ii. VERBA LEGIS SSS.

SSS. The SSS, however, denied the claim in a letter dated January 31, 2002, hence,
[G.R.No. 170195, March 28 : 2011]
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,
PETITIONER, VS. TERESA G. FAVILA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary under
the Social Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (1) that he/she
is the legitimate spouse; and (2) that he/she is dependent upon the member for
support.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision2 dated May 24, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82763 which reversed and set aside the
Resolution3 dated June 4, 2003 and Order4 dated January 21, 2004 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 8-15348-02. Likewise assailed is the
CA Resolution dated October 17, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
5
the petition.
In its Answer,7 SSS averred that on May 6, 1999, the claim for Florante's pension
benefits was initially settled in favor of Teresa as guardian of the minor Florante II.
Per its records, Teresa was paid the monthly pension for a total period of 57 months
or from February 1997 to October 2001 when Florante II reached the age of 21. The
claim was, however, re-adjudicated on July 11, 2002 and the balance of the five-
year guaranteed pension was again settled in favor of Florante II. 8 SSS also alleged
that Estelita Ramos, sister of Florante, wrote a letter9 stating that her brother had
long been separated from Teresa. She alleged therein that the couple lived together
for only ten years and then decided to go their separate ways because Teresa had
an affair with a married man with whom, as Teresa herself allegedly admitted, she
slept with four times a week. SSS also averred that an interview conducted in
Teresa's neighborhood in Tondo, Manila on September 18, 1998 revealed that
although she did not cohabit with another man after her separation with Florante,
there were rumors that she had an affair with a police officer. To support Teresa's
non-entitlement to the benefits claimed, SSS cited the provisions of Sections 8(k)
and 13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 1161, as amended otherwise known as Social
Security (SS) Law.10

thereto.
Ruling of the Social Security Commission

Factual Antecedents
In a Resolution11 dated June 4, 2003, SSC held that the surviving spouse's
entitlement to an SSS member's death benefits is dependent on two factors which
On August 5, 2002, respondent Teresa G. Favila (Teresa) filed a Petition 6 before
must concur at the time of the latter's death, to wit: (1) legality of the marital
petitioner SSC docketed as SSC Case No. 8-15348-02. She averred therein that
relationship; and (2) dependency for support. As to dependency for support, the
after she was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17, 1970, the latter
SSC opined that same is affected by factors such as separation de factoof the
designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-l Form he submitted before petitioner
spouses, marital infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse
Social Security System (SSS), Quezon City Branch on June 30, 1970. When they
under the law. Thus, although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of Florante's
begot their children Jofel, Floresa and Florante II, her husband likewise designated
designated beneficiaries, the SSC ruled that she is disqualified from claiming the
each one of them as beneficiaries. Teresa further averred that when Florante died
death benefits because she was deemed not dependent for support from Florante
on February 1, 1997, his pension benefits under the SSS were given to their only
due to marital infidelity. Under Section 8(k) of the SS Law, the dependent spouse
minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at age 21.
until she remarries is entitled to death benefits as a primary beneficiary, together
Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florante's
with the deceased member's legitimate minor children. According to SSC, the word
pension benefits, Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the
"remarry" under said provision has been interpreted as to include a spouse who
cohabits with a person other than his/her deceased spouse or is in an illicit
relationship. This is for the reason that no support is due to such a spouse and to
allow him/her to enjoy the member's death benefits would be tantamount to
circumvention of the law. Even if a spouse did not cohabit with another, SSC went
on to state that for purposes of the SS Law, it is sufficient that the separation in-fact
of the spouses was precipitated by an adulterous act since the actual absence of
support from the member is evident from such separation. Notable in this case is
that while Teresa denied having remarried or cohabited with another man, she did
not, however, deny her having an adulterous relationship. SSC therefore concluded
that Teresa was not dependent upon Florante for support and consequently
disqualified her from enjoying her husband's death benefits.
SSC further held that Teresa did not timely contest her non-entitlement to the
award of benefits. It was only when Florante II's pension was stopped that she
deemed it wise to file her claim. For SSC, Teresa's long silence led SSS to believe
that she really suffered from a disqualification as a beneficiary, otherwise she would
have immediately protested her non-entitlement. It thus opined that Teresa is now
estopped from claiming the benefits. Hence, SSC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
As Teresa's Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution was also denied by SSC in
12
an Order dated January 21, 2004, she sought recourse before the CA through a
13
Petition for Review14 under Rule 43.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the CA, Teresa insisted that SSS should have granted her claim for death
benefits because she is undisputedly the legal surviving spouse of Florante and is
therefore entitled to such benefits as primary beneficiary. She claimed that the
SSC's finding that she was not dependent upon Florante for support is unfair
because the fact still remains that she was legally married to Florante and that her
alleged illicit affair with another man was never sufficiently established. In fact,
SSS admitted that there was no concrete evidence or proof of her amorous
relationship with another man. Moreover, Teresa found SSS's strict interpretation of
the SS Law as not only anti-labor but also anti-family. It is anti-labor in the sense
that it does not work to the benefit of a deceased employee's primary beneficiaries
and anti-family because in denying benefits to surviving spouses, it destroys family
solidarity. In sum, Teresa prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the assailed
Resolution and Order of the SSC.
The SSC and the SSS through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their
respective Comments15 to the petition.
SSC contended that the word "spouse" under Section 8(k) of the SS Law is qualified
by the word "dependent". Thus, to be entitled to death benefits under said law, a
surviving spouse must have been dependent upon the member spouse for support
during the latter's lifetime including the very moment of contingency. According to
it, the fact of dependency is a mandatory requirement of law. If it is otherwise, the
law would have simply used the word "spouse" without the descriptive word
"dependent". In this case, SSC emphasized that Teresa never denied the fact that
she and Florante were already separated and living in different houses when the
contingency happened. Given this fact and since the conduct of investigation is
standard operating procedure for SSS, it being under legal obligation to determine
prior to the award of death benefit whether the supposed beneficiary is actually
receiving support from the member or if such support was rightfully withdrawn prior
to the contingency, SSS conducted an investigation with respect to the couple's
separation. And as said investigation revealed tales of Teresa's adulterous
relationship with another man, SSS therefore correctly adjudicated the entire death
benefits in favor of Florante II.
To negate Teresa's claim that SSS failed to establish her marital infidelity, SSC
enumerated the following evidence: (1) the letter 6 of Florante's sister, Estelita
Ramos, stating that the main reasons why Teresa and Florante separated after only
10 years of marriage were Teresa's adulterous relationship with another man and
her propensity for gambling; (2) the Memorandum17 dated August 30, 2002 of SSS
Senior Analysts Liza Agilles and Jana Simpas which ran through the facts in
connection with the claim for death benefits accruing from Florante's death. It
indicates therein, among others, that based on interviews conducted in Teresa's
neighborhood, she did not cohabit with another man after her separation from her
husband although there were rumors that she and a certain police officer had an
affair. However, there is not enough proof to establish their relationship as Teresa
and her paramour did not live together as husband and wife; and (3) the field
investigation report18 of SSS Senior Analyst Fernando F. Nicolas which yielded the
same findings. The SSC deemed the foregoing evidence as substantial to support
the conclusion that Teresa indeed had an illicit relationship with another man.
SSC also defended SSS's interpretation of the SS law and argued that it is neither
anti-labor nor anti-family. It is not anti-labor because the subject matter of the
case is covered by the SS Law and hence, Labor Law has no application. It is
likewise not anti-family because SSS has nothing to do with Teresa's separation
from her husband which resulted to the latter's withdrawal of support for her. At
any rate, SSC advanced that even if Teresa is entitled to the benefits claimed, same
have already been received in its entirety by Florante II so that no more benefits
are due to Florante's other beneficiaries. Hence, SSC prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
For its part, the OSG likewise believed that Teresa is not entitled to the benefits
claimed as she lacks the requirement that the wife must be dependent upon the
member for support. This is in view of the rule that beneficiaries under the SS Law
need not be the legal heirs but those who are dependent upon him for support.
Moreover, it noted that Teresa did not file a protest before the SSS to contest the
award of the five-year guaranteed pension to their son Florante II. It posited that
because of this, Teresa cannot raise the matter for the first time before the courts.
The OSG also believed that no further benefits are due to Florante's other
beneficiaries considering that the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension has
already been settled.
In a Decision19 dated May 24, 2005, the CA found Teresa's petition impressed with
merit. It gave weight to the fact that she is a primary beneficiary because she is the
lawful surviving spouse of Florante and in addition, she was designated by Florante
as such beneficiary. There was no legal separation or annulment of marriage that
could have disqualified her from claiming the death benefits and that her
designation as beneficiary had not been invalidated by any court of law. The CA
cited Social Security System v. Davac where it was held that it is only when there
20
is no designation of beneficiary or when the designation is void that the SSS would
have to decide who is entitled to claim the benefits. It opined that once a spouse is
designated by an SSS member as his/her beneficiary, same forecloses any inquiry
as to whether the spouse is indeed a dependent deriving support from the member.
Thus, when SSS conducted an investigation to determine whether Teresa is indeed
dependent upon Florante, SSS was unilaterally adding a requirement not imposed
by law which makes it very difficult for designated primary beneficiaries to claim for
benefits. To make things worse, the result of said investigation which became the
basis of Teresa's non-entitlement to the benefits claimed was culled from unfounded
rumors.
Moreover, the CA saw SSS's conduct of investigations to be violative of the
constitutional right to privacy. It lamented that SSS has no power investigate and
pry into the member's and his/her family's personal lives and should cease and
desist from conducting such investigations. Ultimately, the CA reversed and set
aside the assailed Resolution and Order of the SSC and directed SSS to pay Teresa's
monetary claims which included the monthly pension due her as the surviving
spouse and the lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six times the monthly
pension.
SSC filed its Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision but same was denied in a
Resolution22 dated October 17, 2005. Impleading SSS as co-petitioner, SSC thus
filed this petition for review oncertiorari.
Issue
Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as to be
entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante?
Petitioners' Arguments
SSC reiterates the argument that to be entitled to death benefits, a surviving
spouse must have been actually dependent for support upon the member spouse
during the latter's lifetime including the very moment of contingency. To it, this is
clearly the intention of the legislature; otherwise, Section 8(k) of the SS law would
have simply stated "spouse" without the descriptive word "dependent". Here,
although Teresa is without question Florante's legal spouse, she is not the
"dependent spouse" referred to in the said provision of the law. Given the reason
for the couple's separation for about 17 years prior to Florante's death and in the
absence of proof that during said period Teresa relied upon Florante for support,
there is therefore no reason to infer that Teresa is a dependent spouse entitled to To support her entitlement to the death benefits claimed, Teresa cited Ceneta v.
her husband's death benefits. Social Security System,23 a case decided by the CA which declared, viz:

SSC adds that in the process of determining non-dependency status of a spouse, Clearly then, the term dependent spouse, who must not re-marry in order to be

conviction of a crime involving marital infidelity is not an absolute necessity. It is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of his/her spouse, refers

sufficient for purposes of the award of death benefits that a thorough investigation to the legal spouse who, under the law, is entitled to receive support from the other

was conducted by SSS through interviews of impartial witnesses and that same spouse.

showed that the spouse-beneficiary committed an act of marital infidelity which

caused the member to withdraw support from his spouse. In this case, no less than Indubitably, petitioner, having been legally married to the deceased SSS member

Florante's sister, who does not stand to benefit from the present controversy, until the latter's death and despite his subsequent marriage to respondent Carolina,

revealed that Teresa frequented a casino and was disloyal to her husband so that is deemed dependent for support under Article 68 of the Family Code. Said

they separated after only 10 years of marriage. This was affirmed through the provision reads:

interview conducted in Teresa's neighborhood. Hence, it is not true that Teresa's 'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and

marital infidelity was not sufficiently proven. fidelity, and render mutual help and support'

Based on said law, petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the claimed death benefits.
Likewise, SSC contends that contrary to the CA's posture, a member's designation
Her marriage to trie deceased not having been lawfully severed, the law disputably
of a primary beneficiary does not guarantee the latter's entitlement to death
presumes her to be continually dependent for support.
benefits because such entitlement is determined only at the time of happening of
the contingency. This is because there may have been events which supervened
No evidence or even a mere inference can be adduced to prove that petitioner
subsequent to the designation which would otherwise disqualify the person
ceased to derive all her needs indispensable for her sustenance, and thus, she
designated as beneficiary such as emancipation of a member's child or separation
remains a legal dependent. A dependent spouse is primary beneficiary entitled to
from his/her spouse. This is actually the same reason why SSS must conduct an
the death benefits of a deceased SSS member spouse unless he or she remarries. A
investigation of all claims for benefits.
mere allegation of adultery not substantially proven can not validly deprive
petitioner of the support referred to under the law, and consequently, of her claim
Moreover, SSC justifies SSS's conduct of investigation and argues that said office did
under the SSS Law.
not intrude into Florante's and his family's personal lives as the investigation did not
aggravate the situation insofar as Teresa's relationship with her deceased husband
was concerned. It merely led to the discovery of the true state of affairs between Thus, being the legal wife, Teresa asserts that she is presumed to be dependent

them so that based on it, the death benefits were awarded to the rightful primary upon Florante for support. The bare allegation of Estelita that she had an affair with

beneficiary, Florante II. Clearly, such an investigation is an essential part of another man is insufficient to deprive her of support from her husband under the

adjudication process, not only in this case but also in all claims for benefits filed law and, conversely, of the death benefits from SSS. Moreover, Teresa points out

before SSS. Thus, SSC prays for the setting aside of the assailed CA Decision and that despite their separation and the rumors regarding her infidelity, Florante did

Resolution. not withdraw her designation as primary beneficiary. Under this circumstance,
Teresa believes that Florante really intended for her to receive the benefits from

Respondent's Arguments SSS.

Teresa also agrees with the CA's finding that SSS unilaterally added to the
requirements of the law the condition that a surviving spouse must be actually
dependent for support upon the member spouse during the latter's lifetime. She
avers that this could not have been the lawmakers' intention as it would make it
difficult or even impossible for beneficiaries to claim for benefits under the SS Law.
She stresses that courts (or quasi-judicial agencies for that matter), may not, in the
guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations
not provided nor intended by lawmakers. Courts are not authorized to insert into
the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature
would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission. Hence, Teresa
prays that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution be affirmed in toto.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
The law in force at the time of Florante's death was RA 1161. Section 8 (e) and (k)
of said law provides:
Section 8. Terms Defined. For the purposes of this Act the following terms shall,
unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependent - The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and not over twenty-one years of age, or over
twenty-one years of age, provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse
dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly
dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent
parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the secondary
beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated
by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary. (Emphasis ours.)
From the above-quoted provisions, it is plain that for a spouse to qualify as a
primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must not only be a
legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph (e), that is, one
who is dependent upon the member for support. Paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8
of RA 1161 are very clear. "Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles
of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain
meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animo sermo
est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legisnon est recedendum , or, from
the words of a statute there should be no departure."24
Thus, in Social Security System v. Agiias25 we held that:
[I]t bears stressing that for her (the claimant) to qualify as a primary beneficiary,
she must prove that she was 'the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the
employee.' The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1)
that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member
for support, x x x
Here, there is no question that Teresa was Florante's legal wife. What is at point,
however, is whether Teresa is dependent upon Florante for support in order for her
to fall under the term "dependent spouse" under Section 8(k) of RA 1161.
What the SSC relies on in concluding that Teresa was not dependent upon Florante
for support during their separation for 17 years was its findings that Teresa
maintained an illicit relationship with another man. Teresa however counters that
such illicit relationship has not been sufficiently established and, hence, as the legal
wife, she is presumed to be continually dependent upon Florante for support.
We agree with Teresa that her alleged affair with another man was not sufficiently
established. The Memorandum of SSS Senior Analysts Liza Agilles and Jana Simpas
reveals that it vyas Florante who was in fact living with a common law wife, Susan
Favila (Susan) and their three minor children at the time of his death. Susan even
filed her own claim for death benefits with the SSS but same was, however, denied.
With respect to Teresa, we quote the pertinent portions of said Memorandum, viz:
SUSAN SUBMHTED A LETTER SIGNED BY ESTEL1TA RAMOS, ELDER SISTER OF THE
DECEASED STATING THAT MEMBER WAS SEPARATED FROM TERESA AFTER 10
YEARS OF LIVING IN FOR THE REASONS THAT HIS WIFE HAD COHABITED WITH A
MARRIED MAN. ALSO, PER ESTELITA, THE WIFE HERSELF ADMITTED THAT THE
MAN SLEPT WITH HER 4 TIMES A WEEK.
TERESA SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED BY NAPOLEON AND JOSEFINA,
BROTHER AND SISTER (IN) LAW, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE DECEASED THAT TERESA
HAS NEVER RE-MARRED NOR COHABITED WITH ANOTHER MAN.
BASED ON THE INTERVIEW (DATED 9/18/98) CONDUCTED FROM THE
NEIGHBORHOOD OF TERESA AND BGY. KAGAWAD IN TONDO, MANILA, IT WAS
ESTABLISHED THAT TERESA DID NOT COHABIT WITH ANOTHER MAN
AFTER THE SEPARATION ALTHOUGH THERE ARE RUMORS THAT SHE AND A
CERTAIN POLICE OFFICER HAD AN AFFAIR. BUT [NOT] ENOUGH PROOF TO
ESTABLISH THEIR RELATIONSHIP SINCE THEY DID NOT LIVE-IN AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
BASED ON THE INTERVIEW WITH JOSEFINA FAVILA, MEMBER AND TERESA WERE
SEPARATED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AND THAT SHE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE IF
TERESA COHABITED WITH ANOTHER MAN ALTHOUGH SHE HEARD OF THE
RUMORS THAT SAID WIFE HAD AN AFFAIR WITH ANOTHER MAN. NAPOLEON
WAS NOT INTERVIEWED. (Emphasis ours)
While SSC believes that the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence of Teresa's
amorous relationship, we, however, find otherwise. It is not hard to see that
Estelita's claim of Teresa's cohabitation with a married man is a mere allegation
without proof. Likewise, the interviews conducted by SSS revealed minors only that
Teresa had an affair with a certain police officer. Notably, not one from those
interviewed confirmed that such an affair indeed existed. "The basic rule is that
mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence." 26 Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence."27 Remarkably, the Memorandum itself stated that there is not enough
proof to establish Teresa's alleged relationship with another man since they did not
live as husband and wife.
This notwithstanding, we still find untenable Teresa's assertion that being the legal
wife, she is presumed dependent upon Florante for support. In Re: Application for
Survivor's Benefits of Manlavi,28 this Court defined "dependent" as "one who derives
his or her main support from another [or] relying on, or subject to, someone else
for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the
will, power or aid of someone else." Although therein, the wife's marriage to the
deceased husband was not dissolved prior to the latter's death, the Court denied the
wife's claim for survivorship benefits from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) because the wife abandoned her family to live with other men for
more than 17 years until her husband died. Her whereabouts was unknown to her
family and she never attempted to communicate with them or even check up on the
well-being of her daughter with the deceased. From these, the Court concluded
that the wife during said period was not dependent on her husband for any support,
financial or otherwise, hence, she is not a dependent within the contemplation of RA
829129 as to be entitled to survivorship benefits. It is worthy to note that under
Section 2(f) RA 8291, a legitimate spouse dependent for support is likewise included
in the enumeration of dependents and under Section 2(g), the legal dependent
spouse in the enumeration of primary beneficiaries.
Under this premise, we declared in Aguas that "the obvious conclusion is that a wife
who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be
'dependent for support' upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the
time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the
husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for
herself."30 Hence, we held therein that the wife-claimant had the burden to prove
that all the statutory requirements have been complied with, particularly her
dependency on her husband at the time of his death. And, while said wife-claimant
was the legitimate wife of the deceased, we ruled that she is not qualified as a
primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of
her husband's death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were
already living separately.
In this case, aside from Teresa's bare allegation that she was dependent upon her
husband for support and her misplaced reliance on the presumption of dependency
by reason of her valid and then subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa has not
proper administration, otherwise, it will be swamped with bogus claims that will
pointlessly deplete its funds. Such scenario will certainly frustrate the purpose of
the law which is to provide covered employees and their families protection against
the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death, with a view to promoting their
well-being in the spirit of social justice. Moreover and as correctly pointed out by
SSC, such investigations are likewise necessary to carry out the mandate of Section
15 of the SS Law which provides in part, viz;
Sec. 15. Non-transfer ability of Benefits, - The SSS shall pay the benefits provided

presented sufficient evidence to discharge her burden of proving that she was for in this Actto such [x x x] persons as may be entitled thereto in

dependent upon her husband for support at the time of his death. She could have accordance with the provisions of this Act x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

done this by submitting affidavits of reputable and disinterested persons who have
knowledge that during her separation with Florante, she does not have a known
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed
trade, business, profession or lawful occupation from which she derives income
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 24,2005 and October 17,
sufficient for her support and such other evidence tending to prove her claim of
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 82763 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
dependency. While we note from the abovementioned SSS Memorandum that
Respondent Teresa G. Favila is declared to be not a dependent spouse within the
Teresa submitted affidavits executed by Napoleon Favila and Josefina Favila, same
contemplation of Republic Act No. 1161 and is therefore not entitled to death
only pertained to the fact that she never remarried nor cohabited with another
benefits accruing from the death of Florante Favila.
man. On the contrary, what is clear is that she and Florante had already been
separated for about 17 years prior to the latter's death as Florante was in fact, living
SO ORDERED.
with his common wife when he died. Suffice it to say that "[w]hoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto
by substantial evidence."31 Hence, for Teresa's failure to show that despite their
separation she was dependent upon Florante for support at the time of his death,
[G.R. NO. 177333 : April 24, 2009]
Teresa cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Hence, she is not entitled to the
death benefits accruing on account of Florante's death.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE
As a final note, we do not agree with the CA's pronouncement that the
GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY
investigations conducted by SSS violate a person's right to privacy. SSS, as the
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et al.,Respondent.
primary institution in charge of extending social security protection to workers and
their beneficiaries is mandated by Section 4(b)(7) of RA 8282 32to require reports,
DECISION
compilations and analyses of statistical and economic data and to make an
investigation as may be needed for its proper administration and development. CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Precisely, the investigations conducted by SSS are appropriate in order to ensure
that the benefits provided under the SS Law are received by the rightful Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.
beneficiaries. It is not hard to see that such measure is necessary for the system's
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23, Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent provisions:
1995, created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives the Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act"

ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz: enacted on March 13, 1992:

Section 7. Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.'

xxx xxx

(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to (b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. - The Subic Bay

others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the

and sports facilities; following powers and functions:

xxx xxx

Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public (7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to

respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and

August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine E- amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall

Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on- continue to be licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance. (PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion Authority; to maintain and
preserve the forested areas as a national park;
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as
such licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming community, xxx

drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the
present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted on

Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the February 24, 1995:

ZAMBOECOZONE.
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority - The

PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not give Cagayan Economic Zone Authority shall have the following powers and functions:

power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate

the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three (3) statutes, xxx

which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise created
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to
economic zones and provided for the powers and functions of their respective
others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements, recreational and
governing and administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the grant therein of
sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling, casinos, golf courses,
authority to operate games of chance is clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so
and others, under priorities and standards set by the CEZA;
in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903.
 xxx
And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995," enacted on
February 24, 1995 authorizing other economic zones established under the defunct
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and its successor Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance under the license
of PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto clause, viz:
SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions
granted to special economic zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be
accorded to special economic zones already created or to be created under this Act.
The free port status shall not be vested upon the new special economic zones.
PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the
ecozone-related statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically
empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities to
operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement"
employed therein do not include "games of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes,
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority's grant of license to private respondent PEJI encroached
on its (PAGCOR's) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-
stated special laws to centralize and regulate all games of chance.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no
personality to file the present petition as it failed to cite a superior law which proves
its claim of having been granted exclusive right and authority to license and
regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to PAGCOR's
assertion, the words "games" and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903
include "games of chance" as was the intention of the lawmakers when they
enacted the law.
In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam, 2 PAGCOR cites the November 27, 2006
Opinion3 rendered by the Office of the President through Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the pertinent portions of which read:
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows
the operation of tourism-related activities including games and amusements without
stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
xxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise
(RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity
by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the
same. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o
operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to
others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational
and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.4
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo
est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will, and
preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have
expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis
non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.5
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in
law which are clearly different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary
sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a
pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. 6 On the other hand,
a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill determines the
outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value against
an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value." 7
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar
provisions in the three cited statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while the three
statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan Economic Zone
Authority to directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos within its
jurisdiction, categorically stated that such power was being vested in their
respective administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in the case at bar, however. Using
the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of chance"
and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does
it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily employed the
words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to
grant the power to operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was
done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not.
The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the President
which, after differentiating the grant of powers between the Cagayan Special
Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while the former is
authorized to, among other things, operate gambling casinos and internet gaming,
as well as enter into licensing agreements, the latter is not. The relevant portions of
said Opinion read:
The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is
telling. To the former, the grant of powers is not only explicit, but amplified, while to
the latter the grant of power is merely what the law (RA 7903) states. Not only are
the differences in language telling, it will be noted that both charters of CEZA and
ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e.,
February 23, 1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE and February 24, 1995 in the
case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in the light of what
Congress intended them to be, and the distinction that the lawmakers made when
they enacted the two laws.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the
operation of tourism-related activities including games and amusements without
stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing, dog-
racing and gambling casinos.
xxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise
(RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity
by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the
same. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the
President, the latter's interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves
respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction. In
applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded
as bases thereof - factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight
in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors include
the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration,
their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the
fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the
agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the
practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering
deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute. 8
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to
operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic
Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to
operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of any games of
chance. And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is
DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from operating any games of chance pursuant to
the license granted to it by public respondent.
SO ORDERED.
PEREZ, J.:

The inclusion of allowances in the computation of the retirement/separation benefits

of the employees of petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) is
at issue in this petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rules 64 and 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the nullification and setting aside of the adverse
rulings dated July 4, 2003 and February 15, 2008 issued by respondent Commission
on Audit (COA).

The Facts

Created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 252 dated July 21, 1973, petitioner is a
government-owned and controlled corporation tasked with promoting and
developing Philippine trade in pursuance of national economic development.
Subsequent to the repeal of said law with the May 9, 1977 issuance of Presidential
Decree No. 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine
International Trading Corporation, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Executive Order No. 756 on December 28, 1981, authorizing the reorganization of
petitioner pursuant to his legislative powers to amend charters of government
corporations through executive orders in turn issued pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772. On February 18, 1983,
President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 877, authorizing further the
reorganization of petitioner for the purpose of accelerating and expanding the
country's export concerns.1

On December 31, 1983, Eligia Romero, an officer of petitioner, opted to retire under
Republic Act No. 1616 and received a total of P286,780.00 as gratuity benefits for

iii. STATUTE AS A WHOLE
[G.R. No. 183517 : June 22, 2010]
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
services rendered from 1955 to 1983. Immediately re-hired on contractual basis, it
appears that said employee remained in the service of petitioner until her
compulsory retirement on April 27, 2000. In receipt of retirement benefits in the
total sum of P1,013,952.00 for the period July 1, 1955 to April 27, 2000, net of the
P286,70.00 gratuity benefits she received in 1983, Ms. Romero filed a July 16, 2001
request, seeking from petitioner payment of retirement differentials on the strength
of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. Said provision states that "any officer or
employee who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled to
one month pay for every year of service computed at highest salary received
including allowances, in addition to the other benefits provided by law, regardless of
any provision of law or regulations to the contrary." 2
Confronted with the question of whether the computation of Ms. Romero's
retirement benefits should include the allowances she had received while under its
employ, petitioner sent queries to respondent and the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel regarding the application of Section 6 of Executive Order No.
756. On August 20, 2002, then Government Corporate Counsel Amado D. Valdez
issued Opinion No. 197, Series of 2002, espousing a literal interpretation and
application of the aforesaid provision. Invoking the principle that retirement laws
should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to
be benefited thereby, said opinion declared that, pursuant to the subject provision,
the basis for the computation of the retirement benefits of petitioner's employees
should be the highest basic salary received by them, including allowances not
integrated into the basic pay.3
On the other hand, on July 4, 2003, COA Assistant Commissioner and General
Counsel Raquel R. Habitan issued the first assailed ruling, the 6 th Indorsement dated
July 4, 2003, finding the denial of Ms. Romero's claim for retirement differentials in
order. Taking appropriate note of the fact that the Reserve for Retirement Gratuity
and Commutation of Leave Credits of petitioner's employees did not include
allowances outside of the basic salary, said officer ruled that Executive Order No.
756 was a special law issued only for the specific purpose of reorganizing petitioner
corporation. Although it was subsequently adverted to in Executive Order No. 877,
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was determined to be intended for employees
retired, separated or resigned in connection with petitioner's reorganization and was
not meant to be a permanent retirement scheme for its employees. 4
Elevated by petitioner on appeal before the respondent,5 the foregoing ruling was
affirmed in the second assailed ruling, the Decision No. 2008-023 dated February
15, 2008,6 which likewise discounted the legal basis for Ms. Romero's claim for
retirement differentials. Finding that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was
simply an incentive to encourage employees to resign or retire at the height of
petitioner's reorganization, said decision went on to make the following
pronouncements, to wit:
"Moreover, RA No. 4968 prohibits the creation of any insurance retirement plan by
any government agency and government-owned or controlled corporation other
than the GSIS, viz.:
'Section 10. Subsection (b) of Section twenty-eight of the same Act, as amended is
hereby amended to read as follows:
(b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be
created by the employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore
in force in any government office, agency, or instrumentality or corporation owned
or controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or
abolished: Provided, That the rights of those who are already eligible to retire
thereunder shall not be affected.'
The Supreme Court explained the rationale of the above provisions in Avelina B.
Conte et al. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 116422, November 4, 1996, thusly:
'Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of
any insurance or retirement plan - other than the GSIS - for government officers
and employees,in order to prevent the undue and iniquitous proliferation of
such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law
and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise
would be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put
up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such 'financial
assistance.' (Emphasis ours)
To hold that Section 6 of E.O. 756 is a retirement law for PTIC employees other than
the GSIS law would run counter to the policy of the state to prevent the undue and
iniquitous proliferation of retirement plans that would unduly promote the inequality
of treatment in the retirement benefits of government employees." 7
Hence, this petition.
The Issues

Petitioner seeks the nullification and setting aside of the assailed rulings on the
following grounds, to wit:
A.
RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
FIRST ASSAILED RULING, OPINING THAT SECTION 6 OF EO 756 WAS NOT
MEANT TO BE A PERMANENT RETIREMENT SCHEME OF THE PITC.
B.
RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
SECOND ASSAILED RULING DENYING PITC'S REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE OPINION OF COA GENERAL COUNSEL
RAQUEL HABITAN, LIKEWISE HOLDING THAT SECTION 6 of EO 756 WAS
NOT MEANT TO BE A PERMANENT SCHEME OF THE PITC.
C.
RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
ASSAILED RULINGS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE
THAT RETIREMENT LAWS ARE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED AND ADMINISTERED
IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONS INTENDED TO BE BENEFITTED AND THAT ALL
DOUBTS AS TO THE INTENT OF THE LAW SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR
OF THE RETIREE TO ACHIEVE ITS HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES.
D.
RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RELYING ON
SECTION 10 of RA 4968 AS TO THE ALLEGED PROHIBITION AGAINST ANY
INSURANCE OR RETIREMENT PLAN OR RETIREMENT PLAN OTHER THAN
THE GSIS, SAID LAW HAVING BEEN PASSED PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF
EO 756. OTHERWISE STATED, SECTION 10 OF RA 4968 IS DEEMED
REVISED, AMENDED, SUPERSEDED OR REPEALED BY EO 756 PURSUANT TO
THE REPEALING CLAUSE OF SAID EO 756.8
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.9 Because the law must not be read in truncated
parts, its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. The statute's clauses
and phrases must not, consequently, be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.10 Consistent
with the fundamentals of statutory construction, all the words in the statute must
be taken into consideration in order to ascertain its meaning. 11
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find it well worth
emphasizing at the outset that Executive Order No. 75612 was meant to reorganize
petitioner's corporate set-up. While incorporating amendments of petitioner's
Revised Charter under Presidential Decree No. 1071 with provisions relating to the
subscription of its capital,13 the establishment of subsidiaries, including joint
ventures,14 the composition15 and grant of additional powers to its Board of
Directors,16 the appointment of its President,17 the grant of incentive scheme to its
officers and employees18 as well as its authority to deputize commercial
attaches19 and to grant franchises to operate Philippine trade houses
abroad,20 Section 4 (1) of Executive Order No. 756 specifically authorized petitioner's
Board of Directors to " reorganize the structure of the Corporation, in accordance
with its expanded role in the development of Philippine trade, with such officers and
employees as may be needed and determine their competitive salaries and
reasonable allowances and other benefits to effectively carry out its powers and
functions." For this purpose, Section 6 of the same law provides as follows:
SECTION 6. Exemption from OCPC. -- In recognition of the special nature of its
operations, the Corporation shall continue to be exempt from the application of the
rules and regulations of the Office of the Compensation and Position Classification or
any other similar agencies that may be established hereafter as provided under
Presidential Decree No. 1071. Likewise, any officer or employee who retires,
resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled to one month pay for
every year of service computed at highest salary received including all allowances,
in addition to the other benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law
or regulations to the contrary; Provided, That the employee shall have served in the
Corporation continuously for at least two years: Provided, further, That in case of
separated employees, the separation or dismissal is not due to conviction for any
offense the penalty for which includes forfeiture of benefits: and Provided, finally,
That in the commutation of leave credits earned, the employees who resigned,
retired or is separated shall be entitled to the full payment therefor computed with
all the allowances then being enjoyed at the time of resignation, retirement of
separation regardless of any restriction or limitation provided for in other laws, rules
or regulations. (Italics supplied)
As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order No. 756, we
find that the foregoing provision cannot be interpreted independent of the purpose
or intent of the law. Rather than the permanent retirement law for its employees
that petitioner now characterizes it to be, we find that the provision of gratuities
equivalent to "one month pay for every year of service computed at highest salary
received including all allowances" was clearly meant as an incentive for employees
who retire, resign or are separated from service during or as a consequence of the
reorganization petitioner's Board of Directors was tasked to implement. As a
temporary measure, it cannot be interpreted as an exception to the general
prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance and/or retirement or
pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
186, amended. Pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 4968 which was
21 22
approved on June 17, 1967, said latter provision was amended to read as follows:
Section 10. Subsection (b) of Section twenty-eight of the same Act, as amended is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
(b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be
created by any employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore
in force in any government office, agency, or instrumentality or corporation owned
or controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or abolished:
Provided, That the rights of those who are already eligible to retire thereunder shall
not be affected."
In reconciling Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 with Section 28, Subsection (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 186,23 as amended, uppermost in the mind of the Court is
the fact that the best method of interpretation is that which makes laws consistent
with other laws which are to be harmonized rather than having one considered
repealed in favor of the other.24 Time and again, it has been held that every statute
must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence - interpretere et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretendi.25 Thus, if diverse statutes relate to the same thing, they ought to be
taken into consideration in construing any one of them, as it is an established rule
of law that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one
law.26 We find that a temporary and limited application of the more beneficent
gratuities provided under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 is in accord with the
pre-existing and general prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance
retirement and/or pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 186.
In the absence of a manifest and specific intent from which the same may be
gleaned, moreover, Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 cannot be construed as an
additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an exception to the
prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans
as aforesaid. Aside from the fact that a meaning that does not appear nor is
intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein by
construction,27 petitioner would likewise do well to remember that repeal of laws
should be made clear and express. Repeals by implication are not favored as laws
are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing
on the subject,28 the congruent application of which the courts must generally
presume.29 For this reason, it has been held that the failure to add a specific
repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. 30
The dearth of merit in petitioner's position is rendered even more evident when it is
borne in mind that Executive Order No. 756 was subsequently repealed by Executive
Order No. 877 which was issued on February 18, 1983 to hasten the reorganization
of petitioner, in light of changing circumstances and developments in the world
market. For purposes of clarity, the full text of Executive Order No 877 is
reproduced hereunder, viz.:
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 877
AUTHORIZING THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL
TRADING CORPORATION CREATED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1071, AS
AMENDED
WHEREAS, it is the declared policy of the New Republic to pursue national
development with renewed dedication and determination;
WHEREAS, there is a need to position and gear up the country's export marketing
resources in anticipation of a recovery in the world economy;
WHEREAS, the Philippine International Trading Corporation, hereinafter referred to
as the Corporation, is in the vanguard of marketing Philippine exports worldwide;
WHEREAS, in order to accelerate and expand its exports, there is a need to upgrade
the management and marketing expertise of the Corporation consistent with the
requirements of international marketing;
WHEREAS, in the light of the foregoing, the reorganization of the Corporation
becomes imperative;
WHEREAS, under Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended, the President is
empowered to undertake such organizational changes as may be necessary in the
light of changing circumstances and development;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, and the authority vested on me by
Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended, do hereby order and direct:
1. Reorganization. -- The Minister of Trade and Industry is hereby designated Chief
Executive Officer of the Corporation with full powers to restructure and reorganize
the Corporation and to determine or fix its staffing pattern, compensation structure
and related organizational requirements. The Chairman shall complete such
restructuring and reorganization within six (6) months from the date of this
Executive Order. All personnel of the Corporation who are not reappointed by the
Chairman under the new reorganized structure of the Corporation shall be deemed
laid off; provided, that personnel so laid off shall be entitled to the benefits accruing
to separated employees under Executive Order No. 756 amending the Revised
Chapter of the Corporation.
2. Functions of Chairman. -- The Chairman of the Corporation shall have the
following functions and powers:
a. Exercise all the powers incident to the functions of a Chief Executive Officer,
including supervision and control over all personnel of the Corporation;
b. Review, develop, supervise and direct the export marketing thrusts and strategy
of the Corporation;
c. Upon recommendation of the President of the Corporation, appoint personnel of
the Corporation in executive and senior management positions;
d. Call meetings of the Board of Directors and of the Executive Committee of the
Corporation.
3. Personnel Recruitment and Other Services. -- In recognition of the special nature
of its operation, the Corporation shall, in recruiting personnel and in availing of
outside technical services, continue to be exempt from OCPC rules and regulations
pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 and Section 28 of Presidential
Decree No. 1071. In addition, the provision of Section 7 of Executive Order No. 756
is hereby reaffirmed.
4. Repealing Clause. -- All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1071 and Executive
Order No. 756, as well as of other laws, decrees, executive orders or issuances, or
parts thereof, that are in conflict with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
retirement laws may be gleaned from the fact that the Reserve for Retirement
Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits for its employees were based only on
their basic salary and did not include allowances they received. No less than Eligia
Romero, petitioner's employee whose claim for retirement differentials triggered the
instant inquiry, was granted benefits under Republic Act No. 1616 upon her
retirement on December 31, 1983.

