Integrating Multi Level Governance for Biodiversity Conservation:

Biopsy of Indian Forest Management

Himadri Sinha1

Abstract
Biodiversity conservation essentially requires community involvement. But community-
based conservation or community based resource management is not just about
communities. It is about governance that starts from the ground up and involves multi-
level interactions. Complexities of this multi-level governance create problems but also
provide opportunities to combine conservation with development. Multi-level
governance may facilitate learning and adaptation in complex social-ecological
circumstances. Such arrangements should connect community-based management
with regional/national government-level management, link scientific management and
traditional management systems, encourage the sharing of knowledge and information,
and promote collaboration and dialogue around management goals and outcomes.
Governance innovations of this type can thus build capacity to adapt to change and
manage for resilience.

In India, the criticality of commons with respect to social, ecological and economic
perspectives is immense. Currently, the challenges for the local institutions are
numerous emanating from the rapid globalization and industrialization process with
constant flow of information, money, objects, ideologies and exogenous technologies. In
subsistence agrarian economy where people largely depend on agriculture and forests
for their livelihood requirements and a trend of transition setting in, the problem is all the
more critical. Hence, it is critical for the institutions to be resilient to the increased
externalities and complexities arising from the forces of globalize economy. The paper
examines the institutional challenges and various social factors that influence the
process of resilience building within institutional ambience. The cases of forest
management from eastern India are considered and analyzed from a multi level
governance perspective.

Key words: Biodiversity, Forest, Resilience, Multi level governance, Communities

1
Himadri Sinha is Professor of Rural Development & Research and Planning at Xavier Institute of Social
Service, Purulia Road, Ranchi 834 001, Jharkhand, India. He can be contacted through e-mail:
himadrisinha19@gmail.com/ himadrisinha@xiss.ac.in
 Integrating Multi Level Governance for Biodiversity Conservation:
Biopsy of Indian Forest Management
Introduction
Biodiversity is claimed as a local, regional, national, and international common property.
For the past decade, the roles of international, national and local institutions in
biodiversity conservation have been evaluated and hotly debated from different
perspectives. Many conservationists promote rigid protection under centralized state
agencies and institutions, citing the risks of relying on complicated communities with
many different interests. Yet state agencies lack the resources, the cross-scale
institutional links, and the transparency needed for implementing policies and enforcing
regulations. And in most countries these same agencies lack the legitimacy to negotiate
with powerful actors in broader society. As a result, despite the continuing global
expansion of protected areas, paper parks are the rule (Mascia et.al, 2003).
In India, forest communities and tribal leaving in the forest fringes were alienated from
forest governance since 1927. The then British Government estranged them by
enacting Forest Act 1927 which made the forest department the sole authority over
almost all forests in India barring few village and kingsly forests. Following the act
began history of a long struggle between communities and forest department for
restoring communitys right over forest. Since 1970s forest department tried to include
communities in forest governance. Joint Forest Management was evolved to legitimize
peoples participation in forest protection. After 80 years historic injustice via forest act
1927 taking away all forest rights of tribals and forest dwellers, Government of India
finally decided to notify The Recognition of Forest Rights for Scheduled Tribes and
other traditional Forest Dwellers in January 1, 008. However, several environmentalists
and activists argued that such initiative would be more detrimental for biodiversity
conservation. Amidst such debate, the importance of quest for appropriate linkage
between community and resources in one hand and governance set up attains new
heights.
Globalization has facilitated the linkages between communities and various global
processes perhaps more than ever before. Such linkages can either make them
vulnerable to pressures and incentives that may originate at other levels of social,
political and economic organization (Armitage & Johnson, 2006; Berkes et al. 2006) or
may eventually liberate them. Communities respond to various outside pressures
through various influences and the linkages between communities. Such adjustment of
communities and other levels of political organization need to be studied and
understood. There is a developing literature about scale and interplay of institutions
across scale (Adger et al., 2006; Cash & Moser 2000; Lebel et al., 2005; Young 2002)
indicating that institutional linkages and multi-level governance systems are important
for a variety of reasons (Berkes et al., 2006). Understanding the conservation-
development issue requires attention to scale. For example, regarding the political
economy of conservation in four African countries, Gibson (1999) showed that forces
operating at the level of the nation state (many of them related to peculiarities of
postcolonial governments) are quite different from those at the levels of regions and
communities. In the context of tropical biodiversity conservation, Barrett et al. (2001)

1
argued that community-based conservation overemphasizes the role of local
communities, given that local institutions are only one level in a multi-level system with a
paucity of strong institutions. More robust designs may involve distributing authority
across multiple institutions, rather than concentrating it in just one (Barrett et al., 2001:
497).
Berkes argued that community-based conservation cannot be conservation that is
conceived and implemented only at the local level -- because community institutions are
only one layer in a multi-level world (Berkes et al, 2006). More usefully, community-
based conservation can be used as an abridged label for conservation from the bottom
up, or decentralized governance that starts from the ground up but involves a network of
interactions at various levels. An increasingly globalized world requires institutions that
link the local level to the various higher levels of social and political organization. Such
linkages can provide ways to deal with governance (Kooiman 2003); multiple objectives
(Brown et al. 2005); multiple knowledge systems and may result in the creation of
networks for learning and joint problem-solving (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). They help
address various aspects of complexity, such as self-organization, uncertainty, and
resilience, as well as dealing with the challenges of scale.
The study of community-based conservation in a multi-level world, with focus on
horizontal and vertical linkages, can serve to extend and elaborate commons theory.
Edwards and Steins (1999) pointed out that there is a need to look beyond the
community level and deal with contextual issues. More recent treatments of commons
theory have been addressing the issue of scale with increasing sophistication, and have
a major role to play regarding multi-level governance involving state, private and civil
society actors on resource and environment issues (Dietz et al. 2003, Ostrom et al.,
2002). Commons theory can inform conservation science and help with the
understanding of issues of scale and institutional linkages. The objective of this paper is
(a) how to reconcile communities and conservation at multilevel world and (b) to assess
experiences of Indian forest management in the light of the above understanding.
Reconciling Communities and Conservation in Multi Level World
Berkes (2006) while discussing problematique of community based conservation in a
multi level world stressed on three critical issues viz. (i) relationship between
communities and conservation, (ii) capacity development to deal with multiple objectives
and (iii) developing complexity approach for commons governance.
Number of researchers has examined the conflict between conservation policies set by
the state and the rights of local or indigenous peoples (Moeliono, 2006; Sinha 2005).
The issue has a long history (Borgerhoff Mulder & Coppolillo, 2005; Sinha, 2005;
Western & Wright 1994). Biodiversity is a global commons, and its conservation is
beneficial for the world. But is it also good for the local people? Conservation and
livelihood often found to be contradicting goals and pose divergent problems. Linking
these two has been a important challenge both for governments and environmentalists.
Linking conservation to livelihoods, as a broad strategy, requires a search for
implementation models. Salafsky and Wollenberg (2000) provide models of three
conservation strategies. In the protected area (PA) model based on human exclusion,
local livelihood activities merely appear as one of the internal threats to biodiversity. The

