5.
RIGHT TO BAIL AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL
ABROAD
G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII,
Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander
Bilog, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement
of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc.
(MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of
Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order
of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the
accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal
Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion, 1 and the subsequent Order
dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for reconsideration of
16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion for
reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the court to
allow petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer
for a reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right
to bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied to a
person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and
whether such right may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information2 filed on 2 October 1986 in
Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, later amended in an Amended Information 3 which
was filed on 24 October 1986, private respondent Rodolfo
Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were
charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in
relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly
committed as follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and
continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of
Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist
Party of the Philippines, its military arm, the New People's
Army, its mass infiltration network, the National Democratic
Front with its other subordinate organizations and fronts,
have, under the direction and control of said organizations'
leaders, among whom are the aforenamed accused, and with
the aid, participation or support of members and followers
whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen
publicly and taken arms throughout the country against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the
purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat of
which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from the
allegiance to that government and its laws, the country's
territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in
their capacities as leaders of the aforenamed organizations, in
conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the
organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war
against the forces of the government, destroying property or
committing serious violence, and other acts in the pursuit of
their unlawful purpose, such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed
before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent
and his co-accused were in military custody following their
arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General
Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had earlier escaped from
military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was
offered for his
capture.4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3
October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for private
respondent and his co-accused was filed with this
Court5 which, as shall hereafter be discussed in detail, was
dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis
of the agreement of the parties under which herein private
respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial
before the court having custody over his person" and the
warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled
and they shall be immediately released but shall submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court
below a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished, 6 to which
petitioner filed an Opposition7 citing, among other grounds,
the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated
October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent
categorically conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having custody over
his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987, 8 respondent Judge denied the
motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private
respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, 9which
herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May
198710 on the ground that since rebellion became a capital
offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834,
which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those
who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no
longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187
repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and
restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus,
the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not
to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official
Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was
officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge, taking into
consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted private
respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at
P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the
additional condition that he shall report to the court once
every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every
period thereof. In granting the petition respondent Judge
stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of
Executive Order No. 187, the offense of rebellion, for which
accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable
with the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section
13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114,
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is
now a matter of right in non-capital offenses before final
judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of Section 3,
Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same
rule. In view, therefore, of the present circumstances in this
case, said accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a matter
of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a
capital offense.
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be
dangerous to grant bail to private respondent considering his
stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and
overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy
and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release
would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed
struggle to topple the government before whose courts he
invokes his constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge
replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the accused's
constitutional right to bail in a non-capital offense, which
right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the
prosecution, "the existence of the government that bestows
the right, the paramount interest of the state." Suffice to state
that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a
"declaration of the rights of the individual, civil, political and
social and economic, guaranteed by the Constitution against
impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental action.
Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the worth of
individual. There is recognition of certain inherent and
inalienable rights of the individual, which the government is
prohibited from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine
Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in
case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the
same should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the
eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the
Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government is
that powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower and
the wherewithals to fight those "who oppose, threathen (sic)
and destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and
political institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may not
be founded that the accused may later on jump bail and rejoin
his comrades in the field to sow further disorders and anarchy
against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear
can not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very
explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an accused is
entitled as a matter of light to bail.Dura est lex sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider12 the above order filed on 16 July
1987, petitioner asked the court to increase the bail from
P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per
Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the
bail for the, provisional release of an accused should be in an
amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment
based on the medium penalty imposable for the offense and
explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the
private respondent "had in the past escaped from the custody
of the military authorities and the offense for which he is
charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or
robbery, where after the commission, the perpetrator has
achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it with an
alien system based on a foreign ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration13 indirectly asking the court to deny bail to the
private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in
support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the
accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail
to appear in court for trial," a conclusion it claims to be
buttressed "by the following facts which are widely known by
the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable Court
may have judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years
and was an escapee from detention when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known
address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at
the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to
substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned
out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle
with a declared owner whose identity and address were also
found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January
1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his
arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the
slightest intention to appear in court for trial, if released."
Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the
Chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines and head
of its military arm, the NPA, together with his followers, are
now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion against this
government and threatens the existence of this very Court
from which he now seeks provisional release," and that while
he is entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive
Order No. 187 which restored the original penalty for
rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, yet,
when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an
individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of the
State of self-preservation is paramount to any of the rights of
an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the
United States of America holding "that there is no absolute
constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous
resident aliens pending deportation proceedings, 14 and that an
arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he presents a risk of
flight;15 and sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee
charged with serious felonies who are found after an
adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals
and to the community which no condition of release can
dispel.16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the
Order17 adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
the Court finds the "supplemental" motion for reconsideration
to be without merit and hereby denies it but finds the first
motion for reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as
the amount of bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its
Order of July 7, 1987 only to increase the amount of bail from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this
Court, and with the additional condition that accused Rodolfo
Salas shall report to the court once every two (2) months
within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof
(Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66
SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the
respondent Judge took into account the "sudden turn-about"
on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a
motion for reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of
the private respondent to bail but merely asked to increase the
amount of bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of
arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May
1987; asserted that the American precedents are not applicable
since the cases involved deportation of aliens and, moreover,
the U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a proviso on
the right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only an
injunction against excessive bail; and quoted the concurring
opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of Nava,
et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964
and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil,
172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this
petition submitting therein the following issues:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J.
DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION,
AND IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING
REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION
TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT
RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J.
DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION
WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT
RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent
is estopped from invoking his right to bail, having expressly
waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in
legal custody and face trial before the court having custody of
his person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant of
arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose
Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-capital
offenses, is not absolute when there is prima facie evidence
that the accused is a serious threat to the very existence of the
State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to
present evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently,
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when
he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may
desire to support its prayer for the denial of bail and when he
declared that the State has forfeited its right to do so since
during all the time that the petition for bail was pending, it
never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to adduce
such evidence. And that even if release on bail may be
allowed, respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at
P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take into
account the lengthy record of private respondents' criminal
background, the gravity of the pending charge, and the
likelihood of flight.18
In Our resolution of 11 August 198719 We required the
respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to
cease and desist from implementing his order of 30 July 1987
granting bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private respondent
asks for the outright dismissal of the petition and immediate
lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following
grounds:
I originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
BAIL; NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER
WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A
CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION PERPETUA), HENCE
HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS CORRECT.
PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IS NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN
WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT ONLY
RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private
respondent.21 The reply was filed on 18 September 1987.22
In Our resolution of 15 October 1987 23 We gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to file simultaneously
their memoranda within twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5
November24 and 23 November 198725 petitioner and private
respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda
and that the petition and reply be considered as the
Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in
Our resolution of 19 November 198726 and 1 December
1987,27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the
Solicitor General to express his stand on the issues raised in
this petitions,28 which he complied with by filing his
Manifestation on 30 May 1990 29 wherein he manifests that he
supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent
Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled
and set aside asserting that private respondent had waived the
light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that
granting bail to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking
which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the primary
consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the
trial of the case against him which would be frustrated by the
"almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of
whatever amount"; and application of the guidelines provided
for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure on the amount of bail dictates denial of bail to
private respondent. The Solicitor General likewise maintains
that the right of the petitioner to hearing on the application of
private respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent
Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended
Informations for rebellion and the application for bail were
filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the
offense for which the private respondent was charged
was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the
application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by
the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as
Code was restored. The restored law was the governing law at
the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied
to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of
rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code
to which is attached the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine
not exceeding P20,000.00.30 It is, therefore, a bailable
offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also
provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in custody
shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital offense or an
offense which, under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or
of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged
is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua.31 To that extent the right is absolute.32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez,
et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that the accused was
already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons
and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We
granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency
of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of
the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the
security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of
conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt
of Hernandez is strong, We held:
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be
derived upon mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of
liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system
that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very
first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers
of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of
said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of
freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by
explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This
overturns the Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et
al., supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right
to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion
is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail
may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and
those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof
will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin
their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion
or insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It
shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence
of guilt is strong.33 But once it is determined that the evidence
of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after
similar provisions contained in the Constitution of the United
States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of
the many states provide that all persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof
is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such
provisions, bail is a matter of right which no court or judge
can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in the
exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of right
even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is
evident or the presumption thereof is great!34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to
present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where
bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant
of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. 35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the
respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at
P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines
for the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely
to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs.
Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or
not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out
allegations which necessitate a grant of an opportunity to be
heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but
not for the denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule
114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of
the law, rebellion is no longer punishable byprision
mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No.
6968 approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect
after publication in at least two newspapers of general
circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion
such that, as amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat.
Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands
of others in a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent
for acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. It is not
favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not
a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has,
however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the
original information in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 with the
trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private
respondent, and his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose
Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida
Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce
Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig.
Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among
others, that the petition be given due course and a writ
ofhabeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to produce
the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-accused
before the Court and explain by what authority they arrested
and detained them. The following proceedings took place
thereafter in said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ
of habeas corpus, required respondents to make a return of
the writ on or before the close of office hours on 13 October
and set the petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00
o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Return To The Writ of Habeas
Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina
Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the
military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at the
Philippine General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga
being leaders or members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, New People's Army and National Democratic
Front, organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the
Government through violent means, and having actually
committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. After their arrest they were
forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch XII of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region in Criminal
Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their arrest
were issued and respondents continue to detain them because
of the warrants of arrest and the pendency of the criminal
cases against them. Respondents further allege that, contrary
to the allegation in the petition, herein private respondent was
not a member of the NDF panel involved in peace
negotiations with the Government; neither is he and his
companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe
conduct pass issued by competent authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the
Court of certain agreements reached between them. We issued
a resolution reading as follows:
When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys
Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado,
Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and
William Chua appeared for the petitioners with Atty.
Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor General
Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la
Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the
respondents, with Solicitor General Ordoez arguing for the
respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in
open Court that in conformity with the agreement reached
with the government, the petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under
custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, also in open Court,
confirmed the foregoing statement made by petitioners'
counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition for habeas
corpus, declaring that no objection will be interposed to the
immediate release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, and that no bond will be required of them, but
they will continue to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo
Salas; further, that they will not be rearrested on the basis of
the warrants issued by the trial court provided that they
manifest in open Court their willingness to subject themselves
to the jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when
their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with
petitioners' counsel today relative to the compromise
agreement that they have previously undertaken to submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, that on his oath as member of the Bar, the
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have
agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, the Court ordered their immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations
and statements and required both parties to SUBMIT to the
Court their compromise agreement by 4:00 o'clock this
afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the
parties submitted a Joint Manifestation and Motion duly
signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, Assistant Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S.
Villanueva, counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by
their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Tribunal
respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong,
petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoez
on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were conducted to find
out how the majesty of the law may be preserved and human
considerations may be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following
terms of agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will
be immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al.,
Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926], Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed against them
under their personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of
formal manifestation before the Supreme Court that they will
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to
obtain the conformity of the Government to the foregoing
terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic) and
their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation
during the hearing on October 14 and the present
manifestation in compliance with the resolution announced in
court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas
corpus be dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montao and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint
Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed by
Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
Mercado and Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners
and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Assistant
Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney
Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents which states
that they have entered into an agreement whereby: [a] the
petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners,
and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be
immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al.,
Criminal Case No. 4886, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed against
them, on their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo
Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the
court having custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of
arrest for the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of the formal
manifestation before this Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person
and in view of the said agreement, the petition for habeas
corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
petition for habeas corpus but subject to the condition that
petitioners' lead counsel, Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as
member of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment to ensure
the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion at
the trial of the criminal case for rebellion filed against them.
Teehankee,C.J., is on official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in
agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the pendency
of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his
right to bail."37 Upon the other hand, private respondent
asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal
basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus they precisely
questioned the legality of the arrest and the continued
detention of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, which was not resolved by this Court or by the
compromise agreement of the parties but left open for further
determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the matter of
the right to bail was neither raised by either party nor resolved
by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken by private
respondent after the agreement was reached, like the filing of
the motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the petition for
bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and positive assertions of his
statutory and constitutional rights to be granted not only
provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally, private
respondent maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in
the Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means that private
respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law
or in custodia legis and nothing else; it is not to be interpreted
as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual
imprisonment. It is also defined as the detainer of a person by
virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and possession of a
thing or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I,
pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v.
Com. 82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence, the
"constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the
person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody
of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty."38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will
remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual
confinement or detention, as distinguished from the
stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to
be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest
against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should
be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine
distinction between legal custody and court having custody
over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having
jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine
distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement
that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in
custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this been
unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they should
have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be
remembered that at the time the parties orally manifested
before this Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and
conditions of their agreement and prepared and signed the
Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
already been issued by the trial court against private
respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that only the
warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be
released, further confirmed the agreement that herein
petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or
confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of
the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits
no other meaning or interpretation for the term "in custody of
the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to
relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the
person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of liberty.40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in
legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived
his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for
such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or
such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment
of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent
with claiming it."41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority
is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of
any character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable
right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs
to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution,provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on
the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the
right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right, and without detriment to the community at
large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege
conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitutionmay be
waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not
favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it
infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public
policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights
conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions
intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of
the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are
subjects of waiver.42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,43 it was held:
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into
two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the
accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the
accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those
of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may
be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by
the Constitution, and to consent to action which would be
invalid if taken against his will."44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights
such as, for example, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures;45 the right to counsel and to remain silent; 46 and
the right to be heard.47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of
rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights.1wphi1 Section 12(l)
of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have
a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of
the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other
rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided
such waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which
is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting bail to the private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7,
1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C.
Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina Cruz alias Mrs.
Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora,
for Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-94-897 December 5, 1994
MINOR CYNTHIA L. LARDIZABAL THRU COUNSEL
ATTY. LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE OSCAR A. REYES, respondent.
Luis Lardizabal for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a verified complaint, dated 25 October 1993, filed by
minor Cynthia L. Lardizabal, through Atty. Luis L.
Lardizabal, against Judge Oscar A. Reyes, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Tagudin-Suyo, Province of Ilocos Sur, charging
Judge Reyes with ignorance of the law resulting in gross
miscarriage of justice.
The complaint alleges that on 1 September 1993, the
complainant, a administratively responsible, for no one called upon to try the
12-year old girl, filed a criminal complaint for rape against a
certain Dionisio Lozano alias "Dioning"; that after conducting
the required preliminary investigation of the complainant and
her witnesses, respondent judge issued on 2 September 1993
an order directing the arrest of the accused, but at the same
time, motu proprio, fixed the bail of the accused in the
amount of P80,000.00 without any application on the part of
the accused to be admitted to bail and without conducting any
hearing thereon; that when the accused filed on 7 September
1993 a motion to reduce bail from P80,000.00 to P20,000.00,
respondent judge, again, without prior notice and hearing,
reduced the bail to P40,000.00.
Asked to comment on the complaint, respondent Judge Reyes
explained that after carefully considering and evaluating the
evidence presented at the preliminary investigation, acting
with all honesty and good faith, he arrived at a conclusion that
the evidence adduced was not strong enough to deny bail for
the provisional liberty of the accused; that he later reduced the
bail to P40,000.00 on the premise that justice must be
tempered with mercy and based also on the due process clause
which protects an accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which the accused is charged.
The Court does not accept as satisfactory respondent's
explanation that good faith urged him to fix and grant
bailmotu proprio for the provisional release of the accused
charged with rape. By so doing, he acted irregularly, thereby
depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose
objections to the grant of bail. The rule is explicit that when
an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may be granted
only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the
accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to
determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence of guilt is
strong.
Respondent could not have arrived at a fair conclusion that
the evidence was not strong enough to deny bail to the
accused when the prosecution had not been heard on the
matter. Respondent's unjustified haste in granting bail and
thereafter reducing the amount thereof, in both instances,
without hearing the side of the prosecution, speaks poorly of
his competence in applying the law and jurisprudence on the
matter.
Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody
for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or
in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of
the accused, before the court resolves the motion for bail. If,
as in the present case, the prosecution should be denied such
an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground. 1
We find disturbing respondent's unusual regard for the rights
of the accused to be protected from harassment, as if the
rights of the victim are not important enough. Compassion is
imperative and laudable. It should not however be misplaced,
for the victim and not only the accused, is equally deserving
of it. Justice, though due the accused, is due the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed
to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. Nor does it
suffice that the questions asked by respondent judge before
bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That
fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 2
Respondent judge tried to absolve himself from the charge of
gross incompetence by stating that in the absence of malice or
any wrongful conduct, the judge cannot be held
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Respondent must not hide behind that fundamental rule.
While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it
reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty
by those who are selected to fill the position of administrators
of justice. 3 Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires
judges to act with competence, integrity and independence
and should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 4
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Oscar A.
Reyes GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and is fined
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122737. February 17, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. SERGON MANES and RAMIL MANES, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal taken by accused
Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes from the judgment [1] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, [2] IloiloCity, convicting them
of murder and sentencing them to each "suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties as provided
in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code" and "to indemnify
the family of their victim in the amount of P50,000.00
plus P21,250.00 as expenses for the burial, wake and other
related matter and to pay the costs."
We affirm the conviction.
On July 12, 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo Province
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, an information
charging the accused with murder, as follows:
xxx
"That on or about the 23rd of June, 1991, in the Municipality
of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another to better realize their purpose armed with a knife and
a .38 caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shot Nicanor
Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver with which
they were then provided, inflicting upon the said Nicanor
Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot wounds on the different
parts of his body which caused his death immediately
thereafter.[3]
The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional
liberty of the accused.
On July 22, 1991, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest
against the accused. On October 18, 1991, the trial court
ordered the case archived for failure to locate the two
accused.
On June 24, 1992, or about a year after, accused Sergon and
Ramil Manes were arrested in Romblon, Romblon. On July 6,
1992, they were brought to Iloilo City.
Upon arraignment on September 17, 1992, both accused
pleaded not guilty to the information, and, thereafter, the court
proceeded to try the case.
Meantime, on August 25, 1992, the accused filed a petition
for bail, which was opposed by the prosecution. The trial
court, however, did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did
the accused invoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial.
The prosecution presented six witnesses, [4] two of whom were
eyewitnesses to the crime, while the defense presented three,
[5]
two of whom were the accused themselves.
On January 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting the accused of murder, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
xxx
"Accordingly, finding the accused, Ramil Manes and Sergon
Manes, guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt, they are
therefore sentenced to each suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 41
of the Revised Penal Code and they are also ordered to
indemnify the family of the victim the amount of P50,000.00
plus P21,250.00 as expenses for the burial, wake and other
related matter and to pay the costs.[6]
On February 10, 1995, both accused appealed to this Court. [7]
In the appeal, accused questioned the trial courts failure (a) to
hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider defense of relative in
favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes
was a mere victim of Tamorites unlawful aggression.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
(a) According to the prosecution
On June 23, 1991, at about 5:00 in the afternoon, Alan
Catequista together with Nicanor Tamorite and Jose Cubita,
went to see a basketball game at the barangay plaza. When the
game was over, Allan approached and invited Nicanor
Tamorite to go home; at the time, he was still seated. Accused
Ramil Manes approached Nicanor Tamorite and pointed a .38
caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did not
kill me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now I will
be the one to kill you." Nicanor Tamorite ran to Allan
Catequista and used him as a shield from Ramil. [8] At that
point, Alan Catequista heard a thud and as he looked back, he
saw accused Sergon Manes with a gory knife and he also saw
Nicanor Tamorite running away, with blood on his
back. Ramil Manes pursued Nicanor Tamorite and shot him
hitting him at the back, just above the waistline. Both accused
continued to chase Nicanor Tamorite who ran towards the
premises of the house of Ading Ablado. Ramil Manes fired
two more shots. It could not be determined whether those
shots hit Nicanor Tamorite as he and the accused were already
inside the premises of the fence of Ading Ablado. [9] Jose
Cubita who was near Nicanor Tamorite when the two accused
chased him did not render assistance to him. [10] After Alan
Catequista heard the two shots, he and Jose Cubita ran
home. Alan Catequista told his father and uncle that Sergon
Manes stabbed Nicanor Tamorite and that Ramil Manes shot
him.Alan Catequista, his father, uncle, Jose Cubita and the
mother of Nicanor Tamorite then went to where the body of
Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of the
house of Ading Ablado. Nicanor was lying on his back with
two (2) wounds on the breast, one (1) gunshot wound and one
(1) stab wound.[11]
(b) According to the accused
According to accused Ramil Manes, in the afternoon of June
23, 1991, he was at home cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he
heard shouts coming from the direction of the barangay
basketball court, which was about ten (10) meters away from
his house. He went to the window to check what it was. He
saw his younger brother Sergon Manes lying on the concrete
pavement and several persons were ganging up on him, three
of whom he identified as Nicanor Tamorite, Alan Catequista
and Jose Cubita. They kept on boxing and kicking his brother
prompting him to come to the latters aid. On his way out, he
saw a gun on top of the table and brought it with him to the
basketball court.
While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a
warning shot to prevent Nicanor Tamorite from stabbing his
brother, Sergon. Nicanor persisted in his pursuit of Sergon,
with a knife in his hand. Sergon was about three meters ahead
of Nicanor who was about ten meters ahead of the pursuing
Ramil. Ramil fired another shot which hit Nicanor who fell to
the ground. Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also
fled to the direction of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired
the second shot because he saw the group of Alan Catequista
approaching, armed with guns.[12] Ramil and his brother
Sergon went into hiding and only surfaced a year later when
they were arrested in Romblon.
We find the facts as those established by the prosecutions
evidence.
The appeal has no merit. The trial court did not err in finding
the appellants guilty of murder.
Appellants contend that the trial court committed a serious
error of law when it went on with the trial of the case without
hearing the petition for bail that was set for hearing several
times.
Under the law,[13] in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a
petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused. [14]
While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear
his application summarily and promptly, such right may be
waived expressly or impliedly.[15]
In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without
resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However,
the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their
unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that
they raise this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention
of the trial court at the earliest opportune time, appellants are
deemed to have waived their right to bail.
What is more, the issue has been rendered academic by the
conviction of the accused. When an accused is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt
is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right
nor of discretion.[16]
To exculpate himself, appellant Ramil claims defense of
relative. This must likewise fail. Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code provides the requisites of defense of relative.
The most essential of these elements is
unlawful aggression. Ramil Manes contends that he came to
the defense of his younger brother, Sergon, who was being
attacked by Nicanor Tamorite, Alan Catequista and Jose
Cubita, together with several others. He claimed that these
persons boxed and kicked his brother in different parts of the
body.
If, indeed, more than three persons attacked Sergon Manes, he
would have suffered injuries or even a scratch on his
body. But there was none. In fact, prosecution witness Alan
Catequista testified that in no instance did he, Nicanor
Tamorite and Jose Cubita attack Sergon Manes.
The truth of the matter is that it was Ramil Manes who
approached the victim, pointed a .38 caliber revolver at him
and said "It is bad luck that you did not kill me during the
fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now, I will be the one to kill
you." While Nicanor Tamorite tried to hide from Ramil,
Sergon suddenly appeared from behind and stabbed Nicanor
Tamorite at the back using a fan knife. Unlawful aggression
clearly came from accused-appellants, not from the victim
Nicanor Tamorite.
Jose Cubita, another companion of the victim who witnessed
what transpired that fateful afternoon of June 23, 1991,
corroborated the testimony of Alan Catequista that the
accused-appellants were the aggressors. Despite the fact that
Nicanor Tamorite was unarmed and outnumbered, the
brothers Ramil and Sergon Manes persisted in executing their
plan to the point of chasing the fleeing victim.
Ramil Manes testified that while chasing Nicanor Tamorite
who was about ten meters away from him, he fired only two
shots; one in the air as warning shot and another in the
direction of Nicanor. The second shot hit the victim who fell
to the ground. Ramil fled the scene right after the second
shot. The autopsy report revealed, however, that Nicanor
Tamorite sustained not only one but three gunshot
wounds. There were also stab wounds, one at the right side of
the chest and another at the upper left back of the victim. [17]
Assuming for the sake of argument that Nicanor Tamorite was
carrying a knife while pursuing Sergon, who was allegedly
unarmed, it is highly questionable how the victim sustained
those stab wounds considering their location. The accused
Ramil himself testified that no one approached Nicanor
Tamorite as soon as he fell to the ground so as to account for
the presence of the stab wounds. Neither did the accused
adduce evidence to explain how the victim could have
sustained those stab wounds.
The behavior of accused Ramil Manes subsequent to the
killing further negates his claim of defense of relative. If
indeed he acted in defense of his younger brother Sergon who
was then under attack, he would not harbor any fear in
presenting himself to the proper authorities. Instead, he made
no such report. Persons who act in legitimate defense of their
persons or rights invariably surrender themselves to the
authorities and describe fully and in all candor all that has
happened with a view to justify their acts. They lose no time
in going to the punong barangay, the municipal mayor or the
police and lay before them all the facts. [18]
As regards Sergon Manes, he claims that he should not have
been convicted of murder because he was an innocent victim
of the unlawful aggression of the deceased. He denies that he
stabbed the latter. This denial must fail in light of the positive
identification and testimony of prosecution witnesses, Alan
Catequista and Jose Cubita, that the unlawful aggression came
from accused appellants. Moreover, the autopsy report
conducted by Dr. Leticia Austria-Tobias on June 24, 1991
supports the prosecutions theory that accused shot and
stabbed the victim.
We need not tackle the remaining assignments of error which
obviously must fail in light of the foregoing discussion.
However, as pointed out by the solicitor general,
the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation. Evident premeditation exists when
the following requisites are present:
1. The time when the offender determined to commit the
crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination; and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.[19]
Evident premeditation, like other circumstances that would
qualify the killing to murder, must be established by clear and
positive evidence. Mere presumptions and inferences are
insufficient no matter how logical and probable they may be.
[20]
The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish the
existence of the requisites of evident premeditation. No direct
evidence was presented regarding the time the accused
planned to kill the victim. It was not established that the
appellants persistently and continuously clung to this
resolution despite the lapse of sufficient time for them to clear
their minds and overcome their determination to commit the
same.
The trial court correctly considered treachery as qualifying the
killing of the victim to murder.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes
against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make. [21] Where the victim
was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind
and had no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could not but be
considered as treacherous. [22] In the instant case, Nicanor
Tamorite was seated when Ramil Manes approached him with
a .38 caliber revolver in his hand. Sergon Manes took
advantage of this preoccupation of the victim with Ramil
Manes by surreptitiously attacking and stabbing him at the
back, while he was not in a position to defend himself against
his aggressors.
The manner by which Nicanor Tamorite was assaulted reveals
a concerted action towards the accomplishment of a single
criminal intent. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of
the appellants before, during and after the crime which are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments.[23]
On the other hand, the trial court must not have appreciated
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength
and aid of armed men because these are absorbed in treachery.
[24]
Consequently, we sustain the trial courts conviction of the
accused, including the civil liability imposed against
them. However, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength and aid of armed
men are not to be appreciated.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court
convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil
Manes of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of
the law and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor
Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P21,250.00, as
actual damages.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
VIII. RIGHTS DURING TRIAL
ARTICLE III, SEC. 14
1. DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES
EN BAC
[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998]
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A.
SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y.
PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed
by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652,
and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion,
docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of
respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila finding both
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. The two petitions were consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed
against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of
Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a
complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The information
contained the following averments; thus:
That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian,
Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court,
the above named accused, who is the incumbent mayor of
Bian, Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water
which made her dizzy and weak, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said
JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent,
to her damage and prejudice.
That accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion without
having participated as principal or accessory assisted in the
commission of the offense by bringing said complainant child
to the rest house of accused Bayani `Arthur Alonte at Sto.
Tomas, Bian, Laguna and after receiving the amount
of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who
subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law.[1]
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and
assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian, Laguna,
presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her
counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of
Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to
have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional
Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or
on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her
parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance,
quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of
age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue
Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by private legal
counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in
accordance with law, depose and say:
1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against
Mayor Bayani `Arthur Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-
Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna;
2. That the case has been pending for some time, on
preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change of venue, filed
with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the
Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court, brought to
the Office of the President, on the veracity of the findings of
the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutors
Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure
order filed with the Bian Court;
3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and
meanwhile, I have already lost two (2) semesters of my
college residence. And when the actual trial is held after all
the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a still
indefinite suspension of my schooling to attend the hearings;
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my
family has lived a most abnormal life: my father and mother
had to give up their jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth
grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;
5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I
simply wish to stop and live elsewhere with my family, where
we can start life anew, and live normally once again;
6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for
rape and the other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-
Man Investigating Panel of the Office of the State Prosecutor
found a prima facie case although the information has not
been filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and
related cases or file new cases, whether, criminal, civil, and/or
administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines;
7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit
will put to doubt my credibility as a witness-complainant;
8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor,
premised on a corresponding commitment that there will be
no reprisals in whatever form, against members of the police
force or any other official of officer, my relatives and friends
who extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my search
for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997,
in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Complainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of
June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer"[2]
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of
petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue
dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of
complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997,
ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to
dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the
desistance of private complainant and opined that the
desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect
since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and
control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed
for the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution
(Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the
petition for change of venue. The Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods
being used to abort, by coercion or corruption, the prosecution
of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect for
oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the fear of
the petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses are too
generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in
desisting from pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a
minor, may have succumbed to some illicit influence and
undue pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a
good excuse to grant the petition to transfer the venue of
Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Bian, Laguna to the City of
Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue
from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila is granted. The
Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle Crim.
Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to whom
Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the
petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV
of the RTC of Bian, Laguna and determine the voluntariness
and validity of petitioner's desistance in light of the opposition
of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of
the RTC of Bian, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to
the Executive Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim.
Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this Resolution."[3]
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal
Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was
assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent
Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through
Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a
"compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by
her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found
probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without prejudice to, and
independent of, this Courts separate determination as the trier
of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private
complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of the
public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiyab.
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered
himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the
recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both
pleaded not guilty to the charge. The parties manifested that
they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went
on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with
the trial of the case on the merits. [4] According to Alonte,
however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present
evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and
validity of the affidavit of desistance.[5]
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment,
the prosecution presented private complainant Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing,
Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her
affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of
giving positive testimony in support of the charges against
Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the
action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled
to desist because of the harassment she was experiencing
from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence were
exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and
(iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single centavo
from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then
presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who
affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and
their consent to their daughters decision to desist from the
case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto
Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was
signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and
that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and
voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that in light of
the decision of private complainant and her parents not to
pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the
accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved
for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and
Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was
submitted for decision."[6]
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent
Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor
Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated
that the State interposed no objection to the granting of bail
and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused
in his prayer for the granting of bail.
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to
Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes
filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord with
justice and fair play to join the aforestated motion.
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997,
1st December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th December
1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth
Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his
application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon
by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the
lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the
RTC Manila, Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of
promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the
case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having
received any notice of the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid
Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte
could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he
was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the
NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner
Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been
notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless,
of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two
(2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura `Wella
Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous
crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 335(2)
in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of
the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused
Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled and rendered without any further force and
effect.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte
filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its
resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam" for "Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail,
Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action
against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his
own petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his
petition seeking to have the decision nullified and the case
remanded for new trial; thus:
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered
a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the
petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law
(Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered
a Decision in the case a quo in violation of the mandatory
provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, in
the conduct and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the
promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total
disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing
doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case a
quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2) affidavits
(Punongbayans and Balbins) which were neither marked nor
offered into evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving
the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the
affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioners right to due
process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered
a Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on the
facts which would establish that complainant was raped by
petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution), thereby
setting a dangerous precedent where heinous offenses can
result in conviction without trial (then with more reason that
simpler offenses could end up with the same result).[8]
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following
grounds in support of his own petition; thus:
1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the
course of resolving the prosecutions motion to dismiss the
case is a patent nullity for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total violation
of the petitioners right to due process of law.
2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least
as far as petitioner is concerned.
3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the
right of the accused to a fair trial by an impartial and neutral
judge whose actuations and outlook of the case had been
motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest of media
hype that surrounded this case and use this case as a tool for
his ambition for promotion to a higher court.
4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the
jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the petitioner as a
principal even though he has been charged only as an
accomplice in the information.[9]
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in
view of the case milieu, the prematurity of petitioners'
invocation, i.e., even before the trial court could resolve
Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat
strange way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge
Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial
stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that -
"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing
evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness stand
to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the
private complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she
expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru
their respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the case
for decision merely on the basis of the private complainant's
so called 'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient enough
for their purposes. They left everything to the so-called
'desistance' of the private complainant."[10]
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for
what was conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the
arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding in
conformity with the resolution of this Court in Administrative
Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and
voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed by
Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue
precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps the
problem could have well been avoided had not the basic
procedures been, to the Court's perception, taken lightly. And
in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the
trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the
Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence[11] acknowledges that due process in criminal
proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal
trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that
the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.[12]
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by
now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal
justice system, are mandatory and indispensable.The
principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed
in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot
possibly be met without a "law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial."[13]
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out
in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall proceed in the
following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the
charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense,
and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any
provisional remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting
evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice,
permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the
main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the
parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission
charged in the complaint or information but interposes a
lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified
accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina,[14] the Court has underscored the need to
adhere strictly to the above rules. It reminds that -
"x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific
purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that
an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his
defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should
always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to
the case, whether in the prosecution or defense.In the exercise
of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the
law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel
should not be wielded by one who has an unsound and
distorted sense of justice and fairness.[15]
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that -
"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing
on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of
choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-
examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she
attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory
questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits -
one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to
buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used,
hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to
confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and
may be waived.'" (emphasis supplied) -
it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the
waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of
waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must
be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." [16] Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as
a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver.[17] The Solicitor
General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what
otherwise should have been the regular course of trial:
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to
prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled
for the purpose;[18] (2) the parties have not been given the
opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been
set by respondent Judge for the purpose;[19] and (3) petitioners
have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to
justify any modification in the order of trial. [20] There can be
no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse
for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due
process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of
honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable
right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further
proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back
to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making
any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as
prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper
disposition of the case. The Court likewise deems it
appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the
petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of
the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the
affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan,
hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement that
disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but
merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and
to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this
subject, the case of People vs. Junio,[21] should be
instructive. The Court has there explained:
The appellants submission that the execution of an Affidavit
of Desistance by complainant who was assisted by her mother
supported the `inherent incredibility of prosecutions evidence
is specious. We have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts.The unreliable character of this
document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that
after going through the process of having accused-appellant
arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person
who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, and then repeating her
accusations in open court by recounting her anguish,
Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that `[a]fter
a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same
does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an
afterthought which should not be given probative value. It
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before
the court of justice simply because the witness who has given
it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a
rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the
Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De
Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128;
People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.][22]
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal
cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare,[23] a murder case,
the Court has ruled:
The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit
executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation. To
recant a prior statement is to renounce and withdraw it
formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683,
citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit,
Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had said during
the trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony
because her father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was no longer
interested in prosecuting the case against accused-
appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the
complainant therein, was no longer interested to prosecute the
case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance
before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW
and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with
my fathers desire;
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial
and scrutiny by the court and the parties simply because an
affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented
by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be
tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the
party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the recanting
witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the
witness stand to testify on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus
hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was
presented and the matters he testified to did not even bear on
the substance of Tessies affidavit. He testified that accused-
appellant was not involved in the perpetration of the crime.
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically
would be to make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De
Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128,
134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even
assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this
circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her
original testimony. A retraction does not necessarily negate an
earlier declaration.[People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For
this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because
they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through
intimidation or for monetary considerations. [People vs.
Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a
situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must
not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the
basis of the recantation. They should determine which
testimony should be given credence through a comparison of
the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the
general rules of evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165
SCRA 525.] In this case we think the trial court correctly
ruled.[24]
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent
power to compel the attendance of any person to testify in a
case pending before it, and a party is not precluded from
invoking that authority.[25]
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when
construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not
a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action
has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so
earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight
or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be
up to the court for proper evaluation. The decision
in Junio went on to hold -
While `[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the
case may be, [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal
Code.] the pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint
should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal
action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs.
Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs.
Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to
which the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed after the
institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to
be serious in `signifying (her) intention to refrain from
testifying since she still completed her testimony
notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of desistance. More, the
affidavit is suspect considering that while it was dated `April
1992, it was only submitted sometime in August 1992, four
(4) months after the Information was filed before the court a
quo on 6 April 1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide with
the actual filing of the case.[26]
In People vs. Miranda,[27] applying the pertinent provisions of
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which, in full, states -
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned
the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the
case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and
rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty
already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes." -
the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a
prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above-named persons, as the case may be.It does not prohibit
the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons
the offender after the cause has been instituted, nor does it
order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according
to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty
that may have been imposed is the marriage between the
offended and the offended party."[28]
In People vs. Infante,[29] decided just a little over a month
before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to
dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated on an
affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he
pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this
attempted pardon cannot prosper for two reasons. The second
paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which is
in question reads: 'The offended party cannot institute
criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties,
if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.' This provision means
that the pardon afforded the offenders must come before the
institution of the criminal prosecution, and means, further,
that both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended
party. To elucidate further, article 435 of the old Penal Code
provided: 'The husband may at any time remit the penalty
imposed upon his wife. In such case the penalty imposed
upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed to be
remitted.' These provisions of the old Penal Code became
inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2,
which had the effect of repealing the same. The Revised Penal
Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in
so doing did not have the effect of reviving any of its
provisions which were not in force. But with the incorporation
of the second paragraph of article 344, the pardon given by
the offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution
for adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized that
this pardon must come before the institution of the criminal
prosecution and must be for both offenders to be effective -
circumstances which do not concur in this case."[30]
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need
not say more than what it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge
Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is
convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the
circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible
animosity between the personalities here involved may not all
be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the old
case of Luque vs. Kayanan[31] could again be said: All suitors
are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an
independent, wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased
tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision
is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any
suspicion as to the fairness and integrity ofthe Judge. [32] It is
not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived
as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple
reminder on the use of proper language before the
courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client
or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple
courtesy demands that it be done within the bounds of
propriety and decency. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place
in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of
the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no
time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that
prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties
with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism and
skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty.[33] The Court is hopeful that the zeal which
has been exhibited many times in the past, although
regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will not be
wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court
hereby RULES that -
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed
by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been
filed AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935,
DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said criminal
case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed
judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting petitioners is
declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE;
accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of
Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-
159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for
raffle among the other branches of that court for proper
disposition.
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 151249-50 February 26, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
ARIEL MACARANG, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us on automatic review is a Decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 163) in Criminal Cases Nos.
116969-H and 117275-H, sentencing appellant Ariel
Macarang to suffer the penalty of death in each of said
criminal cases for qualified rape. The dispositive portion of
said Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 116969-H, the accused
is convicted of the crime of rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection and the accessory penalty
provided by law and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 117275-H, the accused is also convicted
of the crime of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death by lethal injection and the accessory penalties provided
by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil aspects of the two cases the accused is ordered to
pay the victim, Armie Christine Macarang, Php75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in giving weight and
credence to the testimony of private complainant and that
appellants guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed its brief, entitled "Brief For The Appellee With
Recommendation To Remand The Cases To The Court A Quo
For Further Proceedings", calling our attention to the fact that
the trial court had considered appellant to have waived his
right to present his evidence without any showing that the
latter was fully aware of the consequences of such waiver.
As borne out by the records of the case, the following
proceedings took place in the trial court:
Two separate Infomations2 were filed charging appellant with
the crime of qualified rape, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 116969-H
On or about November 8, 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, being the father of Armie Christine Macarang y
Amboy, with lewd designs, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Armie Christine
Macarang y Amboy, 13 years old, against her will and
consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 117275-H
On or about June 12, 1998, in San Juan, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
being the father of Armie Christine Macarang y Amboy, with
lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with said Armie Christine Macarang y Amboy, 12
years old, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on December 14, 1999 in Criminal Case
No. 116969-H and on April 11, 2000 in Criminal Case No.
117275-H, appellant, with assistance of counsel, pleaded NOT
GUILTY to each Information. The cases were then
consolidated and jointly heard before Branch 163 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
After pre-trial, the prosecution proceeded to present evidence
and thereafter, rested its case.
The initial hearing for the reception of defense evidence was
scheduled on March 13, 2001. Presiding Judge Leili Suarez
Acebo cancelled the setting as she had to attend a seminar
given by the Supreme Court3 and scheduled anew the hearing
on April 24, 2001 and May 8 and 22, 2001. The April 24
hearing was cancelled upon motion of public prosecutor who
had to attend a seminar at the COMELEC. 4 The May 8
hearing was also cancelled as appellant informed the court
that his de parte counsel, Atty. Arnoldo Pabelonio, was
indisposed.5 The trial court reset the hearing to May 22 as
previously scheduled, and set additional hearings on July 3,
17 & 24, 2001. The May 22 hearing was cancelled for failure
of counsel for appellant to appear in court for the
hearing.6 Again, defense counsel was absent for the July 3
hearing and the same was reset to the next scheduled hearing
dates.7On July 17, 2001, defense counsel manifested in court
that appellant was contemplating on changing his plea from
"not guilty" to "guilty" and requested for more time for the
appellant to come to a decision. The trial court then cancelled
the July 17 and 24, 2001 hearings and re- scheduled the same
on August 14 and 28, 2001.8 On August 14, the trial court,
apparently irked by the numerous postponements of the cases,
issued the following:
ORDER
When this case was called supposedly for the initial
presentation of defense evidence, the defense counsel
manifested that the accused had intimated to him that he was
not prepared to testify, the reason being that he was just
recuperating from an illness. However, when asked by the
Court, accused stated that it was up to his lawyer, inspite of
which, the Defense Counsel begged the indulgence of the
Court as he did not bring the record of the case and was not
prepared to call the accused to the witness stand.
WHEREFORE, considering that the trial of this case had been
repeatedly postponed and that Defense Counsel had been the
subject at least two (2) show cause orders, reset for the last
time to August 28 and September 18, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in
the morning, with a warning that if on the next scheduled
hearing accused would not still be ready to present evidence,
he would be deemed to have waived his right to do so.
SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis supplied).
On August 28, 2001, defense counsel filed an Urgent Motion
to be Allowed to Withdraw as Counsel, 10 stating therein that
the delay in the hearing of the case was due to the insistence
of appellant that he moved for postponements, in the hope
that appellants daughter would eventually cause the dismissal
of the case. At the hearing set on the same date, the trial court
issued the following:
ORDER
When these cases were called for trial, accused begged the
Court for one last resetting on the ground that he is not
prepared. The Public Prosecutor did not object to the request
for postponement on the condition that if on the next
scheduled hearing, accused would still not be able to present
evidence, he would rest his cases and the cases would be
deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the prosecution
evidence.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, reset to September 18, 2001, as
previously scheduled and additional settings on September 25,
2001, October 2 & 9, 2001, all at 8:30 oclock in the morning.
The pending motion to withdraw as counsel filed by Atty.
Arnoldo C. Pabelonio is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Finally, at the hearing held on September 18, 2001, the trial
court issued the following:
ORDER
When this case was called supposedly for the presentation of
defense evidence, accused manifested that he was still not
ready to do so. Record shows that such presentation had been
repeatedly postponed mostly at the instance of the accused
and/or his lawyer.
Thus, as prayed for by the Public Prosecutor and pursuant to
the order of August 28, 2001, accused is now deemed to have
waived his right to present evidence. As further prayed for,
this case is now deemed submitted for decision.
Moreover, the "Urgent Motion to be Allowed to Withdraw as
Counsel" filed by Atty. Arnoldo Pabelonio, is granted with the
consent of the accused.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied).
Based on the prosecution evidence, the trial court, on
November 13, 2001 promulgated its Decision dated October
17, 2001, convicting appellant of the crime of qualified rape
and sentencing him to suffer the ultimate penalty of death in
each of the criminal cases.
We are aware of the usual practice of presiding judges in
warning a party in a case that he will be considered to have
waived his right to adduce evidence if he fails to present it at
the next hearing, after prior unwarranted postponements,
despite previous agreement of the parties. Its objective is to
instill discipline on the litigants and their counsel so that the
proceedings of the court would not be unduly delayed.
However, in criminal cases where the imposable penalty may
be death, as in the present cases, the presiding judge is called
upon to see to it that the accused is made aware of the
consequences of not heeding the warning given by the trial
court. It must be noted that the waiver of the right to present
defense evidence in the present cases was not even voluntary
nor upon the instance of the appellant but imposed by the trial
court, apparently to penalize appellant, after he and his
counsel repeatedly moved for the postponements of the
scheduled hearings.
As stated by the trial court in its Order dated September 18,
2001, appellant manifested in open court that "he was still not
ready to do so", that is, that he was not ready to present his
evidence. Appellant never said that he did not wish to present
evidence. It should have been clear to the trial court that
appellant never intended to waive his right to present his
evidence. Thus, a simple forewarning to the appellant that the
next time that he would not be ready with his defense
evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right to
present it, did not satisfy appellants constitutional right to due
process. The trial court should have first apprised appellant or
explained to him in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver. The trial court should have
satisfied itself that appellant understood the real import of the
courts action if it would consider him as having waived his
right to present his evidence if he would not be ready to do so
the next time the case would be called for trial.
Moreover, in the same Order declaring appellant to have
waived his right to present evidence, the trial court granted
the motion of appellants counsel to withdraw his appearance.
Appellant, therefore, had no more counsel. The trial court did
not ask him if he would wish to solicit the services of another
counsel de parte or want the court to designate a de oficio
counsel for him. Consequently, appellants inaction, after the
declaration by the trial court that he was deemed to have
waived his right to present evidence in spite of the fact that
there were other dates previously scheduled by the trial court
for reception of his evidence, should not be taken against
appellant. It did not justify the trial court to render judgment
against him on the basis of the prosecution evidence and
sentence him to suffer the penalty of death in both cases,
without first ensuring that appellant was aware of the
consequences of the waiver of his right to present his
evidence, and without exerting any effort to ask him if he
would like to be represented by another lawyer of his own
choice or through the assistance of the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) or through a counsel de oficio appointed by the
court.
It is obvious then that the appellant was deprived of his right
to due process.
We apply by analogy our ruling in People vs. Bodoso,13 to wit:
This Court notes with deep regret the failure of the trial court
to inquire from accused-appellant himself whether he wanted
to present evidence; or submit his memorandum elucidating
on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, if any; or in default thereof, file a demurrer to
evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the
prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be
rebutted. The inquiry is simply part and parcel of the
determination of the validity of the waiver, i.e., "not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences," which ought to have been done by the
trial court not only because this was supposed to be an
uncomplicated and routine task on its part, but more
importantly since accused-appellant himself did not
personally, on a person-to-person basis, manifest to the trial
court the waiver of his own right.
In the light of the foregoing, we have no other recourse but to
set aside the judgment of the trial court convicting appellant
and order the remand of the records of the case to the trial
court to conduct further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 163, in Criminal Cases Nos. 116969-H and
117275-H dated October 17, 2001 is SET ASIDE.
