Hist. Sci.

, xxv (1987)

WAYS TO INTERPRET THE TERMS 'ARISTOTELIAN' AND

'ARISTOTELIANISM' IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE
NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

Edward Grant
Indiana University-Bloomington

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF CHARLES B. SCHMITT'

INTRODUCTION

No serious student of medieval thought would challenge the universally held

conviction that medieval natural philosophy, especially cosmology, was
primarily Aristotelian and that the entire enterprise is appropriately character-
ized by the term 'Aristotelianism'. And yet with respect to natural philosophy,
the meaning of the terms 'Aristotelian' and 'Aristotelianism' is far from clear.
Attempts to define them soon encounter difficulties that question their
meaning and utility.
In the narrowest sense, an Aristotelian in natural philosophy in the Middle
Ages should have been someone who assumed the truth or plausibility of all
that Aristotle said on that subject. He should have been closely akin to
Simplicio, Galilee's stereotypical Aristotelian of the Two chief world systems,
who thought it unlikely that Aristotle could have been mistaken. But for
rather obvious reasons such blind dedication and unanimity never occurred
during the Middle Ages, nor, may I add, can we find it in Galileo's day.
Medieval Latin natural philosophers were overwhelmingly Christian and
therefore found themselves, for example, unable to accept Aristotle's convic-
tion that the world was eternal. Moreover there was disagreement on many
passages as to what Aristotle actually meant. Hence there were bound to be
serious differences of opinion. Moreover on certain themes and problems,
medieval natural philosophers found Aristotle's solutions unsatisfactory and
chose to ignore them in favour of other possibilities. And, finally, new
departures were also occasionally made from some briefly expressed but
undeveloped statement by Aristotle. In such instances, the implications of that
statement may have been drawn in ways that Aristotle could not have
foreseen.
But how shall we categorize these differences of opinion with Aristotle?
How significant were they? Were they of sufficient magnitude to cast some
degree of uncertainty on the very concept of medieval and renaissance

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336 EDWARD GRANT

'Aristotelianism'? Our first task, then, is to describe some differences and

departures from Aristotle that qualify as significant and then to see how they
might affect our conception of Aristotelianism.
Departures of the kind that will be described here occurred during the whole
span of Aristotle's dominance in European thought, that is, between the
thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. In a recent article, I sought to illustrate
the manner in which early modern scholastic natural philosophers departed
from late medieval Aristotelian cosmology. I argued that those departures
derived from "new external challenges to the Aristotelian system that began to
take effect in the sixteenth century'? It did not, however, appear to me that
early modern scholastics were therefore more innovative or imaginative than
their medieval predecessors. Indeed they may have been less so because
medieval Aristotelianism was not significantly challenged by new texts and
ideas from outside Western Europe - at least not until the late fifteenth
century. Consequently, any important and interesting departures from Aristo-
tle's physical and cosmological texts derived either from ideas already embed-
ded in works that had entered Western Europe during the great age of
translation during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries or were the result of
suggestions and ideas developed by medieval natural philosophers themselves
without external stimulation.'
The present paper developed initially from my desire to do for late medieval
scholastics what I had already done for their successors in the late sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, namely to identify some of the departures and to
determine their significance. When this process was well underway, the
departures by medieval and early modern scholastics from the thought of
Aristotle inevitably raised questions about the very meaning of the terms
'Aristotelianism' and'Aristotelian'. Although, in a somewhat cursory manner,
I had earlier attempted briefly to interpret the term 'Aristotelianism'," it was
now time to try again at greater length.
Conceptual systems like Aristotelianism, Darwinism, Marxism, and Freu-
dianism have recently captured the attention of philosophers and intellectual
historians. What criteria have to be met for one to be considered, sayan
Aristotelian or a Darwinian? Can such criteria even be formulated? Is there an
essence of Aristotelianism, or Darwinism that might provide a means of
determining who is, and who is not, a legitimate member of one or another of
these -isms. These are difficult questions. In the study of such important
systems, an analysis of Darwinism recently proposed by David L. Hull at a
1982 centennial celebration of Darwin is a model of its kind and I have
profited from it.5 Employing biological concepts analogically, Hull's conclu-
sions are rather startling," But Darwinism is a part of the history of biology so
that Hull's modes of analysis and conclusions are at least familiar to both

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 ARISTOTELIANISM 337

biologists and historians of biology. The application of similar conclusions to

Aristotelianism, however, may appear more radical to historians of medieval
and renaissance philosophy and science than does a similar analysis of
Darwinism to biologists and historians of biology.
Although the object of modern analysis of conceptual systems is to reveal
their underlying similarities of structure and dynamic, medieval and renais-
sance Aristotelianism has at least one major characteristic that distinguishes it
from its relatively modern counterparts. During the long period of its existence
and dominance - say between 1200 and 1700 - the thought of Aristotle was
never conceived as something that evolved or developed over a period of time.
As far as scholastic authors of the medieval and renaissance periods were
concerned the numerous works of Aristotle might well have been written
simultaneously. They had no inkling that some of his ideas at least must have
altered over the course of his life. Inconsistencies and contradictions were thus
deemed only apparent, not real. A proper understanding of the seamless
garment of Aristotle's thought would cause these seeming inconsistencies and
contradictions to vanish. The books of Aristotle were sometimes ordered by
subject but not by chronology. The idea that Aristotle's works had a
developmental history that would be crucial to a proper understanding of the
content of those works did not really manifest itself until the early years ofthe
present century.
Hull divides his analysis of Darwinism into intellectual and social factors.
By the latter, he means Darwin's social relations with amateur and pro-
fessional scientists.' Since Aristotle had been dead for some sixteen hundred
years by the time his works came to exercise a dominance in European
intellectual history around 1200, we cannot inquire about his social relations.
Nor indeed would it be useful to inquire about the social relations involved in
the dissemination of medieval Aristotelianism. We know very little about
individual roles in the initial dissemination of Aristotelian thought in the late
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Hence we know little, if anything, about
the spread of Aristotelianism through scholarly networks. During the first half
of the thirteenth century, Aristotelianism became ubiquitous in the higher
education of western Europe. Indeed between 1200 and 1500 virtually all
students and teachers in the arts faculties studied Aristotle's natural philoso-
phy and were in some sense Aristotelians." Not until the sixteenth century did
rival philosophies emerge and even then Aristotle's natural philosophy
remained dominant into the seventeenth century. To inquire about Aristote-
lians as a group would demand nothing less than a detailed study of the
backgrounds and social relations of the faculties and students of all medieval
universities over some three to five centuries. We would at the very least
discover the obvious: that university teachers and students came from all over

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Europe and from all social classes. None ofthis, I suspect, would heighten our
insight into the phenomenon of Aristotelianism. For, as we shall see, what is
most important and interesting about medieval and renaissance Aristotelia-
nism is the considerable variety of opinion amongst Aristotelians on a rather
wide range of topics. These differences of opinion do not appear to have any
detectable social motivation or regional differentiation. They seem rather to
emerge from the nature and structure of scholastic commentary literature. In
contrast to Hull, then, my analysis will emphasize only the intellectual aspect.
Aristotle differs from his system-building colleagues in yet another signifi-
cant manner. He not only wrote on a far greater range of subjects than most, if
not all, of them, but his impact was significant in all the areas in which he
chose to write - that is, in politics, poetics, economics, cosmology, natural
philosophy, logic, and biology. To attempt to embrace these disparate subjects
under the rubric of Aristotelianism would be unfeasible and impractical. It is
thus essential to focus our efforts. Aristotelianism in this paper will therefore
encompass natural philosophy in the broad sense and cosmology in particular.
My objective is twofold: to identify and describe anomalies, or departures,
from Aristotle that occurred primarily, though not exclusively, in the late
Middle Ages and Renaissance and which occurred primarily, though not
exclusively, in cosmology; and secondly to examine the possible relevance and
significance of these anomalies for our understanding of the terms 'Aristote-
lian' and 'Aristotelianism' in the period from the thirteenth to the seventeenth
centuries.