2
PA implementation is designed to counter these threats (fences and fines). In the
economic substitution model as used by some World Bank funded projects, the project
implements alternative livelihood activities as substitutes for those that adversely affect
biodiversity. The goal here is to increase benefits from these other livelihoods, as a way
to reduce the threat to conservation from local people. Finally in the linked incentives
model, a link is constructed between biodiversity and livelihood. This link closes the loop
and becomes the driving force leading to conservation because it establishes a direct
incentive to protect biodiversity in the long-term (Salafsky & Wollenberg, 2000). Such an
analysis brings out the necessity to deal with multiple objectives; to engage in
deliberation to reconcile the local and global meanings of conservation; to make full use
of lessons from commons research; and to develop a complexity approach for
governing the commons.
Further Berkes argued that to achieve conservation and development simultaneously,
the interests of the both be served. But by and large projects have one sided approach
either to promote conservation or livelihood rarely both. Integrating biodiversity
conservation and livelihood needs with complementary goals thus attains paramount
importance. Berkes therefore argued that a capacity building both for practitioners and
policy makers on one hand and communities on the other become crucial to integrate
goals of biodiversity conservation and livelihood needs.
Finally Berkes also pointed out that the community-based conservation is a complex
systems problem and should employ the tools and approaches appropriate for dealing
with complexity. If community-based conservation in a multi-level world is about
governance that starts from the ground up but involves multi-level interactions, then it
needs to be analyzed with attention to the ways in which such conservation originates
and gets organized, the partnerships involved, and the linkages that connect the local-
level to a multiplicity of other levels. All of these are considerations are in the realm of
complex adaptive systems which includes a consideration of scale but it also includes
much more. Pursuing this theme further, using complex adaptive systems terminology,
the aspects to be considered include: self-organization, path-dependency, scale,
multiple perspectives, multiple stability domains, non-linearity, uncertainty, and
emergence.
Armitage (2006) also argued for inclusion of aspect of political ecology in the adaptive
process of community conservation resilience. According to him power relation,
institutional dynamics and historical conditions vary from communities to communities.
Therefore, adaptive system needs to be contextualized and multiple pathways and
trajectories need to be appreciated and incorporated.
Cristiana Simo Seixas (2006) while analyzing community conservation linkages in
different conservation and development projects across the world noted that in some
initiatives, people had previous experiences working with community mobilization (e.g.,
through religious groups) and awareness development. In others, capacities regarding
social mobilization and social-environmental awareness had to be built throughout the
process. Key leaders providing a vision of the potential outcomes and working as
facilitators and internal conflict managers had played a major role in guiding the
process. Incentives, particularly economic ones, increase peoples commitment to the
initiative. In many cases yet, the initiative worked with existing institutions and social

3
networks. Building on existing institutions and capabilities has served as a catalyst to
some initiatives. However, she also observed that there is no perfect recipe for
conservation-development projects. Some ingredients though are often necessary (e.g.,
vision of possible change and motivation to promote change, leadership, and
community involvement) and others may serve as catalytic in the self-organization
process (e.g., knowledge and skills of supportive organization, funding and other
resources, capacity building, social-economic incentives). Further she also observed
that after the initial self-organization process, the project is often reconfigured through
feedback and learning. Catalytic elements and social, economic and/or ecological
incentives often moves the project forward. However, it is the capacity to adapt to
internal forces (e.g., new demands, internal conflicts, etc) and external forces (e.g.,
markets, central government policies, international economic policies (globalization)
and donor policies) that dictates the ability of a project to survive or disappear.
Therefore, it may be concluded that complexity of an initiative structures and functions
(e.g., partnerships, resource and knowledge mobilization) increases as the initiative
broadens its initial goals and needs; and the complexity decreases after capacity is built
and/or the initiative tends to become self-sustained while maintaining focus on its initial
goals/needs. In other words policies aiming to create opportunity for CBC initiatives
should at first promote and/or strengthen community self-organization. A possible way
to approach such task is through valuing and empowering local institutions and
encouraging and facilitating multi-level, cross-scale partnerships.
Krister Andersson and Arun Agrawal (2006) while analyzing Equity, Institutions, and the
Environment: Socioeconomic Aspects of Local Forest Governance found that the local
institutions matter for the relationships between socioeconomic inequalities and forest
conditions. They found no systematic associations between socioeconomic attributes
and changing forest conditions. Only when controlling for the presence and
performance of local institutions it was possible to discern statistically significant
regularities. They observed systematic differences in these associations depending on
the local institutions supports the notion that local institutions have a moderating effect
on the relationship between socioeconomic inequalities and ecological sustainability.
Socioeconomic inequalities seem to influence ecological sustainability, not directly, but
via local institutions that may mitigate, enhance, or even completely cancel out the
effect that these end up having on the natural environment.
Sisir Pradhan (2006) while working with forest protection bodies in Orissa, India
observed that with the small institutional adjustment and bringing in appropriate systems
and mechanisms makes the institution resilient to internal disturbances. However, to
deal with the externalities caused by the induced forces from outside with a short time
effect, the communities need to build alliances with cross section of people across
boundaries. There is a need for nesting community efforts at various levels. Resilience
is an outcome of the communication among these nested cycles. Long-standing
institutions and/or values in social systems, promote stability, maintain the legacies
required for natural processes of evolution or adaptation, and foster a memory effect.
The concept of resilience corresponds very well to sustainable development theory.
Sustainability can be defined as the ability of a system to maintain a certain well-defined
level of performance over time, and if required to enhance the same, including through
linkages with other systems without damaging essential ecological integrity of the

