Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
3
MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that Judge Asuncion violated Art.14 of the Code of Commerce. The
cited provision prohibits public officers from engaging in business.
HELD: Judge Asuncion did not, or cannot, violate it since such provision is deemed
abrogated
Although the cited provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce, it
however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officials and employees.
Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with
the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the state and defines
the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory. Political law embraces
constitutional law, law of public officers and corporations, administrative law.
Specifically, Art.14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of
administrative Law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business, hence, political in essence.
Note that the Code of Commerce took effect on 1888. Upon the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to US and later from US to RP, Art.14 of the Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been automatically abrogated because where
there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign,
whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly reenacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals on 1980. On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reogranized and became the
Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129. On 1984, petitoner was
appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased
to be a member of the Judiciary. After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a
reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. A Screening
Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower
courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new court of
Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court
justices. When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority
ranking changes from number 11 to 26.
Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to
"inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction
of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and
Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.
They alleged that petioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where
he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
ISSUE: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of
Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court exisiting before the promulgation of E.O.
No. 33.
HELD: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court
existing prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the
1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is
considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts
existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization
launched by the revolutionary goverment of Corazon Aqwuino in the aftermath of the
people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in
any country or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as suddent.
radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners
as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioner received a
Memorandum signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra designating
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and a Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share.
Pending the declaration of the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls under the
term national patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, WON selling
mere 51% shares and not the land itself can be considered part of national
patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
It is per se judicially enforceable The Constitution mandates that qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the foreign
firm, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the shares
of MHC in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had
resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2)
months immediately preceding the election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd
Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement
and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of
voters declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and not of Quezon
City acquire the nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year
immediately preceding the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition of
DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be
proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light of DOMINOs disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion proceedings
declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final
and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained. It is not within the
competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to declare the challenged
voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over
exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of
voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in
which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the decision to be
a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be
between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter
and identity of causes of action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of obtaining the
highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath
of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member
of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral
Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. It would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
In most cases filed to challenge the constitutional validity of any statute or order, the
issue as to whether the petitioners are the proper parties has been questioned. In
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRAGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO,
_______________
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, Petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE
HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, In
his capacity as provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as
Provincial treasurer, G.R. NO. 133064, dated SEPTEMBER 16, 1999, the Mayor of the
City of Santiago, the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City and
three residents of Santiago City filed a petition for Writ of Revision assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8028, converting the City of Santiago, Isabela
from an independent component city to a component city, the locus standi of the
petitioners was questioned. The Court in said case held that it is now an ancient rule
that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who sustained a direct
injury as a result of the endorsement.
Annotations have been made on similar issues in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) such as Constitutionality of Statute or Action Must be Raised by
Proper Party (Taxpayers Suit) in 15 SCRA 497-501, Judicial Deference to Political
Questions in 21 SCRA 822-837, The Plebiscite CasesPolitical or Justiciable Issues in
49 SCRA 180-193, Judicial Review of the Effectivity of a New Constitution and the
Political Doctrine in 50 SCRA 393-413, and Political or Justiciable Question in 59 SCRA
652-673. The issues raised in said cases are justiciability, standing, mootness,
ripeness and political questions. This annotation will dwell on the rule of locus standi
of the petitioners in filing cases questioning the constitutional validity of statutes or
executive orders.
1. Locus Standi Defined
Locus standi generally means a place to stand. It refers to the standing of a person to
file a case. (Ballantine Law Dic-
643
644
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
questions of ripenesswhether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to
warrant judicial interventionand of mootnesswhether the occasion for judicial
intervention persists. (Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10 [1975]). (Fisher, Ibid.)
3. The Issue of Adverseness
To resolve a legal claim, courts need to know that parties have been adversely
affected. Abstract or hypothetical questions, removed from a concrete factual setting,
prevent courts from reaching an informed judgment. The words cases and
controversies limit the federal courts to questions presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 95 [1968])
American courts occasionally consider a case even when both parties agree on the
issue. In United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), the Justice Department
646
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990) and Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the
Philippine Supreme Court ruled that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]).
b. Early Decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court Also Restricted the Rule on Locus
Standi
In 1945, the Philippine Supreme Court in Custodio vs. President of Senate, 42 O.G.
1243 (1945) held that a person who questions the validity of a statute or law must
show that he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. This rule was reiterated in Manila Race Horse
Training Association vs. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951).
In People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), the Court ruled that there must be a showing
that the petitioners interests are or about to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of the ordinance in question. Unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of a statute or ordinance, he has no
standing.
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20
SCRA 849 (1967), the Court held that the invocation of petitioner as motel operators
of their alleged right to being free from reasonable search and seizure need not be
taken seriously.
c. The Relaxed Rule on Locus Standi
In Rodriguez contra El Tesoro de Filipinas, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), the Court ruled that if a
taxpayer cannot attack the validity of the executive order in question or a law
requiring
649
650
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
these petitions. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Taxpayer-Plaintiff must sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party interest. Before he can
invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he
will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public. (Bugnay Construction and Development Corp. vs. Laron, 176
SCRA 243 [1989]).
However, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), the Court ruled that
petitioners do not possess the legal capacity to institute the action for the annulment
of the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) because they are without a present
substantial interest as distinguished from mere expectancy, or future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. The phrase substantial present interest
means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him,
652
654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. (Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA
337 [1998]).
The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does
not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of affected
companies. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
o0o [Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review, 314 SCRA
641(1999)]
1.Introduction
Locus Standi means a place to standa standing in law or suit. (Sanidad vs.
COMELEC, 95 SCRA 358 [1976])
A review of recent decisions show that the Supreme Court has been liberal in
recognizing the Locus Standi of persons or entities who file actions questioning the
validity of a law or actions of the government issuances. In Planters Producers, Inc.
vs. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 (2008):
_______________
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 548,
521
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
tion, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI
No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability
of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain
any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the
ultimate consumer, not the seller.
The Supreme Court said that the mere fact of payment of the levy imposed by Letter
of Instruction 1465 is sufficient to acquire locus standi:
Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public
suit, Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the
enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for
every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has
passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify
it from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it
bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe
sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to
Fertiphil. Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI because
it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy certainly rendered the
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent
power of taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that
taxes can only be levied for public purpose.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with
some modification. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
2.Meaning and Nature of Locus Standi
A party who suffered direct injury has a locus standi to challenge the validity of a law.
Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in-interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
The Liberal trend is to allow citizens affected to file suits as interested parties. A real
party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as
a repre-
523
VOL. 548,
523
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
sentative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a
citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
3.Difficulty of Determining Locus Standi
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled
that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of
an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury
as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public. (Id.)
4.Locus Standi of petitioner in cases of mandamus
To be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a
party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person
which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The Court
will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party
who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal questions. Legal
standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is
being challenged. (Pimentel, Jr. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622
[2005])
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in such a
case that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. (Jumamil vs. Cafe, 470
SCRA 475 [2005])
5.Locus Standi of Government Officials
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
VOL. 548,
525
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Province of Batangas
vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736 [2004])
In relation to the claim of a member of Congress to intervene, invoking his
prerogative as legislator to curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public
funds to compensate Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well
as that as a taxpayer, it should be noted that the amount which the Court directed to
be paid by the Government to Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),
was derived from money deposited by Manila International Airport Authority, an
agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality separate
and distinct from those of the National Government and agencies thereof whose
budgets have to be approved by Congress. (Republic vs. Gingoyon, 481 SCRA 457
[2006])
A national political party likewise meets the standing requirement, provided that it
has obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in a national elections,
which entitles it to participate in the legislative process. (Senate of the Philippines vs.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 [2006])
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006]; Baltazar vs.
Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion, such as in cases of transcendental
importance, or where the issues raised have far-reaching implications. (Baltazar
vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen
and has an interest in the execution of the laws. (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA
74 [2006])
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of
526
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a
favorable action will likely redress the injury. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA
173 [2006])
A party invoking the transcendental importance exception to the standing
requirement must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173
[2006])
This is one of the right cases where the Supreme Court held a liberal recognition of
the locus standi of a private citizen.
VOL. 548,
527
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
Only recently, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno addressed in a forum vowed to further
introduce reform to comply with the constitutional principle of free access to courts.
DE AGBAYANI VS PNB
1971
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellee Agbayani obtained a loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant-
appellant PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate
mortgage. In 1945, Executive Order No. 32 was issued by then President Osmea
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations
As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of
P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant-appellant instituted extra-
judicial foreclosure on the mortgaged property for the recovery of the balance of the
loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff-appellee countered with his suit against defendant-
appellant on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage sought to
be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of
maturity, July19, 1944.
HELD:
Prior to the declaration of nullity of a challenged legislative or executive act, it must
be enforced and had to be complied with. It is entitled to obedience and respect until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity. Parties may have
acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting
than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects.
It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact
must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it
can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. Therefore, during the
eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run.
In the case at bar, there is no need to deal with the effects of declaration of
unconstitutionality of EO and RA because when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years.
Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the
mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of
as a defense.
Facts:
Herein petitioners and intervenors seek reinstatement and payment of back wages.
Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120, which took effect upon its approval on 30
January 1987,reorganizing the then Ministry of Tourism, provides that incumbents
whose positions are not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern or
On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Orders, only the court can declare
a law or order unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the Office of the
Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.
Facts:
Petitioner appealed the case before the Minister of Labor which was subsequently
dismissed for lack of merit. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was likewise denied by the Minister of Labor. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
Ruling:
"x x x Petitioner's contention that the constitutionality of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6
should be passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission, lacks merit. The
Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately declare a
law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains
operative and can be the source of rights and duties.
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC
January 24, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners assert that the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to recognize their vested
rights allegedly created under the coconut levy laws, constitutes taking of private
property without due process of law. They contended that to accord retroactive
application to a declaration of unconstitutionality would be unfair inasmuch as such
approach would penalize the farmers who merely obeyed then valid laws.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored.
The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule
otherwise would be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be
justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of law.
In the case at bar, the Court rules that the dictates of justice, fairness and equity do
not support the claim of the alleged farmer-owners that their ownership of the UCPB
shares should be respected due to the following:
1. The farmers or claimants do not have any legal right to own the UCPB shares
distributed to them.
2. To grant the said shares to petitioners would be iniquitous and prejudicial to
the remaining farmers who have not received the same.
3. Due to operational problems, the intended beneficiaries of the shares were
not able to receive what was due them.
4. The coconut farmers who sold copra did not get the receipts for the payment
of the coconut levy.
From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to
the UCPB shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were
haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that are
found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds.
Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would
also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people,
who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore
expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would
be used no less, than for public purpose.
Facts:
Petitioners, as taxpayers, question the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,"
under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
The proviso reads -
(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the
Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio
chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
Held:
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure . . .
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the
position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his
appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City. His acts as SBMA
official are not necessarily null and void. He may be considered a de facto officer,
"one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of
policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and
third persons.
Where the duties of the office were exercised, under color of a known election or
appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want
of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown
to the public, under color of an election, or appointment or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, shall valid before the same is adjudged to be such.
The proviso under R.A. 7227, which states that for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed
as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority, is declared
unconstitutional. Consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of
Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent
Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by
him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of his authority as
officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
The Operative Fact Doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional law but
also to decisions made by the president or the administrative agencies that have the
force and effect of laws, especially if the said decisions produced acts and
consequences that must be respected.
Facts:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court
cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must,
by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original
6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the
said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret
voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.
Ruling:
The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only
to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President
or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact
doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority
Facts:
Petitioners are stall holders at the Municipal Public Market, which had just been newly
renovated. Respondent (Municipal Mayor) through a letter gave petitioners five days
notice for a meeting concerning the municipal market. One of the things discussed
was the imposition of a "goodwill fee" to pay for the loan made by the municipality
for the renovation.
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was later approved by the Sangguniang Bayan which
imposed the goodwill fee and which authorized the respondent to enter into lease
contracts over the said public market. Less than a year later, respondent wrote a
letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly
renovated municipal public market without any lease contract. As a consequence of
which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested
applicants. This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall
holders at the municipal Public Market, to file before the RTC a Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent.
Petitioners prayed that respondent be enjoined from imposing the goodwill fees
pending the determination of the reasonableness thereof, and from barring
petitioners from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. One of the main
issues being raised by petitioners is the validity of the Ordinance.
Held:
It is a well established rule that questions on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures must be raised first in an Administrative case with
the Secretary of Justice before the courts judicial power can be sought following the
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
However, where the issue raised is a purely legal question, then it is well within the
competence and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency.
Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws,
constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to
the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish.
The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC is whether Municipal Ordinance No.
98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a
public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and
YNOT VS IAC
1987
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef
from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for
violation of Executive Order No. 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate
to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The
government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of
police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Held:
All Courts can exercise judicial review
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty
in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,
"final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
Other issues:
Police power
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not
reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is
difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another
can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the
slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent their slaughter either.
Separation of powers
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers.
For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines
-
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution
The totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation
to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not
there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos
vs. COMELEC,]must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
GO, SR VS. RAMOS (2009)
FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated
by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable
alien. To prove his contention, Luis argued that birth certificate of Jimmy was
tampered, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that
although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario
Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered since all the other entries
were typewritten except the entry on his citizenship which was handwritten as
FChinese.
Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina
mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1(4) of
the 1935 Constitution and CA 625. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952
and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an
undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country
as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised
in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog. As to erroneous
entry, he attributed it to the employees of the LCR.
ISSUE: whether Jimmy is a Filipino citizen = NO
HELD: Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a
citizen. Since his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to
pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However, neither the Philippine Bill of
1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare
claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the
passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not
suffice. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the
father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother
and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a
Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen
HELD: Yes. The issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not attained
finality. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following
concur: (1) A persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party; (2)The solicitor general or his authorized representative
took active part in the resolution thereof; and (3)The finding or citizenship is affirmed
by this court.
Pennisi was able to present the birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda
Quintos and a certification issued by the LCR Of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that
Quintos was born on 14 august 1949 of Filipino parents in Panabingan, San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija; and certified true copy of the Letter Dated 14 July 1999 Of The
Australian Department Of Immigration And Multicultural Affairs, Stating That As Of 14
July 1999, Quintos Has Not Been Granted Australian Citizenship. These documents
have more probative value and must prevail over the statements of Barangay
Officials of Nueva Ecija that no Quintos and Tomedas have resided in the said
barangay and such family names do not exist in census or master list of voters.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The Quintoses
and Tomedas were not included in the census, such as they could have been mere
transients in the place. As for their absence in the masters list of voters, they could
have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos birth
(made 10 years after her birth) does not indicate fraud because it was not issued at
anytime near the filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen.
Finally, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself
attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.
FACTS: In 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her COC for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other
contender, Olivia Paras. Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification
questioning her citizenship against her were filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) which reached the Court. Comelec ruled against Limkaichong. On April 1,
2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint
Resolution of the Comelec and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET
by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as
taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district
concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the
HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the
eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong
was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed.
They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not
attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy
from the time of her marriage to the latter. On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed
both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives.
HELD: Yes. Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The
governing law is the citizenship provision under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution. Limkaichongs father was conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino,
it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. It matters not whether
the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the
line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent
has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office,
as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent
issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and
having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age under
paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Having failed to prove that
Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother who was a natural-born
Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenship
informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the barangay
FACTS: Vicente Ching, born August 11, 1964, was a legitimate son of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother. He took the 1998 Bar Exams and passed but he was not
allowed to take his oath because of the questionable status of his citizenship. It was
only on 15 June 1999, at thirty-five (35) years old or over fourteen (14) years after he
had reached the age of majority, when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625. In the Manifestation he filed together with his Affidavit of Election and his Oath
ISSUE: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14)
years after he has reached the age of majority?
RULING: NO.
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of
this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the US Government to the effect that
the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority
However, the SC held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice that the three (3) year period
is not an inflexible rule. But it cautioned that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite. Election in this case was only made over 7
years after reaching the age of majority and the court did not consider it to have
been made within a reasonable time.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege.
RULING: NO as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Ching cannot take cannot find refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare where the
court considered the exercise of the right of suffrage sufficient to show his preference
for Philippine citizenship. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed
under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would
not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother.
FACTS: Chule Y. Lim, born October 29, 1954, filed a petition for correction of entries
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court alleging that: 1) her surname YU was
misspelled as Yo, 2) her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have
been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina and 3) it was erroneously
indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have
been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her
parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters
father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage
contracted in China. Also, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of
the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no
record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the correction. The Republic
assailed the decision stating that the respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirements of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age
of majority citing Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625.
FACTS: Petitioners are children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother all of
whom were born under the 1935 Philippine Constitution. They were all raised in the
Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent
their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the
country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled
abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship
in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, on 15
August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
took his oath of allegiance. On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same. In 1978,
Valeriano took his oath of allegiance.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however,
failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required
under Section 1 of CA 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected
Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.
RULING:
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of
the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with
the nearest civil registry.
Where the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive
acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done .
The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein
FACTS: Petitioners filed petition for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the
HRET challenged her eligibility. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese
citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that
she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and
to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her
marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a
determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into
the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was
regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she
claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral
attack.
HRET dismissed the petition and petitioners sought reconsideration.
RULING:
Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen.
To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of
naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would
constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity. The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs
father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated
by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a
matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizens descendant.
RULING: Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive,
does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the
judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule
otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which,
as already stated, is not permissible.
The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July
9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros
Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent
any evidence to the contrary.
RULING: Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the
alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother
indeed lost her Philippine citizenship.
Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable
proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. . It bears no indication of basis for foreign
citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named
therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that such person was
issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other
special law. It is only evidence of registration.
Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is
the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof,
reads: Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
xxx
With Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino,
it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore,
following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for
holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent
issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and
having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The
HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
FACTS: Nora Sagun, born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City, is the legitimate child of
a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to
Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to
5. Denaturalization
FACTS: Hubert Tan Co born on March 23, 1974 and his sister, Arlene Tan Co, born on
May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co
Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction
(LOI) No. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The Chairman of the Committee issued on
February 15, 1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on
February 15, 1977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the
ISSUE: Whether or not LOI No. 270 and CA No. 47are statutes in pari
materia which should be read together so that petitioners can claim the
benefit of derivative mode of naturalization under CA 473
RULING: LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of
qualified aliens residing in the Philippines. While they provide for different
procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270
governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same purpose
and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having
demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the Philippines, as well as affinity
to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the
economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated into the
national fabric by being granted Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for
the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less cumbersome
and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are
able to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute
to the cultural, social and political well- being of the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in
pari materia. Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI
No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as an integral
part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA
No. 473,9 which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor
children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the
minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners
in this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of
naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are
likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition: (a)
that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were
born in the Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when Co Boon
Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;
FACTS: The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition for
naturalization despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section
2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have
included the spouses income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income. Second, it
failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs
expenses vis--vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his
proven average gross annual income around the time of his application, which was
only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c)
that Ongs children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third,
the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an
appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification
of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
De Guzman vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were
candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On
April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification
docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines,
but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.
