524 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations
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