DEPARTURES FROM ARISTOTLE'S COSMOLOGY AND PHYSICS

Because I have elsewhere described in detail a number of these departures," I

shall cite them here only briefly. Although more cosmogonical than cosmolo-
gical, a departure from Aristotle demanded by Christian doctrine concerned
the eternity of the world. Scholastic authors were virtually unanimous in
rejecting the eternity of the world as Aristotle described it in De caelo (bk I,
chs 10-12).10
Another momentous medieval departure from a fundamental tenet of
Aristotelian natural philosophy took place in the thirteenth century in
cosmology and involved a shift from Aristotle's system of concentric spheres,
as described in the Metaphysics." to a system of solid eccentric orbs, as
described by Ptolemy in the latter's Hypotheses a/the planets. 12 The differences
between the systems were obvious to all: concentric spheres were in harmony
with the demands of Aristotle's cosmology but could not save the astronomi-
cal phenomena, namely planetary variations in distance and latitude. By
contrast, the system of solid eccentrics and epicyclescould save the astronomi-

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 ARISTOTELIANISM 339

cal phenomena but was at variance with important cosmological principles,

primarily that of the Earth as the sole centre for planetary motion."
The consequences for medieval cosmology were potentially momentous.
The system of eccentrics and epicycles meant that planets could rotate around
a geometric point as well as a physical body, contrary to the claims of
Aristotle, Averroes, and Maimonides that uniform, circular motion in the
heavens could only occur around a physical body, namely the Earth. More-
over, celestial motions could occur around a multiplicity of centres. 14 Both of
these cosmological changes were commonly accepted in the Middle Ages and
Renaissance.
Although both Aristotle and Ptolemy assumed that the celestial orbs were
so perfectly nested one with another that neither empty spaces nor any kind of
matter could intervene, at least two scholastic authors, Albertus Magnus and
Cecco d' Ascoli, insisted that successivesurfaces of celestial orbs are filled with
matter that is capable of contraction and expansion and thereby capable of
division and change." Interorbicular matter was thus radically different from
celestial ether, which was always assumed incorruptible, indivisible, and
unchangeable. The projection of an interorbicular matter not only signifiedthe
abandonment of the basic Aristotelian concept of a completely homogeneous
celestial matter, but it also blatantly abandoned the Aristotelian idea of total
contact between the surfaces of successive orbs.
A significant break with Aristotle's cosmology also involved the planets.
Because the Moon always reveals the same face to us, as can be inferred from
its spots, Aristotle insisted that all other planets must also reveal the same face
to us. Thus no planets could rotate with a proper motion. !6 But if the Moon is
actually carried around by an epicycle, it should present a different face to us
when in the aux of the epicycle than when it is in the opposite of the aux. To
avoid this potentially damaging conflict with observation, it was necessary to
assume that the Moon moved with a rotatory motion contrary to that of the
epicycle and with an equal speed. In this way the Moon would always reveal
the same face to us. For those who accepted the existence of solid eccentrics
and epicyles - and most scholastic natural philosophers did - the Moon's
rotatory motion was routinely assumed. Here was an important departure
from Aristotle: one or more planets was assumed to possess a motion of its
own. Not all planets were merely passive bodies carried round by their
epicycles. The Moon, and perhaps other planets, was now thought to have a
capacity for self-motion." Some scholastics even argued, as did Albert of
Saxony, that the Moon alone rotated because it differed from the other
planets. In this approach, planets were divisible into those that had a capacity
for self-rotation and those that did not. Such a radical distinction between
planets was no part of Aristotelian cosmology."

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CHALLENGE TO PERFECT CIRCULAR MOTION

The perfect circular motion of the planets, which was a basic ingredient of
Aristotle's cosmology, was also challenged, though with little impact. The
Sun's two simultaneous motions, that is, its daily east-to-west motion and its
annual west-to-east motion, produced a path that was spiral-like rather than
perfectly circular. This phenomenon was already mentioned by Plato in the
Timaeus" and was accepted by numerous subsequent authors, including John
of Sacrobosco," Roger Bacon," Albertus Magnus, and Nicole Oresme, most
of whom believed that all the planets as well as the fixed stars moved with
spiral motions compounded of two independent circular motions." Contrary
to ideas about medieval addiction to the perfection of the circle, John North
points to Richard Wallingford's intelligent use of ovals in astronomy."

OTHER DEPARTURES FROM ARISTOTLE

Of numerous other departures from Aristotle, only a few more can be

mentioned here. Where Aristotle stressed radical differences between celestial
and terrestrial matter, medieval natural philosophers began to discern and
emphasize similarities. They also began to challenge the idea that regular,
uniform motion of celestial bodies controlled the motion and activities of all
terrestrial things. While most conceded that uniform, circular celestial motions
were essential to produce the world as we know it, some assigned varying
degrees of independent action to terrestrial bodies.P' During the Middle Ages,
some scholastics even assumed the existence of an infinite extracosmic void
space thus differing from Aristotle, who insisted that void could exist neither
within nor beyond our finite world. This concept would gain considerable
support from both scholastic and non-scholastic authors in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries."
Interesting and important departures were also taken with regard to
hypothetical arguments in which scholastic natural philosophers insisted that
certain opinions that Aristotle had judged impossible were indeed possible, at
least for the divine power. Of these, easily the most important was the
possibility of the existence of other worlds.P On the assumption that God
could, if He wished, create other worlds, some fourteenth century scholastics-
including John Buridan and Nicole Oresme - were led to allow things in those
worlds that violated significant Aristotelian principles. Not only did they find
the idea of a multiplicity of equally privileged physical centres theoretically
acceptable, but they argued that each world would be self-contained so that
every heavy body would fall to the centre ofits own world. If God created such
worlds, void spaces would necessarily lie between them.

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 ARISTOTELIANISM 341

Despite the fact that no one in the Middle Ages believed that actual vacua
could exist within our world, many were prepared to argue that, contrary to
Aristotle, the concept of motion in a vacuum was intelligible. This idea was
given further confirmation by another departure from Aristotle: the medieval
doctrine of mixed bodies, the natural and violent motions of which were
determined by a ratio of two opposing forces, lightness and heaviness, one
serving as an internal resistance, the other as an internal motive force. The
interaction of these two forces determined the direction and speed of the
body."
Indeed the medieval analysis of motion produced other significant and well-
known departures: impetus theory" and what has been called 'Bradwardine's
law', which related speeds of bodies in terms of geometrical proportionalities
rather than by the arithmetic relationships assumed by Aristotle."

DEPARTURES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The departures from Aristotle's natural philosophy that began soon after the
introduction of his physical works into the medieval universities in the
thirteenth century continued on into the seventeenth century. The discovery of
the new world and the impact of the new cosmology that was associated with
the names of Nicolaus Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and Galileo Galilei brought
a number of Renaissance scholastic authors to break with Aristotle and the
more traditional medieval conceptions of the world. Among such departures
the following are especially noteworthy.
The Portuguese discoveries of land in the southern hemisphere around 1500,
helped shatter the traditional medieval Aristotelian belief that Earth and
Water formed separate spheres and that only a quarter of the Earth's sphere, a
part that lay wholly in the northern hemisphere, was elevated above the
waters. On this view, the southern hemisphere was completely submerged.
With land discovered in the southern hemisphere, the concept of two separate
spheres was abandoned in favour of a 'terraqueous sphere', in which Earth
and Water formed a single sphere and where it was now known that over the
entire surface of the globe Earth was partly submerged and partly elevated.
With the acceptance of this judgement by Christopher Clavius, the famous
Jesuit astronomer, many other scholastics also adopted it in the seventeenth
century."
In the aftermath of Tycho Brahe's rejection of physical spheres in the
celestial region, some scholastics not only agreed with Tycho, but also
accepted his geoheliocentric system." A few scholastics also abandoned the
long held fundamental Aristotelian judgement on the incorruptibility of the
celestial region." Indeed some would even argue that the heavens were less
perfect than living things on Earth" and at least one would infer from this that

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342 . EDWARD GRANT

because of the existence of life on Earth, the latter must be nobler than the
planets."
But what do these and other departures from the texts of Aristotle signify?
How, if at all, do they affect our understanding of Aristotelianism? It is now
time to tum to the second aspect of this paper.