Ruling: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of
his failure to renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a
foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. [14]
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant
case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after
taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it must be
emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish
to seek elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Jacot vs Dal
Facts:
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. 3
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a
request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The
Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval 4 of petitioners
request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006, the
Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing
petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. 6
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification 8 before
the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter
failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act
No. 9225.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
Issue:
whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007
local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship.
Ruling:
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy
do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be
complied with for different purposes.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy.
Facts:
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman
of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.On October 25, 2007,
respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the
ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public
office. In his Answer, petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the
same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known
as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He returned to
thePhilippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman
were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law
explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement.
Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to
renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship 18 by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx---xxxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
xxxx--xxxxx
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we
declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen
cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
Willie Yu vs Santiago
Facts:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the
Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After
manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing
a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed
the return. 2 Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The
parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10
November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court
disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino
citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese
passport in 1971, valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization
as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for
and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines
who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared
Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the
incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the COMELECs Joint
Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Reacquisition or Repatriation
Republic vs dela Rosa (1994)
Frivaldo opted to reacquire Filipino citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed in the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the
judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-
year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is
counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of
First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in
naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its
promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country;
(2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government
promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any
decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.
Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact
that she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for
public office. Filing a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship
because in the certificate, the candidate declares himself to be a Filipino citizen and
that he will support the Philippine Constitution. Such declaration operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. The mere fact that respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and
has an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting express renunciation.
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy
process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.
Ciceron P. Altarejos, a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate
in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections was petitioned by the respondents to
be disqualified or cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a
Filipino citizen and made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that he
was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
Altejaros took his oath of allegiance as a repatriated Filipino on Dec. 17, 1997 before
the special Committee on Naturalization. However no copy of his oath was registered
in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of immigration until Feb. 18, 2004.
The registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In the
case at bar, petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he
filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections.
Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application and was,
therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10,
2004 elections.
Tabasa vs CA (2006)
When petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship
derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of
naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner theorizes
that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born
Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when
he was still a minor.
The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino
women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born
Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of
repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of
said natural-born Filipinos.
Tabasa lost his citizenship by operation of law and not due to political and economic
exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by political and
economic reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization.
Facts:
Ruling:
Yes, he is qualified. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of
this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
Ruling:
1. No. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental
functions.
R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or
TESDA under the declared "policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high
quality and efficient technical education and skills development in support of the
development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower responsive to and in
accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities."
Under constitutional and statutory terms, we do not believe that the role and status
of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary
of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of governmental functions i.e., the
handling of formal and non-formal education and training, and skills development. As
an unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped
with both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.
2. The writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds was not valid. TESDAs
funds are public in character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and
thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature
and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Under
Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the implementation of the Act
shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being
sourced from the Treasury, are moneys belonging to the government, or any of its
departments, in the hands of public officials.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held
and firmly established. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is
crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming
immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. The
restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is
engaged in a proprietary activity. The parties executed the Contract Agreement for
the purpose of constructing the Luzon Railways. Despite petitioners claim that the
EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank was
mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do
business in the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Northrail
Project was a purely commercial transaction.
It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it
contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary
Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term "implementing
agency" has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was
immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it
failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law.
Thus, following this Courts ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and
-controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to
sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
c. Consent to be sued
How consent is given.
Veterans vs CA (1992)
Facts: VMPSI was operating as a security agency. By virtue of the provisions of RA
5487, the Private Security Agency Law, the then Pt. Chief Lt. Fidel Ramos issued
Rules and Regulations requiring that all private security agencies/company security
forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region
where their main offices are located. On May 12, 1086, a Memorandum Argreement
was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly
contract rate per guard for 8 hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within
Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside. On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency filed a
complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition. PADPAO found
VMPSI guilty and recommended its expulsion from PADPAO and cancellation of its
license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA (Phil. Constabulary Supervisory
Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies) made similar findings.
When VMPSI requested the issuance of a clearance/certificate of membership,
PADPAO refused to issue one. VMPSI wrote to the PC Chief on March 10 1988 but as
the latter did not reply and VMPSIs license was expiring in March 31, VMPSI filed a
civil case in the RTC against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. The RTC issued a restraining
order enjoining the defendants from committing acts that would result in the
cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSIs license. The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA moved to
dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the case is against the State which had not
given its consent thereto. On June 10, 1988, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the defendants from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSIs
license, until further orders from the court. On August 11, 1989, the CA granted the
petition for certiorari filed by the defendants, ordering the RTC to dismiss the
complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issues: W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against
the state without its consent.
How is consent given?
DA vs NLRC (1993)
Facts: The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the
latter to the said governmental entity. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the
Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and
overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of
Cagayan de Oro City against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security
Agency. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein
petitioner and jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the
payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security
guards. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Commanding
the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two
respondents.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ
of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without
the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that,
therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant
thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also
pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and
jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
Petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the
writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a
money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the
NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
Ruling: 1. Yes. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State
may not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule
effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. True, the doctrine, not too
infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it
grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply
invoking its non-suability.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state
may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be
given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general
law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the
state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents
and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters
into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the
level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign
immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is
not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have
assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into
the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary
in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of
wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract
for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the
consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied.
In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy
a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law.
1. Express Consent
a. Money claims arising from contract
Issue: What is the proper remedy to enforce collection of money claim against the
Government arising from contract? Will mandamus apply?
Ruling: Mandamus us not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against
the State but an ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the suit disguised
2. Implied Consent
a. Government enters into business contracts
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that
the state is immune from suit.
3. Scope of Consent
a. Under Act No. 3083
G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970
. Under a Charter
G.R. No. L-32667 January 31, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION
FACTS: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a
decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. 1 A writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been
issued. 2 He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees
and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity of the order
assailed is challenged on the ground that the funds subject of the garnishment "may
be public in character."
ISSUE: w/n the funds of People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (a government
owned entity) may be garnished?
c. Execution
[ G.R. No. 113191. September 18, 1996
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
FACTS: On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-
0690-93 for his alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the
"labor-only" contracting law. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent
Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
Issue: Whether or not APT can be sued to be held liable to the obligation of PNEI
HELD Proclamation No. 50, creating APT which has been mandated to "take title to
and possession of, conserve, provisionally manage and dispose of assets" that have
been identified for privatization or disposition, clearly provides that said
instrumentality, among other things, can "sue and be sued." This provision
indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court. Nonetheless, we have likewise
since explained that suability does not necessarily mean liability on the part of the
particular instrumentality or agency of the government. The liability of APT under
this particular arrangement should be co-extensive with the amount of assets taken
over from the privatized firm.
4. Suability vs Liability
1.Introduction, p. 699
2.Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity, p. 700
3.The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, p. 702
4.Absolute and Relative Immunity, p. 702
5.Theory of Absolute Immunity, p. 703
6.Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, p. 704
7.Immunities of Consuls, p. 704
8.Honorary Consuls, p. 705
9.Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State, p. 706
10.Immunity of Officials of International Organizations, p. 708
11.Immuntiy of Intergovernmental International Organizations, p. 709
12.Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations, p. 710
13.The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity, p. 712
14.Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats, p. 714
15.The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case, p. 714
1. Introduction
The concept of diplomatic immunity or exemption of individuals from local jurisdiction
originally started from the immunity of diplomatic envoys such as ambassadors,
minis-
________________
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
ters, our counselors representing their countries abroad. Heads of states or sovereign
rulers traveling abroad enjoy inviolability from local jurisdiction. As international
relations developed with the formation of the family of nations, the concept of
immunity persons from local jurisdiction has very much broadened. Immunity has
extended to consuls, ad hoc diplomats, international organizations and their officers.
The petitioner in said case, an employee of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an
intergovernmental banking organization who allegedly committed a crime of oral
defamation invoked immunity from suit, citing a provision of the Headquarters
Agreement between the Philippine government and the ADB, that: Officers and staff
of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
(a) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
2. Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomatic immunity with the law on diplomatic relations among States was
developed much earlier than all other aspects of international law. Even before the
emergence of Greek civilization, the records of ancient China, India and Egypt
showed practices observing respect for emissaries and recognizing the sacred
character of their office. Although no
701
permanent embassies were established, the Greeks and the Romans sent and
received envoys who were accorded respect and personal inviolability. By then,
traces of the principle of exterritoriality as now understood in modern international
law had already been recognized. (Grotius, Book II, ch. XVII on Right to Legation,
trans. by FCG Kelsley, Carnegie Endorsement for International Peace, Oxford, 1925).
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
sador and his suite, together with his residence and the surrounding property, were
legally outside the territory of the state. This fiction obtained for a time of foothold in
international law and served the useful purpose, on one hand, of explaining the
actual immunities granted to foreign representatives and, on the other hand, of
emphasizing the sovereignty and equality of the several states. It was, however,
open to the disadvantage not only of being a fiction but of permitting inferences
more comprehensive than the position of the ambassador called for. The conception
is abandoned in the Vienna Convention; which offers no theoretical basis for the
privileges and immunities it grants. (Fenwick, Charles G., International Law, Appleton-
Century Co., Inc., New York [1965]).
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 138) was declared by a British court to be immune
from suit because of his position as sovereign of an independent state in India.
A foreign sovereign or head of state not only enjoys personal immunity from suit but
also cannot be named as a party defendant to a suit brought against him in his
official capacity as the representative of his state. This was brought out clearly in the
case of De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, (Great Britain, Court of Queens Bench, 1851,
17 Q. B., 196) in which a British court dismissed on grounds of immunity of a suit for
money allegedly wrongfully paid to the government of Portugal.
6. Immunities of Diplomatic Agents
The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomats Relations exempts the heads of diplomatic
missions, such as acting ambassadors or nuncios, or internuncios and charges
daffaires from the exercise of local jurisdiction. The diplomatic representatives enjoy
personal inviolability. They are exempted from exercise of jurisdiction of the receiving
state. Even if they commit an offense they may not be arrested. The remedy of the
local state is to consider him a persona non grata and will be asked to leave the
country. Should he refuse to leave the country he will be treated as an ordinary
individual and the local laws can be applied on him.
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
9. Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State
The traditional absolute theory of immunity exempted a state in every way from the
jurisdiction of other countries: its government could not be sued abroad without its
consent; its public property could not be attached; its public vessels could not be
The Supreme Court held that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal
Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The
question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the
action. The US Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latters consent but it is
of a citizen filing an action against a
707
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
Likewise in US v. Alarcon, 182 SCRA 646 (1990) the suit filed against the US military
officials for damages due to injuries suffered by complainants who were bitten by
their dogs was dismissed as the suit was in effect against US government. The
complainants were committing theft of government property within the military base.
In 1994, the Supreme Court in Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524 (1994)
reiterated the settled jurisprudence that the Vatican as a state represented by the
Holy See may not be sued. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See
the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its ambassador, the Papal
Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since
1957.
10. Immunity of Officials of International Organiza tions
Historically, the present law on international immunities of international organization
started from the experience of the International Labor Organization and League of
Nations and eventually the United Nations and its agencies.
The immunities enjoyed by the United Nations includes immunity for United Nations
assets, wherever located, from any legal process; immunity of all United Nations
premises from search, requisition, expropriation, confiscation, and any other sort of
interference; immunity of archives; complete freedom from all financial controls,
moratoriums, or other monetary regulations; freedom to hold funds in any desired
currency or metal; freedom to transfer funds; an absolute exemption of all assets and
revenue from all direct taxes; exemption from all customs duties as well as from any
foreign trade prohibitions on goods needed for the official use of the organization; a
guarantee of most favored diplomatic treatment as far as rates, priorities, and so on,
connected with all media of communications, are concerned; exemption from all
forms of censorship; the right to use codes; and the privilege of transporting
correspondence by courier or otherwise under
709
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international rights organizations, its
officials and functionaries, is to secure them legal and practical independence in the
performance of their duties. (Jenks, International Immunities, London [1961])
The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled on this type of immunity. In Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development CenterAquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AOD) v. National
Labor Organization, 206 SCRA 289 (1992). The Court in said case held that the
SEAFDEC, being an international organization enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory it is located.
In Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241
SCRA 681 (1995), the Court ruled that the United Nations Revolving Funds for Natural
Resources Exploration, which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United
Nations enjoyed immunity from suit. The United Nations Revolving Funds is involved
in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration
work in Dinagat Island. The Labor Arbiter of the Department of Labor has no
jurisdiction to try the case involving labor disputes.
12. Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations
The principle of immunity from said suit has been extended even to non-
governmental international organizations which are performing meritorious services
to assist countries in the promotion of health, protection of environment, and
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
ganization. (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. International Rice
Institute, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
13. The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity
The privileges and immunities of diplomatic officials are not altogether unlimited.
714
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of
state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove.
For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such
immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove
in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit.
14. Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats
Members of official missions and delegates traveling abroad to attend international
conference are accorded diplomatic immunity while in the performance of their
official functions. The principle of restrictive immunity applies to them, however, for
acts not directly connected with their official duties.
15. The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case
In the case under annotation, the proper procedure was for the municipal court to
inquire whether the petitioner had committed the crime in connection with the
performance of his official duties as an officer of the Asian Development Bank. Sec.
45 (a) of the Headquarters agreement between the Government of the Philippines
and the Asian Development Bank states that the immunity applies to the
performance of their duties in their official capacities.
The immunity of Jeffrey Liang was not absolute. The principle of restrictive immunity
applies to him. The municipal judge in outrightly dismissing the case on the ground of
immunity of the petitioner from local jurisdiction was not proper. It will be different if
the person enjoyed full diplomatic immunity as what happened in the case of WHO
vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 243 (1972) the official was a U.N. officer with full diplomatic
immunity. Thus, the certifications of
715
2
http://lexislove.wordpress.com/tag/sema-vs-comelec/
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of
the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to
receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice
the latters number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the
number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list
system
party -list system
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties.
Formula for Additional
Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The
formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
------------------
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of
additional
for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first
party
first party
--------------
Total no. of votes
for party list system
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned
party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first
party
first party
xxx
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the
ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied
by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified
parties as well.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated
in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of
the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same
day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
ISSUE:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on
22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?
HELD:
WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution
dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
RATIO:
1 & 2. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
5. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or
a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
FACTS:
Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat
Tayo and Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET
assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over the Party list.. and its representatives.. HRET
dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the nominated
representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifivcations of petitioners.
HELD: Affirmative.
The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought
the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo andBa nt a y. Since petitioners Abayon and
Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective
organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into
and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of
districts and party list.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are
treated in like manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees
as members of the House of Representatives, a party-list representative is in every
sense an elected member of the House of Representatives.
Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit
in the House of Representatives. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System
Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees.
Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization
of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath
and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan
FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations
of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
HELD:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-
list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
FACTS:
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized
groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that
manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized
national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to
participate, CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva,
submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be
chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The
nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of
nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2)
herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin
Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS vs COMELEC, CIBAC PARTY LIST
represented by VIRGINIA S. JOSE SHERWIN N. TUGNA, and CINCHONA CRUZ-
GONZALES (2012)
FACTS:
On 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution expunging the
Certificate of Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives
FACTS:
FACTS:
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a
taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No.
10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010
elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay
Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As
such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 4, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System
Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate
businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of
party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807, the
Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List
PHILCONSA VS MATHAY
G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the
preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of
Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution which provides xxx No increase
in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such,
increase. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963,
and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December
30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term
of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the
increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
RULING: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision
refers to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same
sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This
unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the
measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident
the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one
single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when combined with
the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House, underscores
that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration
is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA
4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of
the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
LIGOT VS MATHAY
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the
salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national
government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1,
1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were
increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act
expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution."
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969)
but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term
by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay "that the
increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate
and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the
constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which
provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term
having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Act 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by R.A 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any
official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in
case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials
on the rates of pay as provided by law."
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum
of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum. Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not
sign the warrant.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return
the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course. Hence the present
petition for review by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners claim for retirement gratuity be computed on the
basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress.
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under
Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming
members of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress (House and
Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of
the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-
evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on
December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the
compensation they received "as provided by law" and the Constitution during their
term of office.
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
was already operative when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969 cannot
be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose
term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that
a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation.
PEOPLE VS JALOSLOS
324 SCRA 689
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will. He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as
their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has
the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot
be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want
their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the
House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to
respect his mandate.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
RULING: No. True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In
the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The privilege of immunity from arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of
its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
Section 11, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution provides A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.
Neither can he rely on Aguinaldo doctrine. The Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless
expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed
to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.
TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817
556 SCRA 471 (June 27, 2008)
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by
junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the
President and key national officials.
Later that day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion. A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually
resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
Close to four years later, Trillanes has remained in detention, threw his hat in the
political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at
noon on June 30, 2007.
Before the commencement of his term, Trillanes filed an "Omnibus Motion for Leave
of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" Among his
requests were: (a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of
the Senate xxx (d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments,
reactions and/or opinions to the press, (e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court
and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and
Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to interview him.
xxx
(NB: letters (b), (c), (f) were withdrawn upon his MR when the court denied this
Omnibus Motion)
Trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. The trial court just the same denied the motion. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case.
(2) Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow
him to work and serve his mandate as senator.
(3) Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail as in the case of Former Pres. Estrada &
Former ARMM Gov. Misuari.
Trillanes in attempting to strike a distinction between his case against Jaloslos argues
that the latter was already convicted albeit his conviction was pending appeal,
whereas he is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil
and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases,
both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of
offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a
trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the
denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants
like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. The trial court
thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term"
to speak of. SC categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred
by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in
the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant
is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners
who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph
Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social
functions." He harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
17 SCRA 876
FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and
Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of
an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being
summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs
interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
RULING:
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant
was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense, and that Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution it states
that The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place. The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate
therein.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
(2) Supreme Court are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the
control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having
been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong
to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that
"it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they
may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which
plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting
tools of the planners. SC do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are
officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question
seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two
(2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by
the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs'
OSMEA VS PENDATUN
G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
109 PHI 863
FACTS: Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., filed a verified petition for "declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members
of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity.
HR 59 created a special committee to investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege
speech of June 23, 1960. Said charges emanated from his one-hour privileged speech
entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity
of Garcia as the then President.
The respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension
RULING:
LIBAN VS GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
593 SCRA 68
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-
owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the
position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically
forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to
another government office.
Among others, Respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this
petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges
that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for
forfeiture of his public office and further insists that the PNRC is not a government-
owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI
of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the
PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUES:
3. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of
respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the
Senate
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board
of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public
The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be
able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be
dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to
the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the
present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a
taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise
known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold
the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as
a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity
with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral
and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the
Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency
that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and
cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society. It is
imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation
to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot
be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does
not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive
any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals
elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC
Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private
sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the
President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of
the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the
PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office.
(3) The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the
Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by
special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter.
Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under
a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general
law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as
private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code,
except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC
Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC
should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
CASE: Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by
respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court
on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August
27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the
latters Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper filed on December
23, 2009.
FACTS: The Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when
he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the
PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.[5] The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that
the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it was
unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel v.
Garcia, wherein the Court said that it will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground and goes on to claim that since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of
the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there was no
need for it to delve into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment
should be deemed obiter.
This Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the
Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there
was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this
declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding
the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just
in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status
accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRCs
contention that its structure is sui generis.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
113 SCRA 31
CASE: This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
FACTS: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held where Puyat and his group won.
