In Re: Lanuevo 66 SCRA 254 August 29, 1975 ISSUE:

FACTS: Whether or not Lanuevo be disbarred

This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio HELD:

Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during the 1971
YES.
Bar Examination. From the confidential letter of Oscar
Landicho that the result of the bar exam of one of the It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that
bar examinee was tampered to make him pass the bar characterized respondent Lanuevos well-studied and well-
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the court calculated moves in successively representing separately to
checked the records and revealed that the bar candidate each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the
with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang. He examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-
passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no
Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the
passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations. examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of
It appears that each of the 5 bar examiners were passing.
approached by Lanuevo with the examination booklet
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-
asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar
evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who
examiner explaining that it is a practice policy in bar
fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks
exams that he will review the grades obtained in all
are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no
subjects by an examinee and when he finds a candidate
business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
to have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
low grade in one subject he can bring it to the examiner
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He
for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good
cannot presume to know better than the examiner.
faith of trust and confidence to the authority of
Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the
candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each
subject matter.
In re: Cunanan
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly
known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the
bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar)
may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average
of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50
per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of
Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the
varying degree of strictness with which the examination
papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average
of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per
cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953,
the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
HELD:
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and
availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the
contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of
the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing
the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues
who since the beginning have announced their decision not to
take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who
subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have
decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972
referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of
article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void
and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of
article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is
valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with
section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the
candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952
inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date
or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the
Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, is now
charged before a Military Commission convened by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to
discharge his duties as such commander to control the
operations of members of his command, permitting
them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes
against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and
customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to
establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the
President of the Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case
before the Military Commission; and to permanently
prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of
petitioner.
Petitioner allege that the participation in the prosecution
of the case against petitioner before the Commission in
behalf of the United States of America, of attorneys
Melville Hussey and Robert Port, who are not attorneys
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines, is a diminution of our personality as an
independent state, and their appointments as
prosecutors are a violation of our Constitution for the
reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines
ISSUE:
WON the participation of two American attorneys in the
prosecution of the case is in violation of Rules of Court and
national sovereignty
HELD:
In the first place, respondent Military Commission is a special
military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the
Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil courts. It has
already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which
provides for the organization of such military commissions is a
valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive
order which requires that counsel appearing before said
commissions must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the
Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is
common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are
usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even
possessed of legal training.
Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not
violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper
that the United States, which has submitted the vindication of
crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of
our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of
those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of
sovereignty, it has not been by our government but by the
United States Government which has yielded to us the trial and
punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the
spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Omico Mining and Industrial Corp. v. Vallejos, G.R. No. L-
38974
FACTS:
Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent), then a
judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, filed with
said court a complaint and assigned to Branch II
presided by respondent Judge Amador T. Vallejos,
against Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation and
Frederick G. Webber, alleging two (2) causes of action.
The first, for the return of ten (10) certificates of stock
of the corporation borrowed from him by the
defendants, and the second, for the payment of his
services as legal counsel for the corporation.
Catolico alleged among others that he is a resident of
Cavite City where he is a judge of the Court of First
Instance and stockholder of the defendant Omico
Mining and Industrial Corporation holding thirty (30)
certificates of stock duly paid up .
both defendants entered into a contract of personal and
professional services with him under the terms of which
he was to head defendant corporation's legal department
with the condition that he should render such services
only after his office hours, "even into the dead wee
hours of the night and wherever such services would
not run in conflict with his duties as Judge"; that in
consideration of such services, the defendants
undertook to pay him a yearly salary of P35,000.00
from the date of the contract, but where a case shall
have been settled in and out of court, and defendants
shall have won or saved money because of such
settlement, he shall be paid by way of commission ten
percent (10%) of the amount involved in the litigation
and/or settlement; that, pursuant to said contract, he has
rendered legal services as head of the legal department
of defendant Omico and has attended to the personal
consultation of defendant Frederick G. Webber until the
filing of the complaint, when, by reason thereof, their
official relations were severed;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge can engage in the practice of law
4. JUDGES; OFFICIAL CONDUCT; CONDUCT MUST BE
FREE FROM APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY. The
ambivalence with which the respondent judge applied the rules,
being unduly strict with respect to defendants but unduly
liberal with respect to the plaintiff, falls short of the
requirement that the official conduct of a judge should not only
be free from impropriety, but also from the appearance of
impropriety.