5. Effectivity. -- This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. It doesn't help petitioner's cause any that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756, in
relation to Section 3 of Executive Order No. 877, was further amended by Republic
DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of February, in the year of Our Lord, Act No. 6758,33 otherwise known as the Compensation and Classification Act of
Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Three." (Italics supplied) 1989. Mandated under Article IX B, Section 534 of the Constitution,35 Section 436 of
Republic Act No. 6758 specifically extends its coverage to government owned and
controlled corporations like petitioner. With this Court's ruling in Philippine
Specifically mandated to be accomplished within the limited timeframe of six
International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit 37 to the effect that
months from the issuance of the law, the reorganization under Executive Order No.
petitioner is included in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6758, it is evidently no
877 clearly supplanted that which was provided under Executive Order No. 756.
longer exempted from OCPC rules and regulations, in keeping with said law's intent
Nowhere is this more evident than Section 4 of said latter law which provides that,
to do away with multiple allowances and other incentive packages as well as the
"All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1071 and Executive Order No. 756, as well
resultant differences in compensation among government personnel.
as of other laws, decrees, executive orders or issuances, or parts thereof that are in
conflict with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." In
In the context of petitions for certiorari like the one at bench, grave abuse of
utilizing the computation of the benefits provided under Section 6 of Executive
discretion is understood to be such capricious and whimsical exercise of jurisdiction
Order No. 756 for employees considered laid off for not being reappointed under
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.38 It is tantamount to an evasion of a positive
petitioner's new reorganized structure, Executive Order No. 877 was correctly
duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
interpreted by respondent to evince an intent not to extend said gratuity beyond the
contemplation of law, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
six-month period within which the reorganization is to be accomplished.
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.39 As the Constitutional office
tasked with the duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the
In the case of Conte v. Commission on Audit,31 this Court ruled that the prohibition
revenue, and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
against separate or supplementary insurance and/or retirement plan under Section
held in trust by or pertaining to the government or any of its
28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 was meant to prevent the undue
subdivisions,40 respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in disapproving
and iniquitous proliferation of such plans in different government offices. Both
petitioner's utilization of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 in the computation of
before the issuance and after the effectivity of Executive Order Nos. 756 and 877,
its employees' retirement benefits.
petitioner's employees were governed by and availed of the same retirement laws
applicable to other government employees in view of the absence of a specific
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
provision thereon under Presidential Decree No. 252,32 its organic law, and
Presidential Decree No. 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the PITC.
SO ORDERED.
As appropriately pointed out by respondent, petitioner's observance of said general
 SECTION 100 OF THE OLD NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (OLD NIRC), AS

[G.R. NO. 158885 : October 2, 2009] AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7716, COULD NOT HAVE SUPPLIED THE

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TREATMENT OF REAL PROPERTIES OR REAL ESTATE

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT
DEALERS ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE TREATMENT OF TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
CORPORATION Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REVENUE REGION NO. 8, and CHIEF, ASSESSMENT OTHER COMMERCIAL GOODS ON THE OTHER HAND, AS SAID DISTINCTION IS

DIVISION, REVENUE REGION NO. 8, BIR, Respondents. FOUND IN SECTION 105 AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95

WHICH DEFINES THE INPUT TAX CREDITABLE TO A REAL ESTATE DEALER WHO
[G.R. NO. 170680]
BECOMES SUBJECT TO VAT FOR THE FIRST TIME.
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, II
REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, REVENUE DISTRICT NO. 44, TAGUIG and
PATEROS, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE. Respondents. SECTION 4.105.1 AND PARAGRAPH (A) (III) OF THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS OF

REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95 VALIDLY LIMIT THE 8% TRANSITIONAL INPUT

RESOLUTION
TAX TO THE IMPROVEMENTS ON REAL PROPERTIES.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
III
Before us is respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated April 2,
2009 which granted the consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 6-97 DID NOT REPEAL REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-
Development Corporation, the dispositive portion of which reads:
95.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Tax
The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit.
Appeals and the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are
hereby (1) restrained from collecting from petitioner the amount of P28,413,783.00
The first VAT law, found in Executive Order (EO) No. 273 [1987], took effect on
representing the transitional input tax credit due it for the fourth quarter of 1996;
January 1, 1988. It amended several provisions of the National Internal Revenue
and (2) directed to refund to petitioner the amount ofP347,741,695.74 paid as
Code of 1986 (Old NIRC). EO 273 likewise accommodated the potential burdens of
output VAT for the third quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting transitional input
the shift to the VAT system by allowing newly VAT-registered persons to avail of a
tax credit available to petitioner for the said quarter, or to issue a tax credit
transitional input tax credit as provided for in Section 105 of the Old NIRC. Section
corresponding to such amount. No pronouncement as to costs.
105 as amended by EO 273 reads:

The Motion for Reconsideration raises the following arguments:

Sec. 105. Transitional Input Tax Credits. - A person who becomes liable to value-
added tax or any person who elects to be a VAT-registered person shall, subject to
I
the filing of an inventory as prescribed by regulations, be allowed input tax on his
beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies equivalent to 8% of the value
of such inventory or the actual value-added tax paid on such goods, materials and
supplies, whichever is higher, which shall be creditable against the output tax.
RA 7716 took effect on January 1, 1996. It amended Section 100 of the Old NIRC
by imposing for the first time value-added-tax on sale of real properties. The
amendment reads:
Sec. 100. Value-added-tax on sale of goods or properties. - (a) Rate and base of
tax. - There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or
exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of the gross
selling price or gross value in money of the goods, or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor.rbl r l l lbrr
(1) The term 'goods or properties' shall mean all tangible and intangible objects
which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include:
(A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of trade or business; xxx
The provisions of Section 105 of the NIRC, on the transitional input tax credit,
remain intact despite the enactment of RA 7716. Section 105 however was
amended with the passage of the new National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (New
NIRC), also officially known as Republic Act (RA) 8424. The provisions on the
transitional input tax credit are now embodied in Section 111(A) of the New NIRC,
which reads:
Section 111. Transitional/Presumptive Input Tax Credits. -
(A) Transitional Input Tax Credits. - A person who becomes liable to value-added
tax or any person who elects to be a VAT-registered person shall, subject to the
filing of an inventory according to rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner, be allowed input tax on his
beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies equivalent for 8% of the value
of such inventory or the actual value-added tax paid on such goods, materials and
supplies, whichever is higher, which shall be creditable against the output tax.
[Emphasis ours.]
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation's (FBDC) presumptive input tax credit arising from the land inventory
on the basis of Revenue Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue Memorandum
Circular 3-96 (RMC 3-96). Specifically, Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 provides:
Sec. 4.105-1. Transitional input tax on beginning inventories. - Taxpayers who
became VAT-registered persons upon effectivity of RA No. 7716 who have exceeded
the minimum turnover ofP500,000.00 or who voluntarily register even if their
turnover does not exceed P500,000.00 shall be entitled to a presumptive input tax
on the inventory on hand as of December 31, 1995 on the following: (a) goods
purchased for resale in their present condition; (b) materials purchased for further
processing, but which have not yet undergone processing; (c) goods which have
been manufactured by the taxpayer; (d) goods in process and supplies, all of which
are for sale or for use in the course of the taxpayer's trade or business as a VAT-
registered person.
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax
shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other
similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1,
1988).
The transitional input tax shall be 8% of the value of the inventory or actual VAT
paid, whichever is higher, which amount may be allowed as tax credit against the
output tax of the VAT-registered person.
In the April 2, 2009 Decision sought to be reconsidered, the Court struck down
Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being in conflict with the law. It held that the CIR
had no power to limit the meaning and coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105
of the Old NIRC sans statutory authority or basis and justification to make such
limitation. This it did when it restricted the application of Section 105 in the case of
real estate dealers only to improvements on the real property belonging to their
beginning inventory.
A law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to
the whole law. It is the cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute's
clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but
the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. 1
In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as
a whole; construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent
from the whole act; consider each and every provision thereof in the light of the
general purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make every part effective,
harmonious and sensible. 2
The statutory definition of the term "goods or properties" leaves no room for doubt.
It states:
Sec. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties. - (a) Rate and base of
tax. - xxx. crvll
(1) The term 'goods or properties' shall mean all tangible and intangible objects
which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include:
(A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of trade or business; xxx.
The amendatory provision of Section 105 of the NIRC, as introduced by RA 7716,
states:
Sec. 105. Transitional Input tax Credits. - A person who becomes liable to value-
added tax or any person who elects to be a VAT-registered person shall, subject to
the filing of an inventory as prescribed by regulations, be allowed input tax on his
beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies equivalent to 8% of the value
of such inventory or the actual value-added tax paid on such goods, materials and
supplies, whichever is higher, which shall be creditable against the output tax.
The term "goods or properties" by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes
"real properties held primarily for sale to costumers or held for lease in the ordinary
course of business." Having been defined in Section 100 of the NIRC, the term
"goods" as used in Section 105 of the same code could not have a different
meaning. This has been explained in the Decision dated April 2, 2009, thus:
Under Section 105, the beginning inventory of "goods" forms part of the valuation of
the transitional input tax credit. Goods, as commonly understood in the business
sense, refers to the product which the VAT-registered person offers for sale to the
public. With respect to real estate dealers, it is the real properties themselves which
constitute their "goods." Such real properties are the operating assets of the real
estate dealer.
Section 4.100-1 of RR No. 7-95 itself includes in its enumeration of "goods or
properties" such "real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for
lease in the ordinary course of trade or business." Said definition was taken from
the very statutory language of Section 100 of the Old NIRC. By limiting the
definition of goods to "improvements" in Section 4.105-1, the BIR not only
contravened the definition of "goods" as provided in the Old NIRC, but also the
definition which the same revenue regulation itself has provided.
Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 restricted the definition of "goods", viz:
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax
shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other
similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1,
1988).
As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code,3 an administrative rule or regulation
cannot contravene the law on which it is based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section
105 insofar as the definition of the term "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative
act beyond the authority of the CIR and the Secretary of Finance. The rules and
regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have
the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by
the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and should not be in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the
provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify,
expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void. 4
While administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue
regulations to implement statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope of
the statute to less than what it provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its
terms, or in any way modify explicit provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial
body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress.
Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or
administrative ruling, the basic law prevails. 5
To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of
transitional input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity.
On January 1, 1997, RR 6-97 was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
RR 6-97 was basically a reiteration of the same Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95, except
that the RR 6-97 deleted the following paragraph:
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax
shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other
similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of E.O. 273 (January 1,
1988).
It is clear, therefore, that under RR 6-97, the allowable transitional input tax credit
is not limited to improvements on real properties. The particular provision of RR 7-
95 has effectively been repealed by RR 6-97 which is now in consonance with
Section 100 of the NIRC, insofar as the definition of real properties as goods is
concerned. The failure to add a specific repealing clause would not necessarily
indicate that there was no intent to repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the aforequoted
paragraph was deleted created an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
between the provisions of RR 6-97 and RR 7-95.
We now address the points raised in the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Justice
Antonio T. Carpio.
At the outset, it must be stressed that FBDC sought the refund of the total amount
ofP347,741,695.74 which it had itself paid in cash to the BIR. It is argued that the
transitional input tax credit applies only when taxes were previously paid on the
properties in the beginning inventory and that there should be a law imposing the
tax presumed to have been paid. The thesis is anchored on the argument that
without any VAT or other input business tax imposed by law on the real properties
at the time of the sale, the 8% transitional input tax cannot be presumed to have
been paid.
The language of Section 105 is explicit. It precludes reading into the law that the
transitional input tax credit is limited to the amount of VAT previously paid. When
the aforesaid section speaks of "eight percent (8%) of the value of such inventory"
followed by the clause "or the actual value-added tax paid on such goods, materials
and supplies," the implication is clear that under the first clause, "eight percent
(8%) of the value of such inventory," the law does not contemplate the payment of
any prior tax on such inventory. This is distinguished from the second clause, "the
actual value-added tax paid on the goods, materials and supplies" where actual
payment of VAT on the goods, materials and supplies is assumed. Had the intention
of the law been to limit the amount to the actual VAT paid, there would have been
no need to explicitly allow a claim based on 8% of the value of such inventory.
The contention that the 8% transitional input tax credit in Section 105 presumes
that a previous tax was paid, whether or not it was actually paid, requires a
transaction where a tax has been imposed by law, is utterly without basis in law.
The rationale behind the provisions of Section 105 was aptly elucidated in the
Decision sought to be reconsidered, thus:
It is apparent that the transitional input tax credit operates to benefit newly VAT-
registered persons, whether or not they previously paid taxes in the acquisition of
their beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies. During that period of
transition from non-VAT to VAT status, the transitional input tax credit serves to
alleviate the impact of the VAT on the taxpayer. At the very beginning, the VAT-
registered taxpayer is obliged to remit a significant portion of the income it derived
from its sales as output VAT. The transitional input tax credit mitigates this initial
diminution of the taxpayer's income by affording the opportunity to offset the losses
incurred through the remittance of the output VAT at a stage when the person is yet
unable to credit input VAT payments.
As pointed out in Our Decision of April 2, 2009, to give Section 105 a restrictive 5
Sunga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125629, March 25, 1998, 288 SCRA
construction that transitional input tax credit applies only when taxes were
78, 87.
previously paid on the properties in the beginning inventory and there is a law
imposing the tax which is presumed to have been paid, is to impose conditions or
6
Alagad (Partido ng Maralitang-Lungsod) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
requisites to the application of the transitional tax input credit which are not found
in the law. The courts must not read into the law what is not there. To do so will 136795, October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA 244, 291

violate the principle of separation of powers which prohibits this Court from
engaging in judicial legislation.6

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH

FINALITY for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes: DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration filed by the Commissioner of Internal
*
On official leave.
Revenue.

**
On sick leave. The decision dated 2 April 2009 grants to petitioner a tax credit or refund
ofP347,741,695.74 when petitioner never in fact paid a single centavo of
1
The Civil Service Commission v. Joson, G.R. No. 154674, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. A tax credit or tax refund requires

773,786. that a previous tax was paid by the taxpayer. There can be no tax credit or
refund if no prior tax was paid. In this case, the decision dated 2 April 2009
grants to petitioner hundreds of millions in tax credit or refund without the
2
Republic v. Reyes, No. L - 22550, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 170,173.
taxpayer ever having paid any previous tax to the government. Who will
bear this burden of tax credit or refund? It is all taxpayers in this country
3
Art. 7. xxx
except, of course, petitioner. What makes petitioner so privileged?
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when

they are not contrary to the laws or the constitution. The Constitution mandates that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable."1 There is certainly neither uniformity nor equity if this Court grants
4
Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, G.R. No. 154684, September 8, 2005, 469 petitioner a P347,741,695.74 tax credit or refund when all other taxpayers seeking
a tax credit or refund must first show prior payment of a tax, or at least the
SCRA 424, 436.
existence of a law imposing the tax for which a credit or refund is sought.
The transitional input tax credit was placed in the tax law to pave the smooth
transition from the non-VAT to the VAT system. This input VAT works by deducting
previously paid taxes from the output VAT liability in subsequent transactions
involving the same product. The term "transitional" was placed to distinguish this
from an ordinary input tax.
In 1995, when petitioner bought the Global City land from the national government,
the sale was under a tax-free transaction and without any VAT component. Being
tax-exempt, the national government did not pass on any previous input business
tax, whether in the form of sales tax or VAT, to petitioner as part of the purchase
price. rbl r l l lbrr
the national government of government-owned land is not subject to VAT.2Petitioner
cannot now claim any input tax credit if it buys the same land today, and resells the
same the following day.
Thus, if a real estate dealer like petitioner cannot claim an input tax today on its
purchase of government land, when VAT on real properties is already in effect, then
all the more petitioner cannot claim any input tax for its 1995 purchase of
government land when the E-VAT law was still inexistent and petitioner had not yet
been subjected to VAT.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration.

The 8% transitional input tax credit in Section 105 presumes that a

previous tax was paid, whether or not it was actually paid. Such
presumption assumes the existence of a law imposing the tax presumed to
have been paid. This can be inferred from the provision that a taxpayer is
"allowed input tax on his beginning inventory xxx equivalent to 8% xxx, or
the actual value-added tax paid xxx, whichever is higher." The transitional
input tax requires a transaction where a tax has been imposed by law.
Otherwise, the presumption that the tax has been paid will have no basis.
Without any VAT or other input business tax imposed by law on real
properties at the time of the sale in the present case, the 8% transitional
input tax cannot be presumed to have been paid.

Also, even before real estate dealers became subject to VAT under RA 7716,
improvements on the land were already subject to VAT. However, since the land
itself was not subject to VAT or to any input tax prior to RA 7716, the land then
could not be considered part of the beginning inventory under Section 105. Thus,
the 8% transitional input tax should apply only to improvements on land and not on
the land itself.

To repeat, at the time of the sale by the government of the Global City land in 1995,
there was no VAT on the sale of land. In addition, the government, as seller, was not
subject to VAT. Even if the sale transaction happens today with the VAT on real
properties already in existence, and petitioner subsequently resells the land,
petitioner will still not be entitled to any input tax credit. This is because the sale by

iv. SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW
[G.R. No. 182722 : January 22, 2010]
DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE [DCCCO], REPRESENTED
BY FELICIDAD L. RUIZ, ITS GENERAL MANAGER, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The clashing interests of the State and the taxpayers are again pitted against each
other. Two basic principles, the State's inherent power of taxation and its declared
policy of fostering the creation and growth of cooperatives come into play. However,
the one that embodies the spirit of the law and the true intent of the legislature
prevails.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Section 11 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9282, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the December
1 petitioner on July 23, 2002.9 Thereafter, on October 16, 2002, petitioner received
18, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), ordering petitioner to pay
deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of its
members for taxable years 1999 and 2000, pursuant to Section 24(B)(1) of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC), as well as the delinquency interest
of 20% per annum under Section 249(C) of the same Code. It also assails the April
11, 2008 Resolution3denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO) is a credit cooperative
duly registered with and regulated by the Cooperative Development Authority
(CDA). It was established on February 17, 1968 with the following objectives and
4 5
purposes: (1) to increase the income and purchasing power of the members; (2) to
pool the resources of the members by encouraging savings and promoting thrift to
mobilize capital formation for development activities; and (3) to extend loans to
members for provident and productive purposes.6 It has the power (1) to draw,
make, accept, endorse, guarantee, execute, and issue promissory notes,
mortgages, bills of exchange, drafts, warrants, certificates and all kinds of
obligations and instruments in connection with and in furtherance of its business
operations; and (2) to issue bonds, debentures, and other obligations; to contract
indebtedness; and to secure the same with a mortgage or deed of trust, or pledge
or lien on any or all of its real and personal properties.7
On November 27, 2001, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Operations Group
Deputy Commissioner, Lilian B. Hefti, issued Letters of Authority Nos. 63222 and
63223, authorizing BIR Officers Tomas Rambuyon and Tarcisio Cubillan of Revenue
Region No. 12, Bacolod City, to examine petitioner's books of accounts and other
accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the taxable years 1999 and
2000.8
Proceedings before the BIR Regional Office
On June 26, 2002, petitioner received two Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency
withholding taxes for taxable years 1999 and 2000 which were protested by
two other Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency withholding taxes also for taxable
years 1999 and 2000.10 The deficiency withholding taxes cover the payments of the
honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and
professional fees, and interest on savings and time deposits of its members.
On October 22, 2002, petitioner informed BIR Regional Director Sonia L. Flores that
it would only pay the deficiency withholding taxes corresponding to the honorarium
of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and professional fees
for the year 1999 in the amount of P87,977.86, excluding penalties and interest. 11
In another letter dated November 8, 2002, petitioner also informed the BIR
Assistant Regional Director, Rogelio B. Zambarrano, that it would pay the
withholding taxes due on the honorarium and per diems of the Board of Directors,
security and janitorial services, commissions and legal & professional fees for the
year 2000 in the amount of P119,889.37, excluding penalties and interest, and that
it would avail of the Voluntary Assessment and Abatement Program (VAAP) of the
BIR under Revenue Regulations No. 17-2002. 12
On November 29, 2002, petitioner availed of the VAAP and paid the amounts of
P105,574.62 and P143,867.2413 corresponding to the withholding taxes on the
payments for the compensation, honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and
janitorial services, and legal and professional services, for the years 1999 and 2000,
respectively.
Accordingly, petitioner is ORDERED TO PAY the respondent the respective amounts
of P1,280,145.89 and P1,357,881.14 representing deficiency withholding taxes on
interests from savings and time deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999
and 2000. In addition, petitioner is ordered to pay the 20% delinquency interest
from May 26, 2003 until the amount of deficiency withholding taxes are fully paid
pursuant to Section 249 (C) of the Tax Code.
SO ORDERED.17

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration, but it was denied by the
On April 24, 2003, petitioner received from the BIR Regional Director, Sonia L.
First Division in its Resolution dated May 29, 2007.18
Flores, Letters of Demand Nos. 00027-2003 and 00026-2003, with attached
Transcripts of Assessment and Audit Results/Assessment Notices, ordering petitioner
Proceedings before the CTA En Banc
to pay the deficiency withholding taxes, inclusive of penalties, for the years 1999
and 2000 in the amounts of P1,489,065.30 and P1,462,644.90, respectively.14
On July 3, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En
Banc,19 interposing the lone issue of whether or not petitioner is liable to pay the
Proceedings before the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of its
members for taxable years 1999 and 2000, and the consequent delinquency interest
On May 9, 2003, petitioner protested the Letters of Demand and Assessment
of 20% per annum.20
Notices with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).15 However, the latter
failed to act on the protest within the prescribed 180-day period. Hence, on
Finding no reversible error in the Decision dated February 6, 2007 and the
December 3, 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the CTA, docketed as
Resolution dated May 29, 2007 of the CTA First Division, the CTA En Banc denied
C.T.A. Case No. 6827.16
the Petition for Review21 as well as petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.22

Proceedings before the CTA First Division

The CTA En Banc held that Section 57 of the NIRC requires the withholding of tax at
source. Pursuant thereto, Revenue Regulations No. 2-98 was issued enumerating
The case was raffled to the First Division of the CTA which rendered its Decision on
the income payments subject to final withholding tax, among which is "interest from
February 6, 2007, disposing of the case in this wise:
any peso bank deposit and yield, or any other monetary benefit from deposit
substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangements x x x". According to the
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Review is hereby PARTIALLY
CTA En Banc, petitioner's business falls under the phrase "similar arrangements;" as
GRANTED. Assessment Notice Nos. 00026-2003 and 00027-2003 are hereby
such, it should have withheld the corresponding 20% final tax on the interest from
MODIFIED and the assessment for deficiency withholding taxes on the honorarium
the deposits of its members.
and per diems of petitioner's Board of Directors, security and janitorial services,
commissions and legal and professional fees are hereby CANCELLED. However, the
Issue
assessments for deficiency withholding taxes on interests are hereby AFFIRMED.
Hence, the present recourse, where petitioner raises the issue of whether or not it is
liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time
deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000, as well as the
delinquency interest of 20% per annum.
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner argues that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC which reads in part, to wit:
SECTION 24. Income Tax Rates. --
xxxx
(B) Rate of Tax on Certain Passive Income: --
(1) Interests, Royalties, Prizes, and Other Winnings. -- A final tax at the rate of
twenty percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest from any
currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit
substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangements; x x x
applies only to banks and not to cooperatives, since the phrase "similar
arrangements" is preceded by terms referring to banking transactions that have
deposit peculiarities. Petitioner thus posits that the savings and time deposits of
members of cooperatives are not included in the enumeration, and thus not subject
to the 20% final tax. To bolster its position, petitioner cites BIR Ruling No. 551-
88823 and BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006]24 where the BIR ruled that interests from
deposits maintained by members of cooperative are not subject to withholding tax
under Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC. Petitioner further contends that pursuant to
Article XII, Section 15 of the Constitution25and Article 2 of Republic Act No. 6938 (RA
6938) or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines,26cooperatives enjoy a preferential
tax treatment which exempts their members from the application of Section 24(B)
(1) of the NIRC.
Respondent's Arguments
As a counter-argument, respondent invokes the legal maxim "Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos" (where the law does not distinguish, the courts
should not distinguish). Respondent maintains that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC
applies to cooperatives as the phrase "similar arrangements" is not limited to banks,
but includes cooperatives that are depositaries of their members. Regarding the
exemption relied upon by petitioner, respondent adverts to the jurisprudential rule
that tax exemptions are highly disfavored and construed strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. In this connection,
respondent likewise points out that the deficiency tax assessments were issued
against petitioner not as a taxpayer but as a withholding agent.
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Petitioner's invocation of BIR
Ruling No. 551-888, reiterated in
BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006], is proper.
On November 16, 1988, the BIR declared in BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that
cooperatives are not required to withhold taxes on interest from savings and time
deposits of their members. The pertinent BIR Ruling reads:
November 16, 1988
BIR RULING NO. 551-888
24 369-88 551-888
Gentlemen:
This refers to your letter dated September 5, 1988 stating that you are a
corporation established under P.D. No. 175 and duly registered with the Bureau of
Cooperatives Development as full fledged cooperative of good standing with
Certificate of Registration No. FF 563-RR dated August 8, 1985; and that one of
your objectives is to provide and strengthen cooperative endeavor and extend
assistance to members and non-members through credit scheme both in cash and aforesaid savings account and time deposits of your members. (Underscoring ours)
in kind.
Very truly yours,
Based on the foregoing representations, you now request in effect a ruling as to (SGD.) BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JR.
whether or not you are exempt from the following: Commissioner

1. Payment of sales tax

The CTA First Division, however, disregarded the above quoted ruling in determining
2. Filing and payment of income tax
whether petitioner is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from
3. Withholding taxes from compensation of employees and savings account and
the deposits of its members. It ratiocinated in this wise:
time deposits of members. (Underscoring ours)

This Court does not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent in his
In reply, please be informed that Executive Order No. 93 which took effect on March
Memorandum, nothing in the above quoted resolution will give the conclusion that
10, 1987 withdrew all tax exemptions and preferential privileges e.g., income tax
savings account and time deposits of members of a cooperative are tax-exempt.
and sales tax, granted to cooperatives under P.D. No. 175 which were previously
What is entirely clear is the opinion of the Commissioner that the proper party to
withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955 effective October 15, 1984 and restored by P.D. No.
withhold the corresponding taxes on certain specified items of income is the payor-
2008 effective January 8, 1986. However, implementation of said Executive Order
corporation and/or person. In the same way, in the case of interests earned from
insofar as electric, agricultural, irrigation and waterworks cooperatives are
Philippine currency deposits made in a bank, then it is the bank which is liable to
concerned was suspended until June 30, 1987. (Memorandum Order No. 65 dated
withhold the corresponding taxes considering that the bank is the payor-
January 21, 1987 of the President) Accordingly, your tax exemption privilege
corporation. Thus, the ruling that a cooperative is not the proper party to withhold
expired as of June 30, 1987. Such being the case, you are now subject to income
the corresponding taxes on the aforementioned accounts is correct. However, this
and sales taxes.
ruling does not hold true if the savings and time deposits are being maintained in
the cooperative, for in this case, it is the cooperative which becomes the payor-
Moreover, under Section 72(a) of the Tax Code, as amended, every employer
corporation, a separate entity acting no more than an agent of the government for
making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax at the
the collection of taxes, liable to withhold the corresponding taxes on the interests
rates prescribed by Section 21(a) in relation to section 71, Chapter X, Title II, of the
earned. 27
(Underscoring ours)
same Code as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 and implemented by Revenue
Regulations No. 6-82 as amended. Accordingly, as an employer you are required to
withhold the corresponding tax due from the compensation of your employees. The CTA En Banc affirmed the above-quoted Decision and found petitioner's
invocation of BIR Ruling No. 551-88 misplaced. According to the CTA En Banc, the

Furthermore, under Section 50(a) of the Tax Code, as amended, the tax imposed or BIR Ruling was based on the premise that the savings and time deposits were

prescribed by Section 21(c) of the same Code on specified items of income shall be placed by the members of the cooperative in the bank. 28Consequently, it ruled that

withheld by payor-corporation and/or person and paid in the same manner and the BIR Ruling does not apply when the deposits are maintained in the cooperative

subject to the same conditions as provided in Section 51 of the Tax Code, as such as the instant case.

amended. Such being the case, and since interest from any Philippine currency bank
deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes are paid by We disagree.

banks, you are not the party required to withhold the corresponding tax on the
There is nothing in the ruling to suggest that it applies only when deposits are
maintained in a bank. Rather, the ruling clearly states, without any qualification,
that since interest from any Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any other
monetary benefit from deposit substitutes are paid by banks, cooperatives are not
required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time
deposits of their members. This interpretation was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-
2006] dated October 5, 2006, which was issued by Assistant Commissioner James
H. Roldan upon the request of the cooperatives for a confirmatory ruling on several
issues, among which is the alleged exemption of interest income on members'
deposit (over and above the share capital holdings) from the 20% final withholding
tax. In the said ruling, the BIR opined that:
xxxx
3. Exemption of interest income on members' deposit (over and above the share
capital holdings) from the 20% Final Withholding Tax.
The National Internal Revenue Code states that a "final tax at the rate of twenty
percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest on currency bank
deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from the deposit substitutes and
from trust funds and similar arrangement x x x" for individuals under Section 24(B)
(1) and for domestic corporations under Section 27(D)(1).Considering the
members' deposits with the cooperatives are not currency bank deposits nor deposit
substitutes, Section 24(B)(1) and Section 27(D)(1), therefore, do not apply to
members of cooperatives and to deposits of primaries with federations,
respectively.
It bears stressing that interpretations of administrative agencies in charge of
enforcing a law are entitled to great weight and consideration by the courts, unless
such interpretations are in a sharp conflict with the governing statute or the
Constitution and other laws.29 In this case, BIR Ruling No. 551-888 and BIR Ruling
[DA-591-2006] are in perfect harmony with the Constitution and the laws they seek
to implement. Accordingly, the interpretation in BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that
cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from
savings and time deposits of their members, which was reiterated in BIR Ruling
[DA-591-2006], applies to the instant case.
Members of cooperatives deserve
a preferential tax treatment
pursuant to RA 6938, as amended
by RA 9520.
Given that petitioner is a credit cooperative duly registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC must be read together
with RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520.
Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of the
State to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for
promoting self-reliance and harnessing people power towards the attainment of
economic development and social justice. Thus, to encourage the formation of
cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their growth and
development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.
The legislative intent to give cooperatives a preferential tax treatment is apparent in
Articles 61 and 62 of RA 6938, which read:
ART. 61. Tax Treatment of Cooperatives. -- Duly registered cooperatives under this
Code which do not transact any business with non-members or the general public
shall not be subject to any government taxes and fees imposed under the Internal
Revenue Laws and other tax laws. Cooperatives not falling under this article shall be
governed by the succeeding section.
ART. 62. Tax and Other Exemptions. -- Cooperatives transacting business with both
members and nonmembers shall not be subject to tax on their transactions to
members. Notwithstanding the provision of any law or regulation to the contrary,
such cooperatives dealing with nonmembers shall enjoy the following tax
exemptions; x x x.
This exemption extends to members of cooperatives. It must be emphasized that
cooperatives exist for the benefit of their members. In fact, the primary objective of
every cooperative is to provide goods and services to its members to enable them
to attain increased income, savings, investments, and productivity.30 Therefore,
limiting the application of the tax exemption to cooperatives would go against the
very purpose of a credit cooperative. Extending the exemption to members of
cooperatives, on the other hand, would be consistent with the intent of the
legislature. Thus, although the tax exemption only mentions cooperatives, this
should be construed to include the members, pursuant to Article 126 of RA 6938,
which provides:
ART. 126. Interpretation and Construction. - In case of doubt as to the meaning of
any provision of this Code or the regulations issued in pursuance thereof, the same
shall be resolved liberally in favor of the cooperatives and their members.
We need not belabor that what is within the spirit is within the law even if it is not
within the letter of the law because the spirit prevails over the letter.31 Apropos is
the ruling in the case of Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,32 to wit:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are
not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
[is] slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words
of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them." While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will
of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there,
we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In
doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to
give effect to the lawmaker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is
within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated
differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. (Underscoring
ours)
It is also worthy to note that the tax exemption in RA 6938 was retained in RA
9520. The only difference is that Article 61 of RA 9520 (formerly Section 62 of RA
6938) now expressly states that transactions of members with the cooperatives are
not subject to any taxes and fees. Thus:
ART. 61. Tax and Other Exemptions. Cooperatives transacting business with both
members and non-members shall not be subjected to tax on their transactions with
members. In relation to this, the transactions of members with the cooperative shall
not be subject to any taxes and fees, including but not limited to final taxes on
members' deposits and documentary tax. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law
or regulation to the contrary, such cooperatives dealing with nonmembers shall
enjoy the following tax exemptions: (Underscoring ours)
xxxx
This amendment in Article 61 of RA 9520, specifically providing that members of
cooperatives are not subject to final taxes on their deposits, affirms the 20% per annum are hereby CANCELLED.
interpretation of the BIR that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC does not apply to
cooperatives and confirms that such ruling carries out the legislative intent. Under SO ORDERED.
the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by reenactment,
the reenactment of a statute substantially unchanged is persuasive indication of the
adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction.33
[G.R. No. 141307. March 28, 2001.]

Moreover, no less than our Constitution guarantees the protection of cooperatives.

PURTO J. NAVARRO and DANNY B. TAMAYO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
Section 15, Article XII of the Constitution considers cooperatives as instruments for
APPEALS and ADOLFO AQUINO, ROLANDO LALAS, ABRAHAM MORALES,
social justice and economic development. At the same time, Section 10 of Article II
BLANDO QUINTO, ROMEO VISPERAS, ANTONIO PENULIAR, EDUARDO
of the Constitution declares that it is a policy of the State to promote social justice
ABULENCIA, EMILIO PENULIAR, JR., ERNESTO SERAPION, VICTORIO
in all phases of national development. In relation thereto, Section 2 of Article XIII of
LALANGAN, ANTONIO BURGUILLOS, MIGUEL JIMENEZ, and ELPIDIO
the Constitution states that the promotion of social justice shall include the
VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and
self-reliance. Bearing in mind the foregoing provisions, we find that an
DECISION
interpretation exempting the members of cooperatives from the imposition of the
final tax under Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC is more in keeping with the letter and
spirit of our Constitution. KAPUNAN, J.:

All told, we hold that petitioner is not liable to pay the assessed deficiency
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
withholding taxes on interest from the savings and time deposits of its members, as
Procedure, assailing as erroneous the decision of the Court of Appeals, Fourth
well as the delinquency interest of 20% per annum.
Division, 1 dated October 7, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 5475 which granted the
petition for certiorari filed by herein respondents and declared as null and void the
In closing, cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax
appointment of herein petitioner Purto J. Navarro to the Sanggunian Bayan of
treatment because of the vital role they play in the attainment of economic
Mapandan, Pangasinan.
development and social justice. Thus, although taxes are the lifeblood of the chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

government, the State's power to tax must give way to foster the creation and
The facts are undisputed.
growth of cooperatives. To borrow the words of Justice Isagani A. Cruz: "The power
of taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and may be subordinated to the
In the May 11, 1997 local elections, the following officials were elected to office in
demands of social justice."34
the Municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed December 18, 2007
Cesar M. Calimlim Mayor Lakas NUCD-KAMPI
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and the April 11, 2008 Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accordingly, the assessments for deficiency
Baltazar Aquino Vice-Mayor Lakas NUCD-KAMPI
withholding taxes on interest from the savings and time deposits of petitioner's
members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000 as well as the delinquency interest of
Elected as members of the Sangguniang Bayan ranked according to the highest
number of votes obtained were the following councilors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Political Party
1. Danny B. Tamayo REFORMA-LM
2. Rolando S. Soriano REFORMA-LM
3. Leopoldo C. Biagtan REFORMA-LM
4. Florentino Z. Lalas REFORMA-LM
5. Mamerto Eden, Jr. REFORMA-LM
6. Victorio C. Lalangan LAKAS-NUCD-KAMPI
7. Judy A. Pascual REFORMA-LM
8. Rolando Lalas LAKAS-NUCD-KAMPI
On March 25, 1999, Mayor Cesar Calimlim died. A vacancy was thus created in the
Office of the Mayor so by operation of law, Section 44 of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, then Vice-Mayor Baltazar
Aquino succeeded him. Accordingly, the highest ranking member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, i.e. the one who garnered the highest number of votes, was
elevated to the position of the Vice-Mayor, pursuant to the same law. This was
petitioner Danny B. Tamayo who belonged to the REFORMA-LM political party.
Since a vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation of petitioner
Tamayo to the office of the Vice-Mayor, Governor Victor Agbayani of Pangasinan
appointed herein petitioner Purto J. Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Navarro belonged to the same political party as that of petitioner Tamayo.
Private respondents filed Civil Case No. 99-12958-D to nullify the appointment of
petitioner Navarro before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44
presided by Judge Crispin Laron. Their motions for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and for the inhibition of Judge Laron having been denied, private
respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court.
In a Resolution dated August 25, 1999, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals due to the hierarchy of courts.
Private respondents argued before the Court of Appeals that it was the former vice-
mayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the permanent vacancy
in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the
Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayors political
party, in this case, the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of petitioner
Tamayo, who was the highest-ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the
office of the Vice-Mayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian
Bayan. Pursuant to Section 45 (b) of RA 7160, the person to be appointed to the
position vacated by him should come from the same political party affiliation as that
of petitioner Tamayo. Hence, the appointment extended by Governor Agbayani to
petitioner Navarro, who was a member of and recommended by the REFORMA-LM,
is valid.
The Court of Appeals in a decision dated October 7, 1999 resolved the petition in
favor of private respondents but for the reason different from that posited by
private respondents. According to the appellate court, the vacancy which resulted
from the death of the mayor created a series of vacancies and successions by
operation of law. By this interpretation, petitioner Tamayos former position as the
highest-ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan was filled up by the second
highest-ranking member and that vacated by the second highest-ranking member
was succeeded by the third highest-ranking member, and so forth. And the last
vacancy created was the position of the lowest ranking-member of the Sanggunian,
that is, the eighth position occupied by Rolando Lalas. The Court of Appeals then
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
concluded that it was the appointment of the eighth councilor, who was Rolando
Lalas to the number seven position which created the "last vacancy;" therefore, the
person to be appointed to the vacant position should come from the same political
party to which Rolando Lalas belonged, which was the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners brought the instant
petition.
We give due course to the petition.
Sections 44 and 45 of RA 7160 governing vacancies and succession are quoted
hereunder: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-
mayor, the highest sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest-ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-
governor, mayor or vice-mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the
said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking as defined herein: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay members or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be
resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated
to discharge the functions of his office. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian
shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each
winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election.
SECTION 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. (a) Permanent vacancies
in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall
be filled by appointment in the following manner: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities
and the sangguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned;
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party
under which the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose
elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the
sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee
shall come from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who
caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the
appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of the
appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are conditions
sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shall
be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the
official responsible therefor.
(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does
not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon
recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the
vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the
sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of
the organization concerned. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Under Section 44, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45(b) providing that." . . only the
nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has
the election of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position in the Sanggunian. Such
construction will result in absurdity.
Petitioners also allege that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the
petition because the verification is defective. It is argued that the affidavit merely
stated that the allegations therein are "true and correct to the best of my own
knowledge and information" whereas Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
specifically requires that the allegations be "true and correct of his knowledge and
belief." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the
last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove The contention is without merit. Verification based on the affiants own knowledge
provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the and information is sufficient under the circumstances. Verification is merely a formal
Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy . . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library and not a jurisdictional requisite which does not affect the validity or efficacy of the
pleading, or the jurisdiction of the court. 4 Therefore, a defective verification, as in
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement the present case, does not render the pleading or the petition invalid and the Court
where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party of Appeals did not err in giving due course to the petition.
representation as willed by the people in the election. 2
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the in CA-G.R. SP No. 54675 dated October 7, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled appointment of petitioner Purto J. Navarro to the Sanggunian Bayan of Mapandan,
up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Pangasinan is hereby AFFIRMED as valid and legal.
Otherwise, REFORMA-LMs representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished.
To argue that the vacancy created was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a SO ORDERED
LAKAS-NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the increase of that partys
representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of the REFORMA-LM. This
interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law and thus violative of a
fundamental rule in statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent and purpose of the law. 3 As earlier pointed out, the reason behind par.
(b), section 44 of the Local Government Code is the maintenance party
representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate.