The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
warranto proceedings, questioning the election. They claimed that the stockholders'
votes were not properly counted.
The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent
Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11,
Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman
could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an
administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7,
1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that, May 15, Fernandez had purchased
from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director. The deed of sale,
however, was notarized only on May 30 and was sought to be registered on said
date. The next day, May 31, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in
The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the
said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
Section 11. No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any
court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case
wherein the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party, or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by, the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for
his pecuniary benefit.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been
an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our
opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention"
was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to
vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC
Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
23 total number of senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners
as "independent".)
A petition for quo warranto was filed by Senators Tatad and Santiago alleging that
Senator Guingona had been usurping ,unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the Senate President to recognize Senator
Guingona as the minority leader.
Held:
History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred
to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the
"minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may
also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesser
The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any
rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts
may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province
of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.
Quorum
Facts:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada
requested that his right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to
formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His
request was approved.
However, on the day of the session, the opening of the session was delayed. He was
not given the chance to speak despite his attempts to claim his right to speak. A
commotion broke outside the Senate gallery which prompted them to adjourn.
Nevertheless, Senator Tanada opposed the motion to adjourn. This led Senate
President Avelino and seven of his followers to leave and abandon the session. The
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call,
the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.
After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by
then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill wassigned into law by
President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Facts:
A few years ago, the Garci tapes (alleged conversation of GMA and Garcillano)
became the subject of Congressional hearings and joint investigation of different HR
Committees. The hearings were indefinitely suspended; however, the they decided
to submit reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
persons.
Senator Alejandrino prayed before the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction
against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare
the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the
foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents
ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as
Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and
prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his
office, and from carrying the order of suspension, into effect.
Issue: whether the court has jurisdiction over the matters prayed for by Alejandrino.
Held:
the general rule of mandamus is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members,
or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their
character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they
have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a
gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that there where a member has been
expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether
the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to
"punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds,
expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an
appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive
member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the
power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the
Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General
by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The
Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the
Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the
exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed
for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not
possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the
answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would
hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous
inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of
legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against
the Legislature and the Chief Executive.
Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
Issue: whether or not the House has the authority to censure petitioner.
Held:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1
of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII,
sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken
in debate. its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense."
Issue: whether the House may still bring action against him when it had taken up
other business after his speech.
Held:
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, and such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure
to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a
particular measure."
Issue: whether a speech attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct.
Held:
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For
one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct
constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
Issue:
Authority of the Sandiganbayan to issue to decree a 90-day preventive
suspension of Senator Santiago from any government position.
Held:
It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound
to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be
no ifs and buts about it.
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode
of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he
be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from
the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the
same to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
Nature of preventive suspension it is not a penalty because it is not imposed
in judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this
suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount
to a violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives
and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House;
Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy
in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission
to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be
acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion
were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made
here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of
R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of
that body.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its
due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies
good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to
violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands
on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
FACTS: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RULING:
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the
Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators
representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After
the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose
of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF,
DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional
principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional
committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it,
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members
of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
Pons was charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium, in violation of Act
2381. Pons via his counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28 th day of February;
that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not
passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that,
therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise
questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the
Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with
having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of
adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely,
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question
whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled
in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining
the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron
vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of
the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not
ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show,
with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die55 at 12 o'clock
midnight on February 28, 1914.
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily
depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals
are the acts of the government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object
the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to
inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are,
as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in
his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on
February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of
all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to
enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here
suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the
probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or
absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory.
Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of
the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is
to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of
the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that
afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning
comparatively trifling matters."
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20,
1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in totoby the Senate. The amendment
recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate
proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20,
1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the
amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the
Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted
by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on
July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266
signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill
actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since
it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of
that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the
issue.
Issue: Whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be
adhered to in this jurisdiction.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark
as follows:
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated."
Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the
same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals
and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether
the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is
present.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity
of the statute This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the
validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being
no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the
bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be
consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
Facts:
Duties were assessed and collected, according to the rates established by the Tariff
Act of October 1, 1890 on goods imported by the appellant.
The appellant alleged that the enrolled act in Custody of the Secretary of the State is
missing a Section 30 as evidenced by the Congressional record of proceedings,
reports of committees of each house, reports of committees of conference, and other
papers printed by authority of Congress therefore it should not become a law even if
the said enrolled act is signed by the required signatories in the Constitution
(American).
The facts which were presented in support of the contention that the bill never
became a law in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution were three.
1) That in engrossing the bill, a clause known as section 30, relating to a rebate
of taxes on tobacco, which was shown by the journals of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate to have been regularly passed by both
Houses of Congress, was omitted, and that the engrossed act, as attested by
the Vice-President and the Speaker of the House, as approved by the
President and as deposited with the Secretary of State, was not the act which
passed the two Houses of Congress, and was therefore not a statute of the
United States in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
2) That the first five paragraphs of Schedule E, section 1, of the act, providing for
bounties to producers of American sugar (paragraphs 231 to 235) were
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests
relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is
categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barber contests Biazons
proclamation as the 12 winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification
before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded
to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046
(PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC and the
latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past
elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was
located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao,
Laguna, which was also outside the First District. [
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification
before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded
to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046
(PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC and the
latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past
elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was
located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao,
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET,
docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible
to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. [9]
Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner
lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the
HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The
authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of
the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals,
[33]
which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the
proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed
and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House
of Representatives. [34]
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to
claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House
of Representatives is concerned, is co-equal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET
cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and
qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or
contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House
of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another
body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue
of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-
shopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of
action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings
without giving due notice to the petitioner.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at
the hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all
been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent
in an adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to
speak, make their presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject
only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both
parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of any
denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party
of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial
election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we see no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation
of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the
provincial election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the
transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The
Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving
provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to
be intruding into the COMELEC en banc rule-making prerogative when the Second
Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET premises side by side
with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down any
new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had
previously enacted.
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of
AAngat Tayoand Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET
HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay.
Since petitioners Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen
by their respective organizations under their internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications a
s nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5,Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
members of that House are representatives of districts and party list Once elected,
both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members
of the House of Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an
elected member of the House of Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-
list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the
qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A.
7941, echoing the Constitution.It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide
member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay , respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET
did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members
who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.1 In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House
that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin
C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat
and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably,
the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay
Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the
COMELEC.Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET,1 We ruled that
the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought
the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution 2and Section
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began
occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo
to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,
[7]
claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he
indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3,
2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos
ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he
should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place
to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the
COMELECs finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of
his right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions
affecting elections,[15] such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these
contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives.[16]
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative
in favor of the HRET.[17]
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve
Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case
against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name
from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing
official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second
Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc
did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his
case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding
his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was
solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had
already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. [18] Thus, the
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time
Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the
Senate exercise the power to choose who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 slots of their respective electoral tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the
Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests with the House, not with the Court.
The discretion of the House to choose the members is not absolute, being subject to
the mandatory rule on proportional representation. However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that
the House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET
or the CA. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme
Court is premature.
Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin was the incumbent representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections for the position of
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against petitioner alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned
by the city government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to
the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order
delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the
Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII. The same division sent notice to the
petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case.
Eventually, petitioner was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial
results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b)
the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the office of
the Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be summoned to
answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not
receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his
right to rebut and refute the allegations against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of
the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he received the telegraph
order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after it
was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated its Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect
solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. The same order declared the
votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was
proclaimed, took her oath of office, and assumed office as the duly elected
representative of the 4th district of Leyte. A copy of the said Resolution was sent by
fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a
petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the
COMELEC en banc (a) reversed the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared
the proclamation of respondent null and void. Respondent did not appeal from this
decision.
Issues:
Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings
leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and
respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of
the votes cast in his favor.
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said
Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet enforceable as it has not
attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office of
the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th Legislative district of
Leyte. For these reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the administration
of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents because of the following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest
number of votes; the order of the COMELEC Second Division, which ordered the
proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en banc which
ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc
was not challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests
relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is
categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barber contests Biazons
proclamation as the 12 winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification
before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded
to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046
(PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC and the
latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past
elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was
located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao,
Laguna, which was also outside the First District. [
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification
before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded
to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046
(PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC and the
latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past
elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was
located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao,
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET,
docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible
to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. [9]
Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner
lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the
HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The
authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of
the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals,
[33]
which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the
proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed
and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House
of Representatives. [34]
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to
claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House
of Representatives is concerned, is co-equal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET
cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and
qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or
contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House
of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another
body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue
of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-
shopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of
action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings
without giving due notice to the petitioner.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at
the hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all
been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent
in an adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to
speak, make their presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject
only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both
parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of any
denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party
of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial
election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we see no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation
of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the
provincial election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the
transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The
Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving
provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to
be intruding into the COMELEC en banc rule-making prerogative when the Second
Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET premises side by side
with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down any
new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had
previously enacted.
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of
AAngat Tayoand Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET
HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay.
Since petitioners Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen
by their respective organizations under their internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications a
s nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5,Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
members of that House are representatives of districts and party list Once elected,
both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members
of the House of Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an
elected member of the House of Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-
list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the
qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A.
7941, echoing the Constitution.It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide
member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay , respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET
did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members
who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.1 In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House
that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin
C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat
and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably,
the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay
Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the
COMELEC.Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET,1 We ruled that
the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought
the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution 2and Section
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began
occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo
to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,
[7]
claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he
indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3,
2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos
ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he
should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place
to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the
COMELECs finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of
his right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions
affecting elections,[15] such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these
contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives.[16]
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative
in favor of the HRET.[17]
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve
Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case
against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name
from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing
official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second
Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc
did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his
case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding
his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was
solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had
already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. [18] Thus, the
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time
Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the
Senate exercise the power to choose who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 slots of their respective electoral tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the
Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests with the House, not with the Court.
The discretion of the House to choose the members is not absolute, being subject to
the mandatory rule on proportional representation. However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that
the House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET
or the CA. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme
Court is premature.
Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin was the incumbent representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections for the position of
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against petitioner alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned
by the city government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to
the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order
delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the
Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII. The same division sent notice to the
petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case.
Eventually, petitioner was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial
results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not
receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his
right to rebut and refute the allegations against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of
the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he received the telegraph
order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after it
was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated its Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect
solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. The same order declared the
votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was
proclaimed, took her oath of office, and assumed office as the duly elected
representative of the 4th district of Leyte. A copy of the said Resolution was sent by
fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a
petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the
COMELEC en banc (a) reversed the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared
the proclamation of respondent null and void. Respondent did not appeal from this
decision.
Issues:
Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings
leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and
respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of
the votes cast in his favor.
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said
Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet enforceable as it has not
attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office of
the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th Legislative district of
Leyte. For these reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the administration
of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents because of the following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest
number of votes; the order of the COMELEC Second Division, which ordered the
proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en banc which
ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc
was not challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
HON. WALDO FLORES, in his capacity as Senior capacity as Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary in the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL
ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) vs ATTY. ANTONIO MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
(I sincerely apologize na taas ni, procedural ang case. Please focus
on the Doctrine of Non-delegation of Powers)
FACTS:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board
examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees
reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees
were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations
five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing
members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review
centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED
Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).
Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of
independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR
arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however
believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with
the mandate of EO 566.
A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was
approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to
exclude independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the
meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise
the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and
private institutions of higher education.
In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to
exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED
would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.566; As to the
request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be
integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court
praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from
implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutions
were granted by the Court.
On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of
2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for
ISSUES:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands theCHEDs jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
HELD:
1. Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The scopes of EO
566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs
coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher
education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the
regulation of review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center
under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study
that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure
examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that
would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
2. Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section
20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by theOSG to justify GMAs action) requires
legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other
powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting
the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no
inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA
7722. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.The President has control
FACTS:
Before us is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated
April 2, 2009 which granted the consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio
Development Corporation, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are
hereby (1) restrained from collecting from petitioner the amount of P28,413,783.00
representing the transitional input tax credit due it for the fourth quarter of 1996; and
(2) directed to refund to petitioner the amount of P347,741,695.74 paid as output
VAT for the third quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting transitional input tax credit
available to petitioner for the said quarter, or to issue a tax credit corresponding to
such amount. No pronouncement as to costs.
The Motion for Reconsideration raises the following arguments:
1. Section 100 of the Old National Internal Revenue Code (old NIRC), as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716, could not have supplied the distinction between the
treatment of real properties or real estate dealers on the one hand, and the
treatment of transactions involving other commercial goods on the other hand, as
said distinction is found in Section 105 and, subsequently, Revenue Regulations No.
7-95 which defines the input tax creditable to a real estate dealer who becomes
subject to vat for the first time.
2. Section 4.105.1 and paragraph (a) (iii) of the transitory provisions of revenue
regulations no. 7-95 validly limit the 8% transitional input tax to the improvements on
real properties.
FACTS:
These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and
fringe benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national
government, state universities and colleges, and local government units as required
by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented
through the challenged National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government
employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary
rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be
receiving from such consolidation.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989, covering the offices of the national government,
state universities and colleges, and local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the
specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in
the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and
Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on
May 3, 2004.
The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated
October 2, 1989, covering all government-owned or controlled corporations and
government financial institutions. The DBM re-issued this circular on February 15,
1999 and published it on March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit
(COA) disallowed the payments of honoraria and other allowances which were
deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates. Employees of government-
owned or controlled corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-
publication.
Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12,
2001, clarifying that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may
continue to be granted the employees; all others were deemed integrated in the
standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of allowances and compensation such
as COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were already
deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 in the
Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation nullifies the integration of the
COLA into the standardized salary rates; and
HELD:
1. Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2, 1989 covering all
government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions
was ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on March 16, 1999, its
counterpart, NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 covering the offices of the national
government, state universities and colleges, and local government units should also
be regarded as ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on May 3, 2004. Thus,
the COLA should not be deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates from
1989 to 2004. Respondents counter that the fact that NCC 59 was not published
should not be considered as an obstacle to the integration of COLA into the
standardized salary rates. Accordingly, Budget Circular 2001-03, insofar as it
reiterates NCC 59, should not be treated as ineffective since it merely reaffirms the
fact of consolidation of COLA into the employees salary as mandated by Section 12
of R.A. 6758.
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was factually
integrated into the employees salaries. Records show that the government
employees were informed by their respective offices of their new position titles and
their corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with the Notices of
Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the
breakdown of the employees gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the
composition of his standardized pay under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was
considered part of the employees monthly income.
ABAKADA vs PURISIMA
FACTS: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and
allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department
of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director
General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners,
two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the
officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from
the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
(3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4)
prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including
the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
RULING:
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the
Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators
representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After
the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose
of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF,
DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional
principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional
committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it,
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
SENATE vs ERMITA
FACTS: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that
the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464)
last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on
September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project
of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by
a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North
Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations2 dated September 22, 2005 to the officials of the AFP. Also invited to the
above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff,
General Generoso S. Senga.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
FACTS
Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No.157 directing the Committee on
National Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and
retired military officers were organizing a coup d 'etat to prevent the administration
of then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No.160,
"directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment portfolio of
the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, it
appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City, designated as
FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as
well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically
prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine
National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other
RULING:
The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
Facts:
Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Sen Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted
by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of
prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 (creating
PCGG) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs
unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was
repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE:
May Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-
appearance on legislative investigations?
RULING:
No.
The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose
positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of
public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution which
mandates that Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) vs. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies
FACTS:
Petitioner, Standard Chartered Bank, is an institution incorporated in England with
limited liability licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in
the country. It violated RA 8799 for selling unregistered foreign securities. Senator
Enrile in his privilege speech introduced a Resolution to attend to the matter. The
respondent-committees chairperson Sen. Angara set an initial hearing to investigate
in aid of legislation thereto. Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing and
submit their written position paper. Petitioners, in response, submitted to respondent
a letter stressing their position that there were cases already pending in court which
involved the same issues that the respondent is subjecting to legislative inquiry. The
petitioner thereby poses a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent committee to
continue the inquiry since there are cases of a similar subject filed in court of which
are still pending. Respondent still commenced the investigation. Its vice chairperson
moved for the issuance of a subpoena to those who did not attend the hearing.
Said motion was approved thereby thec ause of a petition. Standard Chartered Bank,
petitioned for a TRO
to direct the Senate Committee on Banks from:
2.Compelling the Banks officers to attend and testify before any further hearing
called by the respondent Committee
3.Enforcing any Hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the
Watch list Petitioner-Bank also prays that judgment be rendered annulling the
subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to them and prohibit the
Committee from compelling them to appear and testify in the inquiry being
conducted pursuant to the Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committee acted without jurisdiction and/or acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, purportedly in aid of
legislation
RULING:
No.
Respondent has jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry although the subject matter
involved is the very same subject matter pending in court. The respondent-
committees action does not encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely on the
courts. The petitioners reliance to the Bengzon case is misplaced to the extent that,
in the case at bar, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and
administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of
unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case and
Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.
Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon was the courts determination that the
intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The petitioners erred in alleging that
the inquiry was simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank
in selling unregistered foreign securities. This fallacy is made more glaring at the
conclusion of Sen. Enriles privilege speech urging the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar
fraudulent activity in the future.
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project
in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project
was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on:
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that
he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
HELD:
YES
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7
of Article III provides:
FACTS:
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review
and arbitrate a hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Courts co-
equal branches of government. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before
respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the NBN Project), a project awarded by
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
The senate thereafter issued a show cause order, unsatisfied with the reply,
therefore, issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. He also mentioned the
petition for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December 7, 2007.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application
for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Courts Resolution dated
February 4, 2008, the parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior
to the Order dated January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications
privilege in our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and
HELD:
I
There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who
invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement
between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions
propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees investigation.
Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in
Senate v. Ermita.
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental
to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution.
II
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does
not relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, because the
Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board
which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make
such power less executive. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a
complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does
not diminish the executive nature of the power. In the same way that certain
legislative acts require action from the President for their validity does not render
such acts less legislative in nature.
B. The doctrine of operational proximity was laid down precisely to limit the scope
of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
It must be stressed that the doctrine of operational proximity was laid down
precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. In the case
at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege to a large swath of the executive
branch (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official
involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term advisor of
the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified
presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic
relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Even in Senate v.
Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons
for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which
the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-
equal department.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in
aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the
investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again.
III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show That the Communications Elicited by the
Three Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive
privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that the information
elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative
functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to
curb graft and corruption.
The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude
into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which,
according to said respondents, would aid them in crafting legislation. Clearly, the
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before
legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of
cases by courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the
counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still
come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions.
In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent
Committees need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling
as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is
because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.
And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3)
questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose
is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating
graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent
Committees investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and
our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are
true and who are liable therefor.
IV. No
No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the
contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did
not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations
should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the
inquiry, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof. The SC also find merit in the argument of the
OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure. The respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary
and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass
upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead,
NOTES:
Restrictions on the right to information: (1) national security matters, (2) trade
secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and
diplomatic matters, as well as information on inter-government exchanges prior to
the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It was further held that even
where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be examined in
strict confidence and given scrupulous protection.