FACTS:
5. ID.; PROHIBITIONS; JUDGES CANNOT ENGAGE IN
PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW; REASONS. The contact
of professional services entered into between private
respondent and the petitioners, while the former was still a
judge of the Court of First Instance, constituted private practice
of law and in contravention of the express provision of Section
35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The aforecited
Rule was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based
on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that
the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high
official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of
a judge of the Court of First Instance.
6. ID.; DUTIES; FULL TIME AND ATTENTION MUST BE
GIVEN TO JUDICIAL DUTIES. The inhibitory rule
embodied in Section 35 of Rule 138 makes it obligatory upon
the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending
special favors to their own private interests and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their
functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral
decency and the desire to promote the public interest.
People vs. Villanueva
The Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged
Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of Malicious
Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said
municipality.
Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but
later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant in the same case was represented by
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having
entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after
securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
condition of his appearance as such, was that every time
he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be
considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services.
The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the
accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al., vs. Blanco,
et al., 79 Phil. 647 wherein it was ruled that "when an
attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by
operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice."
HELD:
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW EMPLOYED IN THE
GOVERNMENT; PROHIBITION TO ENGAGE IN PRIVATE
PRACTICE; MEANING. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of
law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. The appearance as
counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for
a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
2. ID.; ID.; ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY HANDLING
CASE FOR RELATIVE WITH PERMISSION OF SUPERIOR
NOT IN PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE. The isolated
appearance as a private prosecutor, previously authorized by
his superior, of an assistant city attorney in a criminal case for
malicious mischief before a justice of the peace court where the
offended party is his relative, does not violate Section 32, Rule
127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which
bars certain attorneys from practicing.
Dia-Aonuevo v. Bercacio
FACTS:
Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo, to whom We shall refer
henceforth as complainant, claims to be a co-owner of an
undivided interest of a certain parcel of irrigated riceland
situated in Cabilogan, Sto. Nio, Sto. Domingo, Albay. This
property was the object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo
Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios in
favor of Alfredo Ong and acknowledged before Municipal
Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, as ex-officio
notary public, on January 25, 1972. Having been apprised of
the execution of this deed of sale, complainant went to the
office of Judge Bercacio to verify the matter. Upon being
shown a copy of the deed of sale, complainant informed
respondent judge that the vendors owned only one-third
undivided portion of the property and that she and other
cousins of hers owned two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio
advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property
from the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the
judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow them
to redeem the property and for that purpose she gave
respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be used to pay Alfredo
Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of
P3,500.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is authorized from engaging in the
practice of law
HELD:
The rule disqualifying municipal judges from engaging in the
practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of possible use of the
power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a
litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons
of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are
expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preclude any suspicion that they are representing the interests
of a party litigant.|||
Although every office in the government service is a public
trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at
all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public
that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice
De guzman vs. Vsayan Rapid Transit
FACTS:
Concepcion engaged the professional services of the
petitioner,
The employment was for the purpose of obtaining the
suppression, reduction and refund of certain tolerates on
various bridges along the line operated by the
respondent transportation companies
At the time of the employment of the petitioner, it
appears that the respondent transportation companies
had paid the sum of P89,816.70 as toll charges up to
December 31, 1932, an amount said to represent one-
seventh of their gross income up to that date, and in
view of their high rates, the payment of the toll charges
were detrimental to the transportation business of the
respondent if not remedied in time.
The Insular authorities readily saw the justice of the
transportation companies' petition and urged the
provincial board of Occidental Negros to act favorably.
The provincial board, however, declined to follow the
suggestion. The Secretary of Commerce and Public
Works warned the provincial officials by sending them
the communication, dated April 23, 1934, with the
admonition that "if the toll rates have not been
revised . . . by June 15, 1934 this office, much to its
regrets, will be forced to withdraw its approval of the
existing toll rates." By reason of this communication,
the provincial board, on March 7, 1934, with the
conformity of Nicolas Concepcion, adopted a
resolution, reducing the tolls for 2-ton trucks or more,
the only kind of motor vehicles operated by the
respondents, from P1.20 to P0.60 on one bridge, and
from P1.20 to 0.40 on the other. And on April 10, 1935
"upon authority of the Insular Auditor, concurred in by
the Department of the Interior" the provincial board
 refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally collected
from the Visayan Rapid Transit Company, Inc., and the
Negros Transportation Company, Inc., said amount to
be applied to future payments for tolls by said
companies. As a result of this reduction of tolls, the
respondents have been benefited with an economy of
P78,448 for every eighteen months
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entiled to an attorneys fee
HELD:
YES.
Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner
are purely administrative and did not require a high degree of
professional skill and experience, the fact remains that these
services were rendered and were productive of substantial
beneficial results to his clients. It is clear that for these services
the petitioner is entitled to compensation.|||
"It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive
the just and reasonable compensation for services performed at
the special instance and request of his client. . . That is to say,
as long as the plaintiff was honestly and in good faith trying to
serve and represent the interest of the client, he should have a
reasonable compensation for his services. . .
The following are the circumstances to be considered in
determining the compensation of an attorney:
- the amount and character of the services rendered;
- the labor, time, and trouble involved;
- the nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered;
- the responsibility imposed;
- the amount of money or the value of the property affected by
the controversy, or involved in the employment, the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services;
- the professional character and social standing of the attorney;
the results secured; and whether or not the fee is absolute or
contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may
properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent
than when it is not.
- The financial ability of the defendant may also be considered
net to enhance the amount above a reasonable compensation,
but to determine whether or not he is able to pay a fair and just
compensation for the services rendered, or as an incident in
ascertaining the importance and gravity of the interests
involved in the litigation.
Tejan vs Cusi
FACTS:
In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to
petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was required by
respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he
should not be removed or suspended from the practice
of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a
petition in court containing factual averments which
petitioner knew were false||. to wit:
"The records and the transcript of stenographic notes of
Misc. Case No. 2968 of this Court show that you
prepared and/or caused to be prepared a verified
petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312 in favor of
Vicente Calongo, alleging therein as grounds therefor,
'That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate was lost by the
herein petitioner in his house in Mati, Davao; That in
spite of the diligent search of the aforesaid title, the
same could not be found and is therefore now presumed
to be lose,' and had the petition signed by Atty. Justo
Cinco, when you know very well that the owner's
duplicate copy has always been in the custody of
Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares of the
Municipality of Kapalong to whom the same was
entrusted by Vicente Calongo, and that as a result of the
petition, this Court, through the Hon. Vicente P.
Bullecer, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, issued an Order
on June 28, 1967, directing the Register of Deeds of the
City of Davao to issue a new owner's duplicate of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge has authority on his own
motion to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or
suspension of attorneys
HELD:
YES.
The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal
profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme
Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of
persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to
the proper administration of justice. When it appears by acts of
misconduct that he has become unfit to continue with the trust
reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that
trust and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege
accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law
accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance
the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar
Alcala vs. Vera
FACTS:
Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de Vera with gross
negligence and malpractice:
 o For having maliciously and deliberately omitted
to notify them of the decision in civil case 2478
resulting in the deprivation of their right to
appeal from the adverse judgment rendered
against them; and
o For respondent's indifference, disloyalty and
lack of interest in petitioners' cause resulting to
their damage and prejudice.
Civil case 2478 was an action for annulment of a sale of
two parcels of land (lots Nos. 1880 and 1883 covered
by TCT Nos. T-12392 and 12393 respectively) filed by
the vendee, Ray Semenchuk, against the vendors,
spouses Alcala, on the ground that lot 1880 "could not
be located or did not exist", and for the recovery of
damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the
decision but he failed to inform his clients of the
judgment against them.
On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to complainants' house
to serve a writ of execution issued in said case. Totally
caught by surprise, Jose Alcala immediately wrote to
the trial court and inquired for the status of case 2478.
The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply informed Alcala
that the case was decided and that a copy of the
decision was received by respondent attorney. and that
since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was
issued by the trial court on motion of the plaintiff
Semenchuk
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent shall be disbarred
HELD:
NO, guilty of simple negligence only
True it is that petitioners do not appear to have suffered any
material or pecuniary damage by the failure of respondent Atty.
De Vera to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478.
t is no less true, however, that in failing to inform his clients, of
the decision in said civil case respondent failed to exercise
'such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment' (7 C.J.S. 979). The relationship of lawyer-client
being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the
client's being adequately and fully informed and should not be
left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his
interests are being defended. It is only thus that their faith in
counsel may remain unimpaired (Oparel, Sr. vs. Aheria, Adm.