The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the
member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become
vacant by any of the causes already enumerated. The term "last vacancy" is thus
used in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. The
term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with

v. STARE DECISIS
G.R. No. 188302 June 27, 2012
NANCY L. TY, Petitioner,
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by Nancy L. Ty (petitioner), to
challenge the March 31, 2009 decision2 and the June 10, 2009 resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107104. The CA decision dismissed the
petitioners petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The CA resolution denied the
petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Sometime in 1979, the Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (respondent)
wanted to purchase real properties as new branch sites for its expansion program.
Since the General Banking Act4 limits a banks real estate holdings to no more than
50% of its capital assets, the respondents Board of Directors decided to warehouse
some of its existing properties and branch sites to allow more flexibility in the
opening of branches, and to enable it to acquire new branch sites. 5
The petitioner, a major stockholder and a director of the respondent, persuaded two
other major stockholders, Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre, to organize
and incorporate Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala Realty) to hold and purchase
real properties in trust for the respondent. 6
Subsequently, Remedios A. Dupasquier prodded her brother Tomas to endorse to
her his shares in Tala Realty and she registered them in the name of her controlled
corporation, Add International Services, Inc.7 The petitioner, Remedios, and Pedro
controlled Tala Realty through their respective nominees.8
In implementing their trust agreement, the respondent sold to Tala Realty some of
its properties. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to the respondent the properties for
20 years, renewable for another 20 years at the respondents option with a right of
first refusal in the event Tala Realty decides to sell them. 9 However, in August 1992,
Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded payment
of rentals, deposits, and goodwill, with a threat to eject the respondent. 10
Thus, from 1995 to 1996, the respondent filed 17 complaints against Tala Realty,
the petitioner, Pedro, Remedios, and their respective nominees for reconveyance of
different properties with 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) nationwide, including Civil
Case No. 2506-MN before Branch 170 of the RTC of Malabon (Malabon case),
subject of the present case.11
The petitioner and her co-defendants moved to dismiss the Malabon case for forum
shopping and litis pendentia, citing the 16 other civil cases filed in various
courts12 involving the same facts, issues, parties, and reliefs pleaded in the
respondents complaint.13
The Malabon RTC denied the motion to dismiss,14 finding no commonality in the 16
other civil cases since they involved different causes of action. The Malabon RTC
also denied15 the subsequent motions for reconsideration and for suspension of
proceedings.16
After the petitioner and her co-defendants filed their respective answers ad
cautelam,17 the petitioner filed a motion to hold proceedings in abeyance,18 citing
the pendency with this Court of G.R. No. 12761119 that assailed the denial of their
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 4521 before the Batangas City RTC (Branch 84),
and also prayed for a writ of prohibition to order the 17 RTC branches and the three
CA divisions, where the same cases were pending, to desist from further proceeding
with the trial of the cases.
The Malabon RTC granted to hold proceedings in abeyance.20 When the Malabon RTC
denied21 the respondents motion for reconsideration, the respondent elevated its
case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.22 The CA initially dismissed the
petition,23 but on motion for reconsideration, it modified its ruling, setting aside the
RTCs order to hold proceedings in abeyance for mootness, due to this Courts
dismissal of G.R. No. 127611 for late filing.24
Subsequently, the respondent moved for pre-trial.25 Tala Realty opposed the motion
and filed again a motion to suspend proceedings, 26 citing the pendency with this
Court of G.R. No. 132703,27 a petition for certiorari that assailed the CAs
affirmance28 of the dismissal order of the Iloilo City RTC (Branch 28) in Civil Case
No. 22493.29
The petitioner filed her separate opposition to the respondents motion for pre-trial
and a motion to hold proceedings in abeyance, stating that after the dismissal of
G.R. No. 127611, two other similar petitions have been elevated to this Court: (1)
G.R. No. 130184,30 involving the CAs reversal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-
95-24830 in the Quezon City RTC (Branch 91), and (2) G.R. No. 132703.31
The Malabon RTC granted the motion, and again ordered to hold proceedings in
abeyance.32 Six years later, the Malabon RTC directed the parties counsels to inform
it of the status of the pending cases.33
In her compliance,34 the petitioner summarized this Courts rulings in the
consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130184 and 139166,35 and in G.R. No.
132703,36 and reported on the other cases involving the same parties decided by
this Court, such as G.R. Nos.
129887,37 137980,38 132051,39 137533,40 143263,41 and 142672,42 as well as the
other related cases decided by this Court, i.e., G.R. Nos.
144700,43 147997,44 167255,45 and 144705.46
On the other hand, the respondent filed its compliance with motion to revive
proceedings,47 citing the Courts consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130184 and
139166,48 and the decisions in G.R. Nos. 144700,49 167255,50and
144705,51 commonly holding that there existed no forum shopping, litis pendentia
and res judicata among the respondents reconveyance cases pending in the other
courts of justice.
In her comment to the respondents motion to revive proceedings, 52 the petitioner
argued that the proceedings should not be revived since all the reconveyance cases
are grounded on the same theory of implied trust which this Court in G.R. No.
13753353 found void for being illegal as it was a scheme to circumvent the 50%
limitation on real estate holdings under the General Banking Act.
Tala Realty, on the other hand, pointed out that it was the courts prerogative to
suspend or not its proceedings pending the resolution of issues by another court, in
order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations. 54
THE RTC RULING
In its May 6, 2008 order, the RTC granted the respondents motion to revive
proceedings, noting that res judicata is not applicable since there are independent
causes of action for each of the properties sought to be recovered. 55
When the RTC denied56 the petitioners motion for reconsideration,57 she elevated
her case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, assailing the RTC orders. 58
THE CA RULING
In its March 31, 2009 decision, the CA affirmed the RTCs orders.59 It noted that res
judicata does not apply since the issue of validity or enforceability of the trust
agreement was raised in an ejectment case, not an action involving title or
ownership, citing the Courts pronouncement in G.R. No. 144705 60 that G.R. No.
13753361 does not put to rest all pending litigations involving the issues of
ownership between the parties since it involved only an issue of de facto possession.
When the CA denied62 her motion for reconsideration,63 the petitioner filed the
present petition.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to apply G.R. No. 137533 under
the principle of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment and stare decisis, and
ignoring the November 26, 2007 minute resolution in G.R. No. 177865 64 and the
April 7, 2009 consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201,
and 16660865 that reiterated the Courts pronouncement in G.R. No. 137533.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the petitioner is estopped from amending the issues
since she never raised the pendency of the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130088,
131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 in her CA petition, which was based only on
the Courts rulings in G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. No. 177865.
THE ISSUE
The core issues boil down to whether the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 137533 applies
as stare decisis to the present case.
OUR RULING
We grant the petition.
The case at bar presents the same issue that the Court already resolved on April 7,
2009 in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, wherein we
applied the Courts November 22, 2002 decision in G.R. No. 137533, one of several
ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against the respondent arising from the same
trust agreement in the reconveyance case subject of the present petition, that the
trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced. We quoted therein the Courts
ruling in G.R. No. 137533, thus:
The Bank alleges that the sale and twenty-year lease of the disputed property were
part of a larger implied trust "warehousing agreement." Concomitant with this
Court's factual finding that the 20-year contract governs the relations between the
parties, we find the Bank's allegation of circumstances surrounding its execution
worthy of credence; the Bank and Tala entered into contracts of sale and lease back
of the disputed property and created an implied trust "warehousing agreement" for
the reconveyance of the property. In the eyes of the law, however, this implied trust
is inexistent and void for being contrary to law.66
An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as this
Court has held that "where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who
is guilty of the fraud."67
x x x [T]he bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged
implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the
Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its
expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in
Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections
25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had already reached x x x .
Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under
the General Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a
scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement
in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of
the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same transfer
price". This agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to
law. Thus, while we find the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and
binding upon the parties, we cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the
parties intended to create it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case, "the
courts will not assist the payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a
resultant trust for him in accordance with the 'clean hands' doctrine." The Bank
cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust
relationship with Tala.68(italics supplied.)
The Bank and Tala are in pari delicto, thus, no affirmative relief should be
given to one against the other.1wphi1 The Bank should not be allowed to
dispute the sale of its lands to Tala nor should Tala be allowed to further collect rent
from the Bank. The clean hands doctrine will not allow the creation or the use of a
juridical relation such as a trust to subvert, directly or indirectly, the law. Neither
the Bank nor Tala came to court with clean hands; neither will obtain relief
from the court as the one who seeks equity and justice must come to court
DECISION
with clean hands.69 (emphases ours; citation omitted)

G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and
NACHURA, J.:
166608, is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "to adhere to precedents, and
not to unsettle things which are established."70 Under the doctrine, when this Court Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the November
has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are 17, 2003 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13,
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed
same.71 The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule
involved and not upon the judgment, which results therefrom. In this particular decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
sense, stare decisis differs from res judicata, which is based upon the judgment. 72 Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 4
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial The facts follow.
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen)
the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by
the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. 5 They fell in love,
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful pregnant with their first child.
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, At first, they resided at Benjamin's family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When
the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same their second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen's family home in
[issue].73 (italics supplied)
Cebu City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board
It bears stressing that the basic facts of the present case and those of G.R. No. examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a
137533 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 are the same.
Clearly, in light of G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin
and 166608, which the Court follows as precedents, the present action for completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began
reconveyance cannot prosper. It is the Court's duty to apply the previous rulings in
working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen's family, as member of its active
G.R. No. 137533 and in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 to
the present case. Once a case has been decided one way, any other case staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital's Treasurer.11
involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present case, should be
decided in the same manner.74
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975;
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107104 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2506-MN before Branch 170 of the Regional Trial Court of Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie
Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby DISMISSED. Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and

[G.R. NO. 166562 : March 31, 2009] while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent. based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, 1. Benjamin's alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
however, only became manifest thereafter.13
profession;

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware
that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. 14 But after 2. Benjamin's violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at
about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He 3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary

would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to
sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the
pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and cralawlibrary

gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin's job as

anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the
4. Benjamin's irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to
call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some
surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner give regular financial support to his family.24

to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter's drinking
problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same. 16 In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained
that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for

to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when

their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family

drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his

rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19 professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling. 20 He would gamble financial support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at

two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things. 27 He

sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife's also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children,

own jewelry to finance his gambling. There was also an instance when the spouses
21 while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28

had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his
father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going During the trial, Carmen's testimony regarding Benjamin's drinking and gambling

to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as

act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the nanny to the spouses' children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she

gambling establishments.23 personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of
their children.30
In sum, Carmen's allegations of Benjamin's psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations: Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oate's
evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during Benjamin's deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an
anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamin's compulsive drinking,
compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that
petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32
To refute Dr. Oate's opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto
Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness. Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin's
33
psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the
psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the
University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra's) interview with Benjamin's
brothers. Contrary to Dr. Oate's findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is
34
nothing wrong with petitioner's personality, considering the latter's good relationship
with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist. 35
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision 36 declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr.
Oate's findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his
deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an
excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular
activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits
find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art.
36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxx
SO ORDERED.37
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision38reversing the trial court's ruling. It faulted the trial court's finding, stating
that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oate's
conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact, 39 contrary to the
guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina
guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was
promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed
her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to
apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially,
the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining
compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of
merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari 43
with this Court. In a
Resolution dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the
44
CA to resolve Carmen's motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to
reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court's decision. 47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was
denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code has been liberalized; and cralawlibrary
III. Whether the CA's decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would
allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep
respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the
flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme
We find merit in the petition.
Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the
a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal
closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. 51
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English
stone in our Constitution.
courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief
Justice) Reynato S. Puno's discussion on the historical development of this legal
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis -
principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections 52 is
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis
enlightening:
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and
more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still
observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to
holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a
abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation." As the
universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible.
rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be
Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the
followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority
discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once
developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the
decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate
"actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
used to reach the decision."
about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been

U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal

necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial

stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for

repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1)
it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows
for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule
where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves
the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and,
(4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect
stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare
decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these
reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's
"separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law
requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S.
Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus,
by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the
colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court
has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to
promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we
reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first
ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts
are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings.
These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in
fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of
the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged
test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles
of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be
seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.53
To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in
Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the
principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but
was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases,
we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a
part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of
this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar
rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te, 56 we declared that, in
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said
that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be
bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as
well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as
on "all fours" with another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root
cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity.
However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat
such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other
given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced
in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each
case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an
accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the
parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that
there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina
Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by
the court during the pre-trial conference. 60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and
incurability of a party's alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion
should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether
to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by
respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge
the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered
from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18)
years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's and the appellate court's rulings
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 61 The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is
about to assume.62 rbl r l l lbrr
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner's "defects" were present at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble
with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-
existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence
adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in
determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void.
Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts
strengthened respondent's allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts
provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified
that petitioner's behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,63 while Dr.
Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner's personality. Moreover,
there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra's opinion because, aside from
analyzing the transcript of Benjamin's deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr.
Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by
another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as
his (Dr. Obra's) personal interview with Benjamin's brothers. Logically, therefore,
64
the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra's findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner's drinking and gambling
problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to
justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and
fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately,
this court finds respondent's testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented
by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit
pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage.Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In this case, the presumption has
65
not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 147097 : June 5, 2009]
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and
ANGELITO A. PELAYO, Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as
OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP)
Resolution1 dated September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal
cases filed against herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging
herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and
(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman
Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar
year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded
from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the
disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18)
checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of
petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was
allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution 2 dated May 29, 2000
recommending the filing against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said
Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28)
Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against
herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the
cases against petitioners.
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution 3 dated
September 18, 2000. It recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners
for lack or insufficiency of evidence.
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review
the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum4 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA
recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to
proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the
Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP
Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of
the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
continuation of criminal proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Petitioners allege that:
I.
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
II.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.5
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no
authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners
because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is
clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of
proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute.
They point out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the
OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a
separate and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude
that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity,
the Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the OSP. Thus,
petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made
the OSP an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck
down for being unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the
checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the
advances he made from his personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the
immediate implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo
victims.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long
been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no
constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770
violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 inAcop v.
Office of the Ombudsman.6
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides
that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such other functions or duties as may be
provided by law." Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman
was indeed present, the Commission [referring to the Constitutional Commission of
1986] did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through statute,
prescribe such other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As
finally approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is now
embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of
the Constitution, which provides:
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
 xxx MR. COLAYCO:

Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
may be provided by law.

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and MR. RODRIGO:

duties to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during

interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo: So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.

xxx MR. COLAYCO:

MR. RODRIGO: That is correct.

Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the MR. RODRIGO:

Ombudsman is: "to exercise such powers or perform such functions or duties as
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed
may be provided by law." So, the legislature may vest him with powers taken away
by the Ombudsman are "such functions or duties as may be provided by law." The
from the Tanodbayan, may it not? cralawred

sponsors admitted that the legislature later on might remove some powers from the

MR. COLAYCO: Tanodbayan and transfer these to the Ombudsman.

Yes. MR. COLAYCO:

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, that is correct.

Yes. xxx

xxx MR. RODRIGO:

MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body

which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue to function and might be raising the hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.
exercise its powers as provided by law."

MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner. The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x

x x x
MR. RODRIGO:

x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan,

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to
implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature? function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law,
except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this

xxx Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers
under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that
Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):
P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the
Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
xxx

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say
mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman
that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying
may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided
that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by law in
by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the
accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not
Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress
think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at
may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and
some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such
Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective.
other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This
rbl r l l lbrr

Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.8

This is not foreclosed.

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible
recently, inOffice of the Ombudsman v. Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio
disability.7
decidendi on its ruling in Acop andCamanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under
and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No.
the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was
6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and
explained, thus:
Deputy Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special
Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
Prosecutor as among the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of
Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the
R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of
power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated
the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.
to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was
not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or
placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set
aside. Again, this contention deserves scant consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not
to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires
courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the
Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed
in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.14 rbl r l l lbrr
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington
Steel Corporation,15 the Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing
doctrine, stating that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary
judicial practicethatwhen a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to
a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
in which the facts are substantially the same.Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means
that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice
that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to
be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt
to relitigate the same issue.16
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled
that "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling
reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from
this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the
stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished." 17Verily, only upon showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by
our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in
setting aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince
the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They
have not successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of
discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the
power of control and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any
resolution issued by the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's disapproval of
the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is based on
misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and conjectures. The question is
really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to
support a finding of probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of
judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been emphasized in First
Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,18 to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond
the ambit of appeal. Incertiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as
far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness
of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of
evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
bycertiorari . An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is
imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that said public official acted with grave
abuse of discretion. InPresidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto,22 the Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have

of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as

is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari .Certiorari will not be to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty

issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. x x x23

the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a

evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the manner described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with

findings of fact of the court a quo.19 R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of control and supervision over the
OSP when it disapproved the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.

Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable
cause would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the

which the Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have been included as a

Petition for Certiorari should not be given due course. respondent in this petition.

Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No

Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, imparting the value of the Ombudsman's

20 costs.

independence, stating thus:

SO ORDERED.

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and
prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the
consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings
are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the
people and preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in
exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three branches
of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any
outside pressure and improper influence.21

vi. THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH
G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING &
WIRES, INC., and DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF
MANILA, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12,
1985 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting
private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance
of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by
petitioner. The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending
appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In the Resolution of
September 25, 1985 2 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due
course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the order complaint of.
The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit,
private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian
Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. 3 The latter in turn
posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 4 thru petitioner Philippine
British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.
On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Varian
Industrial Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:
1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with 12%
interest per annum from the date of default until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages;
3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and for
attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin
then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in
respondent Court. Varian was required to file its comment but none was filed. In the
Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent Court ordered the execution pending appeal
as prayed for. 6 However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian
failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. In a
Petition dated August 13, 1985 filed with respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the
surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond. 7 In compliance
with the Resolution of August 23, 1985 of the respondent Court herein petitioner
filed its comment. 8 In the Resolution of September 12, 1985, 9 the respondent
Court granted the petition. Hence this action.
It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for
reconsideration of the questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a
general rule a motion for reconsideration has been considered a condition sine qua
non for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply when special
circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10 It has been held further
that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where
execution had been ordered and the need for relief was extremely urgent. 11
The counterbond provides:
WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment was
issued against abovenamed Defendant;
WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order of
attachment issued against them in the above-en-titled case, have offered to file a
counterbond in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY
(P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as provided for in Section 5, Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal and the
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, as Surety, in
consideration of the above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order of
attachment, hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the above
Plaintiff in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY
(P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the condition that in case the Plaintiff
recovers judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver the
attached property so released to the Officer of the Court and the same shall be
applied to the payment of the judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant and
Surety will, on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of the property released.
EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984. 12
Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:
SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. The officer executing the order shall
without delay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the
properties of the party against whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt
from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's
demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court
from which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in
an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an amount equal to
the value of the property which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the
applicant of any judgement ment which he may recover in the action. The officer
shall also forthwith serve a copy of the applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the
order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found within the province.
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At any time after an
order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached,
or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant,
apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the
action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the
security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment
if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is
filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the
application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as
determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching
creditor may recover in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy
thereof shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the
discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the
property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the
party making the deposit or giving the counterbond aforesaid standing in place of
the property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be,
or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional
counterbond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.
SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the
execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any
counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of
the judgment shall become charged on such counter- bond, and bound to pay to
the judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment, which
amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary
hearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the
counterbond is intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the
attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it
provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is
only then that "payment of thejudgment shall become charged on such
counterbond."
The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57
of the Rules of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is
deemed reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also
stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the judgment."
Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its application to a
final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment
of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion
is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned
unsatisfied maybe charged against such a counterbond.
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule,
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a
statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The
rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and
one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the
application of a statute where none is indicated.16 For courts are not authorized to
distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the
law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences. 17
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling
reason apparent in the law to justify it.18 Thus where a statute grants a person
against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an
action for unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all
kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or mineral.19 Since the law in this
case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it
speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should
be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but
also a judgment pending appeal.
All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as
outlined in the case of Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart, 20
Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety
on the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against the
principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in
part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of
the judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary hearing on
the same action as to his liability for the judgment under his counterbond.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers
not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment
pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining
order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as
AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations
and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from abroad various
materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate
precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and
flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these
materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special
excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation
and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended,
commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for
refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of
P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601,
which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines
of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making
application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules
and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." After the
applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of the Exchange Tax
Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner that of the
total sum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13
representing the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import
irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been
approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its
claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the
Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors
are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958
affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term
"stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only
to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not
satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for
review.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by
petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from
the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No.
601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof, which reads as follows:
SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for
the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation
into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya
beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin
concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary
readers approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or private
educational institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in the
publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper, book
cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers (approved by
the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contracts perfected
before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of
Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory
reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for
compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this
Act, in quantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by
the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix;
and such other drugs and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health
from time to time to promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines
shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory
proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated
pursuant to section seven thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in
the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or
manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of
statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with
the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which
indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford,
1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases
where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall
under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and
flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food
products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not
belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall
under the category of food or food products because they are used in the farming
and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a
medicine than food or food product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins are among those
enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to the law.
It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those listed preceding
the term in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those
for breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814
amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch",
which does not always refer to food for human consumption, was added among the
items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the
articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors"
as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those
used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the
principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law
does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company
vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law
does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food
and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not
authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general
sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and
limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require
the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in
ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with
other rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of
Laws by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)

Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the other
questions raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby
ordered to audit petitioners applications for refund which were approved by the
Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount of
P23,958.13.

vii. THE LAW DOES NOT EXCEPT
[G.R. No. 87416. April 8, 1991.]
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and
ROBERTO Z. LORAYES,Respondents.
San Jose, Enriquez, Lacas, Santos & Borje for Petitioner.
Eduardo R. Robles for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; DEFINED. Jurisdiction is the power with which
courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases
(Velunta v. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).
2. ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION. Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of
the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendant, or over the
issues framed in the pleadings (Balais, v. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
3. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, HOW DETERMINED.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time
of commencement of the action (De la Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
4. ID.; ID.; DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION.
Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information." (Lim v.
Rodrigo; 167 SCRA 487 [1988]).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The information under consideration specifically
alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the
same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the
accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a
criminal action (Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
6. ID.; PLACE OF ISSUANCE OF CHECK, VENUE OF VIOLATION OF BOUNCING
CHECK LAW. The determinative factor in determining venue is the place of the
issuance of the check. (People v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988])
7. ID.; ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22; VENUE DETERMINED BY PLACE OF
DELIVERY. On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the
Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People v. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid
down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15,
1981 that" (1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed
and delivered; (2) the place where the check was written, signed or dated does not
necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is
the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. v. Manuel Chua, October
28, 1980)." (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero,
Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14).
8. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT
DISTINGUISHED, WE SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH. It will be noted that the law
does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly
ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988: "Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg.
22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines
though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law." It is a
cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish
courts should not distinguish.
9. ID.; WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY EXCEPTION, COURTS MAY NOT
EXCEPT. Where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co.,
Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).
10. ID.; COURTS MAY AVAIL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES OF DOUBTFUL MEANING. Courts may avail
themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining
the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil.
125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means,
the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on
the bill may be adopted (Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision **
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071
entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa v. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes",
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therein.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
"On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or
draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a
Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to
herein complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00,
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or
credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment
which check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason INSUFFICIENT FUNDS
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said
ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
"After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination,
petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a)
Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and b) That no
offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the
obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to
Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
"On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Accuseds motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit.
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made
payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof,
are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
against current accounts in foreign currency.
"Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by
respondent court in its order dated September 6, 1988, and which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Accuseds motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was opposed by
the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.
The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in
foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p.
1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerreros The
Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5)." (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision,
pp. 20-22)
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders
dated July 19, 1988 and September 6, 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court
of Appeals wherein he contended: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of
petitioner with a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or
with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollar
accounts;
"(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private
transaction between petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not be
legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and
"(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and
void and is not enforceable within the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit.
Upon such premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned check
cannot be said to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22." (Rollo,
Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion
of which reads: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5).
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on
February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has
jurisdiction over the case in question.
The petition is without merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice,
that is, for hearing and deciding cases (Velunta v. Philippine Constabulary, 157
SCRA 147 [1988]).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject
matter, over the person of the defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings
(Balais, v. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time
of commencement of the action (De la Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
The trial courts jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be
questioned.
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some
of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.

"Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place." cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of
Lim v. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction
or venue is determined by the allegations in the information." cralaw virtua1aw library
The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was
committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the
filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action
(Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA
160 [1987] cited in the case of People v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that the
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the
check." cralaw virtua1aw library
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of
Justice, citing the case of People v. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the
following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the
pertinent portion of which reads: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and
delivered; (2) the place where the check was written, signed or dated does not
necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is
the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. v. Manuel Chua, October
28, 1980)." (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero,
Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14).
It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the
petitioner to herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar
account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the
case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are
within the coverage of said law." cralaw virtua1aw library
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the
law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 150
SCRA 520 [1987]).
More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the
actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction
of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]).
Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning
put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may
be adopted (Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The
discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view, as
follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.
"MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry. Mr. Speaker.

"THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.

"MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who
interpellated that any check may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are
talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks in our
currency, and many others.

"THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.

"MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a
check in whatever currency. This would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks.
The check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If
drawn, then this bill will apply.

"MR. TUPAY. So, it include U.S. dollar checks.

"MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker." cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied, for emphasis).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 9102-RU-008, Re: Petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/ or Revoke the Charter
Affiliation of the Union, and MED-ARB ROX Case No. R1000-9104-RU-012, for
Cancellation of Registration Certificate No. 11492-LC in favor of the Union. chanroble svirtualawlibrary

G.R. No. 96663

The facts that matter can be culled as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sometime in June 1990, the Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed

a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc. (PEPSI).
viii. DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

On July 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit statement
THIRD DIVISION
that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (federation)
together with two (2) rank and file unions, Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-
[G.R. No. 96663. August 10, 1999.]
Cola Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP). chanroble svirtuallawlibrary:red

PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. HONORABLE

On July 23, 1990, PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set
SECRETARY OF LABOR, MED-ARBITER NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO & PEPSI-
Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEU-
COLA SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION - UOEF, Respondents.
UOEF and docketed as Case No. 725-90, on the grounds that (a) the members of
the Union were managers and (b) a supervisors union can not affiliate with a
[G.R. No. 103300. August 10, 1999.]
federation whose members include the rank and file union of the same company.

PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE

On August 29,1990, PEPSI presented a motion to re-open the case since it was not
SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND HON. CELENIO N. DAING, in his
furnished with a copy of the Petition for Certification Election.
capacity as Med-Arbiter Labor Regional Office No. X, Cagayan de Oro City,
CAGAYAN DE ORO PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORS UNION (UOEF), Respondents.
On September 4, 1990, PEPSI submitted its position paper to the BLR in Case No.
725-90.
DECISION

On September 21, 1990, PEPSI received summons to appear at the pre-trial

PURISIMA, J.: conference set on September 25, 1990 but which the hearing officer rescheduled on
October 21, 1990. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

These are petitions for certiorari relating to three (3) cases filed with the Med-
On October 12, 1990, PEPSI filed a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal
Arbiter, to wit: MED ARB ROX Case No. R100-9101-RU-002 for Certification Election
with the Secretary of Labor, questioning the setting of the certification election on
filed by Pepsi Cola Supervisors Union-UOEF (Union), MED ARB Case No. R1000-
the said date and five (5) days after. It also presented an urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Suspend the Certification Election, which motion was granted on October 18, 1990.
On November 12, 1990, the Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and Motion for
Reconsideration. Even as the Petition to Cancel, Revoke and Suspend Union Charter
Certificate was pending before the BLR, PEPSI found its way to this Court via the
present petition for certiorari.
On February 6, 1991, the Court granted the prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction.
The pivot of inquiry here is: whether or not a supervisors union can affiliate with
the same Federation of which two (2) rank and file unions are likewise members,
without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended, by Republic
Act 6715, which provides: chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad
"ARTICLE 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible
for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own."
In its Comment dated March 19, 1991, the Federation argued that:
"The pertinent portion of Article 245 of the Labor Code states that. "Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank
and file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organization of their
own." cralaw virtua1aw library
This provision of law does not prohibit a local union composed of supervisory
employees from being affiliated to a federation which has local unions with rank-
and-file members as affiliates. chanroble s virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x x
. . . the Petition to Cancel, Revoke or Set Aside the Charter Certificate of the private
respondent is anchored on the alleged ground that certain managerial employees
are included as members thereof. The grounds for the cancellation of the
registration certificate of a labor organization are provided in Section 7 of Rule II,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, and the inclusion of
managerial employees is not one of the grounds. . . . (in this case, the private
respondent herein) remains to be a legitimate labor organization." 1
On April 8, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, sent in a Comment, alleging inter alia, that: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
". . . under Article 259 of the New Labor Code, only orders of the Med-Arbiter can be
appealed through the Secretary of Labor and only on the ground that the rules and
regulations for the conduct of the certification election have been violated. The
Order of the Representation Officer is "interlocutory" and not appealable. . . .
. . . until and unless there is a final order cancelling its certificate of registration or
charter certificate, a labor organization remains to be a legitimate labor organization
entitled to exercise all the rights and duties accorded to it by the Labor Code
including the right to be certified as a bargaining representative. . . . chanroble s virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
cralaw virtua1aw library
. . . Public respondent cannot be deemed to have committed grave abuse of
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph discretion with respect to an issue that was never presented before it for
resolution. . . .
Article 245 of the New Labor Code does not preclude the supervisors union and the
rank-and-file union from being affiliated with the same federation.
x x x
A federation of local union is not the labor organization referred to in Article 245 but
only becomes entitled to all the rights enjoyed by the labor organization (at the
x company level) when it has complied with the registration requirements found in
Articles 234 and 237. Hence, what is prohibited by Article 245 is membership of
supervisory employees in a labor union (at the company level) of the rank and file. .
..
. . . In other words, the affiliation of the supervisory employees union with the
same federation with which the rank and file employees union is affiliated did not
make the supervisory employees members of the rank and file employees union
and vice versa." 2 . . .
PEPSI, in its Reply dated May 7, 1991, asserted: chanrobles law library : red
"It is our humble contention that a final determination of the Petition to Set-Aside,
Cancel, Revoke Charter Union Affiliation should first be disposed of before granting
the Petition for the Conduct of Certification Election. To allow the conduct of the
certification election to proceed would make any decision arrived at by the Bureau
of Labor Relations useless inasmuch as the same would necessarily be rendered
moot and academic." 3
On June 7, 1991, petitioner again filed a Supplemental Reply stressing:
"It is likewise stressed that officials of both the PCLU and PEUP are top ranking
officers of UOEF, the federation of supervisors union, to wit:
POSITION IN RANK AND FILE UNION POSITION IN FEDERATION
1. Rogelio de la Cruz PCLU-President General Vice President
2. Felix Gatela PEUP-President General Treasurer
3. Carlito Epino PCLU Board Member Educational Research Director
x x x
The respondent supervisory union could do indirectly what it could not do directly as
the simple expedient of affiliating with UOEF would negate the manifest intent and
letter of the law that supervisory employees can only "join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own" and cannot "be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank and file employees." 4 chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On August 6, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment filed a Rejoinder,
claiming thus: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
". . . an employer has no legal standing to question the validity of a certification
election.
. . . For this reason, the Supreme Court has consistently held that, as a rule, a
certification election is the sole and exclusive concern of the employees and that the
employer is definitely an intruder or a mere bystander (Consolidated Farms v.
Noriel, L-47752, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corporation v. Ople, L-
43861, September 4, 1981, 107 SCRA 211; Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano No. L-61153, January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64).
x x x
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
In Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. CIR No. L-35120, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 268,
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the Supreme Court (then dealing with the interpretation of Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act, from which Section 245 of the Labor Code was derived)
grappled with the issue in the case at bar. It held that,
There is nothing in the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act which provides that a
duly registered local union affiliating with a national union or federation loses its
legal personality, or its independence. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
x x x
However, there is absolutely nothing in the Labor Code that prohibits a federation
from representing or exercising influence over its affiliates. On the contrary, this is
precisely the reason why federations are formed and are allowed by law to exist." 5
On November 8, 1991, the Union also filed a Rejoinder.
On December 9, 1991, the Court resolved to DISMISS the case for "failure to
sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion." cralaw virtua1aw library The supervisory employees of the Union are: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In a Resolution dated March 2, 1992, the Second Division of the Court resolved to POSITION
grant the motion for reconsideration interposed on January 28, 1992.
1. Felipe Valdehueza Route Manager
G.R. No. 103300
2. Gerberto Vertudazo C & C Manager
What are assailed in this case is Med-Arbiter Order dated May 23, 1991 and the
Decision and Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, dated October 4, 3. Paul Mendoza Sales Service Department Manager
1991 and December 12, 1991, respectively. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:re d

4. Gilberto Emano, Jr. Route Manager

The decretal portion of the Med-Arbiter Order under attack, reads: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

5. Jaime Huliganga Chief Checker

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, an order is hereby issued: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

6. Elias Edgama, Sr. Accounting Manager

1. Dismissing MED ARB ROX CASE NO. R1000-919104-RU-012 and R1000-9102-
RU-008 for lack of merit; and 7. Romanico Ramos Route Manager

2. Ordering the conduct of a Certification Election to be participated by and among 8. Raul Yacapin Route Manager
the supervisory workers of the respondent company, Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. at its plant at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City, including all the satellite 9. Jovenal Albaque Route Manager
warehouse within the territorial coverage and control of the Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-
Cola Plant. The choices are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 10. Fulvio Narciso Route Manager

1. Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Supervisors Union (U.O.E.P.) 11. Apolinario Opiniano Route Manager

2. No union 12. Alfredo Panas Route Manager

The parties are directed to attend a pre-election conference on June 10, 1991, 2:30 13. Simplicio Nelie Route Manager
p.m. at the Regional Office to determine the qualification of the voters and to thresh
out the mechanics of the election. Respondent/employer is directed to submit five 14. Arthur Rodriguez Route Manager
(5) copies of the names of the rank and file workers taken from the payroll on
October 1-31, 1991, alphabetically arranged (sic) indicating their names and 15. Marco Ilano Warehouse Operations Manager and
positions and dates of employment and to bring the aforementioned payroll during
the pre-election conference for verification purposes." 6 . . . chanrobles.com .ph : virtual law library 16. Deodoro Ramos Maintenance Manager

On June 6, 1991, PEPSI appealed the said Order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, docketed as Case No. OS-
A-232-91.
On October 4, 1991, the Secretary modified the appealed decision, ruling thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 23 May 1991 is hereby modified
to the effect that MED ARB ROX Case No. R1000-9104-RU-012 and R1000-9102-
RU-008 are hereby referred to the Office of the Regional Director which has
jurisdiction over these cases. The call for certification election among the
supervisory workers of the Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. at its plant at Tin-
ao, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby sustained." 7 chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On October 19, 1991, PEPSI presented a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Order but the same was denied on December 12, 1991.
Meanwhile, the BLR issued Registration Certificate No. 11492-LC in favor of the
Union. Dissatisfied therewith, PEPSI brought the instant petition for certiorari,
contending that: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS ARE NOT MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEES;
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS PROHIBITED FROM AFFILIATING ITSELF WITH A
FEDERATION ALREADY AFFILIATED WITH THE RANK AND FILE UNION;
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE OF (SIC) ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE INSTITUTION OF A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION
REGISTRATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO A PETITION
CERTIFICATION ELECTION." 8
The petitions must fail for want of merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that on September 1, 1992, there was a
Resolution of the Union withdrawing from the Federation, to wit: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, that this UNION WITHDRAW, as it
hereby WITHDRAWS its affiliation from the Union de Obreros Estivadores de
Filipinas, and at the same time, give our thanks to the said federation for its help
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph and guidance rendered to this Union in the past." 9 chanrobles.com .ph : virtual law library
The issue in G.R. No. 96663, whether or not the supervisors union can be affiliated
with a Federation with two (2) rank and file unions directly under the supervision of
the former, has thus become moot and academic in view of the Unions withdrawal
from the federation.
In a long line of cases (Narciso Nakpil, et. al., v. Hon. Crisanto Aragon, et. al., G. R.
No. L - 24087, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 85; Toribio v. Bidin, et. al., G.R. No. L-
37960, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 361; Gumaua v. Espino, G.R. No. L- 36188 -
37586 February 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 402), the Court dismissed the petition for being
moot and academic. In the case of F . C. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship Co., March 31,
1915, the Court held: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"It is unnecessary, however to indulge in academic discussion of a moot question. . .
.
. . . The action would have been dismissed at any time on a showing of the facts as
they were . The question left for the court was a moot one. Its Resolution would
have been useless. Its judgment would have been impossible of execution . . ." chanroble svirtual|awlibrary
chanroble svirtualawlibrary However, in the case of University of San Agustin, Inc., Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals,
Et Al., the court resolved the case, ruling that "even if a case were moot and
academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of
dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly
situated. . . ." 10
In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, 205 SCRA 12, [1992] decided by
the Third Division with J. Gutierrez, Jr., as ponente and JJ. Feliciano, Bidin, Romero
and now Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as members it was ratiocinated: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"x x x
Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge
with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors labor organization would represent
conflicting interests, then a local supervisors union should not be allowed to affiliate
with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that
federation actively participates in union activity in the company.
x x
The prohibition against a supervisors union joining a local union of rank and file is
replete with jurisprudence. The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined
to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition
extends to a supervisors local union applying for membership in a national
federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file employees.
The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors
will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own
bargaining unit." cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent the issue of whether or not the Petition to cancel/revoke registration is a
prejudicial question to the petition for certification election, the following ruling in
the case of Association of the Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) v. Hon. Pura
Ferrer-Calleja, in her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations et. al., 203
SCRA 597, 598, [1991], is in point, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . It is a well-settled rule that "a certification proceedings is not a litigation in the
sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-
adversarial and fact finding character." (Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-
Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v.
NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 [1990]. Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if
the decision to grant it proceeds from an examination of the sufficiency of the
petition as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in the position papers
and other documents. chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad
"At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public
respondent that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the
pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the
respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union
filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order
directing the cancellation.
chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanroble s.com :chanrobles.com .ph x x x"
x As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees can join the labor
union of the rank and file, what was held in the case of National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU)-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Hon. R. D. Torres, et.
al., G.R. No. 93468, December 29, 1994, applies to this case. Citing Bulletin
Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, 144 SCRA 628, 635, Golden Farms v. NLRC, 175
SCRA 471, and Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Hon. Nieves
Roldan-Confessor Et. Al., G.R. No. 110854, February 14, 1995, the Court ruled: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
". . . A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters,
or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property.
While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to
join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary
implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed, as elucidated in several case; the latest of which is Chua v. Civil Service
Commission where we said: chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is
thought, at the time of the enactment, to be an all embracing legislation maybe
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the
law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used
to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication . . ., Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences
as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis . . .
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the
rationale behind the disqualification of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin
Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, thus." . . if these managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their
loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership." Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well protected. The employer is
not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members.
Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the same
reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as
included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of
confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential employees could
unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be
governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover,
unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would
mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in
the interest of" the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective
bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty bound to
protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-
Calleja reiterated in Philips Industrial Development, Inc., NLRC, that "confidential
employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having
access to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage.
Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining
agreement."
chanrobles.com :cralaw:re d
The Court finds merit in the submission of the OSG that Route Managers, Chief
Checkers and Warehouse Operations Managers are supervisors while Credit &
Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees.
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject
employees. A careful scrutiny of their job description indicates that they dont lay
down company policies. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies
since they have to report to their respective superior. The mere fact that an
employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise,
there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be
deprived of the right to be a member of a union. In the case of National Steel
Corporation v. Laguesma, G. R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996, it was stressed
that:jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"What is essential is the nature of the employees function and not the
nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the employee has
rank and file or managerial status, or whether he is a supervisory employee." cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the petitions under consideration are DISMISSED but subject
Decision, dated October 4, 1991, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is
MODIFIED in that Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are
highly confidential employees not eligible for membership in a supervisors union.
No pronouncement as to costs. chanroble svirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), Petitioner, v. UNITED PLANNERS CONSULTANTS, INC.
(UPCI), Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated March 26,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 126458 which dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (petitioner). chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
On July 26, 1993, petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau (LMB), entered
into an Agreement for Consultancy Services3 (Consultancy Agreement) with
respondent United Planners Consultants, Inc. (respondent) in connection with the
LMBs Land Resource Management Master Plan Project (LRMMP).4 Under the
Consultancy Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total contract price of
P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined percentage corresponding to the
particular stage of work accomplished.5 In December 1994, respondent completed
the work required, which petitioner formally accepted on December 27,
1994.6 However, petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the total contract price in
the amount of P2,038,456.30. 7
cralawre d
On October 25, 1994, the Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical
Services Office Report8 (TSO) finding the contract price of the Agreement to be
84.14% excessive. This notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10,
9
1998, acknowledged its liability to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and
assured payment at the soonest possible time. 10
cralawre d
For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated
demands, respondent instituted a Complaint 11 against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 222 (RTC), docketed as Case No. Q-07-60321.
Upon motion of respondent, the case was subsequently referred to arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Consultancy Agreement, 13 which petitioner
did not oppose.14 As a result, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Architect Armando N. Alli, and
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) Accredited Arbitrator Engr.
Ricardo B. San Juan were appointed as members of the Arbitral Tribunal. The court-
referred arbitration was then docketed as Arbitration Case No. A-001. 15
cralawre d
During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to adopt the CIAC Revised
Rules Governing Construction Arbitration (CIAC Rules) to govern the arbitration
16
proceedings.17 They further agreed to submit their respective draft decisions in lieu
of memoranda of arguments on or before April 21, 2010, among others.
On the due date for submission of the draft decisions, however, only respondent
complied with the given deadline, while petitioner moved for the deferment of the
19
deadline which it followed with another motion for extension of time, asking that it
be given until May 11, 2010 to submit its draft decision.20 cralawred
In an Order21 dated April 30, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal denied petitioners motions
and deemed its non-submission as a waiver, but declared that it would still consider
petitioners draft decision if submitted before May 7, 2010, or the expected date of
the final awards promulgation.22 Petitioner filed its draft decision23 only on May 7,
2010.
The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award24 dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award) in
favor of respondent, directing petitioner to pay the latter the amount of (a)
P2,285,089.89 representing the unpaid progress billings, with interest at the rate of
12% per annum from the date of finality of the Arbitral Award upon confirmation by
the RTC until fully paid; (b) P2,033,034.59 as accrued interest thereon; (c) ?
500,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P150,000.00 as attorneys fees. 25 It
also ordered petitioner to reimburse respondent its proportionate share in the
arbitration costs as agreed upon in the amount of P182,119.44.26 cralawre d
Unconvinced, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,27 which the Arbitral
Tribunal merely noted without any action, claiming that it had already lost
12
cralawred jurisdiction over the case after it had submitted to the RTC its Report together with
a copy of the Arbitral Award.28cralawre d
Consequently, petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration 29 dated
May 19, 2010(May 19, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration) and a Manifestation
and Motion30 dated June 1, 2010 (June 1, 2010 Manifestation and Motion),
asserting that it was denied the opportunity to be heard when the Arbitral Tribunal
failed to consider its draft decision and merely noted its motion for
reconsideration.31 It also denied receiving a copy of the Arbitral Award by either
electronic or registered mail.32 For its part, respondent filed an opposition thereto
and moved for the confirmation33 of the Arbitral Award in accordance with the
Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules). 34 cralawre d
18
cralawre d
In an Order35 dated March 30, 2011, the RTC merely noted petitioners aforesaid
motions, finding that copies of the Arbitral Award appear to have been sent to the
parties by the Arbitral Tribunal, including the OSG, contrary to petitioners claim. On
the other hand, the RTC confirmed the Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A)36 of
the Special ADR Rules and ordered petitioner to pay respondent the costs of
confirming the award, as prayed for, in the total amount of P50,000.00. From this
order, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration. The CA Ruling

Thus, on June 15, 2011, respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution,
to which no comment/opposition was filed by petitioner despite the RTCs directive
therefor. In an Order dated September 12, 2011, the RTC granted respondents
37
motion.38cralawred
Petitioner moved to quash the writ of execution, positing that respondent was not
39
entitled to its monetary claims. It also claimed that the issuance of said writ was
premature since the RTC should have first resolved its May 19, 2010 Motion for
Reconsideration and June 1, 2010 Manifestation and Motion, and not merely noted
them, thereby violating its right to due process. 40
cralawre d
In a Decision49 dated March 26, 2014, the CA dismissed the certiorari petition on two
(2) grounds, namely: (a) the petition essentially assailed the merits of the
Arbitral Award which is prohibited under Rule 19.750 of the Special ADR
Rules;51 and (b) the petition was filed out of time, having been filed way beyond 15
days from notice of the RTCs July 9, 2012 Order, in violation of Rule 19.28 52 in
relation to Rule 19.853 of said Rules which provide that a special civil action
forcertiorari must be filed before the CA within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside (or until
July 27, 2012).

