a. Heirs of Loreto C. Maramag v. Eva Verna De Guzman Maramag, et al, G.R. No.

181132, June 5, 2009

Lessons Applicable: To whom insurance proceeds payable (Insurance)

FACTS:
Loreto Maramag designated as beneficiary his concubine Eva de Guzman
Maramag
Vicenta Maramag and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie (heirs of Loreto
Maramag) and his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag, also suspected in the killing
of Loreto and his illegitimate children are claiming for his insurance.
Vicenta alleges that Eva is disqualified from claiming
RTC: Granted - civil code does NOT apply
CA: dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for filing beyond reglementary
period
ISSUE: W/N Eva can claim even though prohibited under the civil code against donation

HELD: YES. Petition is DENIED.

Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739
cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot
make any donation to him
If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance
contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not
to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of
the improper beneficiary.
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper
interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless
otherwise specified in the policy.
GR: only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the
insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the
maturation of the policy.
EX: situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third
persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or
indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer
It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when
the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the
insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured
 b. Asian Terminals, Inc. v. First Lepanto-Taisho Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 185964,
June 16, 2014

FACTS: A shipment of 3,000 bags of sodium tripolyphosphate arrived in Manila throug

h COSCO and was discharged into the possession and custody of ATI, a domestic corpor
ation engaged in arrastre business. The shipment remained for quite some time at ATIs
storage area until it was withdrawn by broker, PROVEN, on for delivery to the consigne.
Upon receipt of the shipment, it was found out that the delivered goods incurred shortag
es and spillage for a loss/damage valued at P166,772.41. GASI sought recompense from
COSCO, thru its Philippine agent SMITH BELL, ATI and PROVEN but was denied. Hen
ce, it pursued indemnification from the shipments insurer, FIRST LEPANTO. As subrog
ee, FIRST LEPANTO demanded from COSCO, its shipping agency in the Philippines, S
MITH BELL, PROVEN and ATI, reimbursement of the amount it paid to GASI. ATI and
PROVEN denied liability for the lost/damaged shipment and claimed that it exercised d
ue diligence and care in handling the same.

MeTC dismissed the case. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MeTC
s findings. ATI sought recourse with the CA challenging the RTCs finding that FIRST L
EPANTO was validly subrogated to the rights of GASI with respect to the lost/damaged
shipment. ATI argued that there was no valid subrogation because FIRSTLEPANTO fail
ed to present a valid, existing and enforceable Marine Open Policy or insurance contract
. ATI reasoned that the Certificate of Insurance or Marine Cover Note submitted by FIR
ST LEPANTO as evidence is not the same as an actual insurance contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-presentation of an insurance contract will bar a subrogee from c
ollecting reimbursement.

HELD:

No, Non-presentation of the insurance contract is not fatal to FIRST LEPANTOs cause
of action for reimbursement as subrogee. Subrogation is the substitution of one person i
n the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substitu
ted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedi
es or securities.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court observed that it is conspicuous from the records th
at ATI put in issue the submission of the insurance contract for the first time before the
CA. Despite opportunity to study FIRST LEPANTOs complaint before the MeTC, ATI fa
iled to allege in its answer the necessity of the insurance contract. Neither was the same
considered during pre-trial as one of the decisive matters in the case. Further, ATI never
challenged the relevancy or materiality of the Certificate of Insurance presented by FIRS
T LEPANTO as evidence during trial as proof of its right to be subrogated in the consign
ees stead. Since it was not agreed during the pre-trial proceedings that FIRST LEPANT
O will have to prove its subrogation rights by presenting a copy of the insurance contract
, ATI is barred from pleading the absence of such contract in its appeal. It is imperative f
or the parties to disclose during pre-trial all issues they intend to raise during the trial b
ecause, they are bound by the delimitation of such issues. The determination of issues d
uring the pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions, whether during
trial or on appeal.