Case No. 595, July 30, 1971). As it happened in this case,
because of respondent's failure to notify petitioners of the
decision in Civil Case No. 2478, the latter were entirely caught
by surprise, resulting in shock and mental and emotional
disturbance to them, when the sheriff suddenly showed up in
their home with a writ of execution of a judgment that they
never knew had been rendered in the case, since their lawyer,
the respondent, had totally failed to inform them about the
same.
Catimbuhan vs. Cruz
FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal
complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and
Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in
1979, were senior law students of the U.P. College of
Law where, as part of the curriculum of the university
they were required to render legal assistance to the
needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid.
Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila
filed their separate appearances, as friends of
complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan
opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and
respondent judge, in an Order sustained the respondent
fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said
criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not permission from a fiscal is necessary fro one to
appear as a private prosecutor
HELD:
NO. The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to
enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the
law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if
he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the
trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the
active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just
manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its
approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case: under his
supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-
lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the
accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more
reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor
under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal
Hyrdro Resources Contractors Corp. vs. Pagalilauan
FACTS:
petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban
as its "Legal Assistant." He received a basic monthly
salary of P1,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of
P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00.
On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the
corporation informing him that he would be considered
terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his
alleged failure to perform his duties well.
On October 6, 1980, Aban filed a complaint against the
petitioner for illegal dismissal.
 The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of
dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on employees. This latter duty is not an act of lawyer in the
appeal. exercise of his profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the
corporation. The above-mentioned facts show that the
ISSUE: petitioner paid Aban's wages, exercised its power to hire and
fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised
Whether or not Aban is an employee or a lawyer exercising
control over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his
legal profession
work.
HELD:

EMPLOYEE

A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an

Ramos vs. Rada
employee of a private corporation or even of the government. It
is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as FACTS:
its in-house counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its
table of organization, and otherwise treat them like its other Moises R. Rada, a messenger in the Court of First Instance of
officers and employees. At the same time, it may also contract Camarines Norte, Branch II, is charged with a violation of
with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as
The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one follows:
group is made up of employees while the other is not. A similar
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with
relations practitioners, and other professionals. Aban was
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as
without a written permission from the head of Department:
evidenced by his appointment paper (Exhibit "A"). The
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living allowance.
those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
Thereafter, Aban was dismissed on his alleged failure to
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
perform his duties well. (Exhibit "B"). Aban worked solely for
Government: . . ."
the petitioner and dealt only with legal matters involving the
said corporation and its employees. He also assisted the ISSUE:
Whether or not Rada may engage in private business without Beltran v Abad
permission from its head
FACTS:
HELD:
On May 5, 1983, Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the
NO. complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO
ALL METRO MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT
Sec. 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII prohibits government
ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO
employees from engaging directly in a private business,
PRACTICE LAW. LLphil
vocation or profession or being connected with any
Asked to comment on the Motion, Mr. Abad opposed it.
commercial, credit agricultural or industrial undertaking
He denied the allegation in the Motion that he had been
without a written permission from the head of the
practicing law even after our Decision of March 28,
Department.|||
1983.
The duties of a court messenger are generally ministerial which
ISSUE:
do not require that his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal
of the government. Such being his situation, it would be to WON Elmo Abad is guilty of contempt of court for his
stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor unauthorized practice of law
to augment his income, and to award a premium for
slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being
connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours
and without foreseeable detriment to the Government service.
The messenger's connection with a private corporation need HELD:
not be terminated, but he must secure a written permission
YES.
from the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance where
he is employed, and the latter is authorized to grant or revoke In a comprehensive and well-documented Report the Clerk of
such permission, under such terms and conditions as will Court concluded that the documentary and testimonial
safeguard the best interest of the service, in general, and the evidence, as well as the report of the National Bureau of
court, in particular.||| Investigation, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still
practicing law despite the decision of the Supreme Court of
March 28, 1983 which held the respondent in contempt of
court for unauthorized practice of law. The Report has found as
a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he
signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in
Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a
charge for perjury. |||
The Report of the Clerk of Court reveals that Atty. Ruben A.
Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for
Antonio S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos.
26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Exhibit D). Atty. Jacobe is required to explain within ten
(10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for
collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the
respondent who is not a member of the bar
Bacarro vs. Pinatacan
FACTS:
- This is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by
Carmen E. Bacarro charging Ruben M. Pinatacan, a 1975
successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity,
and lack of proper character required of a member of the Bar
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANTS) After about a year
of courtship, she and respondent became sweethearts on March
17, 1967 while they were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in
Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first sexual intercourse on
March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of marriage,
and they eloped to Cebu City where they stayed for about a
week. They returned to Cagayan de Oro and respondent left
complainant allegedly to see his parents in his hometown and
make the necessary arrangements for their intended marriage.
Respondent came back in May, 1971, but only to inform
complainant that they could not get married because of his
parents' objections. When complainant told respondent that she
was pregnant, he told her to have an abortion. Complainant
refused and they had a quarrel. Thereafter, she did not see or
hear from respondent until after the birth of their baby girl
named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on December 4, 1971.
Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the
time that she had a relationship with respondent. In July, 1973,
she brought the child with her to see respondent in Cavite City
and the latter promised to support the child. However,
respondent did not make good his promise of support so
complainant went to see him again, and once more respondent
made several promises, all of which were never fulfilled, until
he finished his law course and married a singer by the name of
Annie Sarabillo||| (Bacarro v. Pinatacan, A.C. No. 559-SBC,
[January 31, 1984], 212 PHIL 204-212)
- Respondent Pinatacan in his Answer|||
- He claimed that his relationship with complainant started to
cool down in January of 1971 when, over her vigorous
objection and opposition, he applied for a direct commission
with the Philippine Constabulary. He went to Manila and
stayed there for the greater part of March, 1971, for his
physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City, but
in June of 1971, he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, and never again returned to Cagayan de Oro City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pinatacan has good moral standing to allow
him to continue his practice.
HELD:
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the
Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good moral
character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the
high moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession,
and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the
practice of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest and to possess good moral character. "As a
man of law, (a lawyer) is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen." He sets an
example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the
law, but also for his clean living. Thus, becoming a lawyer is
more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar
examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a
member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which
has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon the
qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for
admission to the Bar, that he has measured up to that rigid and
ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation
Diao v. Martinez
FACTS:
Severino Martinez charged Diao with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he
had the requisite academic qualifications. |||
The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor-General
who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in
his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education,
specially in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never
obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the
credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful
completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A.
Diao, practically admits the first charge; but he claims that
although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of U. S. Army, passed the General Classification Test
given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the
educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diaos name be stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys
HELD:
YES.This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the
"error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had
his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it
in April 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies
(2nd semester of 1948- 1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and
the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath,
"That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.)
as prescribed by the Department of Private Education." (italics
on "previous")
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take
the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he
was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained
under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked
In re: Argosino
FACTS:
- Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations
held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due
to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
In Homicide.||| (Re: Al Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution),
[March 19, 1997])
- The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction,
arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation
rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7)
other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide
charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas
and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.||| (Re: Al Argosino, B.M.
No. 712 (Resolution), [March 19, 1997])
- the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for
probation.||| (Re: Al Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution),
[March 19, 1997])
- the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April
1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending
petitioner's discharge from probation.||| (Re: Al Argosino, B.M.
No. 712 (Resolution), [March 19, 1997])
- petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from
probation.
- On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that
he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted
no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by
among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and
six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been
established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8)
accused in the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the
Lawyers Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.
HELD:
YES.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign
the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following, admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is
persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for
the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the
benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should
at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and
easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that
Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society
Collantes vs. Renomeron
FACTS:
- This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative
case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house
counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for
short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register
of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations
with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163
pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in
its subdivision.
- The present complaint charges the respondent with the
following offenses:
"1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and
without sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time
(sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the
corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for
the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit
from the person or persons interested therein. LibLex
"2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
"3. Dishonesty.
"4. Extortion.
"5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself
in connection with pending official transaction before him.
"6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
"7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure." (p. 10, Rollo.)
- As early as January 16, 1987, V & G had requested the
respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of
sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V &
G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action
from the respondent.
- Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to
approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute
sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to
submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain
details about the transactions.
- Although V & G complied with the desired requirements,
respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the
documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain
"special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G
should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from
Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip,
or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house
and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives
- Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in
addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional
registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's
extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May
20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for
registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Code of Professional Responsibility applies
to lawyers in the government
HELD:
YES
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks
(Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to
process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars.
[c] and [d]) and prohibits them from directly or indirectly
having a financial or material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them
from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the
course of any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court;
People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), impose upon every lawyer
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's
oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground
for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action
(Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67)