Let the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 116969-H and
117275-H be REMANDED to Branch 163 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City for further appropriate proceedings
to give appellant the opportunity to present his evidence, if he
so desires, through a counsel of his choice or through the
Public Attorneys Office or any competent de oficio counsel
to be appointed by said court.
For this purpose, the proper law enforcement officers are
directed to TRANSFER appellant Ariel Macarang from the
New Bilibid Prison, where he is presently incarcerated, to San
Juan Municipal Jail, San Juan, Metro Manila, with adequate
security escort, where he shall be DETAINED for the duration
of the proceedings in the trial court.
The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 163) is
directed to dispose of said criminal cases without further
delay.
Costs de oficio
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183975 September 20, 2010
GREGORIO DIMARUCOT y GARCIA, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For resolution in this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is
the Resolution1 dated July 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30466 denying petitioners omnibus
motion to reconsider the August 29, 2007 Resolution
dismissing his appeal, to expunge the same from the Book of
Entries of Judgment, and to give petitioner a period of thirty
(30) days within which to file the appellants brief.
The antecedents:
Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 98-M-98 for
Frustrated Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, under the following Information:
That on or about the 18th day of August, 1997, in the
municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with an iron pipe and with intent to kill
one Angelito Rosini y Go, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and hit with the said iron pipe
the said Angelito Rosini y Go, hitting him on his head,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, which ordinarily
would have caused the death of the said Angelito Rosini y Go,
thus performing all acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to the said Angelito Rosini y Go which
prevented his death.
Contrary to law.2
After trial, on September 11, 2006, the RTC promulgated its
Decision3 convicting petitioner of frustrated homicide, and
sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused GREGORIO aka GEORGE
DIMARUCOT y GARCIA liable of (sic) the lesser offense of
Frustrated Homicide, this Court hereby sentences him to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day, as maximum, of imprisonment.
Accused is further directed to pay complainant Angelito
Rosini y Go, actual damages broken down as follows: the
amount of Nineteen Thousand One Hundred Ten Pesos and
Sixty Five Centavos (P19,110.65) for the
hospitalization/medical bills and the amount of Thirty Six
Thousand Pesos (P36,000.00) as loss of income.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon receiving the notice to file appellants brief, petitioner
thru his counsel de parte requested and was granted additional
period of twenty (20) days within which to file said
brief.5 This was followed by three (3) successive motions for
extension which were all granted by the CA. 6 On August 29,
2007, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal, as
follows:
Considering the JRD verification report dated July 24, 2007
that the accused-appellant failed to file his appellants brief
within the reglementary period which expired on June 6,
2007, his appeal is considered ABANDONED and thus
DISMISSED, pursuant to Sec. 1 (e), Rule 50, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 8 his counsel
admitting that he was at fault in failing to file the appellants
brief due to "personal problems emanating from his
[counsels] wifes recent surgical operation." It was thus
prayed that the CA allow petitioner to file his appellants brief
which counsel undertook to submit within seven (7) days or
until October 4, 2007. By Resolution9 dated November 27,
2007, the CA, finding the allegations of petitioner
unpersuasive and considering that the intended appellants
brief was not at all filed on October 4, 2007, denied the
motion for reconsideration. As per Entry of Judgment, the
Resolution of August 29, 2007 became final and executory on
January 4, 2008.10
On May 8, 2008, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (1) To
Reconsider August 29, 2007 Resolution, (2) To Expunge The
Same From Book Of Entries Of Judgment, and (3) To Give
Accused-Appellant A Final Period Of Thirty Days To File
Appellants Brief. Petitioner reiterated that his failure to file
the appeal brief was solely the fault of his lawyer who is
reportedly suffering from personal problems and depression.
He also cited his advanced age (he will turn 76 on May 30,
2008) and medical condition (hypertension with
cardiovascular disease and pulmonary emphysema), attaching
copies of his birth certificate, medical certificate and
certifications from the barangay and church minister.11
In the assailed Resolution dated July 23, 2008, the CA denied
the omnibus motion holding that petitioner is bound by the
mistakes and negligence of his counsel, such personal
problems of a counsel emanating from his wifes surgical
operation are not considered mistake and/or negligence
contemplated under the law as to warrant reconsideration of
the dismissal of petitioners appeal for failure to file
appellants brief. Thus, when appellant did not file a petition
before this Court to assail the validity of the August 29, 2007
and November 27, 2007 resolutions, the August 29, 2007
resolution attained finality and entry of judgment thereof is in
order.12
The petition has no merit.
Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to
prosecute. The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in
either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
xxxx
It is clear under the foregoing provision that a criminal case
may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with notice to
the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the
prescribed time. The phrase "with notice to the appellant"
means that a notice must first be furnished the appellant to
show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed.13
In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was
served with a notice requiring him to show cause why his
appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file appellants
brief. The purpose of such a notice is to give an appellant the
opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should
not be dismissed because of such failure, in order that the
appellate court may determine whether or not the reasons, if
given, are satisfactory.14
Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in
considering the appeal abandoned with the failure of
petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions
granted to him and non-compliance to date. Dismissal of
appeal by the appellate court sans notice to the accused for
failure to prosecute by itself is not an indication of grave
abuse. Thus, although it does not appear that the appellate
court has given the appellant such notice before dismissing
the appeal, if the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the
appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file his
brief on time and the appellate court denied the motion after
considering said reasons, the dismissal was held proper.
Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior
notice, but the appellant took no steps either by himself or
through counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an attitude
of indifference and inaction amounts to his abandonment and
renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute
his appeal.15
Here, the Court notes the repeated non-observance by
petitioner and his counsel of the reglementary periods for
filing motions and perfecting appeal. While still at the trial
stage, petitioners motion to admit and demurrer to evidence
was denied as it was not seasonably filed (petitioner was
granted fifteen (15) days from August 8, 2001 within which to
file demurrer to evidence but filed his motion to dismiss only For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing
on September 4, 2001), in accordance with Section 23, Rule short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as shown. Here, petitioners counsel failed to file the appellants
amended.16 Before the CA, petitioner and his counsel filed no brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple
less than four (4) motions for extension to file brief, which negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify
was never filed nor attached in the motion for reconsideration the annulment of the proceeding below. (Emphasis
of the August 29, 2007 Resolution dismissing the appeal. The supplied.)1avvphi1
last extension given expired on June 6, 2007, without any The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
brief submitted by petitioner or his counsel. And even when process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
he filed the Omnibus Motion on May 8, 2008, still no exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who
appellants brief was attached by petitioner. Neither did seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements
petitioner file any petition before this Court questioning the of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. 22
validity of the August 29, 2007 resolution and the November Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for
27, 2007 denial of his motion for reconsideration. The the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. The Rules must
dismissal of his appeal having become final, it was indeed too be followed, otherwise, they will become meaningless and
late in the day for petitioner to file the Omnibus Motion on useless.23
May 8, 2008, which was four (4) months after the finality of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
the resolution dismissing the appeal. The Resolution dated July 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
Having been afforded the opportunity to seek reconsideration CA-G.R. CR No. 30466 is AFFIRMED.
and setting aside of the motu proprio dismissal by the CA of SO ORDERED.
his appeal for non-filing of the appeal brief, and with his
subsequent inaction to have his appeal reinstated after the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner cannot 2. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
impute error or grave abuse on the CA in upholding the
finality of its dismissal order. Non-compliance with the
EN BANC
requirement of notice or show cause order before the motu
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
proprio dismissal under Section 8, paragraph 1 of Rule
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
124 had thereby been cured.17Under the circumstances, the
vs.
petitioner was properly declared to have abandoned his appeal
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
for failing to diligently prosecute the same.
2010, Respondent.
Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and negligence
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and
G.R. No. 193036
emotional depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B.
are binding on the client.18 There are exceptions to this rule,
ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,
deprives the client of due process of law, or when the
SR., Petitioners,
application of the general rule results in the outright
vs.
deprivation of ones property or liberty through a technicality.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
However, in this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner
and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
from the general rule. 19 The admitted inability of his counsel
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
to attend fully and ably to the prosecution of his appeal and
ABAD, Respondents.
other sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be
DECISION
more vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel
MENDOZA, J.:
with a more competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
to allow his counsel to represent him on appeal and even up to
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
this Court, apparently in the hope of moving this Court with a
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
petitioners age and medical condition. Verily, diligence is
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
required not only from lawyers but also from their clients. 20
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
Negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
the appellants brief within the reglementary period. Thus, we
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
explained in Redea v. Court of Appeals:21
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel1
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is
that he will suffer deprivation of property without due process
through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
of law on account of the gross negligence of his previous
government are established, limited and defined, and by
counsel. To him, the negligence of his former counsel was so
which these powers are distributed among the several
gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he was
departments.2 The Constitution is the basic and paramount
allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had
law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
prepared and filed his appellants brief. He thus prays the
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
Court reverse the CA and remand the main case to the court of
defer.3 Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no
origin for new trial.
matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding
made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
effect of counsels negligence and allowed a litigant another
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of
chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross
government and the people who run it.4
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated
law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright
cases5 both of which essentially assail the validity and
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30,
interests of justice so require. None of these exceptions
obtains here.
2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for
prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in
his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails
Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.7
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and
Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events
prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people,
convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this
noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President
Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported
cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July
30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order
read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of
the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public
office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and
employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times
be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of
defiance of this principle and notorious violation of this
mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which
seriously affects the political, economic, and social life of a
nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and
misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged
sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very
alarming levels, and undermined the peoples trust and
confidence in the Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of
the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by
the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil,
restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government
and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign
for the Presidency in the last elections "kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he
would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated
solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President
the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO
III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall
primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end,
investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate
action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four
(4) members who will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred
to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous administration
and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and
corruption which it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or
regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has
chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency,
official or employee of the Executive Branch, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce
documents, books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information
and documents from the Senate and the House of
Representatives records of investigations conducted by
committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being
investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information
from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Office
of the Court Administrator, information or documents in
respect to corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or
the regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and
for that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as the case
may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any
person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of justice be
fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness
under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be
admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to
the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a
special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on
corruption of public officers and employees and their private
sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when
in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that
there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for
graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial
agency such as the Department of Justice or any of the
agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may
require in the discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons,
professionals and other personnel determined by it as
necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it
deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the
objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly
conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings,
including the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and
necessary in connection with the objectives and purposes of
this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource
Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons.
x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or
Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel
who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena
issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the
Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give
testimony or produce documents for inspection, when
required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action.
Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in
accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the
Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of
the President shall provide the necessary funds for the
Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute
its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as
effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission
shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the
Commission. x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If
and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section
1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of
graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this
Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect
the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take
effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of
July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
"independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within
the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.
Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is
one.8
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of
an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it
can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much
less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as
to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other
countries which have been created as official, transitory and
non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the facts and
context of serious violations of human rights or of
international humanitarian law in a countrys past." 9 They are
usually established by states emerging from periods of
internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as
mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share
the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past
events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over
a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are
temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of
a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4)
they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by
the State.10"Commissions members are usually empowered to
conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through
their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and
learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them.
They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and
recommend institutional reforms."11
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to
reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals
are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try
and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A
form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal
function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and
to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience
for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter
placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial
retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the
identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one
writer12 puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian
code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: "To those
who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would
like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have
committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no
reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go
unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over
again."
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1,
the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A
perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases
shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-
legislators summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates
the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create
an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent
like the "Truth Commission."
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission" with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of
the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption
is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of
2010" violates the consistent and general international
practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth
commissions to exclusively investigate human rights
violations, which customary practice forms part of the
generally accepted principles of international law which the
Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in
futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for
trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda
to mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will
altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even
addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not
constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither
laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the
constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even
a statute."13
In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the
assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to
create a public office because the Presidents executive power
and power of control necessarily include the inherent power
to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 141616 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772),
R.A. No. 9970,17 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding
body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity
of other executive orders and presidential issuances creating
similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as
Presidential Complaint and Action Commission(PCAC) by
President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on
Administrative Performance Efficiency(PCAPE) by President
Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and
Government Operations(PARGO) by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the
following are the principal issues to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to
file their respective petitions and question Executive Order
No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle
of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress
to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of
judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the
power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.19
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the
petitioners has been put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-
legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their
personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the
petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the
commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain
injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings. 20
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal
standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive
Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes
usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve
to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present
the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as
members of the legislature before the Court. As held in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,21
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In
such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. 22
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he
has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the
budget for its operations. 23 It emphasizes that the funds to be
used for the creation and operation of the commission are to
be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress.
Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the
commission will not entail congressional action but will
simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over
contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown
that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion
of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to
exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential
issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v.
Arroyo24 explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi.
Thus:
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the
plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who
is affected no differently from any other person. He could be
suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or
taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is
entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and
"taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first
laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the
plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter,
he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held
by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v.
Collins: "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people
are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of
every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be
properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to
maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of
public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking
judicial interference in any official policy or act with which
he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United
State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct
injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed inTileston v.
Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is
not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine
was upheld in a litany of cases, such as,Custodio v. President
of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De
la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-
Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases
included. Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule
on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."25
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v.
Torres,26 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance
where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the
party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first
Emergency Powers Cases,27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders although they had only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental
importance28 laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco29are
non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where
the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not
only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they
should be resolved for the guidance of all. 30 Undoubtedly, the
Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of
the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to
the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not
due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue
in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in
its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
controversies with overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that
the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an
adjunct body of the Office of the President. 31 Thus, in order
that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization
vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power
cannot be presumed32 since there is no provision in the
Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President
to create a truth commission. 33 He adds that Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the
continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as
basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize,"
"transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."34 Insofar as
it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the
Office of the President to the extent of creating a public
office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must
be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof. 35
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue
that the creation of a public office lies within the province of
Congress and not with the executive branch of government.
They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to
reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public
office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the
reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of
the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal
organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of
functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency.36 Such continuing
authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited,
and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President
overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative
about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such
as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created
by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President
to create public offices within the Office of the President
Proper has long been recognized.37 According to the OSG, the
Executive, just like the other two branches of government,
possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding
committees to assist it in the performance of its
constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions.38 This power, as the OSG explains it,
is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under
Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.39
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the
power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his
duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials
and employees of his department and in the exercise of his
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion
of his officials.40 The power of the President to investigate is
not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in
the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to
discipline subordinates,41 his power for rule making,
adjudication and licensing purposes 42 and in order to be
informed on matters which he is entitled to know.43
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v.
Ermita,44 where it was held that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with his constitutionally granted power of
control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative
power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control
necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG,
the President may create the PTC in order to, among others,
put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in
the government.45
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the
creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
"reorganization" as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any
function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any
agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision
refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions. These point to situations where a body or an office
is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has
to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere
mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the
Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the
term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office
of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No.
1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
Secretary,46
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President
to reorganize any department or agency in the executive
branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of
the very source of the power that which constitutes an
express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of
the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312
(2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB
is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis
Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by
the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter.47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from
the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in
the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from
Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth
commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory
basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. 48 The
said law granted the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, including the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services
and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize
salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20,
Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases
such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.49
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a
justification for the President to create a public office. Said
decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No.
1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the
decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of
government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of
the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing
manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No.
1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio
upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly
provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was
enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says "it was
enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to
parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government,
the legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416
was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D. 1416
should not be considered effective anymore upon the
promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.]
1416, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President
to reorganize the entire National Government is deemed
repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
correct.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.50
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass
muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No.
1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of
power in the three principal branches of government is a grant
of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency is inherent in the
Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority
of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies
to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of
such authority.51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos
v. Manglapus:52
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the
presidential system of government and restored the separation
of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with
provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive
power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is
head of state as well as head of government and whatever
powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution
itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of
law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
ofspecific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that
our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers
of the President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated
duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws
have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health
v. Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue
Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative
committee to look into the administrative charges filed against
the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous
purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has
the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such
validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former
used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like
the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the
Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There
being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not
inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just
because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the
power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a
public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General,
"whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of
the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission."55 Moreover, since the amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules
and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from
the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article
VII, Section 17 thereof. 56 As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. He has the authority to directly assume the
functions of the executive department.57
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to
primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has
been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law."58 In simpler terms, judicial
discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial
power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and
must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of
administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the
power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study
closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into:
x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere
included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same:
"(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation.
To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter
or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the
rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act
as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award
or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics
included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law.60 Even respondents themselves
admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial
power.61
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not
supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission
will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but
a consequence of the overall task of the commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation."62 The actual prosecution
of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits
of the charges against them,63 is certainly not a function given
to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its
investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and
gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for
the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.64
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under
R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case
of Ombudsman v. Galicia,65 it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the
1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive
but is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct
preliminary investigation on charges against public employees
and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains
concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and
the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local
elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section
15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction,
it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases
supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated
above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation
or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This
is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its
power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation
of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority
under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the
Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and,
thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate
the commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred
that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory
in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a
wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of
their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports
of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft
laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within
the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is
violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it
does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as
its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan
hostility."66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in
virtually all administrations previous to that of former
President Arroyo.67
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the
reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts
committed not only during the administration of former
President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where
the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies" 68 were
reported to have been committed against the Filipino people.
They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as
it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first,
"there is no substantial distinction between the group of
officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1
and other groups or persons who abused their public office for
personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not
germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end
corruption."69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the
petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with
"graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo
administration with the strong arm of the law with equal
force."70
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1
identifies the "previous administration" as the initial subject
of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC
will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and
corruption solely during the said administration. 71 Assuming
arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings
to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners
argue that no offense is committed against the equal
protection clause for "the segregation of the transactions of
public officers during the previous administration as possible
subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on
substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the
Executive Order seeks to correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo
administration from past administrations, it recited the
following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of
large scale graft and corruption in the previous
administration which have eroded public confidence in public
institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large
scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence
in the Government and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as
the object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that
unlike with administrations long gone, the current
administration will most likely bear the immediate
consequence of the policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a
separate class for investigation lies in the reality that
the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that
could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated,
the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption
laws are faithfully executed, are more easily established in the
regime that immediately precede the current administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their
predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues that
are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due
diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration
like the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino
under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand
Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created
by former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative
Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens
committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his
predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos. 73 [Emphases
supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in
a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.74
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities."77 "In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective."78
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. 79 Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political
and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken. 80
It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test ofreasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."82
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class.83 "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made
with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the
class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to
a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify
the non-application of the law to him."84
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition
to the number included in the class. It must be of such a
nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or
"underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
[Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated
solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall
primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end,
investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate
action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred
to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous administration
and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases
supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the
Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these
distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction
of the investigation to the "previous administration" only. The
reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration
cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration
from earlier administrations which were also blemished by
similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not
inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo
administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."88
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No.
1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to
the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine
that "to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose
its effectiveness."89 The reason given is specious. It is without
doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the
PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil it breeds."90
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing
evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point.
Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the
PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous
investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys
limited time and resources. "The law does not require the
impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).91
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the
Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating
almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact
remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching
for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations.
The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations. Whilereasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for
being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick
Wo v. Hopkins,92
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc
body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority
administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. 94 While
the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of
acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to
survive, must be read together with the provisions of the
Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the
guise of "substantial distinctions" would only confirm the
petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an
"adventure in partisan hostility." In the case of US v.
Cyprian,95 it was written: "A rather limited number of such
classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be
arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political
activity or membership in a political party, union activity or
membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise
of first amendment rights."
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace
all persons who naturally belong to the class. 96 "Such a
classification must not be based on existing circumstances
only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number
included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in
situations and circumstances which are relative to the
discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable
from those of the members of the class must be brought under
the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as
are the members of the class."97
The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not
fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection
clause."98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because
it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within
its reach."99 It has been written that a regulation challenged
under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational
predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. 100 In
several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a
valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the
purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations.
These cases refer to the "step by step" process. 101 "With regard
to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk
of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails,
through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that
might conceivably have been attacked."102
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence.
That the previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that
it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1
does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be
focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in
the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by
purposeful and intentional discrimination."103
To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate
discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does
not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and
corruption committed during the previous
administration.104 The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive
Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and
when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section
1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of
graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the
President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations
of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption
committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee
that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded
mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and
caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include
them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only
fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order
No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration."105
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in
the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,106 that the "PCGG
Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14)
does not violate the equal protection clause." The decision,
however, was devoid of any discussion on how such
conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said
case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is -
whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with
respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest
Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like
the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the
present political situation calls for it to once again explain the
legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being
a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial
Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government."
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the
power of judicial review which is the power to declare a
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty
to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation
of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however,
have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme
Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been
accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would
be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them."107
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is
not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government is done in
consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by
the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise,
the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void
and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired
with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the
nation and its people. But then again, it is important to
remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the
means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the
purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in
accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional
parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. 108 The Court
cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will
continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined
principles.
"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to
the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to
sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude."109
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth
commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance
so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it
to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the
judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth
and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to
its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the
search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for
"ours is still a government of laws and not of men."110
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to
cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive
Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO,
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
RESOLUTION
ABAD, J.:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this
case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter
Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on
the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an
immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to
reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the
prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the
facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility;
issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a
manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or
committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."1
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered
because it places the accused under double jeopardy. The
Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice
in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has
already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of
the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State
is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts
to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has
been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for
a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually
overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and
the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan:2
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the
sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment
for the same offense would arm the government with a potent
instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees
that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness
of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents
for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness
to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal
laws.3
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an
acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and
narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when
a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may
assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.4
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions,
he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration
under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court
"must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and
there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of
witnesses and the evidence."5But he has not specified the
violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim
that "the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the
defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the
decision"6 is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from
personal perception.
Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan7 as authority that the Court can set aside the
acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the
government proved in Galman that the prosecution was
deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that
case was "dictated, coerced and scripted."8 It was a sham trial.
Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a
sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no
case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such
that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the
four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did
not really go through the process.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the
Courts appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the
prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave error on
the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and
assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the
defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court
to review the evidence anew and render another judgment
based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally
allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et
als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final
and can no longer be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit
complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes motion for reconsideration
dated December 28, 2010.
 4
For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559
motions for leave to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister SCRA 676, 683-684.
5
Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Supra note 1, at 7.
6
Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Id. at 12.
7
Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto 228 Phil. 42 (1986).
8
Guingona, Jr. Id. at 89.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: CONCURRING OPINION
I vote to grant the M.R. SERENO, J.:
RENATO C. CORONA The Motion for Reconsideration assails the majority for
Chief Justice failing to uphold the trial courts conclusions. The simple fact
is that the evidence tends to demonstrate that Hubert Webb is
No part, prior
innocent. The simple fact also is that the evidence
inhibition CONCHITA CARPIO
demonstrates that not only had Jessica Alfaro failed to
ANTONIO T. MORALES
substantiate her testimony, she had contradicted herself and
CARPIO Associate Justice
had been contradicted by other more believable evidence. The
Associate Justice
other main prosecution witnesses fare no better. This is the
gist of the Decision sought to be reconsidered. While this
No part; filed pleading Court does not make a dispositive ruling other than a
No part due to
as Sol Gen pronouncement of "guilt" or "non-guilt" on the part of the
relastionship to a party
ANTONIO accused, the legal presumption of innocence must be applied
PRESBITERO J.
EDUARDO B. in operative fact. It is unfortunate that statements were made
VELASCO, JR.
NACHURA that sought to dilute the legal import of the majority Decision.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice A pronouncement of this Court that the accused has not been
proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt cannot be
I vote to grant the twisted to mean that this Court does not believe in the
motion for innocence of the accused when the reasoning of the Court
Same vote as J. demonstrates such belief. A careful reading of the majority
reconsideration
Villarama Decision, as well as the concurring opinions, is required to
TERESITA J.
ARTURO D. BRION determine whether the accused were acquitted solely
LEONARDO-DE
Associate Justice becausethere was lingering doubt as to their guilt of the crime
CASTRO
Associate Justice charged or whether the accused were acquitted not only
because of doubt as to their guilt but also because the
evidence tends to establish their innocence. In the case of
DIOSDADO M. LUCAS P. Hubert Webb, the evidence tends to establish his innocence.
PERALTA BERSAMIN On the other hand, the testimony of Jessica Alfaro was wholly
Associate Justice Associate Justice rejected by the majority as not believable.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, private complainant asserts
I vote to grant the that this Court should have respected the trial courts resolve
No part motion for to give full credence to the testimony of Jessica Alfaro. While
MARIANO C. DEL reconsideration as a general rule, a trial judges findings as to the credibility
CASTILLO MARTIN S. of a witness are entitled to utmost respect as he has had the
Associate Justice VILLARAMA, JR. opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness stand,
Associate Justice this holds true only in the absence of bias, partiality, and
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge. 1 The
succeeding discussion demonstrates why this Court has no
JOSE PORTUGAL JOSE CATRAL choice but to reject the trial courts findings.
PEREZ MENDOZA The mistaken impression that Alfaro was a credible witness
Associate Justice Associate Justice was, in significant measure, perpetrated by the trial courts
See concurring Opinion inappropriate and mismatched attribution of rights to and
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO duties of the accused vis-a-vis the principal witness in a
Associate Justice criminal proceeding. As discussed in the promulgated
C E R T I F I C AT I O N Decision of the Court in this case, the trial court failed to
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is recognize the accuseds right to be presumed innocent.
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution Instead, the trial courts Decision indicated a preconceived
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned belief in the accuseds guilt, and as a corollary, that witness
to the writer of the opinion of the Court. Alfaro was telling the truth when she testified to the accuseds
RENATO C. CORONA guilt. In excessively protecting Alfaro, the trial court
Chief Justice improperly ascribed to her the right reserved for an accused. It
also unreasonably imposed severe limitations on the extent of
the right of the defense to cross-examine her.
During Alfaros cross examination, the defense counsel tried
Footnotes to impeach her credibility by asking her about her 28 April
1
Private Complainants Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8. 1995 Affidavit, which markedly differs from her 22 May 1995
2
G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 185. Affidavit. The prosecution objected and moved that the
3
Id. at 207. questions be expunged from the records on the basis of the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained allegedly without the
assistance of counsel, pursuant to Article III Section 12(1) and
(3) of the 1987 Constitution.2This constitutional right,
however, is a right reserved solely for the accused or a
"person under investigation for the commission of an
offense." The prosecutions objection had no legal basis
because Alfaro was clearly not the accused in the case. Alfaro
was a witness who had a legal duty to "answer questions,
although his (her) answer may tend to establish a claim
against him (her)."3 Notwithstanding this, the lower court
sustained the prosecutions objection.
The law does not confer any favorable presumption on behalf
of a witness. It is precisely due to the absence of any legal
presumption that the witness is telling the truth that he/she is
subjected to cross-examination to "test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse,
and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue." 4 The
Rules provide that "the witness may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness
and freedom."5] A witness may be impeached "by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by
evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony."6
The right to cross-examine a witness is a matter of procedural
due process such that the testimony or deposition of a witness
given in a former case "involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse
party" provided the adverse party "had the opportunity to
cross-examine him."7
Notwithstanding the right of the accused to fully and freely
conduct a thorough cross examination, the trial court set
undue restrictions on the defense counsels cross examination
of Alfaro, effectively denying the accused such right. The
length of the cross-examination is not as material in the
determination of the credibility of the witness as much as
whether such witness was fully tested by the defense when
demanded to be tested on cross-examination for honesty by
contradictory evidence of a reputation for dishonesty, for
inconsistency, or for possible bias or improper motive.
To establish Alfaros bias and motive for testifying in the
case, the defense counsel sought to ask Alfaro about her
brother, Patrick. Alfaro admitted that Patrick was a drug
addict and had been arrested once by the NBI for illegal
possession of drugs, but that he was presently in the United
States. The theory of the defense was that Patricks liberty
was part of a deal that Alfaro had struck with the NBI in
exchange for her services. When defense counsel inquired
about the circumstances of Patricks departure for the United
States, the prosecution objected to the questions on the ground
of irrelevance. Respondent judge sustained the objection, thus
foreclosing a significant avenue for testing Alfaros "freedom
from interest or bias."
The defense counsel tried to cross-examine Alfaro regarding
her educational attainment as stated in her sworn statements.
The defense presented her college transcript of records to
prove that she only enrolled for a year and earned nine (9)
academic units, contrary to her claim that she finished second
year college. Notably, Alfaro misrepresented her educational
attainment in both of her affidavits her 28 April 1995
Affidavit which she claimed was executed without assistance
of counsel, and her subsequent 22 May 1995 Affidavit which
was admittedly executed with the assistance of counsel.
Apparently, Alfaros lie under oath about her educational
attainment persisted even after being given counsels
assistance in the execution of the second affidavit, as well as
more time to contemplate the matter. Unfortunately, the lower
court sustained the prosecutions objection to the question on
the ground of irrelevance when the line of testing could have
tested Alfaro's penchant for "accuracy and truthfulness."
Ironically, notwithstanding the trial courts disallowance of
the defenses attempts to impeach Alfaro's character, and the
rule that "(e)vidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached," 8 the trial
court allowed the prosecution to present Atty. Pedro Rivera 9 to
testify positively on Alfaros character. Worse yet, the trial
court disallowed the defense from presenting Atty. Riveras
earlier statement to impeach the latters credibility; again, this
was disallowed on the ground of immateriality. When a
proffer of evidence10 was made by the defense following such
disallowance, the trial court struck the proffer from the record
on the ground that it was allegedly improper on cross-
examination.
The notion that witness Alfaro was able to withstand her cross
examination appears sustainable in large part because her
cross examination was so emasculated by the trial courts
inordinate protection of her, which went so far as to
improperly accord her the right reserved for an accused.
Taken together with repeated instances of unwarranted
exertion of effort to wipe the record clean of some entries that
cast doubt on Alfaros credibility, the trial courts actions
show that it had a bias towards upholding the truthfulness of
Alfaros testimony.
The trial courts treatment of documentary evidence also
suffered from mismatched ascription discarding legal
presumptions without evidence to the contrary while giving
evidentiary weight to unsubstantiated speculation. For
instance, in rejecting Webbs alibi defense, the trial court used
mere speculation that the accuseds family influenced the
production of false entries in official documents to defeat the
legal presumption of said documents accuracy and regularity
of issuance. Notably, the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (US INS) Certification, which
confirmed that Webb was in the United States from March
1991 until October 1992, was authenticated by no less than
the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. State
Department. Furthermore, this official certification of a
sovereign state. having passed through formal diplomatic
channels, was authenticated by the Department of Foreign
Affairs. As discussed in the main decision, such official
documents as the authenticated U.S. INS Certification enjoy
the presumption of accuracy of the entries therein. 11 Official
documents are not infallible, but the presumption that they are
accurate can only be overcome with evidence. Unfortunately,
in the mind of the trial court, pure conjecture and not hard
evidence was allowed to defeat a legal presumption.
Clearly, the trial courts decision in this case was, in
significant measure, the product of switched attributions as to
who should enjoy certain rights and what should be presumed
under the law. This behavior on the part of the trial court and
the effect it had on the factual conclusions on the credibility
of Jessica Alfaro and on the presence of Hubert Webb in the
Philippines at the time of the commission of the crime cannot
be upheld.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for
Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo
assailing the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and
Resolution3 dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was
engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-
buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search
warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon
of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil
Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to
petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted
them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were
riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it.
The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey
house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor.
When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and
informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But
before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that
he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in
front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail,
because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances
and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and
closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover.
SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay
tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with
two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado,
and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo,
searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where
the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched
the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut
several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing
white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that
were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed
transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory
examination, the result of which proved positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against
petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article
III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information 5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about
3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, did then and there have in his possession and
control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a
total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without license or prescription from any competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his
counsel, pleaded not guilty.7 Subsequently, trial on the merits
ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon,
PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector
Mutchit Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of
petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and
Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon,
petitioner was installing the electrical wirings and
airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty
Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to
finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was
engaged by the owner of the establishment in a conversation.
He was able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening.
It was then that he learned from his wife that police operatives
searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the
small structure, 20 meters away from his house where they
found the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother
and was used as a storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
of the charge against him in the Information. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas Boy Castillo," GUILTY of
violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and
Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum of Prision
Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline
substance having a total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered
confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the
latter affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in
toto and the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied
by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
following arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY
OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF
THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY
BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED
THAT IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT
THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE
SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT
ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR
STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE PETITIONER
AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT
FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER
ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF "POSSESSION"
AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD
HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT
BEEN PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment
dated February 10, 2009, enumerated the following counter-
arguments:
I the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by
Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24, Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of
petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs.11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the
search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano,
the police officer who applied for it, had no personal
knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-
buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same
search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the
petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to
quash the search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce
clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was
conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut
located about 20 meters away from his house is no longer
within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the
police officers due to the distance and that the search warrant
did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be
searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure is applicable only against government authorities and
not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who
found the folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the
nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA
erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be
presumed to be in possession of the same just because they
were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG
dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when
prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other
building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the
presumption arises that such person is in possession of such
drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is
sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. 12 According
to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for
a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.13 A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it
requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction.14 The judge, in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him
and not by a fixed and rigid formula, 15and must employ a
flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. 16 The
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of
magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.17 Substantial basis means that the questions of
the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances
as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched.18 A review of the records shows
that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be
remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in
order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement of definiteness. 19 In the present
case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically
designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the
place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by
a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been
found in a place other than the one described in the search
warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless
search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation
of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the
items seized were found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as
evidence because the one who discovered them was
a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure being applicable only against government authorities.
The contention is devoid of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who
effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance of
the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3
Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take place?
A Just a very few moments.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to
reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a
barangay tanod.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?
A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did]
your driver get?
A Two.
Q What happened after that?
A We searched the house, but we found negative.
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and
found nothing.
Q What about you, where were you?
A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.
Q What about the barangay tanod?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded
negative what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his
shop because he ran from his shop, so we searched his
shop.
Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of
Ruben del Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo
Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder
sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?
A Yes.
Q What happened at the shop?
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white
folded paper.
Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.
Q Was that the only item?
A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil
and others inside the electric shop?
A Yes.21
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of
petitioner and that the items that were actually seized were
found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was
corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:
FISCAL:
Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias
Boy, can you still recall what took place?
A We cordoned the area.
Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?
A We waited for the barangay tanod.
Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of
Ruben del Castillo's wife.
Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her]
face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you]
conducted the search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team
mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw that Ruben ran away from
his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his
house.
Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of
Ruben del Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The
house was clean.
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his
electronic shop.
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his
electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw
that (sic) Ruben run from that store and furthermore the door
was open.
Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.
xxxx
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?
A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team
leader Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean
to say that there were other persons or other person that
followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.
Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed
suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q What about you?
A I also followed suit.
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del
Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper
and I saw him open the folded paper which contained four
shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the
tanod open the folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very small. 22
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?
A At his residence, the two-storey house.
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in
conducting the search at the residence of the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben
del Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was
that small house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of
Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut
supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the
nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay
tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the
searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted
as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons
in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or governmental
corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person
in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman
shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which
describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of
persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government
Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised
Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay
members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each
barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members
who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged
with the maintenance of public order, protection and
security of life and property, or the maintenance of a
desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay
member who comes to the aid of persons in authority,
shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well
as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in
authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search
conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that
the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is
considered a private individual, thus, making the same items
admissible in evidence, petitioner's third argument that the
prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the
regulated drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings
of the trial court since the latter has the unique opportunity to
weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying,24 unless attended with arbitrariness or plain
disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual
findings are accorded the highest degree of respect on
appeal25 as in the present case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the
violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for
the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in
possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c)
the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated
drug.26
In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of
possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is
not an essential element. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
physical possession or control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it
is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise
control and dominion over the place where the contraband is
located, is shared with another.28
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or
seized should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that
the property is under appellants control or possession. 29 The
CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated
drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. 30 The
records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns
the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the
said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely
presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an
electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a
resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an
electrician by occupation. As such, conclusion could be
arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical
equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being the case,
he has control of the things found in said structure.31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership of
the structure where the seized articles were found. During
their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating their
basis, that the same structure was the shop of
petitioner.32 During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he
even outrightly concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut
was owned by petitioner, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was
that small house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of
Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut
supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa
hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.33
However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon
admitted that there was an electrical shop but denied what he
said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner,
thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical
shop, is that correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he
owns the shop.
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
A Yes.
Q How big is the structure?
A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a
mahjong den and at the other side is a structure rented by a
couple.34
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge
of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under
his control and dominion and the character of the
drugs.35 With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa
hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal
case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting
perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.36 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of
proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.371wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the
Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del
Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174369 June 20, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ZAFRA MARAORAO y MACABALANG, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the March 1, 2006 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 35,
convicting appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended.
Appellant was charged under an Information3 dated January 4,
2001 filed before the RTC of Manila as follows:
That on or about November 30, 2000, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, without being authorized by law
to possess or use regulated drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under
his custody and control one (1) transparent plastic sachet
containing ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY
POINT ZERO EIGHT ONE (1,280.081) grams of white
crystalline substance known as "shabu" containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without
the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.
On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged against him. 4 Trial on the
merits ensued.
For the prosecution, PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on
November 29, 2000, they received reliable information at
Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that
an undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the
Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early morning of the
following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m.,
he and PO2 Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and
SPO1 Norman Gamit went to the Islamic Center. While
walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men
talking to each other. Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2
Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to
apprehend him.5
Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon
bag on the pavement. He was about to run when PO3 Vigilla
held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The
man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y
Macabalang. The police examined the contents of the bag and
saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline
substance, which they suspected to be shabu. At the police
station, the investigator marked the plastic sachet "ZM-1" in
the presence of the police officers.6
The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory chemical analysis. When examined
by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the
1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance gave a
positive result to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her findings are contained in
Chemistry Report No. D-1121-00.7
In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000,
at around 7:00 a.m., he was going to the place of his uncle,
Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a letter from his
mother. He went there early because he had to report for work
at the Port Area in Manila at 8:00 a.m. On his way, an
unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house
number which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to
the man, who placed his bag down and asked him again.
When they turned around, they saw four men in civilian attire
walking briskly. He only found out that they were police
officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the
man ran away, the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred
that he did not run because he was not aware of what was
inside the bag.8
Appellant further narrated that the police arrested him and
asked who the owner of the bag was. He replied that it did not
belong to him but to the man who ran away. They made him
board a bus-type vehicle and brought him to the police station
in Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was referred to a desk
sergeant. The desk sergeant asked him whether the bag was
recovered from him, and he replied that he had no knowledge
about that bag. He was not assisted by counsel during the
investigation. He was also incarcerated in a small cell for
about ten days before he was brought to Manila City Jail. At
the Office of the City Prosecutor, he met his lawyer for the
first time.9
On September 25, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused
ZAFRA MARAORAO y MACABALANG guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of possession of 1,280.081 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride without license or
prescription, penalized under Section 16 in relation to Section
20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing
said accused to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P5,000,000.00, plus the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the full time during which the
accused has been under preventive imprisonment should be
credited in his favor provided that he had agreed voluntarily
in writing to abide with the same disciplinary rules imposed
on convicted prisoner. Otherwise, he should be credited with
four-fifths (4/5) only of the time he had been under preventive
imprisonment.
Exhibit B, which consists of 1,280.081 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, is confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government. Within ten (10) days
following the promulgation of this judgment, the Branch
Clerk of this Court, is ordered to turn over, under proper
receipt, the regulated drug involved in this case to the
Dangerous Drugs Custodian, National Bureau of
Investigation, as appointed by the Dangerous Drugs Board,
for appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.10
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 11 The entire
records of the case were elevated to this Court. Pursuant to
our Decision in People v. Mateo, 12 however, the case was
transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
At the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE FABRICATED AND COACHED
TESTIMONY OF THE STAR PROSECUTION WITNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED'S DEFENSE OF
DENIAL.13
On March 1, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 25
September 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35 in Crim. Case No. 01-188945 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.14
In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that there was no
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied a fact or circumstance of weight and substance
which would have affected the case. It gave credence to the
testimony of PO3 Vigilla and found appellant's defense of
denial inherently weak. Furthermore, the CA held that
appellant was lawfully searched as a consequence of his valid
warrantless arrest.
Hence, this present recourse.
In his Supplemental Brief,15 appellant stresses that PO3
Vigilla testified that when they first saw appellant, he was
talking with a certain person. It was appellants companion
who scampered away upon seeing the police. PO3 Vigilla
further testified that appellant tried to flee but they were able
to arrest him before he could do so. Appellant argues that his
alleged attempt to flee does not constitute a crime that should
have prompted the police to arrest him. Since his arrest was
illegal, he contends that the subsequent search made by the
police was likewise illegal, and the shabu supposedly
recovered from him is inadmissible in evidence.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to
great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However,
this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual
findings when there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the case.16
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole case for review. This Court is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if
we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the
case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be
considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate
that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt
is proven beyond reasonable doubt.17
Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a
dangerous drug, or the shabu in this case, the prosecution
evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following
elements: (1) the appellant was in possession of an item or
object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug;
(2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the
appellant freely and consciously possessed the drug. 18 In this
case, the fact of possession by appellant of the bag containing
the shabu was not established in the first place.
A careful perusal of the testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a
glaring discrepancy which both the trial and the appellate
courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit, 19 arresting officers
PO3 Vigilla, PO2 Abella, PO1 dela Cruz and SPO1 Gamit
stated that they spotted two unidentified persons standing and
seemingly conversing a few meters ahead of them. "However,
when one of them noticed our presence, he hastily r[a]n away
heading towards the Muslim Center leaving behind the other
person and a maroon colored bag with Adidas marking in
the pavement." In other words, the maroon bag was left
behind by the man who ran away. But at the trial, PO3 Vigilla
testified during direct examination that they spotted two
persons talking to each other, and upon noticing them, "one of
them scampered away and was chased by my companions
while the other one dropped a bag, sir."20Presumably, under
his testimony, the bag was now held by the one who did not
run away. Later, in another part of his testimony, he again
changed this material fact. When he was asked by Prosecutor
Senados as to who between the two persons they saw talking
to each other ran away, PO3 Vigilla categorically answered,
"[t]he one who is holding a bag, sir." 21 Such material
inconsistency leaves much to be desired about the credibility
of the prosecutions principal witness and casts reasonable
doubt as to appellants guilt for it renders questionable
whether he in fact held the bag with intention to possess it and
its contents.
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and the
complicity or participation of the accused. 22 While a lone
witness testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in
certain instances, the testimony must be clear, consistent, and
crediblequalities we cannot ascribe to this case.
Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be
believed, it must both come from a credible witness and be
credible in itself tested by human experience, observation,
common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved
through the years.23 Clearly from the foregoing, the
prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant was indeed in possession ofshabu, and
that he freely and consciously possessed the same.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal
case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by
procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of
proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction
must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense. 24 In this case, the
prosecutions evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway
judgment.1wphi1 Where there is reasonable doubt, the
accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may
not have been established. The Constitution presumes a
person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral
certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the
presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration
granted as a matter of right.25
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 1, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01600 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellant Zafra Maraorao
y Macabalang is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause
the immediate release of appellant, unless the latter is being
lawfully held for other cause/s; and to inform the Court of the
date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within
five (5) days from notice.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
3. RIGHT TO BE HEARD PERSONALLY OR BY
COUNSEL
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186472 July 5, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO SIONGCO y DELA CRUZ, ERIBERTO
ENRIQUEZ y GEMSON, GEORGE HAYCO y
CULLERA, and ALLAN BONSOL y PAZ, Accused,
ANTONIO SIONGCO y DELA CRUZ and ALLAN
BONSOL y PAZ, Appellants.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court for review is the September 20, 2007
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the guilty
verdict rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
166, Pasig City,2 promulgated on November 6, 2000, against
appellants Antonio Siongco (Siongco) and Allan Bonsol
(Bonsol), with modification on the penalty imposed and the
amount of damages to be paid to their victim, Nikko Satimbre
(Nikko).3 This review is made, pursuant to the pertinent
provisions of Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122 and Section 13 of
Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
The factual findings of both courts show that between 6:00
and 7:00 p.m. of December 27, 1998, 11-year-old Nikko, a
resident of Balanga, Bataan, was induced by Siongco to board
a bus bound for Pilar, Bataan, together with the latters
friends, Marion Boton (Boton) and Eriberto Enriquez
(Enriquez). Nikko was told that the two would accompany
him in getting the "Gameboy" that Siongco promised.
Siongco was no stranger to Nikko as he used to be a security
guard at Footlockers shoe store where Nikkos mother, Elvira
Satimbre (Elvira), works as a cashier. After a short stop in
Pilar, Bataan, the three proceeded to Mariveles, Bataan, where
they met with George Hayco (Hayco). The boy was then
brought to Dinalupihan, Bataan, where he was kept for the
night.4
Meanwhile, Elvira arrived home at 7:00 p.m. and found that
her son was not there. She searched for him in the places he
frequented, but to no avail. As her continued search for the
child proved futile, she reported him missing to the nearest
police detachment.5
The following day, December 28, 1998, Enriquez and
Siongco took Nikko to Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. 6 On
December 29, 1998, Elvira received a phone call from a man,
later identified as appellant Siongco, who claimed to have
custody of Nikko and asked for P400,000.00 in exchange for
his liberty. Elvira haggled with her sons captor until the latter
agreed to reduce the ransom money to P300,000.00. Elvira
was also able to talk to her son who was only able to utter
"Hello Ma" as Siongco immediately grabbed the phone from
him. Siongco warned Elvira to refrain from reporting the
matter to the police. He also threatened that Nikko would be
killed if she fails to give the ransom money at 6:00 p.m. of the
next day at Genesis Bus Station in Pasay City.7 That night,
Elvira telephoned the Office of the Chief of Police of
Balanga, Bataan and reported that Nikko was kidnapped. 8
On December 30, 1998, Enriquez and Siongco moved Nikko
to Pateros and cautioned him not to tell anybody that he was
kidnapped. They stayed at the house of Heracleo San Jose
(Heracleo), a relative of Enriquez. They again called Elvira
who failed to keep her appointment with them in Pasay City.
She explained that she was still gathering funds for the
ransom money. The captors reiterated their threats and, at
midnight, they called and instructed her to proceed to Avenida
with whatever available money she had, subject to a
subsequent agreement as to the balance. Elvira refused and
insisted that she preferred to give the amount in full. 9
In the morning of December 31, 1998, Siongco called Elvira
several times with the same threats and demands. Elvira
agreed to meet them that afternoon at the Genesis Bus Station
in Pasay City. Nikko was allowed to speak with his mother
and he assured her that he was not being maltreated. After the
call, Enriquez informed Nikko that his mother wanted a
"kaliwaan" (face to face exchange) deal. Soon thereafter,
Enriquez and Siongco left to meet Elvira, while Nikko stayed
behind.10
On the same day, Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Azurin, Jr.