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The RTC Ruling

The Issue Before the Court
In an Order41 dated July 9, 2012, the RTC denied petitioners motion to quash.
The core issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in applying
It found no merit in petitioners contention that it was denied due process, ruling the provisions of the Special ADR Rules, resulting in the dismissal of petitioners
that its May 19, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading under special civil action for certiorari.
Section 17.2,42 Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules. It explained that the available remedy to
assail an arbitral award was to file a motion for correction of final award pursuant to The Courts Ruling

Section 17.143 of the CIAC Rules, and not a motion for reconsideration of the said
award itself.44 On the other hand, the RTC found petitioners June 1, 2010 The petition lacks merit. chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Manifestation and Motion seeking the resolution of its May 19, 2010 Motion for
I.
Reconsideration to be defective for petitioners failure to observe the three-day
notice rule.45 Having then failed to avail of the remedies attendant to an order of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9285,54 otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution
confirmation, the Arbitral Award had become final and executory.46 cralawred

Act of 2004, institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System

(ADR System)55 in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the
On July 12, 2012, petitioner received the RTCs Order dated July 9, 2012 denying
adoption by the Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy
its motion to quash.47 cralawre d

and efficient means of resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines. 56 cralawre d

Dissatisfied, it filed on September 10, 2012 a petition for certiorari48 before the
Accordingly, A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC was created setting forth the Special Rules of
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 126458, averring in the main that the RTC acted
Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (referred herein as Special ADR Rules) that
with grave abuse of discretion in confirming and ordering the execution of the
shall govern the procedure to be followed by the courts whenever judicial
Arbitral Award. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

intervention is sought in ADR proceedings in the specific cases where it is allowed. 57 cralawre d

Rule 1.1 of the Special ADR Rules lists down the instances when the said rules shall
apply, namely: (a) Relief on the issue of Existence, Validity, or Enforceability of the
Arbitration Agreement; (b)Referral to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR);
(c) Interim Measures of Protection; (d) Appointment of Arbitrator; (e) Challenge to
Appointment of Arbitrator; (f) Termination of Mandate of Arbitrator; (g) Assistance
in Taking Evidence; (h) Confirmation, Correction or Vacation of Award in Domestic
Arbitration; (i) Recognition and Enforcement or Setting Aside of an Award in
International Commercial Arbitration; (j) Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign
Arbitral Award; (k) Confidentiality/Protective Orders; and (l) Deposit and
Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements.58 cralawred
Notably, the Special ADR Rules do not automatically govern the arbitration
proceedings itself. A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of
dispute resolution is that it is a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the
parties to make their own arrangements to resolve their own
disputes.59 Thus, Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR Rules explicitly provides that parties
are free to agree on the procedure to be followed in the conduct of arbitral
proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may conduct arbitration
in the manner it considers appropriate.60
cralawre d
In the case at bar, the Consultancy Agreement contained an arbitration
clause.61 Hence, respondent, after it filed its complaint, moved for its referral to
arbitration62 which was not objected to by petitioner.63 By its referral to arbitration,
the case fell within the coverage of the Special ADR Rules. However, with respect to
the arbitration proceedings itself, the parties had agreed to adopt the CIAC Rules
before the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR Rules.
On May 7, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Arbitral Award in favor of
respondent. Under Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no motion for
reconsideration or new trial may be sought, but any of the parties may file a motion
for correction64 of the final award, which shall interrupt the running of the period for
appeal, based on any of the following grounds, to wit:
65
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
a. an evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or arithmetical
error; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b. an evident mistake in the description of any party, person, date, amount,
thing or property referred to in the award; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
c. where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
d. where the arbitrators have failed or omitted to resolve certain issue/s
formulated by the parties in the Terms of Reference (TOR) and submitted to
them for resolution, and
e. where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy.
The motion shall be acted upon by the Arbitral Tribunal or the surviving/remaining
members.66
cralawla wlibrary
Moreover, the parties may appeal the final award to the CA through a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.67 cralawred
Records do not show that any of the foregoing remedies were availed of by
petitioner. Instead, it filed the May 19, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration of the
Arbitral Award, which was a prohibited pleading under the Section 17.2, 68 Rule 17 of
the CIAC Rules, thus rendering the same final and executory.
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for confirmation proceedings
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Special ADR Rules which requires confirmation by the
court of the final arbitral award. This is consistent with Section 40, Chapter 7 (A) of
RA 9285 which similarly requires a judicial confirmation of a domestic award to
make the same enforceable: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 40. Confirmation of Award. The confirmation of a domestic arbitral award
shall be governed by Section 2369 of R.A. 876.70 cralawred
A domestic arbitral award when confirmed shall be enforced in the same
manner as final and executory decisions of the regional trial court.
 c. Denying the request to refer the dispute to arbitration; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The confirmation of a domestic award shall be made by the regional trial

court in accordance with the Rules of Procedure to be promulgated by the d. Granting or refusing an interim relief; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Supreme Court.
e. Denying a petition for the appointment of an arbitrator; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

A CIAC arbitral award need not be confirmed by the regional trial court to be
executory as provided under E.O. No. 1008. (Emphases supplied) cralawlawlibrary
f. Confirming, vacating or correcting a domestic arbitral award; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

g. Suspending the proceedings to set aside an international commercial

During the confirmation proceedings, petitioners did not oppose the RTCs arbitral award and referring the case back to the arbitral tribunal; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

confirmation by filing a petition to vacate the Arbitral Award under Rule 11.2 (D) 71 of
the Special ADR Rules. Neither did it seek reconsideration of the confirmation order h. Allowing a party to enforce an international commercial arbitral award
in accordance with Rule 19.1 (h) thereof. Instead, petitioner filed only on pending appeal; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

September 10, 2012 a special civil action for certiorari before the CA questioning
the propriety of (a) the RTC Order dated September 12, 2011 granting respondents i. Adjourning or deferring a ruling on whether to set aside, recognize and or
motion for issuance of a writ of execution, and (b) Order dated July 9, 2012 denying enforce an international commercial arbitral award; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

its motion to quash. Under Rule 19.26 of the Special ADR Rules, [w]hen the
Regional Trial Court, in making a ruling under the Special ADR Rules, has acted j. Allowing a party to enforce a foreign arbitral award pending appeal; and
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, k. Denying a petition for assistance in taking evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a party may file a special
civil action for certiorari to annul or set aside a ruling of the Regional Trial Court. cralawla wlibrary

Thus, for failing to avail of the foregoing remedies before resorting to certiorari, the
CA correctly dismissed its petition.
Further, Rule 19.772 of the Special ADR Rules precludes a party to an arbitration from
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

filing a petition for certiorari questioning the merits of an arbitral award.

II.

If so falling under the above-stated enumeration, Rule 19.28 of the Special ADR
Note that the special civil action for certiorari described in Rule 19.26 above may be
Rules provide that said certiorari petition should be filed with the [CA] within fifteen
filed to annul or set aside the following orders of the Regional Trial Court.
(15) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be annulled or
set aside. No extension of time to file the petition shall be allowed.
a. Holding that the arbitration agreement is inexistent, invalid or
unenforceable; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, petitioner asserts that its petition is not covered by the Special ADR
Rules (particularly, Rule 19.28 on the 15-day reglementary period to file a petition
b. Reversing the arbitral tribunals preliminary determination upholding its
for certiorari) but by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (particularly, Section 4 thereof on
jurisdiction; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari), which it claimed to
have suppletory application in arbitration proceedings since the Special ADR Rules
do not explicitly provide for a procedure on execution.
The position is untenable.
Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the
prevailing party.73 cralawre d
While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the
execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Courts considered view that the
Rules procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but
necessarily extend to a confirmed awards execution in light of the doctrine of
necessary implication which states that every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. In Atienza v.
Villarosa,74 the doctrine was explained, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is
thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding of events of the future. So-called gaps in the
law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used
to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that
what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly
and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.75 (Emphases
supplied) cralawlawlibrary
As the Court sees it, execution is but a necessary incident to the Courts
confirmation of an arbitral award. To construe it otherwise would result in an absurd
situation whereby the confirming court previously applying the Special ADR Rules in
its confirmation of the arbitral award would later shift to the regular Rules of
Procedure come execution. Irrefragably, a courts power to confirm a judgment
award under the Special ADR Rules should be deemed to include the power to order
its execution for such is but a collateral and subsidiary consequence that may be
fairly and logically inferred from the statutory grant to regional trial courts of the
power to confirm domestic arbitral awards.
All the more is such interpretation warranted under the principle of ratio legis est
anima which provides that a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent,76 for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its
letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute.77 Accordingly, since the Special ADR Rules are intended to achieve speedy
and efficient resolution of disputes and curb a litigious culture, 78 every interpretation
thereof should be made consistent with these objectives.
Thus, with these principles in mind, the Court so concludes that the Special ADR
Rules, as far as practicable, should be made to apply not only to the proceedings on
confirmation but also to the confirmed awards execution.
Further, let it be clarified that contrary to petitioners stance resort to the Rules
of Court even in a suppletory capacity is not allowed. Rule 22.1 of the Special ADR
Rules explicitly provides that [t]he provisions of the Rules of Court that are
applicable to the proceedings enumerated in Rule 1.1 of these Special ADR Rules
have either been included and incorporated in these Special ADR Rules
or specifically referred to herein.79 Besides, Rule 1.13 thereof provides that [i]n
situations where no specific rule is provided under the Special ADR Rules, the court
shall resolve such matter summarily and be guided by the spirit and intent of the
Special ADR Rules and the ADR Laws.
As above-mentioned, the petition for certiorari permitted under the Special ADR
Rules must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside.80 Hence, since petitioners
filing of its certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 126458 was made nearly two
months after its receipt of the RTCs Order dated July 9, 2012, or on September 10,
2012,81 said petition was clearly dismissible. 82cralawre d
 III.
Discounting the above-discussed procedural considerations, the Court still finds that
the certioraripetition had no merit.
Indeed, petitioner cannot be said to have been denied due process as the records
undeniably show that it was accorded ample opportunity to ventilate its position.
There was clearly nothing out of line when the Arbitral Tribunal denied petitioners
motions for extension to file its submissions having failed to show a valid reason to
justify the same or in rendering the Arbitral Award sans petitioners draft decision
which was filed only on the day of the scheduled promulgation of final award on May
respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable
capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and
claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to
all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as
herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the
government, those funded by donation through the government, those required to
pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a
counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government. (Emphases supplied)
cralawla wlibrary

7, 2010.83 The touchstone of due process is basically the opportunity to be heard.

Having been given such opportunity, petitioner should only blame itself for its own
From the foregoing, the settlement of respondents money claim is still subject to
procedural blunder.
the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite finality of the confirmed arbitral award
by the RTC pursuant to the Special ADR Rules.85 Hence, the respondent has to first
On this score, the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 126458 was likewise
seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim. This appears to have been
properly dismissed. chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

complied with by the latter when it filed a Petition for Enforcement and Payment of
Final and Executory Arbitral Award86 before the COA. Accordingly, it is now the COA
IV.
which has the authority to rule on this latter petition.

Nevertheless, while the Court sanctions the dismissal by the CA of the petition
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 26, 2014 of the
for certiorari due to procedural infirmities, there is a need to explicate the matter of
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126458 which dismissed the petition
execution of the confirmed Arbitral Award against the petitioner, a government
for certiorari filed by petitioner the Department of Environment and Natural
agency, in the light of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 144584 otherwise known as the
Resources is hereby AFFIRMED.
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
Section 26 of PD 1445 expressly provides that execution of money judgment against cralawlawlibrary

the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities is within

the primary jurisdiction of the COA, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

SEC. 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission
shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures,
systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the
preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the
examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to
those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons

ix. CASUS OMISSUS PRO HABENDUS EST
[G.R.No. 170195, March 28 : 2011]
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,
PETITIONER, VS. TERESA G. FAVILA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary under
the Social Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (1) that he/she
is the legitimate spouse; and (2) that he/she is dependent upon the member for
support.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision2 dated May 24, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82763 which reversed and set aside the
Resolution3 dated June 4, 2003 and Order4 dated January 21, 2004 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 8-15348-02. Likewise assailed is the
CA Resolution5 dated October 17, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On August 5, 2002, respondent Teresa G. Favila (Teresa) filed a Petition 6 before
petitioner SSC docketed as SSC Case No. 8-15348-02. She averred therein that
after she was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17, 1970, the latter
designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-l Form he submitted before petitioner
Social Security System (SSS), Quezon City Branch on June 30, 1970. When they
begot their children Jofel, Floresa and Florante II, her husband likewise designated
each one of them as beneficiaries. Teresa further averred that when Florante died
on February 1, 1997, his pension benefits under the SSS were given to their only
minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at age 21.
Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florante's
pension benefits, Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the
SSS. The SSS, however, denied the claim in a letter dated January 31, 2002, hence,
the petition.
In its Answer,7 SSS averred that on May 6, 1999, the claim for Florante's pension
benefits was initially settled in favor of Teresa as guardian of the minor Florante II.
Per its records, Teresa was paid the monthly pension for a total period of 57 months
or from February 1997 to October 2001 when Florante II reached the age of 21. The
claim was, however, re-adjudicated on July 11, 2002 and the balance of the five-
year guaranteed pension was again settled in favor of Florante II. 8 SSS also alleged
that Estelita Ramos, sister of Florante, wrote a letter9 stating that her brother had
long been separated from Teresa. She alleged therein that the couple lived together
for only ten years and then decided to go their separate ways because Teresa had
an affair with a married man with whom, as Teresa herself allegedly admitted, she
slept with four times a week. SSS also averred that an interview conducted in
Teresa's neighborhood in Tondo, Manila on September 18, 1998 revealed that
although she did not cohabit with another man after her separation with Florante,
there were rumors that she had an affair with a police officer. To support Teresa's
non-entitlement to the benefits claimed, SSS cited the provisions of Sections 8(k)
and 13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 1161, as amended otherwise known as Social
Security (SS) Law.10
Ruling of the Social Security Commission
In a Resolution11 dated June 4, 2003, SSC held that the surviving spouse's
entitlement to an SSS member's death benefits is dependent on two factors which
must concur at the time of the latter's death, to wit: (1) legality of the marital
relationship; and (2) dependency for support. As to dependency for support, the
SSC opined that same is affected by factors such as separation de factoof the
spouses, marital infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse
under the law. Thus, although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of Florante's
designated beneficiaries, the SSC ruled that she is disqualified from claiming the
death benefits because she was deemed not dependent for support from Florante
due to marital infidelity. Under Section 8(k) of the SS Law, the dependent spouse
until she remarries is entitled to death benefits as a primary beneficiary, together
with the deceased member's legitimate minor children. According to SSC, the word
"remarry" under said provision has been interpreted as to include a spouse who
cohabits with a person other than his/her deceased spouse or is in an illicit
relationship. This is for the reason that no support is due to such a spouse and to
allow him/her to enjoy the member's death benefits would be tantamount to
circumvention of the law. Even if a spouse did not cohabit with another, SSC went
on to state that for purposes of the SS Law, it is sufficient that the separation in-fact
of the spouses was precipitated by an adulterous act since the actual absence of
support from the member is evident from such separation. Notable in this case is
that while Teresa denied having remarried or cohabited with another man, she did
not, however, deny her having an adulterous relationship. SSC therefore concluded
that Teresa was not dependent upon Florante for support and consequently
disqualified her from enjoying her husband's death benefits.
SSC further held that Teresa did not timely contest her non-entitlement to the
award of benefits. It was only when Florante II's pension was stopped that she
deemed it wise to file her claim. For SSC, Teresa's long silence led SSS to believe
that she really suffered from a disqualification as a beneficiary, otherwise she would
have immediately protested her non-entitlement. It thus opined that Teresa is now
estopped from claiming the benefits. Hence, SSC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
As Teresa's Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution was also denied by SSC in
12
an Order13dated January 21, 2004, she sought recourse before the CA through a
Petition for Review under Rule 43.
14
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the CA, Teresa insisted that SSS should have granted her claim for death
benefits because she is undisputedly the legal surviving spouse of Florante and is
therefore entitled to such benefits as primary beneficiary. She claimed that the
SSC's finding that she was not dependent upon Florante for support is unfair
because the fact still remains that she was legally married to Florante and that her
alleged illicit affair with another man was never sufficiently established. In fact,
SSS admitted that there was no concrete evidence or proof of her amorous
relationship with another man. Moreover, Teresa found SSS's strict interpretation of
the SS Law as not only anti-labor but also anti-family. It is anti-labor in the sense
that it does not work to the benefit of a deceased employee's primary beneficiaries
and anti-family because in denying benefits to surviving spouses, it destroys family
solidarity. In sum, Teresa prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the assailed
Resolution and Order of the SSC.
The SSC and the SSS through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their
respective Comments15 to the petition.
SSC contended that the word "spouse" under Section 8(k) of the SS Law is qualified
by the word "dependent". Thus, to be entitled to death benefits under said law, a
surviving spouse must have been dependent upon the member spouse for support
during the latter's lifetime including the very moment of contingency. According to
it, the fact of dependency is a mandatory requirement of law. If it is otherwise, the
law would have simply used the word "spouse" without the descriptive word
"dependent". In this case, SSC emphasized that Teresa never denied the fact that
she and Florante were already separated and living in different houses when the
contingency happened. Given this fact and since the conduct of investigation is
standard operating procedure for SSS, it being under legal obligation to determine
prior to the award of death benefit whether the supposed beneficiary is actually
receiving support from the member or if such support was rightfully withdrawn prior
to the contingency, SSS conducted an investigation with respect to the couple's
separation. And as said investigation revealed tales of Teresa's adulterous
relationship with another man, SSS therefore correctly adjudicated the entire death
benefits in favor of Florante II.
To negate Teresa's claim that SSS failed to establish her marital infidelity, SSC
enumerated the following evidence: (1) the letter 6 of Florante's sister, Estelita
Ramos, stating that the main reasons why Teresa and Florante separated after only
10 years of marriage were Teresa's adulterous relationship with another man and
her propensity for gambling; (2) the Memorandum17 dated August 30, 2002 of SSS
Senior Analysts Liza Agilles and Jana Simpas which ran through the facts in
connection with the claim for death benefits accruing from Florante's death. It
indicates therein, among others, that based on interviews conducted in Teresa's
neighborhood, she did not cohabit with another man after her separation from her
husband although there were rumors that she and a certain police officer had an
affair. However, there is not enough proof to establish their relationship as Teresa
and her paramour did not live together as husband and wife; and (3) the field
investigation report of SSS Senior Analyst Fernando F. Nicolas which yielded the
18
same findings. The SSC deemed the foregoing evidence as substantial to support
the conclusion that Teresa indeed had an illicit relationship with another man.
SSC also defended SSS's interpretation of the SS law and argued that it is neither
anti-labor nor anti-family. It is not anti-labor because the subject matter of the
case is covered by the SS Law and hence, Labor Law has no application. It is
likewise not anti-family because SSS has nothing to do with Teresa's separation
from her husband which resulted to the latter's withdrawal of support for her. At
any rate, SSC advanced that even if Teresa is entitled to the benefits claimed, same
have already been received in its entirety by Florante II so that no more benefits
are due to Florante's other beneficiaries. Hence, SSC prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
For its part, the OSG likewise believed that Teresa is not entitled to the benefits
claimed as she lacks the requirement that the wife must be dependent upon the
member for support. This is in view of the rule that beneficiaries under the SS Law
need not be the legal heirs but those who are dependent upon him for support.
Moreover, it noted that Teresa did not file a protest before the SSS to contest the
award of the five-year guaranteed pension to their son Florante II. It posited that
because of this, Teresa cannot raise the matter for the first time before the courts.
The OSG also believed that no further benefits are due to Florante's other
beneficiaries considering that the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension has
already been settled.
In a Decision19 dated May 24, 2005, the CA found Teresa's petition impressed with
merit. It gave weight to the fact that she is a primary beneficiary because she is the
lawful surviving spouse of Florante and in addition, she was designated by Florante
as such beneficiary. There was no legal separation or annulment of marriage that
could have disqualified her from claiming the death benefits and that her
designation as beneficiary had not been invalidated by any court of law. The CA
cited Social Security System v. Davac20 where it was held that it is only when there
is no designation of beneficiary or when the designation is void that the SSS would
have to decide who is entitled to claim the benefits. It opined that once a spouse is
designated by an SSS member as his/her beneficiary, same forecloses any inquiry
as to whether the spouse is indeed a dependent deriving support from the member.
Thus, when SSS conducted an investigation to determine whether Teresa is indeed
dependent upon Florante, SSS was unilaterally adding a requirement not imposed
by law which makes it very difficult for designated primary beneficiaries to claim for
benefits. To make things worse, the result of said investigation which became the
basis of Teresa's non-entitlement to the benefits claimed was culled from unfounded
rumors.
Moreover, the CA saw SSS's conduct of investigations to be violative of the
constitutional right to privacy. It lamented that SSS has no power investigate and
pry into the member's and his/her family's personal lives and should cease and
desist from conducting such investigations. Ultimately, the CA reversed and set
aside the assailed Resolution and Order of the SSC and directed SSS to pay Teresa's
monetary claims which included the monthly pension due her as the surviving
spouse and the lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six times the monthly
pension.
SSC filed its Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision but same was denied in a
Resolution22 dated October 17, 2005. Impleading SSS as co-petitioner, SSC thus
filed this petition for review oncertiorari.
Issue
Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as to be
entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante?
Petitioners' Arguments
SSC reiterates the argument that to be entitled to death benefits, a surviving
spouse must have been actually dependent for support upon the member spouse
during the latter's lifetime including the very moment of contingency. To it, this is
clearly the intention of the legislature; otherwise, Section 8(k) of the SS law would
have simply stated "spouse" without the descriptive word "dependent". Here,
although Teresa is without question Florante's legal spouse, she is not the
"dependent spouse" referred to in the said provision of the law. Given the reason
for the couple's separation for about 17 years prior to Florante's death and in the
absence of proof that during said period Teresa relied upon Florante for support,
there is therefore no reason to infer that Teresa is a dependent spouse entitled to
her husband's death benefits.
SSC adds that in the process of determining non-dependency status of a spouse,
conviction of a crime involving marital infidelity is not an absolute necessity. It is
sufficient for purposes of the award of death benefits that a thorough investigation
was conducted by SSS through interviews of impartial witnesses and that same
showed that the spouse-beneficiary committed an act of marital infidelity which
caused the member to withdraw support from his spouse. In this case, no less than
Florante's sister, who does not stand to benefit from the present controversy,
revealed that Teresa frequented a casino and was disloyal to her husband so that
they separated after only 10 years of marriage. This was affirmed through the
interview conducted in Teresa's neighborhood. Hence, it is not true that Teresa's
marital infidelity was not sufficiently proven.
Likewise, SSC contends that contrary to the CA's posture, a member's designation
of a primary beneficiary does not guarantee the latter's entitlement to death
benefits because such entitlement is determined only at the time of happening of
the contingency. This is because there may have been events which supervened
subsequent to the designation which would otherwise disqualify the person
designated as beneficiary such as emancipation of a member's child or separation
from his/her spouse. This is actually the same reason why SSS must conduct an
investigation of all claims for benefits.
Moreover, SSC justifies SSS's conduct of investigation and argues that said office did
not intrude into Florante's and his family's personal lives as the investigation did not
aggravate the situation insofar as Teresa's relationship with her deceased husband
was concerned. It merely led to the discovery of the true state of affairs between
them so that based on it, the death benefits were awarded to the rightful primary
beneficiary, Florante II. Clearly, such an investigation is an essential part of
adjudication process, not only in this case but also in all claims for benefits filed
before SSS. Thus, SSC prays for the setting aside of the assailed CA Decision and
Resolution.
Respondent's Arguments
To support her entitlement to the death benefits claimed, Teresa cited Ceneta v.
Social Security System,23 a case decided by the CA which declared, viz:
Clearly then, the term dependent spouse, who must not re-marry in order to be
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of his/her spouse, refers
to the legal spouse who, under the law, is entitled to receive support from the other
spouse.
Indubitably, petitioner, having been legally married to the deceased SSS member
until the latter's death and despite his subsequent marriage to respondent Carolina,
is deemed dependent for support under Article 68 of the Family Code. Said
provision reads:
'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support'
Based on said law, petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the claimed death benefits.
Her marriage to trie deceased not having been lawfully severed, the law disputably
presumes her to be continually dependent for support.
No evidence or even a mere inference can be adduced to prove that petitioner
ceased to derive all her needs indispensable for her sustenance, and thus, she
remains a legal dependent. A dependent spouse is primary beneficiary entitled to
the death benefits of a deceased SSS member spouse unless he or she remarries. A
mere allegation of adultery not substantially proven can not validly deprive
petitioner of the support referred to under the law, and consequently, of her claim
under the SSS Law.
Thus, being the legal wife, Teresa asserts that she is presumed to be dependent
upon Florante for support. The bare allegation of Estelita that she had an affair with
another man is insufficient to deprive her of support from her husband under the
law and, conversely, of the death benefits from SSS. Moreover, Teresa points out
that despite their separation and the rumors regarding her infidelity, Florante did
not withdraw her designation as primary beneficiary. Under this circumstance,
Teresa believes that Florante really intended for her to receive the benefits from
SSS.
Teresa also agrees with the CA's finding that SSS unilaterally added to the
requirements of the law the condition that a surviving spouse must be actually
dependent for support upon the member spouse during the latter's lifetime. She
avers that this could not have been the lawmakers' intention as it would make it
difficult or even impossible for beneficiaries to claim for benefits under the SS Law.
She stresses that courts (or quasi-judicial agencies for that matter), may not, in the
guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations
not provided nor intended by lawmakers. Courts are not authorized to insert into
the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature
would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission. Hence, Teresa
prays that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution be affirmed in toto.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
The law in force at the time of Florante's death was RA 1161. Section 8 (e) and (k)
of said law provides:
Section 8. Terms Defined. For the purposes of this Act the following terms shall,
unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependent - The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and not over twenty-one years of age, or over
twenty-one years of age, provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse
dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly
dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent
parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the secondary
beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated
by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary. (Emphasis ours.)
From the above-quoted provisions, it is plain that for a spouse to qualify as a
primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must not only be a
legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph (e), that is, one
who is dependent upon the member for support. Paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8
of RA 1161 are very clear. "Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles
of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain
meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animo sermo
est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legisnon est recedendum , or, from
the words of a statute there should be no departure."24
Thus, in Social Security System v. Agiias25 we held that:
[I]t bears stressing that for her (the claimant) to qualify as a primary beneficiary,
she must prove that she was 'the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the
employee.' The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1)
that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member
for support, x x x
Here, there is no question that Teresa was Florante's legal wife. What is at point,
however, is whether Teresa is dependent upon Florante for support in order for her
to fall under the term "dependent spouse" under Section 8(k) of RA 1161.
What the SSC relies on in concluding that Teresa was not dependent upon Florante
for support during their separation for 17 years was its findings that Teresa
maintained an illicit relationship with another man. Teresa however counters that
such illicit relationship has not been sufficiently established and, hence, as the legal
wife, she is presumed to be continually dependent upon Florante for support.
We agree with Teresa that her alleged affair with another man was not sufficiently
established. The Memorandum of SSS Senior Analysts Liza Agilles and Jana Simpas
reveals that it vyas Florante who was in fact living with a common law wife, Susan
Favila (Susan) and their three minor children at the time of his death. Susan even
filed her own claim for death benefits with the SSS but same was, however, denied.
With respect to Teresa, we quote the pertinent portions of said Memorandum, viz:
SUSAN SUBMHTED A LETTER SIGNED BY ESTEL1TA RAMOS, ELDER SISTER OF THE
DECEASED STATING THAT MEMBER WAS SEPARATED FROM TERESA AFTER 10
YEARS OF LIVING IN FOR THE REASONS THAT HIS WIFE HAD COHABITED WITH A
MARRIED MAN. ALSO, PER ESTELITA, THE WIFE HERSELF ADMITTED THAT THE
MAN SLEPT WITH HER 4 TIMES A WEEK.
TERESA SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED BY NAPOLEON AND JOSEFINA,
BROTHER AND SISTER (IN) LAW, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE DECEASED THAT TERESA
HAS NEVER RE-MARRED NOR COHABITED WITH ANOTHER MAN.
BASED ON THE INTERVIEW (DATED 9/18/98) CONDUCTED FROM THE
NEIGHBORHOOD OF TERESA AND BGY. KAGAWAD IN TONDO, MANILA, IT WAS
ESTABLISHED THAT TERESA DID NOT COHABIT WITH ANOTHER MAN
AFTER THE SEPARATION ALTHOUGH THERE ARE RUMORS THAT SHE AND A
CERTAIN POLICE OFFICER HAD AN AFFAIR. BUT [NOT] ENOUGH PROOF TO
ESTABLISH THEIR RELATIONSHIP SINCE THEY DID NOT LIVE-IN AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
BASED ON THE INTERVIEW WITH JOSEFINA FAVILA, MEMBER AND TERESA WERE
SEPARATED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AND THAT SHE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE IF
TERESA COHABITED WITH ANOTHER MAN ALTHOUGH SHE HEARD OF THE
RUMORS THAT SAID WIFE HAD AN AFFAIR WITH ANOTHER MAN. NAPOLEON
WAS NOT INTERVIEWED. (Emphasis ours)
While SSC believes that the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence of Teresa's
amorous relationship, we, however, find otherwise. It is not hard to see that
Estelita's claim of Teresa's cohabitation with a married man is a mere allegation
without proof. Likewise, the interviews conducted by SSS revealed minors only that
Teresa had an affair with a certain police officer. Notably, not one from those
interviewed confirmed that such an affair indeed existed. "The basic rule is that
mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence." 26 Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence."27 Remarkably, the Memorandum itself stated that there is not enough
proof to establish Teresa's alleged relationship with another man since they did not
live as husband and wife.
This notwithstanding, we still find untenable Teresa's assertion that being the legal
wife, she is presumed dependent upon Florante for support. In Re: Application for
Survivor's Benefits of Manlavi,28 this Court defined "dependent" as "one who derives
his or her main support from another [or] relying on, or subject to, someone else
for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the
will, power or aid of someone else." Although therein, the wife's marriage to the
deceased husband was not dissolved prior to the latter's death, the Court denied the
wife's claim for survivorship benefits from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) because the wife abandoned her family to live with other men for
more than 17 years until her husband died. Her whereabouts was unknown to her
family and she never attempted to communicate with them or even check up on the
well-being of her daughter with the deceased. From these, the Court concluded
that the wife during said period was not dependent on her husband for any support,
financial or otherwise, hence, she is not a dependent within the contemplation of RA
829129 as to be entitled to survivorship benefits. It is worthy to note that under
Section 2(f) RA 8291, a legitimate spouse dependent for support is likewise included
in the enumeration of dependents and under Section 2(g), the legal dependent
spouse in the enumeration of primary beneficiaries.
Under this premise, we declared in Aguas that "the obvious conclusion is that a wife
who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be
'dependent for support' upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the
time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the
husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for
herself." 30
Hence, we held therein that the wife-claimant had the burden to prove
that all the statutory requirements have been complied with, particularly her
dependency on her husband at the time of his death. And, while said wife-claimant
was the legitimate wife of the deceased, we ruled that she is not qualified as a
primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of
her husband's death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were
already living separately.
In this case, aside from Teresa's bare allegation that she was dependent upon her
husband for support and her misplaced reliance on the presumption of dependency
by reason of her valid and then subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa has not
compilations and analyses of statistical and economic data and to make an
investigation as may be needed for its proper administration and development.
Precisely, the investigations conducted by SSS are appropriate in order to ensure
that the benefits provided under the SS Law are received by the rightful
beneficiaries. It is not hard to see that such measure is necessary for the system's
proper administration, otherwise, it will be swamped with bogus claims that will
pointlessly deplete its funds. Such scenario will certainly frustrate the purpose of
the law which is to provide covered employees and their families protection against
the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death, with a view to promoting their
well-being in the spirit of social justice. Moreover and as correctly pointed out by
SSC, such investigations are likewise necessary to carry out the mandate of Section
15 of the SS Law which provides in part, viz;
Sec. 15. Non-transfer ability of Benefits, - The SSS shall pay the benefits provided

presented sufficient evidence to discharge her burden of proving that she was for in this Actto such [x x x] persons as may be entitled thereto in

dependent upon her husband for support at the time of his death. She could have accordance with the provisions of this Act x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

done this by submitting affidavits of reputable and disinterested persons who have
knowledge that during her separation with Florante, she does not have a known
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed
trade, business, profession or lawful occupation from which she derives income
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 24,2005 and October 17,
sufficient for her support and such other evidence tending to prove her claim of
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 82763 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
dependency. While we note from the abovementioned SSS Memorandum that
Respondent Teresa G. Favila is declared to be not a dependent spouse within the
Teresa submitted affidavits executed by Napoleon Favila and Josefina Favila, same
contemplation of Republic Act No. 1161 and is therefore not entitled to death
only pertained to the fact that she never remarried nor cohabited with another
benefits accruing from the death of Florante Favila.
man. On the contrary, what is clear is that she and Florante had already been
separated for about 17 years prior to the latter's death as Florante was in fact, living
SO ORDERED.
with his common wife when he died. Suffice it to say that "[w]hoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto
by substantial evidence."31 Hence, for Teresa's failure to show that despite their
separation she was dependent upon Florante for support at the time of his death,
[G.R. NO. 166735 : September 5, 2006]
Teresa cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Hence, she is not entitled to the
death benefits accruing on account of Florante's death. SPOUSES NEREO and NIEVA DELFINO, Petitioners, v. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL,
INC. and HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
As a final note, we do not agree with the CA's pronouncement that the THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
investigations conducted by SSS violate a person's right to privacy. SSS, as the
primary institution in charge of extending social security protection to workers and DECISION

their beneficiaries is mandated by Section 4(b)(7) of RA 8282 to require reports,

32
 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60495,
dated 20 January 2003, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Office of the President,
dated 26 March 1999, and the Resolution dated 11 August 2000, reinstating the
3
grant to respondent St. James Hospital, Inc. of a Locational Clearance and a
Certificate of Locational Viability (CLV) for its expansion as a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity hospital.
St. James Hospital was established in 1990 as a two-storey, ten-bed capacity
hospital in Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision in Santa Rosa, Laguna. In 1994, it applied
for a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its
hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution. Thus, on 23
November 1994, Reynaldo Pambid, HLURB Deputized Zoning Administrator for
Santa Rosa, Laguna, issued a "temporary" clearance for the expansion of said
hospital. Said issuance was challenged by herein petitioners spouses Nereo and
Nieva Delfino, residents of Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, on the ground that the
proposed expansion is in violation of the provisions of the 1981 Santa Rosa
Municipal Zoning Ordinance. Thereafter, Mr. Pambid referred the matter for
evaluation by his superiors.
On 19 April 1995, HLURB Regional Office No. IV Director Alfredo M. Tan II issued a
letter explaining that the issuance of a "temporary" clearance is not allowed under
existing laws for it may be erroneously construed as a permit to start construction.
Director Tan, however, opined that under existing HLURB guidelines, CLVs may be
issued to certain projects for purposes of securing an Environment Compliance
Certification (ECC) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
On the strength of said opinion, Mr. Pambid revoked the temporary clearance issued
to St. James Hospital and declared the expansion as not viable. The municipal
engineer of Santa Rosa, Laguna, also suspended the hospital's building permit,
while DENR Regional Executive Director Antonio Principe issued a cease and desist
order on 16 August 1995. Nevertheless, upon written representation of the
hospital's operator, Dr. Jose P. Santiago, that the St. James Hospital will retain the
same number of beds maintained in the hospital, Mr. Pambid issued a CLV dated 29
October 1995 for the hospital's expansion project. Upon protest from the
petitioners, Mr. Pambid thereafter suspended the issued CLV.
In the interim, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna passed on 11 December
1995 Resolution No. 811, approving the 1991 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP)
or the Comprehensive Zoning new Zoning Ordinance, hospitals are now excluded
from the list of viable institutions within the residential zone of Santa Rosa, Laguna.
Oblivious of the approval of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, Mr. Pambid issued on 1
February 1996 a Certificate of Zoning Compliance or Locational Clearance for the
two-storey, ten-bed St. James Hospital citing as basis the provisions of the 1981
Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning Ordinance. On 14 March 1996, Mr. Pambid likewise
issued a CLV for a four-storey, forty-bed hospital expansion project in favor of St.
James Hospital.
These issuances of Mr. Pambid were, however, invalidated by HLURB Director
Ordinance of the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna. Under the Tan on 25 April
1996, as it violated, according to Director Tan, the provisions of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance. As a result thereof, Mr. Pambid suspended the locational clearance issued
to St. James Hospital and elevated the matter to the HLURB for disposition.
According to Mr. Pambid, he received a copy of the new Zoning Ordinance only on
14 February 1996, two weeks after issuing the locational clearance.
On 16 May 1996, petitioners filed before the HLURB Regional Office No. IV a letter-
complaint against Mr. Pambid for issuing the CLV in violation of both the 1981 and
1991 Zoning Ordinances, and against Dr. Santiago for continuing with the expansion
project despite the invalidation of the CLV issued by Mr. Pambid.
In reply to petitioners' complaint, St. James Hospital maintained that there is a need
to expand the existing hospital to address the acute deficiency of medical facilities
in the municipality, and that the project is permissible under the new Zoning
Ordinance. Furthermore, it pointed out that the project has been favorably endorsed
not only by the residents of Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, but also by the residents
of other neighboring communities. St. James Hospital also argued that it has
already incurred millions of pesos in losses for every day of delay in the
construction.
Pursuant to HLURB Rules, the case was elevated to the HLURB Legal Services Group
(LSG), and was assigned to Arbiter Erwin T. Daga. During the course of the
proceedings, Arbiter Daga issued the following Orders:
1. Order dated December 6, 1996 (temporary restraining order) enjoining St. James
[Hospital] from continuing with its expansion project;
2. Order dated December 11, 1996 ordering St. James [Hospital] to cease and
desist from proceeding with its expansion project;
3. Order dated December 12, 1996 denying St. James [Hospital's] motion to lift the
temporary restraining order; and cralawlibrary
4. Order dated December 14, 1996 ordering St. James [Hospital] to again cease and
desist from further work and construction of the hospital's expansion building
pending the resolution of the case.4
On 4 March 1997, Dr. Santiago filed before the HLURB Board of Commissioners a
Motion seeking the inhibition of Arbiter Daga for partiality, which was subsequently
denied.
On 16 July 1997, after the parties have submitted their respective position papers
and draft decisions, Arbiter Daga rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
1. The Locational Clearance dated February 1, 1996 issued by public respondent
Reynaldo Pambid to the expansion hospital building of private respondent St. James
Hospital, Inc. is hereby revoked and set aside;
2. Ordering private respondent to demolish its two-storey hospital expansion
building within ONE MONTH at its cost and upon failure to comply within the period
given, pay complainantsP10,000.00 per day of delay;
3. Ordering private respondent to relocate its existing ten-bed capacity hospital
within ONE YEAR and thereafter to permanently cease and desist from operating a
hospital/clinic within a residential zone, particularly in Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision,
Dita, Sta. Rosa, Laguna and failure to comply within the reglementary period given,
pay complainants the amount ofP10,000.00 per day of delay;
4. Ordering private respondent to pay this Board administrative fine of P20,000.00,
aside from the other fines previously imposed;
5. Ordering private respondent to pay this Board P5,000.00 per day beginning
February 4, 1997 until the day that it ceased or finished the construction of its
expansion building as determined by the Board's Regional Office No. IV;
6. Ordering private respondent to pay complainants FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS as moral damages, TWO MILLION PESOS exemplary damages, TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS as attorney's fees, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS cost
of litigation;
The motion of private respondent dated 24 June 1997 is hereby DENIED and its
Counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Without prejudice to the filing of criminal action that may be filed with the proper
court.5
Aggrieved by the aforecited Decision, St. James Hospital appealed to the HLURB
Board of Commissioners asserting that the proposed expansion of the hospital
conforms to the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Resolving said appeal, the HLURB
effectively modified Arbiter Daga's Decision, ruling that the existing hospital, with its
original two-storey, ten-bed capacity, is allowable under the old 1981 Zoning
Ordinance and may be allowed to continue as a medical institution within the
Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision even after the effectivity of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance. However, the HLURB opined that the new construction of commercial
buildings within the said residential zone, such as the forty-bed capacity expansion
building of St. James Hospital, is repugnant to Section 2, Article VI of the 1991
Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning Ordinance and, hence, should be disallowed. Thus, on
13 January 1998, the HLURB Special Division rendered a Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the LSG dated July 16, 1997, is hereby SET ASIDE and
a new decision entered:
1. Declaring the original two-storey, ten-bed capacity St. James Hospital, as
allowable in the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna;
2. Ordering respondent St. James to set-up an efficient hospital waste disposal
system in conformity with the rules and regulations and standards of the
Department of Health, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
all other concerned government agencies; and present a certification of compliance
to the Board from said agencies within ninety (90) days from finality hereof; and cralawlibrary
3. Revoking the Locational Clerance dated February 01, 1996 issued by respondent
Pambid for the expansion Hospital building of respondent St. James. 6
The separate Motions for Reconsideration of both parties having been denied by the
HLURB, the parties elevated the case to the Office of the President, which rendered
a decision on 26 March 1999 in favor of St. James Hospital. According to the Office
of the President:
Without doubt, the establishment of a ten-bed capacity hospital, like the existing St.
James Hospital, is allowed within a residential zone. This is expressly provided
under Section 2, paragraph 1(d), Article VI of the 1981 Sta. Rosa Municipal Zoning
Ordinance, the law existing at the time of the founding of the said hospital. The
term "hospital" was, however, deleted from the list of conforming establishments
within a residential zone in the recently approved 1991 CLUP or the Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The question now is
whether or not the proposed expansion of St. James Hospital, which will transform it
into a four-storey, 40-bed capacity hospital, is allowable under the 1991 zoning
ordinance. Stated differently, does the term "institutional", as used in the said
ordinance, include hospitals and other medical establishments.
In construing words or phrases used in a law, the general rule is that, in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning (Amadora v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA
315). For, words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their
ordinary and common use and acceptation (People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352).
Under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, certain activities that are
commercial and institutional in character are allowed within the residential zone. St.
James maintained the term "institutional" includes hospitals and other medical
establishments.
We agree. The word "institutional" used as it is in said ordinance without
qualification should be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning. In law, the
word "institution" is understood to mean an establishment or place, especially one
of public character or one affecting a community (Black's Law Dictionary, Revised
4th edition, 1968, p. 940). It may be private in character, designed for profit to
those composing the organization, or public and charitable in its purposes.
From the above definition, it is clear that hospitals fall within the pale of the term
"institution", a hospital being a public establishment and that the nature of its
business is for profit. The fact that hospitals are not categorized as dwelling unit
does not inevitably mean that it is already a non-conforming establishment within a
residential zone. As provided under aforecited provision of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance, settlement activities that are "institutional in character" are allowed
within the residential zone. Even the HLURB recognized St. James as a medical
institution within the residential zone of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Be
that as it may, St. James Hospital may be allowed to continue its business within
the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision. To limit the term "institutional" to activities
conducted within the dwelling units of the residents would be unrealistic and would
contemplate undue restrictions to existing and lawful establishments, like the St.
James Hospital.
As a conforming establishment within the residential zone, St. James Hospital may
also be allowed to expand its present structure. It is not disputed that the new
zoning ordinance doesnot expressly prohibit expansion of existing buildings within
the residential zone. As correctly observed by St. James, it would be an absurd
requirement if such establishment, like hospitals, would have the appearance of
residential units or that its use be incidental and subordinate to its residential
purposes. The parameters mentioned in the said ordinance should only be applied to
residential units.
Foregoing considered, the locational clearance and the complementary certificate of
locational viability may now be issued in favor of St. James Hospital.
WHEREFORE, the grant to St. James Hospital, Inc., of a Locational Clearance and a
Certificate of Locational Viability (CLV) relative to its expansion as a 4-storey, 40-
bed capacity hospital dated February 1, 1996, is hereby REINSTATED. In all other
respects, the Decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board dated January
13, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto.7
The Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioners having been denied in a
Resolution dated 11 August 2000, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. In
the assailed Decision dated 20 January 2003, the appellate court affirmed the
Decision of the Office of the President, adopting the latter's conclusion that the
establishment/expansion of the St. James Hospital is not a proscribed land use in
the designated residential zone known as Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied in a Resolution
dated 14 January 2005. Hence, the instant Petition.
From the facts of the case, it is undisputed that the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision
located at Barangay Dita, Santa Rosa, Laguna, is located within an area classified as
a residential zone under both the 1981 and 1991 Zoning Ordinances. There is also
no question that a two-storey, ten-bed capacity hospital, such as St. James
Hospital, was allowed to be constructed within a residential zone under the 1981
Zoning Ordinance. Likewise, it is apparent that under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance,
the proposed expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity hospital would be disallowed as it violates the restriction set by said Zoning
Ordinance regarding permissible activities within a residential zone, which
specifically limits any medical institution built within a residential zone to a two-
storey, ten-bed capacity structure.
Nonetheless, with the passage of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, the proposed
expansion of the St. James Hospital must now be decided in light of the provisions
of the new Zoning Ordinance. Hence, the pivotal issue now to be resolved in this
Petition is whether or not the proposed expansion of St. James Hospital into a four-
storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution may be permitted under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance. However, in order to settle the present controversy, it is essential
that we determine the effect of the enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance with
respect to the proposed expansion of the St. James Hospital in view of the deletion
therein of the phrase "hospitals with not more than ten capacity" from those
enumerated as allowable uses in a residential zone as contained in Section 2, Article
VI of the 1981 Zoning Ordinance.
Section 2, Article VI of the 1981 Zoning Ordinance states:
SECTION 2. REGULATIONS FOR URBAN CORE ZONE. - This zone shall be devoted to
various settlement activities that are residential and commercial, or institutional in
character, subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. In the Residential Sector, only the following uses shall be allowed:
a) All types of dwelling units (one-family detached, two-family detached, one-family 1. That they are only for family consumption

semi-detached, two-family semi-detached and multi-family of not more than 5

2. No undue noise shall be created
doors)

3. No foul smell shall be emitted

b) Home occupation, or the practice of one's profession or occupation, such as

tailoring, dressmaking, banking, and like provided that:

