ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4

G.R. No. 207900 April 22, 2014 On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.
MUSTAPHA J. OMAR, Respondents.
On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting Omars
11

For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, which
1
second petition to cancel Hayudinis CoC. The dispositive portion of the COMELEC
petitioner Gamal S. Hayudini (Hayudini) filed to set aside and annul the assailed Resolution reads:
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), dated June 20, 2013 and July2

10, 2013, which cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy for the mayoralty seat in the 2013
3
local elections in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Gamal S. Hayudini as Mayor of South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, in the 13 May 2013 elections, is hereby CANCELLED.

The antecedent facts are: The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations is hereby directed to
constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the lawful
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of
4
winner for mayoralty position in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during the 13 May 2013
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local elections.
Elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, or on
October 15, 2012, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or SO ORDERED. 12

Cancel Hayudinis CoC, entitled Mustapha J. Omar v. Gamal S. Hayudini, docketed as

SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F). Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for
5
Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, arguing
making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared that its Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course to a belatedly
in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening event.
resides in Zamboanga City.
On July 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudinis Motion for Reconsideration
Thereafter, on November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the En Bancs assailed Resolution states:
Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
granted Hayudinis petition on January 31, 2013. On that same day, the COMELECs
6

RESOLVES to DENY this Motion for Reconsideration for LACK OF MERIT.

First Division dismissed Omars earlier petition to cancel Hayudinis CoC in SPA No. 13-
7

Consequently, the June 20, 2013 Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is
106(DC)(F) for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation
hereby affirmed.
as to his residency.
Corollary thereto, the proclamation of respondent GAMAL S. HAYUDINI is hereby
Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court
declared null and void and without any legal force and effect. SALMA A. OMAR is hereby
(RTC), Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, Reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered
8

proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor for South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, being the qualified
the deletion of Hayudinis name in Barangay Bintawlans permanent list of voters. In view
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes, considering the doctrine laid down by
of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of
the case Aratea v. Comelec that a cancelled CoC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
13

Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event on March 26, 2013.

and much less, to a valid vote, to wit:
The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-249(DC)(F). Hayudini appealed the March 8,
9

2013 RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but on April 17, 2013, in CA-G.R. SP
"Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of mayor [of]
No. 05426, the same was denied.
10

San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
1

Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole candidate for the mayoralty
post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly-
elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled, because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after
elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There
was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who
therefore received the highest number of votes."
The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations is hereby directed to
constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming SALMA OMAR
as the winning candidate for mayoralty position in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during the May
13, 2013 elections.
SO ORDERED. 14
Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Hayudini mainly advances the following arguments:
A.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO
OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS THE INSTANT PETITION TO CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY DUE TO SUPERVENING EVENT (SPA. NO. 13-249(DC)(F), DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENT OMAR TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF THE COMELEC RESOLUTION NO.
9532.
xxxx
C.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVISITED AND
MODIFIED THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE FIRST
DIVISION IN THE SPA NO. 13-106(DC)(F).
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO
CANCEL PETITIONER HAYUDINIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY AND DECLARE
HIS PROCLAMATION AS NULL AND VOID.
xxxx
L.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECREED THE
PROCLAMATION OF SALMA A. OMAR AS THE DULY-ELECTED MAYOR FOR SOUTH
UBIAN, TAWI-TAWI. 15
The Court finds the petition to be without merit.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based on
thespecific grounds and available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of
discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of discretion has been
defined as the arbitrary exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility;
or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
For an act to be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such
an abuse must be patent and gross. Here, Hayudini miserably failed to prove that the
16
COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion.
Hayudini contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
admitted, and later granted, Omars petition despite failure to comply with Sections 2 and
4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523.
The subject sections read:
Section 2. Period to File Petition. The Petition must be filed within five (5) days from
the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25) days
from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition. In case of a
substitute candidate, the Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the time the
substitute candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.
2

xxxx
Section 4. Procedure to be observed. Both parties shall observe the following
procedure:
1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the Petition, through
personal service to the respondent. In cases where personal service is not feasible, or
the respondent refuses to receive the Petition, or the respondents whereabouts cannot
be ascertained, the petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating the reason or
circumstances therefor and resort to registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of
service or the affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be filed;
17
Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was also the last day of filing of
CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections. Omar, on the other hand, filed the subject petition
only on March 26, 2013. Under the COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due Course or
Cancel CoC must be filed within five days from the last day for filing a certificate of
candidacy, but not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the CoC subject of
the petition. Clearly, Omars petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period.
Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served
personally to Hayudini.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains the
COMELECs liberal treatment of Omars petition.
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in
order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by
mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an
indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative
that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the
sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of
procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle was
reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and De Castro v.
18
Commission on Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and
19
jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC
must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes." 20
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its
1wphi1
rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
efficient implementation of its objectives ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the
real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by
all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. 21
Indeed, Omar had previously filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudinis
CoC on October 15, 2012, docketed as SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F). This was dismissed on
January 31, 2013, or the same day the MCTC granted Hayudinis petition to be included
in the list of voters. However, on March 8, 2013, the RTC reversed the MCTC ruling and,
consequently, ordered the deletion of Hayudinis name in Barangay Bintawlans
permanent list of voters. Said deletion was already final and executory under the
law. Hayudini, however, still appealed the case to the CA, which was subsequently
22
denied. Notably, thereafter, he went to the CA again, this time to file a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 05499. In a Resolution dated July 9, 2013, the
23
CA also denied said petition primarily because of Hayudinis act of engaging in the
pernicious practice of forum shopping by filing two modes of appeal before said
court. Hence, by virtue of the finality of said RTC decision deleting his name from the
24
voters list, Hayudini, who had been previously qualified under the law to run for an
25
elective position, was then rendered ineligible.
Given the finality of the RTC decision, the same should be considered a valid
supervening event. A supervening event refers to facts and events transpiring after the
judgment or order had become executory. These circumstances affect or change the
substance of the judgment and render its execution inequitable. Here, the RTCs March
26
8, 2013 decision, ordering the deletion of Hayudinis name in the list of voters, which
came after the dismissal of Omars first petition, is indubitably a supervening event which
would render the execution of the ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) iniquitous and unjust.
As the COMELEC aptly ruled, the decision to exclude Hayudini was still non-existent
when the COMELEC first promulgated the Resolution in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) on
January 31, 2013, or when the issues involved therein were passed upon. The First 27
Division even expressed that although the Election Registration Board (ERB) denied
Hayudinis application for registration, it could not adopt the same because it was not yet
final as Hayudini was still to file a Petition for Inclusion before the MCTC. Thus, it is not
28
far-fetched to say that had this final RTC finding been existent before, the COMELEC
First Division could have taken judicial notice of it and issued a substantially different
ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F). 29
3

The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the necessary ground to successfully
have Hayudinis CoC struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of
candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is
not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact,
not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if
he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for
violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective
office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a
registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be
reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will
work for and represent the local government under which he or she is running. Even the
30
will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was
qualified. 31
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious
intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public
office.
32
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for
said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality
where he intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78. It is 33
interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On
November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirming the disapproval of
Hayudinis petition for registration. This is precisely the reason why he needed to file a
34
Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the
MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that "he is eligible for said office," Hayudini
made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in
fact, registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.
Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omars petition solely based on procedural
deficiencies, South Ubian would have a mayor who is not even a registered voter in the
locality he is supposed to govern, thereby creating a ridiculously absurd and outrageous
situation. Hence, the COMELEC was accurate in cancelling Hayudinis certificate of
candidacy. Hayudini likewise protests that it was a grave error on the part of the
COMELEC to have declared his proclamation null and void when no petition for
annulment of his proclamation was ever filed. What petitioner seems to miss, however, is
that the nullification of his proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate
outcome a necessary legal consequence of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to
Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a
disqualification case. The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for
35
the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes. If the
36
disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day,
the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the
winner. Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the
winner, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC
continues. This rule likewise applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has
already taken his oath of office. The only exception to this rule is in the case of
37
4
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
congressional and senatorial candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78 which is the case at
in favor of either the Senate or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the bar.
candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also assumed office. 38

It bears stressing that one of the requirements for a mayoralty candidate is that he must
be a resident of the city or municipality where he intends to be elected. Thus, under
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is required that a candidate must certify
under oath that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. In this case, when
petitioner stated in his CoC that he is a resident of Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian,
Finally, contrary to Hayudini's belief, the will of the electorate is still actually respected
even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded. The votes cast in favor
of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election for these do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice.
On the other hand, those votes for the eligible and legitimate candidates form an integral
part of said voice, which must equally be given due respect , if not more. 41

Tawi Tawi and eligible for a public office, but it turned out that he was declared to be a
non-resident thereof in a petition for his inclusion in the list of registered voters, he WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC Resolutions dated June 20,
therefore committed a false representation in his CoC which pertained to a material fact 2013 and July 10, 2013 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
which is a ground for the cancellation of his CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner's ineligibility for not being a resident of the place he sought SO ORDERED.
election is not a ground for a petition for disqualification, since the grounds enumerated
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically refer to the commission of
39

prohibited acts, and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country.

As held in Aratea v. COMELEC, which is a case for cancellation of CoC under Section
40

78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio

cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether a certificate
of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial, because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning,
his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. We then found that since the winning
mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio, he was never a
candidate at all and all his votes were considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the
second placer, the only qualified candidate, who actually garnered the highest number of
votes, for the position of Mayor.

We find the factual mileu of the Aratea case applicable in the instant case, since this is
also a case for a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Since
Hayudini was never a valid candidate for the position of the Municipal Mayor of South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes, Consequently,
the COMELEC properly proclaimed Salma Omar, who garnered the highest number of
votes in the remaining qualified candidates for the mayoralty post, as the duly-elected
Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi Tawi.

Codilla v. De Venecia case has no application in this case, since it dealt with a petition for
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and not a petition to

5

G.R. No. 211140
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner, vs. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA
1
ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.
In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party is
the son of a sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought to be
done as dictated by law and justice solely for that reason.
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte,
Jr. (Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-
Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap ), Secretary General, House of Representatives, and Hon.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque .
Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13,
2013 elections in accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and [this] Honorable Court;" thus, he seeks the following reliefs:
2
a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR. be issued ordering said respondent to administer the proper
OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; -and allow petitioner to
assume the position of representative for Marinduque and exercise the powers
and prerogatives of said position of Marinduque representative;
b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN]
BARUA-YAP be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of
Regina 0. Reyes in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives and to
REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein petitioner, in
her stead; and
c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN,
PREVENT and PROHIBIT respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from
usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone
District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of said
position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING her to
IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position. 3
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:
On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of
the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
4
of Reyes as candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that Reyes made several material
misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac,
Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent
resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964;
(v) that her civil status is single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks
to be elected to." The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC), entitled "Joseph
5
Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence,
Reyes's COC was accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is
hereby CANCELLED. 6
Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.
But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national
elections were held on May 13, 2013.
The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Commission
(First Division) is hereby AFFIRMED. 7
A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Marinduque, through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013.
Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May
16, 2013.
6

On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the
Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of
the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.
On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-
028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against
Reyes in the HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P
Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality in SPA No. 13-
8
053 (DC), which provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have lapsed since
the date of the promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme Court restraining its
execution, the Resolution of the Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is
hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. 9
On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.
On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR.
No. 207264, entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph
Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division cancelling her . Certificate of Candidacy (for material
misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.
In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
COMELEC docketed as SPC No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs.
New Members/Old Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone
District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the proceedings of the
PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void.
On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC
No. 13-010.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing
Reyes's petition, viz.:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division is upheld. 10
Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has
jurisdiction over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. This Court explained that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (i) a valid
proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.
11
On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc) in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), wherein he prayed that:
[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate EXECUTION
of this Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013;
CAUSE the PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, during the
May 2013 National and Local Elections. 12
At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started
discharging the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.
On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco,
the COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and
declared null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes. The dispositive
part reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO
REYES is declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is hereby proclaimed the winning candidate for the
7

position of representative in the House of Representatives for the province of
Marinduque. (Emphasis supplied.)
13
Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.
On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i)
granting Tan's motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii) directing
the reconstitution of a new PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said
new Board of Velasco as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque. The fallo of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion.
Accordingly, a new composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque is
hereby constituted to be composed of the following:
1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz - Chairman
2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman
3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas - Member
4. Three (3) Support Staffs
For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the
convening of the New Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013
(Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros,
Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member
of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections.
Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial
Board of Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional
candidate Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the 2013 National and Local Elections.
Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy of
the Certificate of Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) and the House of Representatives. 14
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein
petitioner Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque with 48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts. 15
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally
convened in a joint session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of
the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before Speaker
Belmonte, Jr.
On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of
Petition "without waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be
articulated in the HRET which is now the proper forum." 16
On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration (of this Court's June 25, 2013
17
Resolution in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, viz.:
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition
is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
18
On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.
On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for reconsideration
and was denied by this Court.
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to
Reyes essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting,
among others, that he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque.
On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ
of Execution filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to implement
and enforce the May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July 9, 2013 Resolution
in SPC No. 13-010 and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation of Petitioner Lord
8

Allan Jay Q. Velasco as Representative of Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certified
true copy of the writ of execution be personally served and delivered by the
Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano Belmonte for the latter's implementation and
enforcement of the aforementioned May 14, 2013 Resolution and July 9, 2013
Resolution and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation issued by the Special Board
of Canvassers of the Honorable Commission. 19
the COMELEC issued an Order dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all
20
copies of its Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the Certificate of
Finality dated June 5, 2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certificate of
Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
for the latter's information and guidance.
On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. reiterating
the above-mentioned request but to no avail.
On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his
earlier requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll of
Members and register his name in her place as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque.
However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the
letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to
recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate the position and
office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she continues to
discharge the duties of said position.
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction anchored on the following issues:
A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and
ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of petitioner as
duly elected Marinduque Representative and allow him to assume said position
and exercise the prerogatives of said office.
B. Whether or not respondent SG Barna-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED
and ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes
from the Roll of Members of the House and include the name of the Petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of
PERMANENT. INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit
respondent Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and performing the functions
as Marinduque Representative, and to order her to VACATE the said office. 21
As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-defined and clear
legal right and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus." He insists that the
22
final and executory decisions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), and this Court
in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification of respondent Reyes's proclamation and
his subsequent proclamation as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to claim the congressional seat.
Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte,
Jr. "to administer the oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the
prerogatives of the congressional seat for Marinduque
representative;" and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to register [his] name xx x as
23
the duly elected member of the House and delete the name of respondent Reyes from
the Roll ofM embers." Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, citing
24 25
a statement of this Court to the effect that the Speaker of the House of Representatives
has the ministerial duty to recognize the petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly elected
Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged
ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right
as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. 26
With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and
unlawful holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious
prejudice to [him] in that she has already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and
emoluments that pertain to the position of Marinduque Representative since June 30,
2013 up to the present in the amount of around several hundreds of thousands of
pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ
of permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to "restrain, prevent and prohibit [her]
from usurping the position."27
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and
not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject
office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the
latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She
9

argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the petition must be
dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases. 28
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court
over Quo Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She
posits that "even if the Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is
still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right on the part of
[Velasco]. " She argues that numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the
29
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an abundance of case
law that categorically states that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her
proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed
jurisdiction over quo warranto cases filed against Reyes by several individuals.
30
Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to
annul [her] proclamation. " But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the
31
sake of argument that the proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer
cannot be declared the winner x x x" as he was not the choice of the people of the
Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting the jurisdiction of
this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap, opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:
I.
UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT
REYES, INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF HER PROCLAMATION AND HER ELIGIBILITY
FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE HRET.
Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest
filed against respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final
and executory, respondent Reyes may not be restrained from exercising the
prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may
not be compelled by mandamus to remove respondent Reyes :S name from the Roll of
Members of the House.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
II.
CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT
PETITIONER, BEING MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013
ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF MARINDUQUE
REPRESENTATIVE.
Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled
by mandamus to, respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner and register the
latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House.
III.
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. 32
The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for this
Court to revisit its twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 both in
GR. No. 207264, given that (i) this Court was "divided" when it issued the same;
and (ii) there were strong dissents to the majority opinion. It argues that this Court has in
the past revisited decisions already final and executory; there is no hindrance for this
Court to do the same in G.R. No. 207264.
Moreover, the OSG contends that:
Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013
Resolution, upholding the cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no
compelling reason for the House to withdraw its recognition of respondent Reyes as
Marinduque Representative, in the absence of any specific order or directive to the
House. To be sure, there was nothing in the Honorable Court's disposition in Reyes v.
COMELEC that required any action from the House. Again, it bears emphasis that
neither petitioner nor respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap were
parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.
Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against
respondent Reyes:
(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L.
Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;
10

(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes;
(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes; and
(iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay Velasco v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes. 33
And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:
If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office of
the winner, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then there
would obviously be a clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC, given
that the 2011 HRET Rules provide that the appropriate cases should be filed before it
within 15 days from the date of proclamation of the winner. If, as the June 25, 2013
Resolution provides, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only after assumption of office, at
noon of June 30 following the election, then quo warranto petitions and election protests
filed on or after said date would be dismissed outright by the HRET under its own rules
for having been filed out of time, where the winners have already been proclaimed within
the period after the May elections and up to June 14.34
In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14,
2015 dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037, the twin petitions for quo
35
warranto filed against Reyes, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for
Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014
Resolution of [the] Tribunal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.36
In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. No.
207264 is the COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution." 37
To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal of
a Petition-In-Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin petitions
for quo warranto, for "lack of merit." Further, the HRET directed "the hearing and
reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo Warranto against x x x Respondent
[Reyes] to proceed. " Sioco, however, moved for the reconsideration of the said
38
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
September 11, 2014 HR.ET Resolution based on the argument that the latter was
contrary to law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that-
The Tribunals Jurisdiction
It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo
warranto, considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve
the same vis-a-vis the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray
that "after due proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO
REYES DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to sit as Member of the House of Representatives,
representing the Province of Marinduque." In addition, the petitioner Eric Del Mundo
Junio urges the Tribunal to follow the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No.
207264.
On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the
outright dismissal of the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in
G.R. No. 207264. For her part, respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of
the present petitions, albeit after reception of evidence by the contending parties.
The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or
authority of the Tribunal is echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives."
xxxx
In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18,
2013, the COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC), had already resolved that the COMELEC First Division correctly cancelled her
COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency requirements.
Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged the
COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in
G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.
11

With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the
nullification of her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume
jurisdiction over the present petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives. And to be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office, so the Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No.
207264, thus:
x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered
a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution:
xxxx
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate
who is not a member of the House of Representatives x x x.
xxxx
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v.
COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.xx x
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office x x x.
Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first
essential element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives over which the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such element is
obviously absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes' proclamation was nullified by
the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this ground
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions
since Regina Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,"
as declared by the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses:
"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May
2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and
without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of
office."
The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme Court is
"supreme in its task of adjudication; x x x. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in
the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose
judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all other courts, must take their bearings from the
decisions and rulings of the Supreme Court. 39
Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1 77
(Usurpation of Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015, has
been filed in court, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. "
40 41
The Issue
The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ
of mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the
specific acts sought by Velasco in this petition.
The Ruling
The petition has merit.
At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this
petition to re-litigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are
reminded to respect the Entry of Judgment that has been issued therein on October 22,
2013.
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that
this special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary
to the asseverations of the respondents.
12

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use
or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim
is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action
is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position;
otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. In this
42
case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this
Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and
executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the
proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position
of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be
claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the
claimed office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and
not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this
petition to one for quo warranto.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file
a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for mandamus will
prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.43
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state
of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment.
44
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have
no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the
latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in
G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA
No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final
and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the
proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the
position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled
and beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her
proclamation. Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any
questions regarding her election, the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representatives especially so that she has already been
proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties as a Member of the
House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
But the confluence of the three acts in this case - her proclamation, oath and
assumption of office - has not altered the legal situation between Velasco and Reyes.
The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to
cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013.
The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to
run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - for without a
valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the election and much
less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC was
promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court's
final and executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.
This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the
COMELEC, the PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc cancelling Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the winning
candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as early as May 16, 2013, a
couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said decision
cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the much argued proclamation was
made in clear defiance of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the
present petition for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts that should
be taken into consideration:
13

First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by
the COMELEC En Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013,
the effectivity of which was not enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of
the prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining order within a period of five
(5) days as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no
restraining order was forthcoming, the PBOC should have refrained from
proclaiming Reyes.
Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent
Reyes's COC in its Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and
these Resolutions are already final and executory.
Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-
010 cancelled respondent Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco
as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives in representation of
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. The said proclamation has not
been challenged or questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.
Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. in open session, Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid
proclamation.
Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in
deciding this case will paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu
between her and Velasco.
Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to
serve as a Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to
be recognized as a party-respondent at a quo warranto proceeding before the
HRET.
And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution
acknowledging and ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo
warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was based on the existence of a final and
executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 that Reyes is not a bona fide member
of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To reiterate this Court's
pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v. Commission on Elections - 45
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's
submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be
proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on
18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective
assumption of office.
xxxx
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via
its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC,
no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives. x x x."
As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to argue
on the basis of her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to
highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner
secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS." (Emphasis supplied.)
Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to
any party, specially to Velasco, who should be the sitting Member of the House of
Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the leadership of the latter of the
binding decisions of a constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the Supreme Court
Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes before
the HRET had actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of the
COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010. Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the HRET' s
December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's well-defined, clear and certain right
to the subject office.
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution of this
Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering
14

the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In other words,
the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the
administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the
Roll of Members, are ministerial in character vis-a-vis the factual and legal milieu of this
case. As we have previously stated, the administration of oath and the registration of
Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the
part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to
recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the
COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a
legislative district and the Secretary-General to enter said Representative's name in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, the 46
Court decreed:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." For a petition
for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right
to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The
facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on
Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second
Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the
COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and
said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all
officials of the land There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos
and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA,
SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public
respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office.
This decision shall be immediately executory. (Citations omitted.)
Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane Resolution dated May 14, 2013
in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC); (iii) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-
010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC);
and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco is the
rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence,
entitled to a writ of Mandamus.
As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and
Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the
enforcement of the Decision rendered therein nor argue that the doctrine of res
judieata by conclusiveness of judgment applies to him and the public respondents, this
Court maintains that such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along with public respondents
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap, are all legally bound by this Court's
judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC correctly cancelled
Reyes' s COC for Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque on the ground that the latter was ineligible for the subject
position due to her failure to prove her Filipino citizenship and the requisite one-year
15
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would have our dockets
unnecessarily clogged with petitions to be filed in every direction by any and all
registered voters not a party to a case to question the final decision of this Court. Such
restricted interpretation of res judieata is intolerable for it will defeat this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 207264. To be sure, Velasco who was duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a
proper party to invoke the Court's final judgment that Reyes was ineligible for the subject
position.47

It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated and
take judicial notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected to the
subject position had already been long affirmed by this Court. Any ruling deviating from
such established ruling will be contrary to the Rule of Law and should not be
countenanced.