(Police Senior Inspector Azurin, Jr.) was on duty at Crimes
Operation Division of the Philippine Anti-Organized Crime
Task Force (PAOCTF) office in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
At 11:00 a.m., Elvira arrived and requested for assistance for
the recovery of her kidnapped son. The PAOCTF team then
instructed her to bring to the pay-off site a brown envelope
with a letter asking for extension of payment. After briefing,
Azurin and other police operatives proceeded to Genesis Bus
Station in Pasay City. While waiting for Elvira, they noticed
two (2) male persons, later identified as Enriquez and
Siongco, restlessly moving around the place. At around 2:30
p.m., Elvira arrived carrying the brown envelope. As
instructed by the kidnappers, she positioned herself near a tree
and tied a white kerchief around her neck. Shortly thereafter,
Enriquez approached Elvira and took the brown envelope
from her. As he was walking away, the PAOCTF team
arrested him. Thereafter, they followed Siongco, who
hurriedly hailed a taxicab and sped away. Siongco was
arrested at the residence of Heracleo in Pateros where Nikko
was also rescued. Thereafter, Siongco and Enriquez were
brought to Camp Crame.11
The investigations of Nikko and the two detainees, coupled
with the follow-up operations of the PAOCTF, led to the
arrest of appellant Bonsol, and the other cohorts, Hayco and
Boton.12
On January 4, 1999, an Information 13 was filed in court,
charging herein appellants Siongco and Bonsol, together with
Enriquez, Hayco, Boton, and a John Doe, with KIDNAPPING
and SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Arraigned on February 24, 1999, the five accused pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. 14 Trial then ensued; in the
course of which, the prosecution presented in evidence the
oral testimonies of its witnesses: 1) the victim himself, 11-
year-old Nikko; 2) his mother, Elvira; 3) Heracleo, relative of
accused Enriquez; 4) Police Senior Inspector Azurin, Jr. of the
PAOCTF; and 5) Police Superintendent Paul Tucay, the one
who arrested Bonsol, Hayco and Boton.15
With the exception of Boton, all of the accused took the
witness stand. Hayco and Bonsol denied knowledge of and
participation in the crime. Siongco testified that, on December
27, 1998, he saw Nikko at a "peryahan" in Balanga, Bataan
but he did not mind the boy as he was busy conversing with
Enriquez about their business of selling toys. He went to
Manila and stayed at the house of Heracleo on December 28
and 29, 1998 to collect installment payments from customers.
On December 31, 1998, he went to his brothers house in San
Juan, Metro Manila and when he came back to Pateros on the
same day, he was arrested by PAOCTF agents.
Enriquez declared that Nikko voluntarily went with them. He
affirmed that he travelled with Nikko and Siongco to Manila.
They stayed in Bicutan and then moved to Pateros. He alleged
that they called Nikkos mother because the boy kept asking
for a "Gameboy." He went to the Genesis Bus Station to meet
Nikkos mother, who, according to Siongco, would have
something tied around her neck.16
The RTC rejected the denials and alibis raised by the accused
and held that they conspired and mutually helped one another
in kidnapping and illegally detaining Nikko by taking him
through a circuitous journey from Balanga, Bataan to Manila
where ransom demands for his liberty were made.
In a decision dated November 6, 2000, the RTC convicted
Siongco, Bonsol, Enriquez and Hayco of the offense charged
in the Information and meted upon them the extreme penalty
of death. Boton was ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The pertinent portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Antonio Siongco y
Dela Cruz, Eriberto Enriquez y Gemson, George Hayco y
Cullera and Allan Bonsol y Paz GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention for the purpose of extorting ransom, as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, and are hereby sentenced
to suffer the Supreme penalty of Death and indemnify the
victim, Nikko Satimbre, and his mother, Elvira Satimbre,
each, in the amount of P50,000.00, as moral damages, plus
the costs of suit.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, the Court finds accused
Marion Boton y Cereza NOT GUILTY of the crime charged
in the Information.
SO ORDERED.17
From the RTC, the case went directly to this Court for
automatic review.18 The parties were then required to file, as
they did file, their respective appellants 19 and
20
appellees briefs. Consistent with this Courts ruling in
People v. Mateo,21 the case was transferred to the CA 22 for
intermediate review and disposition.
Upon review, the CA concurred with the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court and affirmed the judgment of
conviction but modified the penalty imposed to reclusion
perpetua. The CA increased the amount of moral damages
to P100,000.00 and awarded P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, to be paid jointly and solidarily by the accused to
their victim, Nikko. The fallo of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 6, 2000 of the
RTC Branch 166, Pasig City, in Criminal Case No. 115317-H,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to jointly
and solidarily pay private complainant Nikko Satimbre the
amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.23
Only herein appellants Siongco and Bonsol were able to
perfect an appeal24 of the CA Decision. Consequently, in its
September 29, 2008 Resolution,25 the CA declared the
conviction of accused Enriquez and Hayco as final and
executory, and a Partial Entry of Judgment was made against
them.26 In a Resolution dated April 13, 2009,27 this Court
accepted the appeal interposed by Siongco and Bonsol.
We deny the appeal.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, defines and penalizes
kidnapping and serious illegal detention as follows:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any
private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than
three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female, or a public
officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
In the recent People of the Philippines v. Christopher Bringas
y Garcia, Bryan Bringas y Garcia, John Robert Navarro y
Cruz, Erickson Pajarillo y Baser (deceased), and Eden Sy
Chung,28 we reiterated the following elements that must be
established by the prosecution to obtain a conviction for
kidnapping, viz.: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b)
he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping
must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any
of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping
or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed
by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained,
or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or
detained, is a minor, a female, or a public officer. If the victim
is a minor, or is kidnapped or detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of detention becomes
immaterial.
The essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the
victims liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent
of the accused to effect such deprivation. 29
As correctly held by the RTC and the CA, the prosecution
indubitably proved beyond reasonable doubt that the elements
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention obtain in the case
at bar. Accused-appellants are private individuals who,
together with their cohorts, took 11-year-old Nikko out of his
hometown in Balanga, Bataan on December 27, 1998. They
brought him to Manila on December 28, 1998, where
demands for a P400,000.00 ransom were made to his mother.
Appellants contend that the essential element of detention or
deprivation of liberty was absent because Nikko voluntarily
went with them and that he was free to move around and play
with other children. We disagree.
The deprivation required by Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also
the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for
whatever length of time. It includes a situation where the
victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention
or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. 30 In this
case, although Nikko was free to move around, he was at all
times under the alternate watch of appellants and their
cohorts. He was in their physical custody and complete
control as he was kept in places strange and unfamiliar to him.
While he was allowed to play in the houses where he was
kept, the fact remains that he was under the control of his
captors who left him there, as he could not leave the house
until they shall have returned for him. Because of his tender
age and the fact that he did not know the way back home, he
was then and there deprived of his liberty.1avvphi1
As to the contention of appellant Siongco that there was no
force or intimidation involved in the taking, this Court held
in People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Cruz, Jr. y Concepcion
and Reynaldo Agustin y Ramos31 that the fact that the victim
voluntarily went with the accused did not remove the element
of deprivation of liberty, because the victim went with the
accused on a false inducement, without which the victim
would not have done so. In the present case, when Nikko
boarded the bus bound for Pilar, Bataan, he was under the
impression that Bonsol and Enriquez were to be trusted as he
was assured by Siongco that the two would accompany him to
get his much desired "Gameboy." Without such assurance,
Nikko would not have boarded the said vehicle. In
kidnapping, the victim need not be taken by the accused
forcibly or against his will. What is controlling is the act of
the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after
the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. In short,
the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention can either be made forcibly or, as
in the instant case, fraudulently.32ten.lihpwal
Equally significant is the fact that, in kidnapping, the victims
lack of consent is also a fundamental element. 33 The general
rule is that the prosecution is burdened to prove lack of
consent on the part of the victim. However, where the victim
is a minor, lack of consent is presumed. In this case, Nikko
was only 11 years old when he was kidnapped; thus incapable
of giving consent, and incompetent to assent to his seizure
and illegal detention. The consent of the boy could place
appellants in no better position than if the act had been done
against his will. A kidnapper should not be rewarded with an
acquittal simply because he is ingenious enough to conceal
his true motive from his victim until he is able to transport the
latter to another place.34
The identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate
courts likewise show that the actuations and roles played by
appellants Siongco and Bonsol undoubtedly demonstrate that
they conspired with Hayco and Enriquez in kidnapping and
illegally detaining Nikko. Being sufficiently supported by
evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the same.
Siongco was the one who promised Nikko a "Gameboy." He
told the boy to go with Bonsol and Enriquez and get the toy in
Pilar, Bataan. On December 28, 1998, he arrived in
Dinalupihan, Bataan to fetch Nikko. From there, he, Enriquez
and Nikko left for Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila in a bus.
The following day, Siongco, Nikko, Enriquez, and the latters
friend went to the marketplace and called Nikkos mother.
Siongco demanded from her payment of P400,000.00 as a
condition for the boys release. Siongco repeatedly telephoned
Elvira with the same demand and threats over the next couple
of days. On December 31, 1998, he instructed Enriquez to
meet Elvira at the Genesis Bus Station to get the ransom
money.
It is immaterial whether appellant Bonsol acted as a principal
or as an accomplice because the conspiracy and his
participation therein have been established. In conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all and the conspirators shall be held
equally liable for the crime. 35 On the pretext of getting
Nikkos much desired "Gameboy," Bonsol and Enriquez were
able to conveniently whisk Nikko out of Balanga and bring
him to Pilar, then to Mariveles, and eventually to
Dinalupihan, where Siongco fetched him. Thus, Enriquez and
Siongcos plan of bringing Nikko to Metro Manila, a terrain
unfamiliar to the boy and where the two could enjoy
anonymity to carry out their ultimate goal of extorting ransom
money from Nikkos mother, was accomplished. As shown by
the evidence, without the participation of appellant Bonsol,
the commission of the offense would not have come to
fruition.
Finally, appellants bewail that they were deprived of their
right to an independent and competent counsel when the RTC
appointed Atty. Michael Moralde (Atty. Moralde) as their
counsel de oficio during the pre-trial conference, direct
examination and cross-examination of the prosecutions
principal witness, Nikko. This was so, despite Atty. Moraldes
manifestation during Nikkos cross-examination that the
defense of his actual client, accused Boton, conflicts with that
of the other accused.36
A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. Moralde was
appointed as appellants counsel de oficio in six (6) hearings,
because their regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antoniano from
the Public Attorneys Office P AO), was inexplicably absent.
There is no denial of the right to counsel where a
counsel de oficio is appointed during the absence of the
accused's counsel de parte, or in this case the regular counsel
de oficio, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as
early as practicable under the continuous trial system. 37 The
choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is
not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes
himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing
a de oficio counsel, which it considers competent and
independent, to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of
choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a
criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused,
to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case. 38
The fact that Botons defense conflicts with that of appellants
is immaterial because, as borne out by records, Atty. Moralde
expressly declared that the questions he propounded to Nikko
were only for his client Boton. Thereafter, Atty. Antoniano
was furnished with copies of the transcript of stenographic
notes of the proceedings she missed and was given ample
opportunity to conduct her own cross-examination during the
subsequent hearings. Eventually, she adopted the cross-
examination conducted by the other defense
counsels.391avvphi1
The CA correctly modified the penalty imposed by the RTC to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The penalty
for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code40 is death. However, R.A. No. 9346 41 has banned
the imposition of death penalty and reduced all death
sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.42 In line with prevailing jurisprudence, 43 an award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is proper. The award
of P100,000.00 moral damages is increased to P200,000.00
considering the minority of Nikko.44 As the crime was
attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of example or
correction, Nikko is entitled to P100,000.00 exemplary
damages as correctly awarded by the CA.45
WHEREFORE, the September 20, 2007 Decision..of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00774, finding
appellants Antonio Siongco y dela Cruz and Allan Bonsol y
Paz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of KIDNAPPING and
SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that a P50,000.00 civil indemnity is
awarded and the amount of moral damages is increased
to P200, 000.00.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188726 January 25, 2012
CRESENCIO C. MILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARKET
PURSUITS, INC. represented by CARLO V.
LOPEZ,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the 22 April 2009
Decision1 and 8 July 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the Decision of the trial court finding
petitioner Cresencio C. Milla (Milla) guilty of two counts of
estafa through falsification of public documents.
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer of
private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc. (MPI). In March
2003, Milla represented himself as a real estate developer
from Ines Anderson Development Corporation, which was
engaged in selling business properties in Makati, and offered
to sell MPI a property therein located. For this purpose, he
showed Lopez a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 216445 registered in the name of spouses Farley
and Jocelyn Handog (Sps. Handog), as well as a Special
Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the spouses in
favor of Milla.3 Lopez verified with the Registry of Deeds of
Makati and confirmed that the property was indeed registered
under the names of Sps. Handog. Since Lopez was convinced
by Millas authority, MPI purchased the property for P2
million, issuing Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) Check
No. 154670 in the amount of P1.6 million. After receiving the
check, Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 25 March 2003 executed by Sps. Handog in favor
of MPI and (2) an original Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. 216445.4
Milla then gave Regino Acosta (Acosta), Lopezs partner, a
copy of the new Certificate of Title to the property, TCT No.
218777, registered in the name of MPI. Thereafter, it tendered
in favor of Milla SBTC Check No. 15467111 in the amount
of P400,000 as payment for the balance.5
Milla turned over TCT No. 218777 to Acosta, but did not
furnish the latter with the receipts for the transfer taxes and
other costs incurred in the transfer of the property. This failure
to turn over the receipts prompted Lopez to check with the
Register of Deeds, where he discovered that (1) the Certificate
of Title given to them by Milla could not be found therein; (2)
there was no transfer of the property from Sps. Handog to
MPI; and (3) TCT No. 218777 was registered in the name of a
certain Matilde M. Tolentino.6
Consequently, Lopez demanded the return of the amount
of P2 million from Milla, who then issued Equitable PCI
Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 dated 20 and 23 May 2003,
respectively, in the amount of P1 million each. However,
these checks were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. When Milla ignored the demand letter sent
by Lopez, the latter, by virtue of the authority vested in him
by the MPI Board of Directors, filed a Complaint against the
former on 4 August 2003. On 27 and 29 October 2003, two
Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Documents were filed against Milla and were raffled to the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Makati City, Branch 146 (RTC Br. 146). 7 Milla was accused
of having committed estafa through the falsification of the
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 218777
purportedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034167
That on or about the 25th day of March 2003, in the City of
Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private
individual, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a document denomindated as "Deed of
Absolute Sale", duly notarized by Atty. Lope M. Velasco, a
Notary Public for and in the City of Makati, denominated as
Doc. No. 297, Page No. 61, Book No. 69, Series of 2003 in
his Notarial Register, hence, a public document, by causing it
to appear that the registered owners of the property covered
by TCT No. 216445 have sold their land to complainant
Market Pursuits, Inc. when in truth and in fact the said Deed
of Absolute Sale was not executed by the owners thereof and
after the document was falsified, accused, with intent to
defraud complainant Market Pursuits, Inc. presented the
falsified Deed of Sale to complainant, herein represented by
Carlo V. Lopez, and complainant believing in the genuineness
of the Deed of Absolute Sale paid accused the amount of
P1,600,000.00 as partial payment for the property, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant in the aforementioned
amount of P1,600,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034168
That on or about the 3rd day of April 2003, in the City of
Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a document denominated as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 218777 purportedly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati City, hence, a public document,
by causing it to appear that the lot covered by TCT No.
218777 was already registered in the name of complainant
Market Pursuits, Inc., herein represented by Carlo V. Lopez,
when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew that the
Register of Deeds of Makati did not issue TCT No. 218777 in
the name of Market Pursuits Inc., and after the document was
falsified, accused with intent to defraud complainant and
complainant believing in the genuineness of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 218777 paid accused the amount of
P400,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of complainant in
the aforementioned amount of P4000,000.00 (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
After the prosecution rested its case, Milla filed, with leave of
court, his Demurrer to Evidence.9 In its Order dated 26
January 2006, RTC Br. 146 denied the demurrer and ordered
him to present evidence, but he failed to do so despite having
been granted ample opportunity.10 Though the court
considered his right to present evidence to have been
consequently waived, it nevertheless allowed him to file a
memorandum.11
In its Joint Decision dated 28 November 2006, 12 RTC Br. 146
found Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
estafa through falsification of public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused
Cresencio Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law and considering that
the amount involved is more than P22,000,00 this Court
should apply the provision that an additional one (1) year
should be imposed for every ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos
in excess of P22,000.00, thus, this Court is constrained to
impose the Indeterminate (sic) penalty of four (4) years, two
(2) months one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each
count.
Accused is adjudged to be civilly liable to the private
complainant and is ordered pay (sic) complainant the total
amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS with
legal rate of interest from the filing of the Information until
the same is fully paid and to pay the costs. He is further
ordered to pay attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%) of the
total amount due as and for attorneys fees. A lien on the
monetary award is constituted in favor of the government, the
private complainant not having paid the required docket fee
prior to the filing of the Information.
SO ORDERED.13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in the assailed Decision
dated 22 April 2009, affirmed the findings of the trial
court.14 In its assailed Resolution dated 8 July 2009, it also
denied Millas subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. 15
In the instant Petition, Milla alleges that the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals were not in accordance
with law and jurisprudence. He raises the following issues:
I. Whether the case should be reopened on the ground of
negligence of counsel;
II. Whether the principle of novation is applicable;
III. Whether the principle of simple loan is applicable;
IV. Whether the Secretarys Certificate presented by the
prosecution is admissible in evidence;
V. Whether the supposed inconsistent statements of
prosecution witnesses cast a doubt on the guilt of petitioner.16
In its Comment, MPI argues that (1) Milla was not deprived
of due process on the ground of gross negligence of counsel;
(2) under the Revised Penal Code, novation is not one of the
grounds for the extinction of criminal liability for estafa; and
(3) factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive.17
On the other hand, in its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that (1) Milla was accorded due process of
law; (2) the elements of the crime charged against him were
established during trial; (3) novation is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability for estafa; (4) the money
received by Milla from Lopez was not in the nature of a
simple loan or cash advance; and (5) Lopez was duly
authorized by MPI to institute the action.18
In his Consolidated Reply, Milla reiterates that the negligence
of his former counsel warrants a reopening of the case,
wherein he can present evidence to prove that his transaction
with MPI was in the nature of a simple loan.19
In the disposition of this case, the following issues must be
resolved:
I. Whether the negligence of counsel deprived Milla of due
process of law
II. Whether the principle of novation can exculpate Milla
from criminal liability
III. Whether the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed
by the appellate court, should be reviewed on appeal
We resolve to deny the Petition.
Milla was not deprived of due process.
Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel, Atty.
Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), deprived him of due
process. Specifically, he states that after the prosecution had
rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
and that the former was never advised by the latter of the
demurrer. Thus, Milla was purportedly surprised to discover
that RTC Br. 146 had already rendered judgment finding him
guilty, and that it had issued a warrant for his arrest. Atty.
Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Motion
for New Trial, which Milla claims to have been denied by the
trial court for being an inappropriate remedy, thus,
demonstrating his counsels negligence. These contentions
cannot be given any merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the
client, and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is so
gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the
aggrieved client.20 In this case, Milla was able to file a
Demurrer to Evidence, and upon the trial courts denial
thereof, was allowed to present evidence. 21 Because of his
failure to do so, RTC Br. 146 was justified in considering that
he had waived his right thereto. Nevertheless, the trial court
still allowed him to submit a memorandum in the interest of
justice. Further, contrary to his assertion that RTC Br. 146
denied the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest thereafter filed
by his former counsel, a reading of the 2 August 2007 Order
of RTC Br. 146 reveals that it partially denied the Omnibus
Motion for New Trial and Recall of Warrant of Arrest, but
granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Avail of Remedies
under the Rules of Court, allowing him to file an appeal and
lifting his warrant of arrest.22
It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that Milla
was given opportunities to defend his case and was granted
concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake
and negligence of his former counsel were so gross and
palpable to have deprived him of due process.
The principle of novation cannot be applied to the case at bar.
Milla contends that his issuance of Equitable PCI Check Nos.
188954 and 188955 before the institution of the criminal
complaint against him novated his obligation to MPI, thereby
enabling him to avoid any incipient criminal liability and
converting his obligation into a purely civil one. This
argument does not persuade.
The principles of novation cannot apply to the present case as
to extinguish his criminal liability. Milla cites People v.
Nery23 to support his
contention that his issuance of the Equitable PCI checks prior
to the filing of the criminal complaint averted his incipient
criminal liability. However, it must be clarified that mere
payment of an obligation before the institution of a criminal
complaint does not, on its own, constitute novation that may
prevent criminal liability. This Courts ruling in Nery in fact
warned:
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of
the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal
liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may
only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast
doubt on the true nature of the original petition, whether or
not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a
deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to (cf. Abeto vs.
People, 90 Phil. 581; Villareal, 27 Phil. 481).
Even in Civil Law the acceptance of partial payments, without
further change in the original relation between the
complainant and the accused, can not produce novation. For
the latter to exist, there must be proof of intent to extinguish
the original relationship, and such intent can not be inferred
from the mere acceptance of payments on account of what is
totally due. Much less can it be said that the acceptance of
partial satisfaction can effect the nullification of a criminal
liability that is fully matured, and already in the process of
enforcement. Thus, this Court has ruled that the offended
partys acceptance of a promissory note for all or part of the
amount misapplied does not obliterate the criminal offense
(Camus vs. Court of Appeals, 48 Off. Gaz. 3898). 24 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Further, in Quinto v. People,25 this Court exhaustively
explained the concept of novation in relation to incipient
criminal liability, viz:
Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether
totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the
parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to
be mistaken.
The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a
necessary element of novation which may be effected either
expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly" means that the
contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object
in executing the new contract is to extinguish the old one.
Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an
implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be
an incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is
really no hard and fast rule to determine what might constitute
to be a sufficient change that can bring about novation, the
touchstone for contrariety, however, would be an
irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new
obligations.
There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence
of novation and thereby produce the effect of extinguishing an
obligation by another which substitutes the same. The first is
when novation has been explicitly stated and declared in
unequivocal terms. The second is when the old and the new
obligations are incompatible on every point. The test of
incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can
stand together, each one having its independent existence. If
they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation
novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed
incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely
accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the
essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause
or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would
be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to
extinguish the original obligation.
The changes alluded to by petitioner consists only in the
manner of payment. There was really no substitution of
debtors since private complainant merely acquiesced to the
payment but did not give her consent to enter into a new
contract. The appellate court observed:
xxx xxx xxx
The acceptance by complainant of partial payment tendered
by the buyer, Leonor Camacho, does not evince the intention
of the complainant to have their agreement novated. It was
simply necessitated by the fact that, at that time, Camacho had
substantial accounts payable to complainant, and because of
the fact that appellant made herself scarce to complainant.
(TSN, April 15, 1981, 31-32) Thus, to obviate the situation
where complainant would end up with nothing, she was
forced to receive the tender of Camacho. Moreover, it is to be
noted that the aforesaid payment was for the purchase, not of
the jewelry subject of this case, but of some other jewelry
subject of a previous transaction. (Ibid. June 8, 1981, 10-11)
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa and
penalizes any person who shall defraud another by
"misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property. It is
axiomatic that the gravamen of the offense is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the owner. The terms "convert" and
"misappropriate" have been held to connote "an act of using
or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own or
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed
upon." The phrase, "to misappropriate to ones own use" has
been said to include "not only conversion to ones personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right. Verily, the sale of the pieces of jewelry
on installments (sic) in contravention of the explicit terms of
the authority granted to her in Exhibit "A" (supra) is deemed
to be one of conversion. Thus, neither the theory of "delay in
the fulfillment of commission" nor that of novation posed by
petitioner, can avoid the incipient criminal liability. In People
vs. Nery, this Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not
affected by the subsequent novation of contract, for it is a
public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
State in its own conation. (Emphasis supplied.)26
In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI
checks tendered by Milla could not have novated the original
transaction, as the checks were only intended to secure the
return of the P2 million the former had already given him.
Even then, these checks bounced and were thus unable to
satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa involved here was
not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was
committed through Millas falsification of public documents,
the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere
novation.
The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial courts
finding of guilt.
Finally, Milla assails the factual findings of the trial court.
Suffice it to say that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding
on and accorded great respect by this Court.27
There was no reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals when it affirmed the finding of the trial court that
Milla was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
estafa through falsification of public documents. The
prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements
of the crime charged. The relevant provisions of the Revised
Penal Code read:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of
falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
5,000 shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any other
kind of commercial document
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx
It was proven during trial that Milla misrepresented himself to
have the authority to sell the subject property, and it was
precisely this misrepresentation that prompted MPI to
purchase it.1wphi1 Because of its reliance on his authority
and on the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No.
218777, MPI parted with its money in the amount of P2
million, which has not been returned until now despite Millas
allegation of novation. Clearly, he is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa through falsification of public documents.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY the Petition. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision 1 dated July 28,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268,
finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with
robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, armed with
a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one
unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain,
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money amounting
to P 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian
Allied Services, Inc. represented by Enrique Sumulong; that
on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the
said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Laras plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The
prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique Sumulong
(Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren
Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San
Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b) on May
31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the
amount of P 230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch,
Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San
Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was
accompanied by Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie)
and Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount
withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at
around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City,
Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the
pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera,
iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was seated at the back,
shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding Bautistas advice,
he threw the bag in Bautistas direction; (h) after getting hold
of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i)
seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j)
when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran
towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San
Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to
where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of
the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed
by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken
away from him; (m) when barangay officials and the police
arrived, he and his two (2) other companions were brought to
the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while
on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara
walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig
City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter
arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob
identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastians money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-
Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around 7:55 in
the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police
station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr.
Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went
to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong
identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him for
questioning; (e) at the police station, Lara was placed in a
line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong,
Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was
informed of his rights and subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal
Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) on
May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at
the corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c)
he, together with three (3) other police officers, proceeded to
the crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police
officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to
him eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and six (6) deformed
slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he
interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station;
and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista
at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident. 7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who
resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on
May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench
while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room;
(c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in
the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the
evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins,
police officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara;
(e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police
officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f)
he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car,
one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to
caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you"
(sic); (g) he was brought to the police station and not the
barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated
for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he
was at home when the subject incident took place, the police
challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses
arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to
come back the following day; (j) while he was at the police
line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong
and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his
witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he
will be subjected to an inquest.8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his
neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May
31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara
working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00
in the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa
Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer line the
whole day of May 31, 2001.10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with
homicide in a Decision,11 the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) as amended by
Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said
accused.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC rejected Laras defense of alibi as follows:
The prosecutions witness Enrique Sumulong positively
identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted away
the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on
May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 oclock in the morning along
the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City and the
one who shot Joselito Bautista which caused his instantaneous
death on the same day. As repeatedly held by the Supreme
Court, "For alibi to prosper, an accused must show he was at
some other place for such a period of time that it was
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time
of the commission of the crime" (People versus Bano, 419
SCRA 697). Considering the proximity of the distance
between the place of the incident and the residence of the
accused where he allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31,
2001, it is not physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene within the same barangay. The positive identification of
the accused which were categorical and consistent and
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the
accused whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA
259).13 (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly
attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested without a
warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless
arrest rendered void all proceedings including those that led to
his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by counsel when
the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the
witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of
custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already
attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed
to present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged
acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who
shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The
physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police
was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating
that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator.
Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his
unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took
possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably
claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty.
Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his
witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by
improper motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies
should have been given the credence they deserve. While his
two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not
by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their
credibility.
The CA affirmed Laras conviction. That Lara was supposedly
arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction
considering its belated invocation. Any objections to the
legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a
motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea;
otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was
illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction duly
arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes
culpability:
Appellants avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily
submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of
filing a motion to quash the information for lack of
jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is deemed to
have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant
is estopped from questioning the validity of his arrest since he
never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash
the Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless
arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings
including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and
his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their
culpability.14 (Citations omitted)
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-
up is inadmissible as his right to counsel was violated, the CA
ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a
counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not part of
custodial investigation.
Appellants assertion that he was under custodial investigation
at the time he was identified in a police line-up and therefore
had the right to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our
jurisdiction is the rule that an accused is not entitled to the
assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such
is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception
to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police
attention at the start of the investigation. In the case at bench,
appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution
witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose.
However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated
at all or that a statement or confession was extracted from
him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to appellants hollow cry
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel
given the hard fact that during the police line-up, the
accusatory process had not yet commenced.
Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to
interrogation sans counsel during the police line-up, it does
not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of
violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission
or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of
their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the
testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his alleged
uncounseled confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)
The CA addressed Laras claim that the prosecutions failure
to present a witness who actually saw him commit the crime
charged as follows:
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the
prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that he shot the
victim and took the money.
Such posture is unpersuasive.
Contrary to appellants assertion, prosecution witness
Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim.
Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act was
there any other words spoken by this person?
A There was, sir.
Q What did he say?
A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.
Q Where were you looking when this person approached you?
A I was looking at his face, sir.
Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?
A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.
Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to
him?
A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to
give the money or the bag so I immediately threw away the
bag at the back seat, sir.
Q And how long approximately was that person standing by
your car window?
A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing money
to the back of the vehicle, what did that person do?
A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and
ran away, sir, and I also saw somebody shoot a gun?
Q Who was firing the gun?
A The one who held-up us, sir.
Q By how, do you know his name?
A No, sir.
Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to
recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court
whether indeed the person you saw holding you up at that
time is in court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify
him?
Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first
bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and black pants
who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara (sic).
Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the
vehicle and ran away with it, what did the accused do? (sic)
A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.
Q Around how many shots according to your recollection
were fired?
A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.
x x x x x x"
"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or
happened after you stepped down from the Nissan pick-up,
that is correct?
A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.
Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding
towards that store to call your office by phone, that is correct?
A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.
Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra
when you heard this gunfire?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the
back of the vehicle, that is correct?
A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle, he
followed Joselito Bautista and shot him.
Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this
alleged holdup(p)er followed him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.
Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?
A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.
Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the
gun because he was holding the gun, am I correct?
A Yes, sir."
xxxx
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly
sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and
Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly emerged and
pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding
from him to produce the bag containing the money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim
who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime
six deformed empty shells. 16 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Laras alibi failed to convince.
Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive
identification of the accused, where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and
denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that
he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration
of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers
to the distance between the place where the accused was when
the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as
well as the facility of access between the two places.
Appellant miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility
of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the
perpetration of the felonious act. He himself admitted that his
house was just a stones throw (about three minutes away)
from the crime scene.17(Citations omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted
the appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua and
the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their
supplemental briefs. Both parties waived their right to do so,
stating that they would adopt the allegations in their
respective briefs that they filed with the CA.
Issues
The present review of Laras conviction for robbery with
homicide gives rise to the following issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and
Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara
stood therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Laras supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for
the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his
conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and
d. whether Laras alibi can be given credence so as to
exonerate him from the crime charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I he is not.24
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired
through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or
through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders
to the police or to the court.19 Any objection to the arrest or
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must
be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the
trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in
the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that
may have attended his arrest.20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient
ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived
upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without
error.21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of
a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash
or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule.
II
Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with
counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he
stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel
did not render Sumulongs identification of Lara inadmissible.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise
moment custodial investigation begins and being made to
stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of
custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled
in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12
(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda
rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when
the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation
and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was
settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more
recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted
by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and
cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a
police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police line-up,
the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up.23 (Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the
finding of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial
evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that
only direct and not circumstantial evidence can overcome the
presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even
in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the
established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain,
consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon
the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be
convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free
and denying proper protection to the community.25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances incident took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just
established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly a matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his witnesses failed
indicate Laras guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the
Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the intersection of scene of the crime.
Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all
passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while pointing respects.
the gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger seat, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag containing July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
the money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.
gave it to Bautista who was seated at the back of the pick-up; SO ORDERED.
(d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran
towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista 4. RIGHT TO FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE
and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautistas direction; (f)
Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautistas
G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991
blood was on the crime scene and empty shells were
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
recovered therefrom.
vs.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of
RlCARDO RIO, accused-appellant.
personal property with intent to gain must itself be established
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the
Ray Anthony F. Fajarito for accused-appellant.
physical act of asportation by the accused must be presented
by the prosecution. It must be shown that the original criminal
PADILLA, J.:p
design of the culprit was robbery and the homicide was
Convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the
perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLVI * of Makati, Metro
by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.26 The mere
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 12042, accused-appellant
presence of the accused at the crime scene is not enough to
Ricardo Rio interposed his appeal and as a consequence, the
implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the
clerk of court of said regional trial court branch forwarded the
use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
In this case, Laras intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs
court, however, forwarded the records of the case to the
positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at him
Supreme Court in view of the penalty imposed upon the
and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned
accused.
over to him. That Lara resorted to violence in order to
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in
actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs testimony
two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989, addressed to
that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of Bautista, who
Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant
was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara
Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to
from taking possession of the money.
withdraw the appeal due to his poverty. 1
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the
The Court resolved in a resolution dated 22 June 1990 to
middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of visibility are
require the Solicitor General to comment on the appellant's
favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against
manifestation to withdraw the appeal.
the accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action
malefactor should be normally accepted.27
recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that
accused-appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court,
Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious motives to
whether he desired the appointment of a counselde oficio on
impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge.
appeal, in view of the reasons stated by him for the
Thus, his testimony, which the trial court found to be
withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch as poverty should not
forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit and
preclude anyone from pursuing a cause. It was also
should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to do with
recommended that the clerk of court of the trial court be
the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of
required by the Court to submit the response of the accused-
human nature and against the presumption of good faith that a
appellant along with a certificate of compliance with the duty
prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.28
imposed on him 2 by Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of
IV
Court, which provides:
In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara, the CA
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on
was correct in denying Laras alibi outright. It is well-settled
appeal. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial court
that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is
upon the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case,
inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense,
to ascertain from the appellant, if he is confined in prison,
alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove. 29
whether he desires the Intermediate Appellate Court or the
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not
Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to defend him de
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when
oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a form to be
the offense was committed, but it must likewise be
prepared by the clerk of the appellate court, a certificate of
demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible
compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant
for him to have been physically present at the place of the
to his inquiry.
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
The branch clerk of the trial court, in a letter addressed to the
Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear
Assistant Clerk of Court of the Second Division, this Court, in
and convincing proof.
compliance with the resolution of this Court, dated 16 April
In this case, the proximity of Laras house at the scene of the
1990, adopting the suggestions of the Solicitor General, which
crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true Laras claim
required him to comply with his duty mandated in Section 13,
and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, submitted the reply of the
on the day of the incident, it is possible that his witnesses may
accused-appellant informing the Court that he was no longer
not have noticed him leaving and returning given that the
distance between his house and the place where the subject
interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn
his appeal. 3
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the
Court in a resolution dated 1 October 1990, denied the
appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a
counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant for, as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, all the letters of the
accused-appellant reveal that the only reason offered by him
for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the
services of a counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a
reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice
in any forum. 4
It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this
Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his appeal
pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and
the constitutional mandate provided in Section 11 of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
This constitutional provision imposes a duty on the judicial
branch of the government which can cannot be taken lightly.
"The Constitution", as aptly stated in one case, "is a law for
rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers
with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times
and under all circumstances." 5
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic
privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are the
right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a preliminary
examination. President Mckinley made the first a part of the
Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission by
imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have assistance of
counsel for the defense' ". 6 Today said right is enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is
"perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused
of crime." 7
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant
or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask
him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if
he so desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own." 8
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the
conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even
during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a
counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an
intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where
the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal,
the court is required to inquire into the reason for the
withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal
to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a
counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to
protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with
greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must
have more in law." 9 Justice should never be limited to those
who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor.
Its scales should always be balanced and should never
equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over
another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court
of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty imposed
on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court)
so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if
possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he
has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel
de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said counsel and
the Solicitor General to file their respective briefs, upon
submission of which the case would be deemed submitted for
decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the accused-
appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a verified
complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, duly
subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro
of the province of Rizal, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in the
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her
will. 10
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-appellant,
assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the Makati CLAO office,
as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. 11 The evidence for the prosecution adduced at the
trial established the following facts:
During the months of February and March 1984, complainant
Wilma Phua, then only 13 years of age, was living with her
mother and three (3) sisters in a house in Barangay Bayanan,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. At a distance of
about three (3) meters from this house is another house with a
toilet and bath also owned by complainant's mother but which
was uninhabited at that time. The accused, complainant's
uncle, being the younger brother of complainant's mother, was
staying in their house, free of board and lodging, although he
helped in the household chores. The children used the
bathroom in the uninhabited house because the amenities in
the inhabited house were used only by the adults. 12
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 24 March 1984,
classes having closed for vacation and while Maria Zena Phua
Rio was in the house occupied by her family, her daughter
Wilma (complainant) asked her for the key to the comfort
room of the uninhabited house because she had to answer a
call of nature. After having delivered the key to Wilma, the
latter proceeded to the other house, entered the comfort room,
and seeing that nobody was around and that her uncle was
washing dishes in their house, proceeded to answer nature's
call without taking the precaution of locking the comfort
room from inside. 13
After relieving herself but before she could raise her panty,
the accused entered the bathroom with his body already
exposed, held Wilma's hands, and ordered her in a loud voice
to lie down and when she resisted, the accused got mad and
ordered her to lie down. After she lay down on her back, the
accused put himself on top of her and tried to insert his
private organ into her private part. Wilma kept pushing the
accused away and calling for her mother; however, since the
accused was heavier than she, the accused succeeded in
overpowering her, inserting his penis into her vagina and
having sexual intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust,
the accused released Wilma and allowed her to leave the
bathroom. 14
Outside the bathroom door, complainant met her mother
Maria Zena who, meanwhile, had proceeded to the said other
house after sensing that an inordinate length of time had
passed and her daughter, complainant herein, had not returned
from the bathroom. Maria Zena, upon noticing that Wilma
was speechless, trembling and looking fearful, suspected
something remiss so she tried to open the door of the
bathroom. Unable to open it the first time because it was
locked from inside, Maria Zena waited a few minutes before
pushing the door again. This time she was successful in
finding her brother, the herein accused-appellant in the
process of raising his pants. Maria Zena was ignored by her
brother when she asked him the reason for his presence inside
the bathroom. 15
Still suspecting that the accused has done something to her
daughter, Maria Zena continued her inquisition of her brother
for several days but to no avail. Finally, on 9 April 1984, the
accused was asked to leave the house and move out by his
sister Maria Zena. 16
Only after the departure of the accused did Wilma report to
her mother the fact that she had been raped by the accused
four (4) times between the months of February and March of
that year (1984). After receiving such information, Maria
Zena wanted her daughter to immediately undergo physical
examination; however, Wilma, apparently traumatized by her
experience, was too weak to go with her for such examination
and frequently suffered from fainting spells. It was only on 30
April 1984 that Maria Zena was able to bring Wilma to the
police to report the matter and to file the complaint. After the
report to the police, they were referred to the P.C. Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame where Wilma underwent physical
examination. 17
Dr. Dario Gajardo, the physician who conducted the internal
examination of Wilma, submitted a report of his examination
dated 6 May 1984. The medical report showed, among others,
the following findings:
There is a scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full,
convex and gaping which pale brown, slightly hypertrophied
labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is
disclosed an elastic, fleshly-type hymen with deep lacerations
at 3, 8 and 9 o'clock. ... 18
The medical report also showed that "there was (sic) no
external signs of recent application of any form of
trauma." 19 All these findings led him to conclude that Wilma
is "in a non-virgin state physicially." 20 Later, on the witness
stand, Dr. Gajardo would further testify that Wilma, on
inquiry, revealed that the first rape happened in the month of
February 1984, but that he could not tell the approximate
period or age of the lacerations. 21
Armed with this medical report, Maria Zena and Wilma went
back to the police where a sworn statement of Wilma was
taken and the complaint for rape against the accused was filed
before Third Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro on 12
May 1984. 22
The evidence for the defense consisted of the testimony of the
accused himself and his brother, Amado Rio. The accused's
defense was anchored on alibi and he substantially testified as
follows: that contrary to the statements made by the witnesses
for the prosecution, he was not asked to leave their house in
April 1984, the truth being that he left in the month of January
1984 or about a month before the alleged first rape on Wilma
was committed because, contrary to an alleged employment
agreement between brother and sister, his sister, Maria Zena,
had not paid him any salary as helper in their house; that from
the month of January 1984, up to 24 March 1984 when the
rape charged in the complaint was allegedly committed, he
was in their hometown in Kambalo, Cahidiocan, province of
Romblon; that at the time of his arrest, he was informed of the
criminal charge of rape on his niece filed against him in court;
that from January 1984 up to the time of his arrest on 6 May
1984, he had stayed in the house of his uncle, Francisco Rio,
and had never left the place during the whole period.
The accused vehemently denied the rape and conjectured that
his sister could have fabricated the charge because he left her
house due to her non-payment of his salary as helper. The
brother of the accused in the person of Amado Rio
corroborated the defense of alibi of the accused. 23
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Nemesia B. Merca, the
Election Registrar of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, who
brought with her a Voter's Affidavit which was executed on 31
March 1984 by one Ricardo Rio and was subscribed and
sworn to on 31 March 1984 before Tessie Balbas, Chairman
of Voting Center No. 37-A of Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. On cross-examination, Registrar Merca admitted that
she does not know the accused personally but that the xerox
copy of the Voter's Affidavit that she brought to court was
copied from a book containing about 60 voter's affidavits of
said precinct. 24
After comparing the signature appealing in the Voter's
Affidavit with the penmanship appearing on a letter 25 dated
12 December 1985 written by the accused to his brother,
Amado Rio and on the envelope of said letter, 26 the trial court
ruled that the writing characteristics on the presented
documents are the same, especially the rounded dot over the
letter "i" appearing in the afore-mentioned mentioned
documents. It was, therefore, satisfied that the Voter's
Affidavit was indeed prepared by the accused in Bayanan,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, on 31 March 1984, before Tessie
Balbas and that this piece of evidence completely belies the
defense of the accused as corroborated by his brother, Amado,
that he was in Romblon continuously from the month of
January 1984 up to the time that he was arrested on 6 May
1984. 27
Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the above-named accused guilty of
the crime charged in the information beyond reasonable doubt
the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to
indemnify Wilma Phua in the sum of P15,000.00, Philippine
currency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded
on alibi. The accused claimed that at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. This
claim was corroborated by the accused's brother, Amado Rio.
However, this claim was, as aforestated, rebutted by the
prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit executed by
the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31 March 1984
when appellant claimed he was in Romblon.
Upon careful examination of the voter's affidavit, the Court is
convinced, as the trial court, that the affidavit was indeed
executed by the accused himself and the date appearing
therein must be presumed correct and genuine.
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication
especially between parents and children, husband and wife,
and other relatives and even among those not related to each
other. For such defense to prosper, the accused must prove
that it was not possible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. 28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi except
the testimony of a relative, in this case the accused's brother
Amado, it deserves but scant consideration. 29 Moreover, the
Court notes the fact that while the accused-appellant had
another brother and sister living in Manila besides the
complainant's mother, those two never came to his aid. Were
the accused the innocent man he claims to be, these siblings
would have readily helped in his defense. The testimony of
his other brother Amado alone cannot raise the necessary
doubt to acquit him as against the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female,
especially a twelve-year old child, would undergo the
expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, not to
mention suffer the scandal, embarrassment and humiliation
such action inevitably invites, as wen as allow an examination
of her private parts if her motive were not to bring to justice
the person who had abused her. A victim of rape will not
come out in the open if her motive were not to obtain
justice. 30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of twelve
will abuse her child and make her undergo the trauma of a
public trial only to punish someone, let alone a brother, for
leaving her without the services of an unpaid helper were it
not with the aim to seek justice for her child. Nobody in his
right mind could possibly wish to stamp his child falsely with
the stigma that follows a rape.
On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of
the defense. The new theory presented by counsel de oficio is
that Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant had
sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. It was stressed
by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984
and that, allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had abused
complainant. This allegation as well as the fact that
complainant failed to lock the door to the bathroom could
only have been due to the fact that there was consent. The
charge was filed, according to defense counsel de oficio, only
because the complainant's mother caught them. 31
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been
consent from the complainant, fails to generate doubt as to the
accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous situation indeed
to believe that one, so young and as yet uninitiated to the
ways of the world, would permit the occurrence of an
incestuous relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very
own mother.
The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense
from one of total denial of the incident in question, by way of
alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the alleged consent
of the complainant. This new version could only be attributed
by the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different
from the counsel in the trial court. Although the Solicitor
General has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as
an afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get
himself acquitted, 32 the Court deems it more likely that this
shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the
appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the
case. If the appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal, had
read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly, he
would not have changed the theory of the defense for such a
shift can never speak well of the credibility of the defense.
Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which applies equally in
criminal cases, is that a party may not shift his theory on
appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more conscientious,
he would have known that the sudden shift would be violative
of aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to the
cause of the accused-appellant (his client).
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more
conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients' causes,
whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest
requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in
the prosecution or defense of his client's cause." 33 Lawyers
are an indispensable part of the whole system of
administering justice in this jurisdiction. 34 And a lawyer who
performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is so because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar
and to the public. 35
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, 36 he is
expected to take such reasonable precaution in the discharge
of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance as
will not make him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a
transgressor of its precepts. 37
The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the
circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither
diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility
owed to his client. 38 The ethics of the profession require that
counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty
irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. 39 Any
attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation
distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar. 40
Returning to the case at bar, even if we consider the sudden
shift of defense theory as warranted (which we do not), the
Court is just as convinced, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime as charged. His
conviction must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the
accused-appellant Ricardo Rio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties of the
law, is hereby AFFIRMED. The Court, however, increases the
amount of indemnity to be paid by the accused-appellant to
Wilma Phua to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in line with
prevailing jurisprudence on this matter. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132852 May 31, 2000
TEOFILO MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, erroneously
filed as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But
this procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we have decided to
give it due course to resolve the question whether the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to appeal as a pauper litigant. 1
The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in Crim.
Case No. 5753 before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan
City.2 During the hearing on 23 June 1994 petitioner
represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorney's
Office of Butuan City objected to petitioner's motion to be
allowed to litigate as pauper and moved instead to strike out
the entire testimony of the first witness for the prosecution on
the ground that it was inadmissible for being violative of the
testimonial privilege afforded to children in cases involving
their parents. The Presiding Judge 3 deferred his ruling on the
objection and allowed the testimony to be continued. 4 On 21
July 1994 the trial court issued an order overruling the
objection. On 8 August 1994 the court denied the motion for
reconsideration.5 This prompted petitioner to go to the Court
of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari alleging that the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders. 6
On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto
supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and by
two (2) ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to
petitioner's eligibility to avail himself of this privilege. 7 The
appellate court subsequently issued its resolution dated 21
March 1997 denying the motion and directing petitioner to
remit the docketing fees in the total amount of P420.00 within
five (5) days from notice. 8 On 7 April 1997 petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying his motion
to litigate as a pauper, but this was similarly denied in the
resolution of 8 October 1997.9Petitioner then filed
a Manifestation on 28 October 1997 wherein he stated
through counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees
required of his client "under protest" and that the money
remitted was advanced by his counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez
himself. 10 The transmittal of the amount was evidenced by
two (2) postal money orders attached to the Motion to Litigate
as Pauper. 11
In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition, citing petitioner's failure to
pay the required docket
fee. 12 Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his
compliance with the docket fee requirement as alleged in
his Manifestation adverted to above. 1 However, the Court of
Appeals in the second assailed Resolution of 21 January 1998
denied this latest motion on the ground that, per verification
by the Judicial Records Division, the amount remitted by
petitioner as docket fee was short of 150.00. 14
The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether a
motion to litigate as pauper can be entertained by an appellate
court. When petitioner filed on 23 August 1994 his original
motion to appeal as pauper before the appellate court the
applicable rule was the second paragraph of Sec. 16, Rule 41,
of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which provides
Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper Where a party desiring to
appeal shall establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that
he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting
the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason
of the amount involved, or the nature of the question raised,
that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court, the trial
judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as
pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the
entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial
and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the
appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without
printing the same.