4
system. The factors of resilience like institutional structure,, rule system, adaptive
mechanisms, broad based decision making, mechanisms for accountability and
transparency, resource-user interactions, alliance building across communities and
stake holders can guide an institution to perform consistently over a period of time.
Social capital is dynamic qualities. Social capital generates constructive participation in
development activities. Appropriate use of it empowers communities towards self-
reliance. Both GO and NGO can play pivotal role in unleashing the power of social
capital by operationalising it through appropriate intervention. In many communities,
elements of social capital are in sublime condition. It needs a spark. External agencies
(GO and NGO) are required provide this spark. Once ignited; communities can manage
their resources in sustainable manner to rewrite their economy by reducing poverty.
Sinha (2006), drawing examples from various forest management systems of India,
showed that social capital of rural communities inter alia motivates people to participate
in management of natural resources judiciously for economic development. Internal or
external leadership play pivotal role in unleashing the power of social capital. He further
showed that multi level organizations can be built up by encashing the social network
existing among communities of India and linking the same with three tier Panchayat Raj
Institution (PRI)2 Governing system of India.
It is amply clear from above reviews that a community conservation linkage in multi level
world is a complex and evolving mechanisms. Forest management practices in Indian
had a troubled and conflict ridden trajectory. Such cases can help in learning useful
dimensions of adaptive mechanisms for bio-diversity conservation.
Experiences of Indian Forest Management
Having discussed the critical issues of adaptive mechanisms (resilience), we will now
embark on the few Indian forest management systems to understand how far we have
succeeded in working out healthy multi level governing system both for the betterment
biodiversity and the people who derives their livelihood out of it.
1. Joint Forest Management (JFM): A half-baked cake
The National Forest Policy 1988, made a significant departure while overhauling the
national forest policy of 1952. Impressed by the success of the West Bengal experiment
of involving people in forest management, it recognized the need for involving the
people around the forest in the development, protection and management of forest.
Later on, in June 1990, the Ministry of Environment. Government of India issued
guidelines concerning the involvement of village communities and voluntary agencies in
the protection, development and management of forests and named it as Joint Forest
Management (JFM).
According to JFM policy, forests are not to be commercially exploited for industries. But
they are to conserve soil and the environment and meet the subsistence requirements

2
Gram (village) panchayat is the lowest strata of governance in India consist of 5,000 populations belonging to one
or several adjacent villages popularly known as Panchayati Raj Institution. Above village panchayat exists
Panchayat samityat Block level (Block consist of 50-90 villages depending on the population). Above panchayat
samity exists Jilla Parishad or District Council.

5
of the local people. The policy gives higher priority to environmental stability than
to earning revenue. Derivation of direct economic benefit from forests has been
subordinated to the objective of ensuring environmental stability and maintenance of
ecological balance. It discourages monocultures and prefers mixed forests. The focus
has shifted from commerce, and investment to ecology and satisfying minimum needs
of the people, providing fuel wood and fodder, and strengthening the tribal forest
linkages. It declared that the domestic requirement of fuel wood, fodder, minor forest
produce, and construction timber of tribal should be the first charge on forest produce. It
advises industry to establish direct relationship with farmers who can grow the raw
material if supported by industry with inputs including credit, technical advice and
transport services. As these linkages may take time, in the interim, it was suggested
that import of wood and products should be liberalized, but the practice of supply of
forest produce to industry at concessional prices should cease.
JFM units can be formed with a hamlet, or a village, or a cluster of villages in which
each household has single membership. Each JFM unit consists of two bodies, (a)
general body, which includes all the member households, and (b) managing/executive
committee which consists of elected representatives from among the general body
members along with few nominated members. Managing committee elects its president
and the local forester acts as its convener secretary. The general body meets once a
year whereas the managing committees meetings are expected to be held once in
three months.
But JFM has failed to live up to the aspiration of people. Many places it is viewed as
implementing body of forest policy. JFM unlike panchayats has not accommodated
democratic representatives of people at various levels of decision-making. Instead of
becoming a roll model, JFM is viewed as another drama of an oppressive forest regime
by the people. Here we will discuss why JFM failed achieve its desired goal.
Why did JFM fail in ensuring multi level governance?
Dual agenda of JFM
JFM as a programme has a dual agenda at an institutional level. Firstly, JFM intends to
create productive assets by way of regenerating and/or afforesting forest lands.
Secondly, it aims to achieve the first agenda by way of peoples participation and giving
them the responsibility of protecting and managing their forests. This dual agenda
requires strong, robust village institutions which are representative of the interest of the
entire community. Thus, JFM also is a patent instrument for the empowerment of local
people.
Resistance of bureaucracy to share power
The keenness of the Forest Department (FD) to preserve its own power base and not
giving away its exclusive position of control over the forest to community institutions has
resulted in low level of compliance with the spirit of JFM approach. A frequent complaint
against the forest department is that they have still not given up the police image, and
are not sufficiently sensitized to undertake extension work. To this charge the forest
officials response is that in the initial stages the community is at a low level of
formation, and therefore they cannot dilute their basic responsibility of protection. The