In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No.
13-010, there is no longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of this
Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De
Venecia, "[t]he rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the
48

land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon.

Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath
of office of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. And public respondent Hon. Marilyn B.
Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of Representatives, shall register the name of
petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This Decision shall
be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

16

G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012
EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA
D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to review and nullify the
Resolution2 dated 2 February 2011 and the Order3 dated 12 January 2011 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo D.
Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The petition asserts that the COMELEC
issued the Resolution and Order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections.
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. 4 On 8 December 2009,
Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate
of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for
the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he
was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code 6 both prohibit a local
elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for
the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution 7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18 February 2010
Resolution read:
Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for more than nine consecutive years. Instead he raised arguments to forestall
or dismiss the petition on the grounds other than the main issue itself. We find such
arguments as wanting. Respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of mayor for more
than three consecutive terms, went against the three-term limit rule; therefore, he could
not be allowed to run anew in the 2010 elections. It is time to infuse new blood in the
political arena of San Antonio.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position of mayor in
the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His name is hereby
ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of Official Candidates for the position of Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.8
Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained
pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea)
garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-
Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge
Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010. 9 On the same date,
Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for
an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of
the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S.
201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanidas disqualification, the Office of the Mayor
was deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in
an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of Lonzanidas motion
for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to
allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response
dated 24 August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath
of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice
however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC]."11
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 12 disqualifying
Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs
resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served
as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second,
Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to
imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisin correccional as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisin mayor as maximum. The judgment of
conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v.
People,13before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.
Pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
17

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for having been
convicted by a final judgment of a crime punishable by more than one (1) year of
imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the same position in the May 2010
Elections.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.14
On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Petition-in-Intervention.15She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second
Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates
for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate
who received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the
winning candidate. Since Lonzanidas disqualification was not yet final during election
day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanidas subsequent
disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as
the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 44 16 of the Local Government
Code to succeed as Mayor.
The COMELECs Rulings
The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating:
Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention" filed by Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this
Commission to suspend its Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice, this
Commission hereby RESOLVES to:
1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;
2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN
RACEL ARATEA, proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their
respective Comments on the Petition-in- Intervention within a non-extendible period of
five (5) days from receipt thereof;
4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at
10:00 a.m. COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros,
Manila.
WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and compliance.
SO ORDERED.17
In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer considered
Lonzanidas qualification as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to
hold and discharge the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
The sole issue to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the vacancy resulting from
Lonzanidas disqualification."18 The Resolution further stated:
We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could
never be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a second placer
in the elections. The teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De Venecia and Nazareno and
Domino vs. COMELEC, et al., while they remain sound jurisprudence find no application
in the case at bar. What sets this case apart from the cited jurisprudence is that the
notoriety of Lonzanidas disqualification and ineligibility to hold public office is established
both in fact and in law on election day itself. Hence, Lonzanidas name, as already
ordered by the Commission on February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off from the
list of official candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby:
1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA;
2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo;
3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to
PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales;
18

4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-over of the said office
to Antipolo upon her proclamation; and
5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election Director of
Region III to cause the implementation of this Resolution and disseminate it to the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
SO ORDERED.19
Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011.
The Issues
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal.
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted
in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea
or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELECs 2 February 2011 Resolution and 12
January 2011 Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government Codes rule on
succession.
The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing
jurisprudence that a false representation in the certificate of candidacy as to eligibility in
the number of terms elected and served is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; second, they ignore that a false
representation as to eligibility to run for public office due to the fact that the candidate
suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a material fact that is a ground for a
petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; and third, they resort to a
strained statutory construction to conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule
cannot be a ground for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even
when it is clear and plain that violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility
affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office.
The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a candidates
eligibility to the office he seeks election must be strictly construed to refer only to the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
details, i.e., age, citizenship, or residency, among others, which the law requires him to
state in his COC, and which he must swear under oath to possess. The dissenting
opinions choose to view a false certification of a candidates eligibility on the three-term
limit rule not as a ground for false material representation under Section 78 but as a
ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is clearly contrary to
well-established jurisprudence.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor.
Qualifications and Disqualifications
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the
qualifications of elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section
40 of the Local Government Code provide in pertinent part:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines;
a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on
election day.
xxxx
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
19

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code are specifically enumerated:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received
or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Emphasis supplied)
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." 20 All
the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus
Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in
the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit
rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de
Venecia,21 this Court ruled:
[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are
beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in
nature. x x x
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute
a ground for a petition under Section 68.
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be
denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the
certificate of candidacy:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
20

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which
he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of
birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts
stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items
of information in the certificate of candidacy: 22 name; nickname or stage name; gender;
age; place of birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil status;
residence/address; profession or occupation; post office address for election purposes;
locality of which the candidate is a registered voter; and period of residence in the
Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies four statements: a
statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement
that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; a
statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and a
statement of the candidates allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.23 The certificate of candidacy should also be under oath, and filed within the
period prescribed by law.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being
elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the
finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. x x x
Prisin mayor and temporary disqualification. The duration of the penalties
of prisin mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one
day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification.
The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office
shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office
or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise
of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs
2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. The
penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office,
profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or
during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected
to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisin mayor Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision mayor shall
carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
21

pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted
in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,24 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor. On
the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities
is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material
representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so
run.
In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna), the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
25
explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellees
conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election
Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to
suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for
public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of
the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case
of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty
deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during
the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the
term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any
popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers
to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the
sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the
perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the
provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is
"according to the nature of said penalty" which means according to whether the
penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
"deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually.
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this
accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states
that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
[perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is
immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his
conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida,
he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office
from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment
of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October
2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means
that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that
Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court
held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the false material representation may refer
22

to "qualifications or eligibility. One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification
is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special
disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run
for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes
a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this
Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the
public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her
CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,
therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states
a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law,
is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court
has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate.28(Emphasis supplied)
Latasa, Rivera and Ong:
The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he
seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office. The three-term limit rule,
enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the
electorates freedom of choice,29 is found both in the Constitution 30 and the law.31 After
being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election 32 because he
is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for
[the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" 33 means having the right to run for
elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to
run for the public office.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, 34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasas third term. Latasa filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasas
opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of
candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely
represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos
City. Latasa argued that he did not make any false representation. In his certificate of
candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated
"*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as
city mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasas certificate of candidacy for
violation of the three-term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court
affirmed the COMELEC En Bancs denial of Latasas motion for reconsideration.
We cancelled Marino Morales certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections (Rivera).35 We held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term limit,
having been elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995
to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a
candidate for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not explicitly
rule that Morales violation of the three-term limit rule constituted false material
representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales certificate of
candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis Ongs
certificate of candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition to disqualify, deny due
course and cancel" Ongs certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was predicated on
the violation of the three-term limit rule.
Loong, Fermin and Munder:
When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition
is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification
It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the
grounds for eligibility and ineligibility vis--vis qualifications and disqualifications. For
example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine
locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another country.38 In cases of such
overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the
Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies. 39 Section 78 allows
the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy before
the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the
election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for
disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
23

The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was
discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections 40 with respect to the applicable
prescriptive period. Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78
to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional Vice-Governor of the
Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age. The
petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day
period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalums
petition was one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for
disqualification under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in
Section 78 should be strictly applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law:
It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be
stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only
after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no
fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the
disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem,
therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the
misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of
the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is
made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the
disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the
proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the
misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him.
Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which,
according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.
At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative
branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to
eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253
of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called
procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does not provide, its function
not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is
too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy.41
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a candidates possession of the
required one-year residency requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification
under Section 68 instead of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78. Despite the question of the one-year residency being a
proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the petitioner before the COMELEC
in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No.
780043 and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
or resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the
grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate
proceedings to raise the said grounds." 44 A petition for disqualification can only be
premised on a ground specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition questioning a candidates
possession of the required one-year residency requirement, as distinguished from
permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed under
Section 78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.
In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of
candidacy for Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty.
Tago Sarip filed a petition for Munders disqualification on 13 April 2010. Sarip claimed
that Munder misrepresented that he was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur,
and that he was eligible to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was not yet 18
years of age at the time of the voters registration. Moreover, Munders certificate of
candidacy was not accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not
affix his thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarips petition and
declared that his grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for
denial or cancellation of Munders certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarips
petition was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munders certificate
of candidacy, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file his petition.
The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the COMELEC
Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety of Sarips remedy
but focused on the question of whether Munder was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao
del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC Second Divisions resolution. This Court
ruled that the ground raised in the petition, lack of registration as voter in the locality
where he was running as a candidate, is inappropriate for a petition for disqualification.
We further declared that with our ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim that
lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for
disqualification under Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which
is a ground for a petition under Section 68 is the candidates permanent residency or
immigrant status in a foreign country.
The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a
disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or
condition which bars him from running for public office despite the possession of all the
qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local Government Code]." In so holding the
dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the law. Section 68 is explicit as
to the proper grounds for disqualification under said Section. The grounds for filing a
petition for disqualification under Section 68 are specifically enumerated in said Section.
24

However, contrary to the specific enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing
jurisprudence, the dissenting opinions add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the
three-term limit rule and falsification under the Revised Penal Code, which are obviously
not found in the enumeration in Section 68.
The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanidas possession of a disqualifying condition
(violation of the three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification under Section
68. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification: the commission of
specific prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code and possession of a
permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country. Any other false
representation regarding a material fact should be filed under Section 78, specifically
under the candidates certification of his eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-
term limit as a condition for eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation,
ignoring the verba legis doctrine and well-established jurisprudence on this very issue.
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility,
and thus qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of
candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and
served in an elective position, such fact is material in determining a candidates eligibility,
and thus qualification for the office. Election to and service of the same local elective
position for three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible from running for the
same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility
because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was
eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanidas representation
that he was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
Legal Duty of COMELEC
to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification
Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC
is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from
perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch,
but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the
law.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to
run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the
Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." 46 The disqualification of a convict to run
for elective public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of
a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all the laws"
relating to the conduct of elections.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes.47 We quote from the COMELECs 2 February 2011
Resolution with approval:
As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division
had already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy, and had
stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San
Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its resolution dated August
11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were
likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not
simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc
resolution that Lonzanidas disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the
constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he
is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent
Lonzanidas disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since
respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio,
Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently,
Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post
and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.48 (Boldfacing and underscoring in the original;
italicization supplied)
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
1wphi1
after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was
never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti
polo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
25
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and
the Order dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-158 (DC)
are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special
Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and
desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales.

SO ORDERED.

26

G.R. No. 215847 January 12, 2016
GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
CORNELIO P. ALDON, and RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, Respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
filed to challenge the January 12, 2015 per curiam order of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC/The Commission) en banc in SPA No. 13-254 (DC). The 1
Commission granted the petition to disqualify the petitioner Exequiel Javier and to annul
his proclamation as the duly elected governor of Antique.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election
Code (Election Code). Section 261(d) and (e) of this Code prescribe the following
2
elements of coercion as an election offense:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense: x x x
(d) Coercion of subordinates. -
(1) Any public officer, or any officer of any public or private corporation or
association, or any head, superior, or administrator of any religious organization,
or any employer or landowner who coerces or intimidates or compels, or in
any manner influence, directly or indirectly, any of his subordinates or
members or parishioners or employees or house helpers, tenants, overseers,
farm helpers, tillers, or lease holders to aid, campaign or vote for or against
any candidate or any aspirant for the nomination or selection of candidates.
(2) Any public officer or any officer of any commercial, industrial, agricultural,
economic or social enterprise or public or private corporation or association, or
any head, superior or administrator of any religious organization, or any employer
or landowner who dismisses or threatens to dismiss, punishes or threatens
to punish by reducing his salary, wage or compensation, or by demotion,
transfer, suspension, separation, excommunication, ejectment, or causing him
annoyance in the performance of his job or in his membership, any
subordinate member or affiliate, parishioner, employee or house helper, tenant,
overseer, farm helper, tiller, or lease holder, for disobeying or not complying with
any of the acts ordered by the former to aid, campaign or vote for or against
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
any candidate, or any aspirant for the nomination or selection of
candidates.
(e) Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of
coercion. - Any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates or actually
causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss or
disadvantage upon any person or persons or that of the immediate members of his
family, his honor or property, or uses any fraudulent device or scheme to compel or
induce the registration or refraining from registration of any voter, or the participation in a
campaign or refraining or desistance from any campaign, or the casting of any vote or
omission to vote, or any promise of such registration, campaign, vote, or omission
therefrom. (emphases supplied)
Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than one
year but not more than six years. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides that
3
the Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261(d)
or (e).
On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the definition
of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code. It increased the penalty for coercion
4
committed in violation of a persons right to suffrage to prision mayor. Further, Section 3
of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Section 26, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Election
Code.
On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9385 fixing the calendar of
5
activities for the May 2013 elections. The resolution set the election period from January
13, 2013 until June 12, 2013.
On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B. Maguad filed
an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of
Authority against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero (Mayor Roquero). This
complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 05-2012.
On November 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) issued Resolution No. 291-
2012 recommending to Antique Governor Exequiel Javier (Gov. Javier) the preventive
suspension of Mayor Roquero.
On November 21, 2012, Mayor Roquero filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Regional Trial
27

Court (RTC), Branch 12, Antique, against Gov. Javier and the members of the SP to
restrain them from proceeding with Administrative Case No. 05-2012. The petition was
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 12-11-86.
The case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 11 which issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Dimamay, and the members of the SP filed a petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP-07307.
On December 18, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9581 prohibiting any public
6
official from suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officer during
the election period for the May 13, 2013 elections. This resolution implements Section
261 (x) of the Election Code.
7
On January 15, 2013, the CA issued a TRO in CA-G.R. SP-07307.
On January 16, 2013, the RTC, Branch 11 promulgated its judgment
granting certiorari and prohibition. It ordered the SP to cease and desist from further
proceeding with Administrative Case No. 05-2012. It likewise ordered Gov. Javier to
refrain from implementing SP Resolution No. 291-2012 and from preventively
suspending Mayor Roquero.
On January 23, 2013, Gov. Javier issued Executive Order No. 003, S. 2013,
preventively suspending Mayor Roquero for thirty (30) days.
On February 7, 2013, the SP of Antique issued a decision finding Mayor Roquero guilty
of Grave Misconduct in relation with Section 3(e) of R. A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and Grave Abuse of Authority in relation with Section 5(e) of
R.A. No. 6713. The SP suspended her for four (4) months.
Mayor Roquero filed an Election Offense complaint against Gov. Javier for violating
Section 261(x) of the Election Code. The case was filed before the COMELEC Law
Department and docketed as Election Offense Case (EOC) No. 13-025.
Meanwhile (or on March 15, 2013), the CA granted the writ of preliminary injunction filed
by Gov. Javier, et al., in CA-G.R. SP-07307. It enjoined Judge Nery Duremdes of the
RTC, Branch 11 from conducting further proceedings in SPL Civil Action No. 12-11-86.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
On March 22, 2013, private respondents Cornelio P. Aldon (Aldon) and Raymundo T.
Roquero (Roquero) also filed a petition for disqualification before the Commission
against Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Rosie A. Dimamay, and the other members of the SP.
The case was docketed as COMELEC Special Action (SPA) No. 13-254 (DC.)
Aldon and Roquero sought to disqualify Gov. Javier and the other incumbent officials
from running in the 2013 elections on the ground that the latter committed the election
offenses of Coercion of Subordinates [Sec. 261(d)] and Threats, Intimidation,
Terrorism x x x or Other Forms of Coercion [Sec. 261(e)] by suspending Mayor
Roquero. They alleged that the suspension was political harassment calculated to
intimidate the Roqueros into backing out of the 2013 elections.8
On April 29, 2013, the Clerk of the Commission conducted a conference hearing
between the parties.
On April 30, 2013, Gov. Javier (together with the SP Members) filed a motion to dismiss
with answer ex abundante ad cautelam.
After the May 13, 2013 Elections, only Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier,
Edgar D. Denosta, Teopisto C. Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed
winners. Hence, the Commission considered the disqualification cases against the losing
candidates moot.
On October 3, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA No. 13-
254 (DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of
Antique. The resolution was penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph.
The COMELEC held that the preventive suspension of Mayor Roquero under Executive
Order No. 003 violated the election period ban because it was not for the purpose of
applying the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It also considered the Commissions
findings in EOC No. 13-025 that there was substantial evidence showing that Gov. Javier
acted in bad faith when he suspended Mayor Roquero as a form of punishment for
opposing him. 9
The COMELEC ruled that Gov. Javiers act of preventively suspending Mayor Roquero
during the election period ban fell within the contemplation of Section 261(d) of the
Election Code, which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68. It held that while
Section 261(d) of the Election Code was repealed by Republic Act No. 7890, it did not
remove coercion "as a ground per se for disqualification under [Section] 68." In fact, R.A.
7890 made Coercion (an election offense) a felony with a higher penalty. The 10
28

COMELEC added that the general repealing clause of R.A. No. 7890 cannot impliedly
repeal Section 68 because the latter was "not absolutely and irreconcilably incompatible
with Article 286."
11
Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia dissented from the resolution. Commissioner Guia
reasoned that the legal basis to dismiss Gov. Javier no longer exists because Section 3
of Republic Act No. 7890 had repealed Section 261(d) of the Election Code.
Commissioner Arthur D. Lim took no part in the vote because he did not participate in the
deliberations.
With the votes tied at 1-1-1 (one voted to grant, one dissenting, and one not
participating), the case failed to obtain the necessary majority. Consequently on October
14, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued an order elevating the case to the en
banc for its disposition.
12
The Commission en banc agreed, as a matter of internal arrangement, to submit their
respective opinions explaining their respective votes or their concurrence with either
Commissioner Yusoph or Commissioner Guia.
Three (3) Commissioners concurred with Commissioner Yusoph: Chairman Sixto
Brillantes, Jr., Commissioner Lucenito Tagle, and Commissioner Arthur Lim.
Commissioner Christian Robert Lim joined Commissioner Guias dissent. Commissioner
Al A. Parreo did not participate in the vote as he was away on official business. Thus,
the vote was 4-2-1 in favor of disqualification; in a per curiam order promulgated on
January 12, 2015, the Commission en banc disqualified Gov. Javier and annulled his
proclamation as the governor of Antique.
On January 20, 2015, Gov. Javier filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in
relation with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion
because: (1) its January 12, 2015 order was arrived at on the basis of an "internal
arrangement; and (2) the order did not obtain a majority vote because Commissioner
Arthur Lim should not have been allowed to participate.
The petitioner also asserts that the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. 7890 did not
remove Section 261(d) of the Election Code as a ground for administrative
disqualification. Finally, the petitioner maintains that the Commission unconstitutionally
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
set the Election Period for the May 13, 2013 elections in violation of Article IX-C, Section
9 of the Constitution, Sec. 62 (c) of the Local Government Code, and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7056. 13
In its comment on the petition, COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), counters that it did not abuse its discretion in issuing the January 12, 2015 order
disqualifying Gov. Javier. The Commission insists that the procedure observed during the
proceedings was not infirm and that there was no legal impediment for Commissioner
Arthur Lim to participate in the en banc vote.
On the alleged errors of law, the Commission insists that there was legal basis to
disqualify Gov. Javier under both Sections 261 (d) and (e) of the Election Code; the
repeal of Section 261(d) by R.A. 7890 did not ipso facto remove coercion as a ground for
disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code. It added that Section 261(e), on
the other hand, has not been repealed, either expressly or impliedly.
Finally, the Commission asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9581 fixing the date of
the election period is expressly authorized by Article IX, Section 9 of the Constitution and
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7056.
Based on these submissions, the following issues now confront the Court:
I.
Whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it issued Resolution No.
9581 fixing the 2013 election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013, for the
purpose of determining administrative and criminal liability for election offenses.
II.
Whether the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. No. 7890 did not remove coercion as a
ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code.
III.
Whether the Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Order dated January 12, 2015, disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation
as the governor of Antique.
OUR RULING:
29

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.
The COMELEC is expressly authorized to fix a different date of the election period.
The petitioner contends that the election period for the reckoning of administrative and
criminal liabilities under election laws should always be the same-90 days before and 30
days after an election-fixed in Article IX-C, Section 9 of the Constitution and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7056. He argues that the Commissions authority to fix the pre-election
14
period refers only to the period needed to properly administer and conduct orderly
elections. The petitioner argues that by extending the period for incurring criminal liability
beyond the 90-day period, the Commission encroached on the legislatures prerogative
to impute criminal and administrative liability on mala prohibita acts. Therefore,
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9385 and 9581 were issued ultra vires.
We do not find this argument meritorious.
No less than the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of the election
period. Article IX-C, Section 9 provides:
Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.
15
Congress, through the Election Code, explicitly recognizes this authority:
Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods. Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by
the Commission on Elections, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the
Commission, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the
election and shall end thirty days thereafter. (emphases supplied)
16
Evidently, the 120-day period is merely the default election period. The Commission is
not precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of the election period to ensure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. This is not merely a statutory but
a constitutionally granted power of the Commission.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the Commissions act of fixing the election period
does not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The Commission did not
prescribe or define the elements of election offenses. Congress already defined them
through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and other pertinent election
laws.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
As defined by Congress, some election offenses and prohibited acts can only be
committed during the election period. An element of these offenses (i.e., that it be
committed during the election period) is variable, as election periods are not affixed to a
specific and permanent date. Nevertheless, the definition of the offense is already
complete. By fixing the date of the election period, the Commission did not change what
the offense is or how it is committed. There is thus no intrusion into the legislative
sphere.
There is also no merit in the petitioners argument that the extended election period only
applies to pre-election activities other than the determination of administrative or criminal
liability for violating election laws. Neither the law nor the Constitution authorizes the use
of two distinct election periods for the same election. The law does not distinguish
between election offenses and other pre-election activities in terms of the applicable
election period. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should this Court.
The Alleged Lack of Due Process
We find the petitioners claim that the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
since there was no preliminary investigation as required under Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code to be misplaced. 17
SPA No. 13-254 was an administrative proceeding for disqualification and not a criminal
prosecution of an election offense. The due process requirements and the procedures for
these are not the same. Section 265 of the Election Code only applies to criminal
prosecutions. Disqualification cases are summary in nature and governed by Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
There is likewise no merit in the petitioners allegation that he was denied due process
because the Commission adjudicated the issue without conducting any subsequent
hearings and without requiring the submission of position papers or memoranda,
notarized witness affidavits, or other documentary evidence aside from the annexes
included in the petition and the answer.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. A formal hearing is not always necessary and the observance of technical rules
18
of procedure is not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. The essence of
19
administrative due process is the right to be heard and to be given an opportunity to
explain ones side. Where the Commission hears both sides and considers their
20
contentions, the requirements of administrative due process are complied with.
30