Facts:
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the
elections to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings
conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero
motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
(respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred
to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci
subsequently filed two petitions: One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each
house for they are alleged to be inadmissible in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire
tapping law and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on
the wiretapped conversation for the basic reason that there was no proper
Issue:
Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to
further proceed with their investigation?
Held:
None.
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of
the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify
the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these
rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish
the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed
for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as
provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without
observance of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at
stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they
already published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or
the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and
still does not conforme with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate
to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.
Facts:
For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the PCGG, regularly
received cash dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered losses in subsequent
years. In view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to
protect its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 4555 directing the
conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their respective board
of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee.
Respondents Senate Committees then submitted the assailed Committee Report No.
312, where it found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees
over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter
alia, the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the
government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO)
under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government
nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
Petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular, the
haste with which the respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report
No. 312.
Issues:
Held:
NO.
The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has
been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio. Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution conferred of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of
Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, which must carry with it
all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The wide latitude given to
Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise,
Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting
and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with
companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized
voting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the
COMELEC nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial
results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also
dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in
authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for the May
10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the Congress to
canvass the votes of the election returns for the President and the Vice-President.
MANTE
MANZANO
Facts: YMCA is a non- stock, non- profit institution that conducts various
programs and activities which are beneficial to the public, especially the young
people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.
Thus, YMCA declared itself as charitable and, at the same time, educational
institution.
In conjunction with its operation, YMCA is, on the other hand, earning
revenues from its leased spaces to other private individuals and parking fees from
non- members, among others.
Issue: Is the income derived from the rentals of real property owned
by YMCA established as a welfare, educational and charitable non- profit
corporation- subject to income tax under the National Internal Revenue Code and the
Constitution?
(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and
other non- profitable purposes, not part of the net income of which inures to the
benefit of any private stockholder or member.
A reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income from any
property of exempt organization, as well as the arising from any activity it conducts
for profit, is taxable. The phrase any of their activities conducted for profit does not
qualify the word properties. This makes income from the property of the
organization taxable, regardless of how that income is used- whether for profit or for
lofty non- profit purposes.
Facts: Francisco I. Chavez (Chavez later, for brevity), as tax payer, citizen and
former government official who initiated the prosecution Marcoses anf their cronies
who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury, alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometimes in September 1997, viz:
The PCGG interposes several oppositions for the denial of the reliefs being
sought by Chavez, however, admits forging a compromise with the Marcoses,
stipulating, among others, viz:
Second, PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to
be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The
power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain
extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28(4), Article VI of the Constitution,
specifically provides, No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The PCGG has
absolutely no power to grant tax exemption, even under the cover of its authority to
compromise ill- gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from
paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal
protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in
favour only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate
constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the
commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be
exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim
against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayers financial position demonstrates a clear
inability to pay. xxx. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of
the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only
when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUEZON CITY & THE CITY ASSESSOR,
433 SCRA 119
Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP later, for brevity) is a non- stock, non-
profit entity, established by virtue of P. D. No. 1823. It stood in Lot No. PR- 3- B- 34- 1-
B- 1, SWO 04- 000495, registered in its name, measuring 121, 463 sq. mtrs., and
situated in Quezon City. A wide portion of the said hospital at the ground floor is
being leased to private parties and being utilized as canteen, small store spaces,
offices of some professionals, medical clinics, and the like.
Issues: Whether the LCP is a charitable institution; and, (2)Whether the real
properties of the LCP are exempt from real property taxes.
Held: 1) We hold that the LCP is a charitable institution within the context of the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. xxx xxx xxx
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for
charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the
property itself to the purpose for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not
the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the
property is used for tax exempt purposes.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities
as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt
EXEC. SECRETARY, et. al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC, et. al., GR
No. 164171; GR No. 164172; GR No. 168741 (482 SCRA 673).
Facts: On December 12, 2002, Pres. GMA, through Exec. Sec. Alberto G. Romulo,
issued EO 156 entitled Providing for a Comprehensive Industrial Policy and
Directions for the Motor Vehicle Development Program and its Implementing
Guidelines, that provides, among others, viz:
3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types
of used motor vehicles is prohibited, except for the following:
The above- cited Order is being bombarded with suits for declaratory reliefs
from Subic- based used vehicles importers and traders, among those is herein
Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., before the RTC of Olongapo City, unanimously
seeking, inter alia, for the nullity/invalidity thereof for being transgressing to the
constitution.
Issues: (1) Whether there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; (2) If the
answer is in the affirmative, whether Section 3.1 of EO 156 is reasonable and within
the scope provided by law.
Held: The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it
was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and
that its application should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of R.A.
7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from
customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open
floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.
With respect to the third and fourth issues, an examination of the nature of
a Freeport under R.A. 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation ban under
the questioned EO is necessary.
R.A. 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and
balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservation and their extensions
into alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport Zone,
or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and social development
of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.
The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and
capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest
their capital in a business climate with the least governmental intervention.
In given discussions, we hold that the importation ban runs afoul the third
requisite for a valid administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must
not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant
or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws for such is the
sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot
usurp.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President
to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO
156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on
the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which R.A. 7227, considers to some
extent, a foreign territory.
Facts: On April 18, 1993, House Representative Antonio Abaya filed HB No. 8817,
entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. After public hearings on the
said bill were conducted, the same was passed by the House of Representatives on
Second Reading, and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. Then, it
was transmitted to the Senate.
However, prior to the transmission of the said HB No. 8817 to the Senate
on January 18, 1994, Sen. Vicente Sotto III previously filed before the Senate SB No.
1243, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. Public hearings were also
conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on SB No. 1243. Later, the
Senate Committee on Local Government submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB
No. 8817 approving the same without amendment considering that HB No. 8817 was
all fours with SB No. 1243.
Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading
and was approved on Third Reading, with amendment proposed by the Senate which,
on the other hand, the House of Representatives approved the same.
The enrolled bill was signed by the Chief Executive as R.A. No. 7720.
Issue: In the enactment of RA No. 7720, was there a compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the Constitution?
Held: Although a bill of local application like BH No. 8817 should be constitutional
prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that R.A. No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the Houseof
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the
Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the
House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. xxx. HB
No. 8817 was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
xxx. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a
bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long
as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what
is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for
approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
The bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue: Whether or not the House rules were violated that would render the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 null and void
Held: The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave
abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have
been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of
a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but
only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared
that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts
have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former
Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and
Enhance its Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103,
104, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112, 115 and 116 of Title V, and 236, 237
and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
After the same was considered on the second reading, it was approved by
the House of Representatives after the third reading.
After the HB No. 11197 was transmitted to the Senate, the latter came up
with another version and recommended the approval of SB No. 1630, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and
Enhance its Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103,
104, 105, 107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title
IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114 and 116 of Title V, all of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes.
After considering the HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630, the conference
committee ended up with the endorsement of another/third version of the bill,
entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System, Widening its Tax Base and
Enhancing its Administration and for these Purposes Amending and Repealing the
Relevant Provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended and for Other
Purposes.
The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines, and
became R.A. No. 7716.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 is void for it did not exclusively originate
from the House of Representatives.
Held: To begin with, it is not the law- but the revenue bill- which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. xxx.
At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute- and not only the bill
which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law- must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not
only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to
violate the equality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact
make the House superior to the Senate.
Held: (On Motion for Reconsideration). While Article VI, Section 24 provides that
all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills must originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, it also adds, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new
Facts:
C. Prohibitions
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the
President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other
appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government
and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it
unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting
the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or
employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or
their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the
said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated
unless otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an exemption from that
stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is
constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, Section
13 of the constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both
Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple
positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust.
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a
broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent
of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies
only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and
the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The
court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of
the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. In a Letter dated May 11, 1995, Acting
Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the DOLE designated the petitioner to be the DOLE
representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. in pursuance to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,
As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving
a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the
payment of per diems to the petitioner.
The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices, as follows:
Public Interest v. Elma 494 SCRA 53 (2006) G.R. No. 138965 June 30, 2006
Facts: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as
CPLC (Jan 1999 during his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive
as CPLC.
Arguments: Elma
As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions dont cover other
public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. His
appointment falls under the exceptions in Art IX-B, Section
7
The 2 positions are not incompatible.
NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the
case is capable of repetition, and to serve as a guide to the bench. (Symbolic or
Teaching Function of Judicial Review)
Issue 1: whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision
regarding multiple offices, Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
NO if based on position.
YES if based on primary functions test.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not
applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary,
undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same
rank as the latter positions.
CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal
negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment. The Court
cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
*Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to
the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC,
and vice versa.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet
secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes,
arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could
not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because
neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary
functions of one office do not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover,
even if the appointments in question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B,
which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility between
the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
Issue 2: whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under
the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution.
YES.
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices
was laid out in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in
the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
Public Interest v. Elma 517 SCRA 336 (March 5, 2007) G.R. No. 138965
Facts:
Elma sought - the reconsideration of the Decision in the case of Public Interest
Center, Inc., et al. v. Magdangal B. Elma, et al. (G.R. No. 138965), promulgated on 30
June 2006.
In its Decision, the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the
respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the
concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC
include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of
various executive departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving
heads of executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of
an executive agency, are subject to the review of the CPLC, such appointments would
be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG
Chairman nor the CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. However, had the rule thereunder been applicable to the case, the defect
of these two incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section
allows the concurrent holding of positions only when the second post is required by
the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-
officio capacity. Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the
second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his
appointment as CPLC.
Ruling: DENIED
After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents Omnibus Motions, we
find that the basic issues that were raised have already been passed upon. No
substantial arguments were presented. Thus, the Court denies the respondents
motion for reconsideration.
There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc. What is in question in the present case is the constitutionality of
respondent Elmas concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any
treaty, law or agreement. [2] The mere application of constitutional provisions does
not require the case to be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of
the respondent, the decision of the Court in this case does not modify the ruling
in Civil LibertiesUnion v. Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that Section 3
of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989clearly provides that the
Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division
may be appealed.
D. Succession
Estrada vs. Desierto
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
In the heat of people power , At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered
the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner
and his family hurriedly left Malacanang Palace.29 He issued the following press
statement:
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal
minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that
will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to
me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency On February 6, respondent Arroyo
nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.
Rule: Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. In sum,
we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as
the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he
did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the part tense. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only
took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said
letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of
my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the
Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances
that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the
Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange
that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during
the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In fine, even if
the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that
he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11,
1998 elections. Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible
to serve for another term after that.
COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for
reelection as mayor of Pateros. On motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. It ruled that Capcos
succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the computation of
the three term limitation under the Constitution and Local Government Code.
Capco was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioners
7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Purpose of the three term rule: First, to prevent the establishment of
political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in
question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people.
To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned
came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law
would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by
Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine
years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead,
they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such
officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding
election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned
against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of
the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
provision recognizing peoples power.
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern
about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second
MUNEZ
OMELIO
EFFECTS OF PARDON
CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR
71 PHIL 34 (1940)
FACTS: On March 15, 1930, the CH found respondent Santos guilty of the crime of
estafa and sentenced him to 6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided
ISSUE: Whether or not the pardon granted by the President restores the
respondent to the full enjoyment of his political rights.
HELD: An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent is
conditioned in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions
which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility,"
it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
1. Under Section 11(6), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are two
limitations upon the exercise of this Constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,
to wit: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and, (b) that such power does
not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Court,
the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must
remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
2. The disability is the result of conviction without which there would be
no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment
which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and
resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
an that is left of the consequences of conviction.
FELOBELLO v. PALATINO
72 PHIL 441 (1941)
FACTS: Petitioner Pelobello instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI against
respondent Palatino, the mayor-elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. He alleged that the
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the
disqualification incident to criminal conviction under Sec. 94 of Election Code, the
pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office.
HELD: We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the
limitations imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by the legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that
when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
Under the existing circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting
him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the
popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned above and
before the date fixed in the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for
defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the
constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive
action and disregard what at bottom is a teclu'lical objection
LACUNA v. ABES
24 SCRA 780 (1968)
ISSUE: Whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the
date fixed by law for assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualification
prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes.
HELD: We conclude that the pardon granted to respondent Abes has removed his
disqualification, and his election and assumption of office must be sustained.
1. The new rule consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's
effect should not be necessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the
pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the constitution. "We adopt the
broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations imposed by the
constitution, the pardoning power not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that when granted after the
term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction.xxx We are of the opinion that the better view fi-i the
light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or
impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental
facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant
disabilities of criminal conviction (Felobello v. Palatino).
2. Petitioner emphasizes the non-registration of Abes as a voter in order to
differentiate the case at bar from Pelobello case. The fact stressed does not,
however, make the case dissimilar because registration as a voter is not a
qualification for a candidate or a voter, within the meaning of "qualified voter" in Sec.
2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting.
Moreover, the non-registration of Abes as a voter was predicated upon the same
disqualifying effects of his previous conviction that were blotted out by the plenary
pardon.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.
HELD: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former
post as asst. treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.
1. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of
guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out
the moral stain- It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal
consequences of a criminal indictment if or-dy to give meaning to the fiat that a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative
action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent.
2. The rationale is plainly evident. Public officers are intended primarily for the
collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be
compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because
of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of
estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude
the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
TORRES v. GONZALES
152 SCRA 272 (1987)
FACTS: Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of
estafa (two counts), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years,
10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. These convictions were
affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. "Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On March 22,
1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8,
1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence. Claiming that he has been deprived of his rights under the due process
clause of the Constitution since he was not given an opportunity to be heard before
he was arrested and recommitted to prison and that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 2 counts of estafa
nor the crime of sedition, petitioner files this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.
HELD: It is the court's considered view that if the president can grant reprieves,
commutation, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal case, with
much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases which
are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
1. Applying the doctrine Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos,"
we cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so
we must not distinguish. The constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the president, with the sole exception of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only
in criminal cases, it would be indeed unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
FACTS: Accused, member of the New Peoples Army, was convicted of murder
and sentence to reclusion perpetua He appealed to the Supreme Court. While his
appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 of March 25,
1992. His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.
HELD: The approval of his application for amnesty serves to put an end to his appeal.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense. The conviction of accused is therefore reversed, and he is
acquitted of the crime of murder.
POWERS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
LANSANG v. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448 (1971)
HELD: The SC has the authority (under the 1973 Constitution) to inquire into the
existence of a factual basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of determining
the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Far from being full and plenary, the
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumscribed, confined and
restructed, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
existence, but also as regards the time when and the place where it may be
exercised. The requisite for a valid suspension is outlined in Sec. 10 of Art. VII of the
1935 Constitution. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that
both conditions are present. Upon the basis of the evidence presented, the court
rules on the validity of Proclamation No. 889.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying the system of
Government of the Philippines, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is NOT ABSOLUTE. It goes
hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts
within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law (Constitution), and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted -- is vested in the Judiciary Department,
which, in this aspect is in turn constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such
authority, the function of the Judiciary is merely to check, NOT to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act.
GARCIA v. ENRILE
121 SCRA 472 (1983)
FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus and mandamus filed in behalf of 14
detainees. The 14 had been under surveillance for sometime as members of the CPP.
Nine (9) were arrested on July 6, 1982 while holding a meeting in the residence of
one of them, Aurora Porong, in Nueva Ecija. Taken during the said were materials said
to be subversive documents, detailing how the group would infiltrate youth and
student organizations. Also found were a .38 caliber revolver, live bullets and several
rounds of ammunitions and P18,650 cash. Four (4) were arrested the following day,
July 7,1982, while one of them was arrested on July 15.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that the arrest of the detainees was
illegal on ground that it was affected without a warrant and that their detention was
likewise illegal because no criminal charges had been filed against them within the
period provided by law. In their return, the respondents alleged that shortly after the
HELD: We hold that upon the issuance of PCO against the petitioners, the continued
detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released over after the
filing of charges against them in court, to depend on the President, who may order
the release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in
meritorious cases.
1. The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the
detention of a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which
continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the
arrest has been made initially without any warrant. Its legal effect is to render the
writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in
view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of power to suspend the
said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as
long as the invasion/ rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need
therefore in the interest of public safety continues.
The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the
President as Commander-in-chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial
inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of bill of rights guarantee to
individual freedom. This must be so because the suspension of the privilege is a
military measure the necessity of which the President alone may determine as an
incident of his grave responsibility as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, of
protecting not only public safety but the very life of the State, the government and
duly constituted authorities.
2. From the clear language of Lansang vs. Garcia (42 SCRA 488), "the function
of the court is merely to check-not to supplant the executive or to ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." If, however,
the constitutional right to bail is granted to herein petitioners by the court, thus the
procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of Court what inevitably results is
the supplanting of the decision of the President to detain pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2045, of person's who come under its coverage.
3. What has been said above shows the need of re-examining the Lansang
case with a view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil 87) and
Montenegro vs. Castaeda (91Phil 882), that the President's decision to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all
other persons." This well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which
declared that the "function of the court is merely to check not to supplant - the
Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom
of his act." Judicial interference was thus held permissible, and the test laid down
therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily.
This would seem to be pure semanticism. If we consider that with particular
reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the
grave emergency he has to deal with, which partakes of military measures, the
judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume the authority to check or
CASE DIGESTS
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Facts:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a
profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue a travel documents to
former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that
Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines.
Held:
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inherent in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g.,
his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily,
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean
that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing
a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from
another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the
President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as
protector of the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President
to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers
in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to
its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow
cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers
short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by
the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its
members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a
genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of
our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The
Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion
to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist
factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar
the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be
said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her
discretion in deciding to bar their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause
the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for the President
to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the
Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and
direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in
the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and
to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
OPLE vs TORRES
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a
law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
Held:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. The executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance
.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix
a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the
all-important freedom of thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative
power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought
to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under
A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen
will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
FACTS:
Held:
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two
ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a
memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government
entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID
format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater
efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and
does not involve the exercise of legislative power.
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all
government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability,
compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of
control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The adoption of a
uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs,
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In
issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely
implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures
efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of
current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is
simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and
issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does
not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess
under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres
sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a
national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance.
Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new
national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the
existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and
LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO
420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional
power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as
under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Facts:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board
examination were circulated duringthe examination period among examinees
reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.The examinees
were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations
five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakageand traced it to two Board of Nursing
members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
Subsequently, President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review
centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno
(Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).
Issue/s:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and
Held:
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA
7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private
institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and
private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to
formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which
offers a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school
setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC. It also
covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals
whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the
PRC.
Further, the similar entities in EO 566 cover centers providing review or tutorial
services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which
include, although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions
of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to
alter or repeal them,] and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
ANGELES vs GAITE
Facts
Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care
and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took
care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of
the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial support ranging from
daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses.
After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed
to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since
no more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her
to different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the
petitioner and the police. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a
dragnet operation.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a),
Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of
Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against
Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the
case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a
decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC.
Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez
and was also denied
She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the
ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review
Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since it diminishes
the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
Issue:
W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of
the President?