6
forest department also has powers to cancel or dissolve the Village Forest Protection
Committee (VFCs). Such attitudes dampen the confidence and confuse the autonomy
of the village committee. While forest departments will require some statement in the
resolution to dissolve the management agreement if their community partners fail to
uphold their responsibilities under the JFM programme, it is also important that the
identity of the user group is respected. In Rajasthan and Haryana, where the user
groups are required to be registered as societies, would extend greater independence.
Such groups would continue even if their relations with the forest department are
severed. In Gujarat, VFCs are registered as cooperative societies, which in addition to
being legal entities provide functional autonomy. Once the user group has a separate
legal status this can be used for several purposes.
Often literate villagers are chosen by the FD as leaders. These are generally younger
people, therefore, their authority lacks legitimacy. Excessive dependence of the village
communities on FD has frustrated village autonomy. Another important element is the
response of FD staff to VFCs grievance. In the initial stages, VFCs look forward to
getting support from the forest department in booking offenders, negotiating with other
villages / departments etc. VFCs also need flexibility, and field staff should not throw
rule books at them. Many protecting villages have complained that FD unilaterally
overrules their decisions without explaining the reasons thereof. In some places,
protection is preceded by cleaning, weeding etc. for which the forest department pays
wages to the labour. This must change and the forest department must hand over the
responsibility of handling funds to the VFCs. This would make financial dealing more
transparent and foolproof against misuse of funds. VFCs will also develop a greater
sense of accountability in the process. In Gujarat, the committees raided the houses
and confiscated illegally poached wood. When they wanted to conduct auction of the
seized material, not only did the FD not permit them to utilise the money so received,
but it objected to the place of auction too, pointing to the rules that auction must be
conducted at the Range Forest depot only.
With the exception of clauses in the national and West Bengal resolutions, most state
guidelines do not address the long-term rights of participating communities. Clear
tenure security enhances the authority of community management groups to carry out
protection activities, especially when under pressure from neighbouring villages and
private interest groups. It is necessary that the time frame for such agreements is clear,
as well as the basis for extensions. It may be appropriate for the time period of the
agreement to correspond to the production cycle (rotation) of the primary products.
Restricting JFM to degraded forest areas
The stipulation of restricting JFM to degraded forest areas raises two sorts of issues.
Firstly, the low economic returns from JFM in degraded forest, makes it an unattractive
option for the communities involved. Reserving good forest areas under state control
and handing over degraded forest land to community questions the basic premise of
collaborative management viz. linking responsibility with benefits. The flow of benefits
from degraded forestlands put to JFM (especially in Rajasthan) is not commensurate to
the responsibility of protection handed over to the communities. Thus, the claim that
JFM will lead to sustainable management of the forest through community involvement

7
is debatable. Also, such a restriction implies that the community should first suitable
degrade their forest areas, so as to bring them under JFM.
Lack of legal arrangements
The JFM resolution envisages a big role of the communities in achieving the objectives
of the new forest policy. This collaborative arrangement talks about sharing of
responsibilities and benefits with the local communities. However, many of these
communities are structurally constrained from exercising these responsibilities, as they
lack appropriate authority to do so. There is a case for the necessity to empower the
local group engaged in forest protection, in a legal sense. This would help them to
derive autonomy and authority in dealings with offenders and powerful non-members.
There are examples of forest protection committee members facing penal proceeding
for taking to charge powerful and elite offenders. Such incidents bring down the
motivation of the members of FPC to pursue the objectives of forest protection. Till the
FPCs gather experience and legal authority the, FD has to work in close collaboration
with FPCs.
Tenurial insecurity
JFM arrangement derives its legal legitimacy from the resolution issued by the various
state governments. As these resolutions do not have a statutory basis, they are subject
to reversal. Hence, the tenurial rights of FPCs engaged in forest protection and
management are uncertain and insecure. JEM also faces a threat in the form of a
massive pull of ad-hoc privatization by way of regularization of illicit encroachments on
forest lands. Till such an option is explored vis--vis JFM, there will be little faith
amongst the community members to forge horizontal ties of solidarity.
Institutional change in the Forest Department
The present institutional set up of the forest department was designed to protect the
forests. Participatory forestry requires a different role for the forest department. While
FD has development awareness about benefits of participatory forestry in the recent
years, its understanding and commitment to share control and responsibility with people
is still partial. Institutional reforms in the FD will benefit the objective of community
participation in JFM. This issue should be viewed in the light of the dual agenda of JFM
viz - Afforestation and Regeneration of forest lands as well as improving local
governance. This agenda envisages different roles for the FD and NGOs, involved in
JFM. While the FD will have to ensure feasibility of the forest plantations and support to
the EPC in related matters on one hand, on the other it will have to involve NGOs in the
programme to a greater extent to assist the new FPCs in the complex process of
peoples institutions.
Rights of non-protecting people
The legal and organizational framework for joint management remains weak and
controversial. First, the old rights and privileges of the people (usually established in the
colonial period) have continued in most degraded forest, and often such rights include
free access to expensive timber. Privileges without corresponding responsibility are
found to be counter-productive. Second, often more than one village have their rights in
the same forest, with the result that it becomes difficult to promote village protection

8
committees. Third, a large number of new settlers in a village (they may be the poorest)
have no traditional rights in forests, as their ancestors did not live in the village at the
time of forest settlement they get deprived of benefits, and are compelled to obtain
these illegally. Fourth, sometimes people living several kilometres away from forest
have customary rights in forests. They, with no possibility of getting involved in forest
management, have been customarily using these lands as an open-access resource
without any restriction, for grazing and collection of fuel wood and NTFPs. Migratory
tribes from other states too send their cattle for grazing, and their rights have been
upheld by the Supreme Court (Vira, 1999). Thus, a forest patch does not have a well-
defined and recognised user-group, and may admit the rights of the entire population of
that region or the entire forest area. This type of right-regime, which makes forests
open-access lands, is not conducive to successful protection, as rights of contiguous
villages protecting forests may come in conflict with those of distant villages, not
protecting but still enjoy usufruct rights.
Therefore, at least in JFM areas, use rights should be reviewed in order to put them in
harmony with the care and share philosophy which is the basis of JFM. Even in un-
classed forests, where no previous settlement has been done, the task is not simple
due to the practice of use by a large class of stakeholders. Elsewhere, old settlement
rights may have to be modified with a view to make these amenable to formation of
viable VFCs. This is easier said than done, as changing customary or legal rights would
be perceived as an unpopular step and may face political hurdles. Such a policy can be
made acceptable if it is accompanied by other pro-people changes in technology, nature
of species, secure rights over produce, etc.
Inter-village disputes
Depriving communities far from the resource but having traditional rights is a ticklish
question. Some close communities have solved this by charging fees from distant
villages on the ground that they do not have to protect the resource. In West Bengal,
some VFCs negotiated with neighbouring communities to clarify rights and territorial
responsibilities when they bean to initiate protection activities. As the user groups have
a strong incentive to avoid conflicts, they have often demonstrated that they can
conduct much of the negotiation on their own or with the help of the panchayat (elected
village councils) leaders. However, the Forest Department holds ultimate responsibility
for seeing that management groups do not create conflicts over pre-existing usufruct.
Confusion over forest boundaries is a recurring problem for the VFCs. In one case,
members from Chandmura village in West Bengal thought that they were also
protecting the Arabari forests. Only when the forest was harvested for timber did they
realise that they were not part of the programme. The village took the government to
court, thus delaying harvest benefits to others. The problem could have been avoided
had there been maps and constant dialogue between the participation villages.
The Rajasthan resolution allows revenue village wise FPC formation, which may consist
of several hamlets located separately from each other. This makes the smooth
functioning of the VFC very difficult . Whether multi-hamlet forest protection committees
have been formed, field experience shows that the component communities keep their
independent identity within the large group maintaining clear boundaries of their area