As we held in Lanot v. Commission on Elections:21
The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should
be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary
in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may
be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect,
and vice versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable
cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC,
through its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is
probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-
blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal
conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include
disqualification from holding a future public office.
Commissioner Arthur Lims Participation in the En Banc Voting
The petitioner further argues that the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
by allowing Commissioner Arthur D. Lim to participate in the proceedings before the
Commission en banc. The petitioner maintains that because Commissioner Arthur Lim
took no part in the proceedings before the COMELEC Second Division, then he should
have inhibited from the en banc proceedings pursuant to the ruling in Estrella v.
COMELEC. If we disregard Commissioner Arthur Lims vote, then the Commission
22
would have failed to attain the necessary majority vote of all the members of the
Commission.
The petitioners reliance on Estrella is misplaced because the facts of this case are
different from those of the present case. Estrella involved two related election cases
between the same parties: an election protest and an action for certiorari. One party
moved for Commissioner Lantions inhibition which the Commission denied. However,
Commissioner Lantion later inhibited himself from the certiorari proceeding and was
substituted by another Commissioner. The substitution order was also adopted in the
23
election protest case. When the election protest was elevated to the COMELEC en
banc, Commissioner Lantion participated in the deliberations and voted despite his prior
inhibition. This Court granted certiorari and held that Commissioner Lantions piecemeal
voluntary inhibition was illegal and unethical.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
In the present case, Commissioner Arthur Lim did not inhibit from the proceedings. If the
Commissioner had inhibited, there would have been a need to replace him pursuant to
Rule 3, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (as what happened
24
in Estrella where there was an issuance of an order designating Commissioner Borra as
Commissioner Lantions substitute). Commissioner Arthur Lim only abstained from
voting; he did not participate in the deliberations. When the Commission en banc, as a
matter of internal arrangement, agreed among themselves to submit their own opinion
explaining their respective vote or merely their concurrence with either Commissioner
Elias R. Yusoph or Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guias position on the matter, no legal or
ethical impediment existed preventing him (Commissioner Arthur Lim) from subsequently
participating in the deliberations and from casting his vote.
COMELECs Internal Arrangement
The petitioner also maintains that the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it
set aside its own rules and resolved the case through an "internal arrangement." He
submits that the Commission should have waited for the assigned ponente to write an
opinion before agreeing to vote based on the positions of Commissioner Yusoph and
Commissioner Guia. The petitioner also claims that the assailed Order is a "midnight
decision" and cites the absence of a promulgation date on the front page and of a
certification signed by the Chairman as procedural infirmities.
The petitioner clearly refers to Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
states:
Part IV
Rule 18 Decisions
Sec. 1 Procedure in Making Decisions. The conclusions of the Commission in any case
submitted to it for decision en banc or in Division shall be reached in
consultation before the case is assigned by raffle to a Member for the writing of the
opinion of the Commission or the Division and a certification to this effect signed by the
Chairman or the Presiding Commissioner, as the case may be, shall be incorporated in
the decision. Any member who took no part, dissented, or abstained from a decision or
resolution must state the reason therefor.
Every decision shall express therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. (emphasis supplied)
31

To our mind, the essence of this provision is: (1) that decisions of the Commission,
whether in Division or en banc, must be reached in consultation; and (2) that the
decisions must state their factual and legal bases. Moreover, Rule 18, Section 1 must be
read together with the other provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly
the following related portions:
Rule 1 Introductory Provisions
Sec. 3. Construction These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the
effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before
the Commission.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules In the interest of justice and in order to obtain
speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any
portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
The COMELEC Rules specifically authorize the Commission to suspend the strict
application of its rules in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases. In
this case, the Commission suspended Rule 18, Section 1. The Commission, as a body,
dispensed with the preparation of another ponencia and opted to vote on the legal
positions of Commissioners Yusoph and Guia. Nevertheless, the decision was evidently
reached through consultation. Then Chairman Sixto Brillantes, Jr., Commissioner
Lucenito Tagle, and Commissioner Arthur Lim concurred with Commissioner Yusoph.
Commissioner Christian Robert Lim joined Commissioner Guias dissent. Chairman
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Arthur Lim also wrote separate concurring opinions. The
Court does not see any arbitrariness or infirmity in this internal arrangement that would
have deprived the petitioner of due process.
Moreover, the Commission resorted to this arrangement because, as the petitioner
pointed out, three Commissioners were retiring soon. There was a need to resolve the
cases because the impending vacancies would have resulted in further delay. Contrary
to the petitioners insinuations, "midnight decisions" are not illegal. Judges and other
quasi-judicial officers cannot sit back, relax, and refuse to do their work just because they
are nearing retirement or are near the end of their term. As civil servants, they are
expected to diligently carry out their duties until their separation from service. Thus, the
Commissions suspension of its rules and use of an internal arrangement to expedite its
internal proceedings is not at all unusual in collegial bodies. We note that the vote was
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
divided and dissents were filed, thereby indicating the absence of any malicious
departure from the usual procedures in arriving at the Commissions ruling on the case.
Absence of a Promulgated Date and Failure to Serve Advance Copy
With respect to the absence of a promulgation date on the first page of the assailed
order, this Court directs the petitioners attention to the last page stating that the Order
was "Given this 12th day of January 2015, Manila, Philippines. Promulgation is the
25
process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the
public, or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or
their counsel. The order was evidently promulgated on January 12, 2015.
26
The Commission does not deny that it failed to serve an advance copy of the order to the
petitioner as required under Rule 18, Section 5 of its Rules. But as we previously held in
27
the cases of Lindo v. COMELEC and Pimping v. COMELEC, this kind of procedural
28 29
lapse does not affect the validity of the order and is insufficient to warrant the grant of a
writ of certiorari in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion prejudicing the rights of
the parties.
Repeal of Section 261 (d) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 by Republic Act No. 7890
No less than the Constitution empowers the Commission to decide all questions affecting
elections except those involving the right to vote. It is the sole arbiter of all issues
30
involving elections. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of
judgment committed by COMELEC cannot be reviewed even by this Court. 31
An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction; they only involve errors in the court or tribunals appreciation of the facts
32
and the law. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
33
the court without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.34
A review of the October 3, 2014 COMELEC Second Division resolution (penned by
Commissioner Yusoph), however, showed that the main thrust of this resolution to
which four Commissioners concurred in when the case was elevated to the en banc is
faulty. It considered the repeal of Section 261(d) by R.A. No.7890 to be an implied one,
35
which is contrary to the wordings of R.A. 7890.
For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7890, thus:
32

SECTION 1. Article 286, Section Three, Chapter Two, Title Nine of Act No. 3815, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 286. Grave Coercions. The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not
exceeding Six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without any
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage, or for the
purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act, to prevent him from
exercising such right or from so doing such act, the penalty next higher in degree shall
be imposed."
SEC. 2. Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), Article XXII of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. All other election laws, decrees, executive orders rules and regulations, or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
xxxx
A repeal may be express or implied. An express repeal is one wherein a statute
36
declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its
number or title, is repealed. An implied repeal, on the other hand, transpires when a
37
substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the absence of an
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old
laws.38
In the present case, it is clear that R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261,
paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC Second
Divisions October 3, 2014 resolution, however, treated this repeal as merely an implied
one. Commissioner Yusoph reasoned out as follows:
Moreover, the general repealing clause in Section 3 of RA 7890 cannot impliedly
repeal Section 68 because the latter is not absolutely and irreconcilably incompatible
with Article 286, as amended by RA 7890. Meaning, a case for disqualification due to
coercion under Section 68 can very well stand apart from the criminal case for coercion
under Article 286, as amended. This is so because Section 68 involves an administrative
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
proceeding intended to disqualify a candidate whereas Article 286, supra, involves a
criminal proceeding intended to penalize coercion. Both laws, therefore, can be given
effect without nullifying the other, hence the inapplicability of implied repeal.
To firm up our stance against implied repeal of coercion as a ground for disqualification,
the following pronouncements of the Supreme Court are guiding:
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover
the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each
other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that
is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other."
Well-settled is the rule is statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored. In
order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile
and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference
of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. x x x x" 39
We point out that this resolution and the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Guia
became the basis of the internal arrangement reached upon by the Commission en
banc whereby the commissioners agreed to submit their respective opinions explaining
their votes or their concurrence with either Commissioner Yusoph or Guia.
As earlier stated, the vote was 4-2-1 in favor of disqualification; in a per curiam order
promulgated on January 12, 2015, the Commission en banc disqualified Gov. Javier and
annulled his proclamation as the governor of Antique. Chairman Brillantes and
Commissioner Arthur Lim wrote their own opinions concurring with the position of
Commissioner Yusoph, while Commissioner Tagle submitted his vote concurring with the
opinions of Commissioner Yusoph and Chairman Brillantes.
In his Separate Opinion, Chairman Brillantes agreed with Commissioner Yusoph that the
repeal of Section 261(d) by R.A. No. 7890 was merely implied, and made the following
disquisition:
xxxx
The Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has constantly disfavored and struck down
the use of repeal by implication. Pursuant to jurisprudence, well entrenched is the rule
that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two
laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a
33
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no longer
former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. Stated plainly, a existed. As we held in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, [t]he jurisdiction of the
43

petition for disqualification on the ground of coercion shall be taken differently and COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
distinctly from coercion punishable under the RPC for the two can very well stand Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
independently from each other. x x x Therefore, unless proven that the two are jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265
44

inconsistent and would render futile the application and enforcement of the other, only
then that a repeal by implication will be preferred. x x x x
40
and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the
conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice. 45

A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from
the moment the repealing law becomes effective. The discussion on implied repeals by
41
There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when
the Yusoph resolution, (and the concurring opinion of Chairman Brillantes, Jr.), including there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
the concomitant discussions on the absence of irreconcilable provisions between the two jurisdiction, where power is exercised arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason of
46

laws, were thus misplaced. The harmonization of laws can only be had when the repeal passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to
is implied, not when it is express, as in this case. virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
The COMELECs reasoning that coercion remains to be a ground for disqualification and hostility. 47

under Section 68 of the Election Code despite the passage of R.A. No. 7890 is
erroneous. To the point of our being repetitive, R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section
261 d(1) and (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, rendering these provisions inoperative.
The effect of this repeal is to remove Section 261(d) from among those listed as ground
for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To our mind, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it disqualified Gov. Javier
based on a provision of law that had already been expressly repealed. Its stubborn
insistence that R.A. No. 7890 merely impliedly repealed Section 261 (d) despite the clear
wordings of the law, amounted to an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of judgment.

In his Memorandum/Concurring Opinion, Commissioner Arthur Lim stated that the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET
petition for disqualification is anchored not only on violation of Section 261 (d), but also ASIDE the January 12, 2015 per curiam order of the Commission on Elections en
on the violation of Section 261(e) in relation to Section 68 of the OEC. We point out, banc in SPA No. 13-254 (DC).
however, that the COMELEC Second Divisions October 3, 2014 resolution in SPA No.
13-254 (disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of SO ORDERED.
Antique) was premised solely on violation of Section 261(d) of the OEC; it did not find
that Gov. Javier even by substantial evidence - violated the provisions of Section
261(e). For clarity and accuracy, we quote the pertinent portions of the COMELECs
(Second Division) October 3, 2014 resolution:

Ineluctably, the act of Gov. Javier in preventively suspending Mayor Roquero during the
Election period ban falls within the contemplation of Section 261(d) of the Election Code
which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68, Election Code. That is, Gov.
Javier issued Executive Order No. 003 suspending Mayor Roquero to coerce, intimidate,
compel, or influence the latter to collaborate with or campaign for the former, or to punish
the latter for having manifested political opposition against the former. For that, he must
be disqualified.
42

34

G.R. No. 206004 February 24, 2015
JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's right of
suffrage should not be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny
due course to or cancel an alleged nuisance candidates certificate of candidacy without
providing the candidate his opportunity to be heard.
This is a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory
1
injunction against the following issuances of the COMELEC: first, Resolution No.
9610 dated January 11, 2013, declaring petitioner Joseph B. Timbol (Timbol) a nuisance
2
candidate and ordering the removal of his name from the certified list of candidates; and
3
second, Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, denying his Petition to have his
4
name listed in the certified list of candidates and printed on the ballots for the May 13,
2013 elections.5
On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of
6
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. On January 15,
2013, he received a Subpoena from COMELEC Election Officer Dinah A. Valencia
7
(Election Officer Valencia), ordering him to appear before her office on January 17, 2013
for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy.
8
Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During the
clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He contended
that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among all the candidates who ran for
Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. He
allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.
9
He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared in
the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution
No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013. The clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him
that his name would be deleted from the list and that his Certificate of Candidacy would
be given due course. 10
In the Memorandum dated January 17, 2013, Election Officer Valencia recommended
11
that Timbols Certificate of Candidacy be given due course. 12
Despite Election Officer Valencias favorable recommendation, Timbols name was not
removed from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELECs website. With
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed
on February 2, 2013 a Petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of
13
candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections. 14
In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for
being moot, considering that the printing of ballots had already begun. 15
On March 15, 2013, Timbol filed his Petition for Certiorari with this court, arguing that
16
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him a nuisance
candidate. According to Timbol, the COMELEC deprived him of due process of law
17
when he was declared a nuisance candidate even before Election Officer Valencia
conducted the clarificatory hearing. He prayed for a preliminary mandatory injunction
18
ordering the COMELEC to include his name in the certified list of candidates for the
position of Member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. 19
In the Resolution dated April 16, 2013, this court ordered the Office of the Solicitor
20
General to comment on behalf of the COMELEC.
In its Comment, the COMELEC argued that the Petition was already moot and
21
academic, considering that the May 13, 2013 elections had already been conducted. 22
Even assuming that the Petition was not moot and academic, the COMELEC maintained
that it did not gravely abuse its discretion. Contrary to Timbols argument, he was given
an opportunity to be heard when Election Officer Valencia heard him during the
clarificatory hearing. He even admitted that he attended the clarificatory hearing with his
counsel. 23
Moreover, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Timbols Petition
to be included in the certified list of candidates, considering that the printing of ballots
had already started. 24
With these arguments, the COMELEC prayed that this court deny the Petition for lack of
merit.
25
In the Resolution dated August 6, 2013, this court ordered Timbol to file a reply. When
26
Timbol failed to file his reply despite receipt of the order, we required Atty. Jose Ventura
27
Aspiras (Atty. Aspiras), counsel for Timbol, to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for failing to file a reply on behalf of his client in the
Resolution dated September 2, 2014. We likewise reiterated our order for Atty. Aspiras
28
35

to file a reply for Timbol. Still, Atty. Aspiras failed to comply with our show cause
29
resolution.
We dispense with the filing of the reply and resolve to decide this case based on the
Petition and the Comment.
The issues for this courts resolution are the following:
First, whether this case is moot and academic; and
Second, whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner Timbols Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.
We deny the Petition.
I candidates. Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to
This case is moot and academic.
A case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value." When a case is moot and academic, this court generally declines jurisdiction
30
over it.
31
There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This court has taken cognizance of moot
and academic cases when:
(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of
exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised
required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. (Citation omitted)
32
We may no longer act on petitioners prayer that his name be included in the certified list
of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari on
March 15,2013, 39 days after respondent began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013.
Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already
proclaimed.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth
"controlling and authoritative doctrines" to be observed by respondent in motu proprio
33
denying due course to or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance
candidates. This motu proprio authority is always subject to the alleged nuisance
candidates opportunity to be heard an essential element of procedural due process.
34 35
II
Respondents power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is
subject to the candidates opportunity to be heard.
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access
to opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional
right to run for or hold public office[.]" To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject
36
to limitations imposed by law." Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance
37
put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters
by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or
acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for
the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate." In Pamatong v. Commission on
38
Elections, this court explained why nuisance candidates are prohibited from running for
39
public office:
. . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties
should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral
exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these
logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is
not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions. . . .
....
. . . The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous
enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a
1wphi1
viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
36

candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll
body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be
a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. 40
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of
candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or
cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested
party," "subject to an opportunity to be heard."
41 42
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." In election cases, due process
43
requirements are satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand." 44
In Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, this court explained:
45
[T]he determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves
a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a
deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold
public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the
proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations
against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that
the candidate be notified of the Commissions inquiry into the veracity of the contents of
his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to
prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks. Respondent commits
46
grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy
without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard. 47
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to
explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued
Resolution No. 9610on January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election
Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective
opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did
not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to
file the Petition had he been given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second,
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioners Petition
on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.
We understand the "insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs
implications" of reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of petitioners
48
name in the certified list of candidates. The ballots already printed would have to be
recalled, leading to the waste of the ballots previously printed. It should be noted that
these ballots are special as they have the capability of being optically scanned by
Precinct Count Optical Scan machines. Reprinting another batch of ballots would,
indeed, be costly.
Still, "automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process." Respondent
49
should also balance its duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest,
orderly, and peaceful" with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide
50
intention to run for public office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate.
III
Counsel for petitioner must be fined for failure to comply with the Show Cause
Resolution dated September 2, 2014.
Atty. Aspiras, counsel for petitioner, failed to obtain the injunctive reliefs prayed for in time
for the May 13, 2013 elections. However, this was no reason for him to defy our orders to
file a reply on behalf of his client. For such contumacious acts, he should be ordered to
show cause why he should not be proceeded with administratively.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic.
Moreover, Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras is ORDERED to show cause within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be
the subject of administrative actions for his contumacious attitude towards repeated
orders of this court, specifically, for his failure to comply with the Resolutions dated
August 6, 2013 and September 2, 2014. The action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras
will be docketed as a new and separate administrative case.
Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the initiation of
the proper disciplinary action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras.
SO ORDERED.
37
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4

38

G.R. Nos. 207199-200 October 22, 2013
WIGBERTO R. TAADA, JR. Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ANGELINA D. TAN, AND ALVIN JOHN S. TAADA, Respondents.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari 1 under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court is the Resolution2dated April 25, 2013 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc declaring respondent Alvin John S. Taada not a nuisance
candidate.
The Facts
Petitioner Wigberto R. Taada, Jr., (Wigberto) and respondents Angelina D. Tan
(Angelina) and Alvin John S. Taada (Alvin John) were contenders for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in the
just concluded May 13, 2013 National Elections. 3 Wigberto ran under the banner of the
Liberal Party; Alvin John was the official congressional candidate of Lapiang
Manggagawa; while Angelina was fielded by the National Peoples Coalition. 4
On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC two separate petitions: first,
to cancel Alvin Johns CoC;5 and, second, to declare him as a nuisance candidate. 6 The
said petitions were docketed as SPA Nos. 13-056 (DC) and 13-057 (DC), respectively.
In a Resolution7 dated January 29, 2013, the COMELEC First Division dismissed both
petitions for lack of merit. On Wigbertos motion for reconsideration, 8 the COMELEC En
Banc, in a Resolution9 dated April 25, 2013, upheld the COMELEC First Divisions ruling
in SPA No. 13-057 (DC) that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined under
Section 6910 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines" (OEC). 11 However, in SPA No. 13-056 (DC), it
granted the motion for reconsideration and cancelled Alvin Johns CoC for having
committed false material representations concerning his residency in accordance with
Section 7812 of the OEC.13
On May 15, 2013, Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration 14 of the
COMELEC En Banc s ruling in SPA No. 13-057 (DC) on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. He alleged that Alvin Johns candidacy was not bona fide because: (a) Alvin
John was merely forced by his father to file his CoC; (b) he had no election paraphernalia
posted in official COMELEC posting areas in several barangays of Gumaca, Quezon
Province; (c) he did not even vote during the May 13, 2013 National Elections; and (d)
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
his legal representation appeared to have been in collusion with the lawyers of
Angelina.15
On May 15 and 16, 2013, Wigberto filed with the COMELEC En Banc an Extremely
Urgent Motion to Admit Additional and Newly Discovered Evidence and to Urgently
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration16 and an Urgent Manifestation and
Supplemental17 thereto. These motions, however, remained un-acted upon until the filing
of the present petition before the Court on May 27, 2013. Thus, in order to avoid charges
of forum-shopping, said motions were withdrawn by Wigberto.
In a related development, despite the cancellation of Alvin Johns CoC due to his material
misrepresentations therein, his name was not deleted from and thus, remained printed
on the ballot, prompting Wigberto to file a motion 18 with the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin
John be credited to him instead in accordance with the Courts ruling in Dela Cruz v.
COMELEC19and COMELEC Resolution No. 9599. 20 The PBOC, however, denied
Wigbertos motion in a Resolution21 dated May 16, 2013, holding that the votes of Alvin
John could not be counted in favor of Wigberto because the cancellation of the formers
CoC was on the basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the OEC
and not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the same law. Consequently,
the PBOC canvassed the votes of all three contenders separately, and thereafter, on
May 16, 2013, proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. 22According to
Wigberto, it was for the foregoing reason that he impleaded Angelina as a party-
respondent in the instant petition for certiorari.23
It appears, however, that Wigberto had already filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Annul the Proclamation of Angelina (Petition to Annul) under SPC No. 13-013, asserting
that had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings, 24 the votes cast for Alvin John would have
been counted in his favor which could have resulted in his victory.25 While the Petition to
Annul was still pending resolution, Wigberto initiated the instant certiorari case against
the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring Alvin John not a
nuisance candidate. 1wphi1
On July 3, 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation 26 informing the Court that he had caused
the filing of an Election Protest Ad Cautelam entitled " Wigberto R. Taada, Jr. v.
Angelina Helen D. Tan, " before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which was docketed as Electoral Protest Case No. 13-018.
39

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of public respondent COMELEC,
affirmed in its Comment dated August 18, 2013, 27 that an Election Protest Ad Cautelam
had, indeed, been filed by Wigberto against Angelina before the HRET, praying that he
be declared the winner in the 2013 congressional race in the 4th District of Quezon
Province. It also alleged that on June 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
Resolution annulling the proclamation of Angelina as Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. The propriety of this ruling is
now pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.28
The Issues Before the Court
Wigberto assails the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring that
Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined under Section 69 of the OEC. In
consequence, he seeks that the votes cast in favor of Alvin John be credited to him and,
thereafter, to be declared the winning candidate for the congressional post.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
counting of the votes; "returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation
of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" refers to
matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.31
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member
of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16,
2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30,
2013,32 the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the
issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina
as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and
"returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRETs sole jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

The Courts Ruling SO ORDERED.