A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be
entertained by the appellate court.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, the Court had uniformly frowned upon appellate courts
entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper, holding that the
question of whether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify
him to litigate as pauper is a question of fact which is best
determined by the trial court. The trial court is the court which
may properly decide or pass upon the question of fact which
may require presentation of evidence whether the appellant is
an indigent and may appeal as such, and whether the case is
of such importance that, by reason not only of the amount
involved but of the nature of the question raised in the court
below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court. 15
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect on 1
July 1997 the provision abovequoted was not reenacted.
Section 21 of Rule 3, as now worded, outlines the procedure
for, as well as the effects of, the grant of a motion to litigate as
pauper
Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to
litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court,
upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the
party is one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself
and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of
docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished
him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which
the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent,
unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at
any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the
court should determine after hearing that the party declared as
an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not
made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue
or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose.
On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the
evidentiary requirements for the exemption of pauper litigants
from payment of legal fees
Sec. 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.
Pauper-litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their
immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00)
pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila,
and (b) who do not own real property with an assessed value
of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be
exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the
case favorably to the pauper-litigant, unless the court
otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant
shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do
not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do they own
any real property with the assessed value aforementioned,
supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to
the truth of the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person
shall be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading of that
party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may
have been incurred.
It cannot be inferred from any of the aforementioned
provisions that the restrictive policy enunciated by Sec. 16,
Rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court was carried over
to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nowhere can we find a
provision to the effect that "(a) petition to be allowed to
appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate
court."
We resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner
retrospectively. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to
that extent procedural laws are retroactive. 16 We therefore
hold that a motion to litigate as an indigent can be made even
before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of
appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions.
We believe that this interpretation of the present rules is more
in keeping with our Bill of Rights, which decrees that, "(f)ree
access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty." 17 Our espousal of the democratization of appellate
remedies is shared by the United States Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which
would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial
court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate
appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to
pay the costs in advance . . . . Such a denial is a misfit in a
country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law.
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has. 18
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has complied
with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion
to appear in court as a pauper. He has executed an affidavit
attesting to the fact that he and his immediate family do not
earn a gross income of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that
their only real property, a hut, cannot be worth more than
P10,000.00. 19 He has also submitted a joint affidavit executed
by Florencia L. Ongtico and Helen Maur, both residents of
Butuan City, who generally attested to the same allegations
contained in petitioner's own affidavit. 20 Based on this
evidence, the Court finds that petitioner is qualified to litigate
as an indigent.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 10 November 1997 dismissing the petition
for certiorari of petitioner Teofilo Martinez and its Resolution
dated 21 January 1998 denying reconsideration are SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for appropriate action
to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow
petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the amount
of P420.00 representing the docket fees he paid.
SO ORDERED.
5. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF NATURE AND
CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus
AGRIPINO GUEVARRA y MULINGTAPANG
alias BOY DUNGGOL,
Accused- Appellant.
x------------------------------------------
- - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02367, dated 16 October 2007,[1] affirming
with modification the Decision, dated 4 July 2006, of
the Batangas City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch IV, in
Criminal Case No. 12486, [2] finding accused-
appellant Agripino Guevarra yMulingtapang, alias
Boy Dunggol, guilty of murder, and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The facts gathered from the records of the case are as follows:
On 30 August 2002, an Information [3] was filed with the RTC
charging appellant with murder. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:
That on or about August 24, 2002 at around 9:15 oclock in the
evening
at Ebora Road, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a caliber .
45 pistol, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
repeatedly shot with said firearm suddenly and without
warning one P/Chief Inspector Marcos Barte y Paz while the
latter was unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby
hitting him on different parts of his body which directly
caused the victims death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm is attendant in the commission of the
offense.
When arraigned on 12 November 2002, appellant, assisted by
his counsel de oficio, pleaded Not guilty to the charge. [4] Trial
on the merits thereafter followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Anacleto Gonzales
(Anacleto), Maria Antonette Gonzales (Antonette), Senior
Police Officer 1 FelixbertoCabungcal (SPO1 Cabungcal),
SPO1 Florentino Buenafe (SPO1 Buenafe), Dr. Edwin
Castillo (Dr. Castillo), Dr. Antonio S. Vertido (Dr. Vertido),
and MaritaGonzales Vda. de Barte (Mrs. Barte). Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
Anacleto, cousin of herein deceased victim Police Chief
Inspector Marcos P. Barte (Inspector Barte) of
the Batangas City Police Station, testified that on24 August
2002, at around 3:30 p.m., Inspector Barte, accompanied by a
certain Roberto Godoy (Godoy) and
Ronnie Valiente (Valiente), arrived at his house located
at Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. He,
Inspector Barte, Godoy, Valiente, and Anacletos father-in-
law, Nicasio Resurreccion (Nicasio), talked and drank gin
inside the house. Subsequently, the group, with the exception
of Godoy, left the house and went to a videoke bar owned by
a certain Sergeant Emilio Vidal (Sgt. Vidal) located
at Ebora Road, Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. Th
ey arrived at the videoke bar at about 8:30 p.m. He drank one
bottle of beer while Inspector Barte consumed two bottles of
beer. Thereafter, at about 9:15 p.m., the group went out of
the videoke bar. He saw his wife,Antonette, outside
the videoke bar. Antonette approached and talked to him. He
also saw Godoy seated in the drivers seat of an owner-type
jeep parked near thevideoke bar, and a certain Imelda Shin
(Imelda) sitting at the back portion of the
jeep. Valiente boarded the jeep and sat beside
Imelda. Inspector Barte also boarded the jeep and sat in the
front passengers seat beside Godoy. When Anacleto was
about to board the jeep, appellant suddenly appeared and
approached Inspector Barte. Appellant asked
Inspector Barte if he was Major Barte. Thereupon, he saw
appellant shoot Inspector Barte several times with a short
firearm. He was then one arms length from
Inspector Barte and one meter away from appellant.
Inspector Barte slumped on his seat bloodied
while Godoy shouted that he was also hit. Appellant
immediately fled the scene.[5]
Subsequently, Anacleto drove the jeep and brought
Inspector Barte to
the Batangas Regional Hospital. Inspector Barte was
pronounced dead on arrival.Godoy was also brought to the
said hospital for treatment of his wounds. Later, the police
arrived at the hospital and interviewed him about the
incident. He executed a sworn statement regarding the
incident.[6]
Antonette narrated that on 24 August 2002, at about 8:40
p.m., she, together with Godoy and Imelda, went to
a videoke bar owned by Sgt. Vidal
at EboraRoad, Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, to
fetch her husband, Anacleto. She and Imelda boarded an
owner-type jeep driven by Godoy in going to
thevideoke bar. Upon arriving thereat, she proceeded to
the videoke bar, peeped in its window, and saw Anacleto,
Inspector Barte, her father, and Valiente therein.She signaled
to Anacleto that she would wait for them on the jeep outside
the videoke bar. Afterwards, Anacleto,
Inspector Barte, Nicasio, and Valiente went out of
the videoke bar. Nicasio boarded a tricycle and proceeded
home while Valiente and Inspector Barte boarded the
jeep. Valiente sat beside Imelda at the backseat of the jeep
while Inspector Barte sat beside the drivers seat then occupied
by Godoy. When Anacleto was about to board the jeep, she
heard a gunshot. Upon turning her head towards the direction
of the gunshot, she saw appellant shoot Inspector Barte with a
short firearm. Thereafter, she heard Godoy shouting that
Inspector Barte was shot and told her to call the police. She
immediately proceeded to a nearby drug store where she used
a telephone in contacting the police.She saw Anacleto driving
the jeep with Inspector Barte on board. Later, she proceeded
to the Batangas Regional Hospital where she saw the lifeless
body of Inspector Barte in a stretcher. She also saw
therein Godoy being treated for wounds.[7]
SPO2 Cabungcal, a member of the Batangas City Police
Station, Intelligence Division, testified that he was on duty at
the said station on the night of 24 August 2002. On that same
night, the station received a report about a shooting incident
at Ebora Road, Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. H
e and several police officers immediately proceeded to the
crime scene. Upon arriving thereat, they searched the crime
scene and recovered four caliber .45 empty shells, one live
caliber .45 ammunition and one deformed caliber .45
slug. Thereafter, they went to
the Batangas Regional Hospital where they were informed
that Inspector Barte was already dead. He turned over to
SPO1 Buenafe, the investigator of the case, the evidence they
recovered from the crime scene.[8]
SPO1 Buenafe, a member of the Batangas City Police
Station, Investigation Section, averred that he conducted an
investigation in the instant case; that after the incident, he
went to the Batangas Regional Hospital where he was
informed that Inspector Barte was already dead
and Godoy was injured; and that SPO1 Cabungcal turned over
to him object evidence recovered from the crime scene. [9]
Dr. Castillo, a surgeon assigned at
the Batangas Regional Hospital, recounted that he attended to
Inspector Barte when the latter was brought to the hospital on
the night of 24 August 2002. During the initial examination,
he observed that Inspector Barte sustained gunshot wounds
and had no blood pressure, cardiac and respiratory rate. He
and some medical staff tried to resuscitate Inspector Barte but
to no avail. The gunshot wounds were located on the left
temporal area, left anterior chest, right nipple, and left arm of
Inspector Barte. He considered the gunshot wounds in the left
temporal area and left anterior chest of
Inspector Barte fatal. He issued a medico-legal certificate
pertaining to Inspector Barte and an anatomical chart showing
the location of gunshot wounds sustained by Inspector Barte.
[10]
His findings, as stated in the medico-legal certificate of
Inspector Barte, are as follows:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Marcos P. Barte, 46 years of age,
male, Filipino of Soro-soro 2, Batangas City, at about 9:30
p.m., August 24, 2002 with the following injuries sustained
by him:
Multiple gunshot wounds anterior chest left, Right nipple left
temporal area, left arm
NOTE: DEAD ON ARRIVAL.[11]
Dr. Vertido, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Southern Tagalog, Region 4, declared
that he conducted an autopsy on the corpse of Inspector Barte;
that Inspector Barte sustained three gunshot wounds; that the
first gunshot wound was located on the left portion of the
head which fractured the skull; that the second gunshot
wound was situated on the right portion of the chest which
perforated the heart and the upper lobe of the left lung exiting
at the left side of the back; that the third wound was on the
left portion of the chest which penetrated the upper lobe of the
left lung and exited at the posterior side of the left arm; and
that these wounds caused the death of Inspector Barte.[12] He
issued a Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination on
InspectorBarte in support of his foregoing findings, viz:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, lips and nailbed.
Contusion; anterior chest wall, midline, 2 x 3 cm.
GUNSHOT WOUNDS:
1. ENTRANCE 1.3 x 1.0 cm. ovaloid, edges inverted, with a
contusion collar widest at its upper border, surrounded by an
area of tattoing, 8 x 6 cms. at the left temple 6 cms.infront and
5 cms. above the left external auditory meatus, directed
backwards, downwards and medially, involving the skin and
underlying soft tissue, fracturing left temporal bone,
lacerating corresponding lobe, fracturing and penetrating
left midcranial fossa, into the soft tissue of the left posterior
neck, 12 cms, below and 10 cm behind the left external
auditory meatus where a semideformed slug was recovered.
2. ENTRANCE 1.3 x. 1.0 cm. ovaloid, edges inverted, with a
contusion collar widest at its lower border located at the right
anterior chest wall, 10 cms. from the anterior median line,
125 cms. above the right heel, directed, backward, upward
and from right to left involving the skin and underlying soft
tissue perforating the heart, and upper lobe of the left lung,
then making an EXIT wound, 1.0 x 1.1. cm., ovaloid,
edges everted, located at the back left side, (scapular area) 20
cm. from the posterior median line, 137 cm. above the left
heel.
3. ENTRANCE 1.2 x 1.0 cm. ovaloid, edges inverted with a
contusion collar widest at its lower border, located at the left
anterior chest wall, 2 cm. from the anterior median line 131
cm. above the left heel, directed backward, upward and
laterally, involving the skin and underlying soft tissues,
perforating upper lobe of the left lung then making an EXIT
wound, 1 x 1.1 cm. ovaloid, edges everted located at the left
arm, posterior aspect, upper 3rd 28 cms. above the left elbow.
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUNDS, HEAD AND
CHEST.[13]

Mrs. Barte, wife of Inspector Barte, testified on the civil
aspect of the case. She presented a list of expenses incurred
for the wake and burial of InspectorBarte which amounted
to P183,425.00. She also submitted official receipts pertaining
to the funeral expenses (P46,250.00), burial lot (P53,000.00),
and interment fee (P10,000.00). She claimed that at the time
of Inspector Bartes death, the latter was receiving a monthly
income of P30,982.00.[14]
The prosecution also adduced documentary and object
evidence to buttress the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit:
(1) sworn statement of Mrs. Barte(Exhibit A);[15] (2) sworn
statement of Anacleto (Exhibit B);[16] (3) sworn statement
of Antonette (Exhibit C);[17] (4) sworn statement of
SPO1 Buenafe(Exhibit D);[18] (5) death certificate of
Inspector Barte (Exhibit E);[19] (6) certification from the PNP,
Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, QuezonCity,
that appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of
any kind and caliber (Exhibit F); [20] (7) four empty bullet
shells, one deformed slug and one live ammunition (Exhibit
G);[21] (8) list of wake and burial expenses (Exhibit H); [22] (9)
official receipt covering the funeral expenses (Exhibit I);
[23]
(10) official receipt for the burial lot (Exhibit J); [24] (11)
anatomical chart showing the location of gunshot wounds
sustained by Inspector Barte (Exhibit K);[25] (12) medico-legal
certificate of Inspector Barte signed by Dr. Castillo (Exhibit
L);[26] (13) pay slip of Inspector Barte for August 2002
(Exhibit M);[27] (14) list of expenses incurred for the food
served during the wake and burial of Inspector Barte (Exhibit
N);[28] (15) request for autopsy of Inspector Barte signed by
Mrs.Barte (Exhibit O);[29] (16) certificate of identification
signed by Dr. Vertido (Exhibit P);[30] (17) certificate of post-
mortem examination on Inspector Barte(Exhibit Q);[31] (18)
autopsy report on Inspector Barte signed by
Dr. Vertido (Exhibit R);[32] and (19) anatomical sketch of the
location of the gunshot wounds sustained by
Inspector Barte prepared by Dr. Vertido.[33]
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant
and Ferdinand Ravino (Ravino) to refute the foregoing
accusation. No documentary evidence was
presented. Appellant denied any liability and interposed the
defense of alibi.
Appellant testified that at the time of the incident (9:15 p.m.,
24 August 2002), he was at Barangay Malad, Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro vacationing at the house of a certain Hector
Africa (Africa). He arrived therein on the afternoon of 23
August 2002 and left on the morning of 26 August 2002. He
was not acquainted with Inspector Barte and came to know
that he was accused of killing Inspector Barte when he arrived
at Batangas City from Oriental Mindoro on the afternoon
of 26 August 2002. He was informed that he would be
salvaged for killing Inspector Barte. Hence, he became afraid
and hid in his house for two weeks. Thereafter, he surrendered
to the mayor of Batangas City who turned him over to
the Batangas City police. He alleged
that Anacleto and Antonettetestified against him because he
did not support the candidacy of Antonette during the
previous election for barangay captain
where Antonette lost. He supported then the candidacy of the
incumbent barangay captain.[34]
Ravino narrated that he has known appellant since 1991
because they were co-workers in Toyota
Motors, Batangas City. On 24 August 2002, at around12:00 in
the afternoon, Africa came to his auto mechanic shop
in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and talked to
him. Africa requested him to go to his house
atBarangay Malad, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, to
fix Africas car and thereafter to drink liquor with
him. Subsequently, he went to Africas house arriving therein
at 5:30 p.m. of the same day. He saw Africa, appellant and
one helper of Africa inside the house. Africa told him that
appellant was taking a vacation at his house. After
fixing Africas car, he, Africa and appellant had a drinking
spree until 11:00 p.m. of the same day. Thereupon, he
left Africas house. Later, he and appellant met at the city jail
of Batangas City. He was detained for a criminal charge while
appellant was detained on the charge of killing
Inspector Barte.During their detention, appellant requested
him to testify in his favor to which he acceded. He was still a
detainee at the time he testified in the RTC as regards the
instant case.[35]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 4 July
2006 convicting appellant of murder.[36] Appellant was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay
the heirs of Inspector Barte the amounts of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P109,250.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, P4,212,312.72 for loss of earning capacity, and cost
of suit. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
In view of all the foregoing and upon evidence established by
the Prosecution,
accused Agripino Guevarra y Mulingtapang alias
Boy Dunggol is hereby found Guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of committing the crime of Murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. The proper penalty would have been death by lethal
injection but with the repeal of the death penalty pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346 which was recently signed into law by
the President onJune 22, 2006, imposition thereof is no longer
possible. Consequently, herein accused is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
costs. Further, he shall pay the private offended
party P50,000.00 for the death of Major Barte as
compensatory damages; P109,250.00 as actual damages
sustained which were reflected in the official receipts
submitted in evidence; P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P4,212,312.72 loss of earnings computed on the
basis of the pay slip of Major Barte for the month of August,
2002 showing that at the time of his death his full
compensation amounted to P30,982.00.
The accused maybe credited with his preventive
imprisonment if he is entitled to any and directed to be
immediately committed to the National Penitentiary
in MuntinlupaCity.[37]
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 16 October
2007, the appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming
with modification the RTC Decision.[38] It held that an
additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
should also imposed on appellant because the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the killing of
Inspector Barte. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 4,
2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City,
Branch IV, is hereby AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATION that exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 should also be awarded.[39]
Appellant elevated the instant case before us assigning a
single error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[40]
Appellant maintains in his lone assigned error that his
testimony and that of his corroborating witness, Ravino, were
more credible than the testimonies ofAnacleto and Antonette;
that his denial and alibi were meritorious; and that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in his favor.
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the
witnesses, this Court is guided by the following well-settled
principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the
findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the
result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even
finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor
when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness
who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a
credible witness.[41]
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying
the foregoing guidelines to this case, we found no cogent
reason to overturn the RTCs ruling finding the testimonies
of Anacleto and Antonette credible. As an eyewitness to the
incident, Anacleto positively identified appellant as the one
who shot Inspector Barte with a short firearm. He was merely
one arms length from Inspector Barte and one meter away
from appellant during the incident. In addition, the crime
scene was well-lighted by a nearby lamp post and lights
coming from the videoke bar which enabled him to recognize
appellant. Further, he was familiar with the face of appellant
because the latter was his barriomate. Anacletos direct
account of how appellant shot Inspector Barte is candid and
convincing, thus:
Q: Now, while you were outside the [videoke] restaurant at
around 9:15 in the evening of August 24, 2002, do you
remember any untoward incident that happened thereat?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that particular incident?
A: The shooting of Major Barte (Inspector Barte), sir.
Q: Who shot Major Barte?
A: Agripino Guevarra y Mulingtapang alias Boy Dunggol.
Q: How did it happen that accused was there at that time and
said place?
A: I did not notice where he came from, he suddenly
appeared.
Q: After he suddenly appeared, what did the accused do?
A: He approached Major Barte and asked are you
Major Barte? and afterwards he fired shots at Major Barte.
Q: Was Major Barte able to answer that question of the
accused to him?
A: No maam.
Q: What happened to Major Barte after having (sic) shot by
the accused?
A: I saw him slumped on his seat on the car, bloodied.
Q: How far were you from Major Barte at that time?
A: About one arm[s] length, maam.
xxxx
Q: Now, you said Agripino Guevarra is the one who shot to
death Major Barte, if he is in Court this morning, would you
be able to identify him?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Would you please point to him?
A: (Note: Witness is pointing to the man wearing a yellow
shirt seated in the front row of the Courtroom who answers by
the name of Agripino Guevarra when he was asked by the
Court). [42]
xxxx
Q: You stated that while you were talking with
Major Barte when the latter was sitted (sic) in the front seat,
the accused suddenly appeared?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did he suddenly appear, from your right or left?
A: From my right side, sir.
Q: Where was he at that time in relation to the jeep?
A: On the right side of the jeep, sir.
Q: You are also on the right side of the jeep?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You are also 1 meters from the jeep?
A: No sir.
Q: How far were you from the jeep?
A: More or less one (1) arm length, sir.
Q: How far was the accused in this case when you first saw
him?
A: We were both on the same distance from the jeep, sir.
Q: After you saw the accused suddenly appeared on your right
side you also saw him put up his gun?
A: No sir.
Court:
Q: How about you, how far are you from the accused when
you first saw him?
A: Almost one (1) meter, sir.[43]
xxxx
Q: You stated last time that when the accused asked if he is
Major Barte the accused immediately shot Major Barte, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You also stated that the accused shot him five (5) times?
A: No, sir.
Q: How many times did the accused shoot Major Barte?
A: I heard four (4) shots, sir.
Q: When you say you heard four (4) shots you mean to say
you did not see him fired (sic) his gun?
A: I saw it, sir.[44]
Antonettes testimony, corroborating the foregoing testimony
of Anacleto, was also clear and reliable. Being an eyewitness
to the incident, she pointed to appellant as the one who shot
Inspector Barte. Her narration of the incident is truthful, to
wit:
Q: After Major Barte occupied the front seat at the right [side]
of the driver and your husband was about to board the jeep,
what happened next, if any?
A: I heard that gunshot, maam.
Q: Upon hearing that gunshot, what did you do?
A: I turned my head where the gunshot came from, maam.
Q: And what did you find out?
A: I saw a man shooting a man riding at the right side of the
vehicle, maam.
Q: Who was being shot by that person?
A: Major Barte, maam.
Q: Did you recognize who [shot] Major Barte?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Who is that person?
A: Mr. Agripino Guevarra, maam.
xxxx
Q: You said that you saw Agripino Guevarra shooting
Major Barte, do you know this Agripino Guevarra?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Even before this date?
A: Yes, maam. Being a native of this barangay and I have
been a barangay councilwoman and he became also
a barangay tanod.
Q: If he [is] present in Court this afternoon, would you able to
identify him?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Would you please point to him?
A: (Witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow shirt who
answers by the name of Agripino Guevarra when he was
asked by the Court). [45]
Further, the foregoing testimonies are consistent with
documentary and object evidence submitted by the
prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the
testimonies of Anacleto and Antonette to be clear and
credible.
Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-
serving. Corollarily, alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it
is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. [46] Denial and alibi
must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence otherwise they cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.[47] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the
accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime
was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [48]
Appellant testified that he was vacationing in Africas house
at Barangay Malad, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro at the
time (9:15 p.m.) and date (24 August 2002) of the
incident. Ravino claimed that, upon arriving at Africas house
in Calapan Oriental, Mindoro at about 5:30 p.m. of the day of
the incident, he saw appellant there. Ravino then proceeded to
fix Africas car. After fixing Africas car, he, Africa and
appellant had a drinking spree until 11:00 p.m. of the same
day. Be that as it may, Ravino neither categorically stated nor
confirmed that appellant was present in Africas house from
the time he was fixing Africas car at past 5:30 p.m. up to the
time he was done with it which was before 11:00 p.m. As
mentioned earlier, Ravino merely claimed that he saw
appellant in Africas house at about 5:30 p.m. and after
fixing Africas car, he, Africa and appellant had a drinking
spree until 11:00 p.m. Thus, it was highly possible that
sinceRavinos sight was directed or focused on Africas car as
he was fixing it, he did not notice appellants departure from
Africas house at past 5:30 p.m. Appellant then proceeded to
the videoke bar of Sgt. Vidal
in Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, where he killed
Inspector Barte at around 9:15 p.m. It was also probable
that Ravino did not notice appellants subsequent arrival
in Africas house, which was before 11:00 p.m., from the
crime scene because he was still busy fixing Africas car. The
foregoing view is bolstered by appellants admission that it
would only take him 45 minutes to reach Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro from the Batangas pier via a Supercat boat.
[49]
There was, therefore, a great possibility that appellant was
present at the scene of the crime when it was committed at
about 9:15 p.m. of 24 August 2002. Thus, the defense failed
to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to be
at or near the crime scene when the incident
occurred. Besides, we have held that an alibi becomes less
plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by
relatives or friends of the accused.[50]
We agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the special
aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm
attended the killing of Inspector Barte.
It is settled that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the information and proven during the trial before
they can be appreciated.[51]
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim
might make.[52] The essence of treachery is a deliberate and
sudden attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared
to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of
the attack. Two essential elements are required in order that
treachery can be appreciated: (1) The employment of means,
methods or manner of execution that would ensure the
offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the
offended party who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense
or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means,
methods or manner of execution.[53]
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information
and all its elements were duly established by the prosecution.
Inspector Barte was sitting inside the jeep when appellant
suddenly appeared and approached him. Appellant asked
Inspector Barte if he was Major Barte.However, before
Inspector Barte could respond or utter a word, appellant
quickly shot him several times in the head and chest with a
caliber .45 pistol. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the
appellants attack rendered Inspector Barte defenseless and
without means of escape. There is no doubt that appellants use
of a caliber .45 pistol, as well as his act of waiting for
Inspector Barte to be seated first in the jeep before
approaching him and of shooting Inspector Barte several
times on the head and chest, was adopted by him to prevent
Inspector Barte from retaliating or escaping. Considering that
Inspector Barte was tipsy or drunk and he was seated inside
the jeep where the space is narrow, there was absolutely no
way for him to defend himself or escape.
Pertinent provision of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294,[54] states that if homicide
or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Appellants use of an unlicensed
firearm in killing Inspector Barte was alleged in the
information as a special aggravating circumstance. Such
circumstance was also duly proven by the prosecution during
the trial. The prosecution presented a certification from the
PNP Firearms and Explosives Division which attests that
appellant was not a licensed/registered firearm holder.[55]
Appellants assertion that he was entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender is meritorious. For
voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) that
the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) that the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3)
that the surrender was voluntary.[56]
All of the foregoing requisites are present in the case at bar.
Appellant had not been actually arrested by the police or other
law enforcers. He surrendered unconditionally to the mayor
of Batangas City, a person in authority, thereby saving the
police trouble and expenses which it would otherwise incur in
his search and capture. The fact that appellant surrendered
two weeks after the incident is immaterial. We have held that
for voluntary surrender to mitigate an offense, it is not
required that the accused surrender at the first opportunity.
[57]
As long as the aforementioned requisites are met,
voluntary surrender can be appreciated.[58]
We shall now determine the propriety of the penalties
imposed on appellant.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code states that murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63(4) of the
same Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two
indivisible penalties, as in this case, and both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
crime, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another in consideration of their number and importance. As
earlier determined, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
use of an unlicensed firearm were present in the instant
case. Nonetheless, the aggravating circumstance of treachery
in this case cannot be applied for offsetting because it was
already considered as a qualifying circumstance. [59] Thus, only
the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm
may be utilized in offsetting the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
We stated earlier that the use of an unlicensed firearm in
murder is a special aggravating circumstance and not merely
a generic aggravating circumstance.As such, it cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance such as
voluntary surrender.[60] Thus, the only modifying circumstance
remaining in the present case is the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. Article 63(1) of
the Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two
indivisible penalties, as in this case, and there is present only
one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied. Consequently, the penalty imposable on appellant is
death. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346
entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in thePhilippines, the imposition of the capital punishment of
death has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the
penalty to be meted to appellant shall
bereclusion perpetua. Said section reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall
be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on
appellant, he is not eligible for parole following Section 3 of
said law which provides:
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Hence, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant.
As to damages, both courts acted accordingly in awarding
civil indemnity[61] to the heirs of Inspector Barte since the
award of this damage is mandatory in murder cases.
[62]
Nevertheless, the amount of P50,000.00 imposed as civil
indemnity should be increased to P75,000.00 based on
prevailing jurisprudence.[63] In People v. Quiachon,[64] we
explained that even if the penalty of death is not to be
imposed on accused because of the prohibition in Republic
Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper
as the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of
the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. In the instant case, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm attended the killing
of Inspector Barte. These circumstances were duly alleged in
the information and proven during the trial.
The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is
proper in view of the violent death of Inspector Barte and the
resultant grief to his family.[65]Likewise, the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is in order
because the killing of Inspector Barte was committed with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and use of an
unlicensed firearm.[66] Also, the award of P109,250.00 as
actual damages is appropriate since these were supported by
official receipts attached on records. [67]
The heirs of Inspector Barte should also be indemnified for
loss of earning capacity pursuant to Article 2206 of the New
Civil Code.[68] Consistent with our previous decisions, [69] the
formula for the indemnification of loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x
[Gross Annual Income (GAI) Living Expenses]
= 2/3 (80 age of deceased) x (GAI - 50% of GAI).
Inspector Bartes death certificate states that he was 46 years
old at the time of his demise.[70] The pay slip issued by the
PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Inspector Barte for
August 2002 shows that the latter was earning an annual gross
income of P371,784.00.[71]
Applying the above-stated formula, the indemnity for the loss
of earning capacity of Inspector Barte is P4,213,551.00,
computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 (34) x (P371,784.00 P185,892.00)
= 2/3 (34) x P185,892.00.
= P4,213,551.00.
Hence, the amount of P4,212,312.72 awarded to the heirs of
Inspector Barte as indemnity for the latters loss of earning
capacity should be increased toP4,213,551.00.
In addition to the damages awarded, we also impose on all the
amounts of damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from
this date until fully paid.[72]
WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02367, dated 16
October 2007, is herebyAFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the civil indemnity of
appellant is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; (2) the
indemnity for Inspector Bartes loss of earning capacity is
increased from P4,212,312.72 to P4,213,551.00; and (3) an
interest on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6%
from this date until fully paid is imposed.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179498 August 3, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RUSTICO BARTOLINI y AMPIS, Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
We review the May 31, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which affirmed the guilty verdict rendered by
Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bislig
City2 in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1-2083-H, 99-1-2084-H and
99-1-2085-H, finding appellant Rustico Bartolini y Ampis
guilty of three (3) counts of incestuous rape against his two
(2) daughters, AAA and BBB.3
The facts are culled from the findings of both the trial and
appellate courts.
Appellant Bartolini was charged with three (3) counts of rape
before the RTC, Branch 29, of Bislig City, Surigao del Sur.
The informations filed against him read:
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2083-H:
That on or about 7:00 oclock in the morning sometime in the
month of March 1995, at Sitio [ABC], Barangay [123],
Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd and unchaste
designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rape [his] daughter, [AAA], by means of force and
intimidation, and against his daughters will, to the damage
and prejudice of the said [AAA], who was then 14 years old.
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 23, 1998.4
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H:
That on or about March 2, 1998, at 8:00 oclock in the
morning, more or less, at Sitio [ABC], Barangay [123],
Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously [have] carnal
knowledge or rape his own daughter, [BBB], against the
latters will, to the damage and prejudice of said [BBB].
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27, 1998.5
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H:
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon sometime in
the month of March 1994, at Sitio [ABC], Barangay [123],
Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd and unchaste
designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape [his] daughter
[BBB], 16 years old, against the latters will, to the damage
and prejudice of the said [BBB].
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27, 1998.6
Upon arraignment on May 4, 1999, Bartolini pleaded not
guilty to all the three (3) charges filed against him. 7 The three
(3) criminal cases were thereafter tried jointly.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented four (4)
witnesses: AAA; BBB; CCC, appellants wife and mother of
both victims; and Dr. Emelie S. Viola, the Municipal Health
Officer of Hinatuan District Hospital who conducted the
physical examination of both victims.
Below are the facts established by their testimonies.
Bartolini is married to CCC.8 They begot six (6) children, the
eldest being BBB who was born on January 14,
1978,9 followed by AAA who was born on June 16, 1980.10
Sometime in March 1994, at around 3:00 in the afternoon,
while BBB was weeding the grass on their vegetable garden
with her father, the latter suddenly pulled her to the ground
and forced her to lie down. Bartolini then lifted BBBs skirt,
removed her panty and proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with her. As BBB struggled, appellant punched her and hit her
at her back. Afterwards, appellant put back his clothes and
left. When BBB went inside their house, appellant, who was
waiting for her, warned her not to tell CCC about the incident.
Despite the warning, BBB reported the incident to her mother,
but the latter told her to just keep quiet.11
After the said incident, appellant repeatedly had sexual
intercourse with BBB, the last of which happened on March
2, 1998 at about 8:00 in the morning inside their house while
her mother was away selling fish and while all her siblings
were attending school. That morning, appellant ordered BBB
to get his clothes for him. Appellant then followed BBB to the
room, took off her clothes and raped her.12
It also appears that sometime in March 1995, at about 6:30 in
the morning, while having breakfast, appellant instructed his
second eldest daughter, AAA, to burn the dried leaves in their
garden. Dutifully, AAA went to the garden at around 7:00 that
morning and met her father there. To her surprise, appellant
immediately pulled her and brought her near a big fallen tree
while threatening to kill her and all the members of their
family if she would not acquiesce to his demands. Appellant
told her to remove her panties, but since AAA was crying and
pushing her father away, appellant himself took off AAAs
panties, laid her on the ground and placed one (1) of her feet
on top of the fallen tree. Afterwards, appellant removed his
pants and raped her. After having sexual intercourse with
AAA, appellant put back his pants and went to the barangay
hall to report for duty as appellant was a barangaykagawad at
that time. Like her sister, AAA also told the incident to their
mother, but the latter told her to keep silent for fear that
appellant would fulfill his threats. Consequently, AAA was
repeatedly raped by appellant until sometime in October
1998, a month before she gave birth to appellants child. 13
When CCC discovered that AAA was pregnant, she confided
the matter to her sister-in-law, DDD, who, in turn, reported
the incident to the barangay captain and to a representative of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
in Butuan City. On November 19, 1998, while under the
custody of the DSWD, AAA gave birth to her child.14
During the trial, CCC testified that sometime in March 1994,
her daughter BBB confided to her that she was raped by
appellant. She just kept silent about the incident for fear that
her husband will maul her when confronted. AAA also
reported to her that she was raped by her father sometime in
1995. In one (1) instance, CCC even saw appellant touching
AAAs vagina while the two (2) were inside their kitchen. She
got angry and told her parents-in-law about the incident, but
the latter replied that she has no other evidence to prove her
accusation. CCC also testified that appellant, despite being an
elected barangay kagawad, was a drunkard, violent and an
irresponsible individual. She added that she had received a
letter from appellant threatening to kill them.
Dr. Emelie S. Viola, Municipal Health Officer of Hinatuan
District Hospital, testified that sometime in October 1998,
BBB and AAA were brought to her clinic for physical
examination. Although there were no visible signs of physical
trauma, Dr. Viola found that BBB had deep healed hymenal
lacerations at the 6 and 7 oclock positions, as well as
superficial healed hymenal laceration at the 10 oclock
position, which indicate that there was a penetration of an
object or a male reproductive organ at BBBs female
genitalia.15
Dr. Viola also examined AAA and found that the latter had
deep healed lacerations at the 12 oclock position and
superficial healed hymenal lacerations at the 3, 9 and 10
oclock positions, also indicating penetration of an object or a
male reproductive organ at AAAs vagina. AAA was also
pregnant.16
The defense, on the other hand, presented its lone witness,
appellant Bartolini, who interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. According to him, he could not have raped BBB in the
morning of March 2, 1998 because he has been out of their
house from 4:00 a.m. that day to deliver shrimps, prawns, and
crabs to a certain Benjamin Castaas who resides in Hinatuan,
Surigao del Sur. Appellant claims that he arrived at Castaass
house at around 4:20 a.m. and stayed there for breakfast upon
the latters invitation. After getting paid, he left for home at
around 10:00 a.m. and reached his house fifteen (15) minutes
later.17
On September 4, 2000, a subpoena was issued for Benjamin
Castaas to appear as witness for the defense. 18Castaas,
however, failed to appear before the trial court. A warrant of
arrest was thereafter issued against him, 19 but to no avail.
Thus, on July 24, 2002, the trial court issued another
subpoena to Castaas.20 When Castaas still failed to appear,
the trial court issued an order declaring the case submitted for
decision.21
On September 18, 2002, the RTC promulgated its decision
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of rape committed against AAA and BBB. The fallo
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused RUSTICO BARTOLINI
Y AMPIS, forty-four (44) years of age, a fisherman and a
resident of [ABC, 123,] Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE pursuant to
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11, Republic Act No. 7659, paragraph (1), this Court
hereby sentences him:
1. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2083-H, to suffer the penalty
of Death by Lethal Injection. To pay Seventy-Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2084-H, to suffer the penalty
of Death by Lethal Injection. To pay Seventy-Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and to pay the costs;
[and]
3. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2085-H, to suffer the penalty
of Death by Lethal Injection. To pay Seventy-Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED.22
At the CA, Bartolini argued that he should not have been
convicted of the crime of qualified rape since the information
in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H was defective because it
failed to allege that the act was committed by force or
intimidation as required by law, while there was no allegation
of minority of the victim in the information for Criminal Case
No. 99-1-2084-H. Bartolini also argued that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23
After an extensive discussion on the issues raised by
Bartolini, the appellate court found no compelling reason to
deviate from the findings of the trial court. Nevertheless, the
CA modified the penalties by reducing the penalty of death to
reclusion perpetua following the abolition of the death penalty
and by modifying the monetary award in favor of the victims.
The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads,
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 18, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 29, Bislig
City, in Criminal Case Nos. [99-1-]2083-H, [99-1-]2084-H
and [99-1-]2085-H finding appellant Rustico Bartolini y
Ampis guilty beyond reasonable doubt for three counts of
rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) in Criminal Case Nos. [99-1-]2083-H and [99-1-]2085-H,
the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and to
pay the amount of seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00)
as civil indemnity, seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00)
as moral damages and twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages for each count; and
(b) in Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2084-H, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to
pay the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity, the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages, and twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00)
as exemplary damages;
(c) with costs.
SO ORDERED.24
On August 30, 2007, the records of the case were forwarded
to this Court for automatic review.25 The Court accepted the
appeal and directed the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desire. However, both the
Office of the Solicitor General, for the appellee, and the
appellant submitted manifestations26stating that they replead
and adopt the arguments raised in their respective
briefs27 before the CA.
Appellant raises the following issues:
I. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant;
II. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant in
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H despite the fact that the
information therein was allegedly defective; and
III. Whether the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty
upon the appellant after finding him guilty in Criminal Case
No. 99-1-2084-H considering the failure of the information to
allege minority.28
We shall first discuss the second and third issues raised by the
appellant, i.e., whether the element of force and intimidation
was correctly alleged in the information in Criminal Case No.
99-1-2085-H and whether the penalty of death was properly
imposed upon the appellant in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-
H.
The appellants arguments are partially meritorious.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances: (1) when force or
intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under
12 years of age.29
A perusal of the information used as basis for Criminal Case
No. 99-1-2085-H readily reveals the allegation that appellant
employed force and intimidation in raping BBB. We
reproduce the contents of the information below:
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H:
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon sometime in
the month of March 1994, at Sitio [ABC], Barangay [123],
Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd and unchaste
designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape [his] daughter
[BBB], 16 years old, against the latters will, to the damage
and prejudice of the said [BBB].
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27, 1998.30
The same allegation was proven during the trial. We quote
BBBs testimony during her direct examination:
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened on
March 1994, while you were still residing at [Sitio ABC],
[123], Lingig, Surigao del Sur, together with your parents?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident all about?
A: We were weeding grasses, sir.
Q: Where were you [weeding] grasses?
A: We were weeding grasses near to our house, sir.
Q: Were you alone while you were weeding grasses at [Sitio
ABC], [123], Lingig, Surigao del Sur?
A: We were two, me and my father, sir.
Q: What time was that?
A: Afternoon, sir.
Q: Now, while you were weeding grasses near your house in
the afternoon of March 1994, with your father, what happened
if any?
A: He pulled me, sir.
Q: Where did he bring you?
A: At the place where we were weeding grasses, sir.
Q: What happened next after you[r] father brought you near
the place where you were weeding grasses?
A: He made me lie down, sir.
Q: What did you do when your father made you lie down?
A: He lift[ed] my skirt and took up my panty, sir.
Q: What did you do when your father pulled you[r] panty?
A: I pushed aside his hands, sir.
Q: What did your father do next?
A: He made me lie down, sir.
Q: Afterward[s], what happened next?
A: He also took [off] his brief and his pant[s], sir.
Q: You want to tell this Honorable Court that you were
already [lying] down when your father removed his brief and
his pant[s]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In relation to you[,] where was your father situated when
he removed his brief and pant[s]?
A: [Just by] my side[,] just near me, sir.
Q: What happened after your father removed his pant[s] and
brief?
A: He inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.
xxxx
Q: While his penis was inside your vagina, what happened?
A: He boxed me, sir.
Q: Were you hit by the blow?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: [O]n my back, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you reached to your house, what did [he] do?
A: He scolded me, sir.
Q: Who scolded you?
A: My father, sir.
Q: Why did he scold you?
A: He was afraid I might tell my mother, sir.
Q: Did you tell your mother about the incident?
A: Yes, sir.31
We are adequately convinced that the prosecution proved that
appellant employed force and intimidation upon his victim.
This being so, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling
of both the RTC and the appellate court on this matter.
However, we disagree with the trial courts ruling convicting
appellant Bartolini for qualified rape under Criminal Case No.
99-1-2084-H. The appellate court was correct in sustaining
appellants argument that the special qualifying circumstance
cannot be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H
since the age of the victim was not specifically alleged in the
information.32
Our disquisition in People v. Tagud, Sr.33 succinctly explains
the matter. There, we said:
To justify the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the
single special qualifying circumstance of the minority of the
victim and her relationship to the offender must be
specifically alleged in the Information and proven during the
trial. x x x
xxxx
Even under the old Rules of Criminal Procedure,
jurisprudence already required that qualifying circumstances
must be specifically alleged in the Information to be
appreciated as such.
xxxx
Notably, the amended Information merely stated that
appellant had carnal knowledge of his minor daughter without
stating Arwins actual age. In a rape case where the very life
of the accused is at stake, such an inexact allegation of the age
of the victim is insufficient to qualify the rape and raise the
penalty to death. The sufficiency of the Information is held to
a higher standard when the only imposable penalty is death.
The constitutional right of the accused to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him assumes the greatest importance when the only imposable
penalty in case of conviction is death.34
Similar to Tagud, the qualifying circumstance of relationship
of BBB to appellant was specifically alleged and proven
during the trial. Notably absent in the information, however,
is a specific averment of the victims age at the time the
offense against her was committed. Such an omission
committed by the prosecutor is fatal in the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death against the offender. It must be
borne in mind that the requirement for complete allegations
on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the
accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charges
against him so that he may adequately prepare for his defense
pursuant to the constitutional requirement on due
process,35 specially so if the case involves the imposition of
the death penalty in case the accused is convicted. Thus, even
if the victim is below eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is her parent, but these facts are not alleged in the
information, or if only one (1) is so alleged such as what
happened in the instant case, their proof as such by evidence
offered during trial cannot sanction the imposition of the
death penalty.36
Appellant also argues that both the trial court and the CA
committed reversible errors when he was found guilty for the
three (3) counts of rape even if his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, appellant attacks
AAAs credibility by arguing that it would have been
physically impossible for him to rape said victim on top of a
log as claimed by AAA in her testimony. Appellant also
questions the motive of both victims saying that it is unnatural
for both to report the abuses made on them only after the
lapse of several years.
We cannot subscribe to appellants desperate attempt to save
himself from the consequences of his dastardly acts.
Settled is the rule that when the issue is one (1) of credibility
of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial courts considering that the latter are in a
better position to decide the question as they have heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. It is for this reason that the findings
of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect. These
findings will not ordinarily be disturbed by an appellate court
absent any clear showing that the trial court has overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome
of the case.371avvphi1
Moreover, AAAs testimony was vivid and precise. She said:
Q: What was your position at that time when you said your
father spread your legs apart?
A: When I spread my legs, I was laying (sic), and he put my
one leg on top of the fallen tree.38
We note with approval the CAs observation that such
revelation is plausible and consistent with human experience.
Indeed, if there is any incongruity in the manner of
intercourse as portrayed by the appellant, the same would be
trivial and will not smother AAAs revelation of sexual
abuse.39
How the victims managed to endure the bestial treatment of
their father to them for four (4) long years, with one (1) even
having to live with the shame of siring an offspring from her
very own father, should not be taken against them. Children
of tender age have natural respect and reverence for their
loved ones. More often than not, they would try to keep to
themselves if anything unnatural was committed against them,
especially if the offender is one (1) of their relatives. A father
is known to have a strong natural, cultural and psychological
hold upon his child. Hence, it would be too assuming for us to
ask the victims why they have kept these facts of abuse to
themselves, when their very own mother decided to be mum
on the matter as well.
Anent the award of damages, we find modifications to be in
order. We increase the award of civil indemnity and moral
damages in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00 each. In People v. Catubig,40we explained that
the commission of an offense has a two (2)-pronged effect,
one (1) on the public as it breaches the social order and the
other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings.
Each effect is respectively addressed by the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty
or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of
the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. But unlike
the criminal liability which is basically the States concern,
the award of damages is in general intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. Hence, although it is essential to
observe the requirements imposed by Sections 8 41 and 942 of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the requirements should affect only the criminal
liability of the accused, which is the States concern, and
should not affect the civil liability of the accused, which is for
the benefit of the injured party. Where the special qualifying
circumstances of age and relationship, although not alleged in
the information, are nonetheless established during the trial,
the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in a
conviction for simple rape should equal the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages in convictions for qualified
rape. Truly, BBBs moral suffering is just as great as when her
father who raped her is convicted for qualified rape as when
he is convicted only for simple rape due to a
technicality.1avvphi1
Likewise, we modify the award for exemplary damages.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the award of exemplary
damages for the two (2) counts of qualified rape under
Criminal Case Nos. 99-1-2083-H and 99-1-2085-H and for
the crime of simple rape in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H is
increased to P30,000.00 for each count of rape.43
WHEREFORE, the judgment on review is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS.