c. H.H. Hollero Construction, Inc. v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.
152334, September 24, 2014

Facts: On April 26, 1988, the GSIS and petitioner entered into a
Project Agreement (Agreement) whereby the latter undertook the
development of a GSIS housing project known as Modesta Village
Section B (Project). Petitioner obligated itself to insurethe Project,
including all the improvements, upon the execution of the
Agreement under a Contractors All Risks (CAR) Insurance with the
GSIS General Insurance Department for an amount equal to its cost
or sound value, which shall not be subject to any automatic annual
reduction. Pursuant to its undertaking, petitioner secured CAR Policy
No. 88/085 in the amount of P development, which was later
increased to P 1,000,000.00 for land 10,000,000.00, effective from
May 2, 1988 to May 2, 1989. Petitioner likewise secured CAR Policy
No. 88/086 in the amount of P 1,000,000.00 for the construction of
twenty (20) housing units, which amount was later increased to P
17,750,000.00 from May 2, 1988 to June 1, 1989. to cover the
construction of another 355 new units, effective In turn, the GSIS
reinsured CAR Policy No. 88/085 with respondent Pool of Machinery
Insurers (Pool). Under both policies, it was provided that: (a) there
must be prior notice of claim for loss, damage or liability within
fourteen (14) days from the occurrence of the loss or damage; (b) all
benefits thereunder shall be forfeited if no action is instituted within
twelve(12) months after the rejection of the claim for loss, damage
or liability; and (c) if the sum insured is found to be less than the
amount required to be insured, the amount recoverable shall be
reduced tosuch proportion before taking into account the
deductibles stated in the schedule (average clause provision).
During the construction, three (3) typhoons hit the country, namely,
Typhoon Biring from June 1 to June 4, 1988, Typhoon Huaning on July
29, 1988, and Typhoon Saling on October 11, 1989, which caused
considerable damage to the Project. Accordingly, petitioner filed
several claims for indemnity with the GSIS on June 30, 1988, August
25, 1988, and October 18, 1989, respectively. In a letter dated April
26, 1990, the GSIS rejected petitioners indemnity claims for the
damages wrought by Typhoons Biring and Huaning, finding that no
amount is recoverable pursuant to the average clause provision
under the policies. In a letter dated June 21, 1990, the GSIS similarly
rejected petitioners indemnity claim for damages wrought by
Typhoon Saling on a no loss basis, it appearing from its records
that the policies were not renewed before the onset of the said
typhoon.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is barred from filing a
complaint before the courts based on the insurance claim.
Held: Yes. Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be
construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which
the parties themselves have used. If such terms are clear and
unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain,
ordinary, and popular sense.
Section 10 of the General Conditions of the subject CAR Policies
commonly read:

10. If a claim is in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration

is made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent means or
devices are used by the Insured or anyone acting on his behalf to
obtain any benefit under this Policy, or if a claim is made and
rejected and no action or suit is commenced within twelve months
after such rejectionor, in case of arbitration taking place as provided
herein, within twelve months after the Arbitrator or Arbitrators or
Umpire have made their award, all benefit under this Policy shall be
forfeited.

In this relation, case law illumines that the prescriptive period for the
insureds action for indemnity should be reckoned from the final
rejection of the claim.
As correctly observed by the CA, final rejection simply means
denial by the insurer of the claims of the insured and not the
rejection or denial by the insurer of the insureds motion or request
for reconsideration. The rejection referred to should be construed as
the rejection in the first instance, as in the two instances above-
discussed.

The right of the insured to the payment of his loss accrues from the
happening of the loss. However, the cause of action in an insurance
contract does not accrue until the insureds claim is finally rejected
by the insurer. This is because before such final rejection there is no
real necessity for bringing suit.

a. Sun Life of Canada (Phils.), Inc. v. Sandra Tan Kit and the Estate of the Deceased
Norberto Tan Kit, G.R. No. 183272, October 15, 2014