The petition must fail.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
respective members:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET.29 The phrase
"election, returns and qualifications" refers to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestees title.30 In particular, the term "election" refers to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and

40

G.R. No. 192221 November 13, 2012
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN
LLOYD M. PACETE, Respondents.
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging
concerns is the application of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system
wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading the oval corresponding to
the name of their chosen candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the
candidate's name on the appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual
elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been
cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in
the official ballots on election day,should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be
considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
The Case
In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 in conjunction
with Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed on May
31, 2010, Casimira S. Dela Cruz (petitioner) assails COMELEC Resolution No.
88441 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either
disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names
still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010
elections.
Petitioner prays for the following reliefs:
1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining the taking of oath and
assumption into office of Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as Vice-Mayor
of the Municipality of Bugasong;
2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be rendered granting
the instant Petition and:
(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC Resolution No.
8844 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of the disqualified
nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. Dela Cruz be
counted and tallied in favor of Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz pursuant
to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116; and
(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique where the
Petitioners Election Protest is pending to proclaim as Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Bugasong the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes after the votes in favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela
Cruz is counted and tallied to the votes garnered by Petitioner Casimira
S. Dela Cruz.
3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private
Respondent if Petitioner is proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Bugasong, Province of Antique.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.2
Factual Antecedents
In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member of the
Sangguniang Bayan(SB) of Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed
her certificate of candidacy3 for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Bugasong, Province of Antique under the ticket of the National Peoples Coalition (NPC).
Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy 4 for the
same position.
On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition 5to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate
on the ground that he filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to
put the election process in mockery and to cause confusion among voters due to the
similarity of his surname with petitioners surname. Petitioner emphasized that she is
considered a very strong candidate for the said position having been elected as member
of the SB for three consecutive terms under the ticket of the NPC and obtained the fifth
(2001), fourth (2004) and third (2007) highest number of votes. In contrast, Aurelio is an
unknown in the political scene with no prior political experience as an elective official and
no political party membership. Being a retiree and having no known business, Aurelio
has no sufficient source of income but since the 2007 elections petitioners opponents
have been prodding him to run for the same position as petitioner in order to sow
confusion and thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further cited Aurelios
miserable showing in the previous local elections when he ran and garnered only 126
and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May 2007) and barangay captain of
41

Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November 2007), respectively. Citing Bautista v.
COMELEC,6 petitioner asserted that these circumstances clearly demonstrate Aurelios
lack of a bona fide intention and capability to run for the position of Vice-Mayor, thus
preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 7 declaring
Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-
mayoralty position in Bugasong.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as
scheduled. Aurelios name remained in the official ballots.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of
Bugasong on May 13, 2010, petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be
counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The
Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong 13 showed the
following results of the voting:

Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not TOTAL RANK
deleted in the Certified List of Candidates 8 and Official Sample Ballot9 issued by the
COMELEC. The names of the candidates for Vice-Mayor, including Aurelio and
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on the Official Sample Ballot as follows:
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2

PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1

, Casimira O 3. PACETE,
Consequently, John
on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was L
"BINGBING" (NP) proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong. 14

Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus
Motion10 praying, among other things, that COMELEC issue an order directing the
deletion of Aurelios name from the Official List of Candidates for the position of Vice-
Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for
the May 2010 elections. She also prayed that in the event Aurelios name can no longer
be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the COMELEC issue an order directing
that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in accordance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001.
On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8844 11 listing the names
of disqualified candidates, including Aurelio, and disposing as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of
candidates; and
On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique
an election protest praying for (1) the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for
Aurelio; (2) the annulment of respondent Pacetes proclamation as Vice-Mayor of
Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Bugasong.
Petitioners Arguments
Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes over
petitioners 6,389 votes, petitioner contends that she would have clearly won the
elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes
cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus, petitioner insists she would have garnered a total of
6,921 votes as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent. By issuing a directive to
consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes instead of counting the same in favor of
petitioner in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the COMELECs First
Division gravely abused its discretion.

2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted upon. 12 (Emphasis Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her constitutional right to equal
supplied) protection of the laws because there is no substantial difference between the previous
manual elections and the automated elections conducted in 2010 to justify non-
42

observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued in 2001,particularly on the matter of votes
cast for a candidate who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment where
such nuisance candidate has the same name with that of the bona fide candidate.
Moreover, in contrast to the assailed resolution, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 properly
recognized the substantial distinctions between and among (a) disqualified candidates,
(b) nuisance candidates whose names are similar to those of the bona fide candidates,
(c) nuisance candidates who do not have similar names with those of the bona fide
candidates, and (d) candidates who had voluntarily withdrawn their certificates of
candidacy. As a result of the failure of the COMELECs First Division to make these
important distinctions when it issued Resolution No. 8844 that applies to disqualified
candidates, nuisance candidates and all other candidates whose certificates of
candidacy had been cancelled or denied course, petitioners right to due process was
clearly violated, and only made possible the very evil that is sought to be corrected by
the former rule not to consider the votes cast for the nuisance candidate as stray but
count them in favor of the bona fide candidate.
Respondents Arguments
COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity with respect to its exercise of
supervisory or regulatory authority in the conduct of elections. Also, the time-honored
rule is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party assailing it must
discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving its invalidity. Thus, to strike
down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what
the law prohibits, the statute permits. In this case, petitioner miserably failed to prove a
clear breach of the Constitution; she merely invokes a violation of the equal protection
clause and due process of law without any basis.
On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends that there is a substantial
distinction between a manual election where Resolution No. 4116 applies, and an
automated election governed by Resolution No. 8844. While the votes for the nuisance
candidate were not considered stray but counted in favor of the bona fide candidate, this
is no longer the rule for automated elections. COMELEC cites the following factors which
changed the previous rule: (1) the official ballots in automated elections now contain the
full names of the official candidates so that when a voter shaded an oval, it was
presumed that he carefully read the name adjacent to it and voted for that candidate,
regardless of whether said candidate was later declared disqualified or nuisance; (2)
since the names of the candidates are clearly printed on the ballots, unlike in manual
elections when these were only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the ballot
secrecy folder, the voters intention is clearly to vote for the candidate corresponding to
the shaded oval; (3) the rules on appreciation of ballots under Section 211, Article XVIII
of the Omnibus Election Code apply only to elections where the names of candidates are
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
handwritten in the ballots; and (4) with the use of the automated election system where
the counting of votes is delegated to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines,
pre-proclamation controversies, including complaints regarding the appreciation of
ballots and allegations of misreading the names of the candidates written, were flaws
which the automation rectified. Aside from being germane to the purpose of our election
laws, Resolution No. 8844 is not limited to existing conditions as it is applicable to all
persons of the same class even in succeeding elections, and covered all disqualified and
nuisance candidates without distinction.
Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due process. For public
office is not a property right and no one has a vested right to any public office.
On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly claim the
votes cast for Aurelio in view of the rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, which cannot be supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He also cites an
annotation on election law,15 invoking this Courts ruling in Kare v. COMELEC 16 that the
aforesaid provision when read together with Section 72, are understood to mean that
"any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared
final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray."
Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4, 2010, COMELEC caused the
publication of Resolution No. 8844 in two newspapers of general circulation in the
country. There was thus an earnest effort on the part of COMELEC to disseminate the
information, especially to the voters in Bugasong, Antique, that the name of Aurelio was
printed on the official ballots as one of the candidates for Vice-Mayor. Said voters were
amply forewarned about the status of Aurelios candidacy and the consequences that will
obtain should he still be voted for. Additionally, the petitioner and Aurelio bear different
first names, female and male, respectively; petitioner and her political party engaged in a
massive voter education during the campaign period, emphasizing to her supporters that
she was given the corresponding number ("2") in the official ballots, and the voters
should be very circumspect in filling up their ballots because in case of error in filling up
the same, they will not be given replacement ballots. As to the Judicial Affidavits of those
who voted for petitioner attesting to the fact of mistakenly shading the oval beside the
name of Aurelio in the ballots, which was attached to the petition, petitioner in effect
would want this Court to sit in judgment as trier of facts.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
43

The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64
of the Revised Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 For a petition for certiorari to
prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.18
COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters
falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.19 In this case,
Resolution No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened existing law and
jurisprudence on the legal effect of declaration of a candidate as a nuisance candidate,
especially in the case of nuisance candidates who have the same surnames as those of
bona fide candidates.
Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on
COMELEC when it issued Resolution No. 8844 which is simply consistent with the rule
laid down in Section 211 (24), Article XVIII and Section 72, Article IX of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Said provisions state:
SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption of office.
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and appreciation of
ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason
to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules,
bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voters
will:
xxxx
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment
shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC 20 where this Court, construing
the above provisions, stated:
According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is
contrary to the rule that the second placer cannot be declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelecs Decision to declare the second
placer as winner in the mayoral race should be read in relation with other provisions of
the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646, provides as follows:
xxxx
When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor
of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the
ground therefor, shall be considered stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by
limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment;
the law lists other grounds for disqualification. It escapes us why the Comelec insists that
Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a final judgment. Such an
interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of the election
code.21 (Emphasis supplied; italics not ours)
Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification, the
votes cast for the disqualified candidate should result in considering the votes cast for
him as stray as explicitly mandated by Section 211(24) in relation to Section 72 of the
OEC.
We disagree.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and
not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as
Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false).
Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the
44

similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination
of the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68
(giving money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials
performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving
or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40 22 of Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under
Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy
(COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and have
distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or
confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different
grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private respondents insistence,
therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the
nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition for
Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.
xxxx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects.
While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section
78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v.
Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section
68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a
candidate.24 (Additional emphasis supplied)
Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section
78 cannot be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as
what COMELEC did when it applied the rule provided in Section 72 that the votes cast
for a disqualified candidate be considered stray, to those registered candidates whose
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
COCs had been cancelled or denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled
certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes
cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast
for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or
decisions in special action cases, provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en banc or
division, particularly on special actions (disqualification cases).
special action cases refer to the following:
(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions
or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission,
RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases
shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court;
xxx
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly
whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where
the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration
45

is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall
be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed.
(Emphasis supplied)25
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such
under a final judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista v. COMELEC 26 where the
name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the bona
fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the
COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautistas COC on April 30, 1998, it
denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after the
election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders of
the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are
not really stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate
determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was
not yet final on electionday, this Court also considered those factual circumstances
showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate
candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin
Bautista. We further noted that the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge
of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the
voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been
established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the
voters were informed of the COMELECs decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate.27
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,28 this Court likewise applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to
consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor of the
bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued
only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on
election day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the
similarity of names that affects the voters will and frustrates the same. It may be that the
factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before
and not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof through
newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably,
however, the adverse effect on the voters will was similarly present in this case, if not
worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have
been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to
overcome private respondents lead of only 453 votes after the recount. 29
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010
elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have
been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELECs changing of the
rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant
number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We
observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give
effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates
turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is
faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated
as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any
delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner.
While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write
the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance
candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be
implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the
names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of
the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate
determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x x x30
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in
Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new
automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and counting
of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections
validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance
candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines that these
46

find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply
only to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections,
political rivals or operators benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on
petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance candidates. In such
instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to
write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by
nuisance candidates persist.31
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of
candidates for the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or
disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter simply
shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as
shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days
before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates
not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed,
what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be
deleted from list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance
candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but
counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to
cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a
petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a
COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on
grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the
cancellation of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election
day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters constructive knowledge of such cancelled
candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that
the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate,
petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance
candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated,
even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who
mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots
to correct the same. 1wphi1
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule
well-ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities.32 Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and
delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates
and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the
exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for,
accordingly GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010 insofar as it
orders that the votes cast for candidates listed therein, who were declared nuisance
candidates and whose certificates of candidacy have been either cancelled or set aside,
be considered stray, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Consequently, the 532 votes
cast for Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the elections of May 10, 2010 should have been
counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray votes, making her
total garnered votes 6,921 as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent John Lloyd
M. Pacete who was the declared winner.
Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique in the May 10, 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on
Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
47
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
G.R. No. 216607 April 5, 2016 5. [Chua] is an immigrant and was validly issued a Green Card by the
ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Government of the USA.
IMELDA E. FRAGATA, and KRYSTLE MARIE C. BACANI, Respondents.
6. She resided and continues to reside [in Georgia, USA].
Dual citizens are disqualified from running for any elective local position. They cannot
successfully run and assume office because their ineligibility is inherent in them, existing 7. [Chua] has been a Registered Professional Nurse in the State of Georgia, USA
prior to the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Their certificates of candidacy are void since November 17, 1990.
ab initio, and votes cast for them will be disregarded. Consequently, whoever garners the
next highest number of votes among the eligible candidates is the person legally entitled 8. . . . [Chuas] Professional License in the USA is still to expire in 31 January
to the position. 2014. 15

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the Commission on
1
The last paragraph of the Petition prayed that Chua "be disqualified as a candidate for
Elections Resolutions dated October 17, 2013 and January 30, 2015. The Commission
2 3
the position of councilor in the Fourth District of the City of Manila[.]"
16

on Elections annulled the "proclamation of . . . Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua as

Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila[,]" and directed the Board of Canvassers to
4
reconvene and proclaim Krystle Marie C. Bacani (Bacani) as Councilor for having
Answering the Petition, Chua contended that she was a natural-born Filipino, born to
Filipino parents in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. With respect to her residency, Chua
17

garnered the next highest number of votes. 5

alleged that she had been residing in Sampaloc, Manila since 2008 and had more than
18

complied with the one-year period required to run for Councilor.

19

On October 3, 2012, Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua (Chua) filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila during the May 13, 2013
6
According to Chua, Fragatas Petition was belatedly filed, whether it was treated as one
20

National and Local Elections. The Fourth District of Manila is entitled to six (6) seats in for declaration of a nuisance candidate or for denial of due course or cancellation of
21

the Sangguniang Panlungsod. 7

certificate of candidacy. Fragata filed her Petition on May 15, 2013, which was beyond
22

five (5) days from October 5, 2012, the last day of the filing of certificates of
After the conduct of elections, Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes. She 8
candidacy. The Petition was also filed beyond 25 days from October 3, 2012, the date
23 24

was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers on May 15, 2013. 9

Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy.
25

On the date of Chuas proclamation, however, Imelda E. Fragata (Fragata) filed a
Petition captioned as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance candidate" and "to
10
deny due course and/or cancel [Chuas] Certificate of Candidacy." Fragata was 12
Chua stressed that she had already been proclaimed on May 15, 2013, the same date
11
that Fragata filed her Petition; hence, Fragatas proper remedy was to file a petition for
quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Chua prayed that the
26

allegedly a registered voter in the Fourth District who claimed that Chua was unqualified
13
Commission dismiss Fragatas Petition. 27

to run for Councilor on two grounds: Chua was not a Filipino citizen, and she was a
permanent resident of the United States of America. Fragata specifically alleged the
14
On June 19, 2013, Bacani filed a Motion to Intervene with Manifestation and Motion to
following in her Petition: Annul Proclamation. Bacani alleged that she likewise ran for Councilor in the Fourth
28

District of Manila, and that after the canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh among all
3. [Chua] is not a Filipino Citizen. the candidates, next to Chua. Should Chua be disqualified, Bacani claimed that she
29

should be proclaimed Councilor following this Courts ruling in Maquiling v. Commission

30

4. Prior to the filing of her candidacy, [Chua] has been living in the United States on Elections. 31

of America (USA) for at least 33 years.

Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen, was unqualified to run for
Councilor. Based on an Order of the Bureau of Immigration, Chua was allegedly
32

48

naturalized as an American citizen on December 7, 1977. She was issued an American
33
passport on July 14, 2006.
34
Chua took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 21,
2011. Nonetheless, Chua allegedly continued on using her American passport,
35
specifically on the following dates:
October 16, 2012 Departure for the United States
December 11, 2012 Arrival in the Philippines
May 30, 2013 Departure for the United States 36
Moreover, Chua did not execute an oath of renunciation of her American
citizenship. 37
With Chua being a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy, Bacani
prayed that the Commission on Elections annul Chuas proclamation. 38
In her Comment/Opposition (to the Motion to Intervene of Krystle Marie Bacani), Chua
39
argued that the Motion was a belatedly filed petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, having been filed after the day of the elections. According to
40
Chua, the Motion should not even be considered since she was already proclaimed by
the Board of Canvassers. Thus, Chua prayed that the Motion to Intervene be denied
41
and expunged from the records of the case. 42
The Commission on Elections then ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda. 43
In her Memorandum, Chua maintained that Fragatas Petition was filed out of time and
44
should have been outright dismissed. Reiterating that she had already been proclaimed,
45
Chua argued that Fragatas proper remedy was a petition for quo warranto. 46
Countering Chuas claims, Fragata and Bacani restated in their Joint Memorandum that
Chua was a dual citizen disqualified from running for any elective local position.
The Commission on Elections Second Division resolved Fragatas Petition. Ruling that
Bacani had a legal interest in the matter in litigation, it allowed Bacanis Motion to
Intervene. The Commission said that should Fragatas Petition be granted, the votes for
48
Chua would not be counted. In effect, Bacani would garner the sixth highest number of
49
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
votes among the qualified candidates, which would earn her a seat in the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila. 50
With respect to the nature of Fragatas Petition, the Commission on Elections held that it
was one for disqualification, regardless of the caption stating that it was a petition to
declare Chua a nuisance candidate. The Petition alleged a ground for disqualification
51
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, specifically, that Chua was a
52
permanent resident in the United States.
Since Fragata filed a petition for disqualification, Rule 25, Section 3 of the Commission
on Elections Rules of Procedure governed the period for its filing. Under the Rules, a
53
petition for disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of the proclamation." Fragata filed
the Petition within this period, having filed it on the date of Chuas proclamation on May
15, 2013. 54
The Commission no longer discussed whether Chua was a permanent resident of the
United States. Instead, it found that Chua was a dual citizen when she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy. Although she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in 2011 by
55
taking an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, petitioner failed to take a
sworn and personal renunciation of her American citizenship required under Section 5(2)
of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. 56
Considering that Chua is a dual citizen, the Commission held that Chua was disqualified
to run for Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. Consequently, Chuas Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio, and all votes
57
casted for her were stray. Chuas proclamation was likewise voided, and
58
per Maquiling, Bacani was declared to have garnered the sixth highest number of votes. 59
Thus, in the Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Commission on Elections Second
Division ruled in favor of Fragata and Bacani. The dispositive portion of the October 17,
60
2013 Resolution reads:
47 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES, as
it hereby RESOLVED:
1. To ANNUL the proclamation of respondent Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua as
Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila;
49

2. To DIRECT the Board of Canvassers of the City of Manila
to CONVENE and PROCLAIM Intervenor Krystle Marie C. Bacani as the duly
elected Councilor of the Fourth District of the City of Manila, having obtained the
sixth highest number of votes for said position.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this Resolution.
SO ORDERED. 61
Chua moved for reconsideration, but the Commission on Elections En Banc denied the
62
Motion in the Resolution dated January 30, 2015.
Arguing that the Commission issued its October 17, 2013 and January 30, 2015
Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion, Chua filed before this Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. Fragata and Bacani jointly filed their Comment, while the
63 64
Commission on Elections filed its Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General.
65
Chua emphasizes that she was already proclaimed as a duly elected
Councilor. Assuming that she was ineligible to run for office, this created a permanent
66
vacancy in the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which was to be filled according to the rule on
succession under Section 45 of the Local Government Code, and not by proclamation of
the candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes. 67
Chua maintains that Fragata belatedly filed her Petition before the Commission on
Elections. Since Fragata filed a Petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of
68
candidacy, it should have been filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy, but not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy assailed. Fragata filed the Petition on May 15, 2013, more than
69
25 days after Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012. The 70
Commission on Elections, therefore, should have outright dismissed Fragatas Petition. 71
With her already proclaimed, Chua argues that the Commission on Elections should
have respected the voice of the people. Chua prays that the Resolutions annulling her
72
proclamation and subsequently proclaiming Bacani be set aside. 73
As for Fragata and Bacani as well as the Commission on Elections, all maintain that
Fragatas Petition was a petition for disqualification assailing Chuas citizenship and
status as a permanent resident in the United States. The Petition, which Fragata filed on
74
the date of Chuas proclamation, was filed within the reglementary period.75
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
The Commission on Elections stresses that Chua was a dual citizen at the time she filed
her Certificate of Candidacy. Consequently, she was ineligible to run for Councilor and
76
was correctly considered a non-candidate. All the votes casted in Chuas favor were
77
correctly disregarded, resulting in Bacani garnering the next highest number of
votes. Following Maquiling, the Commission argues that Bacani was validly proclaimed
78
as Councilor, and, contrary to Chuas claim, the rule on succession under Section 45 of
the Local Government Code did not apply, with the disqualifying circumstance existing
prior to the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy.
79
Although Chua was already proclaimed, the Commission on Elections argues that "[t]he
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified." Fragata, Bacani,
80
and the Commission on Elections pray that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition be
dismissed. 81
The issues for this Courts resolution are the following:
First, whether private respondent Imelda E. Fragata filed a petition for disqualification or
a petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy; and
Second, whether the rule on succession under Section 45 of the Local Government
Code applies to this case.
We dismiss the Petition. The allegations of private respondent Fragatas Petition before
the Commission on Elections show that it was a timely filed petition for disqualification.
Moreover, the Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in
disqualifying petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua, annulling her proclamation, and
subsequently proclaiming private respondent Krystle Marie C. Bacani, the candidate who
garnered the sixth highest number of votes among the qualified candidates.
I
As this Court has earlier observed in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, members of
82
the bench and the bar have "indiscriminately interchanged" the remedies of a petition to
83
deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy and a petition for disqualification, thus
"adding confusion to the already difficult state of our jurisprudence on election laws."
84
The remedies, however, have different grounds and periods for their filing. The remedies
have different legal consequences.
50

A person files a certificate of candidacy to announce his or her candidacy and to declare
his or her eligibility for the elective office indicated in the certificate. Section 74 of the
85
Omnibus Election Code on the contents of a certificate of candidacy states:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or section which he seeks
to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in
the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved
proceeding, a candidate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has
been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered
in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of
existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed
religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more candidates for an office
with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware of such fact,
shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue
to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected.
He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly
known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport
size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not
exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
The Commission on Elections has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of certificates of candidacy. However, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
86
Code, the Commission may deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy
87
through a verified petition filed exclusively on the ground that "any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false." The
"material representation" referred to in Section 78 is that which involves the eligibility or
qualification for the office sought by the person who filed the certificate. Section 78
88
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
must, therefore, be read "in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office." Moreover, the false representation "must
89
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
90
A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run. The candidate must also
possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his Dissenting Opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, "that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not
91
imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate
for a public office and vice-versa."
92
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for grounds in filing a petition for
disqualification:
Sec. 68 Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Apart from the grounds provided in Section 68, any of the grounds in Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code as well as in Section 40 of the Local Government Code may
likewise be raised in a petition for disqualification. Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code states:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
51