In Criminal Case Nos. 99-1-2083-H and 99-1-2085-H,
appellant Rustico Bartolini y Ampis is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, in lieu of death, without the possibility of parole. He
is ORDERED to pay each of his two (2) victims, AAA and
BBB, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H, appellant is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is ORDERED to pay the victim,
BBB,P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the
States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such
evidenceadheres to the basic rules of admissibility before
pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon
such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge;
otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The
accused need notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is
discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat
averred:
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20,
1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of
Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a saleswoman
of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having
collected and received the total sum ofP131,286.97 from
several customers of said company under the express
obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver
the collection to the said company, but far from complying
with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time
despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud
the said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said
company but instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the
proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount
ofP131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. 1
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the
information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and
petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who
testified that he was the branch manager of Footluckers
Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since
October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of
Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became
a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was
authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming
from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia,
Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor),
and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and
sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which
she would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts
for the payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first
her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped,
leading him to confront her; that she responded that business
was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify;
that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some
collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to an audit
by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a
customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding
balance had already been fully paid although that balance
appeared unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night
later on, petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny
having misappropriated any money of Footluckers and to
plead for him not to push through with a case against her,
promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and that
she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to work. 2
On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct
examination and re-crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen
Guivencan, whomFootluckers employed as its store auditor
since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on March 31,
2001. She declared that Go had requested her to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had
already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still
reflected outstandingbalances for them; that she first
conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from
Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in
Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her audit that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the
possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts
written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner
submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she
submittedto Go a written report denominated as "List of
Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/
Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-
20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report,
petitioner had misappropriated the total amount
ofP131,286.92.3
During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution
marked the ledgers of petitioners various customers allegedly
with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives,
inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column that
contained the dates of the entries, a second that identified the
invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth
that noted the credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that
summed the balances (debit minus credit).Only 49 of
theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC
because the 50thledger could no longer be found.
In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners
counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that
the figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives,
inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made
the entries were not themselves presented in court. 4With that,
petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine
Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be
irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification,
an offense not alleged in the information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary
exhibits, including Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like
the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly
executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation
sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by
petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report)
of Discrepancies.5
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not
to file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the
intention to do so, and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution
and Defense submitted their respective memoranda, and
submitted the case for decision.6
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as
petitioner had opted "not to present evidence for her defense"
the Prosecutions evidence remained "unrefuted and
uncontroverted,"7rendered its decision finding petitioner
guilty of estafa, to wit:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and
circumstances, the Court finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly,
she is hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE
PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties
provided by law and to indemnify private complainant the
amount of P131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum until
fully paid and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused shall be
effective only until the promulgation of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC
denied the motion on May 7, 2004.9
Issues
Insisting that the RTCs judgment "grossly violated [her]
Constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against her because, while the
charge against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented against her and
upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an
offense not alleged or included in the Information under
which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty," and that said
judgment likewise "blatantly ignored and manifestly
disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that the
documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all
private documents, the due execution and authenticity of
which were not proved in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence," petitioner has directly
appealed to the Court via petition for review on certiorari,
positing the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR
THAT MATTER , CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART.
315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE
CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF
FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATION.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HER WAS VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED
UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER
IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER
ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS "B" TO
"YY"-"YY-2", ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE
EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE
NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE
132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE
ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT SAID EXHIBITS TEND
TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED, A
CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN
GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION THAT SAID
TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE
ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-
2"INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSEDS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL
SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION "REMAINS UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED" DESPITE ACCUSEDS
OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL
AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT CROSS-
EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON
THAT HER TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND
IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE AN OFFENSE
NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE
ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING
"UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED", AND
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES OBJECTION
WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE
DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT EXHIBIT "A", WHICH IS THE LIST OF
CUSTOMERS COVERED BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA
PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT
HEARSAY AND SELF-SERVING.10
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to
allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by
petitioner to her customersviolated petitioners right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting
evidence of the falsification of the duplicate receiptsdespite
the information not alleging the falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence
of petitioners guilt for estafaas charged despite their not
being duly authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers and
receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to
prove petitioners misappropriation or conversion
wasinadmissible for being hearsay.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioners right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation when: (a) it held that the information did not
have to allege her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and
(b) when it convicted her of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the
evidence on falsification.
The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person
accused of a crime, among them the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect
when the information was filed in the RTC, contained the
following provisions on the proper manner of alleging the
nature and cause of the accusation in the information, to wit:
Section 8.Designation of the offense. Whenever possible, a
complaint or information should state the designation given to
the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or
omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such
designation, reference should be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language without repetition, not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature
and cause of the accusation in the informationshould never be
taken for granted by the State. An accused cannot be
convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the
complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other
than that charged in the complaint or information would be
violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation. 11 Indeed, the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless
the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information
filed against him.
The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and
penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal
Code, viz:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount
does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases
mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or
by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such
money, goods or other personal property, or denied his part in
its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to
the prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender
for the delivery or return of such money, goods or other
personal property.12
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution,
petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her
customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the receipts
before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that
the customers had paid less than the amounts actually
reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed
the falsification in order to conceal her misappropriation or
conversion. Considering that the falsificationwas not an
offense separate and distinct from the estafacharged against
her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of
falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation
or conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime duly
alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her
was not infringed or denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information
herein completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin
the context of the substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there
was no necessity for the information to allege the acts of
falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an
element of the estafacharged.
Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with
petitioners concern thuswise:
In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that
[the] prosecutions evidence utterly fails to prove the crime
charged. According to the defense, the essence of Karen
Guivencans testimony is that the accused falsified the
receipts issued to the customers served by her by changing or
altering the amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and
therefore, her testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the
charge is misappropriation under Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of
the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever
of any falsification or alteration of amounts in the
[i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned and
pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the
testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be
considered at all as it tended to prove an offense not charged
or included in the [i]nformation and would violate [the]
accuseds constitutional and statutory right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Court
is not in accord with such posture of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the
crime charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not
[e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution
could not prove falsification. Such argumentation is not
correct. Since the information charges accused only of
misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised
[P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no necessity of
alleging the falsification in the Information as it is not an
element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa
and Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and
when they are considered as two separate offenses. The
complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents
is committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be
able to obtain money or goods from another person. In other
words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing
estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to conceal
the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused
collected payments from the customers, said collection which
was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or
erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of
the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of her
collection which she did not remit to the company xxx. 13
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,
did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution
bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the
Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the
crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt
for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein.14 The Prosecution must further prove the participation
of the accused in the commission of the offense. 15In doing all
these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed.16Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has
no burden of proof,17that he must then be acquitted and set
free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of
innocence in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the
defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the
proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged
its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the
crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor
responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged
in the information?
To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the
Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan,
and various documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly
issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their
payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to
each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt
numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. 18The ledgers and
receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to
YY, and their derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the
various duties of petitioner as Footluckers sales
representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no
personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by
petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner to
Footluckers.This means that persons other than Guivencan
prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and
that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in
the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers
held by Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as well
as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the
entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable
opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of
the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or
conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The
denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of
misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable
and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was
unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative
value, reference is made toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of
Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a
witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A
witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has
heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person
from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in
dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and
cross-examined. The weight of such testimony thendepends
not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the veracity of
the other person giving the information to the witness without
oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant
is not standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be
cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not
obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to
solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to
explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that
she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told
so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent
author.19 Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly
on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant.20 The testimony may have been given under
oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a
party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, it is hearsay just the same.21
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact
asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as
evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the
test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial
utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter
asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard
the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was
really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered
those words.22 This kind of utterance ishearsay in character
but is not legal hearsay.23The distinction is, therefore, between
(a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay
rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in
the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. 24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably
not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay
should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay
also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-
examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct
knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. 25If hearsay is
allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is
not in court.26It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-
examine the adverse partys witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of
justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as
evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also
safeguardinga partys right to cross-examine her adversarys
witness,the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The
firstsolution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial trial
or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or
affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The
examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall
be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless
the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for
a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally. (1a)
The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to
the cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule
132 of the Rules of Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon
the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be
cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated
in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse,
and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a
Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section
14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees
that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx
enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx," the
rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party
equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is
based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under
oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected
to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-
court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of
the out-of-court statement depends.27
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans
testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in
admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, despite their being private documents that were not
duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes
between a public document and a private document for the
purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz:
Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private
determines how the documents may be presented as evidence
in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or
sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged
before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent
public official with the formalities required by law, or because
it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is
self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a
private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the
official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of
Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
requirement of authentication of a private document is
excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the
document is an ancient one within the context of Section
21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have
not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party;29(c) when thegenuineness and authenticity of the
document
have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being
offered as genuine.31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives were private documents because private
individuals executed or generated them for private or business
purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came
under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented
and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the
Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the
manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court,viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that
which it is claimed to be.
The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the
signature of petitioner in various receipts, to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not
tally with the original receipts, do you have copies of these
receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my
possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this
Honorable Court, can you assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you will be able to present those
receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the
accused in this case, Anna Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused
in this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the
receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we
would present this,or offer the same as soon as the original
receipts can be presented, but for purposes only of your
testimony, Im going to point to you a certain signature
over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a receipt from
Cirila Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the
Honorable Court whether you are familiar with the
signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word
"collector".
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature
rather, of the accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be
presenting the original receipts Your Honor, because its
quite voluminous, so we will just forego with the testimony of
the witness but we will just present the same using the
testimony of another witness, for purposes of identifying
the signature of the accused. We will request that this
signature which has been identified to by the witness in this
case be marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present
the original copy and present the same to offer as our exhibits
but for the meantime, this is only for the purposes of
recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt
which has just been identified awhile ago be marked as our
Exhibit "A" You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit "A".
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "A-
1".
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. "A-1". What is the
number of that receipt?
ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that:
received from Cirila Askin.32
xxx
As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the
signature of petitioner on the receipt with serial number
FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit
A, while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was
marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out after the
Prosecution admitted that the document was a
meremachinecopy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften
its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to
produce at a later date the originalsof the receipt with serial
number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that
promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath
the Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature of
petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different witness (though
then still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the
effort to have Go authenticate both themachinecopy of the
receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the
signature of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because
the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was no
longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions Offer of
Documentary Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number
FLDT96 No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit
Bthrough Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not
establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the
same signature that Go had earliersought to identify to be the
signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy
(Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution
abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the
machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96
No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this case, and used
the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely
differentdocument entitled "List of Customers covered by
ANA LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit
duly verified March 16-20, 1997."
In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners
signature on two receipts based alone on the fact that the
signatures contained the legible family name of Patula was
ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the
documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently,
Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature
on the receipts either because she lacked familiarity with such
signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix her
signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts from her
testimony bear out:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation
sheet, will you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the
customer. The other receipt is the one showing her payment
prior to the last payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as
Exhibit "B-3", receipt number 20441.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the
collector, are your familiar with that signature?(shown to
witness)
A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as
Exhibit "B-3-a"
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit "B-4"
and the signature as Exhibit "B-4-a".
COURT:
Mark it.33
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603
issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this
receipt if this is the receipt of your office?
A.Yes.
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the
collector. Whose signature is this? original receipt she has still a balance.
A.Ms. Patula. xxx
Q.How do you know that this is her signature? ATTY. ZERNA:
A.Because we can read the Patula.34 The confirmation sheet ---
We also have similar impressions of lack of proper COURT:
authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution presented to The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the
prove the discrepancies between the amountspetitioner receipt in your earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to
hadallegedly received from the customers and the amounts as the receipts, the original receipts?
she had actually remitted to Footluckers. A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of the Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said
unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit report on showed that that particular customer still has a balance of Ten
petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion, Thousand something?
revealing her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity A. The receipt is no longer here.
of the entries, as the following excerpts of her testimony Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered
show: in the ledger?
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: A. Yes.36
Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions
showed that this Cecilia Askin has an account evidence, it should come as no surprise that petitioners
ofP10,791.75? counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC
ATTY. DIEZ: mysteriously overruled the objections and allowedthe
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
office record. (Continuation of the Direct Examination of
COURT: Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
Let the witness answer. ATTY. ZERNA:
WITNESS: CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us
that and showed it to the customers for confirmation. several ledgers. Where is it now?
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: A It is here.
Q. What about the receipts? Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina
COURT: Cadilig, how much is her account in your office?
Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you ATTY. DIEZ:
copied that amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to
the customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed answer the question, let me interpose our objection on the
by the customers? ground that this ledger has not been duly identified to by
WITNESS: the person who made the same. This witness will be
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a testifying on hearsay matters because the supposed ledger
balance of P10,971.75. was not identified to by the person who made the same.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: COURT:
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the balance Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I
of this customer is still P10,971.75 think they were already duly identified by this witness. As a
(Next Page) matter of fact, it was she who brought them to court
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing): (Next Page)
[i]n your office? COURT (cont.):
COURT: because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger. ATTY. DIEZ
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you? That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the
A. No, Maam.35 entries is not this witness, Your Honor. How do we know
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of that the entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts
Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002) submitted to their office.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: COURT:
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that.
original and the duplicate, will you please enlighten the Let the witness answer.
Honorable Court on that discrepancy which you said? WITNESS:
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully A Its the office clerk in-charge.
paid. Her ledger shows a zero balance she has fully COURT:
paid while in the original The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
(Next page) ATTY. ZERNA:
WITNESS (continuing): She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven is the auditor of Footluckers.
hundred Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos COURT:
(10,791.75). I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where
COURT: those entries were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated xxx
there? ATTY. DIEZ:
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a
forwarded to the Manila Office. continuing objection to the questions profounded(sic) on
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing those ledgers on the ground that, as I have said, it is
that it has already a zero balance? hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.
Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who
prepared the entries on those ledgers, is she still connected
with Footluckers?
A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of
business. So, exempt from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.37
The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the
Prosecutions flawed presentation was avoidable simply by
the RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier
quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the
genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as
follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting
to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also
be given bya comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not
themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents,the
Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and
their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules.
Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive,
were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That
was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires
Corporation:38
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.,
contends that Jeanne Kings testimony was hearsay
because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of
the documents supporting respondents cause of
action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of
lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner
avers that even though King was personally assigned to
handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated
with personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to
respondents cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even
though she personally prepared the summary of weight of
steel billets received by respondent, she did not have personal
knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and
delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action
is founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo
consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable,
respondent has to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400
metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00, and
second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the
importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who
was assigned to handle respondents importations, including
their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the
volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore
competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay, as
this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the
shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She
did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets
received. Even though she prepared the summary of the
received steel billets, she based the summary only on the
receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel
billets received was hearsay. It has no probative value
even if not objected to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to
properly authenticate respondents documentary
evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,
before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must
be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any
person who was present and saw it executed, or who after
its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the
person to whom the parties to the instruments had
previously confessed execution thereof. In this
case, respondent admits that King was none of the
aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary
of the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated
bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of
steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and
Kings testimony on this point could not be taken at face
value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public
or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under
any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.Section 20of the same law, in turn, provides that
before any private document is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone
who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are
private documents. They are not among those enumerated
in Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity
need to be proved before they can be admitted in
evidence.With the exception concerning the summary of
the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their
authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to
prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of
the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient
competent evidence to prove petitioners liability.
That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because
petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-
examination, and did not tender her contrary evidencewas
inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the
seasonable objections to Guivencans testimony bypetitioners
counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied
thathearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no
probative value.39Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions
evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely
technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse
partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to
rebutcould not set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts
overruling of petitioners objections imbue the flawed
evidence with any virtue and value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from
the application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that
the ledgers "were prepared in the regular course of
business."40Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made
at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by
a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet
sweeping mannerof justifying the application of Section 43
was unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence of
the several requisites before entries in the course of business
could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as
follows:
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to
testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries;
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral,
or religious;
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.41
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court
reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge must
rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that
such evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility
before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged
upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein
nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the
accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence.
Heracquittal should follow.
IV
No reliable evidence on damage
Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the
Court declares that the disposition by the RTC ordering
petitioner to indemnify Footluckers in the amount
of P131,286.92 with interest of 12% per annum until fully
paid was not yet shown to be factually founded. Yet, she
cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis.
Heracquittal has to bedeclared as without prejudice to the
filing of a civil action against her for the recovery of any
amount that she may still owe to Footluckers.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe
decision convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as
charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to
a civil action brought against her for
the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of
Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
5. RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL, AND
PUBLIC TRIAL
A. SPEEDY TRIAL
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162206 November 17, 2010
MONICO V. JACOB and CELSO L.
LEGARDA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION and
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for the nullification of the Resolutions dated February
4, 20021 of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division and
December 12, 20032 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division.
In its Resolution dated February 4, 2002, the Sandiganbayan
Special Fourth Division set aside the order to dismiss
Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, among other cases,
verbally issued by Associate Justice Narciso S. Nario (Justice
Nario), Chairman of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division,
during the court session held on August 20, 2001;3 while in its
Resolution dated December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division denied the motions for reconsideration of the
petitioners and other accused.
The following facts are duly established from the pleadings of
the parties:
From 1993 to 1997, Petron Corporation (Petron), a
corporation engaged in the business of refining, marketing
and distribution of petroleum products, received Tax Credit
Certificates (TCCs) by assignment from 18 private
firms4 registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). The
TCCs were issued by the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit & Duty Drawback Center (OSS), an office under the
Department of Finance (DOF), created by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 266 dated February 7, 1992. Petron
used the assigned TCCs to pay its excise tax liabilities.
The practice was for the BOI-registered firms to sign the
Deeds of Assignment upon delivery of the TCCs to Petron.
Petron then forwarded said documents to the OSS, with a
request for authorization to use said TCCs to pay for its excise
tax liabilities. DOF Undersecretary Antonio P. Belicena
(Belicena) approved the request of Petron through the
issuance of Tax Debit Memoranda (TDM) addressed to the
Collection Program Division of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). The BIR Collection Program Division
accepted the TCCs as payment for the excise tax liabilities of
Petron by issuing its own TDM. 5 The control numbers of the
BIR-TDM were indicated on the back of the TCCs, marking
the final utilization of the tax credits.6
However, the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of
the Office of the Ombudsman eventually found that the
aforementioned transactions involving the TCCs were
irregular and violative of the Memorandum of Agreement
dated August 29, 1989 between the BOI and the DOF, which
implemented Article 21 of Executive Order No. 226,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. 7
After the termination of the requisite preliminary
investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution dated March 27, 2000 finding probable cause
against several public officers and private individuals,
including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President, and
Celso L. Legarda (Legarda), Vice-President and General
Manager for Marketing, both of Petron, for perpetrating the
so-called "tax credit scam." On April 10, 2010, the Office of
the Ombudsman filed a total of 62 Informations, 18 of which,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, were against
DOF Undersecretary Belicena, OSS Deputy Executive
Director Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., petitioners and other Petron
officials, and officers of the BOI-registered firms which
assigned the TCCs to Petron, charging them with violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioners provided an undisputed account of the events that
subsequently took place before the Sandiganbayan:
On April 14, 2000, petitioners and the four other Petron
officers who were similarly charged filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation [with the Office of the Ombudsman].
On 17 April 2000, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division]
issued an Order giving the prosecution a period of sixty (60)
days within which
to re-assess its evidence in these cases and to take
appropriate action on the said motion for reconsideration of
accused movants and to inform the Court within the same
period as to its findings and recommendations including the
action thereon of the Honorable Ombudsman.
Sixty (60) days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman did
not even bother to submit a report on the status of the motions
for reconsideration. Months passed, and then, AN ENTIRE
YEAR PASSED. There was still nothing from the respondent
Office of the Ombudsman.
In the meantime, petitioner Jacob was arraigned on 1 June
2000 while petitioner Legarda was arraigned on 18 May 2001.
On March 20, 2001, in view of a significant development in
the Shell cases (then pending with the 5th Division of [the
Sandiganbayan]), petitioners and other accused Petron
officials filed a Motion to Resolve with the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the said motion, petitioners cited the
Memorandum dated 30 January 2001 issued by Special
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo upholding the dropping of the
charges against Shell official Pacifico Cruz on the ground that
there was no sufficient evidence to prove that he was part of
the conspiracy. Petitioners asserted that since their
situation/alleged participation is similar to that of Mr. Pacifico
Cruz, they should similarly be dropped from the criminal
cases. Despite this, the respondent Office of the Ombudsman
took no action.
Considering the time that had lapsed, the [Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division], at the hearing on 1 June 2001, expressly
warned the prosecution that should it fail to resolve the
reconsideration/investigation, it would order the dismissal of
the cases or require the prosecution to show cause why it
should not be cited for contempt.
In its Resolution dated 26 June 2001, the [Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division] in fact denied the motion of the prosecution
for the resetting of the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial on
2 July 2001 "it appearing that the Reinvestigation of these
cases has been pending for more than one (1) year now and
the court cannot countenance the unreasonable delay
attributable to the plaintiff."
In spite of the denial of their motion, the prosecution still
failed to submit its report to the [Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division] during the 2 July 2001 hearing. Instead they asked
for a period of seven (7) more days to resolve the motions for
reconsideration. The arraignment (of the other accused) and
pre-trial therefore had to be reset again to 17 July 2001.
One day before the schedule hearing, the prosecution filed a
Manifestation requesting the cancellation of the arraignment
and pre-trial scheduled the next day on the ground that the
motions for reconsideration/reinvestigation were still pending
resolution.
Once again, [the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] gave the
prosecution another chance. During the hearing on 17 July
2001, the [Sandiganbayan 4th Division] directed the
prosecution, through Prosecutor Orlando Ines, to terminate
the reinvestigation within a period of one (1) more month.
The arraignment and pre-trial were then reset to 20 August
2001.
At the scheduled hearing on August 20, 2001, Prosecutor
Orlando Ines, however, again requested for the deferment of
the arraignment and pre-trial on the ground that the resolution
on the various motions for reconsideration/reinvestigation
were still pending approval by the Office of the Ombudsman.
In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense verbally
and consistently invoked their right to speedy trial and moved
for the dismissal of the cases. In the course of more than one
year, however, the [Sandiganbayan 4th Division] kept
affording the prosecution one chance after another. The sixty
days granted to the prosecution became more than four
hundred days still, there was no resolution in sight.
Thus on 20 August 2001, compelled by its duty to uphold the
fundamental law, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division,
through its Chairman, Justice Nario] issued a verbal order
dismissing the cases. The dismissal was duly recorded in the
minutes of the hearing of the said date which was attested to
by the Clerk of Court and signed by the parties.
On 24 August 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the following prayer: "WHEREFORE,
the undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutors prayed (sic) that the
Order issued by the Honorable Court for the summary
dismissal of all the graft and estafa charges aforecited be SET
ASIDE."
On August 31, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division]
issued an Order taking cognizance of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the prosecution and requiring the
accused to file their respective comments thereon within five
(5) days.
On 4 February 2002, OR SIX (6) MONTHS after [Justice
Nario] issued the verbal order of dismissal, the
[Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division] issued an Order
setting aside said verbal order.
xxxx
In the 4 February 2002 Resolution, this time a Division of five
justices (two of whom dissented) rendered a Resolution
stating:
WHEREFORE, the dismissal of these cases orally ordered in
open court by the Chairman of the Fourth Division during its
court session held on August 20, 2001, and reiterated in his
subsequent ponencia, is hereby set aside.8(Citations omitted.)
The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division gave the
following reasons for overruling Justice Narios verbal order
dismissing the criminal cases against the accused in the
alleged tax credit scam:
In the present case, (1) there is already a delay of the trial for
more than one year now; (2) but it is not shown that the delay
is vexatious, capricious and oppressive; (3) it may be that, as
stated in the herein dissented Resolution, "at the hearings
conducted in these cases, the defense orally, openly and
consistently asked for the dismissal of these cases"; however,
these oral manifestations were more of "knee-jerk reactions"
of the defense counsel in those hearings everytime the
prosecution requested for postponement than anything else as
said defense counsel did not seriously pursue the dismissal of
these cases, such as by reducing their "request" in a formal
written motion to dismiss and/or insisting that the court
formally rule on their request for dismissal and go
oncertiorari if denied; and (4) considering the nature and
importance of the cases, if there is any prejudice that may
have resulted as a consequence of the series of
postponements, it would be more against the government than
against any of the accused; however, be that as it may, none of
the herein accused has come out to claim having been thus
prejudiced.9
On February 26, 2002, petitioners, together with four other
co-accused Petron officials, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 of the February 4, 2002 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division. Other accused also
filed their motions for reconsideration and motions to
quash/dismiss. The prosecution expectedly opposed all such
motions of the accused.
In an Omnibus Resolution dated December 12, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division ruled in the prosecutions
favor and denied all the motions filed by the accused, to wit:
Wherefore, premises considered, this court issues an Omnibus
Resolution denying all the above-described Motion to Quash
for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners come before us via the instant Petition for
Certiorari averring grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division, specifically:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE NOT BEEN PUT IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE GLARING LACK OF EVIDENCE AGAINST
PETITIONERS.11
To recall, Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, ordered the dismissal of all
criminal cases arising from the purported tax credit scam on
the ground that the accused, including petitioners, had already
been deprived of their right to a speedy trial and disposition of
the cases against them. Petitioners assert that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in reversing
Justice Narios order of dismissal of Criminal Case Nos.
25922-25939 because such reversal violated petitioners
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
An accuseds right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article
III12 of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be
defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of
a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with
the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on
the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old
legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-
repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes,
much more so in criminal cases where an accused is
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. 13
Hence, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure also include
provisions that ensure the protection of such right. As we
presented in Uy v. Hon. Adriano14:
Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that the accused is entitled to a speedy,
impartial and public trial. Section 2, Rule 119 of the said
Rules provides that trial, once commenced, shall be
continuous until terminated:
Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.
Trial, once commenced, shall continue from day to day as far
as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a
reasonable period of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and
defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly
or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time
so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first
day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme
Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the
preceding section shall not apply where special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of
trial.
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by the court motu proprio, or on motion of either the
accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted
the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the
order that the ends of justice is served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused on a
speedy trial, shall be deducted.
The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the
following factors:
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the
proceeding would likely make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice;
and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel,
unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the
nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation within the periods of time established
therein.
In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule
shall be granted because of congestion of the courts calendar
or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available
witnesses on the part of the prosecutor.15
We further emphasized in Uy that "speedy trial" is a relative
term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining
whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated,
the delay should be considered, in view of the entirety of the
proceedings. Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday
life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all,
do not exist in a vacuum.16
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan17 is a case originating from exactly
the same factual background as the case at bar. Therein
petitioners Marialen C. Corpuz and Antonio H. Roman, Sr.
were officers of FILSYN Corporation, one of the BOI-
registered firms that assigned TCCs to Petron; and were
among the accused in Criminal Case No. 25922. They filed a
separate Petition for Certiorari before us assailing the
Resolutions dated February 4, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan
Special Fourth Division and December 12, 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division.
We expounded more extensively in Corpuz on the right of the
accused to a speedy trial and disposition of the case against
him, thus:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent
the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent
delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts
to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of
a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to
whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential
ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It
cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system
where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It
secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the
rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.18 (Emphases ours.)
We went on to lay down in Corpuz the test for determining
whether an accused was indeed deprived of his right to a
speedy trial and disposition of the case against him:
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial,
four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the
reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right;
and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be
assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility
that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is
the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There
is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is
not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be
drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to
public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the
burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The
passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the
Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts,
diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor
contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As
held in Williams v. United States, for the government to
sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must
show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or
justification of the State for such delay. Different weights
should be assigned to different reasons or justifications
invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to
delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense
should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is
improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain
some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or
prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less
heavily against the State. Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
factors for granting a continuance.19
In the Petition at bar, Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 were
filed on April 10, 2000. Petitioner Jacob was arraigned on
June 1, 2000, while petitioner Legarda was arraigned on May
18, 2001; with both petitioners pleading not guilty. Since then,
there had been no other significant development in the cases
since the prosecution repeatedly requested for deferment or
postponement of the scheduled hearings as it awaits the result
of the reinvestigation of the Office of the Ombudsman. Judge
Nario verbally ordered the dismissal of said cases during the
hearing on August 20, 2001. Thus, the criminal cases had
been pending for about a year and four months by the time
they were dismissed by Justice Nario.
The accused, including petitioners, had consistently asked in
open court that the criminal cases be dismissed every time the
prosecution moved for a deferment or postponement of the
hearings.
The prosecution attributed the delay in the criminal
proceedings to: 1) the 23 motions for reinvestigation or
reconsideration filed by the accused, which was granted by
the Sandiganbayan in its April 17, 2000 Order; and 2) the
failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to terminate its
reinvestigation and submit its report within the 60-day period
fixed by the said graft court.
Irrefragably, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in
the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the
Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report
despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the
Sandiganbayan, and even more than a year thereafter. That
there were 23 Motions for Reinvestigation filed is
insignificant. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the
word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the
case. It is simply a chance for the Office of the Ombudsman
to review and re-evaluate its findings based on the evidence
previously submitted by the parties. The Office of the
Ombudsman should have expedited the reinvestigation, not
only because it was ordered by the Sandiganbayan to submit a
report within a period of 60 days, but also because said Office
is bound by the Constitution 20 and Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, 21 to act
promptly on complaints and cases pending before it.
Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the Office of the
Ombudsman delayed the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
25922-25939, the said process could not have been dispensed
with as it was undertaken for the protection of the rights of
petitioners themselves (and their co-accused) and their rights
should not be compromised at the expense of expediency.
In Corpuz, we warned against the overzealous or precipitate
dismissal of a case that may enable the defendant, who may
be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby
infringing the societal interest in trying people accused of
crimes rather than granting them immunization because of
legal error.22 Earlier, in People v. Leviste, 23 we already
stressed that:
[T]he State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A
hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead of
unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of
the justice system as a whole and caused uncalled-for delays
in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, the
precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing
the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and
ironically enough, unnecessarily delayed the case in the
process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid.
Such action does not inspire public confidence in the
administration of justice.24
Thus, even though we acknowledge the delay in the criminal
proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by petitioners
and their co-accused by reason thereof, the weighing of
interests militate against a finding that petitioners right to
speedy trial and disposition of the cases involving them would
have justified the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-
25939. We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth
Division that Justice Narios dismissal of the criminal cases
was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State
should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute
the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. We reiterate
our observations in Corpuz that:
There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well
as the other accused, was prejudiced by the delay in the
reinvestigation of the cases and the submission by the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report thereon. So was
the State. We have balanced the societal interest involved in
the cases and the need to give substance to the petitioners
constitutional rights and their quest for justice, and we are
convinced that the dismissal of the cases is too drastic a
remedy to be accorded to the petitioners. The cloud of
suspicion may still linger over the heads of the petitioners by
the precipitate dismissal of the cases. We repeat -- the cases
involve the so-called tax credit certificates scam and hundreds
of millions of pesos allegedly perpetrated by government
officials in connivance with private individuals. The People
has yet to prove the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes
charged beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the ruling of
the Sandiganbayan that before resorting to the extreme
sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case
by dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor
should be ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of
contempt, to explain the delay in the submission of his report
on his reinvestigation.25
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did
not abuse its discretion in setting aside Justice Narios verbal
order, which dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, for
not only was such order baseless, as we had previously
discussed herein; but more importantly, because it is an utter
nullity, as we had ruled in Corpuz.
We held in Corpuz that:
In the unanimous Resolution of December 12, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:
In the cases at bar, the dismissal made in open court by the
Chairman, which was not reduced in writing, is not a valid
dismissal or termination of the cases. This is because the
Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without the
approval or consent of the other members of the Division. The
Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its internal
rules prevailing at the time (Rule XVIII, Section 1(b) of the
1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which is now
Section 1(b), Rule VIII of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan), an order, resolution or judgment, in order
to be valid - that is to say, in order to be considered as an
official action of the Court itself - must bear the unanimous
approval of the members of the division, or in case of lack
thereof, by the majority vote of the members of a special
division of five.
We agree with the foregoing ratiocination. Section 1, Rule
120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates
that a judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a
final order dismissing a criminal case grounded on the
violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A
verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the
provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law, not
in esse, therefore, ineffective. Justice Nario failed to issue a
written resolution dismissing the criminal cases for failure of
the prosecution to submit its report on the reinvestigation of
the cases within the sixty-day period fixed by the graft court.
Moreover, the verbal order was rejected by majority vote of
the members of the Sandiganbayan Special Division. In fine,
there has been no valid and effective order of dismissal of the
cases. The Sandiganbayan cannot then be faulted for issuing
the assailed resolutions.
Neither are the petitioners entitled to a writ of mandamus to
compel the Sandiganbayan to reinstate the cases, considering
that the verbal order of Justice Nario as aforestated does not
exist at all in contemplation of law.26(Emphases ours.)
Given that Justice Narios verbal order dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 25922-25939 is null and void, and does not exist at
all in contemplation of law, it follows that petitioners cannot
invoke the constitutional right against double
jeopardy.1avvphi1
To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following
must be demonstrated:
(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when]
a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.27
In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached
since there is so far no valid dismissal or termination of the
criminal cases against petitioners.
Finally, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did not
commit grave abuse of discretion nor erred in not considering
the glaring lack of evidence against petitioners.
As we pointed out in Rizon v. Desierto28:
Time and again, we have held that a prosecutor does not
decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the person charged. He merely determines whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A finding
of probable cause, therefore, does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It
is enough that the prosecutor believes that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. A trial is
intended precisely for the reception of prosecution evidence in
support of the charge. It is the court that is tasked to determine
guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial on the merits. 29
Here, there has been no trial yet. Therefore, there has been no
occasion yet for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature that shall be passed upon after a
full-blown trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, there being no showing that the impugned
Resolutions dated February 4, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan
Special Fourth Division and December 12, 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-
25939 are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the instant Petition for
Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187728 September 12, 2011
CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Sogod, Southern Leyte,
and PO1 RUDYARD PALOMA y TORRES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, praying that the Order1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte (RTC), dated January 16,
2009, dismissing the criminal case for rape against PO1
Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private respondent), and the
Resolution2 dated March 16, 2009, denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration, be annulled and set aside.
The records reveal the following antecedent facts.
On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private complainant
below, executed a sworn statement before an Investigator of
the 8th Regional Office, Philippine National Police-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Tacloban
City, where she stated that she was raped by herein private
respondent on October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at
Sogod, Southern Leyte. A preliminary investigation of the
case was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued against private
respondent, so he voluntarily surrendered to the Chief of
Police of Sogod on November 18, 2004 and was then
incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.
On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for
Bail. Hearings on the motion commenced on December 7,
2004, but petitioner failed to appear. Only private respondent
presented evidence. Thus, on March 16, 2005, the MCTC of
Sogod issued an Order allowing private respondent to post
bail set at P200,000.00. After posting a surety bond, private
respondent was released from confinement.
Pursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-
level courts of authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of criminal complaints cognizable by Regional Trial Courts,
records of the subject case were transmitted to the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office of Southern Leyte. 3 The Prosecutor's
Office issued a Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding
probable cause against private respondent and, accordingly,
an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. A
warrant of arrest was immediately issued against private
respondent.
On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to
detention4 and, on June 30, 2008, the RTC issued an
Order5 stating that accused had voluntarily surrendered to the
Office of the Clerk of Court and arraignment was set for July
31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008, private
respondent filed a Motion to Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of
Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10, 2008, the RTC
cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment and reset
the arraignment and hearing on said motion for August 20,
2008. At said scheduled date for arraignment and hearing on
the motion, nobody appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the
RTC issued the Order6 dated August 20, 2008 resetting the
arraignment for October 31, 2008 and stating that:
x x x this Court hereby orders the public prosecutor x x x
and/or his assistant prosecutor x x x to appear and prosecute
this case on the next scheduled hearing from arraignment up
to the termination of the trial of this case otherwise this Court
will order the dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute or
nolle prosequi.7
On October 28, 2008, petitioner AAA, private complainant
below, filed through her private counsel, a Motion for
Cancellation of Hearing,8 manifesting that Atty. Pedro
Felicen, Jr. had been granted the authority to prosecute by the
Provincial Prosecutor and praying that the scheduled
arraignment on October 31, 2008 be cancelled due to the
pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of
venue before this Court. The authorized private prosecutor did
not appear on said hearing date. The hearing on October 31,
2008 proceeded as the RTC ruled, in its Order 9 issued on the
same day, that unless restrained by a higher court, the mere
pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not sufficient
reason to suspend the proceedings. Moreover, counsel for
accused invoked the accused's right to a speedy trial and, thus,
private respondent was arraigned in the presence of the
Provincial Prosecutor who was designated by the RTC to
represent the prosecution for the purpose of arraignment. Pre-
trial was set for November 13, 2008. Nevertheless, said
schedule for pre-trial was cancelled (per Order 10 dated
November 4, 2008) as the Presiding Judge of the RTC had to
attend a PHILJA Seminar, and pre-trial was reset to
November 24, 2008. On November 24, 2008, the day of the
pre-trial itself, the private prosecutor again filed a Motion for
Cancellation of Hearing, again using as justification the
pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. The RTC
issued an Order on even date, reading as follows:
During the scheduled pre-trial conference of this case, the
public prosecutors of Leyte, the private prosecutor and the
private complainant failed to appear despite proper notices
sent [to] them. A motion for cancellation of hearing was filed
by the authorized private prosecutor, Pedro Felicen, Jr. for
reasons stated therein to which this Court finds to be not
meritorious, hence, the same is denied. x x x the public
prosecutor as well as the counsel for the accused were
directed to make their oral comments on the first endorsement
of the Hon. Deputy Court Administrator, regarding the motion
to transfer venue of this case to any of the RTC, at Tacloban
City, x x x.
x x x Thereafter, the pre trial proceeded by discussing matters
concerning the amicable settlement, plea bargaining
agreement, stipulation of facts, pre-marking of documentary
exhibits, number of witnesses, trial dates and nature of the
defense. There being no other matters to discuss on pre-trial in
order to expedite the early disposition of this case, the pre-
trial proper is now deemed terminated.11
The said Order also scheduled the initial hearing for trial on
the merits for December 12, 2008. On December 12, 2008, no
one appeared for the prosecution, prompting counsel for
accused private respondent to move for dismissal of the case
on the ground of failure to prosecute. Private respondent's
motion to dismiss was denied per Order 12 dated December 12,
2008, and hearing was reset to January 16, 2009.
Again, on the very day of the January 16, 2009 hearing, the
private prosecutor filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of
Hearing, stating that it
was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy of
the notice of the January 16, 2009 hearing and he had to
attend a previously scheduled hearing for another case he was
handling, set for the very same date. Thus, in the Order dated
January 16, 2009, the RTC disposed, thus:
x x x Again notably absent are the private prosecutor, the two
public prosecutors designated by the Department of Justice to
prosecute this case as well as the private complainant herself.
A last minute urgent motion to reset was filed by the private
prosecutor, but the same is denied being in violation of the
three (3) day rule in filing written postponements. After
hearing the arguments coming from both the public
prosecutor assigned to this Court and counsel for the defense,
the Court deems it proper to act on the urgency of the matter
prayed for by the said counsel. Considering that the accused
has been languishing in jail since June, 2008 up to the present
and to allow him to stay in jail for a single minute, it is quite
unreasonable and would violate his right to speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the
accused to be based on grounds that are meritorious, this
Court pursuant to x x x the rule on speedy trial (RA 8433)
[should be "8493"] hereby orders this case dismissed for
failure of the prosecution to prosecute or nolle prosequi.13
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the same per Resolution dated March 16, 2009.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately
dismissing the rape case against private respondent.
Respondents counter that there was no grave abuse committed
by the trial court and setting aside the dismissal of the rape
case would put private respondent in double jeopardy.
The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
Firstly, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy
of courts. In Garcia v. Miro,14 the Court, quotingVergara, Sr.
v. Suelto,15 ruled thus:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned
to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose
acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the
Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ
is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented.
This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this regard, a
policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
On this point alone, the petition is already dismissible.
However, on several occasions, this Court found compelling
reasons to relax the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts.
In Pacoy v. Cajigal,17 the Court opted not to strictly apply said
doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy,
considered to be one of the most fundamental constitutional
rights of an accused. Hence, the Court also finds sufficient
reason to relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue
of double jeopardy, necessitating a look into the merits of the
petition.
Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case
against private respondent too hurriedly, despite the provision
in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act
No. 8493), now incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the accused, including but not limited to the
following:
xxxx
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings
relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other
courts;
x x x x18
A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only
delays that may be excluded from the time limit within which
trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings
concerning the accused. The time involved in the
proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be
excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who
instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the time during which
the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private
complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the time
limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order
imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in fact, already been
breached. The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial
Order19 dated November 24, 2008 on December 3, 2008,
while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on
December 2, 2008.20 This means that at the latest, trial should
have commenced by January 2, 2009, or if said date was a
Sunday or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet,
because of the prosecution's failure to appear at the December
12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the
prosecution's evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the
hearing to January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-
day time limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to
appear at the January 16, 2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly
observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior
by obstinately refusing to comply with the RTC's directives to
commence presentation of their evidence. Petitioners did not
even show proper courtesy to the court, by filing motions for
cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the hearing and
not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing
on their motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above,
the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying and
trifling with court processes.
Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere
pendency of their petition for transfer of venue should
interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is
akin to having a pending petition for certiorari with the
higher courts. In People v. Hernandez,21 the Court held that
"delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with Section 7,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the
"[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
public respondent from further proceeding in the
case."22 The trial court was then correct and acting well within
its discretion when it refused to grant petitioners' motions for
postponement mainly because of the pendency of their
petition for transfer of venue.
The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance
delays in the prosecution of the case. The Court's ruling
in Tan v. People23 is quite instructive, to wit:
An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2) of
Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may
be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that
an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense
of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with
the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on
the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old
legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-
repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes,
much more so in criminal cases where an accused is
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.
Following the policies incorporated under the 1987
Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as
"The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6
of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first
day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of
court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been
incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Section 2 of Rule 119.
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to state -
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent
the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent
delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts
to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of
a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to
whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential
ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It
cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system
where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It
secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the
rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.
The Court emphasized in the same case that:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of
the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial,
four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the
reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right;
and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or
justification of the State for such delay.1wphi1 Different
weights
should be assigned to different reasons or justifications
invoked by the State. x x x.
Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an
accused's right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was
deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance
are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it;
and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.
xxxx
We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused
to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is
clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.24
Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had
already been deprived of his liberty on two occasions. First,
during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when
he was incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16,
2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when an
Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-
bailable offense, he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008
until the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period
of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation
of liberty for any duration of time is quite oppressive.
Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any
delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice.
Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the
trial in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of
petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this
case where there is no temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against herein
public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the trial court in dismissing the case against
private respondent for violation of his constitutional right to
speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September 4, 2012
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,
INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO,
DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES,
JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE
A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and
RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS,
SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) and
MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA
DEL SUR (MOFAZS), represented by ROMEO C.
ROYANDOYAN, Intervenors.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 178193
DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For consideration is a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of the Court dated January 24, 2012 interposed by
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, namely: Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V.
del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, Salvador P. Ballares, Joselito
A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A. Cadiz, Cesaria De
Luna Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa.
On March 14, 2012, petitioner-movants filed a Manifestation
and Motion stating that they failed to include the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in the list of persons to be furnished
with a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration. They
accordingly moved that their belated service of a copy of the
Motion for Reconsideration on the OSG be considered
compliance with the rules on service of motions for
reconsideration. This Court noted and accepted the
Manifestation and Motion. On March 15, 2012, petitioner-
movants filed a Memorandum in support of the instant motion
for reconsideration.
To the said motion, intervenors Wigberto E. Taada, et al.
filed on June 10, 2012 their Comment and Opposition. The
OSG, on the other hand, after filing two motions for extension
on May 22, 2012 and June 21, 2012, respectively, filed its
Motion to Admit Comment, with Comment attached, on July
13, 2012. This Court noted and admitted the Comment.
As will be recalled, the Court, in its January 24, 2012
Decision, affirmed, with modification, the Partial Summary
Judgments (PSJs) rendered by the Sandiganbayan (1) on July
11, 2003 in Civil Case No. 0033-A (PSJ-A), as amended by a
Resolution issued on June 5, 2007; and (2) on
May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F (PSJ-F), as amended
by a Resolution issued on May 11, 2007.
In this recourse, petitioner-movants urge the Court to
reconsider its Decision of January 24, 2012 on the ground that
it:
1. Made erroneous findings of fact;
2. Erred in affirming the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the subdivided amended complaints;
3. Erred in ruling that due process was not violated;
4. Erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the coconut levy
laws;
5. Erred in ruling that the Operative Fact Doctrine does not
apply; and
6. Erred in ruling that the right to speedy disposition of cases
was not violated.
The instant motion is but a mere reiteration or rehash of the
arguments that have already been previously pleaded,
discussed and resolved by this Court in its January 24, 2012
Decision. And considering that the motions arguments are
unsubstantial to warrant a reconsideration or at least a
modification, this Court finds no reason to modify or let alone
reverse the challenged Decision.
As of 1983,1 the Class A and B San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) common shares in the names of the 14 CIIF Holding
Companies are 33,133,266 shares. From 1983 to November
19, 2009 when the Republic of the Philippines representing
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
filed the "Motion To Approve Sale of CIIF SMC Series I
Preferred Shares," the common shares of the CIIF Holding
companies increased to 753,848,312 Class A and B SMC
common shares.2
Owing, however, to a certain development that altered the
factual situation then obtaining in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, there
is, therefore, a compelling need to clarify the fallo of the
January 24, 2012 Decision to reconcile it, vis-a-vis the shares
of stocks in SMC which were declared owned by the
Government, with this development. We refer to the
Resolution3 issued by the Court on September 17, 2009 in the
then consolidated cases docketed as G.R. Nos. 177857-58,
G.R. No. 178193 and G.R. No. 180705. In that Resolution
which has long become final and executory, the Court, upon
motion of COCOFED and with the approval of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, granted the
conversion of 753,848,312 Class "A" and Class "B" SMC
common shares registered in the name of the CIIF companies
to SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares of 753,848,312, subject to
certain terms and conditions. The dispositive portion of the
aforementioned Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the conversion of the
753,848,312 SMC Common Shares registered in the name of
CIIF companies to SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES
of 753,848,312, the converted shares to be registered in the
names of CIIF companies in accordance with the terms and
conditions specified in the conversion offer set forth in SMCs
Information Statement and appended as Annex "A" of
COCOFEDs Urgent Motion to Approve the Conversion of
the CIIF SMC Common Shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred
Shares. The preferred shares shall remain in custodia legis and
their ownership shall be subject to the final ownership
determination of the Court. Until the ownership issue has
been resolved, the preferred shares in the name of the CIIF
companies shall be placed under sequestration and PCGG
management. (Emphasis added.)
The net dividend earnings and/or redemption proceeds from
the Series 1 Preferred Shares shall be deposited in an escrow
account with the Land Bank of the Philippines or the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
Respondent Republic, thru the PCGG, is hereby directed to
cause the CIIF companies, including their respective
directors, officers, employees, agents, and all other persons
acting in their behalf, to perform such acts and execute such
documents as required to effectuate the conversion of the
common shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares, within
ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Once the conversion is accomplished, the SMC Common
Shares previously registered in the names of the CIIF
companies shall be released from sequestration.
SO ORDERED.4
The CIIF block of SMC shares, as converted, is the same
shares of stocks that are subject matter of, and declared as
owned by the Government in, the January 24, 2012 Decision.