9
and by retaining exclusive control over harvests in their territory. Often such groups
surrounding a large tract of forest form an apex committee to coordinate their activities
and represent themselves to the FD. Although the larger group may facilitate joint
protection and dispute resolution, informal partitioning of the resource has no validity in
law and may not be sustained over a long period.
Most VFCs want their forest tract boundaries to be formally demarcated. Rough
agreements between villages over these boundaries may be sufficient when the
resource is degraded, but once valuable products are regenerated, conflicts will ensue
in the absence of formal notification. Often forest maps are not available which delays
formalization of boundaries. This is not a simple exercise, since natural, administrative
and customary boundaries do not coincide. In practice, under existing customary use,
different boundaries apply to different products, e.g. grazing and fuel wood. Boundary
disputes between neighbouring VFCs are likely to increase as harvesting approaches.
VFCs and panchayats
Another legal problem concerns the status of VFCs versus the village panchayats. The
state government resolutions recommend VFCs as functional groups. However, these
committees have no legal and statutory basis, and it may be difficult for them to manage
resources on a long-term basis. Their relationships with the statutory village panchayats
will need to be sharply defined (Poffenberger and Singh, 1993).
The 1989 West Bengal resolution stated that the local panchayat land management
committee shall select beneficiaries for constituting the VFC. This indicated that the
panchayat, which is outside the user group, would determine who could and who could
not participate. Although in 1990, the West Bengal Government allowed every member
in the village to be a member of the management group, the hold of the panchayat
remained strong. The Orissa order prescribes that the lady deputy chief of the local
panchayat will be the head of the VFC, but the panchayats are not working well and her
stewardship is not seen as legitimate by the indigenous VFCs.
Experience over the last 20 years from Indian social forestry programme indicates that
in many cases panchayats had difficulties in effectively managing community woodlots
due to their inherent political nature and often-diverse constituencies. Panchayats are
political organizations based on electoral system, whereas conflict can be quite harmful
for the effective functioning of VFCs. Protection can work only if there is almost
unanimity and consensus amongst the user group.
Unlike panchayats, powers to the VFC are not given under any law, which may affect
their powers to check free-riding in the long run. Thus, most successful VFCs charge
fees for collection of forest produce, although this practice is technically against the
Forest Act. The illegality can be removed if the allotment of forest land to the VFCs is
done under section 28 of the Forest Act. At present it is done administratively.
Due to the increasing importance of panchayats in decision making in India, many field
activists feel that community forest management must take place at the smallest
possible level of those who actually use the resource. This would require statutory
changes in the current panchayat laws.

10
There is also some concern that if JFM groups were absorbed by village panchayat
vested interests might exert control over decision making. Since small user communities
may comprise of less powerful groups, they may lose authority to elite if the
management becomes a direct adjunct of the panchayat. VFCs are recognized only by
the Forest Department, all other government departments recognize panchayats
making them much more powerful than the VFCs. On the whole, there is need to clarify
the relationship of local forest management groups to panchayats; simply subsuming
them as part of the Panchayat would almost certainly threaten their effectiveness.
2. Multilevel Adjustment in Forest Management: Contribution of NTGCF
National Tree Growers Cooperative Federation Limited started as a project of the
National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) in 1986, when at a request from the
National Wastelands Development Board, a pilot project on Tree Growers Cooperatives
was initiated in selected districts in five states. It was an attempt to apply the institutional
template of cooperative at the village level (a) to bring together village communities in
an effort to promote vegetation on degraded lands, (b) to help villagers to create and
govern village wood-lots to meet their requirements of fuel wood and fodder. Two years
later, in 1988, an apex federation the National Tree Growers Cooperative Federation
(NTGCF) was created, and the implementation of a full scale project handed over to it.
The project is now working in 23 districts in the seven states of Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Uttaranchal.
With each successive year, as the project grew in experience, the complex and varied
historical contexts, the differing policy and tenurial environments, and the diverse
physical settings, it became clearer that a single institutional template, the cooperative
structure, would not suffice. The cooperative legal framework as it exists in the various
states today, would indeed be unable to integrate with the many tenure options existing
in the various states, especially those that addressed village commons. The intrinsic
understanding also emerged that nature conservation and improving dependent rural
livelihoods are two sides of the same coin.
A more inclusive organization with a wider mandate was required one that would be
able to work effectively on different kinds of lands and with the different kinds of long-
standing institutional arrangements and livelihood patterns existing on them. An
organization, moreover, which could develop into an entity, is able to play a more active
role in influencing policy and legislative dimensions. After wide consultations with all
partners concerned, the Foundation for Ecological Security was set up and took the
baton of project implementation from NTGCF in April 2001. It is an adaptive response to
a changing environment, in order for the organization to be, and to remain, relevant and
meaningful in the complex milieu in which it seeks to work.
Appropriate village institutions
As a pilot project of the National Dairy Development Board, the Tree Growers
Cooperatives Project, to begin with, opted for a cooperative framework which had been
successful in the field of dairying. State Governments were approached to lease
revenue wastelands to cooperative societies registered under the State Cooperative
Society Acts for the purpose of developing wood-lots to meet fuel wood and fodder