THE PROBLEM OF ARISTOTELIANISM

From what has been said thus far, significant differences or departures from
Aristotle's natural philosophy, especially his cosmology and physics, began
virtually with its effective introduction into Western Europe in the early
thirteenth century and continued until the end of the seventeenth century,
when Aristotelianism ceased to be a viable world view. Although the magni-
tude of those departures is difficult to measure and seems relative to a
particular period, it does appear that the departures became more dramatic as
we approach the seventeenth century. If so, the explanation may lie in the
virtually exclusive and unchallenged dominance that Aristotle's works held in
the late Middle Ages as contrasted to the serious external challenges that arose
in the late fifteenth century when new Greek works and ideas that were largely
unknown in the preceding centuries entered Western Europe and offered
alternatives to Aristotle's natural philosophy. In the sixteenth century, Plato-
nism, Neoplatonism, Atomism, and Stoicism became flesh and blood alterna-
tives and rivals to Aristotelianism.
The contrast in the intellectual diversity between these two periods is
undoubtedly important for the study of Aristotelianism and must playa role
in understanding the history of that ideology. But our primary concern here is
to know whether the terms 'Aristotelianism' and 'Aristotelian' can be assigned
significant meaning. When one considers the wide range of doctrines and
individuals subsumed under those appellations, the terms appear to lack
reasonably precise defining characteristics. The terms take their broadest
signification from the fact that during the Middle Ages, and to a considerably
lesser extent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Aristotle's works on
natural philosophy formed the general basis for an understanding of the
structure and operation of the world. From Aristotle's physical treatises
scholastic authors derived and justified the geocentric system, the four
elements, the four causes, the doctrine of potentiality and actuality, the
doctrine of celestial intelligences, the sharp distinction between celestial and
terrestrial bodies and between lightness and heaviness, and other fundamental
concepts. By means of commentaries and questiones on Aristotle's physical
treatises, scholastics expounded and disseminated their ideas and interpre-
tations of natural philosophy and theology. Without Aristotle's physical
thought, medieval natural philosophy is hardly imaginable. And yet the

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 ARISTOTELIANISM . 343

departures that have been mentioned here, and others that could be included,
are significant enough to compel attention and to demand some kind of an
explanation as to their relationship to our concept of the terms Aristotelian
and Aristotelianism.
To a considerable extent, the terms are largely ours, used for convenience to
characterize the central role that the natural wbrks of Aristotle held in the
Middle Ages. It was not usual for scholastics in that period to refer to
themselves as Aristotelians. Only later, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, did terms like 'schoolmen' and 'peripatetics' come into vogue to
distinguish and contrast those who continued to study and comment on the
works of Aristotle as opposed to those who had begun to pursue and develop
quite different interpretations of nature. From the fact that hundreds, and
more likely thousands, of medieval natural philosophers and commentators
on the works of Aristotle saw no reason to identify themselves by explicit
terms such as 'Aristotelian " or 'Peripatetic', we must not infer that they do
not represent a real historical movement to whom the label 'Aristotelians' may
justly be applied; or that their overall views in natural philosophy may not be
rightly and appropriately described as 'Aristotelianism'. And above all, we
must not assume that the terms 'Aristotelian' and 'Aristotelianism' are merely
convenient labels that do not represent, or point to, a real historical
phenomenon."
Later in this paper, an attempt will be made to describe and explain the
sense of these terms. The real problem is to see if criteria can be established to
determine the members of the class of Aristotelians. Many different interpre-
tations are possible. But there should be no doubt that the members of the
class of Aristotelians were real and therefore constitute an historical phenome-
non. It is the real members of the class that we are trying to characterize, not
the convenient term or label 'Aristotelian', even though the latter has a
historical basis and is not an arbitrary invention of modern scholars. Our
problem is similar to that of most historians, as for example, those who write
the histories of wars or social movements. The names of those wars or social
movements may have been invented by the participants or by modern
historians. But when the latter investigate these wars or social movements,
they are fully aware that the name, however apt and even if conceived at the
time of the event itself, is a mere label, a convenient means of referring to the
event. But they also know that if historical events are in any sense real, those
wars and social movements are as real as any of them. So it is with
Aristotelians and the commentary literature they produced, which is often
called Aristotelianism.
For centuries, Aristotelians had regularly incorporated ideas of the kind we
have described. Almost from the outset, students of Aristotelian natural
philosophy showed a remarkable facility for incorporating ideas that were

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344 . EDWARD GRANT

directly at variance with Aristotle's own views. In this way, Aristotelianism

revealed a capaciousness that was truly remarkable." Not only did deviations
occur from within, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Aristotelians
absorbed ideas from rival philosophies. As the most obvious evidence of this
tendency, one need only mention that some of the most telling criticisms
against Aristotle that came from the reformers of astronomy and cosmology
were actually adopted by a number of peripatetics. Indeed in dealing with the
fate of Aristotle's thought and influence in the Renaissance Charles Schmitt
has thought it useful to speak of 'Aristotelianisms', because "the single rubric
Aristotelianism is not adequate to describe the range of diverse assumptions,
attitudes, approaches to knowledge, reliance on authority, utilization of
sources, and methods of analysis to be found among the Renaissance followers
of Aristotle"." Indeed "Aristotelianism turns out to be a series of many
different sects agreeing only on the most fundamental issues"." With such
acknowledged diversity, and in view of the numerous departures from
Aristotle's thought, how should we understand what is called 'Aristotelian
natural philosophy', and especially the cosmology embedded in that natural
philosophy? Under these circumstances, what can Aristotelianism mean?
Wholly satisfactory answers to these questions may be unattainable, but the
importance of Aristotelian thought in Western intellectual history makes the
effort to resolve the problem eminently worthwhile.
Toward this end, I shall now present two possible ways of approaching the
concept of Aristotelianism, both of which are based on biological metaphors
or models." As will be all-too-evident, proposed resolutions of the problem
must inevitably be highly speculative.

TYPOLOGICAL OR MORPHOLOGICAL ARISTOTELIANISM

Before describing the two approaches just mentioned, let me first describe and
dismiss a third possibility. One might apply to Aristotelianism the view of
species that prevailed in the early part of the nineteenth century and that
conceived species as composed of natural kinds." That is, each species was
described in as precise a definition as was possible and, with the exception of
accidental variations, it was expected that each member of the species fitted the
definition." If applied to Aristotelianism, this conception of species would be
wholly inadequate, since, however we defined Aristotelianism, the definition
could not possibly encompass all the departures we have mentioned. The
departures would have to be treated either as mere accidental variations from
some essence or fixed type that was embodied in the definition representing the
species, or we would have to assume a great variety of independent species, or
subspecies, of Aristotelianism, each accommodating a departure, or a few