Hence, the need to clarify.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY with FINALITY
the instant Motion for Reconsideration dated February 14,
2012 for lack of merit.
The Court further resolves to CLARIFY that the 753,848,312
SMC Series 1 preferred shares of the CIIF companies
converted from the CIIF block of SMC shares, with all the
dividend earnings as well as all increments arising from, but
not limited to, the exercise of preemptive rights subject of the
September 17, 2009 Resolution, shall now be the subject
matter of the January 24, 2012 Decision and shall be declared
owned by the Government and be used only for the benefit of
all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut
industry.
As modified, the fallo of the January 24, 2012 Decision shall
read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and
178793 are hereby DENIED. The Partial Summary Judgment
dated July 11, 2003 in Civil Case No. 0033-A as reiterated
with modification in Resolution dated June 5, 2007, as well as
the Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 in Civil
Case No. 0033-F, which was effectively amended in
Resolution dated May 11, 2007, are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, only with respect to those issues subject of
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178193. However,
the issues raised in G.R. No. 180705 in relation to Partial
Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 and Resolution dated
June 5, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-A, shall be decided by
this Court in a separate decision.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A
dated July 11, 2003, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We rule as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE COURTS RULING.
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION FOR A SEPARATE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated April 11, 2001 filed by
Defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and
Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for Separate Summary Judgment
dated April 11, 2001 filed by defendant Maria Clara L.
Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(RE: COCOFED, ET AL. AND BALLARES, ET AL.) dated
April 22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
1. a. The portion of Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, which reads:
and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby
authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the
bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and
regulations it may promulgate.
taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is
unconstitutional: (i) for having allowed the use of the CCSF
to benefit directly private interest by the outright and
unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB
shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the
undefined "coconut farmers", which negated or circumvented
the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755
to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
industry and achieve its vertical integration; and (ii) for
having unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA.
b. The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 and Resolution
No. 074-78 are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it
that the distribution of shares serve exclusively or at least
primarily or directly the aforementioned public purpose or
national policy declared by P.D. No. 755.
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut
levy funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary
funds nor part of the general funds of the national government
and similar provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and
Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 1468 contravene the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI,
Sec. 29 (3).
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not
legally and validly obtained title of ownership over the
subject UCPB shares by virtue of P.D. No. 755, the
Agreement dated May 25, 1975 between the PCA and
defendant Cojuangco, and PCA implementing rules, namely,
Adm. Order No. 1, s. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
4. The so-called "Farmers UCPB shares" covered by 64.98%
of the UCPB shares of stock, which formed part of the 72.2%
of the shares of stock of the former FUB and now of the
UCPB, the entire consideration of which was charged by PCA
to the CCSF, are hereby declared conclusively owned by, the
Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F
dated May 7, 2004, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: CIIF BLOCK OF
SMC SHARES OF STOCK) dated August 8, 2005 of the
plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit. However, this
Court orders the severance of this particular claim of Plaintiff.
The Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 is now
considered a separate final and appealable judgment with
respect to the said CIIF Block of SMC shares of
stock.1wphi1
The Partial Summary Judgment rendered on May 7, 2004 is
modified by deleting the last paragraph of the dispositive
portion, which will now read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants
CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and Cocofed, et al)
filed by Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY,
THE CIIF COMPANIES, NAMELY:
1. Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);
2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);
3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);
4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);
5. Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and
6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),
AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY:
1. Soriano Shares, Inc.;
2. ACS Investors, Inc.;
3. Roxas Shares, Inc.;
4. Arc Investors; Inc.;
5. Toda Holdings, Inc.;
6. AP Holdings, Inc.;
7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;
9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.;
10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;
11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;
12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;
13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
14. First Meridian Development, Inc.
AND THE CONVERTED SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED
SHARES TOTALING 753,848,312 SHARES SUBJECT OF
THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED
SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 TOGETHER "WITH ALL
DIVIDENDS DECLARED, PAID OR ISSUEDTHEREON
AFTER THAT DATE, AS WELL AS ANY INCREMENTS
THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE DECLARED
OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO RE USED ONLY
FOH THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT FARMERS AND
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCONUT
INDUSTRY. AND ORDERED HECONVEYED TO THE
GOVERNMENT.
THE COURT AFFIRMIS THE RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ON JUNE 5, 2007 IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 0033-A AND ON MAY 11, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 0033-F, THAT THERE IS NO MORE NECESSITY OF
FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB
SHARES, (2) THE CHF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES AND
(3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE FINALLY
BEEN ADJUDICATED IN THE AFOREMIENTIONED
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11,
2003 AND MAY 7, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
Costs against petitioners COCOFED, et al., in G.R. Nos.
177857-58 and Danilo S. Ursua in G.R. No. 178193.
No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let Entry of
Judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September 4, 2012
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,
INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO,
DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES,
JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE
A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and
RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS,
SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) and
MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA
DEL SUR (MOFAZS), represented by ROMEO C.
ROYANDOYAN, Intervenors.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 178193
DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For consideration is a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of the Court dated January 24, 2012 interposed by
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, namely: Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V.
del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, Salvador P. Ballares, Joselito
A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A. Cadiz, Cesaria De
Luna Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa.
On March 14, 2012, petitioner-movants filed a Manifestation
and Motion stating that they failed to include the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in the list of persons to be furnished
with a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration. They
accordingly moved that their belated service of a copy of the
Motion for Reconsideration on the OSG be considered
compliance with the rules on service of motions for
reconsideration. This Court noted and accepted the
Manifestation and Motion. On March 15, 2012, petitioner-
movants filed a Memorandum in support of the instant motion
for reconsideration.
To the said motion, intervenors Wigberto E. Taada, et al.
filed on June 10, 2012 their Comment and Opposition. The
OSG, on the other hand, after filing two motions for extension
on May 22, 2012 and June 21, 2012, respectively, filed its
Motion to Admit Comment, with Comment attached, on July
13, 2012. This Court noted and admitted the Comment.
As will be recalled, the Court, in its January 24, 2012
Decision, affirmed, with modification, the Partial Summary
Judgments (PSJs) rendered by the Sandiganbayan (1) on July
11, 2003 in Civil Case No. 0033-A (PSJ-A), as amended by a
Resolution issued on June 5, 2007; and (2) on
May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F (PSJ-F), as amended
by a Resolution issued on May 11, 2007.
In this recourse, petitioner-movants urge the Court to
reconsider its Decision of January 24, 2012 on the ground that
it:
1. Made erroneous findings of fact;
2. Erred in affirming the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the subdivided amended complaints;
3. Erred in ruling that due process was not violated;
4. Erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the coconut levy
laws;
5. Erred in ruling that the Operative Fact Doctrine does not
apply; and
6. Erred in ruling that the right to speedy disposition of cases
was not violated.
The instant motion is but a mere reiteration or rehash of the
arguments that have already been previously pleaded,
discussed and resolved by this Court in its January 24, 2012
Decision. And considering that the motions arguments are
unsubstantial to warrant a reconsideration or at least a
modification, this Court finds no reason to modify or let alone
reverse the challenged Decision.
As of 1983,1 the Class A and B San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) common shares in the names of the 14 CIIF Holding
Companies are 33,133,266 shares. From 1983 to November
19, 2009 when the Republic of the Philippines representing
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
filed the "Motion To Approve Sale of CIIF SMC Series I
Preferred Shares," the common shares of the CIIF Holding
companies increased to 753,848,312 Class A and B SMC
common shares.2
Owing, however, to a certain development that altered the
factual situation then obtaining in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, there
is, therefore, a compelling need to clarify the fallo of the
January 24, 2012 Decision to reconcile it, vis-a-vis the shares
of stocks in SMC which were declared owned by the
Government, with this development. We refer to the
Resolution3 issued by the Court on September 17, 2009 in the
then consolidated cases docketed as G.R. Nos. 177857-58,
G.R. No. 178193 and G.R. No. 180705. In that Resolution
which has long become final and executory, the Court, upon
motion of COCOFED and with the approval of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, granted the
conversion of 753,848,312 Class "A" and Class "B" SMC
common shares registered in the name of the CIIF companies
to SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares of 753,848,312, subject to
certain terms and conditions. The dispositive portion of the
aforementioned Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the conversion of the
753,848,312 SMC Common Shares registered in the name of
CIIF companies to SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES
of 753,848,312, the converted shares to be registered in the
names of CIIF companies in accordance with the terms and
conditions specified in the conversion offer set forth in SMCs
Information Statement and appended as Annex "A" of
COCOFEDs Urgent Motion to Approve the Conversion of
the CIIF SMC Common Shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred
Shares. The preferred shares shall remain in custodia legis and
their ownership shall be subject to the final ownership
determination of the Court. Until the ownership issue has
been resolved, the preferred shares in the name of the CIIF
companies shall be placed under sequestration and PCGG
management. (Emphasis added.)
The net dividend earnings and/or redemption proceeds from
the Series 1 Preferred Shares shall be deposited in an escrow
account with the Land Bank of the Philippines or the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
Respondent Republic, thru the PCGG, is hereby directed to
cause the CIIF companies, including their respective
directors, officers, employees, agents, and all other persons
acting in their behalf, to perform such acts and execute such
documents as required to effectuate the conversion of the
common shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares, within
ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Once the conversion is accomplished, the SMC Common
Shares previously registered in the names of the CIIF
companies shall be released from sequestration.
SO ORDERED.4
The CIIF block of SMC shares, as converted, is the same
shares of stocks that are subject matter of, and declared as
owned by the Government in, the January 24, 2012 Decision.
Hence, the need to clarify.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY with FINALITY
the instant Motion for Reconsideration dated February 14,
2012 for lack of merit.
The Court further resolves to CLARIFY that the 753,848,312
SMC Series 1 preferred shares of the CIIF companies
converted from the CIIF block of SMC shares, with all the
dividend earnings as well as all increments arising from, but
not limited to, the exercise of preemptive rights subject of the
September 17, 2009 Resolution, shall now be the subject
matter of the January 24, 2012 Decision and shall be declared
owned by the Government and be used only for the benefit of
all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut
industry.
As modified, the fallo of the January 24, 2012 Decision shall
read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and
178793 are hereby DENIED. The Partial Summary Judgment
dated July 11, 2003 in Civil Case No. 0033-A as reiterated
with modification in Resolution dated June 5, 2007, as well as
the Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 in Civil
Case No. 0033-F, which was effectively amended in
Resolution dated May 11, 2007, are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, only with respect to those issues subject of
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178193. However,
the issues raised in G.R. No. 180705 in relation to Partial
Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 and Resolution dated
June 5, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-A, shall be decided by
this Court in a separate decision.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A
dated July 11, 2003, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We rule as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE COURTS RULING.
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION FOR A SEPARATE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated April 11, 2001 filed by
Defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and
Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for Separate Summary Judgment
dated April 11, 2001 filed by defendant Maria Clara L.
Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(RE: COCOFED, ET AL. AND BALLARES, ET AL.) dated
April 22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
1. a. The portion of Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, which reads:
and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby
authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the
bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and
regulations it may promulgate.
taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is
unconstitutional: (i) for having allowed the use of the CCSF
to benefit directly private interest by the outright and
unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB
shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the
undefined "coconut farmers", which negated or circumvented
the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755
to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
industry and achieve its vertical integration; and (ii) for
having unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA.
b. The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 and Resolution
No. 074-78 are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it
that the distribution of shares serve exclusively or at least
primarily or directly the aforementioned public purpose or
national policy declared by P.D. No. 755.
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut
levy funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary
funds nor part of the general funds of the national government
and similar provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and
Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 1468 contravene the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI,
Sec. 29 (3).
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not
legally and validly obtained title of ownership over the
subject UCPB shares by virtue of P.D. No. 755, the
Agreement dated May 25, 1975 between the PCA and
defendant Cojuangco, and PCA implementing rules, namely,
Adm. Order No. 1, s. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
4. The so-called "Farmers UCPB shares" covered by 64.98% (3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE FINALLY
of the UCPB shares of stock, which formed part of the 72.2% BEEN ADJUDICATED IN THE AFOREMIENTIONED
of the shares of stock of the former FUB and now of the PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11,
UCPB, the entire consideration of which was charged by PCA 2003 AND MAY 7, 2004.
to the CCSF, are hereby declared conclusively owned by, the SO ORDERED.
Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines. Costs against petitioners COCOFED, et al., in G.R. Nos.
xxx xxx xxx 177857-58 and Danilo S. Ursua in G.R. No. 178193.
SO ORDERED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let Entry of
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F Judgment be made in due course.
dated May 7, 2004, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as SO ORDERED.
follows:
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF B. PUBLIC TRIAL
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: CIIF BLOCK OF
SMC SHARES OF STOCK) dated August 8, 2005 of the
plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit. However, this
G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973
Court orders the severance of this particular claim of Plaintiff.
HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court
The Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 is now
of Manila, and FRANCISCO LORENZANA,petitioners,
considered a separate final and appealable judgment with
vs.
respect to the said CIIF Block of SMC shares of
HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First
stock.1wphi1
Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON
The Partial Summary Judgment rendered on May 7, 2004 is
CARBONNEL, respondents.
modified by deleting the last paragraph of the dispositive
Andres R. Narvasa, Manuel V. Chico and Felipe B.
portion, which will now read, as follows:
Pagkanlungan for petitioners.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:
Rafael S. Consengco for respondent Calo, et al.
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.
CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and Cocofed, et al)
filed by Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY,
FERNANDO, J.:
THE CIIF COMPANIES, NAMELY:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and
1. Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);
prohibition, one which thus far has remained unresolved, is
2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);
the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public
3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);
trial. 1 More specifically, did respondent Judge commit a grave
4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);
abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a
5. Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and
guarantee the holding of the trial of the other
6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),
respondents 2inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio
AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY:
Garcia named as the petitioner. 3 That was done in the order
1. Soriano Shares, Inc.;
now impugned in this suit, although such a procedure had
2. ACS Investors, Inc.;
been agreed to beforehand by the other respondents as
3. Roxas Shares, Inc.;
defendants, the hearings have been thus conducted on
4. Arc Investors; Inc.;
fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part,
5. Toda Holdings, Inc.;
and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to
6. AP Holdings, Inc.;
any other person so minded being excluded from the
7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the
8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;
chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or
9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.;
intentional secrecy. For reasons to be more fully explained in
10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;
the light of the facts ascertained the unique aspect of this
11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;
case having arisen from what turned out to be an unseemly
12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;
altercation, force likewise being employed, due to the mode in
13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
which the arrest of private petitioner for a traffic violation was
14. First Meridian Development, Inc.
sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus
AND THE CONVERTED SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED
resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal
SHARES TOTALING 753,848,312 SHARES SUBJECT OF
cases being tried jointly by city court Judge in the above
THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED
manner we rule that there was no transgression of the right
SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 TOGETHER "WITH ALL
to a public trial, and grant the petition.
DIVIDENDS DECLARED, PAID OR ISSUEDTHEREON
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I the
AFTER THAT DATE, AS WELL AS ANY INCREMENTS
City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there
THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
were commenced, by appropriate informations all dated
EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE DECLARED
January 16, 1968, eight (8) criminal actions against
OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO RE USED ONLY
respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and
FOH THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT FARMERS AND
Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCONUT
Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1)
INDUSTRY. AND ORDERED HECONVEYED TO THE
Criminal Case No. F-109192, also for slight physical injuries;
GOVERNMENT.
(2) Criminal Case No. F-109192, alsofor slight physical
THE COURT AFFIRMIS THE RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY
injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109193, for
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ON JUNE 5, 2007 IN CIVIL
maltreatment; b. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1)Criminal
CASE NO. 0033-A AND ON MAY 11, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE
Case No. F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No.
NO. 0033-F, THAT THERE IS NO MORE NECESSITY OF
F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case
FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF
No. F-109198, for light threats; (c) Against Francisco
OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB
Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal
SHARES, (2) THE CHF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES AND
Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised
Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal
Case No. F-109200, for slander."4 The above was followed by
this recital: "The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly
held on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968,
March 30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May 4,1968,
May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968,
June 29, 1968, August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the
fourteen (14) trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April
17, 1968 fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the
parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo
and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension
because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as
soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for
trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and
Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day
for said eight (8) criminal cases." 5Also this: "The trial of the
cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused
and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia." 6 Then
came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen
(14) days of trial, spanning a period of several months (from
March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times
represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in
defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations
filed at their clients' instance. There was only one (1) day
when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and
Carbonnel, was absent. This was on April 20, 1968. But at the
insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said
respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by
the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by
the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible
on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused,
thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit
memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel,
Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum
with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the
transcript of stenographic notes in support of their prayer for
exoneration, and conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect
of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note
that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel
had not objected to or pointed out any supposed
irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum
submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the
evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases." 7 It was
stated in the next petition:
"The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on
September 23, 1968. This was postponed to September 28,
1968 at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel
respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to October 1,
1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at the instance of
Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the
meantime, also entered his appearance as counsel for
respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for
postponement were not grounded upon any supposed defect
or irregularity of the proceedings." 8
Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was
filed with respondent Judge: "Early in the morning of October
1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel, thru their
counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the Court of
First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction ... [alleging jurisdictional defects]." 9 Respondent
Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining
order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the
judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order
from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory
rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting
their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial
of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in
chambers and not in the court room open the public';" and
ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from
reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he
may have rendered already in the criminal cases (in
question) ... pending in his Court, until further orders of this
Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petition on
January 28, 1969, elevated the matter to this Tribunal by
means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. In its
resolution of February 3, 1969, respondents were required to
answer, with a preliminary injunction likewise being issued.
As was to be expected the answer filed by respondent Judge
on March 11, 1969 and that by the other respondents on
March 19, 1969 did attempt to justify the validity of the
finding that there was a failure to respect the right to a public
trial of accused persons. Neither in such pleadings nor in the
memorandum filed, although the diligence displayed by
counsel was quite evident, was there any persuasive showing
of a violation of constitutional guarantee of a public trial, the
basic issue to be resolved. Rather it was the mode of approach
followed by counsel Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners that
did manifest a deeper understanding of its implications and
ramifications. Accordingly, as previously stated, it is for us to
grant the merits prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the
antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly
enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was
entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under present
dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional
provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate,
later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was
stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset
any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust
manner." 11 It would have been surprising if its proposed
inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion,
much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration what appeared
in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as
the Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found expression in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then
government of this country as an unincorporated territory of
the United States. 13Historically as was pointed out by Justice
Black, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the
leading case of In re Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice
of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in
[the] English common law heritage. 15 He then observed that
the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved
long before the settlement of the [United States] as an
accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial." 16 It
was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused
of the right to a public trial appeared in a state constitution in
1776." 17 Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. 18 He could conclude
his historical survey "Today almost without exception every
state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that
all criminal trials be open to the public." 19 Such is the
venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this
provision remains. The Constitution guarantees an accused
the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand it
does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where
language is to be given a literal application. There is no
ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It
possesses that character when anyone interested in observing
the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom
may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His
being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that
lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused
is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be
conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in
his terse summation the importance of this right singled out its
being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable
why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due
process. 20 Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is
posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of events that
individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There
is the well recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be
characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the
convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it was
in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held.
Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of
this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no
showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a
fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right.
Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller
than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his
masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the
requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have
his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what
offense he may be charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact
at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the
city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent
policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice Moran
should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more
appropriately the lack of weight, to any such objection raised.
Thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid
prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial,
assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme
Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that
the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the
place where it was held, his right is deemed waived." 23 The
decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, 24 was handed
down sixty-eight years ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far
from being invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this
petition. One other objection to the conduct of the
proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly disposed
of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an order
at war with obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by
harping on the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of his
control over the prosecution. Again here there was a failure to
abide by settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is
the People of the Philippines for whom the fiscal speaks and
acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an offended party
for such an alleged failure to comply with official duty.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent policemen could be
heard to raise such a grievance, respondent Judge ought to
have been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was
incurred by the city court Judge. As was so emphatically
declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-
Guerrero: 25 "The case below was commenced and prosecuted
without the intervention, mediation or participation of the
fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the
jurisdiction of the court was not affected ... but the court
should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene ... ." 26
4. There is much to be said of course for the concern
displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality as against
the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were
otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of
words. To the extent then that the conclusion reached by him
was motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion
of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is
expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to
have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified.
An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city
courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The
crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil
as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules
not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense
atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is
much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When
it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are
not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from
that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse
of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an
accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may
come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the
alert court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the
risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change
matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-
conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the
usual place that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted
nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal
force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo
November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is
likewise granted, commanding respondent Judge or any one
acting in his place to desist from any further action in
Criminal Case No. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila other than that of dismissing the same. The
preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its
resolution of February 3, 1969 against the actuation of
respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs against
respondent policemen Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.
C. IMPARTIAL TRIAL
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001]
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE
TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO
ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The
Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal charges
against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event
via live television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this
Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised
and authorized television and radio networks throughout the
country, sent a letter[1] requesting this Court to allow live
media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and
other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the
public of full ransparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history."[2] The request was
seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001
to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato
Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition,
[3]
submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of
the former highest official of the land, members of his family,
his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that
the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public
concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware
of.
" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern, as in the
instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by
allowing the live radio and television coverage of the
concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the
proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice in order
to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of
any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on
the part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant
criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada."[4]
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident
bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information
affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd
October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed
by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of
discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the
courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the
opportunity to rule on the question squarely.
While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the
United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on
Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in
the Federal Courts of the United States prohibit the presence
of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of
photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or
radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A
trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious
importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a
means of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the
dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and
serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are
formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media
by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while
permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom,
since a television or news reporter has the same privilege, as
the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or
printing press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that
television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an
inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal
defendant.Voting 5-4, the Court through 'Mr. Justice Clark,
identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might
arise from the impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses,
the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part
pertinently stated:
"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of
telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play
to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to
extraordinary out-of-court influences which might affect their
testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it
may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human
beings also and are subject to the same psychologjcal
reactions as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form
of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public
exposure and distracts him from the effective presentation of
his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which
intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his
case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to
apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them
to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's
constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other
member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of
the news media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the
constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum
that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due process
of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal
proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters
and photographers each time he enters or leaves the
courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to
due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of
justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press
and the right of the people to information may be served and
satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means,
live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
shall notbe allowed. Video footages of court hearings for
news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel
taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No
video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial
proper.
"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties right to due
process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the
proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of
justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of
court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and
restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public
consciousness, and it has become an important instrument in
the quest for truth.[5] Recent history exemplifies media's
invigorating presence, and its contribution to society is quite
impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice
of the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience
during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly
political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the
boob-tubes during those times, that would soon culminate in
EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition
involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on
the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on
the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court
to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
[6]
When these rights race against one another,
jurisprudence[7] tells us that the right of the accused must be
preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but
also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make
absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on
the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that
would come only after the presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of
pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are
devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to
ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, [8] and
decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not
lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of
public's attention[9] and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influence [10] but only by
evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of
fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to
presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must
also be conceded that "television can work profound changes
in the behavior of the people it focuses on." [11] Even while it
may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that
media can bring to bear on them directly and through the
shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that,
indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying
degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such
coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the
decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be
said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to
yield to it.[12] It might be farcical to build around them an
impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful
media of public opinion.[13]
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would
leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a
disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and
deliberate dispensation of justice can create. [14] The effect of
television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is
not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception
of a trial such as we know it now.[15]
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that
belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete
conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be
open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be
totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings.[16]
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom
of the press and the right to public information. It also
approves of media's exalted power to provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with
the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount
right of the accused to due process[17] which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a
maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out
the important function of informing the public in a democratic
society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the
maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process."[18]
This Court, in the instance[19] already mentioned, citing Estes
vs. Texas,[20] the United States Supreme Court holding the
television coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent
denial of due process rights of an accused, also identified the
following as being likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the
greatest significance. x x x. From the moment the trial judge
announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause
celebre.The whole community, x x x becomes interested in all
the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial
immediately assumes an important status in the public press
and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense
with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him into
the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance
of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. x x x
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be
impaired. The impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he
is being viewed by a vast audience is simply
incalculable.Some may be demoralized and frightened, some
cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as
with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement
may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that
the trial is to be televised might render witnesses reluctant to
appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of
the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional
responsibilities the presence of television places on the trial
judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a
fair trial. This most difficult task requires his undivided
attention. x x x
4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom
television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of mental -
if not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the
third degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and
expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress
his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to
concentrate on the proceedings before him - sometimes the
difference between life and death - dispassionately, freely and
without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A
defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in
court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The
heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television
coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined
that live television and radio coverage could have
mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached
atmosphere that should always surround the judicial process.
[21]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16
April 2001, expressed its own concern on the live television
and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to
paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the
rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to
assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the
life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the
Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and
radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to
arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the
accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable
only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the
trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander
to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be
adopted, to see protracted delays in the prosecution of cases
before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a
declaration of mistrial on account of undue publicity and
assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or disallowing
live media coverage of the court proceedings because of
supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having
modified the case law on the matter. Just to the contrary, the
Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23
October 1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the
case law on the matter, and when it did in its 23 rd October
resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live television and
radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the records of the
Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion
regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom" and that
"Philippine courts (had) not (theretofore) had the opportunity
to rule on the question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the
minority opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart,[22] the Nebraska
State trial judge issued an order restraining news media from
publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the
accused or facts strongly implicating him. The order was
struck down. In Richmond Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia,
[23]
the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public and all
participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge
was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that
criminal trials were historically open. In Globe Newspaper
vs. Superior Court,[24] the US Supreme Court voided a
Massachusetts law that required trial judges to exclude the
press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony
of a minor victim of certain sexual offenses.
Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida,[25] where two police
officers charged with burglary sought to overturn their
conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that
the television coverage had infringed their right to fair trial,
explained that "the constitutional violation perceived by the
Estes Court did not stem from the physical disruption that
might one day disappear with technological advances in the
television equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that
the mere presence of cameras and recording devices might
have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the
accused."[26]
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other
federal courts do not allow live television and radio coverage
of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved
are of great dimensions so involving as they do a former
President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases
have twice become the nation's focal points in the two
conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the
magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. Must
these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that
has thus far been achieved? The transcendental events in our
midst do not allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another
possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to
now creep into even the business of the courts in the
dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a
change in the standing rule of the court contained in its
resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be
propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the
popular will of the people in any sense which, instead, are
tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis
of what alone is submitted before them. [27] A trial is not a free
trade of ideas. Nor is a competing market of thoughts the
known test truth in a courtroom.[28]
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological
and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or
liberty of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply them,
even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns
heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to
pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF
THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ,
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying
petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast
live the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of
Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is
really no conflict between the right of the people to public
information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if
there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in
favor of the right of the people and the press because the
people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to
information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard
against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments
for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada
reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of
his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub
judice rule and that, based on his experience with the
impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the
way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger
massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr.
Estrada contends that the right of the people to information
may be served through other means less distracting,
degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio
coverage.1wphi1.nt
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this
important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to
alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real
time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former
president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members, 1 the
Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary
of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by
the vote of eight (8) Justices,2 has resolved to order the audio-
visual recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.lawphil.net
Considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court
believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the
proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time
broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they
be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall
have promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the
National Museum and the Records Management and Archives
Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to
law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be
inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement
of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan
may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119,
21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment
shall be included in the documentary except annotations
which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are
depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised
recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to
the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God
and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub
Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of
vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to
know how their government is conducted. This right can be
enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education and civic training of
the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of
the hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will
be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a
way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot
capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be
primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review
of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan
is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be
checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for
broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings
will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from
the proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be allayed. The
possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the
bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just
determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility
that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before
the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness
of the trial -- which, it may be assumed, is the concern of
those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised
trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not be released
for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the
Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of
the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will
be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of
the trial can be served by audio-visual recordings without
impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the
production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty.
Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's
injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a
documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of
then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the
1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited
intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute matters of a public character."6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial.
But, at least, if a documentary record is made of the
proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be
checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any
attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary
recording of celebrated cases or causes clbres was made
was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard
Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of Quisumbing, J. Although earlier I respectfully Dissented as I
my lay friends found similarly moving. An educational favor live TV coverage, I now concur in the result.
television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther Pardo, J. I concur with the denial of the motion for
leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the reconsideration only. The conditions are inadequate. I join J.
document in full, in four installments, several months after the Vitug's opinion.
case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with a verdict Buena, J. I concur with the Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
of acquittal. Ynares-Santiago, J. I concur with the separate opinion of J.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound Jose Vitug.
respect for the painstaking way in which the truth was De Leon, Jr., J. I concur with Separate Opinion of Justice
searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with Vitug.
uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. I concur but only in the denial with
burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge finality of the MR.
and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the D. RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL AND
courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of TRIAL OF CIVILIANS BY MILITARY COURTS
television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the
broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of
G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987
completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, OTHONIEL V. JIMENEZ,
would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and
ESTER MISA-JIMENEZ, CARLOS LAZARO,
with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an
REYNALDO MACLANG, MAGDALENA DE LOS
agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its
SANTOS-MACLANG, TEODORICO N. DIESMOS,
impact on the public understanding.
RENE J. MARCIANO, DANILO R. DE OCAMPO,
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our
VICTORIANO C. AMADO and MAC
educational system, is now a desperate need. 7
ACERON, petitioners,
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it
vs.
was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, THE TRIAL
of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice
COUNSEL OF MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, and
by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents.
are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the
No. L-69882 May 22, 1987
same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-
EDUARDO OLAGUER, OTHONIEL JIMENEZ,
visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for
REYNALDO MACLANG and ESTER MISA-
public information and exhibition, after passions have
JIMENEZ, petitioners,
subsided.
vs.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, MILITARY
former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby
COMMISSION NO. 34, JUDGE ADVOCATE
ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan,
GENERAL, AFP, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded
and THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondents.
in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sabino Padilla, Jr. and Jose B. Puerto for petitioner Othoniel
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public
Jimenez.
under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b)
Fulgencio Factoran for petitioners Maclang and Magdalena
cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
de los Santos-Maclang
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated
Rene Saguisag for petitioner Mac Aceron.
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings;
Joaquin Misa for petitioner Ester Misa-Jimenez.
(c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
Jejomar Binay for petitioners Reynaldo Maclang and
purposes only and shall be made without comment except
Magdalena de los Santos-Maclang.
such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
Jaime Villanueua for petitioner Danilo R. de Ocampo.
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the
Joker P. Arroyo, Lorenzo M. Tanada and Rene Sarmiento for
recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its
petitioners Eduardo Olaguer and Othoniel Jimenez.
decision in all the cases against the former President shall be
Wigberto Tanada for petitioners Olaguer and Maclang
prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other
sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure
GANCAYCO, J.:
that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of
Filed with this Court are two Petitions wherein the
the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and
fundamental question is whether or not a military tribunal has
control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and
the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open
shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
and functioning. The two Petitions have been consolidated
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings
inasmuch as the issues raised therein are interrelated.
for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in
On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo B.
the National Museum and the Records Management and
Olaguer, Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance
Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los Santos
with law.
Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R.
SO ORDERED.
De Ocampo and Victoriano C. Amado were arrested by the
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-
military authorities. They were all initially detained at Camp
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Crame in Quezon City. They were subsequently transferred to
Bellosillo, J. I am for full live coverage hence I maintain my
the detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except
original view; nonetheless. I concur.
for petitioner Olaguer who remained in detention at Camp
Kapunan, J. I maintain my original view prohibiting live T.V.
Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron voluntarily surrendered to the
and radio coverage and concur with the separate opinion of
authorities sometime in June, 1980 and was, thereafter, also
Justice Vitug.
incarcerated at Camp Bagong Diwa. All of the petitioners are
civilians.
On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for
subversion 1 upon the recommendation of the respondent
Judge Advocate General and the approval of the respondent
Minister of National Defense. 2 The case was designated as
Criminal Case No. MC-34-1.
On June 13. 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines 3 created the respondent Military
Commission No 34 to try tile criminal case filed against the
petitioners. 4 On July 30, 1980, an amended charge sheet was
filed for seven (7) offenses, namely: (1) unlawful possession
of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to
assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to
assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco
Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate
Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5)
arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo
Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. 5 Sometime
thereafter, trial ensued.
In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August 19,
1980, the petitioners went to this Court and filed the instant
Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus." 6 They sought to
enjoin the respondent Military Commission No. 34 from
proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought
their release from detention by way of a writ of habeas
corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that military
commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses
alleged to have been committed during the period of martial
law. They also maintain that the proceedings before the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation
of their constitutional right to due process of law.
On September 23, 1980, the respondents filed their Answer to
the Petition. 7 On November 20, 1980, the petitioners
submmitted their reply to the Answer. 8 In a Motion filed with
this Court on July 25, 1981, petitioner Olaguer requested that
the Petition be considered withdrawn as far as he is
concerned. 9 In the Resolution of this Court dated July 30,
1981, the said prayer was granted." 10 On August 31, 1984,
the respondents filed a Rejoinder to the Reply submitted by
the petitioners. 11
On December 4, 1984, pending the resolution of the Petition,
the respondent Military Commission No. 34 passed sentence
convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty
of death by electrocution. Thus, on February 14, 1985,
petitioners Olaguer, Maclang and Othoniel and Ester Jimenez
went to this Court and filed the other instant Petition, this time
for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
They also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. 12 The respondents named in the Petition are the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Military Commission No. 34, the Judge Advocate General,
the Minister of National Defense and the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons.
In sum, the second Petition seeks to enjoin the said
respondents from taking any further action on the case against
the petitioners, and from implementing the judgment of
conviction rendered by the respondent Military Commission
No. 34 for the reason that the same is null and void. The
petitioners also seek the return of all property taken from
them by the respondents concerned. Their other arguments in
the earlier Petition are stressed anew.
On August 9, 1985, the respondents filed their Answer to the
Petition. 13 On September 12, 1985, this Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
executing the Decision of the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 14 On February 18, 1986, the petitioners
submitted an extensive Brief. 15 Thereafter, and in due time,
the cases were submitted for decision.
In resolving these two Petitions, We have taken into account
several supervening events which have occurred hitherto, to
wit
(1) On January 17, 1981, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 2045 officially lifting martial law in
the Philippines. The same Proclamation revoked General
Order No. 8 (creating military tribunals) and directed that "the
military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby
dissolved upon final determination of case's pending therein
which may not be transferred to the civil courts without
irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on
double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render
prosecution of the cases difficult, if not impossible."; and
(2) Petitioner Ester Misa-Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty in January, 1981. On the other hand, petitioners
Eduardo Olaguer and Othoniel Jimenez obtained provisional
liberty on January 23, 1986. 16 The rest of the petitioners
have been released sometime before or after President
Corazon C. Aquino assumed office in February, 1986.
The sole issue in habeas corpus proceedings is
detention. 17 When the release of the persons in whose behalf
the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is
effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes
moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners
have been released from their confinement in military
detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become
moot and academic.
We come now to the other matters raised in the two Petitions.
The main issue raised by the petitioners is whether or not
military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try
civilians for offenses allegedly committed during martial law
when civil courts are open and functioning.
The petitioners maintain that military commissions or
tribunals do not have such jurisdiction and that the
proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No.
34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right to due
process of law. The respondents, however, contend otherwise.
The issue on the jurisdiction of military commissions or
tribunals to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed
before, and more particularly during a period of martial law,
as well as the other issues raised by the petitioners, have been
ruled upon by a divided Supreme Court in Aquino, Jr. v.
Military Commission No. 2. 19 The pertinent portions of the
main opinion of the Court are as follows
We hold that the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has
been lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction
to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner.
l. The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of
Martial Law ... on September 21, 1972, ... is valid and
constitutional and that its continuance is justified by the
danger posed to the public safety. 20
2. To preserve the safety of the nation in times of national
peril, the President of the Philippines necessarily possesses
broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements
of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has authorized in
General Order No. 8 . . . the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, to create military tribunals to try and decide
cases "of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them." In General Order No. 12 ... , the military
tribunals were vested with jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil
courts," among others, over crimes against public order,
violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws
on firearms, and other crimes which, in the face of the
emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion
and preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. ...
These measures he had the authority to promulgate, since this
Court recognized that the incumbent President (President
Marcos), under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3 of Article
XVII of the new (1973) Constitution, had the authority to
"promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the
period of martial law essential to the security and preservation
of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social
liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to
prevent the resurgence of the rebellion or insurrection or
secession or the threat thereof ... " 21
3. Petitioner nevertheless insists that he being a civilian, his
trial by military commission deprives him of his right to due
process, since in his view the due process guaranteed by the
Constitution to persons accused of "ordinary" crimes means
judicial process. This argument ignores the reality of the
rebellion and the existence of martial law. It is, of course,
essential that in a martial law situation, the martial law
administrator must have ample and sufficient means to quell
the rebellion and restore civil order. Prompt and effective trial
and punishment of offenders have been considered as
necessary in a state of martial law, as a mere power of
detention may be wholly inadequate for the exigency. 22 " ...
martial law ... creates an exception to the general rule of
exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders
offenses against the law of war, as well as those of a civil
character, triable, ... by military tribunals. 23 "Public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial
process." 24 . ... "The immunity of civilians from military
jurisdiction must, however, give way in areas governed by
martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety,
legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals
authorized to exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in
courts. 25 . ..."
xxx xxx xxx
5. ... The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any
particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military
tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form,
notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial
tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due
process of law does not necessarily mean a judicial
proceeding in the regular courts. 26 ...
This ruling has been affirmed, although not unanimously, in at
least six other cases, to wit: Gumaua v.Espino, 27Buscayno v.
Enrile, 28 Sison v. Enrile, 29 Luneta v. Special Military
Commission No. 1, 30 Ocampo v. Military Commission No.
25, 31 and Buscayno v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and
25. 32
These rulings notwithstanding, the petitioners anchor their
argument on their prayer that the ruling in Aquino, Jr. be
appraised anew and abandoned or modified accordingly. After
a thorough deliberation on the matter, We find cogent basis
for re-examining the same.
Some recent pronouncements of this Court could be
considered as attempts to either abandon or modify the ruling
in Aquino, Jr.
In De Guzman v. Hon. Leopando, et al., 33 an officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and several other persons
were charged with Serious Illegal Detention before the Court
of First Instance of Maguindanao sometime in October, 1982.
The military officer sought to effect the transfer of the case
against him to the General Court Martial for trial pursuant to
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1850. The trial court
disallowed such transfer for the reason that the said Decree is
unconstitutional inasmuch as it violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution, as well as the
constitutional provisions on social justice, the speedy
disposition of cases, the republican form of government, the
integrity and independence of the judiciary, and the
supremacy of civilian authority over the military,
When the matter was elevated to this Court by way of a
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the Court
decided that a ruling on the constitutional issues raised was
not necessary. With the view that practical and procedural
difficulties will result from the transfer sought, this Court
resolved to dismiss the Petition for lack of merit.
In Animas v. The Minister of National Defense, 34 a military
officer and several civilians were charged with murder alleged
to have been committed sometime in November, 1971. All of
the said accused were recommended for prosecution before a
military tribunal. in the course of the proceedings, the said
accused went to this Court on a Petition for certiorari and
challenged the jurisdiction of the military tribunal over their
case. The petitioners contended that General Order No. 59
upon which the jurisdiction of the military tribunal is
anchored refers only to the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives in relation to other crimes committed
with a political complexion. They stressed that the alleged
murder was devoid of any political complexion.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez,
Jr., ordered the transfer of the criminal proceedings to the civil
courts after noting that with martial law having been lifted in
the country in 1981, all cases pending before the military
tribunals should, as a general rule, be transferred to the civil
courts. The Court was also of the view that the crime alleged
to have been committed did not have any political
complexion. We quote the pertinent portions of the Decision
of the Court, to wit
Inspite or because of the ambiguous nature of ... civilian
takeover of jurisdiction was concerned and notwithstanding
the shilly-shallying and vacillation characteristic of its
implementation, this Court relied on the enunciated policy of
normalization in upholding the primacy of civil courts. This
policy meant that as many cases as possible involving
civilians being tried by military tribunals as could be
transferred to civil courts should be turned over immediately.
In case of doubt, the presumption was in favor of civil courts
always trying civilian accused.
xxx xxx xxx
The crime for which the petitioners were charged was
committed ... long before the proclamation of martial law. ...
Now that it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of
the past, hopefully never more to return, there is no more
reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be
retained, at this time, by a military tribunal.
We agree with the dissenting views of then Justice, now Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee 35 and Madame Justice Cecilia
Munoz Palma 36 in Aquino, Jr. in so far as they hold that
military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try
civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open
and functioning.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions
(where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty),
the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. 37 The
trial contemplated by the due process clause of the
Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military
commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called,
are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. As
explained by Justice Teehankee in his separate dissenting
opinion-
... Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil
offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial
process, not by executive or military process.
Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly
established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts,
which have "exclusive power to hear and determine those
matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a
citizen. 38
Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a
military government and even on the premise that martial law
continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses
committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil
courts that have remained open and have been regularly
functioning. 39 ...
And in Toth v. Quarles, 40 the U.S. Supreme Court
furtherstressed that the assertion of military authority over
civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander-
in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
The U.S. Supreme Court aptly pointed out ... , in ruling that
discharged army veterans (estimated to number more than
22.5 million) could not be rendered "helpless before some
latter-day revival of old military charges" and subjected to
military trials for offenses committed while they were in the
military service prior to their discharge, that "the presiding
officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and
independence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary
and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military law
officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and
procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these
differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on
the actions of the court martial by the officer who convenes it,
selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who
usually has direct command authority over its members is a
pervasive one in military law, despite strenuous efforts to
eliminate the danger."
The late Justice Black ... added that (A) Court-Martial is not
yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a
significant degree a specialized part of the over-all
mechanism by which military discipline is preserved," and
that ex-servicemen should be given "the benefits of a civilian
court trial when they are actually civilians ... Free countries of
the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to
maintaining discipline among troops in active service.
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the
legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid
him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or
those of his authorized military representatives. 41 Following
the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws as
when an individual should be considered to have violated the
law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. 42 It is not, and it
cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through
the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the
land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so
today and as they did during the period of martial law in the
country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction
over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts. 43 To have it otherwise
would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process
of the civilian concerned.
In addition to this pronouncement, We take note of the
observation made by the Solicitor General to the effect that
the death penalty imposed upon the petitioners by the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to have been
rendered too hastily to the prejudice to the petitioners, and in
complete disregard of their constitutional right to adduce
evidence on their behalf. We quote the pertinent portions of
the Manifestation submitted by the Solicitor General, to wit
Prior to the session of December 4, 1984, when the
respondent Commission rendered its sentence, petitioners
have requested the prosecution to provide them with copies of
the complete record of trial, including the evidences presented
against them, but the prosecution dillydallied and failed to
provide them with the document requested. According to
petitioners, they needed the documents to adequately prepare
for their defense.
But a few days before December 4, 1984 the prosecution
suddenly furnished them with certain transcripts of the
proceedings which were not complete. Petitioner Othoniel
Jimenez was scheduled to start with the presentation of his
evidence on said date and he requested that his first witness
be served with subpoena. The other petitioners, as agreed
upon, were to present their evidence after the first one,
Othoniel Jimenez, has finished presenting his evidence. But
on that fateful day, December 4, 1984, the witness requested
to be served with subpoena was not around, because as shown
by the records, he was not even served with the requested
subpoena. But in spite of that, respondent Military
Commission proceeded to ask each one of the petitioners if
they are ready to present their evidence.
Despite their explanation that Othoniel Jimenez cannot
proceed because the prosecution, which performs the duties
and functions of clerk of court, failed to subpoena his witness,
and that the other petitioners were not ready because it was
not yet their turn to do so, the Commission abruptly decided
that petitioners are deemed to have waived the presentation of
evidence in their behalf, and considered the case submitted for
resolution.
After a recess of only twenty-five (25) minutes, the session
was resumed and the Commission rendered its sentence
finding petitioners guilty of all the charges against them and
imposing upon them the penalty of death by electrocution. 44
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction to try the
petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its
jurisdiction when, as observed by the Solicitor General, the
said tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of
the accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation
of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal that
rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of
jurisdiction. 45
Moreover, We find that Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January
17, 1981) officially lifting martial law in the Philippines and
abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the
national emergency effectively divests the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals for
that matter) of its supposed authority to try civilians,
including the herein petitioners.
The main opinion in Aquino, Jr. is premised on the theory that
military tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians as long
as the period of national emergency (brought about by public
disorder and similar causes) lasts. Undoubtedly, Proclamation
No. 2045 is an acknowledgment on the part of the Executive
Department of the Government that the national emergency
no longer exists. Thereafter, following the theory relied upon
in the main opinion, all military tribunals should henceforth
be considered functus officio in their relationship with
civilians.
By virtue of the proclamation itself, all cases against civilians
pending therein should eventually be transferred to the civil
courts for proper disposition. The principle of double
jeopardy would not be an obstacle to such transfer because an
indispensable element of double jeopardy is that the first
tribunal which tried the case must be of competent
jurisdiction. 46 As discussed earlier, the military tribunals are
devoid of the required jurisdiction.
We take this opportunity to reiterate that as long as the civil
courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
committed by them. Whether or not martial law has been
proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of
no moment. The imprimatur for this observation is found in
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit
A state of martial law, does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ. (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision in the fundamental law is just one of the many
steps taken by the Filipino people towards the restoration of
the vital role of the judiciary in a free country-that of the
guardian of the Constitution and the dispenser of justice
without fear or favor.
No longer should military tribunals or commissions exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by
them when the civil courts are open and functioning. No
longer may the exclusive judicial power of the civil courts,
beginning with the Supreme Court down to the lower
courts 47 be appropriate by any military body or tribunal, or
even diluted under the guise of a state of martial law, national
security and other similar labels.
At this juncture, We find it appropriate to quote a few
paragraphs from the ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez
inAnimas v. The Minister of National Defense , 48 viz
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common
crimes and civilian(s) accused at a time when all civil courts
were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes one
of the saddest chapters in the history of the Philippine
judiciary.
The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by the
glorification of military tribunals, the instability and
insecurity felt by many members of the judiciary due to
various causes both real and imagined, and the many judicial
problems spawned by extended authoritarian rule which
effectively eroded judicial independence and self-respect will
require plenty of time and determined efforts to cure.
The immediate return to civil courts of all cases which
properly belong to them is only a beginning.
And in his separate concurring opinion in Animas, Mr. Chief
Justice Teehankee had this to say
I only wish to add that the great significance of our judgment
in this case is that we reestablish and reinstate the
fundamental principle based on civilian supremacy over the
military as urged in vain in my dissent in the case of Benigno
S. Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2, et al. that
"Civilians placed on trial for offenses under general law are
entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or
military process. Judicial power is vested by the Constitution
exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
as are duly established by law. Military commissions, or
tribunals, are not courts and do not form part of the judicial
system. Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we
under a military government and even on the premise that
martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot
try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses
committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil
courts that have remained open and have been regularly
functioning.
xxx xxx xxx
The terrible consequences of subjecting civilians to trial by
military process is best exemplified in the sham military trial
of the martyred former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.,
whereby he was deprived (1) by the summary ex parte
investigation by the Chief prosecution staff of the JAGO of
his right to be informed of the charges against him and of his
right to counsel as expressly recognized by Section 20 of the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution; (2) of his vested
statutory right to a preliminary investigation of the subversion
charges against him before the proper court of first instance as
required under Section 5 of the Anti-Subversion Act, R.A.