11
needs. However, the difference between milk cooperatives and cooperatives to govern
and manage common lands soon became apparent.
A fundamental difference was that while in the case of milk, individual owners of cattle
pool milk for collective bargaining, in the case of the tree growers cooperatives, the
very resources are commonly held. This critical distinction raised further questions
regarding the compatibility of cooperatives as an institutional design when the lands
were de facto and in some cases de jure commonly held. Moreover, in rural
communities that are characterized by inequalities, an institutional design that ensures
equable access rights to the less articulate was necessary. Another concern has been
that by the very design, cooperatives tended to signal monetization and marketing of the
various benefits accruing from the natural surroundings, and this was not in harmony
with what rural communities seem to see as their coexistence with commons. It was
desirable that work be done at a scale and in a contiguous manner that would revitalize
the hydrological system and build on the socio cultural linkages in a given area, as it
became apparent that by working on scattered patches of land, only some short term
needs would be met. This would have a long-term and cumulative impact on both the
livelihoods of rural communities as well as on the ecological health of the environments
on which they are dependent. Depending upon the various administrative categories of
land and the institutions that are thereby allowed to be works with a variety of
institutional forms such as the van panchayats, panchayats, gram sabhas, watershed
associations, village forest committees, etc.
Over the years, the organization has worked with various institutions in protecting and
managing land resources, providing its resources to strengthen the work of such bodies.
For example, in Uttaranchal van panchayats, which have a proven record of successful
community participation and governance of natural resources, were clearly a better
institutional option than the tree cooperatives. The institution of the van panchayat is
recognized by the government as having a permanent legal right and control over the
village forest. However, some recent policy changes concerning forest management
may affect the autonomy of the van panchayat institutions and could weaken their
existing management systems and their ability to adapt. It is clear that a community
which has a longer or permanent tenure over a forest and autonomy in governance
would have a greater sense of accountability and ownership and would therefore be
more prudent in the use and management of such lands.

Village committees, which traditionally protect and govern gramya jungle (village forest)
lands and forest lands adjacent to their villages, are being supported in Orissa. The
effort has been to assist traditional institutions in recording, in the form of written bye
laws, the principles that have evolved over many years. This would contribute to a more
coherent understanding and dialogue on the patterns of resource use by the constituent
villages. Moreover, as benefit sharing agreements between the communities and the
Government generally under discussion in the rest of the country center around the
term of such protection, this documentation could prove to be an instrument in
establishing local management and governance of the resources, as well as help in
determining the historical nature of such protection.

12
In terms of real experience in working with the village panchayats, the effort has
advanced the furthest in Karnataka. Permission has been received from the Department
of Panchayati Raj and Rural Development to fund the panchayats directly. This has
paved the way for greater autonomy of the hamlet level sub-committees of the
panchayats in formulating site- specific natural resource management plans and to
carry out the requisite interventions. The choice of hamlet level committees has helped
in decentralizing decision making to those most closely associated with and dependent
on the common lands. At the same time representatives of the panchayats are taking a
keen interest in the activities of the constituent hamlets. It remains to be seen whether
this interest would grow to influence the large functioning of the panchayats.
Significantly, there is a growing momentum to transfer the governance of natural
resources to the local level bodies such as the panchayats, rather than have them
managed by a distant District or State administration. In Madhya Pradesh, the
Government has devolved powers to the gram sabha (village body) at the level of
hamlet or revenue village. It is noteworthy that by an amendment of the Constitution,
panchayats which are enshrined as the local governance institutions have also been
mandated the responsibility of managing their natural surroundings. In difficult times
when rights over resources may be contested, such constitutional arrangements can
safeguard interests of the concerned communities.
Considering the topography and the physical scope of work, a perspective which
considers entire landscapes is required for the effective management of natural
resource and hydrological regimes. The Foundation has striven to remain abreast of
changing policies and dynamics and work with institutional forms which would have the
widest possible mandate and that could, wherever possible, govern and protect all the
land categories in a given watershed.
However in states like Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan multiple
institutions in the same watershed are the available option at this juncture. This
duplication often results in the registration of the same group or village community
under different committees because the land they are protecting and regenerating are
under various departments.
Though they are linked, the proliferation of various institutions under various
programmes and the parallel process of devolving powers to the panchayats seem to
be happening independent of each other. In some parts of the country, panchayat
boundaries are coterminous with customary usage practices and there is scope to
overlay the two, i.e. the natural resource boundary and the governance domain. While
in other areas, where various administrative departments are promoting different
institutions for the category of land that falls under their domain, there is a clear
necessity to build linkages or nest similar institutions governing land and water under a
common umbrella.
Institutional design
Local institutions for self-governance supported by the programme interventions remain
accountable to the local people. By design and focus, the interventions aim at centering

13
the poor and their interests in the management and governance of the resources. The
critical elements of such a design are the inclusion of every resident in the habitation;
inclusion of habitations if the resources are shared across communities; representation
of their interests in the decision making equal wages for men and women; payment of
wages as stipulated by the Government; and emphasis on conservation and local use
rather than commercialization of the benefits.
In day-to-day manifestation of such design principles, communities engage in dialogues
within themselves and with their neighboring communities and strive to arrive at
decisions that are just and acceptable. In inequitable settings the discussions are more
protracted and various interest groups strive to find spaces either as a compromise or
tend to assert their positions. This engagement is dynamic and is manifested in
activities such as deciding the species, the location of a water harvesting structure,
regulation of grazing, norms of work behaviour and responsibilities, and importantly, on
the domination of decision making and in the distribution of benefits.
Strengthening communications across the villages
At the village level, regular meetings involving the entire village assembly is the
common forum for planning and implementation. Issues of importance are discussed at
various levels so that there is a larger consultation and concurrence. Periodically,
representatives across villages meet to arrive at area specific regulations. Inter village
disputes concerning boundaries, access and collective responsibilities are discussed. In
a logical progression, such meetings also discuss other matters concerning the area.
In Ajmer, while the distance between the villages did not offer much scope for
strengthening such collectives, the adjacent areas in Bhilwara built on their existing
systems of inter village forums. Such forums were even instrumental in lobbying for a
secure tenure over their land with the local politicians and administration. In Madhya
Pradesh, such forums negotiated with nomadic pastoralists and the district
administration in charting out a path for the migrant cattle. In Andhra Pradesh, such
conglomerates are interacting with adjacent semi urban centers to arrive at measures
that cater to their firewood needs. In Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, local
newsletters highlighting issues concerning natural resources, policies and
developments in the area are periodically published.
As the work of the organization and its experience has grown, the Foundation has
begun to increase its participation at various regional, national and international forums.
It is important that policy and perspectives at various levels all contribute harmoniously
to the goal of eco-restoration and ecological security.
A state-wise summary
Till 206, the Foundation was working with 879 village institutions involving 1,05,598
members. Of these, 507 were Tree Growers Cooperatives and 372 were other forms of
village level institutions. Of the 63,462 hectares of common land made available to
them, these institutions have brought 21,772 hectares under regeneration activities and
planted nearly 14.2 million trees on their common lands, as well as their private lands.
This work generated about 3.6 million workdays of employment in these villages.