4. Other sanitary requirements enforced in the municipality
b.1. Not more than five (5) outside assistants or helpers shall be employed;

g) Boarding House
b.2. The use of the dwelling unit for the home occupation shall be clearly incidental

and subordinate to its use for residential purpose by its occupants; h) Parks and playground

b.3. As much as possible there shall be no change in the outside appearance of the i) Barangay tanod stations

building or premises;
j) Neighborhood assembly hall

b.4. No equipment or process shall be used in such home occupation which creates
k) Recreation centers8
noise, vibration, glare, fumes, odors, or electrical interference or outside the

dwelling unit if conducted in a place other than a single-family residence. In the On the other hand, Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance reads:

case of electrical interference, no equipment or process shall be used which creates

SECTION 2. REGULATIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL ZONE. - This zone shall be devoted to
visual or audible interference in any radio or television receiver or causes fluctuation
various settlements, activities that are residential, commercial, and institutional in
in line voltage off the premises.
character and other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and maintenance of
a) Elementary schools
ecological balance of the municipality, subject to the following terms and conditions:

b) High Schools and vocational schools

The following uses shall be allowed:

c) Chapels, churches, and other place of worship 1. Single detached family dwellings

d) Clinics, hospitals with not more than ten (10) capacity 2. Semi-detached family dwelling

e) Drugstores 3. Two detached family dwelling

f) Backyard gardens and raising of pigs, poultry and other animals and fowls 4. Two semi-detached family dwelling

provided:
5. Multi-family dwelling with not more than five (5) families residing
6. Residential Subdivision Projects
7. Home occupation for the practice of one's profession or for engaging an in-house
business such as dressmaking, tailoring, baking, running a sari-sari store and the
like, provided that:
7.1. Only members of the family residing within the premises shall be engaged in
such home occupation;
7.2. Maximum of five (5) outside helpers or assistants shall be employed;
7.3. The use of the dwelling unit for home occupation shall be clearly incidental and
subordinate to its use for residential purpose by its occupants and for the conduct of
the home occupation, not more than twenty-five (25%) percent of the floor area of
the dwelling unit shall be used;
7.4. As much as possible there shall be no change in the outside appearance of the
building premises;
7.5. No home occupation shall be conducted in any accessory building;
7.6. No traffic shall be generated by such home occupation in greater volume than
would normally be expected in a residential neighborhood and any need for parking
generated by the conduct of such home occupation shall be met off the street and in
a place other than in a required front yard;
7.7. No equipment or process shall be used in such home occupation which created
noise, vibration, glare, fumes, odors, or electrical interference detectable to the
normal sense off the lot, if the occupation is conducted in a single family residence
or outside the dwelling unit if conducted in a place other than a single-family-
residence. In the case of electrical interference, no equipment or process shall be
used which created visual or audible interference in any radio or television receiver
or causes fluctuation in line voltage off the premises.
8. Backyard gardens and raising of pigs, poultry and other animals and fowls
provided:
8.1. That they are only for family consumption;
8.2. No undue noise shall be created;
8.3. No foul smell shall be emitted; and cralawlibrary
8.4. Other sanitary requirements enforced in the municipality are complied with.
9. Barangay Tanod Stations.
10. Police outposts.9
The enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance effectively repealed the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance. This intent to repeal is manifested in the very wordings of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance. The complete title of said Ordinance, "An Ordinance Adopting a
Comprehensive Zoning Regulation for the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna and
Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment Thereof. And for
the Repeal of all Ordinances in Conflict Therewith," as well as the Repealing
Clause10 of the same Ordinance which states that "all other ordinances, rules or
regulations that are in conflict with the provisions of this ordinance are hereby
repealed,"11 clearly express the intent of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Rosa,
Laguna, to repeal any enactment that is inconsistent with the new Ordinance. The
inclusion of this general repealing provision in the Ordinance predicated the
intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts.
This is what is known as an implied repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds on the
premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. There are two categories of implied repeal. The first is where the provisions
12
in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the
latter act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier
one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
13
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.14 The second
category of repeal is only possible if the revised statute was intended to cover the
whole subject matter and as a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule
that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the
whole subject matter of the former statute.15
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the 1991 Zoning Ordinance not only covers
the same, but embraces the whole subject matter contained in the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance, and was enacted to substitute the latter. A perusal of the two pieces of
legislation will reveal that both Ordinances were enacted to guide, control, and
regulate the future growth and development of the Municipality of Santa Rosa,
Laguna, in accordance with the municipality's development plan, as well as to
promote the general welfare of the residents of the community by regulating the
location and use of all buildings and land within the municipality. However, unlike
the 1981 Zoning Ordinance, the 1991 Zoning Ordinance clearly identifies the
development plan to which it is patterned after, specifically the development plan
adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan through Kapasiyahan Blg. 20-91, dated 20
February 1991. Considering that the 1981 Zoning Ordinance was not in furtherance
of the later development plan, consequently, there was the necessity to adopt a new
statute to effect the changes contained therein, hence, the adoption of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance.
Since it is presumed that the Sangguniang Bayan knew of the existence of the older
Ordinance, by enacting the later law embracing the complete subject matter of the
1981 Zoning Ordinance, it must be concluded that the legislative body had intended
to repeal the former Ordinance. With respect to the omission of the phrase
"hospitals with not more than ten capacity" from the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we
conclude that the Sangguniang Bayan did intend to remove such building use from
those allowed within a residential zone. As ruled by this Court, when both intent and
scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior
act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. 16
Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive scrutiny of both
Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone
under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of
worship, and clinics and hospitals have now been transferred to the institutional
zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.17 This clearly demonstrates the intention of
the Sangguniang Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the residential zone only to
those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals.
It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals gave
undue emphasis to the word "institutional" as mentioned in Section 2, Article VI of
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and even went through great lengths to define said term
in order to include hospitals under the ambit of said provision. However, they
neglected the fact that under Section 4, Article VI of said Ordinance 18, there is now
another zone, separate and distinct from a residential zone, which is classified as
"institutional", wherein health facilities, such as hospitals, are expressly enumerated
among those structures allowed within said zone.
Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed to consider
that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term "institutional" as used in
Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration of
allowable uses contained in the same section. Whatever meaning the legislative
body had intended in employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light
of the restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means the
exclusion of others not expressly mentioned.19 Thus, in interpreting the whole of
Section 2, Article VI, it must be understood that in expressly enumerating the
allowable uses within a residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are
deemed excluded. Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are not among those
enumerated as allowable uses within the residential zone, the only inference to be
deduced from said exclusion is that said hospitals have been deliberately eliminated
from those structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in Santa
Rosa, Laguna.
Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a
thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore,
with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the
new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to
another zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body
had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential zone.
Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital, within a
residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
Be that as it may, even if the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-
conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as it is located in a
residential zone where such use is no longer allowed, said structure cannot now be
considered illegal. This is because the St. James Hospital was constructed during the
effectivity of the 1981 Zoning Ordinance, and, as earlier stated, under the said
Ordinance, the construction of a two-storey, ten-bed capacity hospital within a
residential zone is explicitly allowed.
Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming
structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the
expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve
that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity
medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited under the
provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60495, dated 20 January 2003,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new Decision entered:
1. Sustaining that the original two-storey, ten-bed capacity St. James Hospital is
allowable within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna as long as it
shall comply with the provisions on existing non-conforming buildings under the
1991 Zoning Ordinance, as well as the rules and regulations and standards of the
Department of Health, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and all
other concerned government agencies; and cralawlibrary

legality of the proposed expansion of said hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed

medical institution. We shall decide this said issue in accordance with the provisions
2. Prohibiting the proposed expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey,
of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-conforming buildings, the applicable
law at the time of the proposal. As stated in Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 forty-bed capacity hospital, the proposed expansion being illegal under the 1991

Zoning Ordinance: Zoning Ordinance.

Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of SO ORDERED.

any building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this

Ordinance may be continued, although such does not conform with the provisions of

this Ordinance.

1. That no non-conforming use shall [be] enlarge[d] or increased or

exten[ded] to occupy a greater area or land that has already been occupied

by such use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or moved in whole

or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where such [non]-conforming

use exist at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance.20 (Emphasis ours.)

x. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST, EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS


[G.R. NO. 147749 : June 22, 2006]
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE,* Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, San Pablo
Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) assails the July 19, 20001 and April 3, 2001
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59139.
SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing
and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered
to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount
of P8,182,182.852 representing deficiency miller's tax and manufacturer's sales
tax,3 among other deficiency taxes,4 for taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller's
tax was imposed on SPMC's sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.
(UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible
oil as manufactured products.
SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC
appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a
Petition for Review docketed as CTA Case No. 5423.
In its March 10, 2000 decision, the CTA cancelled SPMC's liability for deficiency
manufacturer's tax on the sales of corn and edible oils but upheld the
Commissioner's assessment for the deficiency miller's tax. SPMC moved for the
partial reconsideration of the CTA affirmation of the miller's tax assessment but it
was denied.
SPMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review of the CTA
decision insofar as it upheld the deficiency miller's tax assessment. In its July 19,
2000 resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the principal
ground5 that the verification attached to it was signed merely by SPMC's chief
financial officer without the corporate secretary's certificate, board resolution or
power of attorney authorizing him to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping. SPMC sought a reconsideration of the resolution but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed SPMC's appeal?
cralawlibrary
SPMC contends that its appeal should have been given due course since it
substantially complied with the requirements on verification and certification against
forum shopping. It insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the
merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller's tax. It maintains that
the crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an
ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller's tax pursuant to
Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
For SPMC, Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates two exemptions from the
miller's tax: (a) the milled products in their original state were actually exported by
the miller himself or by another person, and (b) the milled products sold by the
miller were actually exported as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article by
the buyer or manufacturer of the milled products.The exportation may be effected
by the miller himself or by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled products. Since
UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC's milled products, subsequently exported said
products, SPMC should be exempted from the miller's tax.
The petition must fail.
Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the CTA and quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals should be verified. A pleading required to
be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. 6
Moreover, a Petition for Review under Rule 43 requires a sworn certification against
forum shopping.7 Failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of
a Petition for Review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. 8
A corporation may exercise the powers expressly conferred upon it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence
through its board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. 9 Hence,
physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural
persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of
the board of directors. In the absence of authority from the board of directors, no
10
person, not even the officers of the corporation, can bind the corporation. 11
SPMC's petition in the Court of Appeals did not indicate that the person who signed
the verification/certification on non-forum shopping was authorized to do so. SPMC
merely relied on the alleged inherent power of its chief financial officer to represent
SPMC in all matters regarding the finances of the corporation including, among
others, the filing of suits to defend or protect it from assessments and to recover
erroneously paid taxes. SPMC even admitted that no power of attorney, secretary's
certificate or board resolution to prove the affiant's authority was attached to the
petition. Thus, the petition was not properly verified. Since the petition lacked
proper verification, it was to be treated as an unsigned pleading subject to
dismissal.12
In PET Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the dismissal by the Court
13
of Appeals of the petition on the ground that the verification and certification
against forum shopping was signed by PET Plans, Inc.'s first vice-president for legal
affairs/corporate secretary without any certification that he was authorized to sign
in behalf of the corporation.
In BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the petition
14
should be dismissed outright on the ground that the verification/certification against
forum shopping was signed by BPI Leasing Corporation's counsel with no specific
authority to do so. Since the counsel was purportedly acting for the corporation, he
needed a resolution issued by the board of directors that specifically authorized him
to institute the petition and execute the certification. Only then would his actions be
legally binding on the corporation.15
In this case, therefore, the appellate court did not commit an error when it
dismissed the petition on the ground that it was signed by a person who had not
been issued any authority by the board of directors to represent the corporation.
Neither can the Court subscribe to SPMC's claim of substantial compliance or to its
plea for a liberal application of the rules. Save for the most persuasive of reasons,
strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.16 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter
involving strict observance such as the requirement on non-forum shopping, 17as well
as verification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harping
on the policy of liberal construction.18
But even if the fatal procedural infirmity were to be disregarded, the petition must
still fail for lack of merit.
As the CTA correctly ruled, SPMC's sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was
subject to the 3% miller's tax. Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code provided:
Sec. 168. Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar
central mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut
factories. Proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central and mills, coconut
oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories, shall pay a
tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of the gross value in money of all the rope,
sugar, coconut oil, palm oil, cassava flour or starch, dessicated coconut,
manufactured, processed or milled by them, including the by-product of the raw
materials from which said articles are produced, processed or manufactured, such
tax to be based on the actual selling price or market value of these articles at the
time they leave the factory or mill warehouse:Provided, however, That this tax
shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra
from which it is produced or manufactured and dessicated coconut, if such
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts,
shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the
factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without returning to
the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of
any manufactured article or products: Provided further, That where the planter
or the owner of the raw materials is the exporter of the aforementioned milled or
manufactured products, he shall be entitled to a tax credit of the miller's taxes
withheld by the proprietor or operator of the factory or mill, corresponding to the
quantity exported, which may be used against any internal revenue tax directly due
from him: and Provided, finally, That credit for any sales, miller's or excise taxes
paid on raw materials or supplies used in the milling process shall not be allowed
against the miller's tax due, except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
refined sugar factory as provided hereunder. (emphasis supplied)
Costs against petitioner.
The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was
clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm SO ORDERED.

oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as
an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or
operator of the factory or by the miller himself. [G.R. NO. 178160 : February 26, 2009]

The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of products
utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC's situation DECISION
was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller's tax
imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. CARPIO, J.:

SPMC's proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of the exemption clause. The Case

The rule is that the exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the
This is a petition for certiorari 1 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
reasonable presumption is that the State has granted in express terms all it
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to nullify
intended to grant and that, unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the
Decision No. 2007-0202 dated 12 April 2007 of the Commission on Audit (COA).
statute, the favor would be intended beyond what was meant.19

The Facts
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be
construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio
On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 3 creating the
unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is
Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Section 9 of RA No. 7227
excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected
states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and
in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.20 The rule proceeds
functions of the BCDA. Under Section 10, the functions of the Board include the
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in
determination of the organizational structure and the adoption of a compensation
a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to
and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
those expressly mentioned.21
(BSP). Accordingly, the Board determined the organizational structure of the BCDA
and adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive
interpretation.22 Its application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax
On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme
exemptions in strictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer. To allow SPMC's claim for tax
which included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee,
exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign
regular permanent employee, and Board member. In a memorandum 4 dated 25
authority.
August 1997, Board Chairman Victoriano A. Basco (Chairman Basco) recommended
to President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) the approval of the new
compensation and benefit scheme. In a memorandum dated 9 October 1997,
5
President Ramos approved the new compensation and benefit scheme.
In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In
2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant to
Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit scheme
of the BCDA shall be at least equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board increased the
year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees fromP10,000 to P30,000. Thus in
2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and employees received a P30,000 year-end benefit,
and, on 1 October 2002, the Board passed Resolution No. 2002-10-193 approving
6
the release of a P30,000 year-end benefit for 2002.
Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board
members, the full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.
On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Espao of the COA issued Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-0047 stating that the grant of year-end
benefit to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002. In Notice of Disallowance
(ND) No. 03-001-BCDA - (02)8 dated 8 January 2004, Director IV Rogelio D. Tablang
(Director Tablang), COA, Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the
grant of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants. In
Decision No. 2004-0139 dated 13 January 2004, Director Tablang "concurred" with
AOM No. 2003-004 and ND No. 03-001-BCDA - (02).
In a letter10 dated 20 February 2004, BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer
Rufo Colayco requested the reconsideration of Decision No. 2004-013. In a
Resolution dated 22 June 2004, Director Tablang denied the request. The BCDA
11
filed a notice of appeal12 dated 8 September 2004 and an appeal
memorandum13 dated 23 December 2004 with the COA.
The COA's Ruling
In Decision No. 2007-020,14 the COA affirmed the disallowance of the year-end
benefit granted to the Board members and full-time consultants and held that the
presumption of good faith did not apply to them. The COA stated that:
The granting of YEB x x x is not without x x x limitation. DBM Circular Letter No.
2002-02 dated January 2, 2002 stating, viz:
"2.0 To clarify and address issues/requests concerning the same, the following
compensation policies are hereby reiterated:
2.1 PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in
addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic
salary is also paid.
2.2 Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the
government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB
and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.
2.3 Department Secretaries, Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries who serve
as Ex-officio Members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to any
remuneration in line with the Supreme Court ruling that their services in the Board
are already paid for and covered by the remuneration attached to their office."
(underscoring ours)
Clearly, as stated above, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of
Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the
government. The same goes withfull time consultants wherein no employer-
employee relationships exist between them and the BCDA. Thus, the whole amount
paid to them totaling P342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.
Moreover, the presumption of good faith may not apply to the members and ex-
officio members of the Board of Directors because despite the earlier clarification on
the matter by the DBM thru the issuance on January 2, 2002 of DBM Circular Letter
No. 2002-02, still, the BCDA Board of Directors enacted Resolution No. 2002-10-93
on October 1, 2002 granting YEB to the BCDA personnel including themselves. Full
time consultants, being non-salaried personnel, are also not entitled to such
presumption since they knew from the very beginning that they are only entitled to
the amount stipulated in their contracts as compensation for their services. Hence, clearly indicates that directors x x x are authorized to receive only the per diem
they should be made to refund the disallowed YEB. (Boldfacing in the original)
15
authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form. 21

Hence, this petition. Also, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, "Members of the Board of
Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-
The Court's Ruling salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement
benefits unless expressly provided by law." RA No. 7227 does not state that the
The Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are not entitled to the
Board members are entitled to a year-end benefit.
year-end benefit.

With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that,
First, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members
"YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to
and full-time consultants because, under Section 10 of RA No. 7227, the functions
salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary
of the Board include the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme.
is also paid." The full-time consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are
not paid the basic salary. The full-time consultants' consultancy contracts expressly
The Court is not impressed. The Board's power to adopt a compensation and benefit
state that there is no employer-employee relationship between the BCDA and the
scheme is not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are
consultants, and that the BCDA shall pay the consultants a contract price. For
entitled to a per diem:
example, the consultancy contract22 of a certain Dr. Faith M. Reyes states:

Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five
SECTION 2. Contract Price. For and in consideration of the services to be
thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That
performed by the CONSULTANT (16 hours/week), BCDA shall pay her the amount
the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four
of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS and 00/100 (P20,000.00), Philippine currency,
(4) meetings: Provided, further, That the amount of per diem for every board
per month.
meeting may be increased by the President but such amount shall not be increased
within two (2) years after its last increase. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x
rbl r l l lbrr

Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board
SECTION 4. Employee-Employer Relationship. It is understood that no
meeting; limits the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; and limits the
employee-employer relationship shall exist between BCDA and the CONSULTANT.
total amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings. In Magno
v. Commission on Audit,16 Cabili v. Civil Service Commission,17 De Jesus v. Civil SECTION 5. Period of Effectivity. This CONTRACT shall have an effectivity period
Service Commission,18 Molen, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,19 andBaybay Water of one (1) year, from January 01, 2002 to December 31, 2002, unless sooner
District v. Commission on Audit,20 the Court held that the specification of terminated by BCDA in accordance with Section 6 below.
compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute
indicate that Board members are entitled only to the per diem authorized SECTION 6. Termination of Services. BCDA, in its sole discretion may opt to
by law and no other. InBaybay Water District, the Court held that: terminate this CONTRACT when it sees that there is no more need for the services
contracted for. (Boldfacing in the original)
By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by
limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, x x x the law quite
Since full-time consultants are not salaried employees of BCDA, they are not
entitled to the year-end benefit which is a "personnel benefit granted in addition
to salaries" and which is "paidonly when the basic salary is also paid."
Second, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants should
be granted the year-end benefit because the granting of year-end benefit is
consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution. Sections 5 and 18
state:
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment
by all people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of
Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general
ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. 23 In Tondo
Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held
that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing
provisions. In that case, the Court held that "Some of the constitutional provisions
invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -
specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18 - the provisions of which the Court categorically
ruled to be non self-executing."
Third, the BCDA claims that the denial of year-end benefit to the Board members
and full-time consultants violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 25 More
specifically, the BCDA claims that there is no substantial distinction between regular
officials and employees on one hand, and Board members and full-time consultants
on the other. The BCDA states that "there is here only a distinction, but no
difference" because both "have undeniably one common goal as humans, that is x x
x 'to keep body and soul together' " or, "[d]ifferently put, both have mouths to feed
and stomachs to fill."
The Court is not impressed. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of
the constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of proof is on the BCDA
to show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.26 In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima,27 the Court held that:
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and unequivocal one. To invalidate [a law] based on x x
x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
The BCDA failed to show that RA No. 7227 unreasonably singled out Board
members and full-time consultants in the grant of the year-end benefit. It did not
show any clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The claim that there is
no difference between regular officials and employees, and Board members and full-
time consultants because both groups "have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill" is
fatuous. Surely, persons are not automatically similarly situated - thus,
automatically deserving of equal protection of the laws - just because they both
"have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill." Otherwise, the existence of a
substantial distinction would become forever highly improbable.
Fourth, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its
members and the full-time consultants because RA No. 7227 does not expressly
prohibit it from doing so.
The Court is not impressed. A careful reading of Section 9 of RA No. 7227 reveals
that the Board is prohibited from granting its members other benefits. Section 9
states:
Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That
the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four
(4) meetings: Provided, further, That the amount of per diem for every board
meeting may be increased by the President but such amount shall not be increased
within two (2) years after its last increase. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary
Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board
meeting; limits the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; limits the total
amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings; and does not
state that Board members may receive other benefits. In Magno,28 Cabili,29 De
Jesus,30 Molen, Jr.,31 and Baybay Water District,32 the Court held that the
specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of
compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are entitled only to
the per diem authorized by law and no other.
The specification that Board members shall receive a per diem of not more
than P5,000 for every meeting and the omission of a provision allowing Board
members to receive other benefits lead the Court to the inference that Congress
intended to limit the compensation of Board members to theper diem authorized by
law and no other. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Had Congress intended to
allow the Board members to receive other benefits, it would have expressly stated
so. For example, Congress' intention to allow Board members to receive other
33
benefits besides the per diem authorized by law is expressly stated in Section 1 of
RA No. 9286: 34
SECTION 1. Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 13. Compensation. - Each director shall receive per diem to be determined by
the Board, for each meeting of the Board actually attended by him, but no director
shall receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total
per diem of four meetings in any given month.
Any per diem in excess of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) shall be subject to the
approval of the Administration. In addition thereto, each director shall receive
allowances and benefits as the Board may prescribe subject to the approval
of the Administration." (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary
The Court cannot, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or
insert into a statute what Congress omitted, whether intentionally or
unintentionally.35
When a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, the Court must "adopt the one
in consonance with the presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments
the most reasonable and beneficial construction, the one that will render them
operative and effective." 36 The Court always presumes that Congress intended to
enact sensible statutes.37 If the Court were to rule that the Board could grant the
year-end benefit to its members, Section 9 of RA No. 7227 would become
inoperative and ineffective - the specification that Board members shall receive
a per diem of not more than P5,000 for every meeting; the specification that
the per diem received per month shall not exceed the equivalent of four meetings;
the vesting of the power to increase the amount of per diem in the President; and
the limitation that the amount of per diem shall not be increased within two years
from its last increase would all become useless because the Board could always
grant its members other benefits.
With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that,
"YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to
salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary
is also paid." The full-time consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are
not paid the basic salary. The full-time consultants' consultancy contracts expressly
state that there is no employer-employee relationship between BCDA and the
consultants and that BCDA shall pay the consultants a contract price. Since full-time
consultants are not salaried employees of the BCDA, they are not entitled to the
year-end benefit which is a "personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries"
and which is "paid only when the basic salary is also paid."
Fifth, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants are
entitled to the year-end benefit because (1) President Ramos approved the granting
of the benefit to the Board members, and (2) they have been receiving it since
1997.
The Court is not impressed. The State is not estopped from correcting a public
officer's erroneous application of a statute, and an unlawful practice, no matter how
long, cannot give rise to any vested right.38
The Court, however, notes that the Board members and full-time consultants
received the year-end benefit in good faith. The Board members relied on (1)
Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation and
benefit scheme; (2) the fact that RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit Board
members from receiving benefits other than the per diem authorized by law; and
(3) President Ramos' approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme which
included the granting of a year-end benefit to each contractual employee, regular
permanent employee, and Board member. The full-time consultants relied on
Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation and
benefit scheme. There is no proof that the Board members and full-time consultants
knew that their receipt of the year-end benefit was unlawful. In keeping
with Magno,39 De Jesus,40 Molen, Jr.,41 and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit,42 the Board
members and full-time consultants are not required to refund the year-end benefits
they have already received.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit

Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the Board members and full-time consultants of the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority are not required to refund the year-
end benefits they have already received.

SO ORDERED.

xi. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

[G.R. NOS. 166948-59 - August 29, 2012]

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO,
MANUEL S. SA TUITO, ****
MINVILUZ S. CAMINA, JOELITA TRABUCO,
ABEL,IO JUANEZA, ROSALINDA D. TROPEL, FELIPE Y. VILLAROSA, RAUL
APOSAGA, HERMIE BARBASA and ROSARIO BARBASA-PERLAS, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the Sandiganbayan's criminal jurisdiction over graft charges filed
against the Legal Department Head of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-
Retirement and Separation Benefit System (AFP-RSBS) and his co-accused.
The Facts and the Case
In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged
anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when
acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an
unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a
unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted purchase price. The first would be
kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second would be held by the
vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in
the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee, to enable the
AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors to pay
lesser taxes.
The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General
Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered
deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba,
and Iloilo for falsification of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph
1, in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, Sections 3(e) and 3(g).
1
Acting on the Committee s recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the
acquisition of lands in Iloilo City informations before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello,
Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita
Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel, Felipe Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six
counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of falsification of public
documents under Article 171, RPC.
Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the informations
on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On
February 12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand
of the records to the proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the
Philippines, represented by the OMB, which challenges such order.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in
holding that it has no jurisdiction over offenses involving the heads of the legal
departments of government-owned and controlled corporations.
The Ruling of the Court
In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a stock or
non-stock corporation, AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a government-owned and
controlled corporation. Consequently, respondent AFP-RSBS legal department
officers did not fall under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. 8249 that defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.2 On motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution, however, the Sandiganbayan changed its position and ruled that AFP-
RSBS is after all a government-owned and controlled corporation, having been
created by special law to perform a public function.
Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused
since Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to
commit the crime charged, did not hold any of the government positions
enumerated under that section, the pertinent portion of which reads: rbl r l l lbrr
Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as
follows: rbl r l l lbrr
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving: rl
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti- "departments" in relation to the position of "manager." Under this definition,
respondent Bello would fit into the term "manager," he having charge of the AFP-
graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
RSBS Legal Department when the questioned transactions took place.
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are

officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used in Section 4(a)(1)(g), the
Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this doctrine, a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
proper construction may be had by considering the company of words in which the
offense:
term or phrase in question is founded or with which it is associated. 6 Given that the
rbl r l l lbrr

xxx word "manager" was in the company of the words "presidents, directors or
trustees," the clear intent, according to the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning
of the term "manager" to officers who have overall control and supervision of
chanrobles virtual law library

government-owned and controlled corporations.

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. But as the OMB puts it, the enumeration of the officials in each of the categories in

(Emphasis ours) Section 4(a)(1) should be understood to refer to a range of positions within a
government corporation. By the variety of the functions they perform, the
chanrobles virtual law library

"presidents, directors or trustees, or managers" cannot be taken to refer only to

those who exercise "overall" control and supervision of such corporations.
Notably, in its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan defined the word
"manager" used above as one who has charge of a corporation and control of its The directors or trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations do not,
businesses or of its branch establishments, and who is vested with a certain amount for example, exercise overall supervision and control; when they act collectively as
of discretion and independent judgment. a board, the directors or trustees merely lay down policies for the operating officers
to implement. Since "managers" definitely do not have the same responsibilities as
The Sandiganbayan cited Black s Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed., 1968 to support
directors and trustees or as presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate
this definition.3
officers that, under the definition above, has charge of a corporation s "divisions or
rll

departments." This brings Bello s position within the definition.

After a quick check of the same dictionary source but of a later edition, however, the
Court finds this additional definition of "manager:"
Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan does not exercise jurisdiction
rbl r l l lbrr

over him because his rank at the time of the acts complained of was merely that of
A manager is one who has charge of corporation and control of its businesses, or of
Police Superintendent in the Philippine National Police. But the criminal information
its branch establishments, divisions, or departments, and who is vested with a does not charge him for offenses relating to the regular police work of a police

certain amount of discretion and independent judgment.4 rll

officer of his rank. He is rather charged for offenses he committed in relation to his
chanrobles virtual law library

office, namely, that of a "manager" of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, a

government-owned and controlled corporation.
The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above definition that includes
"divisions, or departments," which are corporate units headed by managers. The What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by law must commit the
United States case of Braniff v. McPherren5 also referred to "divisions" and offense described in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official
duties or in relation to the office being held.7 Here, the OMB charged Bello of using
his office as Legal Department Head to manipulate the documentations of AFP-RSBS
land acquisitions to the prejudice of the government.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan
decision dated February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal
Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31, and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan
to REINSTATE these cases, immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and resolve
accused Raul Aposaga s motion for reinvestigation.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-19650. September 29, 1966.]
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., Petitioner-Appellee, v. ENRICO PALOMAR, in
his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, Respondent-Appellant.
Solicitor General for respondent and Appellant.
Ross, Selph & Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. DECLARATORY RELIEF; CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON BEFORE RELIEF CAN BE
AVAILED OF. In order that a declaratory relief may be available, the following
conditions must be present: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino v. The Board of
Accountancy, Et Al., G. R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, Et. Al. v.
Republic of the Philippines, 50 Off. Gaz., No. 2, pp. 578, 578-579; Edades v.
Edades, Et Al., G. R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956).
2. ID.; ELEMENT OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY; CASE AT BAR. The appellees
insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and
the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege
demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. There is an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right on the part of the appellee and a denial thereof on the part
of appellant concerning a real question or issue. With the appellees bent to hold the
contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the
contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable
litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing
declaration (Pablo y Sen, Et. Al. v. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-6868,
April 30, 1955). Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy
when it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward
v. Fox West Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTRUCTION DEFINED; CASE AT BAR.
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws,
p. 1). In the present case, the question of whether or not the scheme proposed by
the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used
therein. This is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
4. ID.; WEIGHT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS. In this jurisdiction, judicial decisions
assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but
also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
5. LOTTERY; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for
the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential
elements of a lottery are: first, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance ("El
Debate", Inc. v. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, citing Horner v. United States
[1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House v. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S. 497; U.S. v.
Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. v. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil.,
395; U.S. v. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company v.
Carmona,p. 233, ante).
6. ID.; GRATUITOUS DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY BY CHANCE; ELEMENT OF
CONSIDERATION NOT PRESENT; CASE AT BAR. In respect to the element of
consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving
the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a
prize ("El Debate", Inc. v. Topacio, supra). Under the rules of the proposed contest
there is no requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any
service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for
the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same
for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles, the contest fails to exhibit any
discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. The scheme is but a
gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
7. ID.; TEST TO DETERMINE PRESENCE OF CONSIDERATION. The element of
consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for
the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of
value in return for the distribution of the prize (People v. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137
Cal. App. [Supp.] 788). The standpoint of the contestant, not that of the sponsor, is
all that matters.
8. ID.; MEANING OF TERM "GIFT ENTERPRISE" ; PROPOSED SCHEME NOT
EMBRACED BY THE TERM. The term "gift enterprise" is commonly applied to a
sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value, but by way of
inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am.
Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with
Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of
Plattsmouth v. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker v. State, 193 S.E.. 605,
56 Ga. App., 705; Bell v. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus
conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar, where there is no
sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the
purchaser, and where the contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of
whether or not they buy the appellees products.
9. POSTAL LAW; TERM "GIFT ENTERPRISE" IS USED IN ASSOCIATION WITH WORD
"LOTTERY." In the Postal Law the term "gift enterprise" is used in association with
the word "lottery." Consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics
noscitur a sociis, it is only logical that the term be accorded no other meaning than
that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if
lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not the slightest indicium in the
law of any intent to eliminate the element of consideration from the "gift enterprise"
therein included.
10. ID.; MAIL FRAUD ORDERS, PURPOSE OF. Mail fraud orders are designed to
prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which
on grounds of public policy are declared non- mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift
enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to
suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals
(Com. v. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent
that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows
ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the
reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain.
11. ID.; WHEN GIFT ENTERPRISES ARE CONDEMNABLE; CASE AT BAR. Under the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein
contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
consideration. Because there is none in the contest herein in question, the appellee
may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
DECISION
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)
conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up
patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls
for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump
at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the
Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate
families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivers." For the privilege to participate, no fee or
consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be
made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station
where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. chanroble s virtual lawlibrary
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called
"Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of
liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the
next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-
burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for
second; and an Eveready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set
for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the
"Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified
contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-
prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional
first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip
to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers in order to take part in
the "National Contest." The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will
receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs
of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed can from
which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will
be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first;
P2,000 for second; P1,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the
remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative
thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982
and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read
as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of
the following classes, whether sealed as first- class matter or not, shall be imported
into the Philippines through the mails, or be deposited in or carried by the mails of
the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the
Bureau of Posts: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner
pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of
any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." cralaw
virtua1aw library
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders. Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or
company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts
may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to
the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word fraudulent plainly
written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever
class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or
agent of such person or company." cralaw virtua1aw library
"SECTION 1983. Deprivation, of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer
service. The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any
person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme
for the distribution of money, or of any reel or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the
issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic
transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company,
whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or
association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the
remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in
favor of such person or company or its agent." cralaw virtua1aw library
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated
October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest
rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster
General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid
and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsels letter of December 7,
1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there
being involved no consideration on the part of any contestant, the contest was not,
under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years
before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view
that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a
"gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of
December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the
proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud
order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives." chanroble s virtuallawlibrary
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for
declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that
judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be
violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of
the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public." After issues were
joined upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules
marked as Annex B of the petition do (sic) not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails."
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues:
first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief;
and, second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the
Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was
the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory
relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and
for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised
Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established
jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor to
wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory
relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must
be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino v. The Board of Accountancy, Et. Al. 90
Phil., 83; Delumen, Et. Al. v. Republic of the Philippines, 94 Phil., 287; 50 Off. Gaz.,
No. 2, pp. 578, 578-579; Edades v. Edades, Et Al., 99 Phil., 675). The gravamen of
the appellants stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the
foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a
number of significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a
business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned light to
exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise
and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as
the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the
power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the
issuance of fraud orders, under sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its
right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme
cralaw virtua1aw library hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of
information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to
request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue
of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the
Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and
accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction
to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which
the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence
with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the
obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed
by the appellants open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was
"conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its
representatives." cralaw virtua1aw library
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The
appellees insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed
contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the
privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of
the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere
theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interest are
substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views
on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its
business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellees proposed contest
believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable
duty. With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue
a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous
shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled
and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, Et. Al. v. Republic of the
Philippines, G. R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of
the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the
appellees "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others"
which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has
ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated
into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward v. Fox West Coast
Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellants pretense that there is here no
question of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear
provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest",
hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the
fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, in the circumstances here presented,
the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their
application to the appellees contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the
art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given
case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).
This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee
is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably
requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our
mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the
matter at hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing
down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of
the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the
construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and
final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate
resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety
nay, the necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the
asperity, distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which
looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and
cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin v.
Arnebergh, 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am.
Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which
it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If
it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with
these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it
not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition,
of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee
will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed
censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous
censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations
in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (Section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of
Court) which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty
and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law we cannot see in the
present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in
our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling
we hand down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying
function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the
appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this
jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of
the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decision
assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but
also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain
no misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just
reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N. J., 399,
117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was
advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the
characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the
corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the
corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see
also: Bunis v. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin v.
Arnebergh, supra.; Thrillo, Inc. v. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost
identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns
as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud
orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to,
any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind." Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in
this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El
Debate", Inc. v. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the
power of the postal authorities under the above-mentioned provisions of the Postal
Law, this Court declared that
"While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one
for this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases
having, to do with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The
term lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as
policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms
of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration;
second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner v. United States [1892], 147 U.S. 449;
Public Clearing House v. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. v. Filart and Singson
[1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. v. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. v. Baguio
[1919], 39 Phil, 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company v. Carmona, p. 233,
ante.)"
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and
chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention.
Consequently, as the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed
down to the existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this
matter, our tasks is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited,
this Court has laid down a definitive yardstick in the following terms
"In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the
gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly
or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal
schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly
for the chance to draw a prize." cralaw virtua1aw library

Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the
language in which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
"No puzzles. no rhymes? You dont need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You dont
have to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liters the Caltex gas
pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from . . . to . . .,
and win valuable prizes. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise
be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station,
request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and
submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned
inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would
brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we heed the stern injunction, "look beyond the
fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious
tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. v. Topacio, supra,
p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but
actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellants insistence that non-Caltex customers who may
buy Caltex products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a
consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if
the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-
requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does
not have to buy anything or to give anything of value.
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales
promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by
those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to
draw a prize by securing entry blanks." The required element of consideration does
not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as
laid down in People v. Cardas, 28 P. 2d. 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp). 788, is whether
the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of
the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that
matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum,
should set the matter at rest: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does
receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the
drawing, does not supply the element of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. v.
Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W. 2d., 844." (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind", which is equally proscribed? Incidentally, while the appellants brief
appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case
cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as
an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellants
action was predicted, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the
Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for
want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element
is not essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed contest
wanting in consideration as we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise,
cannot be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out
in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and
standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under
which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black,
Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd
ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth v. Kieck, 257
N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker v. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell v.
State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly
cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to
which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The
contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy
the appellees products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellees contest can be
encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of
being extended, we think that the appellants pose will gain no added comfort. As
stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift
enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of
consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes v. State,
235 Ala. 192, 178 So. 73; Russell v. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga., 154, 58
S.E, 88; State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox- Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d.,
689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally
impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the
prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and
consideration (E.g.: Bills v. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; DOrio v.
Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People v. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City
and County of Denver v. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo. 20, 7 L.R.A., N. S. 1131,
12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker v. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56
Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent
conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions
relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the
terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills v. People,
supra,); in others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance has
been specifically eliminated by statute (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker v. State,
supra; State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The
lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore,
that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable
statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in
association with the word "lottery." With the meaning of lottery settled, and
consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis
which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only in so far as the element
of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under construction should
be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the
word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly,
there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element
of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the
law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory
construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of
the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public
policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar
schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to
inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. v. Lund, 15 A. 2d.,
839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value
be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where
no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law
can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
"Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery, if it
is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived,
directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell v. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M.,
258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, Emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we
are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which
we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein
contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the
appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof. chanroble svirtual|awlibrary
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the
rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal
Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
xii. EJUSDEM GENERIS

[G.R. No. L-24776. June 28, 1974.]

THE CITY OF MANILA, THE MAYOR OF MANILA, THE CITY ENGINEER OF

MANILA, FERNANDO S. VINZONS and DOMINGA VINZONS-CU, Petitioners,
v. JUAN ENTOTE,Respondent.

J. C. Yuseco & A. R. Narvasa, for Petitioners.

Gelasio L. Dimaano for Respondent.