1700 and of the other charges against him before the proper
civilian officials and to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him under R.A. 5180; (3) of the right to be
tried by judicial process, by the regular independent courts of
justice, with all the specific constitutional, statutory and
procedural safeguards embodied in the judicial process and
presided over not by military officers; and (4) of the right to
appeal to the regular appellate courts and to judicial review by
this Court in the event of conviction and imposition of a
sentence of death or life imprisonment which the charges
carry and wherein a qualified majority of ten (10) votes for
affirmance of the death penalty is required. In fine, he was
denied due process of law as guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights which further ordains that "No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law."Worse, his trial by a military tribunal created by the then
President and composed of the said President's own military
subordinates without tenure and of non-lawyers (except the
law member) and of whose decision the President is the final
reviewing authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces deprived him of a basic constitutional right to be heard
by a fair and impartial tribunal, considering that the said
President had publicly declared the evidence against
petitioner "not only strong (but) overwhelming" and thereby
prejudged and predetermined his guilt, and none of his
military subordinates could be expected to go against their
Commander-in-Chief's declaration.
Hopefully, an these aberrations now belong to the dead and
nightmarish past, when time-tested doctrines, to borrow a
phrase from the then Chief Justice, "shrivelled in the
effulgence of the overpowering rays of martial rule. 49
As stated earlier, We have been asked to re-examine a
previous ruling of the Court with a view towards abandoning
or modifying the same. We do so now but not without careful
reflection and deliberation on Our part. Certainly, the rule of
stare decisis is entitled to respect because stability in
jurisprudence is desirable. Nonetheless, reverence for
precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when
constitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise.
Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified
should be abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more
important than anything else is that this Court should be
right. 50
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold,
that a military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over
civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as
the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned. 51 For the same reasons, Our
pronouncement in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No.
2 52 and all decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they
are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed
abandoned.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petitions
for habeas corpus are DISMISSED for having become moot
and academic. The Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
hereby GRANTED. The creation of the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 to try civilians like the petitioners is
hereby declared unconstitutional and all its proceedings are
deemed null and void. The temporary restraining order issued
against the respondents enjoining them from executing the
Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 is
hereby made permanent and the said respondents are
permanently prohibited from further pursuing Criminal Case
No. MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The sentence rendered
by the respondent Military Commission No. 34 imposing the
death penalty on the petitioners is hereby vacated for being
null and void, and all the items or properties taken from the
petitioners in relation to the said criminal case should be
returned to them immediately. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernando, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C. J., concurring:
I hail the Court's unanimous judgment 1 vacating and setting
aside the penalty of death by electrocution summarily
imposed by respondent military commission on December 4,
1984 upon the principal petitioners Eduardo Olaguer,
Othoniel Jimenez, Reynaldo Maclang and Ester Misa Jimenez
for lack of jurisdiction of military commissions over civilians,
and expressly overturning and rejecting the contrary 1975
ruling in Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No.
2 2 and subsequent cases, issued during the darkest chapter of
our history when time-tested doctrines guaranteeing a person's
right to due process in preservation of his life and liberty,
shrivelled in the effulgence of the overpowering rays of
martial rule." We uphold once again the supremacy of the
Constitution and of the Rule of Law and of civilian authority
over the military.
1. As petitioners submitted in apparent futility at the time in
view of the Aquino ruling, they were denied from the very
beginning elementary due process which guarantees their
constitutional right to an impartial trial because, prescinding
from civilians' right to trial by judicial, not military, process,
the President (Commander-in-Chief) and the Defense
Minister who were the supposed targets of petitioners'
conspiracy, were also the very authorities who personally
approved the filing of the charges against them and referred
them to the respondent commission for trial, and as reviewing
authorities, had the power to reverse or modify every
judgment of respondent commission, even a judgment of
acquittal; furthermore, the President and the Defense Minister
had the power directly or indirectly to substitute at pleasure
the members of respondent commission, assign them as
subordinates to more hazardous or difficult duties and to
promote or prevent their promotion to higher rank. They
could hardly be expected to go against their superiors'
declaration of the "overwhelming" evidence against the
accused. As stressed in my dissent in Aquino:
Petitioner's plea that his trial by a military tribunal created by
the President and composed of the President's own military
subordinates without tenure and of non-lawyers (except the
law member) and of whose decision the President is the final
reviewing authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces deprives him of a basic constitutional right to be heard
by a fair and impartial tribunal considering that the President
has publicly declared the evidence against petitioner "not only
strong (but) overwhelming" and in petitioner's view thereby
prejudged and predetermined his guilt merits consideration.
In Petitioner's view, he has been publicly indicted and his
guilt prejudged by the President when in a nationwide press
conference on August 24, 1971 following the Plaza Miranda
bombing three days earlier of the Liberal Party proclamation
meeting, the President charged him and disclosed evidence in
the possession of the government linking petitioner to some
illegal and subversive activities, in 1965-1971, which are
virtually the same charges now filed against him before
respondent military commission, and declared the evidence
against petitioner "not only strong (but) over- whelming The
President explained on the same occasion that in not acting
against petitioner, he had erred on the side of generosity as
wen as of liberality hoping that good sense may someday
catch up with him" since petitioner was "the only opposition
senator left in the Senate" after the [Plaza Miranda] bombing,
but that he did not know "what will happen later on, because,
of course, the military insist that we must not make any
exceptions to the general rule.
While one may agree that the President as Commander-in-
Chief would discharge his duty as the final reviewing
authority with fealty to his oath "to do justice to every man,"
particularly because of his renowned legal sagacity and
experience, still under the enviromental facts where the
military appears to have been impressed by the President's
appraisal of the evidence and without casting any reflection
on the integrity of the members of respondent military
commission which petitioner himself acknowledges, the
doctrine consistently held by the Court that "elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal" and that "An suitors ... are entitled to
nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly
free, disinterested and impartial tribunal" cans for application
in the present case. 3
The then President had himself acknowledged the
indispensability of the judicial process, stating in the same
nationwide press conference of August 24, 1971 that:
I am a lawyer, my training is oriented towards the protection
of the Bin of Rights, because if you will remember, I have
repeatedly said, that if it were not for the Bill of Rights I
would not be here now. If it were not for the judicial process,
I would not be President of the Republic of the
Philippines. ... 4
Yet, he denied to Aquino the very self-same right to due
process and judicial process.
2. The total unacceptability of military trials for civilians may
be appreciated from the fate and ordeal of petitioners. Since
their arrest on December 24, 1979, they had been
continuously confined for over five years (without physical
access to lawyers, witnesses and court records in the case of
Eduardo Olaguer 5 ) and spent seven Christmases in
confinement, before their provisional release on January 23,
1986 (save petitioner Ester Misa Jimenez whose provisional
release was earlier granted in January, 1981). The extreme
difficulties encountered by civilian counsels in defending
them before respondent military commission can best be seen
from their written motions/manifestations of withdrawal as
such counsel. Former Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada and Atty.
Wigberto Tanada had previously withdrawn as civilian
counsel for petitioner Eduardo Olaguer.
Civilian counsel Sabino Padilla, Jr. for petitioner Othoniel
Jimenez was likewise constrained to file on January 10, 1983
his Motion to Withdraw Appearance, stating the following:
1. In the hearing of March 2, 1982, the prosecution moved for
the discharge of the accused Carlos Lazaro and Teodorico
Diesmos The prosecution alleged that the requirements of
Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had been complied
with. Considering that trial had commenced one year and a
half before the prosecution made this move, the defense
vehemently objected. This Military Commission ruled:
LAW MEMBER:
Please, just listen. We are of the view that this Commission
has no authority to discharge the accused Carlos Lazaro and
accused Teodorico Diesmos from the Charge Sheet to be
utilized as state witnesses. In the same manner that the herein
accused have been included in the Charge Sheet upon the
approval of the appointing authority, the exclusion or
discharge of any of them should likewise carry the approval
of the appointing authority. Therefore, the matter of the
discharge of the said two (2) accused should be addressed to
the appointing authority for his consideration. (Tsn, March 2,
1982, pp. 42-43)
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the start of the hearing last December 13, 1982, the
prosecution informed this Military Commission and the
defense that on December 11, 1982 (a Saturday), the Minister
of National Defense had ordered the discharge of the accused
Lazaro and Diesmos and that the prosecution would be
presenting these accused in that hearing.
In view of the vital implications of such a discharge on the
conduct of the defense of the other accused, all three counsel
of choice immediately moved that the hearing be postponed
or that witnesses other than Lazaro and Diesmos be presented
in that hearing, to allow counsel to take to the Supreme Court
the ruling of the Minister of National Defense as well as this
Military Commission's abdication of a trial court's
jurisdiction to grant or deny a prosecution motion to
discharge an accused.
To the complete surprise and dismay of defense counsel of
choice, the prosecution insisted on presenting Lazaro and
Diesmos before the other accused could take to the Supreme
Court the legality and propriety of their discharge as accused
to be state witnesses. Counsel of choice had no alternative but
to withdraw from the proceedings that day.
Subsequent events disclosed why Lazaro and Diesmos had to
be presented as witnesses on that day, December 13, 1982.
They were to recite, as indeed they recited, a newly fabricated
and fantastic story linking (three years after the fact) the
present accused with the accused in the We Forum case, who
were being arraigned that afternoon in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. Pursuant to this scenario, all the
newspapers the following day carried the same release that
the accused herein and those in the We Forum were members
of one conspiracy.
It has thus become abundantly clear to the undersigned
counsel that under the present circumstances any further
participation on his part in the proceedings before this
Military Commission would not only be futile but also bring
disgrace and dishonor to himself and to the legal profession . 6
Civilian counsel Joaquin L. Misa for his close kin, Ester Misa
Jimenez, after prefatory remarks that he "had never appeared
before in a military court land] entertained a degree of
confidence in the quality of military justice land] was reared
with a healthy regard for military officers" stated in his
written manifestation dated January 10, 1983 that:
... many events in the course of these proceedings have eroded
the confidence of the undersigned in ultimately obtaining
justice from this Honorable Commission.
The last straws so to speak, were the events of December 13,
1982. Three hearings of this case prior to the December 13
hearing were cancelled or postponed upon motion of the
Prosecution on the shallow and never explained excuse that
their next supposed witness, Col. Beroya, was not
available. On December 13, the Prosecution read into the
record an alleged resolution on the state witness question by
the Minister of National Defense (Note that up to this writing
the undersigned has not been served with a copy of that
alleged resolution perhaps because it was written on
stationery marked CONFIDENTIAL). After the supposed
resolution by the Minister of National Defense was read into
the record, the undersigned moved for a postponement of even
one week to afford the undersigned the opportunity to either
ask for a reconsideration by the Minister or raise the matter
to the Supreme Court on Certiorari. The Prosecution's
objection was so vehement that it was incomprehensible to
the undersigned why a simple motion could evoke such a
violent reaction from the Prosecution (Cols. Ridao and
Disierto seemed to be outdoing each other in the decibels of
their objections). This was especially baffling to the
undersigned because theretofore in several instances when the
undersigned inquired if there had been a ruling by "the higher
authorities" on the question of the state witnesses, The
Prosecution always assured the undersigned and the other
civilian defense counsel that if a ruling is made, and it is
adverse to the defense we will be given enough time to deal
with the problem.
As the Commission well knows the defense motion for
postponement was denied and two (2) accused who were
released from the case testified in the absence of all the
civilian defense counsel. Only upon reading the newspaper
the next day was the indecent haste of the Prosecution to
present the two (2) witnesses explained. The Prosecution, and
the Commission by going along with the Prosecution,
apparently wanted to time the newly fabricated testimony of
Diesmos and Lazaro linking this case with the We Forum case
the arraignment of which was held on December 13, in the
afternoon.
The orchestration and synchronization of such testimony in
this case (at the expense of denying the accused recourse
against the resolution of the Minister) with the arraignment in
the We Forum case taken together with the Identically worded
newspaper stories appearing in all the dailies now in
publication has made it clear to the undersigned that this
case will not be decided on its merits but on the convenience
that it affords to the pursuit of the government's objectives. 7
Respondent military commission furthermore on December 4,
1984 summarily called all proceedings to a halt, denied any
continuation of the case and abruptly declared the case
submitted without any evidence for the defense,
notwithstanding that it had not subpoenaed the first defense
witness for petitioner Othoniel Jimenez as duly requested,
while the other petitioners were not expected to be ready with
their witnesses until later hearings; and after a mere 25-
minute recess, rendered its "judgment" imposing the death
penalty by electrocution on all the above-named petitioners.
No objection to this bizzarre procedure came from military
counsels who were assigned to represent petitioners after their
civilian counsels' withdrawal, for as the Solicitor General now
manifested, "the records show, they more often than not
practically acted for the prosecution rather than as defense
counsels. " 7a
3. I hail the Court's reinstatement of the settled ruling in this
jurisdiction that deprivation and disregard of the
constitutional rights of an accused ousts the court or tribunal
of jurisdiction, which had been greatly eroded. This
reenforces the 1987 Constitution's reaffirmation of the role of
the Supreme Court as the guarantor of the constitutional and
human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction with the
function of seeing to it that these rights are respected and
enforced. As the Court stressed in Gumabon vs. Director of
Bureau of Prisons 8 "Once a deprivation of a constitutional
right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 9 So
accused persons who are deprived of their constitutional right
of a speedy trial should be set at liberty. 10 Likewise persons
detained indefinitely without charges so much so that the
detention becomes punitive and not merely preventive in
character are entitled to regain their freedom, for the spirit and
the letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the
precepts of human rights and freedom that a person be
detained indefinitely without any charges.
4. Indeed, Art. VII, section 18 of the 1987 Constitution,
drawing upon the sad lessons of the excessive concentration
of powers in the Chief Executive in the previous Constitutions
which enabled him to exercise absolute power to the point of
taking over the entire government, has provided for measures
to curtail such abuse of executive power. The late former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, pillar and champion of the
Rule of Law, chairman of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission's Judiciary Committee and Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court at the time of the imposition of martial law in
1972, summarized these salutary changes, in his last public
address, as follows:
1. Under the New Constitution, martial law does not suspend
the operation of the New Constitution or supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies.
Neither does it authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians when civil courts
are able to function.
2. Martial law does not supplant the civil courts when the
same are able to function.
3. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
4. Martial law may not be declared upon the ground of
imminent danger of invasion or rebellion. in the event of such
danger, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress the danger, without declaring martial law or
suspending the privilege of the will it.
5. Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation of
martial law, the President shall report the same to Congress in
person or in writing.
6. Congress may, by a majority vote of all its members,
revoke the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ, which action of Congress may not be
set aside by the President.
7. The proclamation of martial law or suspension or the
privilege of the writ by the President, may not exceed sixty
(60) days without the concurrence of Congress.
8. The Supreme Court has been expressly authorized to
"review in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty (30) days from its filing."
9. Under the "1973 Constitution," as amended, at least ten
(10) votes of the members of the Supreme Court were
necessary to invalidate or declare a law unconstitutional,
regardless of the number of vacancies in the Supreme Court
or the number of its members who participated in the
deliberations on the issues involved in the case, and voted
thereon. Under the New Constitution a simple majority of the
members who took part in such deliberation and cast their
votes thereon is sufficient.
10. In the case of suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
same does not apply to persons who have not been placed
under the custody of a court of justice.
11. In case of suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
person detained must be released unless judicially charged
within three (3) days. 11
These substantial checks by the legislature as well as by the
judiciary on the Chief Executive's power to proclaim martial
law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus were meant to forestall a recurrence of the long and
horrible nightmare of the past regime when one single clause,
the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution then in
force that authorized the President to declare martial law was
held to have nullified the entire Constitution and the Bill of
Rights and justified the then President's taking over "absolute
command" of the nation and that the people could "only trust
and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost
patriotism, (he) will not fail them." Thus, persons held under
Presidential Commitment or Detention Orders were detained
indefinitely without charges, yet had no recourse to the courts.
Even if they were acquitted in court, the military would not
release them until and unless the then President lifted the
preventive detention order. 12 It was a long and horrible
nightmare when our people's rights, freedoms and liberties
were sacrificed at the altar of "national security" even though
it involved nothing more than the President-dictator's
perpetuation in office and the security of his relatives and
some officials in high positions and their protection from
public accountability of their acts of venality and deception in
government, many of which were of public knowledge.
Draconian decrees were issued whereby many were locked up
indefinitely for "rumor-mongering," "unlawful use of means
of publication and unlawful utterances, and alarms and
scandals." While the people for the most part suffered in
silence and waited, others never gave up the struggle for truth,
freedom, justice and democracy, a common commitment
which is what makes a people a nation instead of a gathering
of self-seeking individuals. The national will was
systematically undermined to the point, of national mockery,
that the day of imposition of martial law was proclaimed as
"National Thanksgiving Day." As the Court observed
through Mr. Justice Gutierrez in Animas vs. Minister of
National Defense, 13 the era of martial law when military
tribunals, against all tenets of due process, were conferred
jurisdiction over common crimes and civilians, their
glorification with the downgrading of judicial prestige and
"the many judicial problems spawned by extended
authoritarian rule which effectively eroded judicial
independence and self-respect will require plenty of time and
determined efforts to cure."
5. The treacherous assassination on August 21, 1983 of the
martyred Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., within minutes of his arrival
at the Manila International Airport, although ringed with
2,000 soldiers, shocked and outraged the conscience of the
nation. After three years of exile following almost eight years
of detention since martial law, Aquino, although facing the
military commission's predetermined death sentence, supra,
yet refused proper travel documents, was returning home "to
strive for genuine national reconciliation founded on justice."
The late Senator Jose W. Diokno who passed away this year
was among the first victims of the martial law coup d'etat to
be locked up with Senator Aquino. In March, 1973, all of their
personal effects, including their eyeglasses were ominously
returned to their homes. Their wives' visitation privileges
were suspended and they lost all contact for over a month. It
turned out that Aquino had smuggled out of his cell a written
statement critical of the martial law regime. In swift
retribution, both of them were flown out blindfolded to the
army camp at Fort Laur in Nueva Ecija and kept in solitary
confinement in dark boarded cells with hardly any ventilation.
When their persons were produced before the Court on habeas
corpus proceedings, they were a pitiable sight having lost
about 30 to 40 lbs. in weight. Senator Diokno was to be
released in September, 1974 after almost two years of
detention. No charges of any kind were ever filed against him.
His only fault was that he was a possible rival for the
presidency.
Horacio Morales, Jr., 1977 TOYM awardee for government
service and then executive vice-president of the Development
Academy of the Philippines, was among the hard-working
government functionaries who had been radicalized and gave
up their government positions. Morales went underground on
the night he was supposed to receive his TOYM award,
declaring that "(F)or almost ten years, I have been an official
in the reactionary government, serviced the Marcos
dictatorship and all that it stands for, serving a ruling system
that has brought so much suffering and misery to the broad
masses of the Filipino people. (1) refuse to take any more part
of this. I have had enough of this regime's tyranny and
treachery, greed and brutality, exploitation and oppression of
the people," and "(I)n rejecting my position and part in the
reactionary government, I am glad to be finally free of being a
servant of foreign and local vested interest. I am happy to be
fighting side by side with the people." He was apprehended in
1982 and was charged with the capital crime of subversion,
until he was freed in March, 1986 after President Corazon C.
Aquino's assumption of office, together with other political
prisoners and detainees and prisoners of conscience in
fulfillment of her campaign pledge.
Countless others forfeited their lives and stand as witnesses to
the tyranny and repression of the past regime. Driven by their
dreams to free our motherland from poverty, oppression,
iniquity and injustice, many of our youthful leaders were to
make the supreme sacrifice. To mention a few: U.P. Collegian
editor Abraham Sarmiento, Jr., worthy son of an illustrious
member of the Court pricked the conscience of many as he
asked on the front page of the college paper: Sino ang kikibo
kung hindi tayo kikibo? Sino ang kikilos kung hindi tayo
kikilos? Kung hindi ngayon, kailan pa? 13a He was locked up
in the military camp and released only when he was near
death from a severe attack of asthma, to which he succumbed.
Another TOYM awardee, Edgar Jopson, an outstanding honor
student at the Ateneo University, instinctively pinpointed the
gut issue in 1971-he pressed for a "non-partisan
Constitutional Convention;" and demanded that the then
president-soon-to-turn dictator "put down in writing" that he
was not going to manipulate the Constitution to remove his
disqualification to run for a third term or perpetuate himself in
office and was called down as "son of a grocer." When as he
feared, martial law was declared, Jopson went underground to
continue the struggle and was to be waylaid and killed at the
age of 34 by 21 military troops as the reported head of the
rebel movement in Mindanao. 14 Another activist honor
student leader, Emmanuel Yap, son of another eminent
member of the Court, was to disappear on Valentine's Day in
1976 at the young age of 24, reportedly picked up by military
agents in front of Channel 7 in Quezon City, and never to be
seen again.
One of our most promising young leaders, Evelio B. Javier,
43, unarmed, governor of the province of Antique at 28, a
Harvard-trained lawyer, was mercilessly gunned down with
impunity in broad daylight at 10 a.m. in front of the provincial
capitol building by six mad-dog killers who riddled his body
with 24 bullets fired from M-16 armalite rifles (the standard
heavy automatic weapon of our military). He was just taking a
breather and stretching his legs from the tedious but tense
proceedings of the canvassing of the returns of the
presidential snap election in the capitol building. This was to
be the last straw and the bloodless EDSA revolt was soon to
unfold. The Court inJavier vs. Comelec, 15 through Mr.
Justice Cruz, "said these meager words in tribute to a fallen
hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because
he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly
silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and
fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight.
He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not
daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-
exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And
though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound
and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless,
fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the
enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would
impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement.
He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a
very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer
because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles
and stronger than lions." "
6. The greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human
memory. We must note here the unforgettable and noble
sacrifices of the countless brave and patriotic men and women
who feel as martyrs and victims during the long dark years of
the deposed regime. In vacating the death sentence imposed
on the petitioners who survived the holocaust,, we render
them simple justice and we redeem and honor the memory of
those who selflessly offered their lives for the restoration of
truth, decency, justice and freedom in our beloved land. Due
recognition must be given also that 85% of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines readily joined the EDSA revolt and
redeemed the honor of the military by recognizing civilian
supremacy and the supreme mandate given by the people to
the true winners of the elections. Witness the testimony of
Gen. Fidel V. Ramos now chief of the new Armed Forces of
the Philippines, as he recounted early last year his breakaway
from the past regime:
The Armed Forces of the Philippines had ceased to be the real
armed forces supposed to be the defender of the people. There
had developed an elite group within the AFP . . . and the AFP
no longer represented its rank and file and officers corps.
Mr. Marcos was no longer the same President that we used to
know, to whom we pledged our loyalty and dedicated our
services. He was no longer the able and capable commander-
in-chief whom we used to count on. He had already put his
personal interest, his family interest, above the interest of the
people.
The small people in the AFP and the Integrated National
Police were now being pushed around by powerful military
officers motivated by very selfish desires and intentions.
Many of those officers were now practically the servants of
powerful politicians. 16
The present PC/INP Chief, Major General Renato de Vina, on
the 85th anniversary of the Philippine Constabulary last
August 8th publicly stated that "for the perfidy of a few, we
owe the whole nation a sincere apology and a commitment to
intensively pursue our new program of reforms, to weed out
the misfits who bring discredit to our organization," and
solemnly pledged that "now and forever, your PC/INP stands
ready and committed to fight lawlessness, injustice and
oppression, as well as the sinister forces that continue to
threaten our stability and progress as a free country. We make
this solemn pledge here and now, before our entire nation,
before our Commander-in-Chief who is the personification of
our national honor and unity, before God who has always
blessed our people ... to consecrate our lives to the
protection and preservation of our national Ideals-of unity,
peace, justice and democracy."
7. The people by their overwhelming ratification of the 1987
Constitution at the plebiscite held last February 2nd
unequivocally reaffirmed their collective act of installing our
new government following the bloodless EDSA revolt. They
re fused to be deterred by the last-ditch efforts of the forces of
the Right and of the Left to derail our return to fun normalcy
and the restoration of our democratic institutions. They
proclaimed a renewed and vigorous faith in the democratic
process. Among the great changes introduced in the 1987
Constitution to harness the Presidential power to impose
martial law and strengthen the system of checks and balances
in our government were those made by the venerable late
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and his fellow members of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, hereinabove
enumerated. 17 With their work completed, and the 1987
Constitution decisively approved and ratified by the people,
Chief Justice Concepcion could then claim his eternal rest on
last May 3rd and leave us this legacy and caueat: "One thing,"
he said, "I have learned during the martial law regime, and
that is-that a Constitution is as good only as it is enforced. ...
the Primacy of the Law depends ultimately upon the people;
upon their awareness of this fact and their willingness and
readiness to assume the corresponding responsibility, in short,
upon their political maturity." 18
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C. J., concurring:
I hail the Court's unanimous judgment 1 vacating and setting
aside the penalty of death by electrocution summarily
imposed by respondent military commission on December 4,
1984 upon the principal petitioners Eduardo Olaguer,
Othoniel Jimenez, Reynaldo Maclang and Ester Misa Jimenez
for lack of jurisdiction of military commissions over civilians,
and expressly overturning and rejecting the contrary 1975
ruling in Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No.
2 2 and subsequent cases, issued during the darkest chapter of
our history when time-tested doctrines guaranteeing a person's
right to due process in preservation of his life and liberty,
shrivelled in the effulgence of the overpowering rays of
martial rule." We uphold once again the supremacy of the
Constitution and of the Rule of Law and of civilian authority
over the military.
1. As petitioners submitted in apparent futility at the time in
view of the Aquino ruling, they were denied from the very
beginning elementary due process which guarantees their
constitutional right to an impartial trial because, prescinding
from civilians' right to trial by judicial, not military, process,
the President (Commander-in-Chief) and the Defense
Minister who were the supposed targets of petitioners'
conspiracy, were also the very authorities who personally
approved the filing of the charges against them and referred
them to the respondent commission for trial, and as reviewing
authorities, had the power to reverse or modify every
judgment of respondent commission, even a judgment of
acquittal; furthermore, the President and the Defense Minister
had the power directly or indirectly to substitute at pleasure
the members of respondent commission, assign them as
subordinates to more hazardous or difficult duties and to
promote or prevent their promotion to higher rank. They
could hardly be expected to go against their superiors'
declaration of the "overwhelming" evidence against the
accused. As stressed in my dissent in Aquino:
Petitioner's plea that his trial by a military tribunal created by
the President and composed of the President's own military
subordinates without tenure and of non-lawyers (except the
law member) and of whose decision the President is the final
reviewing authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces deprives him of a basic constitutional right to be heard
by a fair and impartial tribunal considering that the President
has publicly declared the evidence against petitioner "not only
strong (but) overwhelming" and in petitioner's view thereby
prejudged and predetermined his guilt merits consideration.
In Petitioner's view, he has been publicly indicted and his
guilt prejudged by the President when in a nationwide press
conference on August 24, 1971 following the Plaza Miranda
bombing three days earlier of the Liberal Party proclamation
meeting, the President charged him and disclosed evidence in
the possession of the government linking petitioner to some
illegal and subversive activities, in 1965-1971, which are
virtually the same charges now filed against him before
respondent military commission, and declared the evidence
against petitioner "not only strong (but) over- whelming The
President explained on the same occasion that in not acting
against petitioner, he had erred on the side of generosity as
wen as of liberality hoping that good sense may someday
catch up with him" since petitioner was "the only opposition
senator left in the Senate" after the [Plaza Miranda] bombing,
but that he did not know "what will happen later on, because,
of course, the military insist that we must not make any
exceptions to the general rule.
While one may agree that the President as Commander-in-
Chief would discharge his duty as the final reviewing
authority with fealty to his oath "to do justice to every man,"
particularly because of his renowned legal sagacity and
experience, still under the enviromental facts where the
military appears to have been impressed by the President's
appraisal of the evidence and without casting any reflection
on the integrity of the members of respondent military
commission which petitioner himself acknowledges, the
doctrine consistently held by the Court that "elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal" and that "An suitors ... are entitled to
nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly
free, disinterested and impartial tribunal" cans for application
in the present case. 3
The then President had himself acknowledged the
indispensability of the judicial process, stating in the same
nationwide press conference of August 24, 1971 that:
I am a lawyer, my training is oriented towards the protection
of the Bin of Rights, because if you will remember, I have
repeatedly said, that if it were not for the Bill of Rights I
would not be here now. If it were not for the judicial process,
I would not be President of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . . 4
Yet, he denied to Aquino the very self-same right to due
process and judicial process.
2. The total unacceptability of military trials for civilians may
be appreciated from the fate and ordeal of petitioners. Since
their arrest on December 24, 1979, they had been
continuously confined for over five years (without physical
access to lawyers, witnesses and court records in the case of
Eduardo Olaguer 5 ) and spent seven Christmases in
confinement, before their provisional release on January 23,
1986 (save petitioner Ester Misa Jimenez whose provisional
release was earlier granted in January, 1981). The extreme
difficulties encountered by civilian counsels in defending
them before respondent military commission can best be seen
from their written motions/manifestations of withdrawal as
such counsel. Former Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada and Atty.
Wigberto Tanada had previously withdrawn as civilian
counsel for petitioner Eduardo Olaguer.
Civilian counsel Sabino Padilla, Jr. for petitioner Othoniel
Jimenez was likewise constrained to file on January 10, 1983
his Motion to Withdraw Appearance, stating the following:
1. In the hearing of March 2, 1982, the prosecution moved for
the discharge of the accused Carlos Lazaro and Teodorico
Diesmos The prosecution alleged that the requirements of
Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had been complied
with. Considering that trial had commenced one year and a
half before the prosecution made this move, the defense
vehemently objected. This Military Commission ruled:
LAW MEMBER:
Please, just listen. We are of the view that this Commission
has no authority to discharge the accused Carlos Lazaro and
accused Teodorico Diesmos from the Charge Sheet to be
utilized as state witnesses. In the same manner that the herein
accused have been included in the Charge Sheet upon the
approval of the appointing authority, the exclusion or
discharge of any of them should likewise carry the approval
of the appointing authority. Therefore, the matter of the
discharge of the said two (2) accused should be addressed to
the appointing authority for his consideration. (Tsn, March 2,
1982, pp. 42-43)
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the start of the hearing last December 13, 1982, the
prosecution informed this Military Commission and the
defense that on December 11, 1982 (a Saturday), the Minister
of National Defense had ordered the discharge of the accused
Lazaro and Diesmos and that the prosecution would be
presenting these accused in that hearing.
In view of the vital implications of such a discharge on the
conduct of the defense of the other accused, all three counsel
of choice immediately moved that the hearing be postponed
or that witnesses other than Lazaro and Diesmos be presented
in that hearing, to allow counsel to take to the Supreme Court
the ruling of the Minister of National Defense as well as this
Military Commission's abdication of a trial court's
jurisdiction to grant or deny a prosecution motion to
discharge an accused.
To the complete surprise and dismay of defense counsel of
choice, the prosecution insisted on presenting Lazaro and
Diesmos before the other accused could take to the Supreme
Court the legality and propriety of their discharge as accused
to be state witnesses. Counsel of choice had no alternative but
to withdraw from the proceedings that day.
Subsequent events disclosed why Lazaro and Diesmos had to
be presented as witnesses on that day, December 13, 1982.
They were to recite, as indeed they recited, a newly fabricated
and fantastic story linking (three years after the fact) the
present accused with the accused in the We Forum case, who
were being arraigned that afternoon in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. Pursuant to this scenario, all the
newspapers the following day carried the same release that
the accused herein and those in the We Forum were members
of one conspiracy.
It has thus become abundantly clear to the undersigned
counsel that under the present circumstances any further
participation on his part in the proceedings before this
Military Commission would not only be futile but also bring
disgrace and dishonor to himself and to the legal profession . 6
Civilian counsel Joaquin L. Misa for his close kin, Ester Misa
Jimenez, after prefatory remarks that he "had never appeared
before in a military court land] entertained a degree of
confidence in the quality of military justice land] was reared
with a healthy regard for military officers" stated in his
written manifestation dated January 10, 1983 that:
... many events in the course of these proceedings have eroded
the confidence of the undersigned in ultimately obtaining
justice from this Honorable Commission.
The last straws so to speak, were the events of December 13,
1982. Three hearings of this case prior to the December 13
hearing were cancelled or postponed upon motion of the
Prosecution on the shallow and never explained excuse that
their next supposed witness, Col. Beroya, was not
available. On December 13, the Prosecution read into the
record an alleged resolution on the state witness question by
the Minister of National Defense (Note that up to this writing
the undersigned has not been served with a copy of that
alleged resolution perhaps because it was written on
stationery marked CONFIDENTIAL). After the supposed
resolution by the Minister of National Defense was read into
the record, the undersigned moved for a postponement of even
one week to afford the undersigned the opportunity to either
ask for a reconsideration by the Minister or raise the matter
to the Supreme Court on Certiorari. The Prosecution's
objection was so vehement that it was incomprehensible to
the undersigned why a simple motion could evoke such a
violent reaction from the Prosecution (Cols. Ridao and
Disierto seemed to be outdoing each other in the decibels of
their objections). This was especially baffling to the
undersigned because theretofore in several instances when the
undersigned inquired if there had been a ruling by "the higher
authorities" on the question of the state witnesses, The
Prosecution always assured the undersigned and the other
civilian defense counsel that if a ruling is made, and it is
adverse to the defense we will be given enough time to deal
with the problem.
As the Commission well knows the defense motion for
postponement was denied and two (2) accused who were
released from the case testified in the absence of all the
civilian defense counsel. Only upon reading the newspaper
the next day was the indecent haste of the Prosecution to
present the two (2) witnesses explained. The Prosecution, and
the Commission by going along with the Prosecution,
apparently wanted to time the newly fabricated testimony of
Diesmos and Lazaro linking this case with the We Forum case
the arraignment of which was held on December 13, in the
afternoon.
The orchestration and synchronization of such testimony in
this case (at the expense of denying the accused recourse
against the resolution of the Minister) with the arraignment in
the We Forum case taken together with the Identically worded
newspaper stories appearing in all the dailies now in
publication has made it clear to the undersigned that this
case will not be decided on its merits but on the convenience
that it affords to the pursuit of the government's objectives. 7
Respondent military commission furthermore on December 4,
1984 summarily called all proceedings to a halt, denied any
continuation of the case and abruptly declared the case
submitted without any evidence for the defense,
notwithstanding that it had not subpoenaed the first defense
witness for petitioner Othoniel Jimenez as duly requested,
while the other petitioners were not expected to be ready with
their witnesses until later hearings; and after a mere 25-
minute recess, rendered its "judgment" imposing the death
penalty by electrocution on all the above-named petitioners.
No objection to this bizzarre procedure came from military
counsels who were assigned to represent petitioners after their
civilian counsels' withdrawal, for as the Solicitor General now
manifested, "the records show, they more often than not
practically acted for the prosecution rather than as defense
counsels. " 7a
3. I hail the Court's reinstatement of the settled ruling in this
jurisdiction that deprivation and disregard of the
constitutional rights of an accused ousts the court or tribunal
of jurisdiction, which had been greatly eroded. This
reenforces the 1987 Constitution's reaffirmation of the role of
the Supreme Court as the guarantor of the constitutional and
human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction with the
function of seeing to it that these rights are respected and
enforced. As the Court stressed in Gumabon vs. Director of
Bureau of Prisons 8 "Once a deprivation of a constitutional
right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 9 So
accused persons who are deprived of their constitutional right
of a speedy trial should be set at liberty. 10 Likewise persons
detained indefinitely without charges so much so that the
detention becomes punitive and not merely preventive in
character are entitled to regain their freedom, for the spirit and
the letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the
precepts of human rights and freedom that a person be
detained indefinitely without any charges.
4. Indeed, Art. VII, section 18 of the 1987 Constitution,
drawing upon the sad lessons of the excessive concentration
of powers in the Chief Executive in the previous Constitutions
which enabled him to exercise absolute power to the point of
taking over the entire government, has provided for measures
to curtail such abuse of executive power. The late former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, pillar and champion of the
Rule of Law, chairman of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission's Judiciary Committee and Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court at the time of the imposition of martial law in
1972, summarized these salutary changes, in his last public
address, as follows:
1. Under the New Constitution, martial law does not suspend
the operation of the New Constitution or supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies.
Neither does it authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians when civil courts
are able to function.
2. Martial law does not supplant the civil courts when the
same are able to function.
3. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
4. Martial law may not be declared upon the ground of
imminent danger of invasion or rebellion. in the event of such
danger, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress the danger, without declaring martial law or
suspending the privilege of the will it.
5. Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation of
martial law, the President shall report the same to Congress in
person or in writing.
6. Congress may, by a majority vote of all its members,
revoke the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ, which action of Congress may not be
set aside by the President.
7. The proclamation of martial law or suspension or the
privilege of the writ by the President, may not exceed sixty
(60) days without the concurrence of Congress.
8. The Supreme Court has been expressly authorized to
"review in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty (30) days from its filing."
9. Under the "1973 Constitution," as amended, at least ten
(10) votes of the members of the Supreme Court were
necessary to invalidate or declare a law unconstitutional,
regardless of the number of vacancies in the Supreme Court
or the number of its members who participated in the
deliberations on the issues involved in the case, and voted
thereon. Under the New Constitution a simple majority of the
members who took part in such deliberation and cast their
votes thereon is sufficient.
10. In the case of suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
same does not apply to persons who have not been placed
under the custody of a court of justice.
11. In case of suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
person detained must be released unless judicially charged
within three (3) days. 11
These substantial checks by the legislature as well as by the
judiciary on the Chief Executive's power to proclaim martial
law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus were meant to forestall a recurrence of the long and
horrible nightmare of the past regime when one single clause,
the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution then in
force that authorized the President to declare martial law was
held to have nullified the entire Constitution and the Bill of
Rights and justified the then President's taking over "absolute
command" of the nation and that the people could "only trust
and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost
patriotism, (he) will not fail them." Thus, persons held under
Presidential Commitment or Detention Orders were detained
indefinitely without charges, yet had no recourse to the courts.
Even if they were acquitted in court, the military would not
release them until and unless the then President lifted the
preventive detention order. 12 It was a long and horrible
nightmare when our people's rights, freedoms and liberties
were sacrificed at the altar of "national security" even though
it involved nothing more than the President-dictator's
perpetuation in office and the security of his relatives and
some officials in high positions and their protection from
public accountability of their acts of venality and deception in
government, many of which were of public knowledge.
Draconian decrees were issued whereby many were locked up
indefinitely for "rumor-mongering," "unlawful use of means
of publication and unlawful utterances, and alarms and
scandals." While the people for the most part suffered in
silence and waited, others never gave up the struggle for truth,
freedom, justice and democracy, a common commitment
which is what makes a people a nation instead of a gathering
of self-seeking individuals. The national will was
systematically undermined to the point, of national mockery,
that the day of imposition of martial law was proclaimed as
"National Thanksgiving Day." As the Court observed
through Mr. Justice Gutierrez in Animas vs. Minister of
National Defense, 13 the era of martial law when military
tribunals, against all tenets of due process, were conferred
jurisdiction over common crimes and civilians, their
glorification with the downgrading of judicial prestige and
"the many judicial problems spawned by extended
authoritarian rule which effectively eroded judicial
independence and self-respect will require plenty of time and
determined efforts to cure."
5. The treacherous assassination on August 21, 1983 of the
martyred Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., within minutes of his arrival
at the Manila International Airport, although ringed with
2,000 soldiers, shocked and outraged the conscience of the
nation. After three years of exile following almost eight years
of detention since martial law, Aquino, although facing the
military commission's predetermined death sentence, supra,
yet refused proper travel documents, was returning home "to
strive for genuine national reconciliation founded on justice."
The late Senator Jose W. Diokno who passed away this year
was among the first victims of the martial law coup d'etat to
be locked up with Senator Aquino. In March, 1973, all of their
personal effects, including their eyeglasses were ominously
returned to their homes. Their wives' visitation privileges
were suspended and they lost all contact for over a month. It
turned out that Aquino had smuggled out of his cell a written
statement critical of the martial law regime. In swift
retribution, both of them were flown out blindfolded to the
army camp at Fort Laur in Nueva Ecija and kept in solitary
confinement in dark boarded cells with hardly any ventilation.
When their persons were produced before the Court on habeas
corpus proceedings, they were a pitiable sight having lost
about 30 to 40 lbs. in weight. Senator Diokno was to be
released in September, 1974 after almost two years of
detention. No charges of any kind were ever filed against him.
His only fault was that he was a possible rival for the
presidency.
Horacio Morales, Jr., 1977 TOYM awardee for government
service and then executive vice-president of the Development
Academy of the Philippines, was among the hard-working
government functionaries who had been radicalized and gave
up their government positions. Morales went underground on
the night he was supposed to receive his TOYM award,
declaring that "(F)or almost ten years, I have been an official
in the reactionary government, serviced the Marcos
dictatorship and all that it stands for, serving a ruling system
that has brought so much suffering and misery to the broad
masses of the Filipino people. (1) refuse to take any more part
of this. I have had enough of this regime's tyranny and
treachery, greed and brutality, exploitation and oppression of
the people," and "(I)n rejecting my position and part in the
reactionary government, I am glad to be finally free of being a
servant of foreign and local vested interest. I am happy to be
fighting side by side with the people." He was apprehended in
1982 and was charged with the capital crime of subversion,
until he was freed in March, 1986 after President Corazon C.
Aquino's assumption of office, together with other political
prisoners and detainees and prisoners of conscience in
fulfillment of her campaign pledge.
Countless others forfeited their lives and stand as witnesses to
the tyranny and repression of the past regime. Driven by their
dreams to free our motherland from poverty, oppression,
iniquity and injustice, many of our youthful leaders were to
make the supreme sacrifice. To mention a few: U.P. Collegian
editor Abraham Sarmiento, Jr., worthy son of an illustrious
member of the Court pricked the conscience of many as he
asked on the front page of the college paper: Sino ang kikibo
kung hindi tayo kikibo? Sino ang kikilos kung hindi tayo
kikilos? Kung hindi ngayon, kailan pa? 13a He was locked up
in the military camp and released only when he was near
death from a severe attack of asthma, to which he succumbed.
Another TOYM awardee, Edgar Jopson, an outstanding honor
student at the Ateneo University, instinctively pinpointed the
gut issue in 1971-he pressed for a "non-partisan
Constitutional Convention;" and demanded that the then
president-soon-to-turn dictator "put down in writing" that he
was not going to manipulate the Constitution to remove his
disqualification to run for a third term or perpetuate himself in
office and was called down as "son of a grocer." When as he
feared, martial law was declared, Jopson went underground to
continue the struggle and was to be waylaid and killed at the
age of 34 by 21 military troops as the reported head of the
rebel movement in Mindanao. 14 Another activist honor
student leader, Emmanuel Yap, son of another eminent
member of the Court, was to disappear on Valentine's Day in
1976 at the young age of 24, reportedly picked up by military
agents in front of Channel 7 in Quezon City, and never to be
seen again.
One of our most promising young leaders, Evelio B. Javier,
43, unarmed, governor of the province of Antique at 28, a
Harvard-trained lawyer, was mercilessly gunned down with
impunity in broad daylight at 10 a.m. in front of the provincial
capitol building by six mad-dog killers who riddled his body
with 24 bullets fired from M-16 armalite rifles (the standard
heavy automatic weapon of our military). He was just taking a
breather and stretching his legs from the tedious but tense
proceedings of the canvassing of the returns of the
presidential snap election in the capitol building. This was to
be the last straw and the bloodless EDSA revolt was soon to
unfold. The Court inJavier vs. Comelec, 15 through Mr.
Justice Cruz, "said these meager words in tribute to a fallen
hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because
he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly
silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and
fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight.
He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not
daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-
exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And
though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound
and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless,
fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the
enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would
impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement.
He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a
very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer
because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles
and stronger than lions." "
6. The greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human
memory. We must note here the unforgettable and noble
sacrifices of the countless brave and patriotic men and women
who feel as martyrs and victims during the long dark years of
the deposed regime. In vacating the death sentence imposed
on the petitioners who survived the holocaust,, we render
them simple justice and we redeem and honor the memory of
those who selflessly offered their lives for the restoration of
truth, decency, justice and freedom in our beloved land. Due
recognition must be given also that 85% of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines readily joined the EDSA revolt and
redeemed the honor of the military by recognizing civilian
supremacy and the supreme mandate given by the people to
the true winners of the elections. Witness the testimony of
Gen. Fidel V. Ramos now chief of the new Armed Forces of
the Philippines, as he recounted early last year his breakaway
from the past regime:
The Armed Forces of the Philippines had ceased to be the real
armed forces supposed to be the defender of the people. There
had developed an elite group within the AFP ... and the AFP
no longer represented its rank and file and officers corps.
Mr. Marcos was no longer the same President that we used to
know, to whom we pledged our loyalty and dedicated our
services. He was no longer the able and capable commander-
in-chief whom we used to count on. He had already put his
personal interest, his family interest, above the interest of the
people.
The small people in the AFP and the Integrated National
Police were now being pushed around by powerful military
officers motivated by very selfish desires and intentions.
Many of those officers were now practically the servants of
powerful politicians. 16
The present PC/INP Chief, Major General Renato de Vina, on
the 85th anniversary of the Philippine Constabulary last
August 8th publicly stated that "for the perfidy of a few, we
owe the whole nation a sincere apology and a commitment to
intensively pursue our new program of reforms, to weed out
the misfits who bring discredit to our organization," and
solemnly pledged that "now and forever, your PC/INP stands
ready and committed to fight lawlessness, injustice and
oppression, as well as the sinister forces that continue to
threaten our stability and progress as a free country. We make
this solemn pledge here and now, before our entire nation,
before our Commander-in-Chief who is the personification of
our national honor and unity, before God who has always
blessed our people ... to consecrate our lives to the
protection and preservation of our national Ideals-of unity,
peace, justice and democracy."
7. The people by their overwhelming ratification of the 1987
Constitution at the plebiscite held last February 2nd
unequivocally reaffirmed their collective act of installing our
new government following the bloodless EDSA revolt. They
re fused to be deterred by the last-ditch efforts of the forces of
the Right and of the Left to derail our return to fun normalcy
and the restoration of our democratic institutions. They
proclaimed a renewed and vigorous faith in the democratic
process. Among the great changes introduced in the 1987
Constitution to harness the Presidential power to impose
martial law and strengthen the system of checks and balances
in our government were those made by the venerable late
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and his fellow members of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, hereinabove
enumerated. 17 With their work completed, and the 1987
Constitution decisively approved and ratified by the people,
Chief Justice Concepcion could then claim his eternal rest on
last May 3rd and leave us this legacy and caueat: "One thing,"
he said, "I have learned during the martial law regime, and
that is-that a Constitution is as good only as it is enforced. ...
the Primacy of the Law depends ultimately upon the people;
upon their awareness of this fact and their willingness and
readiness to assume the corresponding responsibility, in short,
upon their political maturity."