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closely related departures, from Aristotle. Such an approach would be of little

use."
A better approach, and one that I propose as the first of the two
interpretations to be discussed, is related to the more rigid conception just
described, except that it allows variations from the norm, though assuming
that such individual variations will cluster around the norm. In this morpholo-
gical or typological approach, which has affinities with the concept of species
espoused by Georges Cuvier and William Whewell," we may take the natural
works of Aristotle - that is, the Physics, De anima, De generatione et
corruptione, De caelo, Meterology, and so on - as the norm or definitional
essence, or standard of measure, and determine whether a given idea or
concept is an anomaly or departure by comparing it to what Aristotle said. All
the anomalies mentioned above could be viewed from this standpoint. In
effect, the natural works of Aristotle serve as the essence or type of Aristotelia-
nism and the anomalies are variations that cluster around that essence. Cuvier
allowed that variations from a type could occur with the individuals who
possessed those variations remaining members of the species. But at some
unspecified point the variations or differences might be sufficiently removed
from the essence or type that the organism possessing those properties was
excluded from the species. No rules were formulated for determining the
extent to which an organism could deviate from the norm before it was no
longer considered a member of the species in question. As applied to
Aristotelianism, it appears that we could not formulate any defensible and
plausible criteria to determine which departures from the essence should be
included in, or excluded from, the species of Aristotelianism.
During the late Middle Ages, most scholastics were in agreement with
Aristotle on a number of major points concerning the macrostructure, or
overall framework, of the world." With Aristotle, they held that the world was
a finite, unique, material sphere divided into two radically different parts,
celestial and terrestrial. The former extended from the lunar sphere all the way
to the sphere of the fixed stars, and even beyond to the empyrean sphere.
Composed of an incorruptible ether, the heaven was subdivided into a number
of spheres each of which turned with perfect, uniform circular motion.
Because of their greater perfection, celestial bodies, which were not subject to
substantial or qualitative changes, were assumed to influence the behaviour of
organic and inorganic bodies in the terrestrial region. Unanimous in their
belief that the Earth lay at the centre ofthe world, scholastics were agreed that
terrestrial bodies were compounded of four elements and subject to incessant
change. Each of those four elements, moreover, had its natural sublunar place
and would seek to reach, or remain, in that place if unhindered.
But if most scholastics were agreed on certain fundamental structures, they
disagreed on numerous points of cosmic operation. Many opinions were

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proposed that disagreed with Aristotle and were departures from his teach-
ings. Thus in this first approach, we have a set of opinions in which medieval
natural philosophers were generally in agreement with Aristotle, and another
set of opinions with respect to which they departed in varying degrees from
Aristotle. The departures are determined by using Aristotle's own ideas as the
standard. But once these departures are identified, we have no criteria for
deciding which departure shall, or shall not, be a member of the species.
As I have described the process thus far, we seem to be concerned with ideas
rather than individual Aristotelians. Aristotelianism is constituted not of
Aristotelians but rather of an aggregate of ideas about the structure and
operation of the physical world based upon interpretations and opinions held
by Aristotle. In so far as these original, core ideas are repeated and elaborated,
they still remain a part of Aristotelianism. But as some of these ideas are
subsequently abandoned and replaced, criteria must be formulated for inclu-
sion of the replacements into the species of Aristotelianism. Are there
departures too radical for inclusion into the complex of ideas and concepts we
call Aristotelianism? If, for example, an Aristotelian commentator argued for
a substitution ofheliocentrism for geocentrism, would it make sense to include
his version of heliocentrism within Aristotelianism? Or would it be preferable
to designate our hypothetical Aristotelian commentator a Copernican rather
than an Aristotelian? Because of such seemingly intractable difficulties, I am
doubtful that, in the first interpretation, any reasonably consistent criteria
could be established for deciding which ideas would qualify for the deviant
cluster around the essential core of Aristotle's concepts.
Within the framework just described, we could also establish criteria for
determining who is an Aristotelian. Taking Aristotle as the essential type one
could then cluster a group of scholars around that type establishing arbitrary
criteria for inclusion. Individual scholars who were classified as Aristotelians
would largely agree with Aristotle's positions, but could depart from some of
them, and even add new ones. Here again, criteria for inclusion in the group of
Aristotelians would be extremely difficult to establish. For the late Middle
Ages, as contrasted with the early modern, or Renaissance, period, a major
dilemma would soon arise: to what group would we assign those who do not
meet the definitional criteria for an Aristotelian. Would we establish a species
of non-Aristotelians, or anti-Aristotelians? Somehow this runs counter to our
intuition that, whatever their differences, medieval natural philosophers were
all, in some meaningful sense, Aristotelians.
As we saw, in the typological approach anomalies or departures are
measured against what Aristotle said. Thus with regard to any particular
departure, it would not matter whether or not scholastic authors were
themselves aware that a departure had been made. Most of the departures
mentioned earlier were recognized as breaks with Aristotle (especially the

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 ARISTOTELIANISM 347

rejection of the eternity of the world, the assumption of real eccentrics and
epicycles and the consequences that flowed therefrom, and the various
hypothetical arguments in which the divine power acted in ways that were
contrary to Aristotle's basic principles). But sometimes medieval natural
philosophers failed to indicate any sense of difference with Aristotle or they
chose to ignore or reconcile those differences." Indeed what may seem to us a
departure from Aristotle may not have been so construed by those who
proposed or adopted it. Even in what seems an obvious rejection of Aristotle's
rules of motion in the seventh book of the Physics, Nicole Oresme, for
example, suggests that although the rules that appear in the Physics are false,
Aristotle may have understood them properly but been poorly translated."
Because Aristotle was a respected authority, scholastics were not eager to
criticize him or to seek credit for novel interpretations. As a consequence
departures were often made either unwittingly or without drawing attention to
differences of opinion. Only when Aristotle came under direct attack in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did scholastic authors more readily admit
their differences with him. Despite medieval reluctance to indicate conflicts
and disagreements with Aristotle, historical scholarship can identify most of
them and that is all that is required. In a typological system, conscious
awareness of departures or differences of opinion with Aristotle is not a
prerequisite for classification as a departure.

ARISTOTELIANISM LIKENED TO A SPECIES AS A POPULATION

In the second approach to Aristotelianism, we resort to a metaphor or model

in which Aristotelianism is likened to the biological concept of a zoological
species as a population. In this concept, we are still concerned with types, but
no longer with a single type. As Ernst Mayr has put it, "Species consist of
variable populations, and no single specimen can represent this variability"."
That is, the members of a species differ sufficiently from one another so that no
single member is typical of the whole population that comprises the species.
Since no single member of a species is typical, we may name the species after
any single individual member. Although in what follows, the species of
Aristotelianism may still be conceived as an aggregation of ideas associated
with the physical works of Aristotle and the commentaries and questiones
thereon, the ideas and principles are now associated with the individuals who
formulated or repeated those ideas and principles. We shall therefore focus on
the assemblage of Aristotelian natural philosophers.
Let us now see how this second approach may be applied to Aristotelianism.
Because we may plausibly assume that no two Aristotelian natural philoso-
phers agreed in all of their conclusions and propositions, we may treat every
Aristotelian as if he represents an independent version of Aristotelianism.

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348 EDWARD GRANT

Thus the species of Aristotelianism that existed between, say 1200 and 1700,
consists of all extant, individual Aristotelianisms where each individual
Aristotelianism is the product of a single Aristotelian natural philosopher.
Thus there are as many Aristotelianisms as there were individual Aristotelian
natural philosophers. Construed as a species, therefore, Aristotelianism con-
sists of the whole population of individual Aristotelianisms each of which is
the unique product of a single Aristotelian natural philosopher whose ideas,
opinions and interpretations are shared with other members of the species,
that is, shared with other Aristotelian natural philosophers. An Aristotelian
natural philosopher is trained in a tradition and reveals this by repeating some
of what he has learned. As a unique member of the species, however, he will
also add to, detract from, or alter, however slightly, the sum total of his
Aristotelian inheritance.
Certain significant consequences follow from such an approach. There is no
need for a definition of Aristotelianism, since that term embraces a population
with inherent similarities and individual differences. Unlike the first interpre-
tation, there is no norm against which to measure whether a departure has
occurred. In this sense, there are no departures or anomalies. There are only
individual Aristotelians who produce individual Aristotelianisms each of
which consists of an array of ideas, principles, and interpretations. While some
Aristotelianisms are easily recognized as better organized and intellectually
more powerful than others, none is inherently more privileged than any other.
Aristotelianism is thus likened to the concept of a species as a population of
individuals where, though all differ in varying degrees, there is no typological
standard for the species as a whole, which is left undefined. The natural books
of Aristotle can no longer serve as a standard of measure. Indeed, with this
model, Aristotle himself becomes simply another unprivileged Aristotelian
producing just another, albeit the first, individual version of Aristotelianism.
But why do we name our species 'Aristotelianism'? In truth, we could have
named the species 'Aquinasism', or 'Buridanism', or 'Albert of Saxonyism',
and so on." Each of these individuals of the species could have legitimately
given his name to the species since none is more privileged than any other. But
there are good reasons for choosing the natural works of Aristotle as the name
of the species. In evolutionary terms, the members of the species share a
common descent. The works and ideas of Aristotle form the basis of that
common descent. Here of course, the intellectual version of a species differs
from its biological counterpart. In the latter, there is, of course, no first
member. In a strict sense, Aristotle is not the first true Aristotelian either
because he clearly drew upon ideas of his predecessors, especially Plato and the
Presocratics. Nevertheless, the aggregation of ideas in his books on natural
philosophy form a sufficiently independent system to warrant its conceptuali-
zation as a separate intellectual tradition, especially since there is a long

