Layugan vs.

IAC
167 SCRA 363 November 14, 1968
FACTS: Pedro Layugan testified that while he and his companion were repairing th
e tire of their cargo truck that was parked along the right side of the National
Highway, Godofredo Isidro s truck, recklessly driven by Daniel Serrano bumped Lay
ugan. As a result, Layugan had his left leg amputated.
Defendant Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident.
Isidro said that Layugan was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a bro
ther-in-law of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly, while being r
epaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane right after the curv
e; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the
parked truck in installing the early warning device.
Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a dr
iver; that before leaving, he checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruc
t him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by Layugan, w
hile the same was at a stop. Serrano also testified that, When I was a few meters
away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. I stepped on my foot br
akes but it did not function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later
that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not fun
ction. Layugan, on the other hand, claims that a warning device consisting of the
lighted kerosene lamp was placed 3-4 Meters from the back of the truck.
Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent s
uch proof of care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, there exis
ts a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo tru
ck as well as his helper.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not defendant driver Serrano was negligent.
2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.
HELD: 1. NO. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a par
ticular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged ne
gligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent per
son would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligen
ce.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by tho
se considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. A
pplying the definition and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of car
e of Daniel Serrano has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether the cargo truck was parked
along the road or on half of the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into
account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m
from the back of the truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by
Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequenc
e of such accident, Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot
.
2. NO. In our jurisdiction, Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar
to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be est
ablished without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of n
egligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of pr
oof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regulat
es what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plai
ntiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved
, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable wh
ere plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specifi
c act of negligence which is the cause of the injury, or where there s direct evid
ence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances
attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And once the actual cause of injury
is established beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doc
trine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defe
ndant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence. I
n this case, it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convinci
ng evidence the negligence of the defendant driver.
(Note: The discussion in this case of res ipsa loquitur is merely stated in the
obiter dictum.)