Held:
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said
Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political
agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30,
1993 reads:
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his
power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to
expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum
Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of
rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the
former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the
least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own
judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to
achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation
is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental
law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power,
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary
of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as
falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the
President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58
allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it
would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all
preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly
hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and
every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latters expertise in
said matter.
The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded
and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.
BUKLOD vs ZAMORA
Facts:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in
areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President
Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the
employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created thru EO
196 the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim
to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning
the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to
abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the
abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.
Issue:
WON the president has the power to abolish such public office.
Held:
Yes.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB
and the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the
purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O.
No. 191, which is economy. While Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of
EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the government.
Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196
provides that the technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be
composed of people who are already in the public service, they being employees of
other existing agencies. Their tenure with the Task Force would only be temporary,
i.e., only when the agency where they belong is called upon to assist the Task
Force. Since their employment with the Task force is only by way of detail or
assignment, they retain their employment with the existing agencies. And should the
need for them cease, they would be sent back to the agency concerned.
Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under
the direct control and supervision of the President as base of the governments anti-
smuggling campaign. Such a smaller base has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the
assistance of any department, bureau, or office and to use their respective personnel,
facilities and resources; and 2) to select and recruit personnel from within the PSG
and ISAFP forassignment to the Task Force. Obviously, the idea is to encourage the
utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing departments,
agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent office with a whole
set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself burdensome for the
government because it maintained separate offices in every region in the Philippines.
While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana,
we find the latter to have additional new powers. The Task Force Aduana, being
composed of elements from the Presidential Security Group (PSG) and Intelligence
Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), [36] has the essential power to effect
searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The Task Force
Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; and to use their personnel, facilities and resources. Again, the EIIB did
not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the additional authority to
conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not expressly
granted to the EIIB.
Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is
better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of
offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
SECRETARY vs MABALOT
Facts:
The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman Memorandum Order No. 96-735,
transferring the regional functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending
creation of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of DOTC issued Department Order
No. 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the
LTFRB to exercise regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct
supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested.
Issue:
W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against
encroachment on the powers of the
legislative department
Held:
The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and
establish the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the Presidents power
of control under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution.
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It includes the authority
to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a
power directly vested in him by law.
Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers,
stating that unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws xxx
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group,
Facts:
Issue:
Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid; and
Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Held:
The DAO and Memorandum are valid. The acts of the DENR Secretary are likewise
valid.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under
Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to
reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet
members exercising control over a particular executive department. Thus, in DOTC
Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the President through his duly constituted
political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the
LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant
transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a
regional office of the LTFRB.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as
an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not
expressly repudiated the same.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to
reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the
regional centers. In identifying the regional centers, the President purposely
intended the effective delivery of the field services of government agencies. [23] The
same intention can be gleaned from the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14 which
the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the DENR in delivering its services.
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1)
there are no buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer
falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are
already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council
was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsond, through a resolution,
requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these concern
issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in
our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or
expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each
department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
CONSTANTINO vs CUISA
Facts:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the
countrys external debt.
The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs
were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback
programs & bond-conversion programs. Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of
his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ Freedom from Debt Coalition
averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not
constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the
Constitution.
And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be
validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President.
They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino
nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that
the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but
the President alone and personally can validly bind the country.
Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
Issue: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the
respondents. (Governor of BSP)
Held:
Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal imprimaturs,
as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of
the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that
the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments
debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed
as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives,
and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every
aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the
country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many
methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor
Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency, later
adopted in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior from American jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may
not be delegated to or exercised by an agent oralter ego of the President. Justice
Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under
the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their
very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other
person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).[58]
These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers
which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the
suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.
The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of
the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by
the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive,
but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of
similar gravitas and exceptional import.
We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign
debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or
guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual
obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary
incident, but from the established functions of governance.
Moreover, in praying that the acts of the respondents, especially that of the Secretary
of Finance, be nullified as being in violation of a restrictive constitutional
interpretation, petitioners in effect would have this Court declare R.A. No. 245
unconstitutional. We will not strikedown a law or provisions thereof without so much
as a direct attack thereon when simple and logical statutory construction would
suffice.
POWER TO APPOINT
Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the
MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating thebus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the
mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron
Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt
have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so
they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under
RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a
trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005,
reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable
exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e)
of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and
Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no
justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the
E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any
letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an
immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the
only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government
and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal
transportation and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer
all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and
communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is
the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement
a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President,
although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by
law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in
question.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence,
it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular
class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes and the means.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies
at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such,
measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people
using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper
subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern
that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate
and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they
not duly oppressive?
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was
empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment,
maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience
may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The law
mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct,
maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.
HELD: YES
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. x x x" This provision has been interpreted to exclude
the power of control.
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in
local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent
with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only
to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-
reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country,
which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction
in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of
AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power
of control. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a
command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
HELD:
The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution, which reads in part:
o Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the Presidents
power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the
executive departments bureaus and offices. Similar to the counterpart
provisions in the earlier Constitutions, the provision in the 1987
Constitution provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al., this Court defined supervision
as overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to
compel his subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. In Taule v.
Santos, the Court held that the Constitution permits the President to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether a local government or its
officers perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Supervisory
power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
The case of Drilon v. Lim clearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus:
The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but
he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done
but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner
for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the
rules are followed
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga
Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally susceptible to DILG suspension?
This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, where the Court ruled
that the Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by
the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga
barangay, which is not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department
of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization,
being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by
authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government
officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an
organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating
JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA.
CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR,
FELINO C. PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G.
ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T. BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR
M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In
His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Facts: On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior
and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino.
Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6975 provided that the appointments of PNP Chief, Senior
Superintendent to Deputy Director General, and Director General shall be subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through
then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted fifteen (15) respondent police
officers, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National Police with the
rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The appointments of respondent police
officers were in a permanent capacity.
On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original
petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject
appointments and disbursements made therefor.
Issue: WON the appointments extended to police officers require the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments.
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of
the government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
It is settled that the police force is different from and independent of the armed
forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National
Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein
respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law
Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261
(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC.
Issue: WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Held: NO.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill
the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent", this
provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim
appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim
appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning
and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of
the framers of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their names to the
Commission on Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of the said respondent officers
of the PCG had assumed their duties and functions. According to petitioner, their
respective appointments are illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the
confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they should be prohibited from discharging
their duties and functions as such officers of the PCG.
Issue: WON the appointments of the respondents need the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Held: NO.
The PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of
the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do
not require confirmation by the CA.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature
may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances
when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive
power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the
legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power
to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a
person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither
may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to
an office.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as
acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only
an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in
the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President
who her alter ego should be.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily
apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents
immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by
the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII,
Section 7 of the Constitution. Due to the opposition of some congressmen-members
of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must
first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths
and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra, Jr. suspended the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives which was
scheduled at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business.
On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation from the Commission on
Appointments for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for
women. Petitioner sent a reply dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and
questioning the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments over the
appointment of sectoral representatives.
In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions
and Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara,
the Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles.
HELD: NO.
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that
petitioners appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess
(March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of
Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the
appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority,
that petitioners appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. As a matter of fact, the President had expressly submitted petitioners
appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that
Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having
acted on petitioners appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot
and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and
unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission.
FACTS: The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the
main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado
Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper interpretation of a provision in the
1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez was a recommendee of then Justice
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on
the other hand, had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997,
President Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified
xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before
Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac.
On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the President, as
well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition
for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein respondents,
challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment
lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court considered the petition
submitted for resolution and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing
the petition. The subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met
with a denial.
HELD: NO.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part
thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a
subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with
it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that
the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation of the
ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and
FREDDIE GARCIA, petitioners, vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO,
PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and DOREEN FERNANDEZ,
respondents.
Facts: The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto
proceeding involving two sets of CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on who
between the contending groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP
Board, has the legal right to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils down to the
constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the
Board.
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30
(EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board
of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The
original founding trustees, who were all appointed by President Marcos, were Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile, Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father
Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P. Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos
issued PD 15,9 the CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-
municipal public corporation free from the "pressure or influence of politics."10 PD 15
increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive
Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and
assumed the performance of their duties in early January 1999.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this
Court questioning President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP
Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the
CCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at
the next regular meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies
shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers
of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is
entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the
power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may
not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow
trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section
6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be
declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the
appointing power.
Issue: WON the appointments extended by then President Estrada to the "Rufino
Group" are valid.
Held: YES.
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances
when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive
power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of
powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16,
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the
third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law
authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because
the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest
"in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers.
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its various
amendments constitute the Chairperson of the Board as the head of CCP. Thus, the
Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law,
under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be
vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without
compensation.
The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the
remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them
to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to
appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer
appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of
the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to
"elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to
fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional
limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through
election by the co- workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent
appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing
power inherently conflicts with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict
has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a
new President assumes office.
In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as
trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the
same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP
Board, allowing the President to appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In
effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive
branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two
powers are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly.
The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends
to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35
This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control
over the Executive branch.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The
CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a
quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the
Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the
Office of the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an
office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of
all executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the
independent constitutional bodies from the President's power of control. There is
no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the
President.44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity,
virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy
and operation x x x."45 This provision does not free the CCP from the President's
control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the
CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking
activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President's
power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President's control
over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By
stating that the "President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices," the
1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control
all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and
subsumes, influence.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of
eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials
prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC),
chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local
Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for
the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However,
petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC
proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent
constitutional body.
Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified
petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report, the
As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for
reconsideration, it should have provisionally suspended the further enforcement of
the judgment of dismissal without prejudice to its re- implementation if the
reconsideration is eventually denied. Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit from its
own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled to a stay of the execution pending
resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Until the motion for reconsideration is
denied, the adjudication process before the Ombudsman cannot be considered as
completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet ripe for execution.
But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to
review a pending motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and
aggravating the situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy
Gonzales for allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving
the motion for reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the
Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations.
To prevent the situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the
alternative option of securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's
provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed
their duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended
differently.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A.
Gonzales III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.
SO ORDERED.
In December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia
were caught in the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the
cash in their luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers. The
Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the
amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the
charges against them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however,
an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal
Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a scandal of military corruption and
amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, former
Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than P 300
Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases
were eventually filed against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before
the Sandiganbayan.
On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition
for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail.
On March 16, 2010, however, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff sought
the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred
to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant
with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the
hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's
apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At
the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and
adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,24 recommending to the President the dismissal
of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges
against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for
having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman
Act.
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit. In her written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of
prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative
disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded with the case,
setting it for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong
to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
Held: YES.
Sec. 21, RA 6770. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office
of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President
for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due
process.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority,
through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative
discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of
"check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that
the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities.
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly
conducted a subsequent and parallel administrative action against petitioner, its
earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not
have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from proceeding against
petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there
is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office
of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution
itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides
otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or
authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint.
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a
military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general
morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in
relation to the President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It
would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent
disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law
enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the
people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of
office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians. The cloak of independence is
meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively
function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog and
protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and
permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts,
falling short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust.
At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply
because the OP proceeded with the administrative case against him despite his non-
attendance thereat. Petitioner was admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had
interposed his defenses to the formal charge against him. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. Due process is
simply having the opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his
unexplained action in directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case
records to his office; his failure to verify the basis for requesting the Ombudsman to
take over the case; his pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of
The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error
of law. In the instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing
on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's
conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's offenses,
as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust
would be to ignore the significance of the legislature's intent in prescribing the
removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes that,
theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the
removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution
added to the existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad
enough to cover any violation of the oath of office, the impreciseness of its definition
also created apprehension that "such an overarching standard may be too broad and
may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the legislature." Indeed, the catch-
all phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes
as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office" could
be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in office. However,
deliberating on some workable standard by which the ground could be reasonably
interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human error and good
faith precluded an adverse conclusion.
Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and
an unexplained failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt
disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting
his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon
petitioner appears to be an isolated case.
Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's
case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be
considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to
wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request
of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional
mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The
factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman
upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S
Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his
statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for
reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be
simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the
lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of
the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was
likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention
or questionable motivation.
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's
authority to remove her from office upon the averment that without the
Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would
be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for
removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989;
and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the Government
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. With
reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-
Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative
disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final disposition by the
Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold
the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not,
then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence
to establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for
the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has,
nonetheless, failed to obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping
said provision part of the law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct
issues: (a) the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the
validity of the administrative action of removal taken against petitioner Gonzales.
While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing
petitioner Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the
constitutionality of the assailed statutory provision in its two deliberations held on
April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no majority vote to invalidate the
law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the constitutionality of Section
8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal
Rules of the Court.
Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the
majority of the Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to
sustain any challenge to the constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its
provisions.
PALO
FACTS:
Ganzon and Paredes (private respondents) were charged with double murder before
Military Commission for the death of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early
martial law. On July 27, 1973, the military promulgated a decision acquitting Raul
Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard labor.
Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to serve
sentence until he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest
under guard.
ISSUE: W/N a Ganzon can be tried anew for the murders before the civil court despite
earlier verdict rendered by the military court?
RULING: NO
In the case of Cruz vs Enrile the SC ruled that that all the petitioners in said
proceedings "who have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentence
imprisonment" shall have "the option either to complete the service their sentence,
or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction they should be credited in the
service of their sentence for the period of their previous imprisonment. Upon
acquittal, they should set free."
The records show that the private respondents had been arraigned by the military
court, pleaded not guilty, and, with respect to Raul Paredes, acquitted, and with
respect to Ganzon, convicted and sentenced. The records also show that Ganzon had
served time until 1978, when he was placed under "house arrest" by then President
Marcos. He also claims that in 1986, he was pardoned by the then President, an
alleged pardon he is invoking to deter the reinvestigation by the Department of
Justice. To the mind of the Court, Ganzon has accepted the judgment against him,
and as Tan asked, "why should [he] who has accepted the justness of the verdict of
the military court who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to
serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil
court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty?"
Apparently, the question is whether or not, with respect to Ganzon, he has completed
the service of his sentence, since as we held in Cruz, civilians serving sentences
"may be given the option either to complete the service of their sentence," the
option Ganzon has apparently accepted, "or be tried anew by the civil courts," the
option he is obviously rejecting. The Court believes that the question is material since
if he, Ganzon, has completed the service of his sentence, Tan and Cruz are with more
reason applicable, and second, if he has served his sentence, the question of pardon
is moot and academic.
Ganzon served six years in the stockades of the military no doubt as a result of his
conviction but was released in 1978 and put under so-called house arrest
(although then President Marcos never apparently carried this out seriously as
Ganzon was free apparently, to move in and out of his residence). The Court is of the
considered opinion that these twin developments six-year service of sentence and
subsequent release are significant, since if then President Marcos ordered
Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment, he then President Marcos,
unavoidably commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six years (give or take a few days),
FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an
indemnity. The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993,
the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January1994, however, appellant Francisco
Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional
pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be
released from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and
accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed. They were
discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28
December 1993. Atty. Lao further in
formed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting
her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and
consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has
not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect
until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final
and Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntadois hereby
given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon
granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such
withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said
appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine
National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.
FACTS:
Torres was convicted for estafa. The sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On
April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been
charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the RTC of
Quezon City.
President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then
Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order
of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner.
Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this
court. His wife and children filed for an original petition for habeas corpus and pray
for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the
President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to
determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of
pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RULING: NO
Facts:
Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the
amnesty granted them and not by the pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and
for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward
and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the
pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in
violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of
amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No.
347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.
FACTS:
Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court
of the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He then appealed the decision of the RTC.
Subsequently, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application
was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities
were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.
Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-
appellant?
Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty
looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its effects.
The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Jose Patriarca is acquitted
of the crime of murder.
NOTE: SC DISTINGUISHED PARDON FROM AMNESTY
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the CE with the concurrence of Congress is a public act
of w/c the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
person or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does
not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence (Art 36).
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political
party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections.
COMELECSecond Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration
on the ground that they employed violence and used unlawful means to achieve
their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.
Magdalo filed for Motion for Reconsideration and a Manifestation and Motion for Early
Resolution, while the case is under examination, the May 2010 election was held
without Magdalo on the list of registered political parties.
During the pendency of the case there was a subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the
Military Personnel involved in the Oakwood standoff.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the subsequent grant of amnesty?
RULING:
This Court, in People v. Patriarca, explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is
given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence
of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x
x"51(Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, SECTION 4. Effects. (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall
extinguish any criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident or related
to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the
November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident without prejudice to the
grantees civil liability for injuries or damages caused to private persons.
(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the restoration of civil
and political rights or entitlement of grantees that may have been suspended, lost or
adversely affected by virtue of any executive, administrative or criminal action or
proceedings against the grantee in connection with the subject incidents, including
criminal conviction or (sic) any form, if any.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation of its
members in the Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other harmful
People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng
65 PHIL 56 (1987)
FACTS:
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for
a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed
the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However,
Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces
are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because
Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law
provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the
power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides
that only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided
for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited
and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because
there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in
carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation
for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality.
This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation
officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared
the old probation law as unconstitutional.
G.R. No. L-46437 May 23, 1939 EUFEMIO P. TESORO vs. THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS:
Tesoro, a convict of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, accepted the
parole granted by the governor
general. The same included the condition that he shall not commit any crime and will
conduct himself in an orderly
manner. Subsequently, he was charged with adultery. He was arrested and
recommitted to prison.
Rule: 1. Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no
legal authority to investigate
the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the
terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary of the board
once a month during the first year of his parole, and, thereafter, once every three
months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the
supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a
corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his conduct, and a
fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose
authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with
it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such
power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental
power of inquiry and investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded
by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or
even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance.
2. Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has
committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having
violated his conditional parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed
that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction
by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be
deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative
Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of
any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
3. Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the
conditional parole. He claims that,
according to the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter
part of September, 1937," as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937, the
date when the parole was supposed to expire. But that as it may, where, as in the
instant case, the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere,
by way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having consented to
4. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in
which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and
recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs. Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs.
Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict
to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had
not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during
which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original
sentence.
FACTS: Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of
estafa (two counts), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years,
10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. These convictions were
affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. "Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On March 22,
1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8,
1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence. Claiming that he has been deprived of his rights under the due process
clause of the Constitution since he was not given an opportunity to be heard before
he was arrested and recommitted to prison and that he did not violate his
conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 2 counts
of estafa nor the crime of sedition, petitioner files this petition.
Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had
already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense
for which he was conditionally
pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
FACTS: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder.
As Barrioquinto had not yet been arrested, the case was proceeded against Jimenez,
upon which the CFI of Zamboanga sentenced him to life imprisonment. Before the
period for perfecting an appeal has expired, defendant Jimemeze became aware of
Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946. The Proclamation granted amnesty in
favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised
Penal Code. Provided, it is in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, which was committed from December
8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines where the offense
was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. Jimenez
decided to submit his case to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission presided by the
respondents herein, and the other petitioner Barrioquinto, who had then been already
apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commssion, presided by
the respondents, issued an order, returning the cases of the petitioners to the CFI of
Zamboanga. However, the commission did not decide whether or not the petitioners
are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that
inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the
offense as Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolention who shot and killed the
victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty
RULING: YES, the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The theory of the respondents is predicated on a wrong conception of the
nature or character or an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon:
1. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty is granted by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice.
TREATY MAKING
ISSUE: Considering that the agreement is not a basing agreement but covers only
temporary presence of troops and facilities, is the President correct?
FACTS: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court with
power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. While the Philippines signed the
Statute on Dec. 28, 2000, the Office of the President did not ratify it in accordance
with its terms and did not transmit it to the Senate for its concurrence.
ISSUE: May a petition for mandamus lie to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the DFA to bring the signed copy to the Senate for its concurrence?
HELD: No. The President, being the head of the state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with
foreign nations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, the Constitution provides a limitation to his
power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty entered into by him. The role of the Senate, however, is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it
is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or,
having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal
of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
HELD: Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may
be effected in two ways: (1) by order of the President, after due investigation,
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and (2) by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners,
under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
The President may only exercise the power to deport only upon the grounds
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no other, as it would
be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be deported upon an
unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the
Chief Executive.
And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be
delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may
not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express
authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve as
GO TEK v. DEPORT. BD
79 SCRA 17 (1976)
FACTS: On March 3, 1964, the Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation Board (Board) filed
a complaint against the petitioner Go Tek, a resident Chinaman. It was alleged that:
"In December, 1963, the NBI searched an office believed to be the
headquarters of a guerilla unit of the " Emergency Intetligence Section, Armv of the
US", and that Go Tek was among those arrested, an alleged Sector Commander and
Intelligence and Record Officer of that guerilla unit; Fake dollar checks were found in
Go Tek's possession in violation of Art. 168 of the RPC, rendering himself an
undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that the Board recommend to the President the alien's
immediate deportation as an undesirable alien, his presence in this country having
been and will always be inimical and a menace to the peace, welfare, and security of
the community. In a motion to dismiss, petitioner raised the argument that the
complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him for violation
of Art. 168 and that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the case in view of the obiter
dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case that the President may deport aliens only on the
grounds specified in the law. The Board denied the motion arguing that a criminal
conviction is not a prerequisite before the State may exercise its right to deport an
undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to
make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive
power to deport an alien or dismiss a deportation proceeding. The trial court, in
granting the writ of prohibition applied for by petitioner, ordered the Board to desist
from taking cognizance of the said complaint and held that the President may deport
only on grounds enumerated by law; that mere possession of forged dollar checks is
not a ground for deportation; that a criminal conviction is necessary; and that the
Board lacks jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal
possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities) inspite of
1. The aforementioned obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case is not
decisive of this case. In the said case, the aliens were charged with
economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under RA 503.
The ratio decidendi of that case is that the provision of EO 398, series
of 1951, empowering the Board to issue a warrant of arrest upon the
filing of formal charges against an alien, is illegal or unconstitutional
because it is contrary to section 1(3), Art. III of the 1935 Constitution
that warrants shall issue upon probable cause to be determined by the
JUDGE after examining under oath the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.
2. The President's power to deport aliens and the investigations of aliens
subject to deportation are provided under Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. On the other hand, Section 37 of the Immigration
Law provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose, and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant "after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien." 13 classes of
aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specified in
Section 37.
So, under existing law, the deportation of undesirable aliens may be effected: (1) by
order Of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code; and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the Immigration
Law.
3. The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That
power may be exercised by the Chief Executive when he deems such
action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.
When the Chief finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in
the country is injurious to the public interest, he may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them.
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of the facts which warrant the deportation of aliens, as disclosed in an
investigation conducted in accordance with section 69. No other tribunal is at liberty
to re-examine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
ISSUE: Is the power of the President to determine whether an alien may be deported
from the Philippines subject to judicial review?
BENGZON v. DRILON
208 SCRA 133 (1992)
FACTS: On June 20, 1953, RA 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This was amended by RA 1797 which
provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Identical benefits were
also given to the Members of the Constitutional Commission under RA 1568, as
amended by RA 3595. President Marcos signed PD 578, on Nov. 12, 1974, which
extended similar retirement benefits to the Members of the Armed Forces giving
them also the automatic readjustment features of RA's 1797 and 3595. However, on
Jan. 25, 1975, President Marcos issued PD 644 repealing Sec. 3-A of RA's 1797 and
3595 which authorized the adjustment of the pensions of the retired justices of the
SC, CA, Chairman & Members of the Constitutional Commission and the officers and
members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. Significantly, while
the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces was
restored by President Marcos, those of the retired justices of the SC and CA, were not.
This led to the passage by Congress of House Bill 16297 for the reenactment of the
repealed provisions of RA's 1797 and 3595 restoring the said retirement pensions and
privileges of the retired justices and Members of the Constitutional Commission.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill 16297, citing the policy on
standardization of compensation as reason for such veto.
Prior to the instant petition, however, some retired justices of the CA filed a
petition dated April 22, 1991 asking this Court for a readjustment of their monthly
pensions in accordance with RA 1797, contending that PD 644 repealing the latter
law did not become a law for lack of publication.
The Court acted favorably on the request in a resolution dated Nov. 28, 1991.
Pursuant to such resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for
Fiscal Year 1992 (House Bill No. 34925) a certain appropriation for the Judiciary
intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired justices of the
SC and CA. On Jan. 15, 1992, the President vetoed some portions of Sec. 1 and the
entire Sec. 4 of the Special Provisions for the SC and the lower courts, some portions
of Sec. 1 and the entire Sec. 2 of the Special Provisions for the CA, and some portions
of Sec. 3 of Art. XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments
(General Appropriations Act, FY 1992). Hence, the instant petition filed by the
petitioners as retired Justices of the SC and CA questioning the constitutionality of the
veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for FY
1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the SC
and CA. The petitioners assert that said veto is not an item veto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of certain provisions in the
General Appropriations Act, FY 1992, relating to the payment of the adjusted
pensions of retired justices of the SC and CA, is unconstitutional.
HELD: The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed
provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are valid and subsisting.
The veto power is not absolute. In the exercise of the veto power, the
executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He cannot act like an editor
crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes.
However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration
needs the money to run the machinery of the government and it cannot veto the
entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore,
compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for
this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be
vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriation bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of
the item.
In the same manner, the provision which states that, in compliance with
decisions of the SC and the COA, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn
from the general fund adjustment is not an item. It is the "general fund adjustment"
itself which is the item. It was not vetoed.
No President may veto the provisions of a law enacted 35 years before his
term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory
judgment of the SC through the exercise of veto power.
FACTS: The President issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other
duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines,
an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the
board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other products imported in the
Philippines. EO 443 subsequently increased this additional duty from 5% to 9% ad
valorem.
The Tariff Commission, following the procedures set forth by the Tariff and
Customs Code for the imposition of a special levy on crude oil and other petroleum
products, scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence in support of their respective positions.
Meantime, the President issued EO 475 reducing the rate of additional duty
from 9% to 5% ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products.
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Commission submitted to the President a
"Report" for consideration and appropriate action. A week later, the President issued
EO 478 which levied (in addition to the aforementioned duty of 9% ad valorem and all
other existing ad valorem duties) a special levy of 95 centavos per liter or 151.05
pesos per barrel of imported crude oil and P 1 per liter of imported oil products.
Petitioner filed a petition assailing the validity of EO No.'s 475 and 478 as
violative of Sec. 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. He contended that since the
Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may
not assume such power by issuing EO No.'s 475 and 478 which are in the nature of
revenue-generating measures. He further argued that EO No.'s 475 and 478
contravene Sec. 401 of the Tariff & Customs Code which authorized the President to
increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties ONLY when
necessary to protect local industries or products but NOT for the purpose of raising
additional revenue for the government.
HELD: We believe and so hold that EO No.'s 475 and 478 which may be conceded to
be substantially moved by the desire to generate additional revenues, are not, for
that reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Sec. 401 of
the TCC. Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of
constitutionality and legality to which these EO's are entitled.
1. Under Sec. 24, Art. VI, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
legislative rather than the Executive department. There is an explicit
constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
"subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose"
to fix "within specific limits tariff rates and other duties or imposts"
(Sec. 28, Par. 2, Art. VI).
2. The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the
President is authorized to act under the TCC ONLY to protect local
industries and products for the sake of the national economy, general
welfare and/or national security for the following reasons:
a. There is nothing in the language of either Sec. 104 or 401 of the
TCC that suggests such a sharp and absolute limitation of
authority. The words "protective" and "protection", being relied
upon by petitioner, are simply not enough to support the very
broad and encompassing limitation which the latter seeks to
rest on those two words;
b. Petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of
which this Court may take judicial notice -- thai the Bureau of
Customs which administers the TCC is one of the principal
traditional generators of producers of governmental revenue,
the other being the BIR;
c. Customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates
are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for
revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. The levying of
customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure
the effect of protecting local industries. Simultaneously,,
however, the very same customs duties inevitably have the
effect of producing governmental revenues. In the instant case,
since the Philippines in fact produces 10 to 15 % of the crude oil
consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a
special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products
may be seen to have SOME 11protective" impact upon
indigenous oil production for the effective price of imported
crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it
cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the
government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff
rates or special duty;
PRINCIPLE: Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose
general safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factual
determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress has the putative authority to
abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI. It is similarly empowered to alter or expand
its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the
bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative prerogative to
prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in affirmation of the
legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government.
HELD: The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of the
Court of Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard
measure absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The
fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the
required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly
enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power
to impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on
imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation
of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of
products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of
Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence,
governing in this case. They are:
(1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance Department, the
National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no
matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be.
(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law.
Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It
cannot arise from administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive
branch or from the wisdom or whim of the President.
(3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the
specified limits set in the law and is further subject to limitations and
restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently, if Congress specifies
that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the President cannot impose a
tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may be
imposed on the importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn, no
matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President. Even the most
picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the
President.
Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to
impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of
foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment
of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an
undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields
such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an
exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of
an inherent executive power.
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential
authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA.
Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law.
And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on
this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not provide for
specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions must conform to
prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the
considered opinion of members of the executive branch.
Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise
construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of
its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to
limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI
Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective
spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said law which
significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of
taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of
Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress,
not the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and
imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute, the President
has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures
because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and
restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such
limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. Thus, no
matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the
Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity
can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The
entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the
DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of
tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in
GLORIA v. CA
338 SCRA 5 (2000)
FACTS: Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed by President Aquino as Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools in Quezon City. He was reassigned as a
superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology as recommended
y DECS Sec. Ricardo Gloria on June 17, 1994. In October 1994 Director Roxas
informed Icasiano of the reassignment but Icasiano requested reconsideration of the
assignment. Request was denied and CA granted a TRO. CA found that the
reassignment as violative of Icasianos security of tenure. However, Sec. Gloria and
Director Roxas contend that the prohibition is improper because it attacks as act of
the President in violation of the Doctrine of Presidential immunity from suit.
HELD: The contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed
against the petitioners and not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of the petitioners and not of the President.
Furthermore, Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there
is grave abuse of discretion or that the President has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
HELD: No. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination, can these
crimes, especially plunder, which carries the death penalty, covered by the alleged
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
353 SCRA 424
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit Assuming he enjoys
immunity, the
extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before
the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted
in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from
all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. [Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452(2001)]
HELD: We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he
must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events
that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio109 Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in
a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be
sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him,
incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted
and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different
factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-
sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his
or her tenure of office or actual incumbency. 68 Conversely, this presidential privilege
RE: Seniority Among the Fou (4) Most Recent Apppointments to the Position
of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals
Newly appointed justices. After some initial confusion, the four Justices were finally
listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following order of seniority: Justice
Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice Antonio-
Valenzuela (as most junior). The ranking was based in a letter dated March 25, 2010
submitted by the members of the CA Committee on Rules to CA Presiding Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
Ruling: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the
authority, of designating or selecting an individual to discharge and perform the
duties and functions of an office or trust. 3 Where the power of appointment is
absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or
approval is necessary and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission,
may issue at once.4 The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required
of the appointing authority has been complied with.5
In Valencia v. Peralta, 6 the Court ruled that a written memorial that can render title to
public office indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the
commission. For purposes of completion of the appointment process, the
appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive, and
sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to the
appointee.7 Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after the
appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the
appointment but only to facilitate the effectivity of the appointment by the
appointees receipt and acceptance thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission
has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such
document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of
Ruling: When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of
office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of
the state is imperative and unceasing.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his
FACTS: Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were
duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region. They
seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer
of the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in
PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that
declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the
income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices
and Judges are property subject to general income tax applicable to all income
earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall
within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.
The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a
diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed
in Endencia vs. David, must be deemed discarded.
2. Gualberto J. De La Llana, et. al. vs. Manuel Alba, et. al., GR No. L-
57883, 12 March 1982
FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
Facts: Petitioner Civil Service Commission filed a petition for mandamus which seeks
to compel the respondent Department of Budget and Management to release the
balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. It also seeks a determination by this Court
of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
The petitioner claimed that the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002
appropriated P215,270,000.00 for its Central Office, with a total allocation from all
sources, amounting to P285,660,790.44. [1] It complained, however, that the total
The balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report,
no release policy, whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their
submission of the documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of
National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds.
Issue: W/N, the application of the no report, no release policy upon independent
constitutional bodies like the petitioner, CSC, a violation of the principle of fiscal
autonomy, and therefore, unconstitutional.
Held: The SC held that the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5
of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold
that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of
a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities
vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted
the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the
Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies
not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
Significantly, pertinent General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA read as follows:
In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA, which
specifically applied to offices vested with fiscal autonomy, stated:
This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a
guiding principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy
that:
After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically
and regularly released subject to availability of funds. (underscoring supplied)
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the
present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be
automatically and regularly released a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is
contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue collections
are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all
entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be practically
impossible to fully release the Judiciarys appropriations or any of the entities also
vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such other
entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that situation
that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release
appropriations is allowed. (underscoring supplied)
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small
portion of the total national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will the
total revenue collections fall short of the requirements of such agencies.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. [16]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional
Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the
amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely
states:
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of
appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited
from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount
appropriated for them for the previous year.
In light of all the foregoing discussions, respondents act of withholding the subject
funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised
purely questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with the
SC NO
RULING: Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 vests in the CA
appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial
bodies. But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse
should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The
question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal
raises purely questions of law.
CMUs action was one for injunction against the implementation of PP 310 that
authorized the taking of lands from the university. The fact that the President issued
this proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where
the lands were located were facts that were not in issue. These were alleged in the
FACTS: In 1962, the spouses Lomantong Darapa and Sinab Dimakuta obtained a loan
from DBP secured by a real and chattel mortgage over a lot situated at Linamon,
Lanao del Norte covered by Tax Declaration No. A-148. In 1970, the spouses applied
for the renewal and increase of their loan using Dimakutas TCT No. T-1997 as
additional collateral. The DBP disapproved the loan application without returning,
however, Dimakutas TCT. When the spouses failed to pay their loan, DBP foreclosed
the mortgages in 1971, which, unknown to the spouses, included TCT No. T-1997. The
spouses failed to redeem the land under TCT No. T-1997, which led to its cancellation
and eventual issuance of another TCT in DBPs name. In 1984, the spouses
discovered all these and they demanded to DBP the reconveyance of the land. DBP
assured them of the return of the land. But in 1994, DBP sold the land to Abalos. On
the same year, the spouses instituted an action for annulment of title and recovery of
possession. The spouses averred that TCT No. T-1997 was not one of the mortgaged
properties and thus its foreclosure by DBP and its eventual sale to Abalos was null
and void. The DBP countered that TCT No. T-1997 had its roots in Tax Declaration No.
A-148. The RTC annulled DBPs foreclosure of the land under TCT No. T-1997 and
declared Dimakuta as the lawful owner. DBP went to the CA but the latter affirmed
RULING: It is fundamental procedural law that a petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure shall, as a general rule,
raise only questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts this is in contradistinction from a question of fact which arises from doubt
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. A question of law does not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any
of them and the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.
The DBPs insistence that TCT No. T-1,997 is the same land covered by Tax
Declaration No. A-148 is to ask the Court to evaluate the pieces of evidence passed
upon by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. To grant this petition will entail the Court's
review and determination of the weight, credence, and probative value of the
evidence presented at the trial court matters which, without doubt, are factual and,
therefore, outside the ambit of Rule 45.
Petitioners ought to remember that the Court of Appeals factual findings, affirming
that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed
on appeal, except for the most compelling of reasons, such as when: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings
are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10)
the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. None of the exceptions is
present in this petition.
In any event, records reveal that the land covered by the TCT was not among the
properties the spouses mortgaged in 1962. The land covered by the TCT is situated in
Barrio Buru-an, Iligan, Lanao del Norte. DBPs former property examiner and
appraiser who examined the lands which the spouses mortgaged to DBP testified that
he never examined any land in Barrio Buru-an, Iligan.
Republic v. De Guzman
652 SCRA 101 (2011)
RULING: It is worthy to note that while this petition was filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the assertions and arguments advanced herein are those that will
necessarily require this Court to re-evaluate the evidence on record.
It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of
law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.
When there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, then it is a
question of law; but when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts, then it is a question of fact. "Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact,
the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a
question of law."
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is
whether the Court can resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or
evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a
question of fact. Thus, the petition must not involve the calibration of the probative
value of the evidence presented. In addition, the facts of the case must be
undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for the Court to decide is whether
or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was appropriate.
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the controversial LBP check are central to
the issue before us, the resolution of which, will require a perusal of the entire
records of the case including the transcribed testimonies of the witnesses. Since this
is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will only review
them under certain recognized exceptions.
Cua v. People
660 SCRA 235 (2011)
FACTS: Guillermo Cua is a Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR in Olongapo City. He
was charged with Malversation of Public Funds after an audit disclosed that he
incurred a cash shortage amounting to P291,783. Initially he admitted his cash
shortage purportedly to get even with the BIR which failed to promote him but
promised to pay the amount as soon as possible. A special arrangement was made
between the BIR and him wherein the BIR would withhold his salary and apply the
same to the shortage incurred until full payment of the accountability was made.
Nonetheless, an Information for Malversation of public funds was filed against him.
Cua did not testify and instead adduced documentary evidence showing that he had
paid for the shortage by means of deductions from his salary. The RTC convicted him.
The CA affirmed his conviction. Now before the SC, Cua claims among others that he
is not criminally liable because the PNB confirmed the authenticity of the pertinent
documents and that his payment of the shortage was involuntary and without his
consent.
RULING: At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. Thus, questions of fact
are not reviewable. It is not the Courts function to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower
court. As such, a question of law must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution of factual issues is
the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are accorded respect.
A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of
facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being
resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Thus, the
issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set
of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of
fact.
Lorzano v. Tabayag
665 SCRA 38 (2012)
FACTS: The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan
Tabayag. Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Iriga City. Right after the burial
of their father, the petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings that she be
allowed to take possession of and receive the income generated by the subject
property until after her eldest son could graduate from college. The petitioners
siblings acceded to the said request. After the petitioners eldest son finished college,
her siblings asked her to return to them the possession of the subject property so
that they could partition it among themselves. However, the petitioner refused to
relinquish her possession of the subject property claiming that she purchased the
subject property from their father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property. Respondent filed an action for annulment of the sale on the ground that the
signature of their father was forged. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It also
awarded moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of respondent. CA affirmed this
decision.