This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Disqualifications specifically applicable to those running for local elective positions are
found in Section 40 of the Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Private respondent Fragata alleges in her Petition that petitioner is a permanent resident
in the United States, a green card holder who, prior to the filing of her Certificate of
Candidacy for Councilor, has resided in the State of Georgia for 33 years. She anchors
her Petition on Section 40 of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies permanent
residents of a foreign country from running for any elective local position.
It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, persons who file their
certificates of candidacy declare that they are not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country. Therefore, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy may likewise be filed against a permanent resident of a foreign country
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
seeking an elective post in the Philippines on the ground of material misrepresentation in
the certificate of candidacy. 93
What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends on the petitioner. If the
false material representation in the certificate of candidacy relates to a ground for
disqualification, the petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification, so long as the petition
filed complies with the requirements under the law. 94
Before the Commission on Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing
either a petition to deny due course or cancel petitioners certificate of candidacy or a
petition for disqualification. In her Petition, private respondent Fragata did not argue that
petitioner made a false material representation in her Certificate of Candidacy; she
asserted that petitioner was a permanent resident disqualified to run for Councilor under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Private respondent Fragatas Petition,
therefore, was a petition for disqualification.
It follows that private respondent Fragata timely filed her Petition before the Commission
on Elections. Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, a
petition for disqualification "shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy, but not later that the date of proclamation." Private respondent Fragata
filed her Petition on the date of petitioners proclamation on May 15, 2013. The
Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of
private respondent Fragatas Petition.
In addition, the Commission on Elections correctly admitted private respondent Bacanis
pleading-in-intervention.
An adverse decision against petitioner would require a pronouncement as to who should
assume the position of Councilor. Hence, those who believe that they are entitled to the
position may prove their legal interest in the matter in litigation and may properly
95
intervene for a complete disposition of the case.
Private respondent Bacani claims that she is entitled to the position of Councilor. In her
Motion to Intervene, she argues for petitioners disqualification and alleges the
circumstances surrounding petitioners dual citizenship. She then cites Maquiling,
arguing that she should be proclaimed in lieu of petitioner because she obtained the sixth
highest number of votes among the qualified candidates. Private respondent Bacanis
intervention was, therefore, proper.
52

II
The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in disqualifying
petitioner, annulling her proclamation, and subsequently proclaiming private respondent
Bacani as the duly elected Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila.
Petitioner was born to Filipino parents in 1967, which makes her a natural-born Filipino
under the 1935 Constitution. Ten years later, on December 7, 1977, petitioner became a
96
naturalized American. Hence, she lost her Filipino citizenship pursuant to Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63. 97
It was on September 21, 2011 when petitioner took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, thus reacquiring her Filipino citizenship. From September 21, 2011 up
98
to the present, however, petitioner failed to execute a sworn and personal renunciation of
her foreign citizenship particularly required of those seeking elective public office.
Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
provides:
SECTION 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions:
....
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath[.]
Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by taking the
Oath of Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of
foreign citizenship are separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement
for qualification to run for public office. In Jacot v. Dal:
99
[T]he oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially
similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute
the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for
all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of
foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective
public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.100
With petitioners failure to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy
on October 3, 2012. Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she was
disqualified to run for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National
and Local Elections.
Petitioner, however, argues that the Commission on Elections gravely abused its
discretion in proclaiming private respondent Bacani, the mere seventh placer among the
candidates for Councilor and, therefore, not the electorates choice. Petitioner maintains
that the vacancy left by her disqualification should be filled according to the rule on
succession under Section 45(a)(1) of the Local Government Code, which provides:
SECTION 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. (a) Permanent vacancies in
the sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be filled
by appointment in the following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized
cities and independent component cities[.]
The permanent vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those arising "when an elective
local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office." In these situations, the vacancies were caused by
101
those whose certificates of candidacy were valid at the time of the filing "but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal
impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy."102
The rule on succession under Section 45, however, would not apply if the permanent
vacancy was caused by one whose certificate of candidacy was void ab initio.
Specifically with respect to dual citizens, their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio
because they possess "a substantive [disqualifying circumstance] . . . [existing] prior to
the filing of their certificate of candidacy." Legally, they should not even be considered
103
53
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
candidates. The votes casted for them should be considered stray and should not be the next highest number of votes among the eligible candidates. The Commission on
counted. 104
Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua's proclamation and
subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani.
In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio certificates of candidacy, the
person legally entitled to the vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED. This Decision is
next highest number of votes among those eligible. In this case, it is private respondent
105
immediately executory.
Bacani who is legally entitled to the position of Councilor, having garnered the sixth
highest number of votes among the eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections SO ORDERED.
correctly proclaimed private respondent Bacani in lieu of petitioner.

Petitioner may have garnered more votes than private respondent Bacani. She may have
already been proclaimed. Nevertheless, elections are more than a numbers game.
Hence, in Maquiling:

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve
as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a
candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the
highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of
the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy
elective positions in our republic.

....

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded
to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
106

All told, petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua is a dual citizen correctly disqualified
from running for the position of Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013
National and Local elections. With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, her Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio. She was correctly
considered a non-candidate. All votes casted for her were stray, and the person legally
entitled to the position is private respondent Krystle Marie C. Bacani, the candidate with

54

G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012
MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute
who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who
should assume the office following the substitutes disqualification.
The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc
Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the
Second Division;
2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;
3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga
as mayor of Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation issued therefor;
4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from
discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor;
5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code;
6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this
Resolution to the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Department of
Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance and the Secretary of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City.
Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election Director
of Region IV of COMELEC implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED. 1 and 2007 local elections based on the records of the Commission on Elections of
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Antecedents
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M.
Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position
of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and
local elections.2
Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, 3 declared in his CoC that he was
eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.
Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition
denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3)
Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-029
(DC).4 He alleged
therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three
consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
The pertinent portions of Castillos petition follow:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao
Crossing, Lucena City but may be served with summons and other processes of
this Commission at the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City
4301;
2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a
resident of Barangay Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal address at the
Office of the City Mayor, City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be served with
summons and other processes of this Commission;
3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected
during the 2007 local elections, is running for city mayor of Lucena under the
Liberal party this coming 10 May 2010 local elections and has filed his certificate
of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena;
4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004,
55

Lucena City and had fully served the aforesaid three (3) terms without any
voluntary and involuntary interruption;
5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to
14 November 2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to
Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3
October 2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous
and uninterrupted under the existing laws and jurisprudence;
6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of
candidacy of the respondent, hence, such act is outrightly unconstitutional,
illegal, and highly immoral;
7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three
(3) consecutive terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010 national and
local elections;
8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government
Code of the Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled
and is already disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term;
9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper,
unlawful and is potentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of
Lucena; and
10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be
declared disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public office as city mayor of
Lucena City based on the existing law and jurisprudence. 5
The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that
he be declared as a disqualified candidate under the existing Election Laws and by the
provisions of the New Local Government Code.6 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from
office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then
apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence 7to the effect that an involuntary
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of
the application of the three-term limit rule.
In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections,8 holding that preventive suspension, being a mere
temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit
rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with
Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant
portions of his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve are quoted herein, viz:
4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City, the rule that where the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the
control of the officer i.e. involuntary the service of term is deemed interrupted has not
yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the
prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term
limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it stated:
"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly
his third and final term as city councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete
service or full term in office since the same was interrupted when he was suspended by
the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. And the respondent actually heeded the suspension
order since he did not receive his salary during the period October 16-31 and November
1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from office. And this was further bolstered by the
fact that the DILG issued a
Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis
supplied.)
5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would constitute
a ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondents
certificate of candidacy at the time he filed the same. Petitioners ground for the denial of
due course to and/or the cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy thus has no
basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to warrant such relief under the Omnibus
Election Code and/or its implementing laws.
6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on
the three (3)-term limitation, respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to
run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having served three (3) (albeit interrupted)
terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the
2010 elections.
56

7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter, respondent
respectfully submits the present case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to
run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.9
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena
City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.
Acting on Ramons Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division
issued a Resolution on April 19, 2010,10 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of
Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.
Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. 11 Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of
May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for
Reconsideration.12 At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for
Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had
nominated Ramon.13
On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramons Ex parte Manifestation of
Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final
and executory.14
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots
but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute
candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as
against Castillos 39,615 votes.15
Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the
suspension of Barbara Rubys proclamation.16
It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of
its Law Department,17gave due course to Barbara Rubys CoC and CONA through
Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list of
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
candidates. Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected
18
Mayor of Lucena City.19
On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the
COMELEC,20 docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not
substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and
Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc
had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for
Ramon should be considered stray.
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, 21 Barbara Ruby
maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc
did not deny due course to or cancel Ramons COC, despite a declaration of his
disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation,
the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that
with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 900622 applied, based on which
the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor.
On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City,
sought to intervene,23positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara
Rubys substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.
On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillos petition and
Alcalas petition-in-intervention,24 holding:
In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was
the basis for the proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any action
within the prescribed period either in the Commission or the Supreme Court assailing the
said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final and executory. It cannot
anymore be altered or reversed.
xxxx
x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was
actually for the disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms,
which is a ground for his disqualification under the Constitution in relation to Section
4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that Ramon has committed
material representation that would be a ground for the cancellation or denial of due
course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The First
Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for disqualification as gleaned from the body
57

of the resolution and its dispositive portion quoted above. This treatment of the First
Division of the petition as one for disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its
members signed Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division
only disqualified Ramon.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but
had simply become an additional candidate who had filed her COC out of time; and held
that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of the Local
Government Code (LGC).27

Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not
applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot
be considered as stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the
substituted and the substitute carry the same surname Talaga, as provided in Section
12 of Republic Act No. 9006.
xxxx
Issues
The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for
the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.
Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties
should assume the contested elective position.

Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for Ruling
that matter which requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the
substitute should be approved and given due course first by the Commission or the Law The petitions lack merit.
Department before it can be considered as effective. All that Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code as implemented by Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that it 1.
should be filed with the proper office. The respondent is correct when she argued that in
fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a substitute candidate in case the cause for the Existence of a valid CoC is a condition
substitution happened between the day before the election and mid-day of election day. sine qua non for a valid substitution
Thus, even if the approval of the substitution was made after the election, the substitution
became effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with the Certificate of Nomination
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any
and Acceptance.
person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor
of Lucena City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective public
proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order. Hence, we find no
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the
duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10,
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:
2010.25
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.The certificate of candidacy shall state
Acting on Castillo and Alcalas respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
Banc issued the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
Second Divisions ruling.26
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued without a
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
hearing as a mere incident of the COMELECs ministerial duty to receive the COCs of
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
substitute candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based on the wrong facts; and (c)
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
Ramons disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5, 2010, the COMELEC
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
58

foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x
The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit
for filing them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the
regular election, the candidates from among whom they are to make the choice; and (b)
to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law does
not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as
many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or
fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office
in the same election.28 Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the CoC is:
x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidates political
creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public
office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to
any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.
Accordingly, a persons declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed
by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person
making the declaration a valid or official candidate.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two
remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,30 thuswise:
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68
of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the
other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions
also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC.31
Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code (i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidates permanent
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
residency in another country when that fact affects the residency requirement of a
candidate) are separate and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or denying
due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code; and material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya 32 that the following circumstances
may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:
(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid
CoC;
(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a
valid CoC; and
(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or
cancelled.
In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws
his CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the
option of substitution, to wit:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy
to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the
day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the
day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any
board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification
of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only
an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,33 there can be
no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
59

substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much
the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. 34
Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of
the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only
give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a
sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. 35
2.
Declaration of Ramons disqualification
rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not
a valid candidate to be properly substituted
In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of
the COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission
on Elections:36
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be
read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility
for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the
CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the
fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
Castillos petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition,
namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation
referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as
candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c)
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to
his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact that would otherwise render him ineligible. 37 The petition expressly challenged
Ramons eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and
the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and
specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be
denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified
candidate."38
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a
finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false.39 A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of
CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v. Commission on
Elections,40 the Court stressed that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
thus:
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office. Thus, the
misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous
mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or
where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws.
It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or
confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different,
for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities. 41 A
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but
a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed
a CoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under
Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a
candidate. 1wphi1
60

To be sure, the cause of Ramons ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both
by the Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for
all elective local officials, to wit:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result
of a prolonged stay in the same office." The Court underscored this objective in Aldovino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections,44 stating:
x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result
of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of
city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he
be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner
would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely
precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth
consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing
the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. The
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance
candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of
his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.45
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with
Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. 46 That sufficed to render his
CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELECs declaration of
his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As
Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it:
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the
concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for
how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The
Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably
filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person
was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if
we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of
candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of
unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution. 47 (Emphasis supplied)
3.
Granting without any qualification of petition in
SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELECs intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC
That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate
misrepresentation in his CoC was of little consequence in the determination of whether
his CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.
In Miranda v. Abaya,48 the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be
not given due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the
61

petition" and then pronounced in apparent contradiction that Joel Pempe Miranda
was "disqualified." The
Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification,
disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Mirandas
CoC. The Court explained:
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being
disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had
likewise been denied due course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course
and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)
In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the
Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS
the Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from
running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections.
SO ORDERED.
(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998
in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly
sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter
whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x
x x.49
xxxx
x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA
No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose
"Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no question that the said petition
was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that
whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying
the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate
of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. x x x. 50
The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the
particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition
by not subjecting that relief to any qualification.
Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillos petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC)
specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or
cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically stated in the Resolution dated April
19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of
material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillos petition without
express qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramons CoC
based on his apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and
executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and because Ramon
later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it.
4.
Elected Vice Mayor must succeed
and assume the position of Mayor
due to a permanent vacancy in the office
On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits
that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections51 should not apply to him because Ramons disqualification
became final prior to the elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on
Elections,53 where the Court said:
62

x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The
doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other
cases because the judgment declaring the candidates disqualification in Labo and the
other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other
cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common
essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before
the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.
Thus, in Labo, Labos disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after
the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In
the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May
2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In
short, Cayats candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the
10 May 2004 elections.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an
election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a
mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when
the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in
the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final
after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law
governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment
before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The
Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May
2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper
because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.54
Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume
the position of Mayor of Lucena City for having obtained the highest number of votes
among the remaining qualified candidates.
It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring
Ramon disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELECs
Resolution No. 8804,55 a decision or resolution of a Division becomes final and executory
after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration
is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory five days after its promulgation and
receipt of notice by the parties.
The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated
April 19, 2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same date. 56 Ramon filed a
motion for reconsideration on April 21, 201057 in accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696,58 but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010, 59ostensibly to allow his
substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for
reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated that there was no more pending matter
that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due course. Hence, the
Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of
five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably
on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the
withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010
Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final
and executory.
Yet, we cannot agree with Castillos assertion that with Ramons disqualification
becoming final prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in
his favor. Barbara Rubys filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon significantly
differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo
B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his
disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no
substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only
candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby
substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by
the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a
contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same
63

footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillos claim of being the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently entitled
to assume the office of Mayor.
Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr.
1wphi1
should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second
highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the
disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the
sovereign will."60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not
be deemed elected to the office. 61 There was to be no question that the second placer
lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated
position.62 No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a
loser to be their political leader or their representative. 63
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning
candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and
in law of that candidates disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.64Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of
votes may be deemed elected. 65 But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo
simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not
the least aware of the fact of Barbara Rubys ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the
COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May
20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from
assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid
candidate for her to substitute due to Ramons ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not
voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the
period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate. 66
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such
vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the
LGC, to wit:67
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases;
AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.
These are two special civil actions for certiorari 1 questioning the resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. No. 193237,
Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul the 10 May 2010 Resolution 2 of the
COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution 3 of the COMELEC En Banc,
which both ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy on the ground of false
material representation. In G.R. No. 193536, Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges the
11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which applied the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code in filling the vacancy in the Office of the
Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte created by the cancellation of Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy.
The Facts
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on
6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due
course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that
Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had
already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisin mayor by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-
140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos
admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino
countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987.
Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5 February
2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos
64

further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for
disqualification filed against him on the same grounds. 4
The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos criminal record as
follows:
As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery on
January 22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin of the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his co-accused guilty of robbery and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor
maximum. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was
dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only after a lapse of several years or more
specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before the RTC
Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his
Probation Officer, Jalosjos probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19,
1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on December
19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification
attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of
his probation. This Certification was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the
dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in 2004, docketed as
SPA No. 04-235.
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former
Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the
fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his
probation. A portion of the decision of the Sandiganbayan is quoted hereunder:
The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador
Jalosjos, Jr., unwarranted benefits and advantage because the subject certification,
which was issued by the accused without adequate or official support, was subsequently
utilized by the said probationer as basis of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to
Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which
prompted the said court to issue the Order dated February 5, 2004 in Crim. Case No.
CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring that said probationer has complied with the order of
probation and setting aside its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the warrant or [sic]
arrest; and that said Certification was also used by the said probationer and became the
basis for the Commission on Elections to deny in its Resolution of August 2, 2004 the
petition or [sic] private complainant James Adasa for the disqualification of the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
probationer from running for re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City in the National and
Local Elections of 2004.5
The COMELECs Rulings
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardinos petition and cancelled
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded that "Jalosjos
has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in
fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he
has not yet served."6 The COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos certificate of
compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his
sentence. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year,
eight months and twenty days of prisin correccional as minimum, to four years, two
months and one day of prisin mayor as maximum. The COMELEC First Division ruled
that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for in Section
40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160."7
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
With the proper revocation of Jalosjos earlier probation and a clear showing that he has
not yet served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for Jalosjos to claim
that his civil as well as political rights have been violated. Having been convicted by final
judgment,
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His
proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the
Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality, and to oust him
from the office he now wrongfully holds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for
utter lack of merit. Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and ordered to CEASE and
DESIST from occupying and discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions of the Local Government Code on
succession apply.
SO ORDERED.8
65

Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while
Cardino filed his petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.
On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No. 193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated August
11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are hereby
AFFIRMED.9
Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial
notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved 11 to
consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation on
1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from the position of Mayor of the City of
Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was accepted by the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E. Yebes." 12Jalosjos resignation was
made "in deference with the provision of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to his
candidacy as Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."13
These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos resignation. In resolving Jalosjos
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardinos Petition in G.R. No.
193536, we address not only Jalosjos eligibility to run for public office and the
consequences of the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, but also COMELECs
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos
probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for
Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos certificate of
candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed a deliberate
misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good faith upon a previous
COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position from which he is now
being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 were
issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the dispositive
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local Government
Code on succession should apply.
This Courts Ruling
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction
by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos certificate of
candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time,
and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc.
The dissenting opinions erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and apply the rule on succession under
the Local Government Code.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public
office is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78
of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
66

therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that
he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public
office.14 If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a
criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate
of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74
and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section
40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more
than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. x x x
Prisin mayor and temporary disqualification. The duration of the penalties of prisin
mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve
years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in
which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
67

xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification.
The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall
produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise
of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. The
penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or
calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such
disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the
term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any
popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Art. 42. Prisin mayor its accessory penalties. The penalty of prisin mayor shall
carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted
in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, 15 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand,
under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that
"the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he
is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the
import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellees
conviction of a crime penalized with prisin mayor which carried the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election
Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to
suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for
public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of
the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case
of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty
deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during
the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
68

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the
term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any
popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers
to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the
sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the
perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the
provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is
"according to the nature of said penalty" which means according to whether the
penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
"deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once
the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does
not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his
jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his perpetual special
disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately
executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction
becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run
for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible
perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of
conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means
that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that
Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"
means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications
and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections,17 the false material representation may refer to "qualifications
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run
for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a
certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in
Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be
read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility
for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the
CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the
fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. 18(Emphasis supplied)
Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisin mayor, to which
perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a
petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in
Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only to election offenses
under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised Penal Code. For
ready reference, we quote again Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
69

said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the
crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the offenses
enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election Code. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs when it holds that Jalosjos conviction
for the crime of robbery under the Revised Penal Code is a ground for "a petition for
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not for cancellation of COC under
Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws other
than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a petition under Section 68. In
Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,19 the Court declared:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated
in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the
ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and not administrative in nature.
(Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four
statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino
citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to,
a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks
election; and (4) a statement of the candidates allegiance to the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines.20
We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The
COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not eligible to run for
public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of
Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification
which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under Section 78. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a
disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78 without, however, saying under
what specific provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his
certificate of candidacy.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground
for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
from a crime penalized by prisin mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed.
The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law
expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs
to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of
candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes.21 Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from
the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after
the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was
never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void
ab initio. Jalosjos ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus,
Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May
2010 elections Cardino who received the highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the
first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible 22 should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently
had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of
candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of
candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-
candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can
never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds
that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. 23 If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio
is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also
be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This
is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can
operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a
legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
70
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch,
but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the
law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to
run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the
Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." 24 The disqualification of a convict to run
for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the
anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special
disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be
grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those
suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and the
Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11
August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Bane, respectively,
in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Agapito J.
Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010 elections and thus received the highest number
of votes for Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special City
Board of Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of Justice and
the Department of Interior and Local Government so they can cause the arrest of, and
enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to his conviction for the
crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 18) of
Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 212398 November 25, 2014
EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO, Petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGA Y" S. SAN LUIS, Respondents.
Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court (Rules), is the May 21, 2014 Resolutio of the Commission on Elections
1 with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws." (emphasis
(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which affirmed the September 26, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division granting the petition for disqualification filed
2
by private respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio
Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito (Ejercito). Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by San Luis before the Office of
the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial
candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. Alleged
3
in his Petition are as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
5. [Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the
electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called "Orange Card" with an intent
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor. Copy thereof is
hereto attached and marked as Annex "C" and made as an integral part hereof;
6. In furtherance of his candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of
Laguna, [Ejercito] and his cohorts claimed that the said "Orange Card" could be
used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs
as declared by the statements of witnesses which are hereto attached and
marked as Annex "D" as integral part hereof;
7. The so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material consideration in
convincing the voters to cast their votes for [Ejercitos] favor in clear violation of
the provision of the Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other materialconsideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if hehas been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
ours)
8. Thus, pursuant to the mandate of the aforesaid law, [Ejercito] should be
disqualified;
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
9. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has
a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. A certification issued by the Provincial
Election Supervisor is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E" as an integral
part hereof;
10. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615,
otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION
ACT provides and I quote:
"Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. The aggregate amount that a
candidate or party may spent for election campaign shall be as follows:
a. For candidates Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy.
b. For other candidates without any political party and without any
support from any political party Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
c. For Political Parties and party-list groups Five pesos (P5.00) for
every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates. (underscoring mine for emphasis)
11. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is
only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE
72
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX 14. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito] committed an
(P4,576,566.00) PESOS. election offense as provided for under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615, which provides and I quote:
12. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law,
[Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 "Election Offense. Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall
election. For television campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the constitute an election offense punishable under the first and second paragraph of
sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our partys official monitoring on the following Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code in addition to administrative liability,
dates[:] April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013. whenever applicable. x x x"

Network Date Program Time Duration Amount* 15. Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
ABS- April 28, TV Patrol 5:58 p.m. 4 minutes P3,297,496 Election Code which provides and I quote:
CBN 2013 (approximately
) "Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
ABS- April 28, Sundays Best 10:40 4 minutes P3,297,496 he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found
CBN 2013 (local p.m. (approximately by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
specials) ) influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
GMA April 28, Sunday Night 10:46 3 minutes P2,635,200 functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
2013 Box Office p.m. (approximately his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
GMA April 28, Sunday Night 11:06 4 minutes P2,635,200 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs
2013 Box Office p.m. (approximately d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing asa
) candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
GMA April 28, Sunday Night 11:18 4 minutes P2,635,200 permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
2013 Box Office p.m. (approximately to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
) status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
GMA April 28, Sunday Night 11:47 4 minutes P2,635,200 with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws." (emphasis
2013 Box Office p.m. (approximately ours)
)
ABS- May 4, 2013 TODA MAX 11:26 4 minutes P3,297,496 16. On the other hand, the effect of disqualification is provided under Sec. 6 of
CBN p.m. (approximately Republic Act No. 6646, which states and I quote:
)
ABS- May 5, 2013 Rated K 8:06 p.m. 4 minutes P3,297,496 "Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
CBN (approximately judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
) not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
Total P23,730.78
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
4
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
* Total cost based on published rate card;
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
13. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as prescribed under suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of [his]
the Fair Election Act, he still exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for guilt is strong." (emphasis mine)
which he paid the sum of P16,611,549;
73

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Upon filing of this petition, a declaration by the Honorable Commission of the
existence of probable cause be made against [Ejercito] for violating the afore-
quoted provisions of laws;
2. In the event that [Ejercito] will beable to get a majority vote of the electorate of
the Province of Laguna on May 13, 2013, his proclamation be suspended until
further order of the Honorable Commission pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646;
3. Lastly, a criminal case for VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS be filed against
[Ejercito] before the proper court[;] [and]
4. Other relief, just and equitable underthe premises, are also prayed for. 4 unfounded, and totally speculative. He stated that the Health Access Program or the E.R.
Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent ExParte Motion to Issue
Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the Very
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of
Respondent. However, these were not acted upon by the COMELEC. The next day,
5
Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
as the duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna. Based on the
6
Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with
San Luis 471,209 votes. 7
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference on June 4,
2013. Ejercito then filed his Verified Answeron June 13, 2013 that prayed for the
8
dismissal of the petition due to procedural and substantive irregularities and taking into
account his proclamation as Provincial Governor. He countered that the petition was
9
improperly filed because, based on the averments and relief prayed for, it is in reality a
complaint for election offenses; thus, the case should have been filed before the
COMELEC Law Department, or the election registrar, provincial election supervisor or
regional election director, or the state, provincial or city prosecutor in accordance with
Laurel v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 10. Assuming that the petition could be
10
given due course, Ejercito argued that San Luis failed to show, conformably with Codilla,
Sr. v. Hon. De Venecia, that he (Ejercito) was previously convicted or declared by final
11
judgment of a competent court for being guilty of, or found by the COMELEC of having
committed, the punishable acts under Section 68 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 881,
or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended (OEC). 12
As to the acts he allegedly committed, Ejercito claimed that the same are baseless,
"Orange Card" was a priority project of his administration as incumbent Governor of
Laguna and was never intended to influence the electorate during the May 2013
elections. He added that the "Orange Card," which addressed the increasing need for
and the high cost of quality health services, provides the Laguneos not only access to
medical services but also the privilege to avail free livelihood seminars to help them find
alternative sources of income. With respect to the charge of having exceeded the total
allowable election expenditures, Ejercito submitted that the accusation deserves no
consideration for being speculative, self-serving, and uncorroborated by any other
substantial evidence.
Citing Sinaca v. Mula, Ejercito asserted that the petition questioning his qualification
13
was rendered moot and academic by his proclamation as the duly-elected Provincial
Governor ofLaguna for the term 2013-2016. He perceived that his successful electoral
bid substantiates the fact that he was an eligible candidate and that his victory is a
testament that he is more than qualified and competent to hold public office.
Lastly, Ejercito considered San Luis petition for disqualification as purely frivolous and
with no plain and clear purpose but to harass and cause undue hardship. According to
him, the fact that it was filed only a few days before the May 13, 2013 elections evidently
shows that it was lodged as a last-ditch effort to baselessly derail and obstruct his
assumption of office and function as the duly-elected Laguna Governor.
74

The scheduled case conference between the parties on June 13, 2013 was reset to June
27, 2013. In the latter date, all the documentary exhibits were marked in evidence and
14
the parties agreed to file their respective memorandum within ten (10) days. 15
San Luis substantially reiterated the content of the Petitionin his
Memorandum. Additionally, he alleged that:
16
15. After the election, [San Luis] was able to secure documents from the Information and
Education Department of the Commission on Elections showing that [Ejercito] have
incurred advertising expenses with ABS-CBN in the amount of [P20,197,170.25] not to
mention his advertisement with GMA 7. Copies of the summary report, media purchase
order, advertising contract[,] and official receipt are marked as EXHS. "B-1", "B-2", "B-3",
and"B-4" (Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D", supplemental to the very urgent ex-parte
motion)[.] 17
It was stressed that the case is a "Special Action for Disqualification" seeking to
disqualify Ejercito as gubernatorial candidate for violation of Section 68 (a) (c) of the
OEC. He prayed that "[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito] BE
DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from further holding office as Governor of
Laguna." In refutation of Ejercitos defenses, San Luis argued that it is precisely
18
because of the commission of the election offenses under Section 68 of the OEC that he
(Ejercito) should be disqualified. Also, citing Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6646, San Luis contended that Ejercitos proclamation and assumption of office do not
19
affect the COMELECs jurisdiction to continue with the trial and hearing of the action until
it is finally resolved.
For his part, Ejercito filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of Memorandum)20 restating all the
arguments set forth in his Verified Answer.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to:
(1) GRANTthe Petition for Disqualification filed against respondent Emilio Ramon
"E.R." P. Ejercito;
(2) DISQUALIFY respondent Ejercito from holding the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Laguna, pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
(3) ORDER respondent Ejercito to CEASE and DESIST from performing the
functions of the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(4) DECLARE a permanent VACANCY in the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Laguna;
(5) DIRECT the duly elected Vice Governor of Laguna to assume the Office of
the Provincial Governor by virtue of succession as provided in Section 44 of the
Local Government Code; and
(6) DIRECT the Campaign Finance Unit to coordinate with the Law Department
of this Commission for the conduct of a preliminary investigation into the alleged
violations of campaign finance laws, rules and regulations committed by
respondent Ejercito.
SO ORDERED. 21
On procedural matters, the COMELEC First Division held that the title of San Luis
petition and its reliance on Section 68 (a) (c) of the OEC as grounds for his causes of
action clearly show that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which allows petitions for
22 23
disqualification to be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy,
but not later than the date of proclamation." No credence was given to Ejercitos
contention that the petition was mooted by his proclamation as Governor of Laguna. The
COMELEC First Division opined that the case of Sinacais inapplicable, because it was
not about Sinacas eligibility or whether he committed any of the acts enumerated in
Section 68 of the OEC. Consistent with Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, it was 24
declared that Ejercitos garnering of more votes than San Luis in the May 2013 elections
is not tantamount to condonation of any act or acts that he committed which may be
found to bea ground for disqualification or election offense.
The COMELEC First Division settled the substantive issues put forth in the petition for
disqualification in this wise:
Anent [San Luis] first cause of action, [San Luis] presented the Sworn Statement dated
[May 7, 2013]of a certain Mrs. Daisy A. Cornelio, together with the "Orange Card" issued
to Mrs. Cornelio, marked respectively as Exhibits "A-4" and "A-3" as per [San Luis]
Summary of Exhibits to prove that [Ejercito] committed the act described in Section 68
(a) of the OEC. After reviewing Mrs. Cornelios Sworn Statement, we do not find any
averment to the effect that the Orange Card was given to the affiant to influence or
75
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
induce her to vote for [Ejercito]. Affiant only stated that she was given the Orange Card Even if we were to assume that only PhP 6,409,235.28 was actually paid out of PhP
"last April of this year" and that she was "not able to use it during those times when [she] 20,197,170.25 advertising contract, thisamount is still more than PhP 4,576,566.00,
or one of [her] family members got sick and needed hospital assistance." Aside from Mrs. which is [Ejercitos] total authorized aggregate amount allowed for his election campaign,
Cornelios Sworn Statement, there is no other evidence to support [San Luis] claim, computed as follows:
leading us to reject[San Luis] first cause of action.
Number of registered Authorized expense Total amount of
With respect to the second cause of action, [San Luis] presented Exhibits "B-1" to "B-4", voters for the whole x per voter registered = spending allowed
which are submissions made by the ABS-CBN Corporation as mandated by Section 6 of Province of Laguna in the constituency for election campaign
Republic Act No. 9006 ("RA 9006" or the "Fair Election Act"), implemented through
Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615. Exhibit "B-3" is an Advertising Contractbetween
1,525,522 registered
ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. ("SCI"). The details of x PhP 3.00 per voter = PhP 4,576,566.00
voters in Laguna
the Contractare as follows:
While not presented as evidence in this case, we cannot deny the existence of another
Advertising Contract dated [May 8, 2013]for one (1) spot of a 3.5-minute advertisement
scheduled for broadcast on [May 9, 2013], amounting to PhP 3,366,195.05. This
Payor/Advertiser Scenema Concept International, Inc. Contract also contains the signature of [Ejercito] accepting the donation from SCI and is
Beneficiary Jeorge "ER" Ejercito Estregan
accompanied by an ABS-CBN-issued Official Receipt No. 279513 dated [May 7, 2013] in
Broadcast Schedule April 27, 28, May 3, 4, 10 & 11, 2013
SCIs name for PhP 6,409,235.28. If we add the amounts from both contracts, we arrive
Number of Spots 6 spots of 3.5 minutes each
at a total cost of PhP 23,563,365.29, which, coincidentally, is the product of:
Unit Cost per Spot PhP 3,366,195.04
Total Cost of Contract PhP 20,197,170.25 plus VAT
The Contract contains the signature of [Ejercito] signifying his acceptance of the donation Number of spots x Unit cost per spot = Total contract cost
by SCI, the latter represented by its Executive Vice President, Ms. Maylyn Enriquez. In
addition to the advertising contract, Exhibit "B-4" was submitted, which is a photocopy of Seven (7) spots x PhP 3,366,195.04 = PhP 23,563,365.28
an Official Receipt issued by ABS-CBN for the contract, with the following details:
This matches the data gathered by the Commissions EID from the reports and logs
Date of the Receipt [April 26, 2013] submitted by broadcast stations as required by the Fair Election Act. According to the 99-
Received From Scenema Concept International, Inc. page Daily Operations Log for Channel 2 submitted by ABS-CBN covering the period of
Amount Received PhP 6,409,235.28 [April 27, 2013] to [May 11, 2013], [Ejercitos] 3.5-minute or 210-second advertisement
Official Receipt No. 278499 was aired seven (7) times. The specific details on the dates of airing, program or time
slot when the advertisements were aired, and the time when the advertisements as
culled from the 99-page Daily Operations Logare summarized as thus:

Upon verification of the submitted Exhibits "B-1" to "B-4" with this Commissions Date aired Program/Time Slot Airtime
Education and Information Department (EID), the latter having custody of all advertising 28 Apr 2013 TV Patrol Linggo/5:20-5:30 pm 05:54:40 PM
contracts submitted by broadcast stations and entities in relation tothe [May 13, 2013] 28 Apr 2013 Harapan: Senatorial Debate/9:30-11:30 pm 10:40:13 PM
National and Local Elections, we find the said Exhibits tobe faithful reproductions of our 04 May 2013 TODA MAX/10:30-11:15 pm 11:26:43 PM
file copy of the same. A comparison of [Ejercitos] signature on the Advertising 05 May 2013 Rated K-Handa Na Ba Kayo/7:15-8:15 pm 08:06:42 PM
Contractand that on his Certificate of Candidacy show them to be identical to each other, 09 May 2013 TV Patrol/6:30-7:45 pm 07:35:56 PM
leading us to the conclusion that [Ejercito] had indeed accepted the PhP 20,197,170.25 10 May 2013 TV Patrol/6:30-7:45 pm 07:44:50 PM
donation in the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBNs Channel 2.

76
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4

77
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
11 May 2013 TV Patrol Sabado/5:30-6:00 pm 06:12:30 PM
Source: Pages 6, 8, 43, 47, 75, 84, and 93 of ABS-CBN Channel 2 Daily Operations Log
for [April 27, 2013] to [May 11, 2013].

Assuming arguendo, that the actual cost of both contracts only amounted to PhP
12,818,470.56 as substantiated by the two (2) Official Receipt sissued by the ABS-CBN
on [April 26] and [May 7, 2013], or even if we were only to consider Exhibit ["B-4"] or the
Php 6,409,235.28 payment to ABS-CBN on [April 26, 2013], it nevertheless supports our
finding that [Ejercito] exceeded his authorized expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00
which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68 (c) and concurrently an election
offense pursuant to Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 25

Only Ejercito filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc. After the parties exchange of pleadings, the Resolution of the COMELEC First
26 27

Division was unanimously affirmed on May 21, 2014.

The COMELEC En Bancagreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis
petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito, reasoning that:

x x x First, the title of the petition indicating that it is a petition for disqualification clearly
expresses the objective of the action. Second, it is manifest from the language of the
petition that the causes of action have relied primarily on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the
OEC[,] which are grounds for disqualification x x x. Third, notwithstanding that the relief
portion of the petition sounded vague in its prayer for the disqualification of Ejercito, the
allegations and arguments set forth therein are obviously geared towards seeking his
disqualification for having committed acts listed as grounds for disqualification in Section
68 of OEC. Lastly, as correctly observed by the COMELEC First Division, San Luis
Memorandum addresses and clarifies the intention of the petition when it prayed for
Ejercito to "be disqualified and prevented from holding office as Governor of Laguna."
While there is a prayerseeking that Ejercito be held accountable for having committed
election offenses, there can be no doubt that the petition was primarily for his
disqualification.

Section 68 of the OEC expressly grants COMELEC the power to take cognizance of an
action or protest seeking the disqualification of a candidate who has committed any of
the acts listed therein from continuing as one, or if he or she has been elected, from
holding office. One ground for disqualification listed in Section 68 is spending in an
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law. It is exactly on said

78

ground that San Luis is seeking the disqualification of Ejercito. The jurisdiction of
COMELEC over the petition, therefore, is clear. 28
The alleged violation of Ejercitos constitutional right to due process was also not
sustained: Ejercito insists that he was deprived of his right to notice and hearing and was
not informed of the true nature of the case filed against him when San Luis was allegedly
allowed in his memorandum to make as substantial amendment in the reliefs prayed for
in his petition. San Luis was allegedly allowed to seek for Ejercitos disqualification
instead of the filing of an election offense against him.
As discussed above, the allegations in the petition, particularly the causes of action,
clearly show that it is not merely a complaint for an election offense but a disqualification
case against Ejercito as well. San Luis memorandum merely amplified and clarified the
allegations and arguments in his petition. There was no change in the cause or causes of
action. Ejercito[,] therefore, cannot claim that he was not aware of the true nature of the
petition filed against him.
Likewise, Ejercito cannot complainthat he was deprived of his right to notice and hearing.
He cannot feign ignorance that the COMELEC First Division, throughout the trial, was
hearing the petition as a disqualification case and not as an election offense case. He
was served with Summons with Notice of Conference on [June 4, 2013] and was given a
copy of the petition. He likewise submitted to the jurisdiction of the Commission when he
filed his Verified Answer. He also participated in the Preliminary Conference on [June 27,
2013] wherein he examined evidence on record and presented his own documentary
exhibits. Lastly, he filed a Manifestation (in lieu of Memorandum) incorporating all his
allegations and defenses.
Ejercito contends that amending the reliefs prayed for is prohibited under Section 2, Rule
9 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He asserts that the relief prayed for in the
memorandum is not the same as that in the petition. However, a scrutiny of said
amendment shows that no new issues were introduced. Moreover, there was no
departure from the causes of action and no material alterations on the grounds of relief.
The amendment[,] therefore[,] is not substantial as it merely rectifies or corrects the true
nature of reliefs being prayed for as set forth in the petition. The records of the case will
show that Ejercito has been afforded the opportunity to contest and rebut all the
allegations against him. He was never deprived of his right to have access to the
evidence against him. He was adequately aware of the nature and implication of the
disqualification case against him. Thus, Ejercito cannot say that he was denied of his
constitutional right to due process.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
It is important to note at this point that Ejercito, in his motion for reconsideration,
deliberately did not tackle the merit and substance of the charges against him. He limited
himself to raising procedural issues. This is despite all the opportunity that he was given
to confront the evidence lodged against him. Therefore, there is no reason for the
COMELEC En Bancto disturb the findings of the COMELEC First Division on whether
Ejercito indeed over-spent in his campaign for governorship of Laguna in the [May 13,
2013] National and Local Elections. 29
Anchoring on the case of Lanot v. Commission on Elections, the COMELEC En
30
Banclikewise debunked Ejercitos assertion that the petition was prematurely and
improperly filed on the ground that the filing of an election offense and the factual
determination on the existence of probable cause are required before a disqualification
case based on Section 68 of the OEC may proceed. It held:
As discussed in the case of Lanot vs. Comelec, each of the acts listed as ground for
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC has two aspects electoral and criminal
which may proceed independently from each other, to wit:
x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender
should be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are
summary in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a
preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal
aspect, and vice-versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable
cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC,
through its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is
probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-
blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal
conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include
disqualification from holding a future public office." (Emphasis supplied)31
The petition for disqualification against Ejercito for campaign over-spending before the
Commission isheard and resolved pursuant to the electoral aspect of Section 68 of the
OEC. It is an administrative proceeding separate and distinct from the criminal
proceeding through which Ejercito may be made to undergo in order to determine
whether he can be held criminally liable for the same act of over-spending. It is through
this administrative proceeding that this Commission, initially through its divisions, makes
79

a factual determination on the veracity of the parties respective allegations in a
disqualification case. There is no need for a preliminary investigation finding on the
criminal aspect of the offenses in Section 68 before the Commission can act on the
administrative or electoral aspect of the offense. All that is needed is a complaint or a
petition. As enunciated in Lanot, "(a)n erring candidate may be disqualified even without
prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect
may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa."
Moreover, Ejercitos reliance on Codilla is misplaced. The COMELEC En Banc opined
that the portion of the Codilla decision that referred to the necessity of the conduct of
preliminary investigation pertains to cases where the offenders are charged with acts not
covered by Section 68 of the OEC, and are, therefore, beyond the ambit of the
COMELECs jurisdiction. It said that the decision refers to this type of cases as criminal
(not administrative) in nature, and,thus, should be handled through the criminal process.
Further rejected was Ejercitos argument that the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification the moment he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor
of Laguna. For the COMELEC En Banc, its First Division thoroughly and sufficiently
addressed the matter when it relied on Maquiling instead of Sinaca. It maintained that
Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, not COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, is 32
relevant to the instant case as it states that the COMELEC shall continue the trial and
hearing of a pending disqualification case despite the proclamation of a winner. It was
noted that the proper application of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 was already clarified
in Sunga v. COMELEC. 33
Finally, the COMELEC En Bancruled on one of San Luis contentions in his
Comment/Oppositionto Ejercitos motion for reconsideration. He argued that he becomes
the winner in the gubernatorial election upon the disqualification of Ejercito. Relying on
Maquiling, San Luis declared that he was not the second placer as he obtained the
highest number of valid votes cast from among the qualified candidates. In denying that
Maquiling is on all fours with this case, the COMELEC En Bancsaid:
In the instant case, Ejercito cannot be considered as a noncandidate by reason of his
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. He was a candidate who filed a valid
certificate of candidacy which was never cancelled.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Ejercito was a bona fide candidate who was disqualified, not because of any ineligibility
existing at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but because he violated the
rules of candidacy. His disqualifying circumstance, thatis, his having over-spent in his
campaign, did not exist at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. It did not
affect the validity of the votes cast in his favor. Notwithstanding his disqualification, he
remains the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes.
Ejercito cannot be on the same footing with Arnado in the Maquiling case. Arnado was
disqualified from running for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Sur because he was a
dual citizen not qualified to run for election. His disqualification existed at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. The effect, pursuant to the Maquiling case, is that the
votes he garnered are void, which in turn resulted in having considered the "second
placer" Maquiling asthe candidate who obtained the highest number of valid votes
cast.
San Luis is in a different circumstance. The votes for the disqualified winning candidate
remained valid. Ergo, San Luis, being the second placer in the vote count, remains the
second placer. He cannot[,] thus[,] be named the winner.
Section 6, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which governs Section 68
petitions for disqualification, enunciates the rule succinctly, to wit:
Section 6. Effect of Granting of Petition. In the event a Petition to disqualify a candidate
is granted by final judgment as defined under Section 8 of Rule 23 and the disqualified
candidate obtains the highest number of votes, the candidate with the second highest
number of votes cannot be proclaimed and the rule of succession, if allowed by law, shall
be observed. In the event the rule of succession is not allowed, a vacancy shall exist for
such position. 34
On May 23, 2014, Ejercito filed before this Court a Petition for certiorari with application
for the issuance of a status quo ante order or temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI). Without issuing a TRO/WPI, the Honorable Chief Justice,
35
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, issued on May 28, 2014 an order to respondents to
comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice. Such order was confirmed nunc pro tunc by the Court En Bancon June 3, 2014.
36 37
Meantime, on May 26, 2014, Ejercito filed before the COMELEC En Bancan Omnibus
Motion to suspend proceedings and to defer the implementation of the May 21, 2014
Resolution. On the same day, San Luis also filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to
38
Declare COMELEC En Banc Resolution of May 21, 2014 and First Division Resolution of
80