 "(3) ordering the nine conditions contained in the agreement between the City and
DECISION
the petitioner, with conditions 6 and 7 modified in accordance with the next
preceding paragraph, annotated on the proper certificate of title; and
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
"(4) ordering the intervenors Fernando S. Vinzons and Dominga Vinzons-Cu to close
completely and forever any and all openings and apertures of their houses intended
This litigation involves an easement of a right-of-way over Lot 3, Pcs-2672, covered
for ingress, egress and regress, abutting on the said private alley. Costs against the
by T.C.T. 45531 of the Register of Deeds of Manila issued in the name of Juan Entote
intervenors." 2
who on February 2, 1961, instituted the present action for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition against the City of Manila, its Mayor and City Engineer, docketed as
The case is now before Us for review on certiorari upon petition filed by the City of
civil case 46352 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to compel the City and its
Manila, the City Mayor and the City Engineer, Fernando S. Vinzons and Dominga
officials to release the lot from said easement by virtue of which it was made open
Vinzons-Cu as petitioners with Juan Entote, Respondent.
to the public in general as an approved private alley. During the pendency of civil
case 46352, Fernando Vinzons and his sister Dominga Vinzons-Cu intervened in the
The decision of the appellate court recites the following undisputed facts: 3
proceedings. After trial, the Court of First Instance presided then by Hon. Edilberto
Soriano rendered judgment dismissing Juan Entotes complaint. Juan Entote
Juan Entote is the registered owner of five (5) lots located in the City of Manila
appealed to the Court of Appeals and on August 24, 1964, a decision was rendered
covered by separate certificates of title, to wit: (a) Lot 2 (LRC) Pcs-232, 106.03 sq.
by the Fourth Division of said Courts 1 which set aside the trial courts decision in
m., T.C.T. 46840; (b) Lot 3 Pcs-2672; 202.4 sq. m., T.C.T. 45531; (c) Lot 1 Pcs-
the following manner: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

2672, 143.11 sq. m., T.C.T. 45547; (d) Lot 12-D Pcs-5804, 142.8 sq. m., T.C.T.
45548, and (e) Lot 2 Psd-3665, 436.92 sq. m., T.C.T. 45531. All these. five lots are
"ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is set aside, and we enter another
contiguous to `each other and form one integrated parcel which abuts Padre
Herrera Street, a public thoroughfare. When Entote acquired Lot 3 Pcs-2672 which
"(1) declaring the alley under litigation as a private alley, and limiting the use
is the lot involved in this litigation and to which We shall refer simply as Lot 3, the
thereof exclusively and only to the owner of the immovable (petitioner), his heirs,
same was already subject to an easement of a right-or-way annotated on T.C.T.
assigns and servants, to persons dealing with the owner of the immovable, and to
45531 which reads as follows: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

public officers and public employees whose duties have to do with public order,
public safety, public health, public morals and the general welfare of society.
"Entry No. 2072/T-20550 EASEMENT OF A RIGHT OF WAY Affecting Lot 3 of
plan Pcs-2672 described herein, for ingress, egress and regress in favor of the
"(2) ordering the modification of conditions 6 and 7 contained in the agreement
owners of Lob 1 and 2 of plan Pcs-2672, respectively, their heirs and assigns, their
between the City and petitioner so as to read as follows: 6. the use of the alley
servants and any and all other persons whomsoever, for their respective use,
shall be limited exclusively to the applicant Juan Entote, his heirs, assigns and
benefits or advantage, with right at all times to pass and repass over said property.
servants, to persons dealing with him, and to public officers and public employees
(Dec. No. 403, page 36, Book 23 of Not. Pub. of Manila, Nicanor G. Jocson)." cralaw virtua1aw library

whose duties have to do with public order, public safety, public health, public morals
and the general welfare of society; 7.1 will allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and
Adjacent to the property of respondent Entote is that of intervenor Fernando
drainage purposes, and I shall not ask for indemnity for the use thereof;
Vinzons who is the registered owner of several lots which like those of Juan Entote
are adjacent to each other and also constitute one integrated parcel which borders
Lorenzo Chacon Street. The house of the other intervenor Dominga Vinzons-Cu is
erected on this property of her brother, Fernando Vinzons. One of the lots of
intervenor Vinzons is what is now described as Lot 1 of Consolidation-Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Pcs-232 registered under T.C.T. 46726. This particular lot is a
consolidation of Lot 15-A Psd 12716 which was titled in the name of Fernando
Vinzons under T.C.T. 33678, with a 35.87-sq.m. portion of Lot 2 Pcs-2672, the latter
having been bought by intervenor Vinzons from Petrona Vera Vda. de Marzan on
December 27, 1956. Upon the sale of this 35.87-sq. m. portion of Lot 2 Pcs 2672
and its segregation from the rest of said Lot 2, the vendor Marzan and the vendee
Vinzons entered into an agreement whereby: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"The parties agree to waive, quitclaim and renounce their right-of-way easement to
the adjoining lot known as Lot 3 of Plan Pcs-2672 and annotated in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 45531 as P/E 139193 V-26, there being already an access to
Lorenzo Chacon, a public street." cralaw virtua1aw library
With the consolidation of the 35.87-sq. m. portion of Lot 2 Pcs-2672 with Lot 15-A
Psd 12716, a new certificate of title No. 46726 was issued for the consolidated
parcel now described as Lot 1 Pcs-232. The remaining portion of Lot 2 Pcs 2672
with an area of 106.03 sq. m. became Lot 2 of the consolidation subdivision plan
232 and was subsequently sold by the owner Marzan to respondent Entote to whom
was issued T.C.T. 46840, and is one of the contiguous lots owned by Entote which
We mentioned earlier.
On March 12, 1957, respondent Entote applied to the City Engineer of Manila for a
permit to construct a two-storey building on his aforementioned property. The City
Engineer, however, required as a condition to the issuance of said permit that Lot 3
be converted into an approved private alley subject to nine (9) conditions as
follows: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"1. The private alley shall be at least three (3) meters in width;
"2. The alley shall not be closed so long as a building exists thereon;
"3. The alley shall be opened to the sky;
"4. I shall construct the alley and provide the same with concrete canals as per
specifications of the City Engineer;
"5. The maintenance and upkeep of the alley shall be at my expense;
"6. The alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstruction whatsoever shall be
placed thereon;
"7. I will allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer
and drainage purposes, and I shall not ask for any indemnity for the use thereof;
"8. I shall impose upon the vendor or new owner of the property the conditions
above-mentioned;
"9. I shall register at my expense in the Register of Deeds of Manila, the nine (9)
conditions set forth for the opening of this alley as encumbrance in the
corresponding Certificate of Title covering my property." (EmphasisOurs)
Believing that he had no other recourse but to accede to the conditions imposed by
the City Engineer, respondent accepted the same, and the nine conditions were duly
annotated on the certificate of title of Lot 3.
Sometime in 1959, a respondent Entote wanted to construct an adobe stone fence
and a guardhouse at the dead end portion of Lot 3 because of thefts committed
inside his property, and he applied for a building permit but his application was
denied on the ground that Lot 3 was an approved private alley which was to remain
accessible not only to the adjacent lot-owners but to the public in general. On
September 17, 1959, Entote sent a letter to the City Mayor and the City Engineer
stating that he was withdrawing Lot 3 as an approved private alley, but this was
opposed and denied by the City. Entote was thus compelled to go to court for relief
through the present action.
The Court of Appeals found merit in respondent Entotes complaint, and We fully
concur with the judgment under the following considerations.
1. As regards the opposition of petitioners Fernando Vinzons and Dominga Vinzons-
Cu to whom We shall refer simply as intervenors
An easement as defined in Art. 613 of the Civil Code is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner. It is established either by law, in which case it is called legal, or by the will of
the parties? in which event it is a voluntary easement. 4 A voluntary easement is
extinguished upon its renunciation by the owner of the dominant estate. 5
We have before Us an easement of right-of-way voluntarily constituted over Lot 3
Pcs-2672 by its original owner, Petrona Vera Vda. de Marzan, in favor of Lots 1 and
2 also of Pcs 2672 likewise owned by her. When owner Marzan sold a small portion
of 35.87 square meters of Lot 2 to intervenor Fernando Vinzons, the vendor and
vendee agreed in writing that the parties "waive, quitclaim and renounce their right-
of-way easement to the adjoining lot known as Lot 3 of Plan Pcs-2672" for the
reason that the sold portion was to be consolidated with another lot of the vendee
which gave it an outlet to Lorenzo Chacon Street. By this written agreement the
vendee, Fernando Vinzons, expressly and formally renounced and lost accordingly
whatever rights he had to the easement of right-of way over Lot 3; his renunciation
being perfectly valid under the law 6 the same is binding upon him and upon all
those whose interests are derived from him, the other intervenor Dominga Vinzons-
Cu included.
Intervenors assert, however, that the Appellate Court erred in denying them the
enjoyment of the easement, the waiver executed by Fernando Vinzons
notwithstanding, for the simple reason that the herein intervenors are embraced
within the phrase: "any and all other persons whomsoever, for their respective use."
found in the entry of the easement and that said phrase is "clear enough indication
of the intent to distinguish between, on the one hand, the `owners of Lots 1 and 2 .
. . their heirs and assigns, their servants, and on the other, all other persons of the
general public." In other words, according to intervenors the easement was
intended not only for the benefit of the immovable Lot 2 and its owners, but of the
community and the public at large. 7
The foregoing argument of intervenors cannot be sustained. For ready reference We
are quoting once more the entry on the easement which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"Entry No. 2072/T-20550 EASEMENT OF A RIGHT OF WAY Affecting Lot 3 of
plan Pcs-2672 described herein, for ingress, egress and regress in favor of the
owners of Lots 1 and 2 of plan Pcs-2672, respectively, their heirs and assigns, their
servants and any and all other persons whomsoever, for their respective use,
benefits or advantage, with right at all times to pass and repass over said property.
(Dec. No. 403, page 36, Book 29 of Not. Pub. of Manila, Nicanor G. Jocson)."
(emphasis Ours)
As correctly stated in the decision under review: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
". . . A reading of the annotation on the certificate of title 45531 will show that the
right of way was constituted in favor of the owners of Lots 1 and 2 of plan Pcs-2672,
their heirs and assigns, their servants and all other persons whomsoever, for their
respective use. Here the easement enumerates particular or specific persons who
are entitled to the easement and followed by general terms.
"It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that where general words follow an enumeration
of persons or things, by words of a particular or specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same general class as those specifically mentioned.
Under the rule of construction known as ejusdem generis, where general words
follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words
will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature
or class as those enumerated. The rule is based on the obvious reason that if the
legislature had intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense
they would have made no mention of the particular classes. (82 CJS 658-660.)
General words, which standing alone might have a wide and comprehensive
meaning, when joined with an enumeration of articles, things, and entities will be
interpreted in their narrower sense and understood to refer only to articles, things
and entities fairly similar in kind, class and nature to those set forth in the
associated list of enumeration. (Sandack v. Tamme, C.A. N.M., 182 F.2d. 759.)
"In the case at bar general words follow an enumeration of particular classes of
persons which are analogous in the sense that they have one common denominator
privity with the owners of lots 1 and 2 plan Pcs-2672. Hence, the generic terms
used in the easement should be construed in a limited sense as to exclude the
indiscriminate public from the enjoyment of the right of way easement constituted
on the alley and limit the same to those who are privy to the owners of the
dominant estates, lots 1 and 2 plan Pcs-2672." (pp. 18-20, rollo)
Intervenors assail the application of the "ejusdem generis" rule which gives the
"easement a restricted and restrictive construction" and claim that under the
"primordial rule of construction that where the terms of an instrument are clear,
there is no room or occasion for interpretation either to enlarge or restrict their
plain meaning." 8 The flaw of the argument lies in the fact that it ignores the
phraseology of the easement which made use first, of terms referring to specific
class of person, viz: "the owners of Lots 1 and 2 of plan Pcs-2672, respectively,
their heirs and assigns, their servants", and then, after such an enumeration,
subjoins a term of extensive and general signification, i.e.," and any and all other
persons whomsoever." It is this kind of phraseology in a statute or any written
document which precisely calls for the application of the doctrine of "ejusdem
generis" in construing the import of the general phrase used. For under the maxim
of "ejusdem generis" which means "of the same kind, class or nature", when
general words follow an enumeration of particular cases, such words apply only to
cases of the same kind as those expressly mentioned. 9 Thus, when broad
expressions are used, such as, "and all others", or "any others" these are usually to
be restricted to persons or things of the same kind or class with those specifically
named in the preceding words. 9* In our jurisdiction, this Court in Ollada v. Court of
Tax Appeals, Et. Al. 10 applied the rule of "ejusdem generis" to construe the
purview of a general phrase "other matters" appearing after an enumeration of
specific cases decided by the Collector of Internal Revenue and appealable to the
Court of Tax Appeals found in section 7, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 1125, and
it held that in order that a matter may come under said general clause, it is
necessary that it belongs to the same kind or class of cases therein specifically
enumerated. In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 11 the rule of "ejusdem generis"
was once more applied to construe a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act
of 1970 (R.A. 6132) which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens,
lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or
foreign origin, 12 and the Court held that under the doctrine of "ejusdem generis"
the phrase "and the like" applies to things or gadgets of the kind specifically
enumerated, and that consequently the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes
is not within the general clause. All the above simply shows that contrary to the
assertions of the intervenors, in the case now before Us, the Appellate Court
correctly applied the rule of "ejusdem generis" in construing the easement in
question thereby holding that the clause "any and all other persons whomsoever"
embraces only "those who are privy to the owners of the dominant estate, lots 1
and 2 Plan Pcs-2672" and excludes "the indiscriminate public from the enjoyment of
the right-of-way easement." 13
Intervenors-petitioners argue however that the right of the public to use Lot 3 is a
settled matter decided in their favor and adversely against respondent Entote in civil
case 33076 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding the contrary. 14 Intervenors refer to a complaint filed on July 10,
1957, with the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Entote against
intervenor Fernando Vinzons and the latters tenant Cu Kim Ching to compel them
to remove a steel matting fence which was built across Lot 3 on the side bordering
the Vinzons property. In said case, Fernando Vinzons interposed a counter-claim
alleging that he had in his favor an easement over Lot 3. The trial court rendered
judgment the dispositive part of which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants forthwith to
remove the adobe stone and steel matting fence erected on the private alley in
question (being lot 3, Pcs-26721 of which plaintiff is the exclusive owner;
sentencing defendants to pay, jointly and severally, to plaintiff the sum of P3.00 per
sq. m. per month for the use and occupation of the 14.4481 sq. m. of the said alley,
cut by the afore-mentioned fence, from April, 1957 until the fence referred to is
actually removed, and the costs; and dismissing defendants counterclaim for lack of
merit. (Emphasis ours)"
In a portion of the body of the decision of the trial court, it says
"As to the second proposition or issue raised by defendant, that he has a right of
easement to use or pass along the alley in question, it is needless to say that as
soon as the fence is removed, defendant, in common with others, may use or pass
along the alley which is intended for the public (See Exhs. 25, 25a, 25b, and 25c)."
(pp. 22-23, rollo, emphasis Ours)
It is claimed by intervenors that the above pronouncement in civil case 33076 from
which no appeal was taken by respondent Entote, is now the law of the case"
between the parties."
We disagree. The Appellate Court rightly held that the quoted portion of the trial
courts opinion in civil case 33076 was but an obiter dictum because the right of the
public to the use of the private alley, Lot 3, was never an issue in said case. 15
What was put forth by intervenor Vinzons as his defense and counterclaim in the
case was his alleged right to an easement of right-of-way over Lot 3; he did not
invoke either in his defenses or counterclaim the right of the public in general to use
said alley. Considering therefore that what was set up by intervenor Fernando
Vinzons as his counterclaim was his right-of-way easement over Lot 3, which
however was expressly and categorically dismissed in the dispositive part of the
decision, the Court of Appeals properly held that said decision in civil case 33076
was res judicata in favor of now respondent Entote as against intervenors herein
insofar as the easement over Lot 3 was concerned. It is a settled doctrine that the
judgment of a case is what is contained in the dispositive portion; statements made
in the opinion are "informal expressions of the view of the court and cannot prevail
against its final order or decision." 16 A remark made, or opinion expressed, by a
judge, in his decision upon a cause, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon
the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, is an obiter dictum and as such it lacks the force of an
adjudication and is not to be regarded as such. 17 In the aforecited civil case 33076
the alleged right of the public to use Lot 3 as an approved private alley was not in
issue and consequently the statement of the trial court on that point was a mere
expression of an opinion, an obiter dictum with no binding force for purposes of res
judicata.
The next argument of intervenors is that the maintenance of Lot 3 as a private alley
open to public use is in consonance with section 103 of the Revised Ordinances of
the City of Manila which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"When the applications, plans, and specifications conform to the requirements of
this title and of title thirteen hereof, the city engineer shall issue a permit for the
erection of the building and shall approve in writing such plans and specifications,
one copy of which shall be returned to the owner or his agent and one copy shall be
retained by the city engineer; Provided, That the building shall abut or face upon a
public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially
approved; And provided, further, That any private street or alley opened in an
interior lot for the purposes of this section, once officially approved, shall be open to
the general public, and with its approved width preserved, shall be maintained and
kept in good repair by the grantee of the permit, his heirs, executors and assigns,
and shall never be closed by any person so long as there is a building or other
structure abutting or facing upon such private street or alley. (Emphasis ours.)"
(See p. 13, petitioners-city officials brief) 18
Intervenors assert, and on this point the other petitioners i.e., the City of Manila
and its Mayor and City Engineer, join them, that the above-quoted provision is
designed to protect the health, sanitation, and the safety of the public and that this
Court upheld its enforcement in the case of Aragon Et. Al. v. City Engineer Aquino,
GRL-48451, October 30, 1942.
We do not doubt the wisdom of, much less the necessity for, an ordinance such as
section 103 quoted above; however, We believe that it cannot be used to justify the
retention of Lot 3 of respondent Entote as private alley open to the general public.
It is important to note that the City Engineer required the opening of Lot 3 as a
private alley in connection with the issuance of a permit to construct a building of
respondent Entote on one of his lots because the building to be constructed did not
abut a public street and the occupants thereof would have no exit. To provide that
exit to a public street, Lot 3 had to be converted into a private alley, and this was
primarily for the benefit of the building to be constructed on the interior lot of
respondent Entote. That being the case, We do not see how the Appellate Court
could have erred, as contended by intervenors, when it held that an alley opened
and maintained as a condition for the authority to construct a building is intended
only for its benefit and not for the general public, following, as it did, the decision of
this Court in Li Yao v. de Leon, Et. Al. L-14324, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 966, 972.
19
In the Li Yao case the facts were: Mariano Cu Unjieng and Sons owned several lots
in the City of Manila among which were known as Lots 3, 4-B, and 6-B. Lot 3 was
leased by Cu Unjieng to Smith Bell & Co. and the latter desiring to construct a
building at the inner portion of Lot 3 applied for a building permit. Because the
building did not abut a public street, more particularly Raon street, the City
Engineer of Manila required as a condition to the issuance of a permit that a private
alley two meters in width, be opened on the eastern part of Lot 3 to connect said
construction with Raon street pursuant to section 103 of the Revised City
Ordinances. Cu Unjieng as owner of the lot executed a public instrument
undertaking to open and maintain said private alley, and this was duly annotated on
the corresponding certificate of title of Lot 3 as well as the titles of Lots 4-B and 6-
B. Subsequently, William Li Yao became the owner of Lot 3 and in July of 1957 he
filed a petition in Court for the cancellation of the aforesaid encumbrance stating
that the building to which the encumbrance referred no longer existed and the legal
necessity for the private alley had terminated. The petition was opposed by the new
owners of Lots 4-B and 6-B surnamed de Leon on the ground that they had
buildings on these lots which would have no more access to Raon street if the alley
were closed. The City Engineer of Manila did not oppose the petition. The trial court
granted the petition of Li Yao after it found that Lots 4-B and 6-B are contiguous to
other lots of the oppositors which border along Rizal Ave. street. On appeal, this
Court affirmed the Order of the court a quo and held inter alia the following: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"Having been made as a condition precedent for the construction of a building in the
interior of Lot No. 3, said demand was evidently made for the benefit of the
occupants of said building, not those of Lots 4-B or 6-B, now belonging to
appellants: Whatever benefits the latter may have derived from the private alley in
question was purely incidental to those established in the interest of the occupants
of Lot No. 3. . . . The alley in question was opened and maintained in compliance
with the provisions of section 103 of the Revised City Ordinances, which deals with
the issuance of building construction permits by the City Engineer. Pursuant thereto,
no such permit shall be granted unless the building concerned abuts or faces upon
a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially
approved. Consequently, such private street or alley as may have been opened and
maintained as a condition for the authority to construct said building is intended
only for its benefit." (pp. 972-974, 1 SCRA; emphasis Ours)
The intervenors however cite the case of Aragon v. City Engineer Aquino, supra, to
justify the retention of the encumbrance over Lot 3; but that case is not in point as
correctly argued by respondent Entote in his brief. 20 In the Aquino case there was
a justifiable reason to deny the closure of the private alley in question as it would
deprive the "accessorias" constructed along the alley an exit to a public street and
the persons occupying said "accessorias" would thereby be prejudiced. In the case
now before Us, however, the herein intervenors have their own exit to Lorenzo
Chacon street as their property abuts the latter, and the closure of Lot 3 would not
damage them at all. Intervenors have really no use for said alley because as found
by the Appellate Court they even constructed a steel matting fence across a portion
of Lot 3 which was the one ordered removed by the Court of First Instance of Manila
in civil case 33076 mentioned earlier.
To compel respondent Entote to open and maintain Lot 3 for the benefit of the
herein intervenors as well as for the general public is to countenance a most
inequitable situation because: (1) without paying compensation for such use,
intervenors are given an exit to Padre Herrera street, the next street parallel to
Lorenzo Chacon street, thereby gaining access to two public thoroughfares, a
privilege or an advantage denied to respondent Entote who has no access to
Lorenzo Chacon street through the Vinzons property; (2) as regards the general
public, the latter is given the right to encroach on the privacy of a property owner
even without valid cause. Actually there is no benefit to be gained by the
indiscriminate public with the use of said alley as the latter traverses only through
the property of respondent Entote and ends there; the public cannot make use of
the alley to effect a "shortcut" from Padre Herrera to Lorenzo Chacon Street
because the Vinzons property stands on the way.
Hence, We agree with the Appellate Court when it ruled that the phrase contained in
section 103 of the Revised City Ordinances, to wit: "shall be opened to the general
public" is to be construed or interpreted to mean "only those persons dealing with
the owner of the immovable, the residents of the buildings for which the alley was
opened in the first place and officials and employees of the city as well as the
national government having to do with the safety, health, public order, morals and
the general welfare of society" and that "the indiscriminate public" is excluded
therefrom. 21

In fact, the word "alley" when not qualified of the term "private" is conventionally
understood in its relation to towns or cities to mean a narrow street in common use
(White v. Meadow Park Land Co., 213 S.W. 2d 123, 125, 240 Mo. App. 683), but
when the word "private" is prefixed to the word "alley" it acquires a different
meaning, that is, a "private alley" is an alley which is not dedicated to the public use
and to which the general public is denied access or which is set apart for some
particular purpose. (Talbert v. Mason, 113 Vs. W. 918, 921, 136 Iowa 373, 14
L.R.A., N.S., 818, 125 Am. St. Rep. 259)
One last argument advanced by intervenors is that the decision under review
permits respondent Entote to "disown and renege upon a formal undertaking he had
voluntarily assumed." 22
We can summarily dismiss this argument of intervenors by referring to the case of
Li Yao, supra, where there was a similar undertaking made by the property owner to
maintain the private alley open to the public but which did not stand on the way of
the Court when it allowed the property owner to cancel said undertaking. However,
a stronger reason why intervenors contention cannot be sustained is given by the
Appellate Court when it said: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
". . . Entote entered into the said agreement in the belief that the interpretation
given h section 103 of the Revised City Ordinances by the city officials is correct. He
was under the mistaken impression that the city could validly impose the nine
conditions.
"Mistake vitiates consent (See art. 1330, new Civil Code.) This is especially true
where mistake is made upon conditions which have moved the parties to enter into
the agreement. (See art. 1331, supra.) Therefore, it is obvious that where mistake
invalidates consent, the agreement is not binding. In this case, the consent of
Entote was vitiated by mistake in believing that the City could validly impose the
conditions. Hence, said agreement is not binding.
"The argument that Entote could have had the assistance of counsel, and that
considering his intelligence he could not have committed the mistake, is neither
here nor there. Entote sincerely believed that the respondents could legally impose
the condition that the alley must always be open to the public. He committed a
mistake in good faith. Hence, he is entitled to relief from the adverse effects of his
mistake. . . ." (pp. 34-35, rollo)
On the basis of all that We have stated above, We find that the Appellate Court did
not commit any error when it ordered the intervenors herein "to close completely
and forever any and all openings and appertures of their houses intended for
ingress, egress and regress abutting on the alley in question, 23 the latter being a
necessary consequence of the finding that intervenors have no right to any
easement of right-of-way over Lot 3. The claim of intervenors that Dominga
Vinzons-Cu would undergo considerable expense if required to tear down her
existing wall, demolish and remodel her house is of no moment considering that she
built with the knowledge that her brother had waived and renounced his easement
over Lot 3; if she was not told of that fact, then it is her co-intervenor, Fernando
Vinzons, who is to blame.
2. With respect to the opposition of petitioners, the City of Manila, the City Mayor
and City Engineer
The above-named petitioners center their opposition to the petition of respondent
Entote on section 103 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. 24 This point
has been amply discussed in this Opinion, 25 and what has been stated is sufficient
to dispose of the lone argument of the City. We add, however, that just as the City
of Manila in the case of Li Yao, supra, found no justifiable reason to oppose the
petition of William Li Yao to cancel from the latters certificate of title the
undertaking to keep his Lot 3 open to the public, so also in the case of the herein
respondent Entote, the City should find no valid reason to oppose the cancellation of
the encumbrance which requires respondents Lot 3 to be accessible to the public in
general, the situation in the two cases being strikingly similar.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We DENY this Petition for Review and AFFIRM the decision
of the Court of Appeals with costs against intervenors-petitioners.
So Ordered.
 Article Ten: Amusement Tax on Admission

G.R. NO. 183137 : April 10, 2013
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President,
GREGORY K. LOY,Petitioner, v.THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
DECISION
Section 59. Imposition of Tax. There is hereby levied a tax to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
cockpits, dancing halls, dancing schools, night or day clubs, and other places of
amusement at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission
fees; and

A tax of ten percent (10%) of gross receipts from admission fees for boxing,
LEONEN, J.:
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is likewise

The principal issue in this case is the scope of authority of a province to impose an levied. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

amusement tax.
Section 162 of the Tax Ordinance provided that the Tax Ordinance shall take effect

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on January 1, 2006.

praying that the December 10, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court,- Branch
It was Pelizloy's position that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10% amusement
62, La Trinidad, Benguet in Civil Case No. 06-CV-2232 be reversed and set aside
tax on gross receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
and a new one issued in which: ( 1) respondent Province of Benguet is declared as
hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the Province of
having no authority to levy amusement taxes on admission fees for resorts,
Benguet. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before the Secretary of Justice on January
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, tourist spots, and other places for
27, 2006.
recreation; (2) Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005
is declared null and void; and (3) the respondent Province of Benguet is
The appeal/petition was filed within the thirty (30)-day period from the effectivity of
permanently enjoined from enforcing Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial
a tax ordinance allowed by Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
Revenue Code of 2005.
as the Local Government Code (LGC).1 The appeal/petition was docketed as MSO-
OSJ Case No. 03-2006.
Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owns Palm Grove Resort, which is
designed for recreation and which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and
Under Section 187 of the LGC, the Secretary of Justice has sixty (60) days from
function halls. It is located at Asin, Angalisan, Municipality of Tuba, Province of
receipt of the appeal to render a decision. After the lapse of which, the aggrieved
Benguet.
party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved

Treating the Secretary of Justice's failure to decide on its appeal/petition within the
Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue
sixty (60) days provided by Section 187 of the LGC as an implied denial of such
Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance"). Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance levied a
appeal/petition, Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before
ten percent (10%) amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts,
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet. The petition was docketed
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots." Specifically, it provides
as Civil Case No. 06-CV-2232.
the following: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Pelizloy argued that Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance imposed a
percentage tax in violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of local
government units (LGUs) under Section 133 (i) of the LGC. Thus, it was null and
void ab initio. Section 133 (i) of the LGC provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.
- Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxx
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar
transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided herein
The Province of Benguet assailed the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction
as an improper remedy. It alleged that once a tax liability has attached, the only
remedy of a taxpayer is to pay the tax and to sue for recovery after exhausting
administrative remedies.2 chanroble svirtualawlibrary
On substantive grounds, the Province of Benguet argued that the phrase other
places of amusement in Section 140 (a) of the LGC3 encompasses resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since "Article 220 (b)
(sic)" of the LGC defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion and entertainment
x x x synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."4 However, the Province
of Benguet erroneously cited Section 220 (b) of the LGC. Section 220 of the LGC
refers to valuation of real property for real estate tax purposes. Section 131 (b) of
the LGC, the provision which actually defines "amusement", states:
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term:
xxx
(b) "Amusement" is a pleasurable diversion and entertainment. It is synonymous to
relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun On December 10, 2007, the RTC rendered the
assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction for
lack of merit.
Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper remedy. On the
validity of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance, the RTC noted that, while
Section 59, Article X imposes a percentage tax, Section 133 (i) of the LGC itself
allowed for exceptions. It noted that what the LGC prohibits is not the imposition by
LGUs of percentage taxes in general but the "imposition and levy of percentage tax
on sales, barters, etc., on goods and services only." 5 It further gave credence to the
Province of Benguet's assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
chanroble svirtualawlibrary
springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the phrase other places of
amusement in Section 140 of the LGC.
On May 21, 2008, the RTC denied Pelizloy's Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Pelizloy filed the present petition on June 10, 2008 on pure questions of
law. It assailed the legality of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance as being a
(supposedly) prohibited percentage tax per Section 133 (i) of the LGC.
In its Comment, the Province of Benguet, erroneously citing Section 40 of the LGC,
argued that Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance does not levy a percentage
tax "because the imposition is not based on the total gross receipts of services of
the petitioner but solely and actually limited on the gross receipts of the admission
fees collected."6 In addition, it argued that provinces can validly impose amusement
taxes on resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots, these
being amusement places'.
For resolution in this petition are the following issues: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Whether or not Section 59, Article X of Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107,
otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005, levies a percentage tax.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary
2. Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on
admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist
spots for being "amusement places" under the Local Government Code.
The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty,"7 and as such, inheres in the State.
Such, however, is not true for provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays as they
are not the sovereign;8 rather, they are mere "territorial and political subdivisions of First, Section 130 provides for the following fundamental principles governing the
the Republic of the Philippines".9
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

taxing powers of LGUs: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, muncipalities and 1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.
barangays is summarized in Icard v. City Council of Baguio: 10
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2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall: chanroble svirtualawlibrary

It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no

a. be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's ability to pay; cralawlibrary

inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power when
b. be levied and collected only for public purposes; cralawlibrary

granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of

the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality.
c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no place in the interpretation of
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the taxing power of a municipal corporation.11 [Underscoring supplied]

d. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the restraint

Therefore, the power of a province to tax is limited to the extent that such power is of trade.
delegated to it either by the Constitution or by statute. Section 5, Article X of the
1987 Constitution is clear on this point: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case

be let to any private person.

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines
4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee,

governments. [Underscoring supplied] charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by the LGC.

Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer
5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.
vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct
authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges."12 Nevertheless, such authority is
Second, Section 133 provides for the common limitations on the taxing powers of
"subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide". 13 chanroble svirtualawlibrary

LGUs. Specifically, Section 133 (i) prohibits the levy by LGUs of percentage or value-

In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted 14

added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
services except as otherwise provided by the LGC.
Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters.

As it is Pelizloy's contention that Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance levies a
Relevant provisions of Book II of the LGC establish the parameters of the taxing
prohibited percentage tax, it is crucial to understand first the concept of a
powers of LGUS found below.
percentage tax.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Citytrust Investment Phils. Inc.,15 the
Supreme Court defined percentage tax as a "tax measured by a certain percentage
of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods sold, bartered or
imported; or of the gross receipts or earnings derived by any person engaged in the
sale of services." Also, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in Section 125, Title V,16 lists amusement taxes as
among the (other) percentage taxes which are levied regardless of whether or not a
taxpayer is already liable to pay value-added tax (VAT).
Amusement taxes are fixed at a certain percentage of the gross receipts incurred by
certain specified establishments.
Thus, applying the definition in CIR v. Citytrust and drawing from the treatment of
amusement taxes by the NIRC, amusement taxes are percentage taxes as correctly
argued by Pelizloy.
However, provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if
amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. Section 133 (i) of the LGC
prohibits the levy of percentage taxes "except as otherwise provided" by the LGC.
Section 140 of the LGC provides: chanroble svirtualawlibrary
SECTION 140. Amusement Tax - (a) The province may levy an amusement tax to be
collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at a rate of not more
than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters of cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and withheld
by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the provincial treasurer before
the gross receipts are divided between said proprietors, lessees, or operators and
the distributors of the cinematographic films.
(c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas, recitals, painting and art exhibitions,
flower shows, musical programs, literary and oratorical presentations, except pop,
rock, or similar concerts shall be exempt from the payment of the tax herein
imposed.
(d) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may prescribe the time, manner, terms and
conditions for the payment of tax. In case of fraud or failure to pay the tax, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan may impose such surcharges, interests and penalties.
(e) The proceeds from the amusement tax shall be shared equally by the province
and the municipality where such amusement places are located. [Underscoring
supplied]
Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception to the general rule in
Section 133 (i). Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of
amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement."
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are
not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being
subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes
may be levied on admissions to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs,
and tourist spots hinges on whether the phrase other places of amusement
encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter
follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned."17
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The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in National
Power Corporation v. Angas18 as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular
and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not
specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the In the present case, the Court need not embark on a laborious effort at statutory
lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, construction. Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition of
it would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used amusement places': chanroble svirtualawlibrary

only general terms. [2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-
400].19
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Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term: chanroble svirtualawlibrary

In Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals,20 the Supreme Court had an xxx

opportunity to interpret a starkly similar provision or the counterpart provision of

(c) "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other
Section 140 of the LGC in the Local Tax Code then in effect. Petitioner Philippine
places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or
Basketball Association (PBA) contended that it was subject to the imposition by
viewing the show or performances [Underscoring supplied]
LGUs of amusement taxes (as opposed to amusement taxes imposed by the
national government). In support of its contentions, it cited Section 13 of
Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a
Presidential Decree No. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code of 1973, (which
common typifying characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the staging
is analogous to Section 140 of the LGC) providing the following:
of spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other
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events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, other places of amusement

Section 13. Amusement tax on admission. - The province shall impose a tax on
must be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being venues "where
admission to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement xxx.
performances" or being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold public

Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the Supreme Court rejected PBA's shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an

assertions and noted that: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

audience.

In determining the meaning of the phrase 'other places of amusement', one must As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary,22 show means "a spectacle or

refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and display of something, typically an impressive one";23 while performance means "an

circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment." 24 As

basketball games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, such, the ordinary definitions of the words show and performance denote not only

concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g.,

entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming. [Underscoring

21 displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and

supplied] (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.

However, even as the phrase other places of amusement was already clarified in Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs

Philippine Basketball Association, Section 140 of the LGC adds to the enumeration of and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks

'places of amusement' which may properly be subject to amusement tax. Section admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances".

140 specifically mentions 'boxing stadia' in addition to "theaters, cinematographs, While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they

concert halls and circuses" which were already mentioned in PD No. 231. Also, are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage

'artistic expression' as a characteristic does not pertain to 'boxing stadia'. or present shows and/or performances.
Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not stadia, Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance must be sustained with respect to
belong to the same category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, admission fees from boxing stadia.
and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the other
places of amusement contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The second

properly be subject to amusement taxes.
At this juncture, it is helpful to recall this Court's pronouncements in Icard:
The power to tax when granted to a province is to be construed in strictissimi juris.
Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be
resolved against the province. Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no
place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a province.25 chanroble svirtualawlibrary
paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005,
in so far as it imposes amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots, is declared null and void.
Respondent Province of Benguet is permanently enjoined from enforcing the second
paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005
with respect to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.
SO ORDERED.

In this case, the definition of' amusement places' in Section 131 (c) of the LGC is a
clear basis for determining what constitutes the 'other places of amusement' which
may properly be subject to amusement tax impositions by provinces. There is no
reason for going beyond such basis. To do otherwise would be to countenance an
arbitrary interpretation/application of a tax law and to inflict an injustice on
unassuming taxpayers.

The previous pronouncements notwithstanding, it will be noted that it is only the

second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance which imposes
amusement taxes on "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourist spots". The first paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance
refers to "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, cockpits, dancing halls, dancing
schools, night or day clubs, and other places of amusement". In any case, the
issues raised by Pelizloy are pertinent only with respect to the second paragraph of
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance. Thus, there is no reason to invalidate the
first paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance. Any declaration as to
the Province of Benguet's lack of authority to levy amusement taxes must be limited
xiii. REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
to admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots. [G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988.]

Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance is not JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A.
limited to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots but YLAYA, PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A.
also covers admission fees for boxing. As Section 140 of the LGC allows for the AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A.
imposition of amusement taxes on gross receipts from admission fees to boxing
 AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A.
AMADORA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE
SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH, SERGIO P. DAMASO, JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO, ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON, thru his
parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and
ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, ATTY. FRANCISCO
ALONSO, Respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates, for Petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for Respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of
his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were
scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and
deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito
Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life
as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. 2 Additionally, the
herein petitioners, as the victims parents, filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector,
the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of
litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys
fees. 3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and
all the defendants were completely absolved. 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades
but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in
the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already
ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and that in any event
the defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos
on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a
classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply
disagree. chanrobles.com .ph : virtual law library
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his physics
experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the
custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics
report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already
ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners
consider important because of an earlier incident which they claim underscores the
negligence of the school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied
by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys,
confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or taking any further action. 6 As Gumban
was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed
Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been
confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not
been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof
that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article
2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting
positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody." cralaw virtua1aw library
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-
quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno, 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and
Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better
resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School
and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school
supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove
it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers.
Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action filed against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him
in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort
committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29, 1957,
exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the
ground that it was not a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom
Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the
school authorities who should be held liable. Liability under this role, he said, was
imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in
particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply
only to "heads" and not "teachers." cralaw virtua1aw library
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut
a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in
Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages.
Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself
had also not been sued) that the school was not liable because it was not an
establishment of arts and trades. Morever, the custody requirement had not been
proved as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede
those of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members
of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960. chanroble s virtual lawlibrary
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed
by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute.
Although the wrongdoer who was already of age was not boarding in the
school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with
him. The Court declared through Justice Teehankee: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"The phrase used in the cited article so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower
court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now
be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision." cralaw virtua1aw library
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students
already of age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody
of the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice
Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted
that the rule should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the
school would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes dissent in the
Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic
school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic
institutions will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised." cralaw virtua1aw library
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly
impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it
is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties
herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers
even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so,
when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach
to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the
head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis,
"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Exconde where he said in part: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of
arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their
pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from
the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third
persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over
the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words arts and trades does
not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments. The phrase is only an
updated version of the equivalent terms `preceptores y artesanos used in the
Italian and French Civil Codes. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of
Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to
have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the
parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and
not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under
his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
cralaw virtua1aw library discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while
the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-
academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion
in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or
even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any
student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school,
no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances
being the same, the teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved
whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be held liable,
and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the
school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There
does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because
the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school
is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and
not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its
equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of
the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to
excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where,
on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to
be held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of
the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and
trades? And in the case of the academic or non-technical school, why not apply the
rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of
the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the
head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly
instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school
of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of
teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
school was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative
duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students.
The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship
with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts
of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties
with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the
expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of
their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its
present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear
and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the changes in the
situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment. chanroble s law library : red
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility
co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during
the school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be
within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of
the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be
co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon
the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the
period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of
the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school
only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already
registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be
deemed ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be
certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of
reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is
still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance
of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying
the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer
for his students torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible
for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one
designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are
assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically
present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and
actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the
discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused
by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort
was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed
to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on
the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for
the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As
long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability
imposed by Article 2180, which also states that: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages." cralaw virtua1aw library
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only
when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending
student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is
still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student
under him regardless of the students age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school although the
wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in
his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability
under this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely
to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear,
to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is
not the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence
is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or
omission of its head or the teacher in its employ. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its
teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction
of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline
among them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through
the assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce
those rules upon the students. This should bolster the claim of the school that it has
taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be
unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as
long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this
respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of
responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child because
the latters dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It need not be
stressed that such dependence includes the childs support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teachers influence, besides being co-terminous with the period of
custody, is usually enforced only because of the students desire to pass the course.
The parent can instill more lasting discipline on the child than the teacher and so
should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed
by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice even if he is already of age and therefore less tractable
than the minor then there should all the more be justification to require from the
school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence
in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the
students acts because he has reached majority age and so is no longer under the
formers control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the
teachers responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following
conclusions: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year
classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to
finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed,
even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school
is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the
school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of
them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the
direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular
classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of
the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student
was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection
with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredos killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing
that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-
observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against
him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And
while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-
charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has
not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon
the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline. chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should
be held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later
to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher
authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of
Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the
gun that killed the petitioners son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the
other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged
with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of
the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury
inflicted by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latters death at
the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we
deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material
relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is
so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., did not participate in deliberations.
Fernan and Padilla, JJ., no part, formerly counsel for Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term "teacher" in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This would limit liability to
occasions where there are classes under the immediate charge of a teacher, which
does not seem to be the intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco parentis
will have the same duties and obligations as parents whenever in such a standing.
Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and
students so long as the latter remain in their custody, meaning their protective and
supervisory custody.
Thus, Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who stand in loco
parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental authority:
"Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:
x x
(2) Teachers and professors;
x x
(4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;"
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
"Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed
by government regulations and those of each school or institution. . . ."
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not contravene the concept
of substitute parental authority.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanroble s.com :chanrobles.com .ph
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their
pupils was explained in Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
"The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted
for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the
whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well
as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some students themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow
students. (Italics supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility treated of
shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180 speaks only of
teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same provision, the school, as
x their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to
perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law
on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself from
liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
x
"Art. 2180. . . .
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
x x x
cralaw virtua1aw library
Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the Civil Code, supra, it is
apparent that the Code Commission had already segregated the classification of
"teachers and professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from "directors of trade
establishments, with regard to their apprentices." cralaw virtua1aw library
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur in the Courts opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by Justice Isagani
A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need for a major amendment to, if not a

complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code insofar as it refers to teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or
apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic of the past and
contemplates a situation long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41
SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of arts and
trades. Students in "technological colleges and universities are no different from
students in liberal arts or professional schools. Apprentices now work in regular
shops and factories and their relationship to the employer is covered by laws
governing the employment relationship and not by laws governing the teacher
student relationship. chanroble s.com : virtual law library
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps early high school
students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration who are given the
respect due to substitute parents. Many students in their late teens or early adult
years view some teachers as part of a bourgeois or reactionary group whose advice
on behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic matters is not only resented but
actively rejected. It seems most unfair to hold teachers liable on a presumption juris
tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly
speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to
prove the contrary of negligence to be freed from solidary liability for the acts of
bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who would just as soon hurt them as they
would other members of the so-called establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicts should apply to teachers and schools of whatever
nature insofar as grown up students are concerned. The provision of Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The Court cannot make
law. It can only apply the law with its imperfections. However, the Court can suggest
that such a law should be amended or repealed.
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-
ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-
in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV,
HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU
TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,
ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA
CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU
YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN
JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE
BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON,
LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,
ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III,
ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO
TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO,
RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-
CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO
IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL
ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS,
RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS
LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA,
EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD
SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS,
NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN
VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA,
LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG,
ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL
DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA,
FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON,
VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX
VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE
C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND
ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO
N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T.
RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO,
SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO,
BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN
80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,
JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF
THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA,
MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE
VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT,respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination
by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means
and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court
is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which
has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political
crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional
methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its
resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-
equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good
of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among
these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing
laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the
greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th

Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November
28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved by the
11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment
filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. Impeachment
Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In
cases where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a Member
of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable
officer, impeachment proceedings
against such official are deemed
initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint
and/or resolution against such official,
as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House
votes to overturn or affirm the finding
of the said Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the case
may be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a

resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated at
the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary
General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of
Impeachment Proceedings. Within
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT a period of one (1) year from the date In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a
impeachment proceedings are deemed duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
initiated as provided in Section 16
impeachment proceedings shall be
hereof, no impeachment proceedings, petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance,
initiated against the same official more
as such, can be initiated against the
than once within the period of one (1)
same official. (Italics in the original; Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
year.
emphasis and underscoring supplied) Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored
by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint was
endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," 9 but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the Secretary General
of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. 13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most
of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."
remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his
and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28,
2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17
and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et.
al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return
the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance,
pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin
Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in
the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as
citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the
use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving
and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and
respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy
Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a
right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money
and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice,
and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances
emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the
Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and
deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition
commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and
a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state
what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves
paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a
member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their
petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction
to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution,
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in
their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in
behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as
unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent
House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging
that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental
significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct
and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its
officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or
giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they
filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power
to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment
assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea,
alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter
of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue
"which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the
House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying
the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on
the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive
jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues
raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of
transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared
null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate
be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment
by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2)
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that
they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first
three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House
of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the
second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R.
No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which
were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing
docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a
legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes
on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a
motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally
transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the
Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003,
Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their
offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent
House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to
comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the
petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called
on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties
and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through
Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction
to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On
even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting
the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of
the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases,
including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to
(a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents
to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include
them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of
the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it
since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not,
and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning
the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground
that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional
deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question
is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra
filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the
Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On
November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also
filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment
and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and
Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory
issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by
this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from
the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for
and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined
them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the
power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings;
(2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining.
These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice
Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2
on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution
of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment,
and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant
is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at
rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine
the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.24(Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be
sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of
judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the
supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws
of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of
the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the
1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to
invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law
professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive
and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this
power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together
with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence
to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x
x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention
of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its
history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt
from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past,
but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general
set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other
matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee
on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles
of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is
to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
theirordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases
where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And
so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact
the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through
Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by
the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel
Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have
dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could also affect others. When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by
itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory.45(Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other
aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker
De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that
the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of
judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence,
any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding
is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review
over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional
questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are
outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the
majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it
runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try
impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances,
under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would
create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise
point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial
power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American
Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition
that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided
for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and
restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently
judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment
proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution,
are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction
and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution
can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have
long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the
umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court
and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,
that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power
as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.
Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle
that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise
of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents
in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of
judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs
of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this
Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null
and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination,
and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng
v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is
subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial
review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will
sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing
since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and
transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the
need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the
well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to
vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief
Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court,
the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the
rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure 73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding
standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been
noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity
to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only
certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper
role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law
or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such
parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the
party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to
the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before
us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary,
they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members
of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality
of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power
of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners,
given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially
when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the
suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class,
is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or
not they were before the court.89Where it clearly appears that not all interests can
be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitionersadditionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their
petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is
mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in
the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this
Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental
importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a
party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at
the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which
courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any
interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of
right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they
seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one
additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no
objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this
Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.
al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as
citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the
minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found
the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance,
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not
the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on
any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were
hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the
Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit
as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it
from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which
the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was
granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for,
while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public
moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
"being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations
omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the
act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public
money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a
member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had
by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done,
if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the
2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite
that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that
there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being
the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that
all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and
opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members
to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are
presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains
that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice
can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives
of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the
ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and, therefore,
petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as
previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed
with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively
vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to
grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined
the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus
Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any
rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases
which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of
the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified,
hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse
to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief
Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this
Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God,
and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with
the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but
the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general
set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was
not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request
an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start
with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the
Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September
22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the
delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained
prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on
September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media
could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already
incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under
mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22
had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some
delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up.
One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the
1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972,
whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the
operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions,
much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was
presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by
our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of
the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely
the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled
beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but
of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the
barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with
proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite
because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast
in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying
that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being
heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in
force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum
favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice,
I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed
the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and
void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political
question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the
vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the
Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in
the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the
members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference
between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices
upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon,
they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea
of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases
in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue
was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced
the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable.
There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary
party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to
perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties
as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her
physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has,
also another important function. The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and
the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent
of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have
an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion
further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower
courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases
but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority
or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the
duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme
Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political
question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do
away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is
judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power
includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may
not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from
the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. 104 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty,
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of
the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are
not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of
Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions
which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. 106 x x
x constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla,
this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform
under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political
question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination
of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 108 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these
two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or thepotentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of
one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining
whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court
shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the
Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over
which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue
would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. 113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than
by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their
clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its
judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality
of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case
of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised,if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will
be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration
until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657
for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a
judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by
the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary
to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of
the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues
upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be
passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the
court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from
a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and
legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an
open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on
the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and
resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the
Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the
separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be
broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is
further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries
has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-
quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of
Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be
compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new
argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only
by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same
does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by
at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed
a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites
for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the
signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the
Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires
in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the
Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the
Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have
been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section
3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary
only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment
complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as
the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have
raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original
petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as
well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they
are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15
and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that
the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial
review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a
moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment
because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125 But this argument
is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws
with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject
to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which
the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from
its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the
instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction
is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other
office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an
interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public
has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they
expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber
strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office." 130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already
been settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the
petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested
parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not
sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any
Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without
inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative
but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest
that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the
1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will
be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal
whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place
their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its
entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on
the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of
them, is nothing short ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to
exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the
judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the
original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba, this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven
134
pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme
Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-
adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only
in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a
friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry
as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a
question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who
fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this
rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks
a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only
in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought
to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although
made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v.
TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be
encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts
of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of
the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the
need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk
serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the
vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano echoes
this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against
Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a
reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action
may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not
regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails
to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a
decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the
end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which
paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate
branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their
duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet
there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in
a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by
encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise
the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not
of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under
its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate
Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term
"initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing
can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished
in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar
prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials
could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed
on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which
he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments
on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any
doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of
the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to
begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary
of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first
action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003
in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the
articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning
or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on
Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the
Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt
to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into
the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many
proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution
on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of
this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the
information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just
make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was
that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the
Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite
examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves
or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on
Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical
about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of
the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision,
that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which
read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on
line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House
of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing
of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it
the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified
compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in
keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis
and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted
by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the
obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings
starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in
a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint
under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is
Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that
the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding,
however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint
moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the
second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided
by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of
one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that
the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body
can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On
the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and
an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several
steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House
of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must
be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of
the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of
one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It
is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point
that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when
the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the
House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial.
Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on
the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the
proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.
Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary toinitiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the
vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of
a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they
ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle
of reddendo singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of
two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'
taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or,
by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or
(3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from
filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not
use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of
Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention)
on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a
different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former
members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their
emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning
because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness. 148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There
are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986
Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief
Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons.
Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the
deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article
XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and
interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power
to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either
House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what
constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of
the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
InArroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice
Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by
the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these
limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the
Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in
his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that
in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the
validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are
non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in
the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of
rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to
view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first
defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It
held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine
the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the
House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names
of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote
shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker
with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14,
1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore,
is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his
own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters
the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and
the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity
of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was
examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore
any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the
mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition
will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power
to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of
the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a
mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the
people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of
justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is
needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this
Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a
shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The
Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the
present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the
parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not
be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure,
it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not
defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our
own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions.
Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution
are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis
for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16
and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal
Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to
how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus,
the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of
the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is
to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns
the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning
different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or
tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the
Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an
exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have
fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to
be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to
the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the
matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of
normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate
any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had
been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take
no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent
public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through
what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a
bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of
the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found
the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose
resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the
fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional
material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate
in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under
the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon
that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process
of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently
without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time
bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none,
nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over
the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and
ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have
actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on
said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights
regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has
dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could
be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts.
Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because
it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible
fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's
official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules
on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in
specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar
is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its
members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's
moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is
most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application
to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence.
The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this
Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have
less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test
once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a
solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is
indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of
legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a
democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the
use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
 In her Supplemental Affidavit filed on 29 March 2001, petitioner, however, recanted
and alleged instead that it was a certain Bebie Correa who received the two checks
which are the subject matter of the complaints and encashed the same; and that
said Bebie Correa left the country after misappropriating the proceeds of the checks.
xiv. SHALL, MAY AND MUST
On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City finding probable cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two
separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a
[G.R. NO. 168617 : February 19, 2007]
Private Individual, under Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the

BERNADETTE L. ADASA, Petitioner, v. CECILLE S. ABALOS, Respondent. Revised Penal Code, as amended.

DECISION Consequently, two separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782, raffled to Branches 4 and 5, Regional Trial

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Court of Iligan City, respectively.

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner This instant petition pertains only to Criminal Case No. 8782.

Bernadette L. Adasa, seeks to nullify and set aside the 21 July 2004 Decision 1 and
10 June 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 which On 8 June 2001, upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court in Criminal Case No.

nullified the Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Resolutions of the 8782 issued an order directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to

DOJ reversed and set aside the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of conduct a reinvestigation.

Iligan City, which found on reinvestigation probable cause against petitioner, and
After conducting the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City
directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to withdraw the information
issued a resolution dated 30 August 2001, affirming the finding of probable cause
for Estafa against petitioner.
against petitioner.

The instant case emanated from the two complaints-affidavits filed by respondent
Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case No. 8782,
Cecille S. Abalos on 18 January 2001 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not guilty.3
Iligan City, against petitioner for Estafa.

Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City,
Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001.
received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without
respondent's knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the
In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and set aside the 30 August
latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks.
2001 resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the
said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner.
On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received
and encashed the two checks issued in favor of respondent.
The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to 3. Whether or not the petition before the Court of Appeals has been rendered moot
file a "Motion to Withdraw Information" on 25 July 2002.
and academic by the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Criminal Case No.

On 26 July 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of 8782.

the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the Petition for Review
since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 21 July 2004 granted respondent's petition

been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a Petition for Review before the DOJ, and reversed the Resolutions of the DOJ dated 11 July 2002 and 30 January 2003.

the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or
In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Section 7 of DOJ
even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed
Circular No. 70 which states "[i]f an information has been filed in court pursuant to
Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of
the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused
the Petition for Review before the DOJ.
had already been arraigned," ruled that since petitioner was arraigned before she

In a resolution dated 30 January 2003, the DOJ denied the Motion for filed the Petition for Review with the DOJ, it was imperative for the DOJ to dismiss

Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ such petition. It added that when petitioner pleaded to the charge, she was deemed

Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any to have waived her right to reinvestigation and right to question any irregularity that

appeal taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. surrounds it.

This is due to the permissive language "may" utilized in Section 12 whereby the
Anent the second issue, the Court of Appeals declared that the existence of
Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the
probable cause or the lack of it, cannot be dealt with by it since factual issues are
fact that the accused has been arraigned.
not proper subjects of a Petition for Certiorari.

Meanwhile, on 27 February 2003, the trial court issued an order granting

In disposing of the last issue, the Court of Appeals held that the order of the trial
petitioner's "Motion to Withdraw Information" and dismissing Criminal Case No.
court dismissing the subject criminal case pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the
8782. No action was taken by respondent or any party of the case from the said
DOJ did not render the petition moot and academic. It said that since the trial
order of dismissal.
court's order relied solely on the resolutions of the DOJ, said order is void as it

Aggrieved by the resolution of the DOJ, respondent filed a Petition violated the rule which enjoins the trial court to assess the evidence presented

for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Respondent raised the following issues before it in a motion to dismiss and not to rely solely on the prosecutor's averment

before the appellate court: that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case.

Dissatisfied by the Court of Appeals' ruling, petitioner filed a Motion for

1. Whether or not the Department of Justice gravely abused its discretion in giving
Reconsideration setting forth the following grounds:
due course to petitioner's Petition for Review despite its having been filed after the

latter had already been arraigned; 1. that the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 is

permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal
2. Whether or not there is probable cause that the crime of estafa has been
despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned;
committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof;
2. that the contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of Justice should be
given great weight and respect;
3. that Section 7 of the Circular applies only to resolutions rendered pursuant to a
preliminary investigation, not on a reinvestigation;
4. that the trial court's order of dismissal of the criminal case has rendered the
instant petition moot and academic;
5. that her arraignment was null and void it being conducted despite her
protestations; and cralawlibrary
6. that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right to preliminary
investigation has been nullified or recalled by virtue of the trial court's order of
reinvestigation.4
The Court of Appeals stood firm by its decision. This time, however, it tried to
construe Section 7 side by side with Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 and
attempted to reconcile these two provisions. According to the appellate court, the
phrase "shall not" in paragraph two, first sentence of Section 7 of subject circular, to
wit:
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the
petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied.)
employed in the circular denotes a positive prohibition. Applying the principle in
statutory construction - that when a statute or provision contains words of positive
prohibition, such as "shall not," "cannot," or "ought not" or which is couched in
negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated,
that statute or provision is mandatory, thus rendering the provision mandatory - it
opined that the subject provision simply means that the Secretary of Justice has no
other course of action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when
arraignment of an accused had already taken place prior to the filing of the Petition
for Review .
On the other hand, reading Section 12 of the same circular which reads:
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu
proprio or upon motion, dismiss the Petition for Review on any of the following
grounds:
x x x
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken; x x x.
the Court of Appeals opined that the permissive word "may" in Section 12 would
seem to imply that the Secretary of Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal
notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned. This provision should
not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to Section 7. The two
provisions, taken together, simply meant that when an accused was already
arraigned when the aggrieved party files a Petition for Review, the Secretary of
Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due
course thereto, but instead dismiss or deny it outright. The appellate court added
that the word "may" in Section 12 should be read as "shall" or "must" since such
construction is absolutely necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the
rule as gathered from the context.
As to the contemporaneous construction of the Secretary of Justice, the Court of
Appeals stated that the same should not be given weight since it was erroneous.
Anent petitioner's argument that Section 7 of the questioned circular applies only to
original resolutions that brought about the filing of the corresponding informations
in court, but not to resolutions rendered pursuant to a motion for reinvestigation,
the appellate court simply brushed aside such contention as having no basis in the
circular questioned.
It also rejected petitioner's protestation that her arraignment was forced upon her
since she failed to present any evidence to substantiate the same.
It is petitioner's contention that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of
her right to preliminary investigation has been nullified by virtue of the trial court's
order or reinvestigation. On this score, the Court of Appeals rebuffed such argument
stating that there was no "supposed waiver of preliminary investigation" to speak of
for the reason that petitioner had actually undergone preliminary investigation.
Petitioner remained unconvinced with the explanations of the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition.
Again, petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due course to an appeal or Petition
for Review despite its having been filed after the accused had already been
arraigned. It asserts that the fact of arraignment of an accused before the filing of
an appeal or Petition for Review before the DOJ "is not at all relevant" as the DOJ
can still take cognizance of the appeal or Petition for Review before it. In support of
this contention, petitioner set her sights on the ruling of this Court in Crespo v.
Mogul,5to wit:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment
of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation. (Emphasis supplied.)
To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of Appeals, which stated:
6
There is nothing in Crespo v. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of
an appeal, by way of a Petition for Review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as
far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a Petition for Review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals7 where this Court declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of
Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of
Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a Petition
for Review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or
information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the
prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution,
is subject to the discretion of the court.
The Court is unconvinced.
A cursory reading of Crespo v. Mogul reveals that the ruling therein does not
concern the issue of an appeal or Petition for Review before the DOJ after
arraignment. Verily, the pronouncement therein has to do with the filing of a motion
to dismiss and the court's discretion to deny or grant the same. As correctly pointed
out by respondent, the emphasized portion in the Crespo ruling is a parcel of the
entire paragraph which relates to the duty and jurisdiction of the trial court to
determine for itself whether or not to dismiss a case before it, and which states that
such duty comes into play regardless of whether such motion is filed before or after
arraignment and upon whose instructions. The allusion to the Secretary of Justice as
reviewing the records of investigation and giving instructions for the filing of a
motion to dismiss in the cited ruling does not take into consideration of whether the
appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment.
Significantly, in the Crespo case, the accused had not yet been arraigned when the
appeal or Petition for Review was filed before the DOJ. Undoubtedly, petitioner's
reliance on the said case is misplaced.
Also unavailing is petitioner's invocation of the cases of Roberts v. Court of Appeals
and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals. As in Crespo v. Mogul, neither Roberts v. Court of
Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of Appeals took into account of whether the appeal or
petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment. Just like in the
Crespo case, the accused in both Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court
of Appeals had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or Petition for Review was
filed before the DOJ.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the
provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70 violated three basic rules in statutory construction.
First, the rule that the provision that appears last in the order of position in the rule
or regulation must prevail. Second, the rule that the contemporaneous construction
of a statute or regulation by the officers who enforce it should be given weight.
Third, petitioner lifted a portion from Agpalo's Statutory Construction 8 where the
word "shall" had been construed as a permissive, and not a mandatory language.
The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative
rule9 of procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous,
interpretation need not be resorted to.10Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly
and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or a Petition for
Review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary.
Petitioner's reliance to the statutory principle that "the last in order of position in the
rule or regulation must prevail" is not applicable. In addition to the fact that Section
7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 needs no construction, the cited principle cannot apply
because, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, there is no irreconcilable
conflict between Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Section 7 of the
circular provides:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. - The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the
petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly
intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the
appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had
already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall
not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of review. (Italics
supplied.)
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states:
SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. - The Secretary may reverse, affirm or
modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the
Petition for Review on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3 hereof;
(b) That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided has not been
complied with;
(c) That there is no showing of any reversible error;
(d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it suspends
the proceedings based on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question;
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken;
(f) That the offense has already prescribed; and
(g) That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal. (Emphases
supplied.)
It is noteworthy that the principle cited by petitioner reveals that, to find
application, the same presupposes that "one part of the statute cannot be
reconciled or harmonized with another part without nullifying one in favor of the
other." In the instant case, however, Section 7 is neither contradictory nor
irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen above, Section 7 pertains to the
action on the petition that the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the
options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a Petition for Review or of an
appeal.
As aptly observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically applies to a situation on
what the DOJ must do when confronted with an appeal or a Petition for Review that
is either clearly without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or filed after an accused
has already been arraigned, i.e., he may dismiss it outright if it is patently without
merit or manifestly intended to delay, or, if it was filed after the acccused has
already been arraigned, the Secretary shall not give it due course.
Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal. Under said section, the
DOJ may take any of four actions when disposing an appeal, namely:
1. reverse the appealed resolution;
2. modify the appealed resolution;
3. affirm the appealed resolution;
4. dismiss the appeal altogether, depending on the circumstances and incidents
attendant thereto.
As to the dismissal of a Petition for Review or an appeal, the grounds are provided
for in Section 12 and, consequently, the DOJ must evaluate the pertinent
circumstances and the facts of the case in order to determine which ground or
grounds shall apply.
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the
appeal or Petition for Review due course and must dismiss the same. This is
bolstered by the fact that arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal
or Petition for Review is set forth as one of the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore,
in such instance, the DOJ, noting that the arraignment of an accused prior to the
filing of an appeal or Petition for Review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12,
must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the
DOJ must not give due course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
Likewise, petitioner's reliance on the principle of contemporary construction, i.e., the
DOJ is not precluded from entertaining appeals where the accused had already been
arraigned, because it exercises discretionary power, and because it promulgated
itself the circular in question, is unpersuasive. As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of
Appeals:
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous interpretation or construction
by the officers charged with the enforcement of the rules and regulations it
promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in the latter's construction of
such rules and regulations. That does not, however, make such a construction
necessarily controlling or binding. For equally settled is the rule that courts may
disregard contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or rule
construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous,
where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has previously
given the statute a different interpretation.
If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative officer
called upon to implement it has erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be
corrected when the true construction is ascertained. If a contemporaneous
construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be declared null and void.
Such principle should be as it is applied in the case at bar.11
Petitioner's posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word
"shall" is misplaced. It is petitioner's view that the language of Section 12 is
permissive and therefore the mandate in Section 7 has been transformed into a
matter within the discretion of the DOJ. To support this stance, petitioner cites a
portion of Agpalo's Statutory Construction which reads:
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states that
"banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall,
subject to availability of funds xxx, accept at a discount at not more than two per
centum for ten years such (backpay) certificate" implies not a mandatory, but a
discretionary, meaning because of the phrase "subject to availability of funds."
Similarly, the word "shall" in the provision to the effect that a corporation violating
the corporation law "shall, upon such violation being proved, be dissolved by quo
warranto proceedings" has been construed as "may."12
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes apparent that the same is
not applicable to the provision in question. In the cited passage, the word "shall"
departed from its mandatory import connotation because it was connected to
certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the availability of funds" and "upon such
violation being proved." No such proviso/condition, however, can be found in
Section 7 of the subject circular. Hence, the word "shall" retains its mandatory
import.
At this juncture, the Court of Appeals' disquisition in this matter is enlightening:
Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of
Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a Petition for Review despite
its being outrightly dismissible, such as when the accused has already been
arraigned, or where the crime the accused is being charged with has already
prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has been committed, or that there
are legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result would not only be
incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the
Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and
would only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second sentence of
Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only
subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and
efficient administration of justice, but would also render its other mandatory
provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory. 13
In her steadfast effort to champion her case, petitioner contends that the issue as to
whether the DOJ rightfully entertained the instant case, despite the arraignment of
the accused prior to its filing, has been rendered moot and academic with the order
of dismissal by the trial court dated 27 February 2003. Such contention deserves
scant consideration.
It must be stressed that the trial court dismissed the case precisely because of the
Resolutions of the DOJ after it had, in grave abuse of its discretion, took cognizance
of the Petition for Review filed by petitioner. Having been rendered in grave abuse of
its discretion, the Resolutions of the DOJ are void. As the order of dismissal of the
trial court was made pursuant to the void Resolutions of the DOJ, said order was
likewise void. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a void judgment is a complete
nullity and without legal effect, and that all proceedings or actions founded thereon
are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose. That
14
respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal from the dismissal
order of the trial court is of no moment. Since the dismissal was void, there was
nothing for respondent to oppose.
Petitioner further asserts that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies only to
appeals from original resolution of the City Prosecutor and does not apply in the
instant case where an appeal is interposed by petitioner from the Resolution of the
City Prosecutor denying her motion for reinvestigation. This claim is baseless. rbl r l l lbrr
A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the same
provision to limit its application to appeals from original resolutions and not to
resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the rule stating that "when the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish"15 finds application in this regard.
Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void as the same was
improvidently conducted. Again, this contention is without merit. Records reveal
that petitioner's arraignment was without any restriction, condition or
reservation.16 In fact she was assisted by her counsels Atty. Arthur Abudiente and
Atty. Maglinao when she pleaded to the charge.17
Moreover, the settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is
deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to
question any irregularity that surrounds it. 18 This precept is also applicable in cases
of reinvestigation as well as in cases of review of such reinvestigation. In this case,
when petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively waived the
reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result
thereof to the DOJ Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ
Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or Petition for Review because
petitioner had already waived or abandoned the same.
Lastly, while there is authority19 permitting the Court to make its own determination
of probable cause, such, however, cannot be made applicable in the instant case. As
earlier stated, the arraignment of petitioner constitutes a waiver of her right to
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding
of probable cause. For this reason, there is no need for the Court to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause.
Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised
in, and be subject of, a Petition for Review on Certiorari since this Court is not a trier
of facts. This being the case, this Court cannot review the evidence adduced by the
parties before the prosecutor on the issue of the absence or presence of probable
cause. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21
July 2004 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 158960 : November 24, 2006]
LORNA FRANCES FILIPINO, Petitioner, v. F. WALTER R. MACABUHAY,
representing DRUGMAKERS' LABORATORIES, INC., Respondent.
disciplinary power and supervisory authority, the company succumbed to her
demands and issued United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 331512 in the
amount of P110,000.00, supported by Cash Voucher No. 3620311 in petitioner's
name. The check, however, was issued to a certain Marites L. Vilchez upon
petitioner's request.
In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied respondent's allegations and claimed that
the transaction was purely between Drugmakers and Vilchez; that she did not
receive any demand letter from respondent; and that Vilchez had fully paid the loan
as evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt dated May 2, 1997. 12 In support of her
contentions, petitioner submitted the February 7, 1997 Affidavit 13 of Vilchez where
the latter attested that she was the debtor of the subject loan; that she came to
know of respondent through a friend, Arlene Piago; and that respondent loaned her
P110,000.00 in exchange for jewelry obtained by Evangeline C. Del Mundo, a
principal officer of the company.14

DECISION
In an Affidavit dated September 1, 1997, Del Mundo denied Vilchez' allegations and
claimed that respondent company is not engaged in the business of financing or
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
lending. She denied knowing Piago and alleged that the amount of P110,000.00 was
loaned to petitioner. She denied buying any jewelry from Vilchez and claimed that it
This Petition for Review 1 assails the August 22, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of
would be absurd for her to issue a company check for her personal transactions,
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54974 which affirmed the June 11, 1999 Decision 3 of the
more so for goods she has not received. 15
Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0481 dismissing petitioner Atty. Lorna
Frances Filipino from government service pursuant to Sections 7(d) 4 and 11(b)5 of
During the preliminary conference on November 25, 1997, petitioner made a
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 (1989);6 and its July 3, 2003 Resolution7 denying
reservation that a formal hearing be held to give her the opportunity to cross-
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
examine the witnesses and evaluate the documentary evidence against her.16

On October 5, 1995, respondent F. Walter R. Macabuhay, representing Drugmakers'

In the scheduled hearing on May 19, 1998, however, petitioner filed a Motion to
Laboratories, Inc., filed before the Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit 8 charging
Dismiss17 on the ground that respondent's cause of action has prescribed considering
petitioner Lorna Frances Filipino, former Chief of the Legal Information and
that more than one year has passed from the alleged commission of the act on
Compliance Division of the Bureau of Food and Drugs Administration (BFAD), with
January 26, 1993 to the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit on October 5, 1995. The
soliciting a loan from the company, in violation of R.A. No. 6713, R.A. No. 3019
Ombudsman denied the motion in an Order18 dated June 10, 1998, stating that its
(1960),9 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (1975). 10
rules are merely directory and that public policy and interest dictate inquiry into the
case. In the same Order, the formal investigation was set on July 1, 1998.
Respondent alleged that sometime in January 1993, petitioner demanded a loan
from the company in the amount of P110,000.00. Because of petitioner's
The hearing scheduled on July 1, 1998 did not push through as petitioner moved for Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this Petition for Review
reconsideration of the June 10, 1998 Order which was denied and the parties were raising the following issues:
required to submit the case for adjudication in an Order dated November 19,
1998.19 Petitioner thereafter filed a Memorandum20 on February 22, 1999. I

On April 20, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion21 to set the case for formal
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE FINDINGS
investigation and/or hearing but the Ombudsman denied the same holding that
OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS (SIC) SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
petitioner's submission of a Memorandum was a waiver of her right to a formal
investigation. EVIDENCE.

On June 11, 1999, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision dismissing petitioner from II
government service, the dispositive portion of which states:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT PETITIONER

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Lorna Frances Filipino, also
NEVER PURSUED THE REMEDY OF FORMAL INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE OFFICE OF
known as Lorna Frances Cabanlas, is hereby found guilty as charged of the offense
of "contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom her office THE OMBUDSMAN.

has business relations" and "soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly any loan or
anything of monetary value." Pursuant to Section 22 (j) and (k), Rule XIV, Omnibus III
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 prescribing the penalties for
administrative offenses and Section 7 (d) in relation to Section 11 (b), Republic Act
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT PETITIONER WAS
No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS SINCE SHE FILED HER MEMORANDUM.
Officials Employees," she is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service upon her
receipt of a copy of this Decision.
IV

SO RESOLVED.22
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals alleging that she
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN SENDING A COPY OF THE ORDER RESOLVING
was deprived of due process and that the findings of the Ombudsman were not
THE MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WAS NOT REBUTTED BY PETITIONER.
supported by substantial evidence. On August 22, 2002, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
V

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed

Decision dated June 11, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby AFFIRMED. THE PETITIONER BELIEVES THAT THE COMPLAINT SHO(U)LD BE DISMISSED

PURSUANT TO SEC. 20[5] OF RA 6770.24

SO ORDERED. 23
Petitioner contends that the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds of
prescription; denial of due process; and lack of substantial evidence showing that
she was guilty of contracting loans from respondent with whom her office has
business relations.
Meanwhile, respondent failed to comment on the instant petition despite several
notices sent by the Court. Thus, we dispensed with the filing of the same.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the complaint is barred by prescription; 2)
whether petitioner was denied due process; and 3) whether there is substantial
evidence showing petitioner's participation in the loan transaction.
The petition lacks merit.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
states:
Sec. 20. Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
xxx
(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of.
Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision, respondent's
complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year
after the alleged commission of the acts complained of.
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not
mandatory as petitioner contends.25 When used in a statute, it is permissive only
and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced. 26 Applying Section 20 (5), therefore, it is
discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation on a
complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription.
As regards the second issue, we find that petitioner was not deprived of due
process. It is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.27 Deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard and given the opportunity to present his side.28 In Samalio v. Court of
Appeals,29 we held:
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through
oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The
standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a
certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not
legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency
to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary
evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of
their direct testimony.30
In the instant case, petitioner had the opportunity to present her side as well as
submit countervailing evidence to refute respondent's claims. She participated in all
levels of the proceedings, from the Ombudsman to this Court. The records show
that petitioner submitted before the Ombudsman the following: a) Counter-Affidavit
refuting all the charges against her; b) Motion to Dismiss the complaint; c) Motion
for Reconsideration of the order of denial of the Motion to Dismiss; d)
Memorandum; e) Urgent Motion to set case for a formal investigation and/or
hearing; and f) Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition. The Ombudsman also
considered petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the June 11, 1999 Decision
while the Court of Appeals heard her appeal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the requirements of due process were satisfied in
the instant case. Petitioner was never deprived of an opportunity to a formal
investigation as in fact hearings were scheduled, but petitioner opted to file several
pleadings instead of proceeding with the formal investigation.
Further, pursuant to the November 19, 1998 Order of the Ombudsman, petitioner
filed a Memorandum on February 22, 1999 without reservation. She did not move
for reconsideration of the said Order which categorically stated that after the
parties' submission of memoranda, the case would be considered ripe for
resolution.31 The Urgent Motion to set case for formal investigation and/or hearing
was filed only on April 20, 1999, long after the case had been deemed submitted for
resolution. Thus, petitioner impliedly waived her right to a formal hearing.
Finally, the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals correctly held that there is
substantial evidence proving petitioner's liability under R.A. No. 6713. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.32 The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable
ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct, even if the evidence
might not be overwhelming. 33
The evidence on record sufficiently established petitioner's participation in the loan
transaction with respondent company. Cash Voucher No. 36230 shows that the
amount of P110,000.00 was disbursed by respondent in favor of petitioner.
Respondent also submitted a signed handwritten note 34 showing petitioner's
personal details as well as the terms of payment for the subject loan. Moreover, the
testimonies of Evangeline Del Mundo and F. Walter R. Macabuhay were
straightforward and consistent.
On the other hand, petitioner relied on bare denials. And while it appears that
petitioner initially denied acquaintance with Vilchez, she eventually admitted
knowing her during the Senate proceedings on April 11, 1996.35 Likewise, we agree
with the findings of the Ombudsman that Vilchez' account of the loan transaction is
"incredible" and "highly suspect." That respondent would allow its officers to use
36
company funds for their personal purchases is implausible.
In view of all the foregoing, the Ombudsman correctly gave credence to the
evidence presented by respondent. Needless to say, findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence, as in the instant case, are
conclusive.37 Further, when the administrative bodies' factual findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze
and weigh the parties' evidence all over again except when there is serious ground
to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task in an
appeal by Petition for Review onCertiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals. 38
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54974 affirming the June 11, 1999 Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0481 dismissing petitioner Atty. Lorna Frances
Filipino from government service, and its July 3, 2003 Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183868 : November 22, 2010
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner, v. MARINA SALES,
INC., Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari 1
cralaw under Rule 45, the Commissioner of
Customs(Commissioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), assails the April 11, 2008 Resolution 2
cralaw of the Court of Tax Appeals
En Banc (CTA-En Banc), in C.T.A. E.B. No. 333,dismissing his petition for review for
his failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Tax Appeals
Division (CTA-Division).
Respondent Marina Sales, Inc. (Marina) is engaged in the manufacture of Sunquick
juice concentrates. It was appointed by CO-RO Food A/S of Denmark , maker of
Sunquick Juice Concentrates,to be its manufacturing arm in thePhilippines . As
such,Marina usually imports raw materials into the country for the purpose. In the
past,the Bureau of Customs (BOC) assessed said type of importations under Tariff
Heading H.S. 2106.90 10 with a 1% import duty rate. 3
cralaw
On March 6, 2003,Marina's importation,labeled as Import Entry No. C-33771-03,
arrived at the Manila International Container Port (MICP) on board the vessel APL
Iris V-111. Said Import Entry No. C-33771-03 consisted of a 1' x 20' container STC
with a total of 80 drums: (a) 56 drums of 225 kilograms Sunquick Orange
Concentrate; and (b) 24 drums of 225 kilograms of Sunquick Lemon
Concentrate. 4
cralaw It was supported by the following documents:(a) Bill of Lading No.
APLU 800452452 dated February 2, 2003; 5
cralaw and (b) CO-RO Food A/S of Denmark
Invoice No. 1619409 dated January 27, 2003. 6
cralaw
Marina computed and paid the duties under Tariff Harmonized System Heading H.S.
2106.90 10 at 1% import duty rate.
This time, however, the BOC examiners contested the tariff classification of Marina's
Import Entry No.C-33771-03 under Tariff Heading H.S. 2106.90 10. The BOC
examiners recommended to the Collector of Customs, acting as Chairman of the
Valuation and Classification Review Committee(VCRC) of the BOC, to reclassify
Marina's importation as Tariff Heading H.S. 2106.90 50 (covering composite
concentrates for simple dilution with water to make beverages) with a
corresponding 7% import duty rate.
The withheld importation being necessary to its business operations,Marina
requested the District Collector of the BOC to release Import Entry No. C-33771-03
under its Tentative Release System. 7Marina undertook to pay the reclassified rate of
cralaw
duty should it be finally determined that such reclassification was correct. The
District Collector granted the request.
On April 15, 2003,the VCRC directed Marina to appear in a deliberation on May 15,
2003 and to explain why its shipment under Import Entry No.C-33771-03 should
not be classified under Tariff Heading H.S. 2106.90 50 with import duty rate of
7%.
8
cralaw
On May 15, 2003, Marina, through its Product Manager Rowena T. Solidum and
Customs Broker Juvenal A. Llaneza, attended the VCRC deliberation and submitted
its explanation, 9
cralaw dated May 13, 2003, along with samples of the importation under
Import Entry No. C-33771-03.
On May 21, 2003, another importation of Marina arrived at the MICP designated as
Import Entry No. C-67560-03. It consisted of another 1' x 20' container STC with a
total of 80 drums:(a) 55 drums of 225 kilograms of Sunquick Orange Concentrate;
(b) 1 drum of 225 kilograms of Sunquick Tropical Fruit Concentrate; (c) 17 drums of
225 kilograms of Sunquick Lemon Concentrate; (d) 3 drums of 225 kilograms of
Sunquick Ice Lemon Concentrate; and (e) 4 drums of 225 kilograms Sunquick Peach
Orange Concentrate. The said importation was accompanied by the following
documents: (a) Bill of Lading No. KKLUCPH060291 dated April 17, 2003; 10
cralaw and (b)
CO-RO Foods A/S Denmark Invoice No. 1619746 dated April 15, 2003. 11
cralaw
Again,the BOC examiners disputed the tariff classification of Import Entry No.C-
67560-03 and recommended to the VCRC that the importation be classified at Tariff
Heading H.S. 2106.90 50 with the corresponding 7% duty rate.
In order for Import Entry No. C-67560-03 to be released,Marina once again signed
an undertaking under the Tentative Release System. 12
cralaw
In a letter dated July 7, 2003,the VCRC scheduled another deliberation requiring
Marina to explain why Import Entry No.C-67560-03 should not be classified under
Tariff Heading H.S. 2106.90 50 at the import duty rate of 7%. 13
cralaw
On July 17, 2003, Marina again attended the VCRC deliberation and submitted its
explanation 14dated July 17, 2003 together with samples in support of its claim that
cralaw
the imported goods under Import Entry No. C-67560-03 should not be reclassified
under Tariff Heading H.S. 2106.90 50.
Thereafter, the classification cases for Import Entry No. C-33771-03 and Import
Entry No. C-67560-03 were consolidated.
On September 11, 2003, as reflected in its 1st Indorsement, the VCRC reclassified
Import Entry No. C-33771-03 and Import Entry No. C-67560-03 under Tariff
Heading H.S. 2106.90 50 at 7% import duty rate. 15
cralaw
On October 7, 2003,Marina appealed before the Commissioner challenging VCRC's A careful scrutiny of the record of this case showed that petitioner failed to file
reclassification. 16
cralaw

before the Second Division the required Motion for Reconsideration before elevating

In its 1st Indorsement of November 13, 2003, 17

cralaw the VCRC modified its earlier ruling his case to the CTA En Banc.
and classified Marina's Import Entry No. C-33771-03 and Import Entry No. C-
67560-03 under Tariff Heading H.S. 2009 19 00 at 7% duty rate, H.S. 2009.80 00 Section 1, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals provided for the

at 7% duty rate and H.S. 2009.90 00 at 10% duty rate. following rule, to wit: chanrobles virtual law library

Apparently not in conformity,Marina interposed a petition for review before the CTA RULE 8
on February 3, 2004, which was docketed as CTA Case No. 6859.
PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
On October 31, 2007,the CTA Second Division ruled in favor of Marina 18
cralaw holding that
its classification under Tariff Heading H.S. 2106.90 10 was the most appropriate and
SECTION 1. Review of Cases in the Court en banc.- In cases falling under the
descriptive of the disputed importations. 19
cralaw It opined that Marina's importations were
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court en banc, the petition for review of a
raw materials used for the manufacture of its Sunquick products, not ready-to-drink
juice concentrates as argued by the Commissioner. 20
cralaw Thus, the decretal portion of decision or resolution of the Court in Division must be preceded by the filing of a

the CTA -Second Division reads: chanroble s virtual law library

timely motion for reconsideration or new trial with the Division.

WHEREFORE,finding merit in petitioner's Petition for Review, the same is hereby In statutory construction, the use of the word 'must' indicates that the requirement
is mandatory. Furthermore, the word 'must' connote an imperative act or operates
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Resolution/Decision dated November 13, 2003 of the
to simply impose a duty which may be enforced. It is true the word 'must' is
Valuation and Classification Review Committee of the Bureau of Customs is hereby
sometimes construed as 'may' ' permissive ' but this is only when the context
SET ASIDE and petitioner's importation covered by Import Entry Nos.C-33771-03 requires it. Where the context plainly shows the provision to be mandatory, the

and C-67560-03 are reclassified under Tariff Harmonized System Heading H.S. word 'must' is a command and cannot be construed as permissive, but must be
given the signification which it imparts.
2106.90 10 with an import duty rate of 1%.

It is worthy to note that the Supreme Court ruled that a Motion for Reconsideration
SO ORDERED.
is mandatory as a precondition to the filing of a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.
The Commissioner disagreed and elevated the case to the CTA-En Banc via a
petition for review. 21
cralaw

WHEREFORE, applying by analogy the above ruling of the Supreme Court and taking

In its Resolution of April 11, 2008, the CTA En Banc dismissed the petition. The into consideration the mandatory provision provided by Section 1 of Rule 8 of the
pertinent portions of the decision including the fallo read: chanrobles virtual law library

Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals and considering further that petitioner did

not file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Second Division before elevating the

case to the Court En Banc, which eventually deprived the Second Division of an
opportunity to amend, modify, reverse or correct its mistake or error, if there The Commissioner also contends that the testimony of Marina's expert
witness,Aurora Kimura, pertaining to Sunquick Lemon compound shows that it could
be,petitioner's Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED.
be classified as 'heavy syrup' 29
cralaw falling under the category of H.S. 2190.90 50 with a
7% import duty rate. 30
cralaw

SO ORDERED. 22
cralaw

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

The Commissioner sought reconsideration of the disputed decision, but the CTA En
Banc issued a denial in its July 14, 2008 Resolution. 23
cralaw

On the procedure, the Court agrees with the CTA En Banc that the Commissioner
failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Rule 8, Section 1 of the Revised
Hence, this petition.
Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals 31
cralaw requiring that 'the petition for review of a
decision or resolution of the Court in Divisionmust be preceded by the filing of a
In his Memorandum, 24
cralaw the Commissioner submits the following issues for
timely motion for reconsideration or new trial with the Division.' The word "must"
resolution: chanroble s virtual law library

clearly indicates the mandatory -- not merely directory -- nature of a

requirement.' 32

A.
cralaw

The rules are clear. Before the CTA En Banc could take cognizance of the petition for
WHETHER THE DISMISSAL BY THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS' EN BANC OF
review concerning a case falling under its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the litigant
PETITIONER'S PETITION BASED ON MERE TECHNICALITY WILL RESULT IN must sufficiently show that it sought prior reconsideration or moved for a new trial

INJUSTICE AND UNFAIRNESS TO PETITIONER. with the concerned CTA division. Procedural rules are not to be trifled with or be
excused simply because their non-compliance may have resulted in prejudicing a

B. party's substantive rights. 33

cralaw Rules are meant to be followed. They may be relaxed
only for very exigent and persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not

WHETHER THE CHALLENGED DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS' commensurate to his careless non-observance of the prescribed rules. 34
cralaw

SECOND DIVISION HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S IMPORTATION ARE

At any rate, even if the Court accords liberality, the position of the Commissioner
COVERED BY IMPORT ENTRY NOS. C-33771-03 AND C-67560-03 ARE has no merit. After examining the records of the case, the Court is of the view that

CLASSIFIED UNDER TARIFF HARMONIZED SYSTEM HEADING H.S. 2106.90 the import duty rate of 1%, as determined by the CTA Second Division, is correct.