RULING: Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that
the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Chavez v. JBC
676 SCRA 579 (2012)
FACTS: Frank Chavez filed a petition for prohibition before the SC questioning the
constitutionality of the present composition of the JBC.
RULING: Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to
first ascertain the nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an
action is determined by the allegations therein and the character of the relief sought,
the Court views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule
63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8
(1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that
which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because
the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document
sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with
the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only
questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not
among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
Tecson v. Comelec
424 SCRA 277
ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates? - NO
RULING: An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April
1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
Legarda v. De Castro
542 SCRA 125 (2008)
Macalintal v. PET
651 SCRA 239 (2011)
FACTS: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and
of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the PET. He chafes at the creation of a
purportedly separate tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set
personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET. According to him, the
designation of the justices of the SC as members of the PET violates Sec 12, Art VIII
of the Constitution since the PET exercises quasi judicial powers.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on
the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES
Facts: On May 23, 1997, Florentino M. Alumbres, filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the
destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. It
was alleged that he requested Caoibes to return the executive table he borrowed
from respondent; that Caoibes did not answer so respondent reiterated his request
but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed
him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses
was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had
the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that criminal
charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, acting on the complaint for misconduct filed by
herein complainant, rendered a Decision dismissing the administrative case against
herein respondents as well as the counter-complaint filed by the latter against herein
complainant.
The Investigating Judge adopted the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao and, accordingly, recommended that the instant administrative complaint
be dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should take cognizance of this case
Held:
Pursuant to the above-settled rule, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao should
have referred the instant complaint to this Court for appropriate action, instead of
resolving the same. Hence, we agree with the OCA that the Decision rendered by the
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao in OMB-M-A-02-126-E does not have any force
and effect on the present administrative case before us.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P.
PONCE DE LEON
Facts: A complaint was filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt
Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman
of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based
on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and
published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation
in Puerto Princesa City. The complaint avers that the article tends to impede,
obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that the
article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive
and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of
complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and
impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed
before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic
review.
Issue: Who has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged contumely is
committed against a lower court while the case is pending in the Appellate or Higher
Court
Held: In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an
act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court
and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial
administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time
with respect to a given controversy. Partly because of administrative considerations,
xxx
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential
Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No.
326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the
Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of
Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and
duties of the position as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of
a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the
powers and duties attached to the said position;
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions
of an Executive Judge.
Issue:
Whether Judge Manzano can serve concurrently as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice
Held:
No. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering
that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the
Constitution, his request must be denied.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-
members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they
exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment
of their judicial duties.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a
representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and
the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice
Facts: During the 11th Congress] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the
House of Representatives. Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became
laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No.
2157 to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment sought to increase the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average
annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.
In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June
30, 2001 xxx
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July
2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 29 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt
from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.
Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of
Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1
and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.
The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate
session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that
passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from
the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this
reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to
pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the
Senate for proper action.
Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision
exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income requirement.
As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood
bills, all of which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law
directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to
determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.
Held:
As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of
political subdivisions in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code, subject to the approval of the voters in the unit
concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area,
population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by
RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these indicators or
criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute.
Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they
conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income
standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save
for the use of the term barrio in lieu of barangay, may be instead of shall, the
change of the phrase unit or units to political unit and the addition of the modifier
directly to the word affected, the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction
of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:
It bears notice, however, that the code similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the
aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via
either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need
not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository
to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after
making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of
indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this
case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from
PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory
laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically
exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned.
Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified
indicators.
Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC
and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their
contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased
income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is
startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009,
as they in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the
cityhood laws.
As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the
income criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being
unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20
million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to
subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds
expression in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention,
the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered
by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In
other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009,
adhered, in the final analysis, to the criteria established in the Local Government
Code, pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to
discuss this exemption angle.
Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading
Requisites for Creation. The section sets the minimum income qualifying bar before
a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally,
Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income of at least ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years as a minimum income standard for a
municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by
the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that [a] municipality or cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x. RA 9009 in turn amended
said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus:
xxx
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the
rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical
inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.
Xxx
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the
pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities
were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold.
These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing
excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and
Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold of PhP
100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending
cityhood bills xxx
(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply
to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words,
Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income
requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income
requirement;
(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really
immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations
during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch
as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being
considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as
here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law
results in absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had
pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially
distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each
of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the original Sec.
450 of the 1991 LGC.
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice
Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the
matter of the correctness of the factual premises upon which the said decision was
predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of
March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that the basic issues
have already been passed upon reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or
not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic
issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was
precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution.
This May 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to
declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the
constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009
Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the
aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition
or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where
the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law
or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution
dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated
groundthat the basic issues have already been passed suffice to
hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009,
which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that the basic issues had already
been passed upon betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not
the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues
raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the
day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn
on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the
inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote
on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution.
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the majority of
the Members contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution xxx
Xxx
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec.
7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing
that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be
deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original
action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the
petition or motion shall be denied.
If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the
aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the
prescription of the Constitution that the cases shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon. To repeat, the last vote on the
issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009
Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock.
xxx Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the
procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the
power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served
thereby. In the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by
stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only
tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application
must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice. xxx. When a case is impressed with public
The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009
motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008
Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration.
MANGELEN VS. CA
215 SCRA 230 (1992)
Facts: Civil Case No. 84-22306 involved an action for the recovery of the amount of
P600,000.00 which defendant, now private respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.,
represented by its President, private respondent Pedro Habaluyas, bound itself to pay
plaintiff, now petitioner, by virtue of a Compromise Agreement. Instead of filing an
Answer within the reglementary period private respondents submitted a motion to
dismiss xxx
On 24 July 1984, defendant filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to hold
in abeyance further proceedings on the ground that they had filed with the then
Intermediate Appellate Court on 12 July 1984 a petition for certiorari raising the
issues of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and litis pendencia. That case was
docketed as A.C.-G.R. No. 03742. xxx
IAC - In said decision, public respondent practically adopted the factual findings of
the trial court, and explicitly declared that the latter simply acted "in accordance with
the provisions of the rules of court" 12 and committed no reversible error "in
declaring the defendents (sic) in default xxx Still unable to accept the verdict,
defendants-appellants filed a motion to reconsider the decision, xxx On 12 July 1989,
public respondent promulgated a resolution reversing its earlier decision of 30
January 1989. Because of its brevity, the resolution is quoted in full:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court promulgated
on January 30, 1989 is hereby granted and the said decision is hereby reversed. Let
this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Issue: WON IAC followed the requirement of Article VII Section 14 of the Constitution.
Held: NO.
There is more to the confusion. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings, thereby placing the latter in a quandary as to
what it was supposed to do. The trial court would not know what "further
proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified the order of default
nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus, the former would be hard pet at
finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented for its resolution.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in
a resolution promulgated on April 19, 2002.
On July 3, 2002, herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. On November 14,
2002, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for certiorari, to wit:
In the present petition, the foregoing circumstances are not present. The findings of
fact by the Labor Arbiter were affirmed by public respondent to the effect that private
respondent Eddie Endaya was illegally dismissed by petitioner. It therefore pains us
to conclude that private respondent stands to suffer more due to the said illegal
dismissal. Such that, it is the private respondent who may suffer irreparable injury
should the writ for preliminary injunction be issued. Such being the case, the prayer
for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is hereby
DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.
Insofar as the prayer of private respondent for the immediate dismissal of the instant
petition is concerned, we find merit in the same. The factual issues raised in the
instant petition had already been passed upon by public respondent. As such, we
give our imprimatur to the same since it is in agreement with that of the Labor
Arbiter, and hence deems (sic) binding and conclusive on us.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT and that
the questions raised are too UNSUBSTANTIAL to require consideration. SO ORDERED.
Issue: CA has violated the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based.
Held: NO. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals issued the above-quoted
resolution without any analysis of the evidence of the parties or reference to any
legal basis. As such, it violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ,
never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides that the court may dismiss a petition for certiorari if it finds the same to be
patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised
therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Furthermore, a reading of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals shows
that the main issue raised is factual as it questions the finding of the NLRC that
respondent Endaya was illegally dismissed from his employment. Petitioner brought
up issues the resolution of which necessarily involves a review of the evidence
presented by both parties. It is settled that resort to a judicial review of the
decisions of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the rendering tribunal, board or office.[18] It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the
basis of the labor official or officer in determining his conclusion It is not for the
appellate court to reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has
gained expertise in its specialized field. Considering that the findings of fact of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by evidence on record, the same must be
accorded due respect and finality
Facts: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision dated May 6, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan granting the Demurrer to Evidence
of Mayor Henry E. Barrera (Mayor Barrera) and dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25035-
25037, 25039-25041, 25043, 25045-25047, 25049-25050, and 25053-25054, on the
Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the assailed
decision as it never expressed clearly and distinctly the facts and the evidence on
which it is based, in violation of Article VIII Section 14 of the Constitution
Held: NO.
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[n]o decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based." The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution is to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the
parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the
pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should
he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors
against it.
Our review of the Sandiganbayan Decision dated May 6, 2006 reveals that said
judgment actually contained a summary of the antecedent facts and proceedings; as
well as a discussion on the relevant statutory provisions, the elements of the offense
charged, and the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the People.
The factual and legal bases of the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, granting Mayor
Barrera's Demurrer to Evidence, are readily evident xxx
In the instant cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove actual
injury and damage suffered by the private complainants, as one of the elements of
the crime herein charged, in that it failed to specify, quantify and prove to the point
of moral certainty the purported "undue injury". Xxx Likewise, the prosecution's
evidence failed to prove manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith on the part of the
accused, as the fourth of the above-stated requisites for the commission of the crime
herein charged.
The evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of that quantum of proof
necessary to establish the fact that the accused acted with manifest partiality or with
evident bad faith. On the contrary, what is clear from the evidence adduced, was
that herein accused simply exercised his legitimate powers under the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which provides that a municipal mayor has the
power to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers" and, for this purpose, he shall
have the power to "issue such executive order as are necessary for the proper
enforcement and execution of the laws and ordinances." Ex-Mayor Elamparo's acts of
The undue haste of awarding stalls in the new public market by Ex-Mayor Elamparo
was flagrant, because from 26 June to 30 June, 1998, former stall holders of the old
market that burned down, held a rally to denounce the allegedly unfair awarding of
contracts of lease over the new stalls, complaints ranging from awards to new
comers, to instances of two stalls, being awarded to one lessee.
It was precisely in this state of affair that prompted herein accused-movant Barrera
to cause the issuance of Memorandum No. 1, Series of 1998, after he had taken his
oath as mayor of Candelaria, Zambales, to wit:
"You are hereby advised that effective 1:00 PM, June 30, 1998, the transferring
to and occupancy of stalls inside the Public Market shall be temporarily suspended.
Lastly, of significance is the fact that Memorandum No. 1 applied to all stallholders at
the new public market, be they supporters or not of Mayor Barrera during the 1998
mayoralty elections just past. These admissions of the complaining witnesses in open
court, thus, refute their allegations in their affidavits that the purpose of the
memorandum was to award the new stalls to Mayor Barrera's supporters.
In the light of all the foregoing, We find that herein accused-movant Henry E. Barrera
cannot in fairness be held liable under the indictment. In this connection, it has been
held that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of the defense; the burden of proof is never on the accused to disprove
the facts necessary to establish the crime charged. "It is safely entrenched in our
jurisprudence" says the Supreme Court, "that unless the prosecution discharges its
burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not
even offer evidence in his behalf.
In fact, based on the foregoing, the People was able to identify and discuss
with particularity in its present Petition the grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by the graft court in granting Mayor Barrera's Demurrer to Evidence.
Thus, contrary to the People's contention, the aforequoted Sandiganbayan
judgment did not violate the mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution.
Facts: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief
of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard
employed assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the
ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw
during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of
ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of
police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the
accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly
recounted before the trial court their respective positions and participation in the
fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed
the crime.
Issue: Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that [n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
Held: YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that [n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Issue: WON the respondent judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held: Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts
nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge
of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide
a case within the reglementary period of 90 days xxx
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of
cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory.
The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to
minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our
courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the
litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify
the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the
Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the case
was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision
should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the
Code of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-
10-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower
courts.
Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the
submission of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides:
x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or
allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of
the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is
earlier. (Emphasis ours)
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was
still awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court
held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda
within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for
failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the
memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case
may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the
rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in its
absence the court can do on the basis of the judges personal notes and the records
of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of the
privilege. (Emphasis ours)
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised
Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less
serious charge. Under Section 11(B) [21] of the same Rule, the penalty for such
Facts: The case revolved around the provisional take-over by the PCGG of COCOFED
and its assets, and the sequestration of shares of stock in United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) purportedly issued to and/or owned by over a million coconut farmers,
Cojuangco, the six (6) Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) corporations[6] and
the fourteen (14) CIIF holding companies[7] (hereafter collectively called "CIIF
companies"). These CIIF companies are so called for having been organized and/or
acquired as UCPB subsidiaries with the use of the CIIF levy.
Upon verbal inquiry by Atty. Manuel Laserna, Jr. as to which board should be
recognized in the interim until a resolution of the matter pending before this Court,
the Court is of the view and so hold that those designated by the PCGG as of June 11,
1983 (sic), in the afternoon, will be the operating board of the COCOFED. As earlier
stated, this recognition by this Court is without prejudice to any other act or acts
which the parties might wish to refer to this Court and which this Court will respond
to at the interim.
Aggrieved, COCOFED and others who claimed to have been prejudiced by the
designation of the board of directors issued by the PCGG interposed the instant
petition to challenge said PCGG appointments.
The PCGG discovered later that the sequestered properties involved in the case were
registered in the name of the corporate-owners and not in the name of the individual
defendants; thus, there was a need to further amend the complaint pursuant
to Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. Under this constitutional
provision, failure to include corporate defendants which own the sequestered
properties would result in the automatic lifting of the writs of sequestration. Thus, 78
corporate defendants were included in the newly amended complaint entitled Third
In 1995, during the pendency of the instant petition, the Republic moved for
the subdivision of CC 0033 into separate trials on the various sequestered
assets, attaching the corresponding amended complaints. On March 24, 1999,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the Republic's motion and
subdividing CC 0033 into eight (8) separate complaints on the various subject
matters
Issue:
GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THIS PETITION
Superseding events have rendered the instant case moot and academic
In Mendoza v. Villas, the Court explained the concept of mootness, citing Gunsi, Sr. v.
Commissioners:
Sec. 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically provides for the effect of the
amendment of pleadings, to wit:
Thus, the Court considered the issue of whether an original complaint should have
been dismissed for having become moot with the admission of an amended
complaint in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. The Court ruled in this wise:
With the issue of admission of the amended complaint resolved, the question of
whether or not the original complaint should have been dismissed was mooted.
Section 8, Rule 1.0 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that an amended
pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. In this case, the original
complaint was deemed withdrawn from the records upon the admission of
the amended complaint. This conclusion becomes even more pronounced in that
the RTC already rendered a decision on the merits of the said amended complaint,
not to mention the Lu Ym father and sons' concurrence in the mootness of the issue
in the instant petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
Facts: Travel Order No. 103-2008 dated 11 November 2008 ordered the conduct of a
judicial audit in Branch 17 from 24 to 25 November 2008. The judicial audit team
submitted a memorandum dated 14 January 2009, five days after Judge Mantuas
retirement, to Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches (DCA Vilches). The judicial
audit team quantified Branch 17s caseload as follows:
As of audit date, the Court has a total caseload of 356 cases consisting of 230
criminal cases and 126 civil cases based on the records actually presented to and
examined by the team xxx
The judicial audit team also found that Branch 17s case records were not in order.
The team noted that the case records are stitched together with pagination.
However, the criminal records are not chronologically arranged. Also, the records
attached to criminal cases jointly tried are incomplete (Crim. Cases 1129, 1131,
1189, 1190, 1185, 1186, 1033, 1205, among a few). The courts docket books are not
updated. There are no log book[s] on arrest and search warrants, exhibits,
disposed/decided/archived cases and incoming documents. There is no order on
payment of postponement fee in proper cases.
In a letter dated 27 April 2009 addressed to DCA Vilches, Atty. Mape informed the
OCA of the status of the cases enumerated in the report of the judicial audit team
and submitted the Orders, Resolutions and Notices of Hearing issued by Branch 17.
Atty. Mape also stated that Branch 17 already complied with all other items
mentioned by the judicial audit team in their recommendation. However, the wearing
of uniform was considered optional starting 1 April 2009 in view of a memorandum
issued by the OCA. Atty. Mape begged for the OCAs indulgence and explained that
the delay in the submission of his reply was brought about by two substitutions of the
judge assigned to Branch 17. At the time of audit, Judge Mantua presided over
the court. Pursuant to Judge Mantuas retirement on 9 January 2009, Administrative
Order No. 180-2008 designated Judge Maraya, Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional
Trial Court, Calubian, Leyte, as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 17 to replace Judge
Mantua. Administrative Order No. 23-2009 dated 3 March 2009 revoked Judge
Marayas designation and Judge Rogelio R. Joboco (Judge Joboco), Presiding Judge of
Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, took over as acting presiding judge of Branch 17.
Issue: WON Judge Mantua was remiss in his duty to promptly dispose the cases in
his sala
Held: The report of the judicial audit team, and consequently that of the
OCA, suffers from inaccuracies and a slant towards mere fault-finding. Civil
Case No. PN-0354, Mingasca v. Omega-Reyes, was entered twice, but in consecutive
numbers, in the table for civil cases without further setting. Because of this double
entry, the judicial audit team and OCA probably overlooked Judge Mantuas action
dated 27 November 2008. Furthermore, despite Atty. Mapes submissions dated 19
January 2009 and 27 April 2009 of copies of the Orders, Resolutions and Notices of
Hearing issued by Branch 17, the OCA failed to state in their Memorandum that out
of the 126 cases listed, Judge Mantua took action on 114 cases, or 90.48%,
before he retired on 9 January 2009.
It should be noted that the judicial audit team submitted their report to DCA Vilches
five days after Judge Mantuas retirement. The OCA, in turn, submitted their
Memorandum to CJ Puno on 12 May 2009, or a little over four months after Judge
Mantuas retirement. During his incumbency, Judge Mantua was never given a
chance to explain the results of the judicial audit report. With the knowledge
that the judicial audit report will be submitted only after Judge Mantuas retirement,
the judicial audit teams recommendations were directed only to Atty. Mape, the
Acting Clerk of Court and Legal Researcher II of Branch 17, and Judge Maraya, Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 17 at the time of the reports submission. In its
Memorandum, the OCA recommended that Judge Mantua be fined for gross
incompentency and inefficiency.