September 26, 2013 Final and Executory and to Issue Forthwith Writ of Execution or
Implementing Order invoking Paragraph 2, Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No.
39
9523, in relation to Section 13 (b), Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. On
May 27, 2014, the COMELEC En Bancissued an Order denying Ejercitos omnibus
motion, granted San Luis extremely urgent motion, and directedthe Clerk of the
Commission to issue the corresponding writ of execution. On even date, Vice-Governor
41
Hernandez was sworn in as the Governor of Laguna at the COMELEC Main Office in
Manila. The service of the writ was deemed completed and validly served upon Ejercito
on May 28, 2014. 42
In his petition before Us, Ejercito raised the following issues for resolution:
THE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THAT:
(I) IT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT
RULED FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION OF PETITIONER EVEN IF IT WAS
NEVER PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION. WORSE, THERE IS YET NO
FINDING OFGUILT BY A COMPETENT COURT OR A FINDING OF FACT
STATING THAT PETITIONER ACTUALLY COMMITTED THE ALLEGED
ELECTION OFFENSE OF OVERSPENDING;
(II) IT RELIED ON A DOCUMENTARY EXHIBIT (ADVERTISING CONTRACT)
WHICH WAS NOT EVEN FORMALLY OFFERED AS EVIDENCE; [AND]
(III) IT DISQUALIFIED PETITIONER FOR AN ACT DONE BY A THIRD PARTY
WHO SIMPLY EXERCISED ITS RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION WITHOUT
THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF PETITIONER[.] 43
The petition is unmeritorious.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an independent
action that is available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution
44
of jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct simple errors of judgment. More 45
importantly, it will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and isactually
proved to exist.46
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
40
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. x x x.
47
Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolution with grave
abuse of discretion.
We now explain.
The petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is for the latters disqualification and
prosecution for election offense
Ejercito insists that his alleged acts of giving material consideration in the form of
"Orange Cards" and election overspending are considered as election offenses under
Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Section 13 of R.A. No.
48 49
9006, and punishable under Section 264 of the OEC. Considering that San Luis petition
50
partakes of the nature of a complaint for election offenses, the COMELEC First Division
has no jurisdiction over the same based on COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 and 51
Section 265 of the OEC.
52
Still, Ejercito contends that the COMELEC erroneously sanctioned a change in San Luis
cause of action by the mere expedient of changing the prayer in the latters
Memorandum. According to him, San Luis additional prayer for disqualification in the
Memorandum is a substantial amendment to the Petitionas it constitutes a material
deviation from the original cause of action from a complaint for election offenses to a
petition for disqualification. Since such substantial amendment was effected after the
case was set for hearing, Ejercito maintains that the same should have been allowed
only with prior leave of the COMELEC First Division pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the53
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which San Luis never did.
The arguments are untenable.
The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or,
if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. A petition
54
to disqualifya candidate may be filed pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC, which states:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.-- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
81

committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or animmigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 (e) refer to election campaign or partisan
political activityoutside the campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or
defacement of lawful election propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election
propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and regulations on election propaganda
through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]); threats, intimidation,
terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion (Section 261 [e]); unlawful
electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds
(Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the
election within the restricted areas (Section 261 [cc], sub-par.6). All the offenses
mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, not toviolations of
other penal laws. In other words, offenses that are punished in laws other than in the
OEC cannot be a ground for a Section 68 petition. Thus, We have held:
x x x [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the [OEC]. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit
of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to
Sections 265 and 268 of the [OEC], the power of the COMELEC is confined to the
conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from its filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with
the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
xxx xxx xxx
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Section 268. Jurisdiction. The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action orproceeding for violation of this Code,
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be
under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
55
In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled
that the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election
offense but for disqualification as well. Indeed, the following are clear indications:
1. The title of San Luis petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution
No. 9523. This expresses the objective of the action since Rule 25 is the
56
specific rule governing the disqualification of candidates.
2. The averments of San Luis petition rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC
as grounds for its causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates
the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position and
provides, as penalty, that the candidate shall be disqualified from continuing as
such, or if he or she has been elected, from holding the office.
3. Paragraph 2 of San Luis prayer in the petition states that "[in the event that
[Ejercito] will be ableto get a majority vote of the electorate of the Province of
Laguna on May 13, 2013, his proclamation be suspended until further order of
the Honorable Commission." San Luis reiterated this plea when he later filed a
Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion toIssue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of
Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue
Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent. The relief sought is actually
pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 5 Rule 25 of COMELEC
57 58
Resolution No. 9523, both of which pertain to the effect of a disqualification case
when the petition is unresolved by final judgment come election day.
4. San Luis Memorandum emphasized that the case is a "Special Action for
Disqualification," praying that "[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito]
BE DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from further holding office as Governor of
Laguna."
With the foregoing, Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San
Luis petition. This considering, it is unnecessary for Us to discuss the applicability of
Section 2,Rule 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, there being no substantial
82

amendment to San Luis petition that constitutes a material deviation from his original
causes of action. Likewise, COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 and Section 265 of the OEC
do not apply since both refer solely to the prosecution of election offenses. Specifically,
COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 is an amendment to Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure on the prosecution of election offenses, while Section 265 of the OEC is found
under Article XXII of said law pertaining also to election offenses.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral
aspect of a disqualification case
Assuming, arguendo, that San Luis petition was properly instituted as an action for
disqualification, Ejercito asserts that the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine
whether the acts enumerated under Section 68 of the OEC were indeed committed is a
requirement prior to actual disqualification. He posits that Section 5, Rule 25 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the matter of preliminary investigation;
hence, the clear import of this is that the necessity of preliminary investigation provided
for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 remains undisturbed and continues to bein full
force and effect.
We are not persuaded.
Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 states:
Section 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass. If a Petition
for Disqualification is unresolved by final judgment on the day of elections, the petitioner
may file a motion with the Division or Commission En Banc where the case is pending, to
suspend the proclamation of the candidate concerned, provided that the evidence for the
grounds to disqualify is strong. For this purpose, atleast three (3) days prior to any
election, the Clerk of the Commission shall prepare a list of pending cases and furnish all
Commissioners copies of said the list.
In the event that a candidate with an existing and pending Petition to disqualify is
proclaimed winner, the Commission shall continue to resolve the said Petition.
It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary
investigation because it merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which deals with disqualification of candidates. In disqualification
cases, the COMELEC may designate any of its officials, who are members of the
Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay
officials. As aforementioned, the present rules of procedure in the investigation and
59
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
prosecution of election offenses in the COMELEC, which requires preliminary
investigation, is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9386. Under said Resolution, all
lawyers in the COMELEC who are Election Officers in the National Capital Region
("NCR"), Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys, Assistant Regional
Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and lawyers of the Law Department are
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses
under the election lawswhich may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed
to them by the COMELEC. 60
Similarly, Ejercitos reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is misplaced. COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050, which was adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:
WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a number of cases of
disqualification filed by virtue of the provisions of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Codein relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987;
WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on matters of procedure in
dealing with cases of this nature and the manner of disposing of the same have not been
uniform;
WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the disposition [of] disqualification
cases contemplated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, there is a strongly felt need to lay down a definite policy in
the disposition of this specific class of disqualification cases;
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, the Commission en banc:
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the
disposition of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987:
1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of
the grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
filed directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a
candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining
whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the
Commission results in a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in
83

factcommit the acts complained, the Commission shall order the disqualification of the
respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu
proprio, or [on] motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the [Law] Department
of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to
conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the
election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent
has been elected orhas lost in the election.
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate
who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification
case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department of the Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the
respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes
a prima faciefinding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the
appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending
and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation ifthe evidence of guilt is
strong.
3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty(30) days
from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the
Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation. If it makes a prima faciefinding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the
Information for filing with the appropriate court.
61
In Bagatsing v. COMELEC, the Court stated that the above-quoted resolution covers
62
two (2) different scenarios:
First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the
election which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining
whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in
a finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification.
In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
propioor on motion of any of the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department
of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the
election against a candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who
has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed
as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC
for preliminary investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with
the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending
and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt
is strong.
63
However, with respect to Paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, which is the
situation in this case, We held in Sunga:
x x x Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavitinfringes on Sec. 6 of RA
No. 6646, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protestand, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (italics supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intentis that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing
of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e.,until judgment is rendered thereon. The
word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a
positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left with
no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus,
in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains
unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavitin effect disallows what RA No. 6646
imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC
which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope
of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies
must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of
84

carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative
rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial
body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress.
Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or
administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the
investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the
election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be
disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is toemploy delaying tactics so
that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be
decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is
not the main intent and purpose of the law.64
The "exclusive power [of the COMELEC] to conduct a preliminary investigation of all
cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws" stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a disqualification case. It has been
repeatedly underscored that an election offense has its criminal and electoral aspects.
While its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be
the subject of summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender
should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that
is summaryin character. This Court said in Sunga:
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its
criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused
candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the
quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its
electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be
disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding which is
summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under
Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard
summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with,
under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal
conviction.
65
and equally in Lanot:
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender
should be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are
summary in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a
preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal
aspect, and vice-versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable
cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC,
through its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is
probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-
blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal
conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include
disqualification from holding a future public office.
The two aspects account for the variance of the rules on disposition and resolution of
disqualification cases filed before or after an election. When the disqualification case is
filed before the elections, the question of disqualification is raised before the voting
public. If the candidate is disqualified after the election, those who voted for him assume
the risk that their votes may be declared stray or invalid. There isno such risk if the
petition is filed after the elections. x x x.
66
We cannot accept Ejercitos argument that Lanot did not categorically pronounce that the
conduct of a preliminary investigation exclusively pertains to the criminal aspect of
anaction for disqualification or that a factual finding by the authorized legal officers of the
COMELEC may be dispensed with in the proceedings for the administrative aspect of a
disqualification case. According to him,a close reading of said case would reveal that
upon filing of the petition for disqualification with the COMELEC Division, the latter
referred the matter to the Regional Election Director for the purpose of preliminary
investigation; therefore, Lanot contemplates two referrals for the conduct of investigation
first, to the Regional Election Director, prior to the issuance of the COMELEC First
Divisions resolution, and second, to the Law Department, following the reversal by the
COMELEC En Banc.
For easy reference, the factual antecedents of Lanot are as follows:
On March 19, 2004, a little less than two months before the May 10, 2004 elections,
Henry P. Lanot, et al. filed a Petition for Disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the
OEC against then incumbent Pasig City Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio. National Capital
85

Region Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra conducted hearings on the petition. On May 4,
2004, she recommended Eusebios disqualification and the referral of the case to the
COMELEC Law Department for the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the possible
violation of Section 261 (a) of the OEC. When the COMELEC First Division issued a
resolution adopting Director Ladras recommendations on May 5, 2004, then COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos informed the pertinent election officers through an
Advisory dated May 8, 2004. Eusebio filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 9, 2004.
On election day, Chairman Abalos issued a memorandum to Director Ladra enjoining her
from implementing the May 5, 2004 COMELEC First Division resolution. The petition for
disqualification was not yet finally resolved at the time of the elections. Eusebio's votes
were counted and canvassed. After which, Eusebio was proclaimed as the winning
candidate for city mayor. On August 20, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc annulled the
COMELEC First Division's order to disqualify Eusebio and referred the case to the
COMELEC Law Department for preliminary investigation.
When the issue was elevated to Us, the Court agreed with Lanot that the COMELEC En
Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the
disqualification case pending preliminary investigation of the COMELEC Law
Department. Error was made when it ignored the electoral aspect of the disqualification
case by setting aside the COMELEC First Division's resolution and referring the entire
case to the COMELEC Law Department for the criminal aspect. We noted that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, upon which the COMELEC En Banc based its ruling, is
procedurally inconsistent with COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, which was the governing
rule at the time. The latter resolution delegated to the COMELEC Field Officials the
hearing and reception of evidence of the administrative aspect of disqualification cases in
the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections. In marked contrast, in the May 2013
elections, it was only in cases involving barangay officials that the COMELEC may
designate any of its officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case
and to receive evidence. 67
The COMELEC En Banc properly considered as evidence the Advertising
Contract dated May 8, 2013
Ejercito likewise asserts that the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013 should not have
been relied upon by the COMELEC. First, it was not formally offered in evidence
pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules and he was not even furnished with a
68
copy thereof, depriving him of the opportunity to examine its authenticity and due
execution and object to its admissibility. Second, even if Section 34, Rule 132 does not
apply, administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are nonetheless
proscribed from rendering judgment based on evidence that was never presented and
could not be controverted. There is a need to balance the relaxation of the rules of
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
procedure with the demands of administrative due process, the tenets of which are laid
down in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. And third,the
69
presentation of the advertising contracts, which are highly disputable and on which no
hearing was held for the purpose of taking judicial notice in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 129 of the Rules, cannot be dispensed with by COMELECs claim that it could take
70
judicial notice. Contrary to Ejercitos claim, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules is
inapplicable. Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court is clear enough in stating that it
71
shall not apply to election cases except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. In fact, nowhere from COMELEC Resolution No.
9523 requires that documentary evidence should be formally offered in evidence. We 72
remind again that the electoral aspect of a disqualification case is done through an
administrative proceeding which is summary in character.
Granting, for arguments sake, that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court applies, there
have been instances when We suspended the strict application of the rule in the interest
of substantial justice, fairness, and equity. Since rules of procedure are mere tools
73
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that the Court is
empowered to suspend its rules or to exempt a particular case from the application of a
general rule, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the
ends of justice. The fact is, even Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
74
Procedure fittingly declare that "[the] rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before
the Commission" and that "[in] the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy
disposition ofall matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion
thereof may be suspended by the Commission." This Court said in Hayudini v.
Commission on Elections: 75
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its
rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of its objectives ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the
real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by
all means withinits command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. 76
86

Further, Ejercitos dependence on Ang Tibay is weak. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the
77
filing of a motion for reconsideration and denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who had the opportunity to be heard thereon. In this case, it is
78
undisputed that Ejercito filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc. Despite this, he did not rebut the authenticity and due execution of the advertising
contracts when he decided not to discuss the factual findings of the COMELEC First
Division on the alleged ground that it may be construed as a waiver of the jurisdictional
issues that he raised.
79
We agree with San Luis and the Office of the Solicitor General that, pursuant to Section
2, Rule 129, the COMELEC has the discretion to properly take judicial notice of the
80
Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013. In accordance with R.A. No. 9006, the
COMELEC, through its Campaign Finance Unit, is empowered to:
a. Monitor fund raising and spending activities;
b. Receive and keep reports and statements of candidates, parties, contributors
and election contractors, and advertising contracts of mass media entities;
c. Compile and analyze the reports and statements as soon as they are received
and make an initial determination of compliance;
d. Develop and manage a recording system for all reports, statements, and
contracts received by it and todigitize information contained therein;
e. Publish the digitized information gathered from the reports, statements and
contracts and make themavailable to the public;
f. Develop a reportorial and monitoring system;
g. Audit all reports, statements and contracts and determine compliance by the
candidates, parties, contributors, and election contractors, including the
inspection of Books and records of candidates, parties and mass media entities
and issue subpoenas in relation thereto and submit its findings to the
Commission En Banc;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
h. Coordinate with and/or assist other departments/offices of the Commission
receiving related reports on Campaign Finance including prosecution of violators
and collection of fines and/or imposition of perpetual disqualification; and
i. Perform other functions as ordered by the Commission. 81
The COMELEC may properly takeand act on the advertising contracts without further
proof from the parties herein. Aside from being considered as an admission and 82
presumed to be proper submissions from them, the COMELEC already has knowledge
of the contracts for being ascertainable from its very own records. Said contracts are
ought to be known by the COMELEC because of its statutory function as the legal
custodian of all advertising contracts promoting or opposing any candidate during the
campaign period. As what transpired in this case, the COMELEC has the authority and
discretion to compare the submitted advertising contracts with the certified true copies of
the broadcast logs, certificates of performance or other analogous records which a
broadcast station or entity is required to submit for the review and verification of the
frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements aired.
To be precise, R.A. No. 9006 provides:
Sec. 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda.
xxxx
4.3 Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party
shall not be printed, published, broadcast or exhibited without the written acceptance by
the said candidate or political party. Such written acceptance shall be attached to the
advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC as provided in Subsection
6.3 hereof.
Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. All registered parties and bona
fidecandidates shall have equal access to media time and space. The following
guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC:
xxxx
6.2
xxxx
87

(b.) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall
be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90)
minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to
the COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review
and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for
any candidate or political party.
6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for
advertising, promoting or opposing any political party or the candidacy of any person for
public office within five (5) days after its signing. x x x.
The implementing guidelines of the above-quoted provisions are found in Rule 5 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9476
Section 2. Submission of Copies of Advertising Contracts. All media entities shall
submit a copy of its advertising and or broadcast contracts, media purchase orders,
booking orders, or other similar documents to the Commission through its Campaign
Finance Unit, accompanied by a summary report in the prescribed form (Annex "E")
together with official receipts issued for advertising, promoting or opposing a party, or the
candidacy of any person for public office, within five (5) days after its signing, through:
a. For Media Entities in the NCR The Education and Information Department
(EID), which shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit of the
Commission.
b. For Media Entities outside of the NCR The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO)
concerned who shall furnish copies thereof to the Education and Information
Department of the Commission within five (5) days after the campaign periods.
The EID shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit of the
Commission.
xxxx
It shall be the duty of the EID to formally inform media entities that the latters failure to
comply with the mandatory provisions of this Section shall be considered an election
offense punishable pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006. [RA 9006, Secs. 6.3
and 13] and in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
SECTION 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda
through Mass Media. All parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to
media time and space for their election propaganda during the campaign period subject
to the following requirements and/or limitations:
a. Broadcast Election Propaganda
xxx
Provided, further, that a copy of the broadcast advertisement contract be furnished to the
Commission, thru the Education and Information Department, within five (5) days from
contract signing.
xxx
d. Common requirements/limitations:
xxx
(3) For the above purpose, each broadcast entity and website owner or administrator
shall submit to the Commission a certified true copy of its broadcast logs, certificates of
performance, or other analogous record, including certificates of acceptance as required
in Section 7(b) of these Guidelines,for the review and verification of the frequency, date,
time and duration of advertisements aired for any candidate or party through:
For Broadcast Entities in the NCR The Education and Information Department (EID)
which in turn shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the
Commission within five days from receipt thereof.
For Broadcast Entities outside of the NCR The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO)
concerned, who in turn, shall furnish copies thereof to the Education and Information
Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn shall furnish copies thereof to the
Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt
thereof.
For website owners or administrators The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO)
concerned, who in turn, shall furnish copies thereof to the Education and Information
Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn shall furnish copies thereof to the
Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt
thereof.
88
 ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
All broadcast entities shall preserve their broadcast logs for a period of five (5) years "expenditure" and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution. He 86

from the date of broadcast for submission to the Commission whenever required.
Certified true copies of broadcast logs, certificates of performance, and certificates of
acceptance, or other analogous record shall be submitted, as follows:
also stresses that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law
applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by third
parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign
donations is presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the government.

We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and
Candidates for National 1st Report 3 weeks after start of campaign March 4 - 11
Positions Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercitos knowledge and
period consent. As found by the COMELEC First Division, the advertising contracts submitted in
Candidates for Local 2nd 3 weeks after 1st filing week April 3 - 10
Positions evidence by San Luis as well as those in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow
Report assertion. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must because
3rd Report 1 week before election day May 2 - 9 non-compliance is consideredas an election offense. 87

Last Election week May 14 - 17

Report
Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the
1st Report 1 week after start of campaign April 15 - 22
candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate,
period
which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the
2nd 1 week after 1st filing week
April 30 - May
COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor,
Report 8
the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political
3rd Report Election week May 9 - 15
party. Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476
88

Last 1 week after election day May 16 - 22

requires that election propaganda materials donated toa candidate shall not be
Report
broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which
For subsequent elections, the schedule for the submission of reports shall be prescribed
shall be in the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify
by the Commission.
the description of the items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the
advertising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders shall be signed by the
Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in
candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the party and, in case of
excess of what is allowed by the OEC
a donation, should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or
their authorized representatives. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously
89

Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and
Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without
his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even
assuming that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he should not be
penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his consent.
states thatit shall be unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given
free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate withoutthe written
acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the words
"airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the true and
correct name and address of the donor. 90

Citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decided by the US Supreme

83

Court, he argues that every voter has the right to support a particular candidate in
This Court cannot give weight to Ejercitos representation that his signature on the
accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of expression, which
advertising contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the first
is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He believes that an
84

time in this petition for certiorari. It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither
advertising contract paid for by a third party without the candidates knowledge and
alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for
consent must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail against the laws
the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. It would be offensive to the basic
91

suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advances the view
rules of fair play and justice to allow Ejercito to raise an issue that was not brought up
that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between "contribution" and
85

before the COMELEC. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
92

89

equally truethat elementary considerations of due process require that a party be duly
apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered. 93
Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercitos knowledge
and consent, and whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any
factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65 petition. This Court is nota trier of facts and is
not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of factual allegations. 94
Instead, the findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by any other administrative
agency exercising expertise in its particular field of competence, are binding on the
Court. As enunciated in Juan v. Commission on Election: 95
Findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are
afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such
findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be
disturbed. The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional
body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than
enough expertise in its field that its findings orconclusions are generally respected and
even given finality. x x x.
96
Having determined that the subject TV advertisements were done and broadcasted with
Ejercitos consent, it follows that Citizens United does not apply. In said US case, a non-
profit corporation sued the Federal Election Commission, assailing, among others, the
constitutionality of a ban on corporate independ entexpenditures for electioneering
communications under 2 U.S.C.S. 441b. The corporation released a documentary film
unfavorable of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate for the Democratic
Party's Presidential nomination. It wanted to make the film available through video-on-
demand withinthirty (30) days of the primary elections, and it produced advertisements to
promote the film. However, federal law prohibits all corporations including non-profit
advocacy corporations from using their general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures for speech that is an "electioneering communication" or for speech that
97
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate within thirty (30) days of a
primary election and sixty (60) days of a general election. The US Supreme Court held
that the ban imposed under 441b on corporate independent expenditures violated the
First Amendment because the Government could not suppress political speech on the
98
basis of the speaker's identity as a non-profit or for-profit corporation. It was opined:
Section 441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on
speech. As a "restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
political communication during a campaign," that statute "necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96
S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam).Were the Court to uphold these
restrictions, the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of
the various points in the speech process. See McConnell, supra, at 251, 124 S. Ct. 619,
517 L. Ed. 2d 491 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (Government could repress speech by "attacking
all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas," for "effective public
communication requires the speaker to make use of the services of others"). If 441 be
applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner
restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices the
Government deems to be suspect.
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people. See Buckley, supra, at 14-15, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659
("In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make
informed choices among candidates for office is essential"). The right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The First Amendment
"'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for
political office." Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
223, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1989)(quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272, 91 S. Ct. 621, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1971)); see Buckley, supra, at 14, 96 S.
Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications
of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by
our Constitution").
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it,
whether by design orinadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are "subject to strict
scrutiny," which requires the Government to prove that the restriction "furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." WRTL, 551 U.S., at
464, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329(opinion of Roberts, C. J.). While it might be
maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical
matter, see Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S., at 124, 112 S. Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d
476(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), the quoted language from WRTL provides a
sufficient framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this case.
We shall employ it here.
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against
attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2000)
90