10 WITH AN IMPORT DUTY RATE OF ONE PERCENT (1%) IS NOT

The table shows the different classification of Tariff import duties relevant to the
CORRECT. cralaw
25
case at bar:

The Commissioner argues that the dismissal of his petition before the CTA-En Banc
is inconsistent with the principle of the liberal application of the rules of TARIFF HEADING IMPORT DUTY COVERAGE
procedure. cralaw
26
He points out that due to the dismissal of the petition, the government RATE
would only be collecting 1% import duty rate from Marina instead of 7%. 27
cralaw This, if
sanctioned, would result in grave injustice and unfairness to the government. 28
cralaw

H.S. 2106.90 10 1% Covers flavouring materials, nes., of kind used in food an

 Verily, to fall under the assailed Tariff Harmonized System Headings, petitioner's
drink industries; other food preparations to be used as raw
(herein respondent) articles of importation, as fruit juices/mixtures, should not have
material in preparing composite concentrates for making
beverages lost its original character, in spite of the addition of certain 'standardizing

agents/constituents.' Contrary thereto,We find the subject importations categorized

as 'non-alcoholic composite concentrates' to have apparently lost their original

H.S. 2106.90 50 7% Covers composite concentrate for simple dilution with
character due to the addition of ingredients in such quantity that the concentrated
water to make beverages
fruit juice mixture only comprises a small percentage of the entire compound.

H.S. 2009. 19 00 7% Covers orange juice, not frozen This was clearly explained by the VCRC in its subsequent Resolution/Decision

('1st Indorsement') issued on February 17, 2005 pertaining to subsequent similar

H.S. 2009.80 00 7% Covers juice of any other single fruit or vegetable importations of petitioner, effectively correcting its findings in the assailed

Resolution/Decision dated November 13, 2003 concerning the same party-

importer,issues and articles of importation, 37

to wit:
H.S. 2009.90 00 10% Covers mixtures of juices
cralaw chanroble s virtual law library

SUB-GROUP OBSERVATIONS/FINDINGS: chanroble s virtual law library

The Commissioner insists that Marina's two importations should be classified under
Tariff Heading H.S. 2106.90 50 with an import duty rate of 7% because the
concentrates are ready for consumption by mere dilution with water.
The classification issue was divided into two regimes. The era under the old
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, while the other is the latest
revised edition,the Asean Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature.

The Court is not persuaded. The previous committee resolution was promulgated technically not on the merit of

the case but failure on the part of the importer to submit their position
As extensively discussed by the CTA Second Division, to fit into the category listed
under the Tariff Harmonized System Headings calling for a higher import duty rate paper/arguments within the prescriptive period given by the committee.

of 7%, the imported articles must not lose its original character. In this case,
however, the laboratory analysis of Marina's samples yielded a different Importer submitted samples of subject shipment for laboratory analysis to Philippine

result. 35
cralaw The report supported Marina's position that the subject importations are Customs laboratory to validate the veracity of product information given by the
not yet ready for human consumption. Moreover,Marina's plant manager, Rebecca
supplier and to determine the correct tariff classification.
Maronilla, testified that the juice compounds could not be taken in their raw form
because they are highly concentrated and must be mixed with other additives
xxx xxx xxx
before they could be marketed as Sunquick juice products. If taken in their
unprocessed form, the concentrates without the mixed additives would produce a Based on the report of the Laboratory Analysis, compound is made up to water
sour taste. 36
cralaw In other words, the concentrates, to be consumable, must have to lose 57.9%, Invert Sugar 34.34%, Citric Acid 2.94%, Vitamin C (Ascorbic Acid) 105 mg.
their original character. To quote the CTA Second Division: chanroble s virtual law library
Since the item is compound which is composed of water, sugar, concentrated juice,
flavourings,citric acid, stabilizer, preservatives, vitamins C and colouring to produce
beverage ready to drink.Consequently the concentrated citrus juice has lost
its original character due to the fact that it comprises only 12% of the total
compound. 38
cralaw
Items (fruit juices) classifiable under HS 2009 are fruit juices generally obtained by
pressing fresh, healthy and ripe fruit. Per item 4 of the Explanatory Notes to the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System apparently subject article
has lost its original character as concentrated fruit juice drink to the compounding
ingredients which reduces the fruit juices to 12% of the total compound.
In view of the foregoing subject article is classifiable under Tariff Heading H.S.
2106.90 10 at 1% for entries filed under the old regime. For those filed under the
new regime tariff heading AHTN 2106.90 51 at 1% where the item are specifically
provided.
RESOLUTION: To apply sub-group recommendation which is to adopt H.S.
2106.90 10 at 1% for entries filed under the old regime and for those filed
under the new regime, AHTN 2106.90 51 at 1% where the item are
specifically provided. 39
crala w
To 'manufacture' is to 'make or fabricate raw materials by hand, art or
machinery,and work into forms convenient for use.' 40
cralaw Stated differently, it is to
transform by any process into another form suitable for its intended use.Marina, as
the manufacturing arm of CO-RO Food A/S ofDenmark ,transforms said juice
compounds, being raw materials, into a substance suitable for human consumption.
This is evident from the 'Commissioner's Report' 41
cralaw of Executive Clerk of Court II,
CTA, Jesus P. Inocando, Jr., who conducted an ocular inspection of Marina's
manufacturing plant in Taguig City. Pertinent excerpts of the 'Commissioner's
Report' are herein reproduced:
On our ocular inspection of the manufacturing plant of petitioner, Ms. Solidum and
Mr. Domingo showed us the sample of the imported compounds (raw materials),
showed to us the step by step manufacturing process of petitioner and even showed
us the bottling and packaging of the finished product.
Per observation of the undersigned, the imported compounds (raw materials) are
very sticky, the plant is clean and that the personnel of petitioner in the plant
strictly following the manufacturing process as presented in Annex A and Annex B of
this report.
Upon questioning by the counsel for respondent, Mr. Domingo said that while the
imported compounds (raw materials)can be mixed with water and may be drinkable,
he is not sure if the same is suitable for human consumption. None of us dared to
taste the sample of imported compounds (raw materials) diluted in water. The
imported compounds (raw materials) mixed with water produces bubbles on top of
the mixture, not like the one that has gone through the manufacturing process.
Counsel for respondent requested for the marking of Label of Sunquick Lemon (840
ml.), [Annex C], as Exhibit 1 for the respondent. 42
cralaw
Contrary to the Commissioner's assertions, empirical evidence shows that the
subject importations would have to undergo a laborious method, as shown by its
manufacturing flowchart 43
cralaw and manufacturing process, 44
cralaw to achieve their
marketable juice consistency. Accordingly, the 1% tariff import duty rate under Tariff
Heading H.S. 2106.90 10 was correctly applied to the subject importations.
In any case, the VCRC in its 1st Indorsement 45
cralaw of February 17, 2005 (a subsequent
proceeding involving the same type of importation) rectified the disputed tariff
reclassification rate. Thus, in Marina's succeeding importations, the VCRC already
adopted the 1% import duty rate as paid by Marina in the past.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

xv. NEGATIVE WORDS
[G.R. Nos. 179431-32 : June 22, 2010]
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., AS THE SECOND NOMINEE OF CITIZENS BATTLE
AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 180443]
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES AND
ARMI JANE R. BORJE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions
for certiorari and mandamusis whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can
issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the
substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC
thereby implements.
Common Antecedents
The Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups
duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their
intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, 2 CIBAC, through its
president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from
which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number
of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales;
(4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees' certificates of acceptance
were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees
was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star
News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7,
2007,6 whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of
nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to
COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions
of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the
nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their
petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the
nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May
2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the
COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the
proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The right of CIBAC to a second seat
8
as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-
List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of
744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was
clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanueva's filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC
members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a
petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to
set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and
hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated
July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May 14, 2007
elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela
Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party,
Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and
Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations
and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.
The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated
July 18, 2007,12proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional
seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each; and holding in abeyance
the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de
los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P.
Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation
of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by
Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied,
however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC
Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-
05413 thuswise:
WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves
the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil
Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution
thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi
Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's
nominees therefore shall be:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
SO ORDERED.

The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the
president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such;
that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to
oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the
party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well
as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president
of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative
and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal,
although done without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the
Board's acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the party
should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second
nominee of CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List
Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15
Precis of the Consolidated Cases
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to
compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of
CIBAC.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on
January 12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No.
07-054 (approving CIBAC's withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang as CIBAC's second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the
substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC
to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18 the law
that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an
inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as
Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin's proper recourse was
an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by
Lokin.
For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition
for mandamusand a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately
seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Issues
The issues are the following:
(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and
violates the Party-List System Act; and
(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC
and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in
fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-
corporate in nature.
Ruling
The petitions are granted.
A
The Court has jurisdiction over the case
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list
organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of
Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses
herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the
HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.
We do not agree.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly
a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds
of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can
only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State,
or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat
the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place.
Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where
the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo
warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be
seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly
be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list
organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list
organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin's case is not
one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to
unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action
for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause
of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the
COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC
in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the
mode of review is by a petition forcertiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in
the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin's petitions forcertiorari and
for mandamus against the COMELEC.
B
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping
Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as
a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition
in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because
he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a
particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy)
would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court. 19
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or
not is the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses
different courts and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or
to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the
same issue.20
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act
constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as
trifling with the courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an
improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. 21
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not
necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed
involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. 22 The
actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. 23
Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other.24
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him
as the second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72
(announcing CIBAC's entitlement to an additional seat in the House of
Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and
NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of
concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise
be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted
that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBAC's
second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and
to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with
pending disputes.
On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the
September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the
nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as
the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to challenge the validity
of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC's basis for allowing CIBAC's
withdrawal of Lokin's nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action
for certiorari and the action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum
shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, because they were based on
different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.
C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in
accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the
Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be
unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the
Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may
be delegated.25
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and
administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such
delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal
principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or
primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the
policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to
selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the
prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or
administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between
the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a
discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make
laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. 26
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or
to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively
legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and
regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to
existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of
administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend
a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling
and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following
requisites to be valid:28
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a
referendum, and a recall. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it
29
by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC
enforces and administers.30
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the
COMELEC met the first requisite.
The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No.
7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on
the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect
that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply
means that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the
limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress,32 for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out,
not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs
may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and
enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not
contemplated by the Legislature.33
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45)
days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate
of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees
once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b)
the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes
incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and
free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has
intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature
really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation
should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the
Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart. 34 When the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application.35 Accordingly, an administrative agency
tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where
its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36
The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the
nominees or to alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the
deliberations of the Congress, viz:
MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do
not see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the
nominating party to change the nominees or to alter the order of
prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any
time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing
altered?
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished
Gentleman from Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be
introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly consider the
same.
MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to
the COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or
in the order of listing.
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular
nominee has been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before
election day the nominee changed his political party affiliation. The
nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and
the political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee
who changed his political party affiliation.
MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be
the exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the
nominee dies, then there has to be a change but any change for that matter
should always be at the last part of the list so that the prioritization made by
the party will not be adversely affected. 37
The usage of "No" in Section 8 - "No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list" - renders Section 8 a negative law, and is
indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or
negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the
command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain from doing the
forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose
its nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter
the order in the list of its nominees' names after submission of the list to the
COMELEC.
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part
of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list
that the list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will
not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of
the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all
the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the
nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the
people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not
for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of
any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list
nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people,
enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing
the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list
of nominees circumvents the voters' demand for transparency. The lawmakers'
exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such
circumvention.
D
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list
organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has
been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated.
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases
not falling under any of the three exceptions.
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general
rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend
only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is
established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail
the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule
that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in
determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it
accords with reason and justice.39
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the
scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and
meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a
statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted.
Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be
resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the
liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the
exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should
receive a restricted construction.
E cannot amend an act of Congress.42
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. - A party-list nominee may be
substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party,
or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his
acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances,
the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four
the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election,40 has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add
anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for
that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not
override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry out.41
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government
under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect.
The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the
statutory provision's phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is
to phrase anew or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the
original word or phrase is not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text
of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral
right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section
8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral
right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to
withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of
Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to
save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his
name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the
capriciousness of the party-list organizations.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941
of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The
success of the system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the
part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system,
and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making
intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.
Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly
issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent
that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee
once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:

The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law (a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving

postulates that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously Citizens' Battle Against Corruption's withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin,

in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees,

fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as

reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and

they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down. 45

(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
F as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens' Battle Against Corruption in the
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 House of Representatives.

An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin,
law and the IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its
Jr. as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens' Battle Against Corruption in
parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor
the House of Representatives.
the effect of law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid
source of any right, obligation, or power.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 - to the extent that it allows the
SO ORDERED.
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the
COMELEC - was invalid, CIBAC's withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the
others and its substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and
ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could
only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Resultantly, the COMELEC's approval of CIBAC's petition of withdrawal of the
nominations and its recognition of CIBAC's substitution, both through its assailed
September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Chief Supt. Romeo M. Acop and Sr. Supt. Francisco G. Zubia seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision dated July 30, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which dismissed this petition for injunction.

The factual antecedents leading to the present petition are as follows:

On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the criminal group known as
the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of
the Philippine National Police (PNP).

SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)
of the PNP and who was one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation of
the May 18, 1995 incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was
no shootout and the eleven suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were
instead summarily executed. SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of the CIC,
made the same statement corroborating the claim of SPO2 delos Reyes.

The Senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the

subject incident. SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate
hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that SPO2
delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government's Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Accordingly, SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2
dela Cruz were admitted into the said Program.

On March 12, 1996, herein petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, but who are
among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, filed before the court a
quo a petition for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order questioning
the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into the
Program. Petitioners contend that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law
enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified
from being admitted into the witness protection program even though they may be
testifying against other law enforcement officers.
xvi. FUNCTION OF A PROVISIO
On July 30, 1998, the trial court rendered the herein assailed decision.

Hence, the petition anchored on a sole assignment of error, to wit:

G.R. No. 134855 July 2, 2002
"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS
CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP and SR. SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, REYES AND SPO2 CORAZON DELA CRUZ ARE QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED INTO
JR., petitioners-appellants, THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM DESPITE THEIR CLEAR DISQUALIFICATION
vs. FROM THE PROGRAM UNDER SECTION 3(D) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6981,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'WITNESS PROTECTION, SECURITY AND BENEFIT
Department of Justice, and SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JUDE ROMANO, in ACT'."
his capacity as the Director of the Government's Witness Protection
Program; SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS REYES and SPO2 CORAZON DELA Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC be reversed and set aside and instead -
CRUZ,respondents-appellees.
"a) An Injunction be issued enjoining the Department of Justice from continuing to
RESOLUTION provide the benefits accruing under the Witness Protection Program to respondents
SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz;
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
"b) Order the immediate discharge of respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela
Cruz from WPP and for the latter to be ordered to cease and desist from accepting
the benefits of the WPP; and
"c) Order respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz to return whatever
monetary benefits they have received from the government as a consequence of
their wrongful and illegal admission into the WPP."1
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that the petition
lacks merit and that the same has been rendered moot and academic because the
coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the Program was already
terminated on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced
by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated February
10, 1999.2 In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela
Cruz agree with the OSG.
Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason
of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the coverage of the
Program. However, we find it necessary to resolve the merits of the principal issue
raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future guidance of both bench
and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we have
ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol,3and Viola vs. Alunan III,4 "courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading
review.'"
Petitioners' main contention is that Section 3 of R.A. No. 6981 lays down the basic
qualifications a person must possess in order to be admitted into the Program and
that Section 4 of the same statute is not an exception to Section 3 but, it simply
adds requirements for witnesses before they may become eligible for admission into
the Program in case of legislative investigations.
We do not agree.
Section 3(d) provides:
Sec. 3. Admission into the Program. - Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is
testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any
investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program: Provided, That:
xxx
(d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against the
other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his
family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Witness in Legislative Investigations. - In case of legislative
investigations in aid of legislation, a witness, with his express consent, may be
admitted into the Program upon the recommendation of the legislative committee
where his testimony is needed when in its judgment there is pressing necessity
therefor: Provided, That such recommendation is approved by the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be.
A careful reading of Sections 3 and 4 readily shows that these are distinct and
independent provisions. It is true that the proviso in Section 3(d) disqualifies law
enforcement officers from being admitted into the Program when they "testify
before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority." This
is the general rule. However, Section 4 provides for a specific and separate situation
where a witness testifies before a legislative investigation. An investigation by a
legislative committee does not fall under the category of "any investigating
authority" referred to in Section 3. Section 4 contains only a proviso that the
witness' admission to the Program must be recommended by the legislative
committee when in its judgment there is a pressing necessity therefor and said
recommendation is approved by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be. Section 4 does not contain any
proviso similar to Sec. 3(d) as quoted above, nor does Section 4 refer to the
application of the proviso under Section 3. In other words, Section 4 did not make
any qualification or distinction.
It is basic under the law on statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.5 The operation of a proviso is usually and
properly confined to the clause or distinct portion of the enactment which
immediately precedes it or to which it pertains, and does not extend to or qualify
other sections or portions of the statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall so
operate is clearly disclosed.6
In the present case, it is clear that the legislative intent that the proviso under
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981 does not apply to Section 4. The trial court did not err
in concluding that if the framers of the law intended otherwise, they could have
easily placed the same proviso of Section 3(d) or referred to it under Section 4.
Hence, in the absence of a clear proviso or reference to Section 3(d), a witness in a
legislative investigation whether or not he is a law enforcement officer, may be
admitted into the Program subject only to the requirements provided for under
Section 4. It is not disputed that the Senate Committee on Justice and Human
Rights, chaired by then Senator Raul Roco, had recommended the admission of
SPO2 delos Reyes and dela Cruz into the Program and was duly indorsed by then
Senate President Edgardo J. Angara.
WHEREFORE, we DENY DUE COURSE to the petition and AFFIRM the assailed
decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16808 January 3, 1921
ANDRES BORROMEO, plaintiff,
vs.
FERMIN MARIANO, defendant.
Fisher and DeWitt for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Feria for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
Quo warranto proceedings have been instituted in this court to determine the right
of the plaintiff and of the defendant to the office of Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
The only facts, and these are undisputed ones, which need be noticed, are the
following: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and took
possession of the office on that date. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed
Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge
of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date
consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.
Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of
the Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code,
secs. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for each judicial
district, except the night. (Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the judge is "filed with
the clerk of the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its
records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by the Secretary
of Justice to temporary duty in a district other than their own for the purpose of
trying land registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding
portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to which particular attention is
addressed by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of
another district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the
Governor-General only if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause
shall exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)
The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the
general legislative intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act.
When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is once clearly
ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower import
may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with this
fundamental principle is another, equally well-established, that such a construction
is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provision of the statute. (2
Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2
Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 287.)
Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the
Administrative Code, the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous.
Judges of First Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the
respective judicial districts of the Philippines Islands. They are not appointed judges
of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of judges of first
instance of definite districts until they resign, retire, or are removed through
impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and
distinct judicial offices.
The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not
beginning with the usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the
nature of a proviso, and should be construed as such. The office of a proviso is to
limit the application of the law. It is contrary to the nature of a proviso to enlarge
the operation of the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the
main provisions of the statute. A proviso which is directly repugnant to the purview
or body of an Act is inoperative and void. (See generally, 25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et
seq.; and specifically, the leading cases of McKnight vs. Hodge [1909], 55 Wash.,
289, 104 Pac., 504, 40 L. R. A. [N.S.], 1207; McCormick vs. West Duluth [1891], 47
Minn., 272, 50 N.W., 128; Idaho Power & Light Co. vs. Blomquist [1916], 26 Idaho,
222; 141 Pac., 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these principles concerning
provisos are applied.)
To arrive at a correct decision with reference to the proviso before us, let it first be
recalled that the law is emphatic in its specification that, save when judges of first
instance are detailed to try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation
duty, "no judge of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district
than that for which he is commissioned." The keyword to the proviso which follows
is "appointed." This word should here be given its usual signification. Many of the
decisions follow the definition of "appoint" found in the Century Dictionary and
Encyclopedia. "Appoint" is there defined as "to allot, set apart, or designate;
nominate or authoritatively assign, as far a use, or to a position or office." All the
authorities united in saying that the term "appoint" is well-known in law and
whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the
nomination or designation of an individual. Appointment signifies no more than
selection for public office. (4 C. J., 1402, 1404, citing numerous decisions.)
The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the
law of public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and
distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make
it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at
pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the
office. (22 R. C. L. 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge
of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this district is
accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to another
district. No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge of First
Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be
made to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc., 1373.) In our judgment, the
language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted with
reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the Governor-General to
force upon the judge of one district an appointment to another district against his
will, thereby removing him from his district.
Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not
be given a meaning which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the
law, it should further be recalled that judges of first instance are removable only
through a fixed procedure. Moreover, impeachment proceedings, as conducted by
the Supreme Court, may be in the nature of jurisdiction, conferred upon the
Supreme Court by ratification of the Congress of the United States, which, it has
uniformly been held, cannot be diminished. (We make no ruling on this point
because unnecessary for the resolution of the case.) But, certainly, if a judge could
be transferred from one district of the Philippine Islands to another, without his
consent, it would require no great amount of imagination to conceive how this
power could be used to discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal. A
judge who had, by a decision, incurred the ill-will of an attorney or official, could, by
the insistence of the disgruntled party, be removed from one district, demoted, and
transferred to another district, at possibly a loss of salary, all without the consent of
the judicial officer. The only recourse of the judicial officer who should desire to
maintain his self-respect, would be to vacate the office and leave the service. Unless
we wish to nullify the impeachment section of the Administrative Code, and thus
possibly to encroach upon the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the
Organic Law, section 155 must be interpreted so as to make it consistent therewith.
What we have said is reinforced by the authorities most directly in point. In the
early decision of Marbury vs.Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137), the Supreme Court
of the United States, in unmistakable terms, explained the powers of the Judiciary
in enforcing the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land and held that the
President of the United States had no power to remove a justice of the peace of the
District of Columbia from office. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said that "When the
officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not
revocable, and cannot be annulled: it has conferred legal rights which cannot be
resumed. The discretion of the executive is to be exercised, until the appointment
has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the office is
terminated, in all cases where, by law, the officer is not removable by him. The right
to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute unconditional
power of accepting or rejecting it." The great jurist further or observed that "It is,
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law
is"
In State of Louisiana vs. Downes ([1869], 21 La. Ann., 490), the Supreme Court of
Louisiana said that a judge of a court could, under the Constitution of that State,
only be removed from office by impeachment, by address of the Legislature, or by
proceeding under the intrusion act. It was held that the appointment and
commissioning by the Governor of the State of a party to an office which has legally
been filled, without the vacancy being first declared according to law, was an
absolute nullity.
The Attorney-General brings to our notice an obsolete law which had escaped us,
and which, if any lingering doubts exist, would serve to remove that. This law is Act
No. 396, enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1902. Section 4 thereof, separate
and distinct from the other provisions of the Act, and not tacked on as a proviso,
provided that "any judge of a Court of First Instance . . . may be transferred from
one judicial district to another by order of the Civil Governor, with the advice and
consent of the Commission. Any judge so transferred shall, upon such transfer,
cease the performance of judicial duties in the district to which he was originally
appointed, and shall be the regular judge thereafter in the judicial district to which
he as been so assigned." But Act No. 396 was thrice repealed by the Philippine
Legislature; the first time, impliedly by the enactment of Act No. 2347, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, and subsequently, expressly by the Administrative Code of 1916
and the Administrative Code of 1917. Instead, also, of continuing the phraseology of
section 4 of Act No. 396, the Legislature merely included the proviso to which we
have alluded. It cannot, therefore, admit of doubt that the members of the
Philippine Legislature had before them the Act of the Philippine Commission and
preferred, not to perpetuate the old law, but to insert language of their own. The
purpose of the Philippine Legislature was clearly to safeguard the interests of the
judiciary, and this laudable purpose, it is for us now to effectuate.
Far more convincing than precedent or argument are great and basic principles long
inherent in popular government intended to create an independent judiciary. A
history of the struggle for a fearless and an incorruptible judiciary prepared to follow
the law and to administer it regardless of consequences, can be perused with ever-
recurring benefit. Since the early days of the Republic, the judicial system in the
United States, with certain exceptions which only served to demonstrate more fully
the excellence of the whole, has been viewed with pride, and confidently relied upon
for justice by the American people. The American people considered it necessary
"that there should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers
and secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against the
arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government." (Woodrow
Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.) It was such a
conception of an independent judiciary which was instituted in the Philippines by the
American administration and which has since served as one of the chief glories of
the government and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people.
The Attorney-General in the argument in support of his motion for reconsideration,
quotes the last preceding sentence and says that he dissents therefrom. The
number of authoritative replies to the proposition advanced by the law officer of the
government relative to the intention to establish an independent judiciary in these
Islands, is limited only by space in which to quote them. Possibly we can do no
better than to make our own the language of Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for a
unanimous court, in Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of
Occidental Negro ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 384), when he said: "This governments in
the United States, now possesses a complete governmental organization, with
executive legislative, and judicial departments, which are exercising functions as
independent of each other as the Federal or State governments." (For the legislative
version of the same idea, see Administrative Code, sec. 17.)
On occasion, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied the accepted
theory of the division of powers, termed by the United States Supreme Court as
"one of the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law"
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson [1881], 13 Otto, 168), and has unhesitatingly refused to
interfere with the official acts of the Governor-General or to intrude on the rights
and privileges of the Philippine Legislature (In the Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93;
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros,supra; In
re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41; U.S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; U.S. vs. Ten
Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1; Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919],
39 Phil., 886.) As an instance of this class of decisions, in Veloso vs. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, supra, this court, in considering the right of the
Philippine Senate to be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
elective members, said:
The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of
Representatives, respectively is full, clear, and complete. . . . The judiciary, with its
traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive
privilege of the legislature to remain where the sovereign authority has placed it.
Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is made the sole judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its elective members, this tribunal neither can, nor
ought, to take jurisdiction of the case.
Although much more reluctantly, and also much more infrequently we are happy to
add, the court has had to defend the judiciary against legislative and executive
encroachment. (Ocampo vs. Cabagis [1910], 15 Phil., 626;In re Guaria [1914],
24 Phil., 37; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; and Province of
Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338.) As an instance of the latter class of decisions,
in Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, supra, Mr. Justice Moreland, speaking for the court, It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the
said: possession of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth
Judicial District. It is our judgment that the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be
The judiciary is one of the coordinate branches of the Government. ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District, and the
(Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil., 534; United States vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Its plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by
preservation in its integrity and effectiveness is necessary to the present form of the Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be entered as the
Government. . . . It is order of the court. So ordered.
clear . . . that each department is bound to preserve its own existence if it live up to
the duty imposed upon it as one of the coordinate branches of the government. Araullo, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Whatever a person or entity ought to do or must do in law, it has the power to do. Johnson, J., signed the original decision, but was not present when the motion for
This being true, the judiciary has the power to maintain its existence; and whatever reconsideration was filed and when this decisions was promulgated.
is reasonably necessary to that end, courts may do or order done. But the right to
live, if that is all there is of it, is a very small matter. The mere right to breathe does
not satisfy ambition or produce results. Therefore, courts have not only the power
to maintain their life, but they have also the power to make that existence effective
for the purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate Separate Opinions
means, do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to
make the judiciary an effective institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, VILLAMOR, J., dissenting:
inherent power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure
I dissent. The interpretation, which the majority give to the last clause of section
effectiveness in the administration of justice. This is clear; for, if the judiciary may
155 of the Administrative Code, in the sense that it requires the consent of a judge
be deprived of any one of its essential attributes, or if any one of them may be
of the Court of First Instance in order that he may be transferred from one judicial
seriously weakened by the act of any person or official, then independence
district to another, is an amendment of the law, an act which should be done only by
disappears and subordination begins. The power to interfere is the power to control,
the legislative branch of the government. I am not unaware of the possibility that
and the power to control is the power to abrogate. The sovereign power has given
the power of the Governor-General to effect such transfers of Judges of First
life to the judiciary and nothing less than the sovereign power can take it away or
Instance with the consent of the Senate may produce as a result the resignation of
render it useless. The power to withhold from the courts anything really essential
the judge thus transferred if he does not accept the transfer. However, this fact
for the administration of justice is the power to control and ultimately to destroy the
should be referred to the legislature in order that it may amend the law if it sees fit
efficiency of the judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty to their creator, the
to do so. The provisions of the law being clear, the court should apply it in the
sovereign power, permit themselves to be subordinated to any person or official to
manner and form in which it has been passed by the legislature, without attempting
which their creator did not itself subordinate them.
to attach thereto a condition, as that of the consent of the judge transferred, which
A stirring plea has been made by the learned representative of the Government for the legislature did not see fit to require.
a decision which will work for the public welfare. We agree that, under the peculiar
It is presented that the appointment to a specific position in the Government
conditions existing in the Philippines, it is sometimes well for a judge not to remain
requires, among other elements, the acceptance thereof, without which it would not
indefinitely in a particular district. But it is a far cry from this premise to the use of a
produce any effect. However, with reference to the transfer of judges a new
method not sanctioned by existing law and savoring of military discipline. Our
appointment is made only to distinguish a permanent transfer from a temporary
conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the
assignment to sit in another district, which is forbidden by law, except for the
principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are
purposes of land registration cases; and a new oath is taken only to attest the fact
permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and
that the transfer has been effected and that the transferred judge has taken
who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and
possession of the office in the new district for the purposes of jurisdiction. But, in
coordinate to the other two departments of government. We are pleased to think of
reality, in this case there is no new employee, there is not a different office. The
judges as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was removed
transferred judge continues being a judge as much as before his transfer, holds the
from office because when asked "if in the future he would delay a case at the King's
same office with all the attributes and powers thereto annexed, and enjoys the
order," replied: "I will do what becomes me as a judge."
same privileges, with the sole difference as to the place in which jurisdiction is
For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language exercised. In this case, according to the law, the prior consent of the judge is not
used in the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection necessary in order that he may be transferred to another district, for the good of
with the whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the public service, which is the basis of the power to make such transfers, is over
the principles of the law of public officers, leave from for no other construction than and above the personal interests of every citizen.
that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district only with his
It is also contended that the last clause of section 155 is a danger to the
consent.
independence of the judiciary. But if this legal provision is considered in relation to
section 5 of the Administrative Code, which presumes that administrative discretion
is exercised for the good of the service and the benefit of the public; and if it is
furthermore considered that the executive power to effect transfers of judges is
subject to the approval of a restraining body, that is, the Senate, it seems, in my
opinion, that this legal provision is a prudent measure tending to protect the
interest of good public service.
According to law, the Governor-General has the discretion to make transfers of
judges from one district to another, with the consent of the Senate. Therefore, to
the Governor-General and to the Senate, and not to the judges, is the power
granted to determine how such discretion should be exercised. In the case at bar
there is not even a single allegation that such discretion has been abused in
disregard of the law, and therefore, there is no way by which this court may
disapprove the transfer of the petitioner deiced to be effected by the Governor-
General in the exercise of the discretionary powers conferred upon him by law.
If the consent of a judge is an essential requisite to his transfer to another district,
it must also be an essential requisite to his assignment to sit in another district to
try land registration cases or as vacation judge, for in both cases, the same reason
exists, that is, the danger to the independence of the judiciary, which is the
foundation of the majority opinion. The result would be the complete repeal of
section 155 of the Administrative Code through the interpretation given by this
court. And an interpretation leading to such result should be discarded for it is
contrary to the doctrines of statutory construction cited in the majority opinion, to
wit: that the court should give effect to the general intention of the legislator, if it
may be gathered from all the viewpoints from which the law is examined; and that,
if possible, that construction should be adopted which gives effect to all the
provisions of the law (2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction, page 662 et
seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; sec. 207 of the Administrative Code).
But what is the intention of the legislator in the legal provision now under
consideration? The provisions of the law are clear and it is not necessary either to
stretch the imagination or resort to other jurisdictions, to discover the intention of
the legislator. Section 155 of the Administrative Code provides:
For the purpose of trying land registration cases only, a judge of first instance may,
if the public interests so require, be detailed by the Department Head to temporary
duty in a district other than his own. Save when so detailed or when assigned to
vacation duty, no judge of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other
district than that for which he is commissioned; but nothing herein shall be
construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to
be judge of another district.
It is admitted by the authorities on the subject that the object of a saving clause of
proviso is (1) to except something from the legal provision in question, or (2) to
restrict the provisions thereof, or (3) to exclude all possible reason for erroneously
construing such provision so as to make it applicable to cases which the legislature
did not intend to include therein.
In whatever sense the proviso in question is interpreted, there is no reason for
requiring the consent of the judge for a temporary or permanent transfer to another
district. The intention of the legislature, as gathered from the provisions of the law,
is that no judge shall be required to render services in another district, except to try
land registration cases or to act as vacation judge, but without prejudice to his
being appointed by the Governor-General as judge of another district.
That discharge is a different thing from transfer is a self-evident proposition
requiring no proof. That a judge appointed to another district may refuse to accept
his transfer is not disputed by anyone. But if he leaves the office by abandonment
or resignation, such result is not a necessary effect of the transfer but of his free
will.
The majority decision tries to solve the proposition that if the remedy prayed for is
not granted judges would lose their judicial independence. But we should remember,
in this connection what Judge Cooley, one of the most eminent American jurists, in
resolving the proposition that if it should be held that the Governor cannot be
compelled to fulfill purely ministerial duties, those in possession of legal rights
would, in many cases, be without remedy, said in the case of
Sutherland vs. Governor (29 Mich., 329), to wit:
Practically, there are a great many such cases, but theoretically, there are none at
all. All wrongs, certainly, are not redressed by the judicial department. A party may
be deprived of a right by a wrong verdict, or an erroneous ruling of a judge, and
though the error may be manifest to all others than those who are to decide upon
his rights, he will be without redress. A person lawfully chosen to the Legislature
may have his seat given by the house to another, and be thus wronged without
remedy. A just claim against the State may be rejected by the board of auditors,
and neither the governor nor the courts can give relief. A convicted person may
conclusively demonstrate his innocence to the governor, and still be denied a
pardon. In which one of these cases could the denial of redress by the proper
tribunal constitute any ground for interference by any other authority? The law must
leave the final decision upon every claim and every controversy somewhere, and
when that decision has been made, it must be accepted as correct. The presumption
is just as conclusive in favor of executive action as in favor of judicial.
A case in which the court discussed the proposition that there can be no wrong
whatever without any remedy is that of People vs. Bissell (19 Ill., 229). In that case
the court said:
It is urged upon us, that in a government of laws there must be an adequate
remedy for every wrong, and that where a clear right exists, there must be some
mode of enforcing that right. While human society is governed by so imperfect a
being as man, this can be true only in theory. If we are to compel the Governor or
the legislature to right every wrong which may arise from their omissions of duty,
then surely they must, in order to make this Utopian system perfect, have the
power to compel us to do right in every case. May it not be as well supposed that
we will act perversely, and refuse to perform a duty imposed upon us, to the injury
of the citizen, as that the Governor will do so? In the formation of the government,
equal confidence was rightfully reposed in each department, to which appropriate
and independent duties were assigned.
The proceeding instituted in this case is entitled Quo Warranto, a proceeding for
determining the right of a Judge of First Instance to sit in a determined judicial
district. But there can be no doubt that in this question is involved the power of the
Governor-General to appoint Judges of First Instance. While the petition in this case
does not include the Governor-General as party respondent, nevertheless, the
judgment of this court must in the same manner necessarily affect him who
authorized the appointment now in dispute and the appointee, now respondent
Judge Fermin Mariano. This conclusion is inevitable for the case deals with the
appointment of a judge made by the Governor-General in the exercise of his
discretional powers. Indeed this court cannot decide this case by granting the
prayer of the petitioner without disapproving the manner in which this power of the
Governor-General has been exercised. Has the court jurisdiction to do this?
Section 26 of the Jones Act provides, among other things:
The Judges of the Courts of First Instance shall be appointed by the Governor-
General, by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.
In view of this legal provision and of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to
maintain that a Judge of First Instance may not be transferred to another district
without his consent amounts to judicially determining that the Governor-General
cannot exercise the power conferred upon him by law to transfer a judge from one
district to another without the consent of the judge concerned.
The question whether courts possess or do not possess jurisdiction to control the
official acts of the Governor has been raised before many courts of the United
States. And this Supreme Court, in the case of Severino vs. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366, 387, 400, 402), after
examining the various cases in which this question was raised in the United States,
said:
We think that the weight of authority, based upon legal principles and sound
reasoning, supports the proposition that in the United States the supreme courts of
the States do not have jurisdiction to control the official acts of the governor. For
better reasons we conclude that this court has no jurisdiction, either by mandamus
or injunction, to control the official acts of the Governor-General, inasmuch as we
have seen that his duties, powers, and responsibilities are more comprehensive
than those conferred upon any State Governor. When the Philippine legislative body
confers upon the Governor-General powers and duties, it does so for the reason that
he is in a better position to know the needs of the country than any other member
of the executive department, and with the full confidence that he will perform such
duties, under his official oath, as his best judgment dictates. If this had not been
the intention of the legislature, they could have placed the duty upon some other
official of the executive department. It no doubt is sometimes very necessary for
the Governor-General to perform certain important executive duties without delay,
and should this court attempt to distinguish between purely ministerial and
discretionary duties, conferred upon him by law, and attempt to determine in each
case which are purely ministerial, which are political, or which are discretionary, the
Governor-General, to that extent would become subservient to the judiciary. To
avoid this is why the three great coordinate departments of the Government were
created and made independent of each other. President McKinley in creating civil
government in this country took into consideration these fundamental principles of
separate and independent departments, which have been demonstrated to be
essential to a republican form of government, and conferred upon the Governor-
General, as the Executive of the Philippine Islands, the power to execute the laws
according to his best judgment, holding him responsible to the President of the
United States, without interference on the part of the judiciary. In so doing he
reposed in the Executive of this country great confidence, realizing that he, the
Executive, acting independently of the judiciary, would be in a better position to
carry out the great underlying principles of American institutions for the peace and
happiness of the inhabitants of this country. The President realized that the final
decision of every question in controversy must be left somewhere, and when such
decision has been made it must be accepted as correct. The presumption is just as
conclusive in favor of executive action, as to its correctness and justness, as it is in
favor of judicial action.
In another part of this decision this court added:
Inasmuch as the three coordinated departments of the Government, the executive,
legislative, and judicial, have been established and are operating, as we have said,
as independently of each other as the same three coordinated branches created
under the constitution of the Federal and State governments are operating in the
American Union, and in view of the fact that there have been conferred upon the
Chief Executive of these Islands more extensive powers, duties, and responsibilities
than have been conferred upon the governors of the various States of the Union, we
think the reason for the holdings of the courts of the United States, which have
passed upon this question are worthy of consideration. We might here add that we
have no doubt that the present incumbent of the office of Governor-General, a man
who is ready and willing at all times to render obedience to the law, would follow
the mandate of this court, but such willingness to be governed by the order of this
court would not of itself give us jurisdiction. Nor should he manifest (which he has
not done) his intention to not obey the mandate of this court, this would not be
sufficient reason for us to asbtain from requiring him to comply with such mandate
in case we have jurisdiction.
And in the dispositive part of the decision the court among other things said: "That
we can not and should not entertain a complaint which seeks to control or interfere
with the official duties of the Governor-General."
In the case of Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil., 534), this court,
adhering to the same principle announced in the case of Severino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra, established the following
doctrine:
In a government of separate and independent departments, executive, legislative,
and judicial, with separate and distinct functions, one department will not attempt
to interfere with the performance of the exclusive duties of another. To permit such
an interference would destroy the independence of the separate departments and
would make one subject to the control of the others. For the judiciary to interfere,
for the purpose of questioning the manner of exercising the legal and political duties
of the chief executive head of the Government or to control the action of the
legislative department, would, in effect, destroy the independence of the
departments of the Government and would make all departments subject to the
ultimate control of the judicial. Such a conclusion or condition was never
contemplated by the organizers of the Government.
In deciding the present petition, ordering that the respondent judge Fermin Mariano
should be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty-fourth District and that
possession thereof should be surrendered to the petitioner Andres Borromeo, has
not this court judicially determined that the appointment of the former to said
district and that of the latter to the twenty-first, both made by the Governor-
General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate, are not well made iii. GENERAL AND SPECIAL LAWS
and are contrary to the immovability of judges and should therefore be annulled by
this court? What does the decision of the majority mean but that it is a real iv. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LAWS
intrusion in the exercise of the powers conferred upon the executive and legislative
departments of the Government? And is this not openly contrary to the doctrines v. STATUTE V. ORDINANCE
established in the decisions cited of this Supreme Court itself, where the much-
vaunted independence of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments is
proclaimed?
D. CONSTITUTION
The petition is denied.
i. INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
The motion for reconsideration should be granted.
ii. SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS

iii. TREATED AS A WHOLE

E. STRICT V. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTIONS

III. AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

A. INTRINSIC

B. EXTRINSIC

i. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES

C. CONFLICTING STATUTES ii. POLICY

i. CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE iii. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

ii. IN PARI MATERIA iv. CONSTRUCTION BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES