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1)Siochi v.



-This case involves a 30 sqm parcel of land registered in the name of Alfredo Gozon
married to Elvira Gozon.

-In 1991, Elvira filed a Petition for Legal Separation against her husband Alfredo.

-In 1992, Elvira filed a Notice of Lis Pendens.

-In 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario entered
into an agreement to buy and sell over the property for the price of P18 Million.

-They stipulated that Alfredo would 1) Secure an affidavit from Elvira that the property is
his exclusive property and to annotate the agreement at the back of the TCT; 2) Secure
the approval of the RTC to exclude the property from the Legal Separation case; 3)
Secure the removal of the Notice of Lis Pendens.

-But despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply.

-After paying the P5 Million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price,
Mario took possession of the property.

-In 1994, RTC rendered decreeing the legal separation. As regards to the property the
court held that it is deemed conjugal property. Also in the same year, Alfredo by virtue of
a SPA executed in his favour Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Reality Inc
(IDRI) for 18M.

-Mario then filed with the RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages,
annulment of the donation of sale, with oreliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
and/or TRO.

-RTC held in favour of Mario.

-On appeal by Alfredo, the CA held the sale of the subj. land by Alfredo to Mario as null
and void. The conveyance was done without the consent of Elvira.

-Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the CA. In his petition, Mario alleges that
the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct
signified her acquiescence to the sale. IDRI on the other hand alleges that it is a buyer
in good faith.

WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira and WON the
sale made by Alfredo to Mario is valid.


-The petitions is without merit.

-The case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of
the property occurred after the effectivity of the FC, the applicable law is the FC Art.

-In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with
whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot
sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or authority of the court. Without
such consent or authority, the sale is void.

-The agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of
Elvira. Thus, the agreement is entirely void.

-As regards to Marios contention that the agreement is a continuing offer which may be
perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the propert
was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates
that the offer was already withdrawn.

-With regard to IDRI, it is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further
inquiries about the vendors title to the property. The rep. of IDRI testified that he knew
about the existence of the Notice of Lis Pendes and Legal Separation case filed before
the RTC. Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the RTC decision declaring the
property as conjugal.

-Nevertheless, the court find it proper to reimburse the 18M paid by IDRI.
2) Quiao v. Quiao

-This case involves Legal Separation questioning the dissolution and partition of

-In 2000, Respondent Rita Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against
herein petitioner Brigido Quiao (Brigido).

-The RTC granted the complaint.

-In 2005, respondent filed a motion for execution of the judgment which was granted by
the court.

-In 2006, after 9 months from the promulgation of the decision, petitioner filed before the
RTC a Motion for Clarification asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.

-The RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouse
and the debts. That after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have
any right to any share of the net profits earned.


WON the decision is final and executor despite the filing of the petitioner of a Motion for

WON petitioners vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant
to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code.


-The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time
the Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.

- In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The
petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December
16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the
respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had
lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been
partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his
Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net profits earned. From the foregoing,
the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October
10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had
already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for
clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and executory.

-The Rule on Legal Separation provides that the petition [for legal separation] shall be
filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent
has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a
non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner.

-Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties'
property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains.

-First, we have to determine what governs the property relations of the spouses.
Records show that the petitioner and respondent got married on Jan. 6, 1977. At the
time of the marriage the operative law is the Civil Code of the Phil. and since they did
not agree on the marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the
System of Relative Community or CPG.

-Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property
relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is CPG. And under this property
relation, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry. The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

-Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant
case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article
63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article
256 of the Family Code this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other

-(Second Issue) In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First,he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of
the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory
of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the Decision dated October
10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling
forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due

- The petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under
Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be
forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case.
3) Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite

- This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where
one of the spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities
to the victims' heirs.
-The petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia was accused of murder.
-The RTC rendered decision acquitting Efren for insufficiency of evidence but finding
Melecia guilty as charged.
-The RTC ordered to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50k as
civil indemnity, P50k each as moral damages, and P150k as actual damages.
-Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance
of the writ resulting in the levy of real properties of the spouses.
-Petitioner Efren filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
-RTC denied the motion.
-Efren filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but the CA dismissed the petition. It
also denied his motion for reconsideration.


WON the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the
murder case.


-To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the
spouses property relations.

-Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family
Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.

- Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it was the Civil Code,
not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it was the system of
absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia.

-Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the
personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear
prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none
of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident
that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and
automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal
partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with
prenuptial agreements.

-The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be
modified except prior to marriage.

Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must
be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66,
67, 128, 135 and 136.

-Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage
between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified
except before the celebration of that marriage.

-Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the
absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a
decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and
agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) judicial separation of property had
been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to
comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property
under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of
their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these
circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.

-What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the
Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and
incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. Thus:

Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

-This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of
ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change
the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into
absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would
be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
-What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the
operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary,
is that they were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains.

-Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether
or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil
liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the

-Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in
the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been

-Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal
indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated.

-Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered." No
prior liquidation of those assets is required.
4) De Leon v. De Leon


-In 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, while still single, purchased from the [PHHC] through
a Conditional Contract to Sell a parcel of land.
-In 1968, Bonifacio married plaintiff Anita De Leon.
-Bonifacio paid [PHHC] the total amount of P1,023.74. The right of ownership over the
subject parcel of land was transferred to the late Bonifacio on 1970, upon the full
payment of the total [price] of P1,023.74 and upon execution of the Final Deed of Sale.
-After full payment, Bonifacio was issued [TCT] No. 173677 on 1972.
-1974, Bonifacio executed a Deed of Sale in favor of defendants-spouses Tarrosa for
the amount of P19,000.00.
-The parties stipulate that the Deed of Sale is valid and genuine.
-However, plaintiff Anita De Leon was not a signatory to the Deed of Sale executed on
-Bonifacio died on 1996.
-The said Deed of Sale executed on 1974 was registered on 1996 before the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and [TCT] No. N-173911 was issued to Lita O. De
Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa.
-The RTC ruled that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita
and rendered judgement in favour of Anita and her children.
-The Tarrosaas appealed before the CA.
-The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

WON the land purchased on instalment by Bonifacio before his marriage to Anita was
his exclusive property.
WON the subject property is conjugal.

-The Subject Property is the Conjugal Property of Bonifacio and Anita.
-Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time
Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or the wife.

-Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that
the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were
acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be
considered conjugal.

- In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the
PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage
of Bonifacio and Anita.

-In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not
passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where
title passes upon delivery of the thing sold

-Such is the situation in the case, the conditional contract to sell executed by and
between Bonifacio and PHHC on 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the
property will vest on Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale which, in
turn, will be effected upon payment of the full purchase price.

-Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had
fully paid the purchase price on 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more
than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the
property was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership
to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.

-Petitioners argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacios exclusive property, since it
was registered solely in his name, is untenable.

-What is material is the time when the property was acquired.

-The 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or
encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.

-The sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule,
be with the wifes consent.

-The sale is not valid.

-The sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is
incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes.

-The nullity, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory
requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.

-Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the
acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when
the law itself authorized their validity.

-Interest in the Conjugal Partnership Is Merely Inchoate until Liquidation.

-Nevertheless, this Court is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas paid the amount of
P19k for the property in question. Thus, as a matter of fairness and equity, the share of
Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the
amount paid by the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled principle that no person should unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.
5) Aggabao v. Parulan


-The RTC annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favour of the petitioners in the
2 parcels of land the respondents owned for want of written consent of the husband
Dioniso Parulan, Jr.

-CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

-The petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari to reverse the decision of the

WON the sale of conjugal property made by respondent wife by presenting a special
power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by respondent husband in her
favor was validly made to the vendees, who allegedly acted in good faith and paid the
full purchase price, despite the showing by the husband that his signature on the SPA
had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his absence from the

- We resolve the main issue against the vendees and sustain the CAs finding that the
vendees were not buyers in good faith, because they did not exercise the necessary
prudence to inquire into the wifes authority to sell.
- We hold that the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was not
merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.

-Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the
effectivity of the Family Code

-The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of
the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family
Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made
during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
-Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
-In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
-However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
-Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family
Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.
-Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer during
the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124
of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the
proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could
not be ratified.

-Due diligence required in verifying not only vendors title, but also agents
authority to sell the property

In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a standard to determine the good faith of
the buyers dealing with a seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose
capacity to sell was restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required
before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith in such a situation,
the buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but
also into the sellers capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must
observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the
validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into
the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the
other spouse.
-It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show that he has relied on the
face of the certificate of title to the property, for he is not required to explore beyond
what the certificate indicates on its face. In this respect, the petitioners sufficiently
proved that they had checked on the authenticity of TCT No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377
with the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City as the custodian of the land
records; and that they had also gone to the Los Baos Rural Bank to inquire about the
mortgage annotated on TCT No. 63377. Thereby, the petitioners observed the requisite
diligence in examining the validity of the TCTs concerned.
-Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners that the issue was whether or
not they had diligently inquired into the authority of Ma. Elena to convey the
property, not whether or not the TCT had been valid and authentic, as to which
there was no doubt. Thus, we cannot side with them.
-Firstly, the petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the written consent of
Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not present evidence to show that they had made
inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly executed
by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. Had they made the appropriate inquiries, and not
simply accepted the SPA for what it represented on its face, they would have uncovered
soon enough that the respondents had been estranged from each other and were
under de facto separation, and that they probably held conflicting interests that would
negate the existence of an agency between them.
-To lift this doubt, they must, of necessity, further inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena. The
omission to inquire indicated their not being buyers in good faith