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 ARISTOTELIANISM . 349

subsequent history of commentaries focused on his works. In our scheme,

then, Aristotle may be given pride of place as the first Aristotelian and his
Aristotelianism considered the first member of the species Aristotelianism.
The advantage of the population approach lies in its obvious subversion of
the notion of Aristotelianism as in any sense a firm, cohesive body of doctrine
from which a series of departures were made. It even relieves us of the need to
determine what an anomaly or departure is. Moreover, the population
approach does not require a definition of Aristotelianism other than that
which asserts it to be the product of Aristotelians.

WHO IS AN ARISTOTELIAN?

Thus of the two interpretations of Aristotelianism that I have presented, the

population approach seems preferable, in part because it enables us to sidestep
certain dilemmas that are inherent in the first, or typological, approach. Both
approaches, however, confront a major problem: How do we determine who is
an Aristotelian and thus who qualifies as a contributor to the domain of ideas
that comprise Aristotelianism as a whole? Is it appropriate to include in the
population of individuals comprising the species of Aristotelianism - that is in
the population of Aristotelian natural philosophers - someone who holds or
formulates an idea or ideas that is radically at variance with those of Aristotle
and most, if not all, other Aristotelians? Are boundary conditions required? Is
there some limit beyond which it would no longer be fitting and appropriate to
describe someone as an Aristotelian?
At the very least, an Aristotelian ought to be someone whose education
involved a reasonable degree of familiarity with the works of Aristotle and
earlier Aristotelians and who had himself probably written one or more
questiones or commentaries on the natural books of Aristotle for the purpose
of expressing genuine opinions about the operation of the physical world.
Should it happen that our hypothetical Aristotelian failed to write commentar-
ies or supercommentaries on the relevant works of Aristotle, his Aristotelia-
nism might nevertheless be reflected in other kinds of treatises.
But we must assume that an Aristotelian in natural philosophy is so
identified because he had a more than cursory familiarity with Aristotle's
natural books. We must assume that Aristotelians form a continuous com-
munity of scholars and that what binds them is a focus on the works of
Aristotle. Thus an alien being in another galaxy who might have written, word
for word, all the Aristotelian treatises that Thomas Aquinas or Nicole Oresme
had written would not, for that reason alone, be considered an Aristotelian
unless he had also been trained in the tradition and was part of a community
of scholars who had studied some or all of the works of Aristotle and probably
one or more subsequent commentaries on those works."

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350 EDWARD GRANT

But what about a natural philosopher who adopted ideas radically at

variance with the thought of Aristotle and his followers? Should he be
included among Aristotelians? The response will differ with each of the two
different approaches that we have described. In the first, or Cuvier model, any
so-called Aristotelian who accepted the heliocentric system, would seem
ineligible for membership in the species of Aristotelianism. For although the
dividing line between species in the Cuvier approach is arbitrary, each species
was intended to keep together entities that bear a reasonable resemblance to
each other. The very term 'cluster' suggests a density of ideas ranged closely
around an essential core. The Aristotelian geocentric system and the Coperni-
can heliocentric system are too much at variance to allow for their inclusion in
the same typological species.
With the second, or population approach, things are quite different. In this
approach, all cosmological or physical ideas put forth by any identifiable
Aristotelian should belong to the species of Aristotelianism. A consequence of
this policy is the possible inclusion of ideas that are undeniably antithetical to
the views of Aristotle and to those of most Aristotelians. Under the appropri-
ate circumstances, the heliocentric system could indeed be included even
though, at first glance, it seems reasonable to assume that any Aristotelian
natural philosopher who adopted the Copernican heliocentric system would
ipsofacto be excluded from the company of Aristotelian natural philosophers.
And yet, Thomas White (1593-1676), a self-proclaimed Aristotelian natural
philosopher, accepted the Copernican system as true, even using certain
Aristotelian ideas to arrive at that truth. 50 Thus it appears that an Aristotelian
natural philosopher could adopt the Copernican system and continue to
employ Aristotelian principles and ideas in cosmology as well as in other areas
of natural philosophy. 51

SELECTIVITY AND ADAPTAnON

The population approach also provides a means of better understanding the

changes that occurred over the whole range of the history of Aristotelianism.
According to Stephen Toulmin, in his important Human understanding, "an
evolutionary account of conceptual development '" has two separate features
to explain: on the one hand, the coherence and continuity by which we identify
disciplines as distinct, and, on the other hand, the profound long term changes
by which they are transformed or superseded". 52 As a discipline involved in the
history of ideas, 53 Aristotelianism gained its coherence by virtue of the natural
works of Aristotle and its continuity was guaranteed by the community of
scholars who transmitted it generation after generation for some four to five
centuries.

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 ARISTOTELIANISM 351

Earlier I declared that in the population approach, departures, or variations

or mutations, to use biological terms, do not occur in the sense of a departure
from a norm or definitional essence, since there is no norm or definitional
essence. Nevertheless, as we saw, new ideas, or variants were indeed intro-
duced into Aristotelianism. They are variants with respect to previously
established concepts or ideas. Now in the biological realm, variations are
perpetuated only if they enable individual members of the species to adapt,
that is, enable them to cope more effectively with their ecological environ-
ment." In the intellectual domain of Aristotelianism, the success of a variation
may be measured by its degree of acceptance amongst Aristotelians. One that
is more widely accepted than another can be said to have been more successful.
In biology, however, some variations may be harmful and others helpful for
the survival of the species in its particular ecological environment. But what
criteria could we invoke to determine whether a variant idea was harmful or
helpful to the success of Aristotelianism? Here the major subdivision of the
history of Aristotelianism into medieval and early modern versions may prove
helpful. We observed earlier that during the late Middle Ages, Aristotelianism
had no serious external rivals, whereas in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, it had numerous rivals. Without competitors during the late Middle
Ages, variant ideas were not required to have survival value for Aristotelia-
nism as a whole. It was under no threat from competitors. But during the early
modern period, variations may have been made to enable it to cope more
adequately with its competitors. Some of these variations, and perhaps the
most important, were drawn from the new science that had been under
development since the late sixteenth century. Some Aristotelians began to
deny the existence of celestial spheres, others denied the incorruptibility of the
celestial region, and so on. But did these new variations within Aristotelianism
have adaptive, or survival, value? Probably not. But why not?
Although numerous Aristotelians adopted some of the new ideas that came
into vogue in the seventeenth century, they did not, any more than their
medieval predecessors, use those new variations to strengthen Aristotelianism
as a whole. Thus the variations proved neither helpful nor harmful. They were
simply variations. Whether an Aristotelian formulated a variation himself or
drew it from an outside source, the variant idea simply formed part of that
scholar's Aristotelianism. If others found that particular idea useful or better
than what was available, they could make it part of their own respective
versions of Aristotelianism. But this process did nothing more than increase
the number of ideas in Aristotelianism. Old and new ideas would simply
subsist together. But was the old or the new idea better for Aristotelianism?
Even if we relate the measure of success of a variant idea directly to the
number of Aristotelians who adopted it, I fail to see how this can prove helpful
in determining whether this or that variant strengthened or weakened Aristo-

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352 EDWARD GRANT

telianism in its struggle with outside competitors. Nor indeed do I know how
we can determine the impact of a variation in the late Middle Ages, in the
period prior to the emergence of those competitors.