The report of the judicial audit team showed that no appropriate action was done in
68 cases, 23 cases remained unresolved after a sufficient amount of time, and 10
cases were not decided within the reglementary period. In contrast, there is no
We issued a Resolution dated 15 August 2011 which redocketed the case as a regular
administrative matter and required Judge Mantua to comment on the OCAs 12 May
2009 Memorandum. The pertinent portions of Judge Mantuas comment read:
When I assumed office as Judge of RTC, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte in August 2005,
my court then had no Clerk of Court. xxx
This comment is not an excuse for the findings of the Judicial Audit team of my
performance, but is made only to show the state of affairs of the court during my
stewardship of the same for a period of a little over three (3) years. However, despite
my earnest efforts, there were things which have been overlooked due to
inadvertence and these were just product [sic] of human weakness and
imperfection.
This Court has always impressed upon judges the necessity of deciding
cases with dispatch. Section 5 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary states that [j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that [a] judge shall dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Canon 6 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that [a judge] should be prompt in disposing of
all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied. Section 15(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that judges of
lower courts decide cases within three months from the date of submission.10
This Court has repeatedly reminded judges that they must resolve matters
pending before them promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally
mandated three-month period. If they cannot comply with the same, they
should ask for an extension from the Supreme Court upon meritorious
grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should be
observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time.
Judges must dispose of the courts business promptly. Delay in the disposition of
cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions on them.11
Facts: In a Letter, Judge Santos requested from theOffice of the Court Administrator
(OCA) additional time to try and decide two election cases, namely: (a) Special
Proceedings No. 2007-02 (Election Protest No. 2007-02) filed by a certain Felicisimo
Gavino against Raymundo Jucutan; and (b) Special Proceedings No. 2007-03 (Election
Protest No.2007-03) initiated by Angel Marinas against Edgardo Corre.
The OCA, favorably recommended the extension requested by Judge Santos which
was adopted by the Court in its July 21, 2008 Resolution.Judge Santos was granted an
extension of thirty (30) days or until June 7, 2008 to decide both election cases and
was directed to furnish the Court with copies of his decisions on said cases within ten
(10) days from the promulgation of judgment.
Thereafter, in a Letter Judge Santos provided the Court with a copy of his February
16, 2009 Decision in Election Protest No. 2007-03. The OCA, however, noticed that
the said decision was
rendered eight (8) months beyond the extension granted to Judge Santos. Inits March
11, 2009 Report, the OCA recommended Warning.
In a letter, dated July 10, 2009, Judge Santos sought another extension of thirty (30)
days or until August 10, 2009 to decide Special Proceedings No. 2007-02 as he
apparently needed more time to evaluate the voluminous records of the case. The
OCA, in its Memorandum required Judge Santos to explain xxx
Issue:
Held: Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires lower courts to
decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3)
months from date of submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Canon 1,
Rule 1.02, of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should administer
justice impartially and without delay.
Specifically, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to
dispose of their business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. All
cases or matters must be decided or resolved by all lower courts within a period of
three (3) months from submission.
In this case, Judge Santos failed to render the decision in 294 cases within the
reglementary period or to even ask for extension. The Court,
in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that justify
the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this
reason why the Court has been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within
which to decide cases and resolve matters and incidents related thereto. When a
judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all that is
needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension
of time within which to decide the case. Thus, a request for extension within which to
render a decision filed beyond the 90-day reglementary period is obviously a
subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judge Santos could have easily asked the Court or an extension of time to decide on
these cases like what he had done in the two election cases. He, however, opted not
to do so. The Court cannot understand why Judge Santos asked for extension in the
two election cases but not in the 294 cases already waiting for disposition in his sala.
The Court can only surmise that it was deliberate so he could not be directed by the
Court to immediately resolve all of them. The fact that the cases were mentioned in
the monthly report of cases and semestral docket inventories is not extenuating. The
indelible fact is that he was in delay in resolving those cases. Under the
circumstances, it was inexcusable.
Held:
1. Yes. On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order
No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task
assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization
of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August
7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the
entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of
Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all
Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan."
The mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
constitutional. Such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments
and commissions." The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital
region, and other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as
in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to
doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang
Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate
2. No. Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides
with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under
Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the
1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal
the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. Moreover, the
Supreme Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President
who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose
his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,
for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of
the judiciary.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of
judicial power. In the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint.
CAYETANO v. MONSOD
201 SCRA 210 (1991)
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Commission on Appointments. Petitioner
Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10
years.
On June 5, 1991, the CA confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day he assumed
office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Hence, this petition by Cayetano, as citizen and
taxpayer, praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of COMELEC be declare null and void.
HELD:
Section 1(1), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least 35 years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any election position in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
While there seems to be no Jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office, Black defines practice of law as The
rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and techniques to serve the interest of another with his comment. It is not limited to
appearing in Court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation but embraces
the preparations of pleadings, and other papers incidents to actions and special
proceedings, conveyance, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of legal advises to clients. xxx
The practice of law means any activity, In or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which devise or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Interpreted in the light of various definitions of the term practice of law, particularly
the modem concept of law practice, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a
Practice of law- to include any activity in and out of court which should require the
use of legal skills, knowledge or expertise. But this is qualified by the phrase
member of the Philippine Bar.
Because of the law student practice rule that law students who have finished
at least 3rd year, not 3 years, in law school, to be accepted in the law student
practice. The law student would be technically performing tasks which require the
use of legal skills, but he is not yet a member of the Philippine bar, he cannot be
qualified to the position.
There is a common disqualification on appointments. They must not have
been candidates for any elective position, in the elections immediately preceding
their appointment.
2 things:
(1) It does not refer to the 1 year usual laying back prohibition
that if you have ran in the last election, you cannot be appointed to any government
office
within a period of 1 year for the Commissioners, it is in the immediately preceding
elections
if youre a candidate, you cannot be appointed within a period of 3 years.
Art. IX-C, Sec. 1(2): The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
NACIONALISTA v. ANGELO
85 PHIL 101 (1949)
FACTS:
On Nov. 9, 1949, while respondent Bautista held the Office of the Solicitor General of
the Philippines, President Quirino designated him as acting member of the COMELEC.
He took his oath of office and forthwith proceeded to assume and perform the duties
of the office while at the same time continued to exercise all the powers and duties
as Solicitor General.
Petitioner Nacionalista Party instituted this proceeding praying that after due hearing,
a writ of prohibition be issued commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist
forever from acting as member of the COMELEC unless is legally appointed as regular
Member of said Commission. Petitioner alleged that membership in the Commission
is a permanent constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and, therefore, no
designation of a person or officer in an acting capacity could and can be made
because a member of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any other office;
and because the respondent as Solicitor General belongs to the Executive
Department and cannot assume the powers and duties of a member in the
Commission.
HELD:
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is an independent body or institution. By the
very nature of their functions, the members of the COMELEC must be independent.
The Supreme Court said that the appointment to the Commission is permanent,
they cannot be temporary or in an acting capacity. Only permanent appointees are
secured in their offices.
A person not secured in his office may retain from exercising his duties in such a
manner that he will clash with the appointing authority. There may be hesitation on
his part, that is not conducive to the independence of the Commission. Only a
permanent appointment can make the person secured from the appointing authority.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC
GR 93867 (Dec. 18, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioner Brillantes is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines
of Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named Chairman of the
fact-finding Commission to investigate the 1989 December coup dtat attempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to make the challenged designation.
HELD:
No. The President does not have the power to make the challenged designation. Art.
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that: In no case shall any Member of the
Commission on Elections be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. Art. IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution, likewise expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of
their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and the exercise of its own discretion.
That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of
the Philippines. The choice of the acting Chairman is an internal matter that should
be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President
violates their independence.
NP v. VERA
85 PHIL 149 (1951)
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition filed by the Nacionalista Party and its
official candidates for Senators against Vicente de Vera, Chairman of the COMELEC to
enjoin him from sitting or taking part in the deliberations of said Commission in
connection with the elections of the Liberal Party for the position of Senator in the
last elections, and for that reason, he is disqualified from acting on all matters
connected with said elections, the Nacionalista Party also argued that his
appointment as Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the constitution and,
therefore, it is void ab initio. It was found out that de Vera was already a member of
the Commission when he is appointed its chairman. Nacionalista Party argued that
such appointment was in fact a reappointment which is expressly prohibited by the
Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court pronounced that the ground invoked by petitioners would be
proper in quo warrant to proceedings but not in a petition for prohibition because it is
inquiring into a persons title he is holding under color of right. Nevertheless, the
Court gave its view on the 1985 Constitutional appointment of COMELEC that There
shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a chairman and two
other members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed. xxx it must be noticed from this provision that the prohibition against
reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the Commissioners
shall hold office for a term of 9 years. This imports that the Commissioners may not
be reappointed only after they have held office only for, say, 3 or 6 years, provided
his term will not exceed 9 years at all.
REP v. IMPERIAL
FACTS:
The Solicitor General filed this quo warrant to proceeding against respondents Hon.
Imperial and Hon. Perez, to test the legality of their continuance in office of as
Chairman and Member, respectively, of the COMELEC. According to the Solicitor
General, the first Commissioners of COMELEC were duly appointed and qualified on
July 12, 1945 with the following terms of office:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on July 12, 1954;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on July 12, 1951;
Hon. Vera, Member, for 3 years, expiring on July 12, 1948;
Upon death of chairman Vito in May 1947, Member Vera was promoted Chairman on
May 26, 1947.The Solicitor General argued that based on the case of NP V. Bautista,
the term of office of Vera would have expired on July 12, 1954 or the date when the
term of office if the late Vito would have expired. But Chairman Vera also died in
August, 1951 and the respondent Hon. Imperial was appointed Chairman to serve for
a full term of 9 years or to expire on July 12, 1960 despite the theory that he could
legally server as Chairman only up to July 12. 1954. Respondent Hon. Perez was
appointed member on Dec.8, 1949 again for a full term of 9 years expiring on Nov.
24, 1958. The solicitor General argued that Hon. Perez could serve only up to July 12,
1951 or the date when the term of office of Member Enage who was his predecessor
would have expired.
HELD:
Sec 1. Par. 1 of Art. X of the 1935 Constitution provides that: There shall be an
independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other
members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office
for a term of nine years, another for six years, and the third for three years. The
Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on Elections may be removed
from office only by impeachment in the manner provided in this Constitution.
The provision that of the first 3 Commissioners appointed one shall hold office for
nine years, another for 6 years and the third for 3 years when taken together with
the prescribed term of office for 9 years, without reappointment, evidences a
deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the
Commission, by having subsequent members appointable only once every 3 years,
so that no President can appoint more than one Commissioner, thereby preserving
and safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the Commission as a body.
The rotation plan and selection of the fixed term of 9 years for all subsequent
appointees were evidently for the purpose of preserving it from hasty and irreflexive
changes.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its
workability: (1) That the terms of the first 3 Commissioners should start on a common
date; and, (2) That any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the
expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
The starting date, however, should be June 21, 1941 since that is the date of the
organization of the Constitutional COMELEC under CA 657 ( which was formerly, a
GAMINDE v. COA
347 SCRA 655 (2000)
FACTS:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P.
Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. She assumed office
on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointment (CA), Congress of the Philippines confirmed the
appointment also informing her that her will expire on February 2, 1999.
On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President
as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, opined that petitioners term of office would expire on
February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999,
Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the COA requesting opinion on whether or
not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their
salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, COA, issued an opinion that the term of
Commisioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her
appointment conformably with the constitutional extent. Consequently, on March
24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance,
disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-
terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed
the disallowance to the COA en banc. On June 15, 1999, the COA dismissed petitioner
appeal. The COA affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of
petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her
appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with
the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for
reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the COA denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, CSC, to
which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated
in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
FACTS
Capablanca was appointed into the PNP service with the rank of PO1 with a
temporary status and was assigned at the PNP Station in Butuan City. After two
years, he took the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the NAPOLCOM and
passed the same. On 2000, he took the Career Service Professional Examination-
Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the CSC and likewise passed the
same. Thereafter, the Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon him the permanent
status as PO1.
On 2001, The CSC Caraga informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged
irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took on 2000. According to the CSC,
the person in the picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the
person whose picture is attached in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) and that the
signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the signature affixed to the PDS.
During the preliminary investigation, Capablanca, represented by a counsel,
moved to dismiss the proceedings. He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM which has
sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police officers
to the exclusion of the CSC. Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted was void. Moreover, he
alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the
jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM.
PO1 Capablanca, then, filed a Petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for
the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. Instead of
filing its Answer, the CSC Caraga moved to dismiss the case. It argued that, other
than not exhausting administrative remedies, the CSC was not stripped of its original
disciplinary jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies.
The court denied CSCs motion, and later, ruled that that the CSC had no jurisdiction
to conduct the preliminary investigation, much less to prosecute PO1 Capablanca.
The CSC filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA granted CSC
Petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT IT HAS ONLY APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND IT IS THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
(NAPOLCOM) WHICH HAS THE JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT INITIATORY INVESTIGATION
OF THE CASE.
RULING
The petition lacks merit.
It is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a
preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity
committed by the petitioner. Petitioner anchors his argument that the heads of
departments, agencies, offices or bureaus should first commence disciplinary
proceedings against their subordinates before their decisions can be reviewed by the
CSC.
It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate
power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed
against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office,
and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil
service examinations.
Moreover, in Civil Service Commission v. Albao, we rejected the contention
that the CSC only has appellate disciplinary jurisdiction on charges of dishonesty and
falsification of documents in connection with an appointment to a permanent position
in the government service.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, is
misplaced. In said case, the NAPOLCOM assailed Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-
5487, which provides:
3. Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine
National Police must have passed any of the following examinations:
The Court of Appeals found in favor of the NAPOLCOM and held that the CSC,
by issuing Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-5487 encroached on the exclusive power
of NAPOLCOM under RA 6975 to administer promotional examinations for policemen
and to impose qualification standards for promotion of PNP personnel to the ranks of
PO2 up to Senior Police Officers 1-4.
TAY
Powers of COA
FACTS:
The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040, authorizing the conferment
of Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) to elective local officials of Manila who
have been elected for three consecutive terms in the same position. Pursuant to the
ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of a number of former councilors.
However, the Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum, with the following observations: that the Ordinance is without legal
basis; the monetary reward is excessive and tantamount to double compensation in
contravention to the IRR of RA 7160; and that the appropriations to implement the
Ordinance was improperly classified.
The councilors filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance, which was granted by
the Legal Adjudication Office-Local of the COA. Upon review however, the COA
rendered the assailed Decision, sustaining the Notice of Disallowance.
RULING: YES.
It was the contention of the petitioners that the power and authority of the COA to
audit government funds and accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power
to disallow a particular disbursement. Citing Guevara v. Gimenez, they claim that the
COA has no discretion or authority to disapprove payments on the ground that the
same was unwise or that the amount is unreasonable.
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives a broad outline of the powers and
functions of the COA, to wit:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on
a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity,
directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate,
the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit,
as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad
powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and
the uses of public funds and property. This includes the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for
such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA
is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit
jurisdiction of the COA.
This case involves the grant of rice allowance to employees of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) by virtue of RA 6758 (the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989). A group of NEA employees, claiming that they did
not receive such allowances, filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA
before the RTC which later decided in their favor and directed NEA to settle said
claims. This decision was issued a certificate to the effect that is has become final
and executory.
This decision was questioned by NEA before the CA which ordered the
implementation of a writ of execution against the funds of NEA. This was reversed by
the SC on the following grounds:
COA had already passed upon claims similar to the subject of the case in their
earlier resolution. COA opined that the court may have exceeded its
jurisdiction when it entertained the petition for the entitlement of the
employees which had already been passed upon by COA. Thus, employees,
pursuant to the above COA decision, cannot defy that decision by filing a
petition for mandamus in the lower court. PD 1445 and the 1987 Constitution
prescribe that the only mode for appeal from decisions of COA is on certiorari
to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the subject
As to the grant of the allowance under said final and executory decision, NEA
requested for a legal opinion before the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) which opined for the approval of the release of the allowance. Hence, NEA
issued a Resolution approving the same and the release of the funds.
However, the resident auditor of COA did not allow the payment of rice allowance for
a particular period. The Notice of Allowance was appealed, but the same was denied
by COA. They went again to the SC questioning the disallowance of their rice subsidy.
RULING:
(Discussion is primarily on the entitlement to the subsidy. The following are the
matters relating to the powers of COA)
The immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a court
possessed of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in
the guise of a case for mandamus is a money claim falling within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of COA. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking
cognizance of cases filed by claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the SC
issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23, 2000 enjoining judges of
lower courts to exercise caution in order to prevent "possible circumvention of the
rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit" and reiterating the basic rule that:
"All money claims against the Government must be filed with the Commission on
Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize
the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect
sue the State thereby."
RULING:
Jurisdiction over coconut levy funds.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state
audit. As an independent supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be
undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution, [n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of [COA]. Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth
by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over coconut levy funds,
being special public funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and,
consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using said funds. However, declaring
the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to private
appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the government,
and consequently, renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the
pertinent provisions of PD Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-
mandated function and undermine its constitutional independence. Accordingly,
Article III, Section 5 of both PD Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
FACTS:
This resolves the MFR of the SCs Decision affirming COA decision which substantially
held that petitioner (as former Executive Director of the Cooperative Development
Authority or CDA) is personally and liable for the amount of P881,819.00 covered by a
COA Notice of Disallowance and involved overpriced computer units.
Among others, the MFR is anchored on the following ground: whether brand should
be considered by COA as one basis of comparison, in light of compliance with
intellectual property laws on software piracy and hardware imitation.
RULING:
The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of
funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this
purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority,
subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
As such, CDAs decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use,
including computers and its accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and
regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive
and extravagant expenditures. Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its
equipment have to conform to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable
price for the items purchased.
In this case, the brand information was found by the COA as irrelevant to the
determination of the reasonableness of the price of the computers purchased by
CDA. Hence, on this ground, the MFR is dismissible.
FACTS:
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman of the
COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year
of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of
the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his
office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold
on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a
fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of
office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter to President Aquino III,
signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his
replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Aquino III
named Tan as COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the
resignation of Villar, the SC consider the instant case as falling within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case.
RULING:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for
seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner argues that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second
appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of
commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
This is however incorrect. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in
context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or
constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by
the President for a term of 7 years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no
longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a
Commissioner who was appointed for a term of 7 years who likewise served the full
term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner
shall have served the full term of 7 years, then he can no longer be reappointed to
either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is
to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him to
appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of 7 years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2),
Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to
the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of
terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the
position of Chairman must not exceed 7 years so as not to disrupt the rotational
system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom
February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner
devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been
divergence of opinion as to the import of the word reappointment, there has been
unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as
chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more
than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year
service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to
the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-
year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA
Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be
invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose
of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first
set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than 7 years cannot
be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the
expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a
full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
more than 7 years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the SC restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of 7 years; an appointment for
a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot
validly shorten the full term of 7 years in case of the expiration of the term as
this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the
Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,
disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired
portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed
for a full term of 7 years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first
appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the
prohibition against reappointment.
Appeals
FACTS:
Petitioner Reyes filed this petition with the SC as an appeal by certiorari under Rule
44 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the COA disallowing the
refund of the government share in the fund to them as employee-members of TLRC,
and the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
RULING: Incorrect.
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of rulings of
the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment or
final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this
Court on certiorari under Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was filed on June
17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless,
the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to this Court was
only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution.
The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not reviewable by
ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on
Audit.
[But note that in this case, the SC set aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and
treated the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit not finding that the
COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the
government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members.]
VALLES