(striking down content based restriction). Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. See First Nat. Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978). As
instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on
the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.
Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government
may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives
the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth,
standing, and respect for the speaker's voice. The Government may not by these means
deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and
speakers are worthy of consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.
The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the
disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing
governmental entities to perform their functions. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986) (protecting the
"function of public school education"); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977) (furthering "the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974)
(ensuring "the capacity of the Government to discharge its [military] responsibilities"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 557, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1973)("[F]ederal service should depend upon
meritorious performance rather than political service"). The corporate independent
expenditures at issue in this case, however, would not interfere with governmental
functions, so these cases are inapposite. These precedents stand only for the
proposition that there are certain governmental functions that cannot operate without
some restrictions on particular kinds of speech. By contrast, it is inherent in the nature of
the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources
in order to determine how to cast their votes. At least before Austin, the Court had not
allowed the exclusion of a class of speakers from the general public dialogue.
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and
logic lead us to this conclusion.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
The previous decisions of the US Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce (which ruled that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's
99
corporate identity) and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission (which upheld the limits on electioneering communications in a facial
100
challenge) were, in effect, overruled by Citizens United.
Like Citizens Unitedis the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo. In this much earlier case, the
101
US Supreme Court ruled, among other issues elevated to it for resolution, on a provision
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, (FECA) which limits 102
independent political expenditures by an individual or group advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office to $1,000 per year. Majority of the
US Supreme Court expressed the view that the challenged provision is unconstitutional
as it impermissibly burdens the right of free expression under the First Amendment, and
could not be sustained on the basis of governmental interests in preventing the actuality
or appearance of corruption or in equalizing the resources of candidates. 103
Even so, the rulings in Citizens United and Buckley find bearing only on matters related
to "independent expenditures," an election law concept which has no application in this
jurisdiction. In the US context, independent expenditures for or against a particular
candidate enjoy constitutional protection. They refer to those expenses made by an
individual, a group or a legal entity which are not authorized or requested by the
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, oran agent of the candidate; they
are expenditures that are not placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a
candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate. In contrast, there is
104
no similar provision here in the Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006105 and its
implementing rules and regulations specifically make it unlawful to print, publish,
106
broadcast or exhibit any print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the
candidate without the written acceptance of said candidate.
If at all, another portion of the Buckley decision is significant to this case. One of the
issues resolved therein is the validity of a provision of the FECA which imposes $1,000
limitation on political contributions by individuals and groups to candidates and
authorized campaign committees. Five justices of the nine-member US Supreme Court
107
sustained the challenged provision on the grounds that it does not violate First
Amendment speech and association rights or invidiously discriminate against non-
incumbent candidates and minority party candidates but is supported by substantial
governmental interests in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption. It was
held:
91

As the general discussion in Part I-A, supra, indicated, the primary First Amendment
problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the
contributor's freedom of political association. The Court's decisions involving
associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a "basic constitutional
freedom," Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 57, that is "closely allied to freedom of speech
and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960). See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, supra at 460-461; NAACP v. Button, supra, at 452(Harlan,
J., dissenting). In view of the fundamental nature of the rightto associate, governmental
"action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the
closest scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 460-461. Yet, it is clear that "[n]either the
right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute." CSC v.
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973). Even a "significant interference' with protected
rights of political association" may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently
important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, at 488; NAACP v. Button, supra, at
438; Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 488.
Appellees argue that the Act's restrictions on large campaign contributions are justified
by three governmental interests. According to the parties and amici, the primary interest
served by the limitations and, indeed, by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of
corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive
influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if
elected to office. Two "ancillary" interests underlying the Act are also allegedly furthered
by the $ 1,000 limits on contributions. First, the limits serve to mute the voices of affluent
persons and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of
all citizens to affect the outcome of elections. Second, it is argued, the ceilings may to
some extent act as a brake on the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby
serve to open the political systemmore widely to candidates without access to sources of
large amounts of money.
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose -- to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions -- in order
to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $ 1,000 contribution limitation.
Under a system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense personal
or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to provide the
resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign. The increasing importance of
the communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to
effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more essential
ingredient of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large contributions are given to
secure political quid pro quo's from current and potential office holders, the integrity of
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
our system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such
pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples
surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one. Of
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of
the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for
abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions. In CSC v. Letter
Carriers, supra, the Court found that the danger to "fair and effective government" posed
by partisan political conduct on the part of federal employees charged with administering
the law was a sufficiently important concern to justify broad restrictions on the
employees' right of partisan political association. Here, as there, Congress could
legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence "is also
critical... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to
a disastrous extent." 413 U.S. at 565.
Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery
laws and narrowly drawn disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of
dealing with "proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements." But laws making
criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal withonly the most blatant and specific
attempts of those with money to influence governmental action. And while disclosure
requirements serve the many salutary purposes discussed elsewhere in this opinion,
Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure,and
that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality
or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial
contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their
contributions are fully disclosed.
The Act's $ 1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large
campaign contributions-- the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality
and potential for corruption have been identified -- while leaving persons free to engage
in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their
services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting
candidates and committees with financial resources. Significantly, the Act's contribution
limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust
and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens,
associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.
We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions,
the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political
candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms
caused by the $ 1,000 contribution ceiling. (Emphasis supplied)
92

Until now, the US Supreme Court has not overturned the ruling that, with respect to
limiting political contributions by individuals and groups, the Governments interest in
preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance was "sufficiently important" or
"compelling" so that the interest would satisfy even strict scrutiny.
108
In any event, this Court should accentuate that resort to foreign jurisprudence would be
proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy and that
even in the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence are merely
persuasive authority at best since they furnish an uncertain guide. We prompted in
109
Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company: 110
x x x American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At
best, they are persuasive for no court holds a patent on correct decisions.Our laws must
be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may
be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation
related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public
interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that
our public interest is distinct and different from others.
111
and once more in Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas: 112
x x x [A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are
of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have
only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.... [I]n
resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by
different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution
can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long
since diverged. 113
Indeed, in Osmea v. COMELEC, this Court, in reaffirming its ruling in National Press
114
Club v. Commission on Elections that Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 does not invade
115 116
and violate the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression, remarked in
response to the dissent of Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero:
On the other hand, the dissent of Justice Romero in the present case, in batting for an
"uninhibited market place of ideas," quotes the following from Buckley v. Valeo:
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination
ofinformation from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."
But do we really believe in that? That statement was made to justify striking down a limit
on campaign expenditure on the theory that money is speech. Do those who endorse the
view that government may not restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the
relative voice of others also think that the campaign expenditure limitation found in our
election laws is unconstitutional? How about the principle of one person, one vote, is this
not based on the political equality of voters? Voting after all is speech. We speak of it as
the voiceof the people even of God. The notion that the government may restrictthe
speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of othersmay be foreign to the
American Constitution. It is not to the Philippine Constitution, being in fact an animating
principle of that document.
Indeed, Art. IX-C, 4 is not the only provision in the Constitution mandating political
equality. Art. XIII, 1 requires Congress to give the "highest priority" to the enactment of
measures designed to reduce political inequalities, while Art. II, 26 declaresas a
fundamental principle of our government "equal access to opportunities for public
service." Access to public office will be deniedto poor candidates if they cannot even
have access to mass media in order to reach the electorate. What fortress principle
trumps or overrides these provisions for political equality? Unless the idealism and hopes
which fired the imagination of those who framed the Constitution now appeardim to us,
how can the electoral reforms adopted by them to implement the Constitution, of which
11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to 90 and 92 are part, be considered infringements
on freedom of speech? That the framers contemplated regulation of political propaganda
similar to 11(b) is clear from the following portion of the sponsorship speech of
Commissioner Vicente B. Foz:
MR. FOZ. . . . Regarding the regulation by the Commission of the enjoyment or utilization
of franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges or concessions
granted by the Government, there is a provision that during the election period, the
Commission may regulate, among other things, the rates, reasonable free space, and
time allotments for public information campaigns and forums among candidates for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This has to do with the
media of communication or information. Proceeding from the above, the Court shall
117
now rule on Ejercitos proposition that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on
campaign donations. He vigorously asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476
distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes no proscription on the
93

medium or amount of contribution madeby third parties in favor of the candidates, while
the limit set by law, as appearing in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies only to
election expenditures of candidates.
We deny.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates
118
and political parties for election campaign, thus:
SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. The aggregate
amount that a candidate or registered politicalparty may spend for election campaign
shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and
for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in
the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a
candidate without any political party and without support from any political party
may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in
the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to
any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly
reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax. 119
Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166. These 120
provisions, which are merely amended insofar as the allowable amount is concerned,
read:
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. No candidate shall spend for
his election campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for
every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy:
Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to
be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire
of land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the
campaign: Provided, further, That where the land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities,
apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or
supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered toassess the amount commensurate
with the expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and
shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political parties. A duly accredited political
party may spend for the election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates an aggregate amount not exceeding the equivalent of
one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently registered therein. Expenses
incurred by branches, chapters, or committees of such political party shall be included in
the computation of the total expenditures of the political party.
Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be considered as expenses of their
respective individual candidates and subject to limitation under Section 100 of this Code.
SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures. No person, except
the candidate, the treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such
candidate or treasurer, shall make any expenditure in support of or in opposition to any
candidate or political party. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate or the
treasurer of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such candidate or political
party.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished
the Commission signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the party and showing the
expenditures so authorized, and shall state the full name and exact address of the
person so designated. (Emphasis supplied) 121
The focal query is: How shall We interpret "the expenses herein referred to shall include
those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate"and "except the candidate, the
treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such candidate or
treasurer"found in Sections 100 and 103, respectively, of the OEC? Do these provisions
exclude from the allowable election expenditures the contributions of third parties made
with the consent of the candidate? The Court holds not.
94

When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law
would lead to absurdity, impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory construction
may be resorted to such as the legislative history of the law for the purpose of solving
doubt, and that courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the
deliberations during the enactment, as well as prior laws on the same subject matter in
order to ascertain the true intent or spirit of the law.
122
Looking back, it could be found that Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are
substantially lifted from P.D. No. 1296, as amended. Sections 51, 52 and 54 of which
123
specifically provide:
Section 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. No candidate shall spend for his
election campaign an amount more than the salary or the equivalent of the total
emoluments for one year attached to the office for which he is a candidate: Provided,
That the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred by the candidate, his
contributors and supporters,whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of
land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the
campaign: Provided, further,That, where the land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities,
apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or
supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate
with the expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and
shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa, they shall not spend more
than sixty thousand pesos for their election campaign.
Section 52. Limitation upon expenses of political parties, groups or aggrupations.A
political party, group or aggrupation may not spend for the election of its candidates in
the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates anaggregate amount
more than the equivalent of fifty centavos for every voter currently registered therein:
Provided, That expenses incurred by such political party, group or aggrupation not duly
registered with the Commission and/or not presenting or supporting a complete list of
candidates shall be considered as expenses of its candidates and subject to the
limitation under Section 51 of this Code. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters or
committees of a political party, group or aggrupation shall be included in the computation
of the total expenditures of the political party, group or aggrupation. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 54. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.No person, except the
candidate or any person authorized by him or the treasurer of a political party, group or
aggrupation, shall make any expenditure in support of, or in opposition to any candidate
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
or political party, group or aggrupation. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate of
the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation shall be considered as expenditure of
such candidate or political party, group or aggrupation.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished
the Commission, signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the party, group or
aggrupation and showing the expenditure so authorized, and shall state the full nameand
exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to P.D. No. 1296, R.A. No. 6388 (otherwise known as the "Election Code of 1971")
was enacted. Sections 41 and 42 of which are relevant, to quote:
124
Section 41. Limitation Upon Expenses of Candidates. No candidate shall spend for his
election campaign more than the total amount of salary for the full term attached to the
office for which he is a candidate.
Section 42. Limitation Upon Expenses of Political Parties and Other Nonpolitical
Organizations. No political party as defined in this Code shall spend for the election of
its candidates an aggregate amount more than the equivalent of one peso for every voter
currently registered throughout the country in case of a regular election, orin the
constituency in which the election shall be held in case of a special election which is not
held in conjunction with a regular election. Any other organization not connected with any
political party, campaigning for or against a candidate, or for or against a political party
shall not spend more than a total amount of five thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Much earlier, Section 12 (G) of R.A. No. 6132, which implemented the resolution of
125
both Houses ofCongress calling for a constitutional convention, explicitly stated:
Section 12. Regulations of Election Spending and Propaganda. The following provisions
shall govern election spending and propaganda in the election provided for in this Act:
xxx
(G) All candidates and all other persons making or receiving expenditures, contributions
or donations which in their totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to further or oppose the
candidacy of any candidate, shall file a statement of all such expenditures and
contributions made or received on such dates and withsuch details as the Commission
on Elections shall prescribe by rules. The total expenditures made by a candidate, or by
any other person with the knowledge and consent of the candidate, shall not exceed
thirty-two thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
95

In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said,
therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to
regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate but also of his or her
contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate limit of the formers
election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase "those incurred or caused to
1awp++i1
be incurred by the candidate"is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are
contributed or donated in the candidates behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a
contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person authorized by such
candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. (Where 126
the law does not distinguish, neither should We.) There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidates allowable limit of
election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters rights of speech
and of expression under Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral
regulation, the laws concern is not to curtail the message or content of the
127
advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and
among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any
restriction on speech or expression is only incidentaland is no more than necessary to
achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in
political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional
objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII
of the Constitution.128
Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political
advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the essence of a truly
democratic form of government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 21, 2014 Resolution of the COMELEC
En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which upheld the September 26, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division, granting the petition for disqualification filed by private
respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito,
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND
ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No.
15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo)
on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6
September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and
Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar."1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial
court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although
necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate
reflecting the court decreed adoption, the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only
2
sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption
failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's
new name and the name of her adoptive parents. Without delay, petitioner's mother
3
executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-
Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4
96

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter
with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received
her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. 5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
F927287 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and
6 furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities
19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine
Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616. 7 early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the
8 secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3)
United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston
College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree
in Political Studies. 9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the
10
U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July
1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16
April 1992. Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika)
12
were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14
She obtained
U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to
support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this
time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with
her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father
17
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3
February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in
the settlement of his estate. 18
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first
quarter of 2005. The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification
19
of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods,
20
21
as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. As 22
23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay,
24
children immediately followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to
25
complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. 26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her
husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005. The corresponding 27
Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006. Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
28
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. She travelled back to
29
the Philippines on 11 March 2006. 30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. The family home was
31
eventually sold on 27 April 2006. Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S.
32
in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major
Philippine company in July 2006. 33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home and to this day, is where the
34
couple and their children have been residing. A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said
35
property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on
1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
97

Act of 2003. Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn
36
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship
on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. As can be gathered from its 18
37
July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is
deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered
as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates
38
(ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006. She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
40
XX4731999. This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued
41
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA. 42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before 43
assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary
public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in
44
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the
45
said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From
46
then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport. 48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that49
day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she
stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the
intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. In the same 50
questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically
in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010. 52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months"
to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." Petitioner
53
obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
56
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC
57
an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing
of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated
cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001
(DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. She is convinced that the
59
47
COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition. Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that
60
petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections. 61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. Elamparo claimed
62
that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings. Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
63
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born
64
Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
65 66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound
by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated
that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May
2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is
54
qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the
ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be
counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under
98

the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was
actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in
the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary
jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in
her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation
that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings
were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of
citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to
the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that
the same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or
recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess
natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-
born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for
Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of
the Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should
she serve as the country's next leader.
68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding
that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material
representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED. 69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner
which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying
the same. 70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before
the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the
71
requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72
99

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born
status. Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is
73
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to
exclude them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born
74
citizen.
75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support
her claim that foundlings have a nationality. According to Tatad, international
76
conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary
in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. He also stressed
77
that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings. 78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option
to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former
natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling. 79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with
the ten (10) year residency requirement. Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her
80
domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship
which was sometime in 2010 or 2011. Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
81
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed
thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S. 82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as
SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not
bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen. He advanced the view that former
83
natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.
84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had
only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior
to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that
she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not
meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition, docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He
85
claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that
she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and that
she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. Contreras 86
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. He asserted that petitioner's physical
87
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition
of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as
such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws. 88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action.
His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Instead, Tatad completely
89
relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not
among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective
office.
90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they
focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. A petition for quo warranto falls
91
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC. 92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents. Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-
93
born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality
and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. Consequently, the
94
petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated
under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status. Moreover, the
96
official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the
issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her
appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
100

RTC. She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born
97
citizen of the Philippines.
98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing
her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement
and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.
99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied with. She reasoned out that there
100
was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the
acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for
Senator was a mistake made in good faith. 102
In a Resolution promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled
103
that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year
residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC
when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The
COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present
petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation
of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter,
oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to
ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-
007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado
D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding
the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding
the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated
are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner
is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be
denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate
a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the
discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications
of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article
IX, C, Section 2:
101

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse
to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground
for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the
President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
102

Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
104
COMELEC is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
105
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in
Rule 25 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action
which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making
power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the
right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in
their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as
already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office.
In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or
during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of
the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not
imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization
Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of the Law does
not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the
respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of
provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual
should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification
is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are
established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his
favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship
or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the
beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case
(G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's
residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995.
This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state
in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to
fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only
in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations
made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections
for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives.
(R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
103

Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be. 106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25
September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which
states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate. 107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by
final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate,
or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate.
Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by
a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by
law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides
of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of
jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by
statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is
not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident
facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation
can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
foundlings are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
108
Constitution, they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments,
109
when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein
petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to
present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown
nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole
chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that
110
petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the
burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were
aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such
status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this
case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters
shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
111
104

15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo
Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970,
the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented
were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were
210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299
Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were
245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not
dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in
Iloilo was Filipino.
112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that
she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has
1wphi1
typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes
and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a
113
person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would
be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents
are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under
Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the
Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not
face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50%
chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our
questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average,
there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to
1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio
of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino
is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while
the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the
ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I
am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all,
the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than
99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not
imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those
infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a
foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because
there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings
might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty -
99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision
denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional
interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court held that:
114
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle
of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and
105

of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers. 115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by
the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted:
"The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the
father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The
gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them
Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage
born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a
child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the
Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols: The amendment should read thus: "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father
and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child,
is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a
Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not
unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does
not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from
Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that
the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized,
and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively. 116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
account, cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who
117
said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment
to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a
mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
106

cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to
apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February
2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was
the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the
way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and
Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct.
Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are
imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What
matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos
because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency
and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a
class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive
policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a
famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not
silently silent, it is silently vocal.
118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just
and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to
impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the
grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the
Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express
intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to
use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really
intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several
provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,"
Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws
is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties,
status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court
will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, a child
119
left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court
may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and
over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well
as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality.
Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners. (Underlining supplied)
120
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes"
(otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
107

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to
the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation." These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
128

naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform Bill of Rights. 129

any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as
instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts
121
State. Article 15 thereof states:
130

of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not
analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election 1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of
122
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status Article 7
as a foundling. 123

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation be cared for by his or her parents.
or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by
124

national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field,
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International
125

Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a
customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two
nationality:"
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and
a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is Article 24
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of
126

law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of
reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems
generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness
127
and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and
the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
108

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our
present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to
wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of
birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the
rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of
the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing
the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich effectively
131
affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of
the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or
132 133
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in
the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of
international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally
accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only
sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a
minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content
with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in
Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to" the 1966
134 135
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out
that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the
Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition
of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and
yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread
practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but
also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and
the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of
Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally," support the notion that the right
136
against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South
137
America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-
two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three
(33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not
signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings
are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.
109

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's
Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are
among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the
DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings
as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99%
and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of
nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class
which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to
their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those
treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that
the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this
Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect and
uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions
139
of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The
COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is
not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140
repatriation was explained as follows:
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC where we described it as an
141
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also
included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit, which cited Tabasa v. Court of
142
Appeals, where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
143
recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit is categorical that
144
"if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover
his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to
decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is
not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to
145
mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or
perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are
only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and
naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie.,
did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
110

reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr., where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should
147
be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a
doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected." 148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed
a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to
presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data
required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the
effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee." Under R.A.
149
No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact
that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any
notation that it is an amended issue." That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books,
150
and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of
Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential." The law therefore allows
151
petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what
would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was
an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in
the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
146
committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before
and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held
on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May
2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence
in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months"
which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25
May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is
the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or
bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
152
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned
their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include
petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to
the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in
March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of
their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June
2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding
tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation
Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-
mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement
111

from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27
April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where
petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit
from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that
she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and
Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate
to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work
and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim
conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus
manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi. The COMELEC 154
disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the
position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the
Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by
the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC, Japzon v. 155
COMELEC and Caballero v. COMELEC. During the oral arguments, the private
156 157
respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC. Respondents contend that these cases
158
decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a
permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under
a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24
May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, the only evidence presented was a community tax
159
certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC did not involve a candidate who wanted to count
160
residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that
residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts
after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, the 161
candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his
frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC, the candidate was found to be an American
162
citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The
COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient
to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by
the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted
only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together
leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from
the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address
in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from
U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is
clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended,
otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no
overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one
year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and
"comes or returns to the Philippines." The law institutes a balikbayan program
163
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to
become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country" in
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line with the government's "reintegration
program." Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
165
112

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms
that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted
him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before
he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is
exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and
buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile
is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's
evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close
to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC, and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to
166
have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue
of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six
( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator.
Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the
statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required
in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in
2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period
when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25
May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC,
is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which
is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first
version was vague.
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her
U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had
returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the
school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding
and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her,
yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's
mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, the candidate mistakenly put seven (7)
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months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one
year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to
have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she
was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would
have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually
and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because
COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact
that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on
24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As
already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as
early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement
of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an
established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012
COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by
Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco
discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
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circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and
were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition
for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted
that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6)
months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer
period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when
petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be
said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for
Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to
hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner,
moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily
constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to,
and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for
public office.
168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good
number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines
and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of
coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which
the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her
residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that
"based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it
is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for
purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as
President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency
have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less
in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner. It ignores, above all
169
else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the
SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration
in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six
(6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the
residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years
of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the
declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for
the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner,
by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a
length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of
residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts
of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however
stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
[Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in
San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson
Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former
lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name
and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal
of some of the family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the
1a\^/phi1
Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of
the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
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In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills,
where they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the
case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date
than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in
Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion
from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA
No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
ADMIN LAW CASES SESSION 4
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11
December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December
2015 Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
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