CONCLUSION

There is, of course, at least a third alternative to the two interpretations given
above, namely to ignore the problem. We could simply assume that we have a
fair idea of who the Aristotelians were and what Aristotelianism was and
probe no further. To date, this is precisely the approach that has been
employed. But if we follow such a course, it ought to be only because that
proves the best option after an examination of alternatives. This is not a trivial
problem. After all, some form of Aristotelianism was in effect for nearly five
hundred years and for much of that time it was the dominant intellectual force
in European thought. This paper is an attempt to see if we can relate and
interpret the realities that actually underlie the conceptual terms 'Aristotelian'
and 'Aristotelianism'.
From its entry into Europe, Aristotelianism was an extraordinarily capa-
cious natural philosophy. Over the centuries when it was a force to be
reckoned with, much that was deemed fundamental to Aristotelianism at some
period in its history was challenged, though not usually abandoned, at a later
time by something that was at variance with what Aristotle himself had said or
what his followers had at one time assumed. Aristotelianism often included
conflicting earlier and later opinions simultaneously. It was always a domain
of both traditional and innovative concepts and interpretations and was
therefore inevitably elastic and absorbent. Hence its most interesting feature
was a capaciousness that knew few limits. If Aristotelianism could absorb the
essential features of Copernicanism, how much easier could it accommodate
itself to the other rivals we mentioned above - Platonism, Neoplatonism,
Stoicism, and Atomism. In a variety of ways, Aristotelians incorporated
aspects of most, if not all, of these philosophies.
Aristotelianism was seemingly indestructible and irrefutable because it was
so much more absorbent than adaptable. In this it was unlike two other
scientific 'isms' - Newtonianism and Darwinism - whose adherents con-
sciously sought to retain and improve the consistency of their respective
systems. There was no real effort to adapt Aristotelianism to the newly
evolving science and natural philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Rather, as we saw, individual Aristotelians simply accepted some of
the new ideas and incorporated them into the available matrix of Aristotelia-
nism, which simply grew larger and more complex, if not incoherent.
No serious effort was made to mesh the new ideas with the old in order to
forge a more viable Aristotelianism. As a natural philosophy in which neither

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 ARlSTOTEL~M . 353

mathematics, nor experiment, nor prediction, played a significant role in

determining the structure and operations of nature, no arguments or proofs
could easily affect it, to say nothing of demolishing it. When mathematical
physics reached a stage of development in the seventeenth century where it
could provide explanations and predictions of phenomena that were imposs-
ible within Aristotelian natural philosophy, the latter lost credibility. The
species of Aristotelianism did not evolve into anything else. It became extinct,
falling victim to the new science of the seventeenth century, which had the
same effect on Aristotelianism as those alleged Earth-impacting meteorites
had on the dinosaurs some sixty-five million years ago.

REFERENCES
I. No one laboured more heroically to describe and understand medieval and renaissance
Aristotelianism than the late, and much lamented, Charles Schmitt. All who venture into
the subject, owe him a great debt. Although we shall never know whether he would have
approved of the approach taken in this article, I think it highly probable that he would
have welcomed another effort to shed light on the perplexing phenomenon of
Aristotelianism.
Although the loss of Charles Schmitt was a heavy blow, we must take comfort in the
fact that he was not alone in the study of renaissance Aristotelianism. Significant
contributions have been made by others (two noteworthy contributors are Charles H.
Lohr and L. W. B. Brockliss) and, judging from the calibre of past achievements, we have
good reason for optimism about future research.
I am grateful to the two reviewers who passed judgement on my article and raised
pertinent questions. My replies to their major points appear below.
2. Edward Grant, "A new look at medieval cosmology", Proceedings of the American Philoso-
phical Society, cxxix, pt 4 (1985), 424.
3. By "external stimulation" I mean influences by other philosophical systems - for example,
Platonism, Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Atomism - as would happen in the
sixteenth century. I do not mean such events as the theological condemnation issued at
Paris in 1277, which clearly had some effect on the course of medieval natural philosophy.
In that action the theologians who condemned and the theologians and masters of arts
who were warned not to hold or teach the 219 condemned propositions were almost all-
if not all - versed in Aristotelian natural philosophy. Their quarrels lay within the
confines of ideas and concepts about natural philosophy and theology that had been
debated at Paris for some decades prior to 1277.
4. See Edward Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility: Scholastic reaction
to Copernicanism in the seventeenth century", Transactions of the American Philosophi-
cal Society. lxxiv, pt 4 (1984), 3-4.
5. David L. Hull, "Darwinism as a historical entity: A historiographic proposal", in The
Darwinian heritage: including proceedings 0/ the Charles Darwin Centenary Conference.
Florence Center/or the History and Philosophy 0/ Science. June 1982, ed. by David Kohn,
with bibliographic assistance by Malcolm J. Kottler (princeton, N. J., 1985),773-812.
6. Hull explains that "although Darwin's name appears in the term 'Darwinians', it might seem
natural to use him as the type specimen in defining the Darwinian nexus. It is, but other
Darwinians such as Hooker and Huxley would serve as well" (ibid., 786). In his
conclusion (p. 809), he declares that "a scientist can be a Darwinian without accepting all

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354 . EDWARD GRANT

or even a large proportion of the elements of Darwinism. Conversely, a scientist can by

and large accept the tenets of Darwinism without being a Darwinian."
7. See Hull, "Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5), 784-800.
8. Indeed even those in the higher faculties oflaw, medicine, and theology were usually required
to have a master of arts degree, which meant that they had also studied Aristotle's natural
philosophy.
9. See my paper "Medieval departures from Aristotelian natural philosophy", to be published in
Annali dell'Istituto e Museo di Storia della Scienza di Firenze.
10. In the massive condemnation of 1277,the eternity of the world was denounced in approxima-
tely twenty different articles. For details, see Edward Grant, "Issues in natural philoso-
phy at Paris in the late thirteenth century", Medievalia et humanistica, n. s., xiii (1985),
77-81.
II. Translations of the Metaphysics were made from Arabic and Greek in the thirteenth century
by Michael Scot and William of Moerbeke, respectively (see "Aristotle", Dictionary of
scientific biography (16 vols, New York, 1970-80), i, 250-81, pp. 272-3; the section on the
"Tradition and influence" of Aristotle is by L. Minio-Paluello).
12. For J. L. Heiberg's Greek text and German translation of the first book and L. Nix's German
translation of the second book from an Arabic version, see J. L. Heiberg (ed.), Claudii
Ptolemaei opera quae exstant omnia, ii: Opera astronomica minora (Leipzig, 1907),69-145.
The conclusion ofbk I, which is omitted from Heiberg's version, has been published in
an Arabic edition with English translation by Bernard R. Goldstein, "The Arabic version
of Ptolemy's Planetary hypotheses", Transactions of the American Philosophical Society,
n.s., lvii, pt 4 (1967). For a description of the system as Roger Bacon described it, and as
it was generally understood in the Middle Ages, see Edward Grant, "Cosmology", in
David C. Lindberg (ed.), Science in the Middle Ages (Chicago, 1978),281-3.
13. Although most scholastic authors did not explicitly comment on the differences between the
Aristotelian and Ptolemaic systems, it is difficult to imagine that they were unaware of
them since, in his commentaries on Aristotle's De caelo and Metaphysics, both widely
known in the Middle Ages, Averroes had defended Aristotle and the concentric system
against Ptolemy's eccentrics and epicycles (see Francis J. Carmody, "The planetary
theory of Ibn Rushd", Osiris, x (1952), 556-86). Roger Bacon, who was one of the first
Latin scholastics, if not the first, to comment on the Ptolemaic system of eccentrics and
epicycles, distinguished between them and opted for Aristotle (Opera hactenus inedita
Rogeri Baconi, ed. by Robert Steele and Ferdinand M. Delorme, 16 fascicules (Oxford,
1905-40), Fascicule 4: De celestibus, tiber secundus communium naturalium (Oxford,
1913), 443-6; see also Pierre Duhem, Le systeme du monde: Histoire des doctrines
cosmologiques de Platon Ii Copernic (10 vols, Paris, 1913-59), iii, 424-8).
14. See Nicole Oresme, Le Livre du ciel et du monde, ed. by Albert D. Menut and Alexander J.
Denomy, C.S.B.; translated with an introduction by Albert D. Menut (Madison, Wis.,
1968), bk 2, ch. 16, 463 and John Buridan, Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris
quattuor De caelo et mundo, ed. by Ernest A. Moody (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), bk 2,
question 14, p. 191, lines 19-23.
15. For Albertus, see Alberti Magni Opera omnia, v, pt 1: De caelo et mundo, ed. by Paul Hossfeld
(Aschendorff, 1971), bk I, tract I, ch. 11, 29-30. Cecco considered the problem in his
Commentary on The sphere of Sacrobosco in Lynn Thorndike, The sphere of Sacrobosco
and its commentators (Chicago, 1949),ch. 7, 353. Although both authors give Thebit ibn
Qurra as the source of this interpretation, I have not found it in any of Thebit's works
that were translated into Latin.
Albertus says that this opinion was also held by Avicenna and Averroes. The omission
of Aristotle's name probably signifies that, in Albertus's judgement, Aristotle did not

