STORY HIGHLIGHTS

To understand this influence, one must

understand that like most of South and Central
Asia, in Afghanistan too, Islam took root
primarily through the mystical dimension of the
religion.
"I do not deem your departure advisable at this time for
your presence in Afghanistan is a source of blessing and
pride for this land's inhabitants," wrote King Amanullah
Khan (r. 1919-29) to Naqib Sayed Hassan Gailani, Pir of
the Qadiriyyah Sufi order of Afghanistan on March 21,
1929.
Faced with an uprising that eventually ended his reign, the
Afghan monarch beseeched the Sufi Pir to abandon his
travel plans, and instead, assist the state in subduing the
rebellion.
The uprising, led by Habibullah Kalakani who, like a
number of conservative Afghans, was offended by King
Amanullah's rapid reforms, is said to have been instigated
by the British. Interestingly, the head of the
Naqshbandiyyah Sufi order of Afghanistan , Hazrat Nur al-
Mashayekh Mojaddidi, was actively helping the rebellion
against the king.
Historically, Sufism has always been intertwined with
Afghan politics. The story of a Sufi dervish placing a
wreath of wheat on the head of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the
founder of modern Afghanistan, at a Sufi shrine in
Kandahar in 1747 is told to confirm the Durrani king's
legitimacy. Zahir Shah , the last monarch of Afghanistan
(r. 1933-73), was proclaimed king after Hazrat Nur al-
Mashayekh placed the ceremonial turban on his head.
Sufi leaders as peace brokers
Prominent mystics had great roles in two Anglo-Afghan
Wars and in a number of rebellions in the 19th and early
20th centuries against the state. Many peace deals were
brokered by Sufi leaders as they enjoyed respect among
both sides of conflicts throughout Afghanistan's
tumultuous history.
The importance of the role of mystic leaders fluctuated.
But even at their lowest moments of political significance,
their perceived power, if not de facto importance, has
preserved Sufi leaders' place in Afghan politics.
To understand this influence, one must understand that
like most of South and Central Asia, in Afghanistan too,
Islam took root primarily through the mystical dimension
of the religion.
The Islam of Afghanistan, therefore, has traditionally been
Sufi Islam, particularly the understanding of the religion
that is offered by the Qadiriyyah and Naqshbandiyyah Sufi
orders.
Unlike many other Islamic countries, Sufi orders in
Afghanistan are not exclusive elite mystical clubs. Rather,
they claim adherents among all segments of society .
While conventional Sufism, consisting of khanaqahs ,
initiation rites and regular dhikr sessions do exist, the
majority of Afghans are considered maraboutic Sufis or
devotees of a certain pir and his family by inheritance. It
is mostly this kind of Sufism that continues to give a
unique privilege to the descendents of the Gailani and
Mojaddidi pirs.
And this was precisely why after the communist coup
d'etat of 1978, which was followed by the Soviet military
invasion, the majority of Afghans turned to Pir Sayed
Ahmad Gailani and Hazrat Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, the two
main Sufi sources, to lead their resistance.
Other mujahideen leaders that formed resistance groups
in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran were mostly heads or
members of radical Islamist parties that had emerged
from the late 1950s onwards in Afghanistan.
As the primary conduit and manager of the US military
assistance to the Afghan mujahideen, Pakistan's Inter
Service Intelligence agency (ISI) chose to sideline the Sufi-
led mujahideen groups and bolster the radical
organisations with which it had established relationships
long before the Soviet invasion.
The uneven distribution of arms, cash and political support
throughout the 1980s to some extent diminished the
political magnitude of Sufi leaders, though their spiritual
positions remained, for the most part, intact.
In April 1992, after the fall of the last remnants of the
communist regime and the take-over of Kabul by the
mujahideen, Hazrat Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, head of the
Naqshbandiyyah Sufi order, became the first interim
president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
While Mojaddidi remained somewhat active during the
ensuing civil war (1992-96), Gailani, the head of
Qadiriyyah order, bowed out of the internecine conflict and
asked his followers to do the same.
Taliban's harshest critics
Both Sufi leaders became the harshest critics of the
Taliban movement as the religious students swept the
country off of former mujahideen commanders and took
Kabul in 1996. Paradoxically, a number of the former
commanders and followers of both mystic leaders
eventually joined the Taliban.
At the Bonn Conference of December 2001, where an
interim Afghan government was formed to replace the
Taliban, Gailani and Mojaddidi were represented. But, like
the Pakistanis, the Americans too, downplayed their
significance in the Afghan society.
Despite the recent universal rise to prominence of radical
Islam and against all the money and sophisticated
propaganda machinery that they utilise to exploit the
weaknesses of Muslim states and disenchantment of
Muslim masses, a majority of Afghans continue to see
Islam through traditional Sufi lenses.
The Americans and the international community have
spent billions of dollars in Afghanistan in the past 12
years to fight extremism. But, they never understood that
by investing - politically and financially - in promoting the
mystical dimension of Islam, Afghan society would have
had a more effective means to sideline extremism . A
nation with hundreds of years of Sufi tradition engraved in
its popular - as well as high - culture could easily return to
its spiritual origins and it would have cost Washington and
NATO capitals far less in treasure and lives.
The two main rivals in the upcoming Afghan presidential
elections, however, seem to have finally come to
understand the persistent significance of Sufi leaders . One
of the front-runners in the April 5 presidential elections, Dr
Ashraf Ghani, previously held a skeptical position on the
potential role of Sufi leaders in the post-Taliban Afghan
society. But, he went through lengthy efforts to gain Pir
Sayed Ahmad Gailani's support for his ticket. This support
in the previous two presidential elections had gone to
President Hamid Karzai.
Karzai also lost the support of his longtime ally, Hazarat
Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, when the former refused to sign
the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US after a
Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) unanimously voted in favour
of concluding the agreement.
Recently, in a shrewd political chess move, the Afghan
president has brought Mojaddidi's cousin, Mohammad
Amin Jan, to Kabul (he was residing in Pakistan) and has
given him a seat on the High Peace Council. While with
this move Karzai showed that he can easily replace a
rebellious Sufi leader with another, he also gave away his
dependence on the support of Sufi leaders and his
understanding of their continued significance in Afghan
society.
Given the three-decade-long systematic reduction of the
role of Sufi leaders, and in an election where vision,
ideology and principles come secondary to money and the
buying and selling of votes, the names Gailani and
Mojaddidi may not fetch great numbers of ballots, but
they continue to carry weight in an indefinable way.
Perhaps those names add a certain dignity, respectability
and trust that protracted conflict and foreign interference
has erased from Afghan politics. Perhaps, unlike
westerners, those two Afghan politicians have realised
that Sufism is the age-old anchor on which society relies
when all else becomes dubious and complicated.
Helena Malikyar is an Afghan political analyst and historian.