14
Recently work was initiated in 60 village institutions. Of which 7 were Tree Growers
Cooperatives, 4 van panchayats, 19 village under the Joint Forest Management, 12
panchayats and 18 village committees.
3. Organized Tasar Silk production and marketing in Jharkhand, India
Certain NGOs in Jharkhand has developed a multilevel governing system for Tasar Silk
production and marketing in the state of Jharkhand, India. The system was developed
by encashing economic dependencies of people and interdependency of various
segments of users on others. Governing system is described
below.
Tasar (Tussah) is copperish colour, coarse silk mainly used
furnishings and interiors. It is less lustrous than mulberry silk, but
has its own feel and appeal. Tasar silk is generated by the
silkworm, Antheraea mylitta which mainly thrive on the food plants
Asan and Arjun. The rearings are conducted in nature on the trees
in the open. In India, tasar silk is mainly produced in the states of
Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Orissa, besides Maharashtra, West
Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. Tasar culture is the main stay for
many a tribal community in India.
Economic importance
Jharkhand ranks first among the tasar silk producing states with a contribution of about
45-50 per cent of Indias production. Tasar culture is concentrated mainly in the tribal
areas of the state such as Santhal Parganas and Chotanagapur regions particularly in
the districts of West Singhbhum, Ranchi, Dumka, Godda, Giridih, Saraikela etc. An
estimated 65,000 families are engaged in tasar silk industry. Of them over 47,000
rearers are reported to be engaged in tasar silkworm rearing but only 50 to 60 % of
them are active and conduct rearing every year. West Singhbhum, Ranchi Dumka,
Pakur Godda and Saraikela districts account for over 65 per cent of the rearers.
As per estimates the food plants availability in the forests is spread over 900 thousand
hectares. But only around 36 thousand hectares are presently being used for tasar
silkworm rearing. Among the districts, Singhbhum account for over 35% of the forest
area used followed by Dumka, Godda, Giridih, Palamu and Pakour district. As
mentioned Arjuna (Terminallia arjuna) and Asan (Terminallia tomentosa) are the two
main species of tasar food plants available in abundance in the state.
Tasar silkworm rearing and production of tasar silk yarn/fabrics provide source of
livelihood to a large number of families belonging to disadvantageous section of the
society and skilled/semi-skilled labour in the state. Tasar silk production accounts for
sizeable contribution to the states domestic product and thus assumes special
importance in the economy of the State.
Production process
Tasar silkworm is bivoltine (i.e has two cycles in a year) non domestic species. Its two
cycles generally are completed between June to October. For remaining part of the
year, silk worms remain in dormant state within cocoon. These cocoons need to be
preserved during October to June so to get another good crop in the following year.

15
Local tasar growers collect the cocoons from the local forests or plantation sites and
store in well-sanitised room known as Grainage. Normally village women take care of
the sanitation and cleanliness of the Grainage.
Now a days in large part of Jharkhand state villagers have raised plantation of
Terminallia arjuna and Terminallia tomentosa on wasteland or unfertile village fallow
with the help of government subsidies. Unlike natural forest, plantation sites have pure
strand of above two tree species. Tasar silkworm, therefore, remain restricted to the
plantation sites. Plantation sites are normally maintained by group of villagers who raise
silkworm from egg to cocoon stage. These growers collect disease free eggs/layings
(DFL) from the Grainage raise the first crop for commercial seed multiplications. Second
crop is generally used for silk production. Considering this nature of production few
groups concentrate on first crop and sell the egg to larger number of rearers who are
only interested in second crop. Cocoons produced after the second crop largely used
for silk production. Only limited cocoons are preserved in Grainage for next season.
Cocoons used for silk production are sent to the reelers and from reelers the silk yarn
goes to weavers.
Traditionally individuals usually manage Grainage, Cocoon production, Reeling and
Weaving by them and finished products used to be sold to the local traders. Traders
usually offer very low prices.
PRADAN a NGO tried to intervene in tasar production process to check the exploitation
of producers and to enhance the marketable quality of finished product. It was felt that
as long individual producers or collectors manage the show as single individual, their
bargaining powers remain low. Low bargaining capacity leads to low earning which then
restricts quality improvement. PRADAN therefore, organised the association at different
level of producers/collectors. As a result Grainage association, Seed producers
association, Commercial cocoon producers association and Reelers association are
formed. Association looks after the marketing and technology up gradation. Individual
producers take care of quality control, and production of marketable output at their end.
Association ensures better price for the produce. Features of different activities under
the above-mentioned project are as follow:
Grainage: Raising peoples own Grainage bank (Tasar Seed Grain Bank) is one of
most challenging and unique feature of the project. Earlier tasar seed used either
collected from natural source where seed loss was quite high due to natural hazards or
from central Grainage bank maintained by Central Silk Board. Project aimed to promote
Grainage bank owned and managed by individual entrepreneur at village level. An
individual can earn a net profit of Rs. 6000-9000 per one cycle. Same individual can
also become rearer and earn additional profit from rearing. The features of these
Grainage bank are given below:
Plantation: Project also aimed at raising plantation of host plants primarily consists of
Arjuna and Asan on uncultivated barren land. SHGs were formed at village level with
villagers who has uncultivated barren lands. These villagers pooled their land and
planted the host plants under a joint or common work plan. After raising plantation from
third year onward these villagers start working as rearers.