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 ARISTOTELIANISM . 355

hold such an opinion. Despite their silence, it seems likely that both Albertus and Cecco
realized that on this issue they had departed from Aristotle.
16. Aristotle, De caelo, 2.8.290a. 25-27.
17. In support of the Moon's rotatory motion, see Albert of Saxony, Questions on De celo, bk 2,
qu.7, fo1.106r, col.2 (the fifth principal argument) in Questiones et decisiones physicales
insignium virorum: Alberti de Saxonia in octo libros Physicorum; tres libros De celo et
mundo; ... Recognitae rursus et emendatae summa accuratione et iudicio Magistri Georgii
Lokert Scotia quo sunt Tractatus proportionum (Paris, 1518); Pierre d'Ailly, 14 Quaes-
tiones in Spherae tractatus Ioannis de Sacro Busto Anglici viri clariss.; Gerardi Cremonen-
sis Theoricae planetarum novae; Prosdocimo de Beldomando Patavini super tractatus
sphaerico commentaria, nuper in lucem diducta per L.GA. nunquam amplius impressae...Pe-
tri Cardin. de Aliaco episcopi Camaracensis 14 Quaestiones ...Alpetragii Arabi Theorica
planetarum nuperrime Latinis mandata literis a Calo Calonymos Hebreo Neapolitano, ubi
nititur salvare apparentias in motibus planetarum absque eccentricis et epicyclis (Venice,
1531),fols 163v and 164v;and Paul of Venice, Summa naturalium (Venice, 1476): Liber
celi et mundi, 31, col.2 (because the work is unfoliated and provided with few signatures,
the page numbers have been counted from the beginning of the Liber celi et mundi).
18. Unlike Albert of Saxony, John Buridan had argued for uniformity of planetary behaviour and
properties: either all planets rotated around their own centres or none did. Buridan
adopted the latter alternative. See Edward Grant (ed.), A source book in medieval science
(Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 524-6, where Buridan's discussion of this issue is translated
from his Questions on the metaphysics, bk 12, qu.Ll ,
19. Plato, Timaeus, 39A-B. For a discussion of Plato's meaning and the manner in which the
spiral is generated, see Thomas L. Heath, Aristarchus of Samos: The ancient Copernicus
(Oxford, 1913), 169; for the relevant figure, see p.I60. This part of the Timaeus was
known in Latin translation during the Middle Ages.
20. The Sphere of Sacrobosco, ch.3, in Thorndike (ed. and tr.), The sphere of Sacrobosco (ref. 15),
133 (Latin text, p.IOI).
2!. Roger Bacon (see ref. 13), Communia naturalium, 433 (in line 14, the text has speras instead of
spirasi.
22. Earlier Theon of Alexandria, Averroes, and al-Bitruji had also described the spiral motion.
See Francis J. Carmody, De motibus celorum, critical edition of the Latin translation of
Michael Scot (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952), 52-54 and Nicole Oresme and the
kinematics of circular motion: Tractatus de commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate
motuum celi, ed. with an introduction, English translation, and commentary by Edward
Grant (Madison, Wis., 1971), 31-33, 240, 241.
23. See John North, "Coordinates and categories: The graphical representation of functions in
medieval astronomy", in Edward Grant and John E. Murdoch (eds), Mathematics and its
applications to science and natural philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1987), 173-
88, p. 184.
24. For example, Richard of Middleton (Clarissimi theologi magistri Ricardi Media Villa...super
quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae (4 vols, Brescia,
1591;reprinted Frankfurt-am-Main, 1963),bk 2, dist.14, art.2, question 5 in vol. ii, 182-
3) and Hervaeus Natalis (De materia celi, questions 7 and 8 in Quolibet Hervei...quolibeta
undecim cum octo ipsius...tractatibus infra per ordinem descriptis...De beatitudine; De
verbo; De eternitate mundi; De materia celi... (Venice, 1513; reprinted Ridgewood, N.J.,
1966),fols 47v-5Iv) in the thirteenth century; Buridan (Quaestiones super libris quattuor
De caelo et mundo (ref. 14), 170)and Oresme (Le Livre du ciel et du monde (ref. 14), bk 2,
ch.S, 375-7) in the fourteenth century; and the Coimbra Jesuits (Commentarii Collegii

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356 . EDWARD GRANT

Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu in quatuor libros De coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae, 2nd edn
(Lyons, 1598), bk 2, ch.3, quA, p.203) at the end of the sixteenth century.
25. See Edward Grant, Much ado about nothing: Theories of space and vacuum from the Middle
Ages to the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, 1981), part II.
26. This important theme was discussed at some length by Pierre Duhem, Le systeme du monde
(ref. 13), ix, ch.20, 363-430 for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and vo!. x (in
various places as indicated in the table of contents). For an English translation of
Duhem's account of the plurality of worlds, see Pierre Duhem, Medieval cosmology:
Theories ofinfinity. place. time. void. and the plurality of worlds, ed. and trans!. by Roger
Ariew (Chicago, 1985).A fine, but briefer, account appears in Steven J. Dick, Plurality of
worlds: The origins ofthe extraterrestrial life debate from Democritus to Kant (Cambridge,
1982),ch.2, 23-43. See also Edward Grant, "The condemnation of 1277, God's absolute
power, and physical thought in the late Middle Ages", Viator, x (1979), 211-44,
pp.219-26.
27. A detailed discussion appears in Grant, Much ado about nothing (ref. 25), 24-66;also Duhem,
Le systeme du monde (ref. 13),viii, 7-120,and pp. 369-427in Ariew's partial translation of
Duhem's discussion (ref. 26).
28. For the major accounts, see Marshall Clagett, The science of mechanics in the Middle Ages
(Madison, Wis., 1959), ch.8, 505-40 and Anneliese Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der
scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2nd edn (Rome, 1951), part II: "Die Impetustheorie",
113-314.
29. The major medieval treatises on this important theme were by Thomas Bradwardine and
Nicole Oresme. For the text and translation by the former, with commentary, see Thomas
of Bradwardine, his Tractatus de proportionibus, ed. and trans!. by H. Lamar Crosby, Jr
(Madison, Wis., 1955);for the latter, see Nicole Oresme, "De proportionibus proportio-
num" and "Ad pauca respicientes", ed. with introductions, English translations, and
critical notes by Edward Grant (Madison, Wis., 1966).
30. On the terraqueous sphere, see Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility"
(ref. 4), 22-32.
3I. Many scholastics who sided with Tycho were Jesuits. See Christine Jones Schofield, Tychonic
and semi-Tychonic world systems (New York, 1981;Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University,
1964), 277-89, especially p.286, and Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and
immobility", 12-13.
32. For example the three Jesuits, Giovanni Baptista Riccioli (1598-1671) (Almagestum novum
(Bologna, 165I), pars posterior, 238, co!.I), Melchior Comaeus (1598-1665) (Curriculum
philosophiae peripateticae uti hoc tempore in scholis decurri solet (Herbipolis (Wiirzburg),
1657), 489), and George de Rhodes (1597-1671) (Philosophia peripateticae ad veram
Aristotelis mentem libris quatuor digesta et disputata (Lyons, 1671),278-81).
33. See Edward Grant, "Celestial perfection from the Middle Ages to the late seventeenth
century", in Religion. science. and world view: Essays in honor of Richard S. Westfall, ed.
by Margaret J. Osler and Paul L. Farber (Cambridge, 1985), 152-7.
34. Riccioli came to this conclusion (op. cit. (ref. 32), 157-61).
35. One reviewer made this a fundamental criticism, charging that the term 'Aristotelianism' is
only an historiographical convenience that refers to no real historical phenomenon. I am
charged with talking "about Aristotelians as though they are a real constituency of
European intelligentsia from 1300 to 1650". The fact that 'Aristotelians' were dis-
tinguished as a group in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, prompts our reviewer to
declare that" 'Aristotelian' is an indispensable category for a historian of late Renais-
sance and early-modem science, to enable him to distinguish such academic traditiona-