EN BANC
G.R. No. 75983 April 15, 1988
MANUEL R. CRUZ; PAULINO M. ARCEO; ELPIDIO
G. CACHO; ROGELIO P. GARCIA; MANUEL M.
DELA CRUZ; WILLIAM H. LORENZANA; PABLO P.
GARCIA; RODRIGO A. HALASAN; ADRIANO B.
CASTILLO; LEONARDO L. PAQUINTO; NESTOR T.
LIWANAG; ALEXANDER P. ROXAS; PABLO M.
MERCADO; EDUARDO P. GARCIA; GERARDO M.
LUCAS; LEONIDES G. MAABO; BRAULIO
DEPUSOY; ALFREDO M. TILA; JEOFREY T.
METEORO; BENIGNO G. BANTOLINO; ANTONIO P.
DATUL; RENATO V. VENGCO; EDGARDO
TERRENAL; EDUARDO D. DELFIN; CORNELIO C.
TACDERAN; AMANCIO D. LORIESTO; JOSE A.
SELOTERIO; APOLONIO E. ONIA; DOMINGO
MARCO; ARTURO VILLASANTA; ANTONIO
OCCASIONES; TEODORO C. CARANDANG;
ROGELIO A. GARCIA; ROMEO A. BASENSE; HARRY
B. BENLIRO; ROLANDO B. BENLIRO; JAMES A.
UMADHAY; VICENTE A. GENER; ERNESTO A.
CARPIO; MANUEL S. SALARDA; GETULIO B.
BRAGA, JR.; ARCADIO D. CELENDRO; VIRGILIO P.
GOMEZ; SERGIO R. PREYE; CIRIACOM DELA
GUARDIA; RODITO B. SORIASO ANTONIO D.
PUMAR; FEDERICO B. VECINAL; CESARIO D.
VECINAL; LORETO D. VECINAL; ROGELIO D.
VECINAL; MARCELO B. DE MESA; JULIAN DE
MESA; GAVINO B. DE MESA; REMIGIO B. DE MESA;
DANILO B. DE MESA; ROLANDO P. TOLENTINO;
ANASTACIO P. DEL ROSARIO; REYNALDO C.
REYES; BENITO B. PANGANIBAN; ROMUALDO M.
MONTENEGRO; ROMULO C. OCAMPO;
DEMOCRITO M. SILVESTRE; SALLY B. DIMAISIP;
FILIPINO B. DE LEON; NARCISO G. VIGO; TOMAS
C. AMORTE; CATALINO S. CRUZ; EDUARDO F.
JAVIER; ROGELIO L. CARICUNGAN; ERNESTO R.
BARADI; RENE P. CORTEZ; EDUARDO D.
RAMIREZ; DONATO G. CABONITALIA; CAMILO
PATAO; JOSE TORRES; ISABELO NARNE; ERIC F.
PICHAY; DELFIN PIANO; FRANCISCO PIANO;
RUDY G. ROMERO; MARIO G. MERCADO; JUANITO
PIANO; REYNOSO J. LAGMAY; PABLO S. CALLEJO;
FLORANTE SAGUN; RUSSEL A. PAULINO; LAUREL
LAMACA; RUFINO GAMBOA; TIRSO F. BALA, JR.;
ANTONIO CRUZ; BENITO PUGAL; CASIMIRO
PATAO; ROGELIO PATAO; EULOGIO PUGAL;
CARLITO PUGAL; ANDRES PATAO; VICENTE
ARCANO; MARIANO YTURIAGA RODOLFO
MANUEL; EDUARDO ABIHAY; MANUEL CARREON;
CAMILO PIANO; LUCIO ARIMANDO PABLO
ACIERTO; EDUARDO PASCUAL; FERMIN PUGAL;
FLOR PIANO; RUDY PIANO; JUANITO BAFUL;
GODOFREDO RAQUEO; CALIXTO SOMERA;
HILARION PATAO; DELFIN B. GUTIERREZ;
TEODULO BUGARIN; JAIME A. SABADO, JR.;
ALMARIO VILLANUEVA; APOLONIO SOMUDIO;
OSCAR LITADA; ROLANDO L. TOLENTINO;
HERMINIO BATONGBAKAL; ROGELIO TURION;
NELSON REMO; FERMIN CORREA; DOMINGO
SALAZAR; FELIPE PAREDES; DOMINGO RECINTO;
SILVANO BEATO; TOMAS GARCIA; RODOLFO
ABIHAY; MELCHOR CA-AMIK; NELITO C.
LONTOC; EDERLINO LACSINA; DOMINGO R.
REYES; RODOLFO D. MANANSALA; ROSALINO R.
DELOS SANTOS; RONIE A. CELIZ; VIRGILIO M.
MALGAPO; DIONISIO C. CABRERA; ROGELIO V.
PORTILLO; JOSE D. PAMINTUAN; ROBERTO P.
GALVEZ; LINO B. DAPADAP; FERNANDO R.
ROMERO; LINO M. VILLARIN; EMILIANO P.
SICANGCO; PAULINO V. ZAMORA; LEONARDO C.
REYES; GUMAL A. SAMO; IMPERIAL D. USMAN;
GERUNDIO A. BOYLES; ELPIDIO L. URBANO;
ROMEO S. CANTADA; SOFRONIO B. GALO;
EUGENE D. BALANSAG; CIRILO P. MARIANO;
ROMEO C. CARIO EDGARDO L. GOMEZ;
EUGENIO CABAERO; AQUILINO LEYRAN;
ANTONIO A. HERMIDA; ALVARO P. CABASAG;
PRIMITIVO SULAYAD; TEODORO B. PATANO;
DOMINGO R. RODRIGUEZ; ROGER N.
MAGALLANES; SALVADOR 0. CALDERON;
LEOPOLDO B. ARCADIO; APLON M. LINOGAMAN;
JOSE E. ABRIA; JESUS N. ABRIA; ANDRES P.
PARADO; LARRY A. ARPON; JESSIE CABAGUNAY;
MANUEL A. BARQUILLIA; DANIEL S. CINCO;
TIMOTEO C. LLAMERA JR.; ERNESTO D. DUMPA;
ORLANDO G. ACSALAN; BONIFACIO VALLETE;
AGUSTIN VALLETE; SAMSON ARANETA; ERNESTO
DOCTOLERO; AVELINO HABULAN; ROLANDO
TUDIN; CONRADO M. GLORIA; DANIEL G.
CAMPOS; JAIME F. CO; VIRGILIO ALEJANDRO;
SULPECIO L. REJUSO, JR.; MARCELO S. GUESE;
VICENTE PATAO; ROMEO IBAYAN; DANILO
MAGALLANES; RICARDO C. JARATA; ERNESTO H.
ABOLOC; DIOSDADO RODRIGUEZ; ALFREDO P.
PEREZ; FEDERICO VILICINA; ROSENDO I. RAMOS;
JOSE C. SIOCHI; FEDERICO MARCELINO;
BENJAMIN V. TAN; DANILO CRUZ; CONSTANTE
CABANILIA; LEOPOLDO V. JOSE; PACIFICO
BATACAN; VICENTE SY; JOSE TORDESILLAS;
ANTONIO DEPUSOY; ARMANDO I. ULPINDO;
EDILBERTO LIBERATO; JIMMY C. REALIS;
SULPICIO C. REJUSO; GEDALTIE MARIN; RENATO
BALLESTEROS; and DEMOCRITO
LORAA petitioners,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FIDEL
RAMOS, GENERAL (RET.) EMILIO N. CEA,
MINISTER NEPTALI GONZALES AND BRIG.
GENERAL SAMUEL SORIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79077 April 15, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS OF IMPERIAL D. USMAN AND
SAMU GUMAL, ACSARA GUMAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
PRESIDENT OF MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 30,
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.
G.R. Nos 79599-79600 April 15, 1988
CONRADO M. GLORIA AND DANILO V.
MAGALLANES, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF (AFP), THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL (AFP), THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 79862 April 15, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS IN BEHALF OF MANUEL DE LA
CRUZ,petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. MELITON GOYENA (RET.), IN HIS
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
PRISONS,respondents.
G.R. No. 80565 April 15, 1998
LEOPOLDO V. JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, SECRETARY RAFAEL IL
ETO, GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS, SECRETARY
SEDFREY ORDOEZ AND BRIG. GEN. SAMUEL
SORIANO, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioners in 75983.
Anselmo M. Mabuti for petitioners D. Cruz and F. Marcelino.
Lininding P. Pangandaman for petitioners in 79077.
Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for petitioners in 79599-79600.
Jack L. Soriano for petitioner in 79862.
NARVASA, J.:
Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this Court on
October 1, 1986 1 to test the legality of the continued
detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees 2 arrested
in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed to
the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to
stand trial for common crimes 3 before various courts
martial; 4if any of these offenses had any political color, this
had neither been pleaded nor proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed
as military personnel. 5 One hundred and fifteen (115) accused
had been condemned to die. Forty-six (46) were sentenced to
life imprisonment. To nine (9) others were meted prison terms
of from twenty to thirty years; to forty-one (41), prison terms
of ten to twenty years; and to three (3), less than ten years.
The present status of their cases are disparate, as might be
expected. As of the date of filing of the petitions in this Court,
the sentences of sixty-eight (68) had become final upon their
approval by the Office of the President, 6seventy-five (75)
cases were pending review in either that Office or before the
Board of Military Review, while the appeal or review of the
remaining seventy-three (73) cases either had been expressly
suspended pending the outcome of these petitions, or are
simply not dealt with in the records.
Presidential amnesty was granted to petitioner Virgilio
Alejandrino, 7 yet to this date he remains a prisoner at the
Penitentiary, as do Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro
Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus, although they
were acquitted of the charges against them, 8 and Reynaldo C.
Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, who appear to have fully
served the sentences imposed on them by the military
commissions which convicted them. 9
The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the
establishment of all military tribunals as well as General
Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity of all the
proceedings had against them before these bodies as a result
of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty.
Their plea is for the grant of a retrial of their respective cases
in the civil courts, where their right to due process may be
accorded respect. 10 The writ ofhabeas corpus issued on July
31, 1987, two weeks after an amended petition 11 was filed
with leave of court, reiterating the arguments originally
pleaded, and setting forth the additional claim that the
pronouncement of this Court of the lack of jurisdiction of
military tribunals to try cases of civilians even during martial
rule, as declared in Olaquer, et al. vs. Military Commission
No. 34, et al., 12 entitled the petitioners to be unconditionally
freed from detention.
The Solicitor General's return of the writ in behalf of the
public respondents stated that the latter "offer no objection or
opposition to the release from detention of petitioners-
civilians ... (which) may be immediately effected, unless there
are other legal causes that may warrant their detention ...
(while) the other petitioners who are military personnel x x
should not be released. 13 This return was shortly amended
however 14 to urge that this Court take a "second look" and
undertake a "thorough re-examination of
the Olaquer decision," suggesting the inapplicability of the
ruling to "cases involving civilians charged with, and
convicted of common crimes and ... cases where the detained
accused have, in effect, fully served the sentence by their
continued detention for the duration of the penalty imposed."
Also suggested was the giving of "limited retroactive" to the
decision, considering the consequences "of voiding earlier
convictions, ... (such as) The grant of immunity from
prosecution as a result of prescription or of the Statute of
(L)imitations having run, witnesses having been scattered and
no longer available, ... memories hav(ing) also been taxed
beyond permissible limits, ... and (the annulment) of acquittal
decisions, ... to the great prejudice of the rights of the
accused. 15
In Olaquer, this Court in no uncertain terms affed that
... a military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over
civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as
the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned (People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 274
[1975]). For the same reasons, Our pronouncement in Aquino,
Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2 (L-37364,63 SCRA 546) and
all decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are
inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed
abandoned. 16
Such is the statement of the doctrine squarely applicable in
these cases.
1. Clearly, no right to relief under Olaquer exists in favor of
the 26 petitioners who were admittedly in the military
service. 17 Over them the courts martial yardly exercised
jurisdiction. It need only be said that these tribunals were
created precisely to try and decide cases of military personnel,
and the validity of General Order No. 8 ordaining their
creation, although repeatedly challenged on constitutional
grounds, has as many times been upheld by the Court, either
expressly or impliedly. 18 As to these petitioners, the writ is
thus unavailing.
2. Deference to the Olaquer decision impels on the other hand
the application thereof to all civilians, without distinction,
who were haled before military tribunals. To be sure, due
consideration was given to the submittal that the doctrine is,
or should be declared as, limited in aplicability to "political of
fenders," and not "ordinary crimes" such as those of which the
civilian petitioners were convicted. 18a But distinction should
not be set where none were clearly intended. The issue
in Olaquer, as here, is the jurisdiction of courts martial over
the persons of civilians, and not merely over the crimes
imputed to them, regardless of which they are entitled to trial
by judicial, not executive or military process. Conformably
with this holding, the disposition of these cases would
necessarily have, as a premise, the invalidity of any and all
proceedings had before courts martial against the civilian
petitioners. There is all the more reason to strike down the
proceedings leading to the conviction of these non-political
detainees who should have been brought before the courts of
justice in the first place, as their offenses are totally unrelated
to the insurgency avowedly sought to be controlled by martial
rule.
Due regard for consistency likewise dictates rejection of the
proposal to merely give "prospective effect" toOlaquer. No
distinction should be made, as the public respondents propose,
between cases still being tried and those finally decided or
already under review. All cases must be treated alike,
regardless of the stage they happen to be in, and since
according to Olaquer, all proceedings before courts martial in
cases involving civilians are null and void, the court deems it
proper to adhere to that unequivocal pronouncement,
perceiving no cogent reason to deviate from the doctrine.
The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes appear to offenses involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days from
have been committed, and there are accusations against herein notice of this decision, without prejudice to the reproduction
petitioners for those offenses. Olaquer cannot and does not of the evidence submitted by the parties and admitted by the
operate to absolve the petitioners of these charges, or establish Military Commission. If eventually convicted, the period of
that the same are baseless, so as to entitle them to immediate the petitioners' detention shall be credited in their favor.
release from detention. It is not to be forgotten that the The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are
victims in offenses ascribed to the petitioners have as much DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch the necessary
interest as the State has to prosecute the alleged authors of the proceedings inclusive of those for the grant of bail which may
misdeeds. Justice will be better served if the detention of such be initiated by the accused.
of the petitioners as are not hereby ordered released or SO ORDERED.
excepted, is continued until their cases are transferred to the
ordinary courts having jurisdiction, and the necessary 7. RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
informations have been filed against them therein, as has
already been done in the case of petitioners Imperial D.
G.R. No. 176229 October 19, 2011
Usman and Samu Gumal. 19 The State should be given a
HO WAI PANG, Petitioner,
reasonable period of time to accomplish this transfer, at which
vs.
time the petitioners may apply for bail for their temporary
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
release.
DECISION
The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates questions
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
to arise as to the availability of certain defenses to the
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial
petitioners upon their prosecution before the civil courts. It
investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render
seems evident, however, that no breach of the constitutional
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of
made during such investigation. 1 "The admissibility of other
punishment for the same offense 20would result from the
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
retrial of the petitioners" cases, for the simple reason that the
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation."2
the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse
attaching. 21 Valid previous proceedings are required in order
assails the June 16, 2006 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals
that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6,
accused in the second prosecution. 22
1995 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
Neither does the defense of prescription appear to be available
118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him
to the petitioners who, except for a handful, were charged
and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit
with offenses punishable by death or reclusion
Yue,5 Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao6 and Kin San Ho7 guilty
perpetua, which prescribe in twenty years. 23 Even the few not
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article
so charged cannot raise such defense since the filing of the
III8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the
first indictments suspended the running of the prescriptive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16,
period, and the prosecutions under the informations to be filed
2007 CA Resolution9 denying the motion for reconsideration
should be regarded as mere continuations of the previous
thereto.
proceedings. 24 At the very least, the filing of the first charges
Factual Antecedents
should be considered as having interrupted the prescriptive
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United
period notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction of the military
Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong
tribunal in which they were filed, applying, by analogy, the
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA).
ruling in People vs. Olarte. 25
Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who
In fine, the Court holds that the merits of the indictments
came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the
against all these civilians are solely for the civil courts to
group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a
weigh and decide upon after due proceedings. Otherwise
Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L.
stated, they are entitled to the retrial they have explicitly
Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express
requested of their respective cases in the civil courts.
Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted insofar as
passengers as their turn came up. From the first traveling bag,
petitioners Vergilio Alejandrino, 26 Domingo Reyes, Antonio
she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes
Pumar Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado, Del
and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag
Campus, 27 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los
was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were
Santos 28 are concerned. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons
almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming
is hereby ordered to effect the immediate release of the above-
suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and
mentioned petitioners, unless there are other legal causes that
opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw
may warrant their detention.
inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho,
transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the
William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio B. Braga, Jr.,
attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and
Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel,
Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the
Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A.
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon,
Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera,
she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU)
Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano,
while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier
Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando
discovered.
Tudin, Rosendo I. Ramos, Pacifica Batacan, Edilberto
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using
Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis, Democrito Loraa who are all
the passenger manifest and further examined their bags. The
military personnel.
bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is
chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains
hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary informations
nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled
against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the
that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the
express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and
same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho
Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two
or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes
were recovered from the baggages of the six accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the
relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to the presence of the
chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test on the
white crystalline substance contained in said chocolate boxes
at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. 10 The result
of his examination11 of the white crystalline substance yielded
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled together with
tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond
Section.
The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were
brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over to
the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them.
Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and
that the representative samples were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.12 Out of the 13 tourists, the
NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as
against petitioner and his five co-accused.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September
19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his co-accused.
These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-
1591 to 97. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation13 which the trial court granted. The
reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy
among the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single
Amended Information14 under Criminal Case No. 91-1592
and to the withdrawal of the other Informations. 15 The
Amended Information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously carry and transport into the country without
lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also popularly known as
"SHABU", a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, 17 all the
accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their
defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision 18 finding all
the accused guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds
the accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT yue, ho wai
pang, wu hing sum, tin sun mao, and kin san ho (ho kin san)
guilty of Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to
transport into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of
methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu,
and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF
IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF
THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS (p30,000.00) each as
FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being imposed
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering its
applicability to the accused though retroactively for having a
less stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment provided in
Republic Act No. 6425. The fine ofP30,000.00 for each
accused is imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more
favorable to the accused [than] that provided in R.A. No.
7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER
SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be
imposed since the offense was committed prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused
WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU,
HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.19
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court
where the case records were forwarded to per Order of the
RTC dated May 10, 1995.20 Later, all the accused except for
petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective withdrawal
of appeal.21 This Court, after being satisfied that the
withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences
of their action, granted the withdrawal of their respective
appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997. 22 Per Entry
of Judgment, 23 said Resolution became final and executory
on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner was the only one
left to pursue his appeal.
Petitioner filed his Brief24 on April 6, 1998 while the
brief25 for the respondent People of the Philippines was filed
on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Per Resolution26 dated August 30, 2004, this
Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and
determination pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v.
Mateo.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC. While conceding that petitioners
constitutional right to counsel during the custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to
hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his
conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he
was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to
confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with
favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the existence of
conspiracy among the accused.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration28 which the CA denied in its
Resolution29 dated January 16, 2007.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the
following grounds:
I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS
DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS
DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A
CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS
TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE
CONSTITUTION.30
OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as
evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against himself.
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the
fact that he was not assisted by a competent and independent
lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he
was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults
the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such
investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all
the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs
authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right
under Section 1231 of Article III of the Constitution, we must
not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said
constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only
confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,32 the Court categorically ruled that
"the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of
other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and
[are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation."
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or
admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution
did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from
him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was
taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently
used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt
of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its
Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in
People v. Buluran,33 "[a]ny allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction." Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred
in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial
investigation deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People
v. Wong Chuen Ming34 to exculpate himself from the crime
charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case of
Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The
disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the
trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective
decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting
the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they
affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags.
The Court construed the accuseds act of affixing their
signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged.
And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda
rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was
declared inadmissible evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the
accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole
testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have
performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing
the judgment of conviction, the Court noted that said
examiners testimony was not corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case
was on the strength of his having been caught inflagrante
delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the
basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the
testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and
credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated.
Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct
evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of
the crime. As the Court held in People v Dela Cruz, 35 "[n]o
rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be
adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a
single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such
testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In
such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a
conviction."
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and
applied to another case when there are stark differences
between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their
own unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes
the pertinent provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the
1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to
confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know
and understand what the witnesses testified to. According to
him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would
testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the
evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-
examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the
opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of
the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is
petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the
proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should
have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG
contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-
examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination
suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the
witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any
objection to the presentation of the prosecutions evidence
particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of
an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack
of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the
important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to
fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test
their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a
guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses
of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,36 the Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal
prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers
are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on
their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation
is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if
the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the
function and test of confrontation has also been accomplished,
the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to
cross-examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him was not impaired.
Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts
finding of conspiracy which was quoted by the appellate court
in its assailed Decision, and which we once again herein
reproduce with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct
evidence to conclude conspiracy. However, just like in other
cases where conspiracy is not usually established by direct
evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that
there are enough circumstantial evidence which if taken
together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be
denied that the accused somehow have known each other
prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila. Although
Law Ka Wang denied having known any of the accused prior
to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang identified him
as the one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the
Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with the travel
agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who received the
personal things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be place[d] in a
bag provided for by the travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum
has been known to accused Ho Kin San for about two to three
years as they used to work as cooks in a restaurant in Hong
Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n]
to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San.
These relationships in a way can lead to the presumption that
they have the capability to enter into a conspiracy. Second, all
the illegal substances confiscated from the six accused were
contained in chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the
same weight all contained in their luggages. The Court agrees
with the finding of the trial prosecutor that under the given
circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have been
perpetrated only through an elaborate and methodically
planned conspiracy with all the accused assiduously
cooperating and mutually helping each other in order to
ensure its success.37
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
"Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a
felony."38 "[C]onspiracy which determines criminal
culpability need not entail a close personal association or at
least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a
crime."39 "It need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue
a common design."40 "The assent of the minds may be and,
from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of
facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that
they are parts of some complete whole" as we ruled in People
v. Mateo, Jr.41 Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his
co-accuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that
there was a common design, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime
committed.
Petitioners guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the
contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling
bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was
his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing
upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes.
Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified
on June 3, 1992, she declared that she did not see any
chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioners
bag.42 Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony
that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from
petitioners bag when they were still at the counter. This
sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate
boxes from petitioners bag when they were at the ICU. 43 To
us, this slight clash in Cincos statements neither dilute her
credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.
The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved
petitioners Demurrer to Evidence in its Order 44 of February
16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus
In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to command conviction, the
Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco is
either conjectural or hearsay and definitely missed its mark in
incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even
testified that she found nothing inside the hand-carried
luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But
that was when investigation was going on at the Intensive
Counting Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda Cinco later on
testified that from the express lane in going to the ICU, after
the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four
(4) chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin
Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from the luggage of
herein movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it
was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pangs bag was
already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she
nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the owner
thereof, pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not
hearsay evidence. They are facts from the personal perception
of the witness and out of her personal knowledge. Neither is it
conjectural.45
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a
witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor
a conclusion on the basis of said parts. "In ascertaining the
facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on
direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered."46 Also, where there is nothing in the records
which would show a motive or reason on the part of the
witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification
should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no
evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for
the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive,
hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.1avvphi1
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so
overwhelming that this Court is convinced that his guilt has
been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can
speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable
fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of
transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into the
country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense
consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu
inside his luggage considering that his bag was provided by
the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of
transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because
it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the
mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense
punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an
individual caught committing the act so punished regardless
of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials,
petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to
successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution. "It is
basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are
eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides
negative testimony."47
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no
error in adjudging petitioner guilty of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country in
violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended.
Penalty
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed
by the appellate court, we find the same in accord with law
and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the
commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of
R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1683.48 The decree provided that for violation of said
Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging fromP20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed.
Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 765949 further introduced
new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20,
Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new
amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was
changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 toP10 million".
On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended
Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new
penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied
depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty
of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life
imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given
retroactive application, it being more favorable to the
petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
We agree. In People v. Doroja,50 we held:
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994)
this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law, being more
lenient and favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded
retroactive application, x x x.
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life
imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal statutes
with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a
retroactive effect", 51 the penalty imposed by the trial court
upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the
penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well
as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED
and the assailed June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01459 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
8. RIGHT TO SECURE ATTENDANCE OF
WITNESSES SEC. 10, RULE 21
9. TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988
FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B.
MERCADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA VEGA,
JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Victor de la Serna for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The first is whether or not a
court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being
arraigned, escapes from the custody of the law. The other
issue is whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried
in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own
behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who
testified against him.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula,
Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein private
respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the
crime of murder.
On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were
arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge,
Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for
September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the
acused including private respondent, were duly informed of
this.
Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private
respondent escaped from his detention center and on the said
date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals
handling the case (the petitioners herein) to file a motion with
the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against
all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr.
be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified. (Emphasis supplied.) *
Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court
proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the
private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand
the moment he shows up in court. 1
After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court
rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five
accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against
the private respondent. The dispositive portion is as follows:
WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan Alex
Potot, Rogelio Mula Fernando Cargando and Rogelio Baguio
are concerned, this case is hereby dismissed. The City Warden
of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby ordered to release these accused
if they are no longer serving sentence of conviction involving
other crimes.
The proceedings in this case against the accused Teodoro de
la Vega, Jr. who has escaped on August 30,1973 shall remain
pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to
cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present
his defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction
over his person. 2
On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive
portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the
constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier.
However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order
dated November 22, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners, expressed the
opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, the private respondent, who was tried in
absentia, did not lose his right to cross-examine the witnesses
for the prosecution and present his evidence. 3 The reasoning
of the said court is that under the same provision, all accused
should be presumed innocent. 4Furthermore the lower court
maintains that jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega,
Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to cross-
examine and present evidence must not be denied him once
jurisdiction over his person is reacquired. 5
We disagree.
First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused-private respondent
when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973
and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In cases criminal,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either
by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such
voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for
arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this
case.
But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the
accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to
appear during the trial? We answer this question in the
negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier
cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance
of parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that
where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not
guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the
court over his person and this continues until the termination
of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of
the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution aforecited a "trial in absentia"may be had when
the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an
arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3)
that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling
for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private
respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said
arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of
the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and
this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the
lower Court. 7 It was also proved by a certified copy of the
Police Blotter 8 that private respondent escaped from his
detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in
court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the
trial court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions
of the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the
reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other
accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred
when it suspended the proceedings as to the private
respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused
only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the
duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court
need not wait for the time until the accused who who escape
from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his
evidence and moss e the witnesses against him. To allow the
delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective
the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it has been
aptly explained:
. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a
provision as there were quite a number of reported instances
where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed
indefinitely because of his non- appearance. What the
Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued
enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved.
With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his
absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse
could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both
society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in
seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.9
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a
judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still
presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be
based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence
must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there
can be no violation of due process since the accused was
given the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in
absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present
evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the
trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights.
This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused
to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a
personal right and may be waived. 10 In the same vein, his
right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him
for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this
case is buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115
which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our
Constitution, to wit:
... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at
the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be
considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial.
When an accused under custody had been notified of the date
of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived
his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial
dates until custody in regained....
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold,
that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentiawaives his
right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront
and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. 11
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the
trial court in Criminal Case No. 112-L in so far as it suspends
the proceedings against the herein private respondent Teodoro
de la Vega, Jr. is reversed and set aside. The respondent judge
is hereby directed to render judgment upon the innocence or
guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr.
in accordance with the evidence adduced and the applicable
law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1353. March 11, 1997]
DANILO B. PARADA, complainant, vs. JUDGE
LORENZO B. VENERACION, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 47, MANILA,respondent.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The case before us stems from a verified complaint filed by
Danilo B. Parada against respondent Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority
and rendering unjust and erroneous interlocutory orders and
judgment in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121385
to 88, entitled People vs. Danilo Parada, which led to
complainant Paradas premature incarceration at the Makati
City Jail and Muntinlupa National Penitentiary.
The undisputed facts of the case as found by the Office of the
Court Administrator are as follows :
Complainant herein is the accused in the aforementioned case
for four (4) counts of estafa which were initially raffled to
Branch 30, RTC, Manila presided by Judge Senecio
Ortile.Complainant is also duly bonded with the Eastern
Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO). On October 23,
1993 complainant notified said court formally thru counsel of
his change of address from 219 Cityland Condominium,
Buendia Extension, Makati, Metro Manila to 2412 Nobel St.,
Bo. San Isidro, Makati, Metro Manila. On October 27, 1993
he also notified the Manager of the bonding company of his
change of address. On February 8, 1994, Judge Ortile
inhibited himself from trying the said case and thus, the case
was re-raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Lorenzo
Veneracion, and per order of April 26, 1994, the hearing of the
case was set for June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994. Apparently, the
notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to
complainants former address and that for failure of accused-
complainant to appear on June 3, 1994, respondent ordered
the arrest of herein accused-complainant, ordering the
confiscation of the bond and a trial in absentia was
conducted. Respondent Judge likewise assigned a counsel de
officio, Atty. Jesse Tiburan of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO) as counsel for the accused.
xxx Furthermore, a warrant of arrest was issued on June 3,
1994 with no bail recommended.
On June 6, 7 and 8, 1994, respondent court issued orders
noting the failure of the petitioner to appear and proceeded
with the trial in absentia. On the hearing of June 8, 1994, the
motion of counsel de officio of accused-complainant that
defense be allowed to present evidence upon petitioners
arrest, was denied and further held that the failure of the
accused to appear is a waiver of his right to adduce evidence.
xxx. On November 25, 1994, a decision was rendered
convicting herein accused-appellant of the crime and the
decision was promulgated despite his absence. Accused-
complainant was arrested and brought to the Makati City Jail.
Accused-complainant filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus, Certiorari and Annulment of Judgment with prayer
for immediate relief with the Court of Appeals and was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37340 entitled Danilo Parada vs.
Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion, et. al..
On August 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision declaring the decision dated November 25, 1995 of
respondent court null and void and further ordering the case to
be remanded to respondent for further proceeding in order to
afford accused-complainant the opportunity to rebut the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and documentary
evidence against him as well as present his evidence. [1]
Subsequently, Parada filed with this Court the instant
complaint dated March 11, 1996 against the respondent Judge
Veneracion in connection with the decision and interlocutory
orders rendered by the latter in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-
121385 to 88. He alleged, inter alia, that the respondent Judge
is guilty of ignorance of the law when he did not follow the
legal requirements of a valid trial in absentia which led to his
conviction and premature incarceration, that the order of his
arrest with no recommendation for bail was erroneous, and
that respondent Judge abused his authority when he issued the
June 8, 1994 order denying the motion of Paradas counselde
oficio to allow him to present his evidence upon his
arrest. Parada thus prayed for the dismissal from service of
the respondent Judge and that the latter be barred from
railroading the subject Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121385 to 88.
On June 4, 1996, the Office of the Court Administrator
received the respondent Judges comment to Paradas
complaint, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxx
1. That the herein complaint is purely and plainly a
harassment suit arising from the Decision rendered in the case
of People vs. Danilo Parada for estafa;
2. That the charges therein are denied because they are not
based on the facts and of the records of the case, the herein
Judge merely acted with compassion upon receipt of the
records of these cases from another sala, after having been
informed that the private complainants merely borrowed from
loan sharks the money given to the accused Danilo Parada and
that they are only interested in compelling said accused to
return their money, not in sending said accused to jail;
3. That the herein Judge acted in good faith in the trial of the
said cases.[2]
Unfazed by the foregoing assertions of the respondent Judge,
the Office of the Court Administrator on the contrary held
that:
xxx
Respondents general denial of the allegations imputed to him
does not belie any of the facts which lead to the incarceration
of the complainant. Thus, his failure to deny each and every
specific allegations can be construed as admission on his part.
Moreover, trial in absentia may proceed only if the accused
failed to appear at the trial without justification despite due
notice. In this case, complainant was never notified of any
hearing from the time he changed his address up to the
promulgation of the decision despite the fact that he notified
the court and his bonding company.
xxx
Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused-
complainant with no bail recommended despite the fact that
the crime charged was bailable and denied the motion of his
counsel for the accused to adduce evidence upon accuseds
arrest. Clearly, respondent denied complainant his right to due
process.[3]
On the basis of these observations, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge
Veneracion be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a
warning that a commission of the same or similar infraction
shall be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter
alia, that trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial
in absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned;
(2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.[4]
In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two (2) and
three (3) of a valid trial in absentia are clearly
wanting. Parada had not been duly notified of the trial
because the notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to
the former address of Paradas counsel despite the fact that the
latter formally notified the court of his change of address. His
failure to appear therefore in the June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994
hearings is justified by the absence of a valid service of notice
of hearing to him.
As a rule, where a party appears by attorney in an action or
proceeding in a court of record, all notices required to be
given therein must be given to the attorney of record.
[5]
Accordingly, notices to counsel should be properly sent to
his address of record and unless the counsel files a notice of
change of address, his official address remains to be that of
his address of record.[6]
It is undisputed that Paradas counsel filed a notice of change
of address on October 23, 1993. As such, the respondent
judge should have already taken cognizance of the new
address when it sent the notice of hearing dated April 27,
1994. It is thus unwarranted for the respondent judge to still
send the notice of hearing to the old address of Paradas
counsel because it is not his official address nor his address of
record. Concomitantly, the sending of notice of hearing to his
former address is an invalid service and cannot in any way
bind Parada.
It is worthy to stress that due process of law in judicial
proceedings requires that the accused must be given an
opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and
defend in person at every stage of the
proceedings. Incidentally, the right to a hearing carries with it
the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings in
court.Notice to a party is essential to enable him to adduce his
own evidence and to meet and refute the evidence submitted
by the other party.[7] No less than the Constitution provides
that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law. A violation therefore of any of the
rights accorded the accused constitutes a denial of due process
of law. The circumstantial setting of the instant case as
weighed by the basic standards of fair play impels us to so
hold that the trial in absentia of Parada and his subsequent
conviction are tainted with the vice of nullity, for evidently
Parada was denied due process of law.
Judges, by the very delicate nature of their functions in
dispensing justice, should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties.[8] In resolving matters in
litigation, they should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the
facts and the applicable laws. Had respondent judge carefully
and diligently studied the records of the case, he would have
surely noticed the change of address, and his questioned
orders, which eventually led to Paradas unwarranted
deprivation of liberty, could not have been precipitately
issued.
Likewise, the warrant of arrest with no recommendation for
bail that was issued by respondent Judge on June 3, 1994 is a
downright violation of Paradas constitutional right to
bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is
strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the
custody of the law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It
should be noted that the crime with which Parada was charged
is estafa[9] which is undoubtedly a bailable offense. This
circumstance could not have escaped the attention of the
respondent judge when he issued on June 3, 1994 the order of
arrest of Parada with no recommendation for his bail. In so
doing, respondent judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so
gross which the Court can not countenance. Judges are
required by Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct to be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.[10] They are called upon to exhibit more than just
a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. [11]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion is
FINED P10,000.00 for disregarding Paradas right to
procedural due process and for showing gross ignorance of
the law, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of a
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166980 April 4, 2007
CARMELO C. BERNARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and F.T. YLANG-
YLANG MARKETING CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo assails the Resolutions 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 2004 and January 14,
2005 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration,
respectively.
Petitioner was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila with six counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on December 3, 1997 six
postdated checks in equal amounts of P22,500. Save for the
check numbers and dates of maturity, four Informations under
Criminal Case Nos. 320977 to 320980 were similarly worded
as follows:
That on or about December 3, 1997, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously make or draw and issue to F.T.
YLANG-YLANG MARKETING, CORP. rep. by Dennis Tan
to apply on account or for value PHILIPPINE SAVINGS
BANK check no. 0007806 [0007805, 0007804, 0007803]
dated April 30, [March 30, February 28, January 30] 1998
payable to YLANG-YLANG MFG. in the amount
of P22,500.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of
issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for reason "Account Closed"
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING
CORP. the amount of the check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.2
The two Informations under Criminal Case Nos. 320975-76
averred that Check Nos. 0007808 and 0007807 respectively
dated June 30, 1998 and May 30, 1998 "would be dishonored
by the drawee bank for the reason Account Closed if
presented for payment as the account against which it was
drawn ha[d] already been closed even before [their] said
date[s]."3
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel de oficio,
pleaded "not guilty" to the offenses charged. At the pre-trial
conference on August 25, 1999, petitioner failed to appear
despite notice, prompting Branch 24 of the MeTC to issue a
warrant of arrest against him and set the cases for trial in
absentia.
After the prosecution presented its first witness, petitioner
filed a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to Lift Warrant of
Arrest, and a Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts
charged in the Informations under Criminal Case Nos.
320975-76 do not constitute an offense.
By Order of April 5, 2000, the trial court lifted the warrant of
arrest in view of petitioners appearance but denied the
Motion to Quash for lack of merit.
At the following trial date, petitioner failed to appear despite
notice, drawing the trial court to proceed with his trialin
absentia and issue warrant of arrest4 against him.
By Decision5 of October 23, 2001 promulgated in absentia on
December 13, 2001, the trial court found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. 22 in all the cases.
He was, in each case, sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of One (1) Year, to pay a fine of Twenty-Two
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P22,500), and to indemnify
private complainant in the amount of Twenty-Two Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P22,500).
Ten months following the promulgation of the judgment,
petitioner posted a bond before another branch of the court.
Petitioner having been convicted and no motion having been
filed for his provisional liberty pending any appeal from or
motion for reconsideration of the Decision, the trial court
cancelled the bond and issued an alias warrant of arrest. 6
Petitioner thereupon filed an Urgent Motion for New Trial
and/or to Set Aside Trial and Judgment (Motion for New
Trial) which was, by Order7 of January 10, 2003, denied
following his and his counsels failure to appear at the hearing
of the motion and comply with the rule on proper service of a
motion.8 Petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied, by Order9 of May 26, 2003.
Petitioner appealed the Orders dated January 10, 2003 and
May 26, 2003 as well as the Decision dated October 23, 2001
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 of
which, by Decision of December 22, 2003, affirmed 10 the
judgment with modification as to the penalties imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed
decision is hereby affirmed with modification. This Court
finds accused/appellant Carmelo C. Bernardo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 but set [sic] aside the penalty of imprisonment and
hereby sentences her [sic] to pay a fine ofP22,500.00 in each
case, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or
non-payment not to exceed six (6) months, and, to pay private
complainant F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING
CORPORATION the total amount of P113,500.00 by way of
indemnity.
Meanwhile, the alias warrant of arrest issued against
accused x x x
is hereby ordered lifted and set aside.
No pronouncement as to costs. (Underscoring supplied)
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
RTC decision but it was denied.
Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
Petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review within 30 days
from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from his counsels receipt of
the RTC Order denying his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, by Resolution of June 21, 2004,
granted petitioner an extension, but only 15 days pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 42,12 to file his Petition.
Apparently unaware of the above-said Resolution of June 21,
2004 under which his petition would be filed not later than
June 16, 2004, petitioner used up the 30-day extension sought
and filed his petition on July 1, 2004. Petitioner in fact
received the June 21, 2004 Resolution only on July 9, 2004.13
By Resolution14 of July 30, 2004, the appellate court denied
petitioners petition due course for having been filed 15 days
late and for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and other
pertinent and material documents. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied by Resolution 15 of
January 14, 2005, the appellate court noting that the MeTC
Decision attached to the Motion for Reconsideration was a
mere photocopy and uncertified.
Hence, the instant petition faulting the appellate court:
A. . . . IN RECKONING THE PERIOD OF 15 DAYS
EXTENSION FROM THE EXPIRY DATE OF THE
ORIGINAL PERIOD OF 15 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR
FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM, INSTEAD OF FROM
DATE OF THE RECEIPT OF THE ORDER GRANTING
EXTENSION;
B. . . . IN APPLYING THE RULES OF PROCEDURE VERY
STRICTLY AND IN UTTER DISREGARD OF ITS
INTERNAL RULES WHICH LIBERALLY ALLOW
COMPLETION OF PORTIONS OF RECORDS IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES AND THE SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE APPLYING LIBERALLY THE RULES
OF PROCEDURE;
C. . . . [IN NOT] CONSIDER[ING] THE MERITS OF THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW.16 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner argues that the 15-day extension granted to him by
the appellate court should be reckoned from his date of receipt
of its June 21, 2004 Resolution.
The argument fails. A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC 17 issued on
February 29, 2000 is clear. It provides that "[a]ny extension of
time to file the required pleading should . . . be counted from
the expiration of the period . . ." The extension should thus be
tacked to the original period, to commence immediately after
the expiration of such period. The court has no discretion to
reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later
than the expiration of such original period, not even if the
expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.18
Petitioners reliance on the 1989 case of Vda. de Capulong v.
Workmens Insurance Co., Inc.19 on this point does not thus
lie. Parenthetically, the factual milieus in Vda. de Capulong
and the present case are dissimilar. The respondent in Vda. de
Capulong specifically moved that it be given an additional
period "from receipt of the order" of the court allowing
extension, and the court granted an extension of time without
indicating when it would commence. In the present case,
petitioner prayed for a period of extension to be counted from
the expiration of the original period or "from June 1, 2004,"
which date the appellate court correctly used in reckoning the
extension.20
Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in not resolving
his motion for extension before the expiration of the 15-day
extension so that he would have known that his request for 30
days was not granted.
Petitioners position does not lie too.
Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may grant
an "additional period of 15 days only" within which to file the
petition for review. Albeit under the same section, a "further
extension" not to exceed 15 days may be granted "for the
most compelling reason," petitioner had no basis to assume
that his request for a 30-day extension is meritorious and
would be granted.21
Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but
in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never
presume that their motions for extension or postponement
would be granted or that they would be granted the length of
time they pray for.22
Petitioner claims, however, that his motion for extension
presented a compelling reason for the grant of a further
extension. Justifying the 30-day period sought, petitioner
explains that he was implicitly seeking both a 15-day
extension and a further extension of 15 days.
The wording of the rule with respect to further extension is
couched in restrictive terms. Section 1 of Rule 42 provides
that "[n]o further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days."
Petitioners motion for extension was anchored on a lone
ground, his counsels being "pre-occupied in the preparation
of petitions, memoranda, briefs, and other lengthy pleadings
in cases as important as this case" and in "daily court
appearance and personal commitments." Sustaining
petitioners lone ground would obliterate the distinguishing
essence of a further extension for it would do away with the
necessity of presenting compelling grounds addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.
But crediting arguendo petitioners "implicit" justification,
this Court sees no reason to disturb the exercise by the
appellate court of its discretion in denying a "cumulative"
extension and in effectively ruling that heavy workload of
counsel is not a most compelling reason.
Respecting the second assigned error, the CA correctly
dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to comply with
Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, which specifically requires that both
lower courts judgments or final orders must be attached to
the petition in the required form clearly legible duplicate
originals or certified true copies. Indeed, petitioner fell short
in his compliance. He attached to his petition only the RTC
Decision of December 22, 2003 and its Order of May 4, 2004.
He did not attach thereto the MeTC Orders dated January 10,
2003 and May 26, 2003, and the Decision dated October 23,
2001 which were appealed23 to the RTC and which were
likewise adverse to him. 24 While to his Motion for
Reconsideration, he attached the October 23, 2001 Decision,
it was not in the required form, and while he attached a
duplicate original of the May 26, 2003 Order, he failed to
submit the January 10, 2003 Order.
There is no cogent reason to deviate from such requirement
under Section 2(d) of Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of which
has been held to be discernible and well settled. 25
Petitioner having failed to perfect his appeal, the RTC
judgment had become final and executory.26 This leaves it
unnecessary to dwell on petitioners assertion that he was
denied due process of law and the right to counsel before the
trial court.
Suffice it to state that the requisites of a valid trial in
absentia, viz, (1) the accused has already been arraigned, (2)
he has been duly notified of the trial, and (3) his failure to
appear is unjustifiable, are, as reflected above, present in the
case.27
Estrada v. People28 should, under the facts and circumstances
attendant to the case, dispel any lingering doubts of petitioner
on the validity of the trial courts proceedings.
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14
(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
"after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." x x x
x x x Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas,
[the] escape should have been considered a waiver of their
right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the
court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not
prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were
deemed to have received notice. The same fact of their
escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they
have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and
protection of the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gimenez
v. Nazareno, the trial against the fugitives, just like those of
the others, should have been brought to its ultimate
conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule
on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all
the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It
should not wait for the fugitives re-appearance or re-
arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses who testified against
them.29 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
As for the promulgation of judgment in absentia, the
following pertinent provision of Section 6 of Rule 120 should
likewise put to rest any doubts on its validity:
The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of
the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel
or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
xxxx
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused
personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel,
requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the
decision. If the accused was tried in absentiabecause he
jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him
shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in
the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his
last known address or thru his counsel.
x x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
A word on the modified penalty imposed by the RTC.
Contrary to its reasoning, the penalty of imprisonment in
cases of violation of B.P. 22 was not deleted. As clarified by
Administrative Circular 13-2001, the clear tenor and intention
of Administrative Circular 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down
a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in B.P. 22.30
Since the prosecution did not raise the matter as an issue and,
at any rate, there is no showing of repeated violation or
wanton bad faith on the part of petitioner, the non-imposition
of the penalty of imprisonment is in order.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
10. WHEN PRESENCE OF AN ACCUSED IS A
DUTY
A. ARRIAGNMENT AND PLEA, WHTHER OF
INNOCENCE OR GUILT RULE 116, SEC1 (B)
B. DURING TRIAL, FOR IDENTIFICATION
G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO
QUIJANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG,
ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON,
ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO
MABUHAY, respondents.
Basilio E. Duaban for accused.
CRUZ, J.:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be
arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the
prosecution. 1 As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended
information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he
pleaded not guilty. 2 Trial commenced, but while it was in
progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first
information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city
court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release;
and so he escaped. 3 The respondent judge, learning later of
the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance
with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in
absentia under certain circumstances. 5 The respondent judge
denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings
until the return of the accused. 6 The order of the trial court is
now before us on certiorari and mandamus. 7
The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He
mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal
reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the
broader perspective of its intendment.
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19,
of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows:
Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of
criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely
deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of
the defendant's escape. The old case ofPeople v.
Avancea 8 required his presence at certain stages of the trial
which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the
defendant had not re-appeared or remained at large. As his
right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable
even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's
advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the
trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by
Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the
prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only
that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of
the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old
doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee
could not be held because he could not be duly notified under
Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have
waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is
also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial
unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the
past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further
proceedings against him and in effect ultimately absolving
him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his
escape will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by
preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue
even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived
except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under
Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver
of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the
subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with
his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The
same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear
unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself
beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v.
Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the
accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent
conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case,
since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no
reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the
accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was
released on the illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to
bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of
the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of
the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the
evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even
probable conviction.
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is
apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in
"the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is
not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look
beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking
to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for
its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its
ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision.
The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who
assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court of
Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide
and to report to us the result of his investigation within sixty
days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December
22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the
accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to
continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario
Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is
terminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.