16
Cocoon processing: PRADAN has created Common Facility Centres (CFC). These
centres were constructed in a participatory manner and quality of the work was
excellent. Picture of this centre is given below. The objective of the whole activity is to (i)
promote capacity building, (ii) extend improved technology, (iii) eliminate primitive
practices, and (iv) organize forward and backward linkages. The processing is divided
into two phases which are shown as Figure 1, and 2.
Pre processing activities
Grainage

Commercial DFLs Commercial Rearers Cocoons

Seed cocoons Seed Rearer

Fig 1. Individual and association trade off in Grainage, and Rearing activities

Bank
Weavers
Rearers group

Rearers group
Marketing Federation

Rearers group
Yarn Market
PRADAN

Fig 2. Individual and association trade off in post cocoon processing

Lessons Learnt from the Cases
From the above cited cases, we can derive some important lessons for developing multi
level adaptive governing systems in Indian context. Summarized version of key learning
is given in Table 1.
First, integrating conservation with economic development (in the form of livelihood
expansion) has become inevitable. JFM suffered in many places as it pursued only
conservation agenda. NTGCF on the other hand adopted a pragmatic approach by
incorporating livelihood expansion approach in the programme. Tasar production and
marketing (TPM) cases primarily emphasized on livelihood enhancement and ensures
conservation for the sustenance of the same. However, in this case stakeholders like
reelers and weavers do not have direct contribution to the conservation of plantation
sites.

17
Second, power sharing is another key aspect in setting up multi level governance. In
JFM power sharing is existing only at grassroots and thereby it is incomplete and
ineffective. In the case of NTGCF and TPM power sharing is more equally diffused at all
level. Therefore, linkages between private to government and linkages among various
level of governance are found to work more effectively.
Third, leadership plays crucial role in integrating multi level governance. Appropriate
leadership development is therefore, essential paraphernalia for such governance.
While NTGCF and TPM encouraged more acceptable and experienced leadership, JFM
looked for literate youth leadership. JFM faced set backs as in many places youth were
not well accepted by middle aged and older generation and youths inexperience created
more feud than amicable settlement.
Table 1. Attributes of multi level governance in forest management
Attributes JFM NTGCF Tasar production
& marketing (TPM)
Key objective Conservation of forest Conservation & Livelihood with
Livelihood linkage conservation
concern
Model Conservation Conservation with Incentive with
moderate livelihood conservation
alternatives practices
Mode of Power sharing at Sustainable Sustainable
functioning grassroots is practiced peoples peoples
but not at higher level organization with organization with
viable network viable network
Network Somewhat present at Substantially strong Substantially strong
grassroots but faded at grassroots, at grassroots,
away at the upper level district, state and district and state
national level
Private Government plays a Legal support is Legal and monetary
Government role of benevolent obtained from supports are
linkages monster government but obtained from
government government but
interference at government
operational level is interference at
absent operational level is
absent
Implication on Strong influence Moderate to low Low influence
national level
Peoples Somewhat strong when Strong but people Strong due to good
inclination alternative livelihood expect alternative cash flow
programmes were livelihood option
incorporated
Leadership 1. Peoples leadership 1. Peoples 1. Peoples as well
is encouraged at leadership is entrepreneurial
grassroots, encouraged at all leadership is

18
 2. Younger leadership level and they are encouraged at all
is encouraged but well established, level,
their acceptance at 2. Both older and
village level is not younger
well established leadership are
encouraged &
therefore, their
acceptance is
also high
Adaptive 1. Tribal customary 1. Monetization of 1. Monetization of
practices rights over forest is commodities, commodities,
legalized 2. Simpler practices 2. Simpler practices
2. Alternative like auctions, like auctions,
livelihoods are over-pricing to over-pricing to
created & yielded reduce use, reduce use,
positive results 3. Sale for
increasing village
funds
Changing policy Informal to formal rules Confrontation with Formal stakes have
existing informal been created
policies, informal
stakes are either
denied or over-ruled
Changing social 1. Multiple leaders, 1. Multiple leaders, 1. Multiple leaders,
structures internal power internal power evolving
struggles, struggles, organizational
2. poor understanding 2. Better structure
of organizational understanding of
process organizational
process
Challenges Integrating with PRI Integrating with PRI Integrating with PRI
system system system as well as
market network
Fourth, adaptation to formal rules in place informal rules has been the trend in all types
of institution. Although evolving multiple leaders some places created power struggle, in
many cases it has unleashed hidden entrepreneurial potential.
Fifth, peoples participation in governance has also brought some radical changes in
forest policy. For example rights of tribal and forest communities over forest has been
legalized. Besides this, peoples aspirations are also acknowledged by creating
alternative livelihood options by all governing mechanisms also had positive implications
on multi level governance.
Sixth integration of forest governance with elected PRI governance is another crucial
issue. PRI is legal entity and wider legal jurisdiction than any forest institutions which
work as society. Inclusion of PRI in forest governance will not only enhance the

19
legitimacy of such institutions but also can enhance forest intuitions access to
government development funds.
Lastly, in all forest institutions we have found active role of catalytic agency. In JFM
forest department plays as catalyst, in NTGCF FES- a NGO played the role of catalyst
and in TPM, it is PRADAN who mobilized the entire governing mechanisms. We have
found that people may organize themselves without any external intervention at village
level but for organizing multi level governance become inevitable in Indian context.
Conclusion
Setting up linkages between local communities and higher up other actors of
biodiversity conservationist is an essential need. De-linking human element from
conservation is less than any viable solution. Setting up these linkages requires
understanding the relationships between communities and conservation, and
developing the capacity of the actors to deal with multiple conservation objectives. In
the case Indian Forest Management JFM initially brought some fresh air towards
achieving the above goal. Unfortunately, forest department could not continue process
of establishing multi-level governance through necessary democratization. As a result,
JFM is becoming less community oriented and more of co-opted ad hoc managing body
dominated by forest bureaucrats.
Many self initiated community based conservation efforts in India have been trying to
evolve into more viable form multi-level linkages of late. These communities are
showing how they are adapting new situations without compromising with conservation
objectives. However, these initiatives need to work out some adjustment with governing
system of the country. Such negotiation will be very crucial for the sustenance of such
adapting behaviour of the communities.

20
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