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 ARISTOTELIANISM . 357

lists from the 'new philosophers'. But the category is of far less use to a medievalist who is
dealing with thinkers who all share the same premises and attitudes."
For my critic, terms like 'Aristotelian' and 'Aristotelianism' are mere convenient labels
to enable us to categorize things and perhaps to talk about them, but they point to
nothing that is historically real. No doubt terms have been used in this manner. But it
does not seem true about the terms 'Aristotelian' and 'Aristotelianism'. For although the
terms may be convenient, they represent real historical phenomena, which are the major
focus of this study. For we need only ask to whom were those in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries referring when they used the term 'Aristotelian', or 'Aristotelians'?
Surely most of those who used that term had some real flesh and blood individuals in
mind whom they thought of as 'Aristotelians'. Indeed, the same applies to modem
historians of the Renaissance. When they use that same term, they must surely believe
that some individuals were'Aristotelians'. Therefore all act as though they are concerned
with what is, or was, a real phenomenon (if it is unreal, then what is it?).
And what about the Middle Ages? Since they did not identify or label themselves as
Aristotelians do we modems have any warrant to do so? Our critic has supplied the best
reason for believing that we have. For he, or she, has argued that during the Middle Ages
scholastic natural philosophers formed a cohesive group because they shared "the same
premises and attitudes" about the thought of Aristotle. Because those "premises and
attitudes", as well as opinions, judgements and even education were shared to a great
degree with a similar group labelled as 'Aristotelians' in the sixteenth century, we are
justified in applying the same term to the group that preceded. The fact that the term
'Aristotelian' was only applied in the sixteenth century - perhaps first by the enemies of
Aristotle's followers - does not alter the real connections and historical affiliations
between scholastic followers of Aristotle in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Aristote-
lianism was as real an historical phenomenon in the Middle Ages, as it was in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
36. See Edward Grant, "Aristotelianism" and the longevity of the medieval world view", History
of science, xvi (1978), 93-106, especially pp.IOZ-3. In this article, I emphasized the
capaciousness of Aristotelianism with respect to cosmology.
37. Charles SChmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1983), 10;
also quoted in Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility" (ref. 4), 4,
n.lI.
38. Charles SChmitt, "A critical survey and bibliography of studies on renaissance Aristotelia-
nism, 1958-1969", Saggi e testi, xi (padua, 1971), 17; also quoted in Grant, "Aristotelia-
nism and the longevity of the medieval world view" (ref. 36), IOZ.
39. The idea for using biological models was suggested by my departmental colleagues, Professors
Ronald Giere and Michael Bradie. Professor Frederick Churchill, who first drew my
attention to David Hull's work, helped me to understand the differences between the
models. Professor Noretta Koertge also responded generously to my queries. To all of
them I am grateful. Any errors, misunderstandings, and misapplications that may appear
here are in no way attributable to them.
40. In much of what follows, I am using as a guide two articles by David L. Hull. The first has
already been mentioned ("Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5; the second is
"Exemplars and scientific change", in PSA 1982: Proceedings ofthe 1982 biennial meeting
ofthe Philosophy of Science Association, ed. by Peter D. Asquith and Thomas Nickles (Z
vols, East Lansing, Mich., 1983), ii, 479-503. Ernst Mayr provides an important critique
of Hull's paper ("Comments on David Hull's paper on exemplar's and type specimens",
ibid., 504-11).
41. See Hull, "Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5), 781.

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358 . EDWARD GRANT

42. Hull rejects the idea that Darwinism, or other conceptual systems, can have essences. See
'Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5), 778.
43. For Whewell, see Hull, op. cit. (ref. 40), 481-2; for Cuvier, see William Coleman, Georges
Cuvier zoologist: A study in the history ofevolution theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1964),3,
143-6.
44. For the points of agreement on the macrostructure, see my article, "Aristotelianism and the
longevity of the medieval world view" (ref. 36), 94-95.
45. Although Aristotle manifestly believed in an eternal world without beginning or end and was
thus at odds with medieval Christians, who were committed to a world that had a
supernatural beginning, some sought to explain away and reconcile those differences. See
Richard Dales's description of the manner in which certain thirteenth century scholastics
denied that Aristotle actually believed in a world without a beginning. In their view,
Aristotle intended only to claim that the world and time came into being together. Hence
Christians were free to believe that the world existed through all of time and yet could
have had a beginning by means of a supernatural creation ("The origin of the doctrine of
the double truth", Viator, xv (1984),169-79).
46. See Oresme, op. cit. (ref. 29), 274.
47. Cited by Hull, op. cit. (ref. 40), 484, from Ernst Mayr, Principles of systematic zoology (New
York, 1969),369.
48. Hull observes that in a species, the notion of a "typical" member is inappropriate. Any
member can serve that function ("Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5), 782). He
concludes (p. 784) that "if one wanted to individuate the Darwinians in 1859, Huxley
would do as well as Hooker, Hooker as well as Darwin, and so on. Similarly, if one
wanted to individuate Darwinism in 1859,Hooker's treatment of evolution in his Flora of
Australia ... would do as well as Darwin's treatment in the Origin."
49. The opinion in this lengthy sentence is not my creation, but I cannot recall the source.
50. See Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility" (ref. 4), 8-9.
51. In my article, "A new look at medieval cosmology, 1200-1687"(ref. 2),426, I had argued that
"Insofar as White had accepted the heliocentric system, we must conclude that he had
effectively abandoned Aristotelian cosmology. But he could nonetheless continue to
consider himself an Aristotelian if he retained other significant aspects of Aristotelian
natural philosophy." On the basis of the two approaches outlined in this paper, I would
now hold that, despite his extraordinary view, White remains an Aristotelian in
cosmology.
The second reviewer asks whether Gassendists and Cartesians, many of whom fit the
population conception of an Aristotelian (that is, they commented on one or more works
of Aristotle and accepted some or many of his assumptions), ought also to be identified as
Aristotelians. If they meet the general criteria established earlier then they may indeed be
properly categorized as Aristotelians. But if analogous population criteria are formulated
for Gassendists and Cartesians, nothing prevents some or all of them from also being
classified as Gassendists or Cartesians. Under such circumstances, it would follow that
the species of Aristotelianism and Cartesianism or Gassendism would possess certain
features in common. However an individual may belong to more than one group,
whether or not they share overlapping or common descriptive features. Thus Thomas
White may be appropriately classified as both an Aristotelian and a Copernican.
52. Stephen Toulmin, Human understanding: The collective use and evolution ofconcepts (prince-
ton, N.J., 1972), 139.
53. Ibid., 142.
54. Ibid., 138.

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