Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
In an order dated October 27, 1982, 8 the trial court absolved Pioneer Not satisfied with the modified judgment of the trial court, Aboitiz
from liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly appealed the same to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
establish a case of negligence against the crane operator which the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages
court a quo ruled is never presumed, aside from the fact that the awarded to the Vianas.
memorandum of agreement supposedly refers only to Pioneer's liability in
case of loss or damage to goods handled by it but not in the case of Hence, this petition wherein petitioner Aboitiz postulates that
personal injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly invoke the fellow- respondent court erred:
servant rule simply because its liability stems from a breach of contract of
carriage. The dispositive portion of said order reads:
(A) In holding that the doctrine laid down by this
honorable Court in La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby modified insofar as
al. (17 SCRA 739, July 27, 1966) is applicable to the
third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
case in the face of the undisputable fact that the factual
is concerned rendered in favor of the plaintiffs-,:
situation under the La Mallorca case is radically
different from the facts obtaining in this case;
(1) Ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to
pay the plaintiffs the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of
(B) In holding petitioner liable for damages in the face
Anacleto Viana; P9,000.00 (sic) as actual damages;
of the finding of the court a quo and confirmed by the
P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay
Honorable respondent court of Appeals that the
computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as
deceased, Anacleto Viana was guilty of contributory
attorney's fees; P5,000.00 value of the 100 cavans of
negligence, which, We respectfully submit contributory
palay as support for five (5) years for deceased's
negligence was the proximate cause of his death;
parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia
Viana,computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as
specifically the honorable respondent Court of Appeals reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who
failed to apply Art. 1762 of the New Civil Code; remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance
are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
(C) In the alternative assuming the holding of the reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
Honorable respondent Court of Appears that petitioner circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage
may be legally condemned to pay damages to the and prepare for his departure. 12 The carrier-passenger relationship is not
terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried
private respondents we respectfully submit that it
to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's
committed a reversible error when it dismissed
premises to claim his baggage. 13
petitioner's third party complaint against private
respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation instead of
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the
compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner for
aforesaid case of La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit:
whatever damages it may be compelled to pay to the
private respondents Vianas. 9
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of
carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and
the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a
respondent Court of Appeals found the victim Anacleto Viana guilty of
place selected by the carrier at the point of destination,
contributory negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of
but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
for the unloading of cargoes which was the direct, immediate and
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
proximate cause of the victim's death.
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
I. Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from
alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is
the time Anacleto Viana disembarked from the vessel and that he was
considered still a passenger. So also, where a
given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes prior to the
passenger has alighted at his destination and is
operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer
proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
reasonable e and he consequently ceased to be a passenger.
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the
Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca vs. Court of
report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been
Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
shot, and he in good faith and without intent of
engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother,
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the
thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to
vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship will
the protection of the railroad company and its agents.
not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his
destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's
get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer
they alighted from the bus. Racquel, the child that she period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers
was, must have followed the father. However, although such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the
the father was still on the running board of the bus number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of
waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity
or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need
father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel
was at this instance that the child, who must be near and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the
the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily,
it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of
exercised the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's
person' required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar.
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to
obligation to transport safely its passengers. ... The the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto
presence of said passengers near the bus was not Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes,
still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier
protection under their contract of carriage. 14 stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to
their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule baggage.
as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable
presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the
should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, victim had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to
such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking
customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum time
such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be
of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to
therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour
interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause.
The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one (1)
cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard
petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause. procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading
operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the cannot be gainsaid that petitioner had inadequately complied with the
foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a required degree of diligence to prevent the accident from happening.
passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that
II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as
business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's
circumstances of each case. 15 More particularly, a common carrier is explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently
bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the supposed
due regard for all the circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger dies or is cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area and the
injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at most
acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-
carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of a-vis the gravity of the danger to which the deceased was exposed.
the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in
failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly
destination, 18 which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to
and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry
safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation
into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such
subsists.
perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious
persons" to be exercised "as far as human care and foresight can
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a
provide" which is required by law of common carriers with respect to
passenger's death or injury the operator of the vessel was at fault or
their passengers.
negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is
incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's
avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to the passengers of
aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate
common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a stringent
and direct cause of, because it could definitely have prevented, the
statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court has
former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at
likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of the law by
bar, 19 petitioner has expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent
exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from common
Court of Appeals that petitioner did not present sufficient evidence in
carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the passengers who
support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of
often become hapless victims of indifferent and profit-oriented carriers. gross negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise.
We cannot in reason deny that petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case, it
No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE
respondent court's declaration that there was no negligence on the part LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN, petitioners,
of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the trial court's vs.
finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being absolved COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT
of any liability. BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT,
NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat
the alleged gross negligence of the victim, hence its present contention represented by Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.
that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence of the crane
operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack Francisco S. Reyes Law Office for petitioners.
of evidence on its present theory. Even in its answer filed in the court
below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken the necessary Antonio C. de Guzman for private respondents.
safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact
which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not
impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz
by filing its third-party complaint only after ten (10) months from the REGALADO, J.:p
institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the
ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint 1 for damages
corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which
like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what we have said occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged
that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging
that no negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules
the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat.
However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter
its passenger is the rationale for our finding on its liability.
bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and
cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed expired.
A No sir. 21
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs
of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual
finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to
the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its
employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review
of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman Republic of the Philippines
himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be SUPREME COURT
absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the Manila
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and
Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or EN BANC
negligence.
G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
LA MALLORCA, petitioner, were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to
vs. the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET of their baggages, was the first to get down the bus, followed
AL., respondents. by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a
shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four
G. E. Yabut, R. Monterey and M.C. Lagman for petitioner. or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to
Ahmed Garcia for respondents. the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had
left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him,
BARRERA, J.: unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the
running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door,
CA-G.R. No. 23267-R, holding it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading,
pay to respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip,
his minor daughter Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages. notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the
driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are: still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran.
Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete
stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband
plaintiffs had gotten off.
and wife, together with their minor daughters, namely, Milagros,
13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2 years
old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran
No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the immediately jumped from the running board without getting
defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the
Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife
four pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to
The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground,
plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other
covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in
Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both which she rode earlier together with her parents.
were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance
with the appellant's rules and regulations. For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the
present suit against the defendant seeking to recover from the
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral
stopped to allow the passengers bound therefor, among whom damages and actual damages sustained as a result thereof
and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court below bus. There can be no controversy that as far as the father is
rendered the judgment in question. concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not
unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and
breach of contract of carriage and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting
the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his
representing burial expenses and costs. baggage from the car.1 The issue to be determined here is whether as
to the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety
could not be a breach of contract in the case, for the reason that when under the contract of carriage also persisted.
the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus
involved in the incident and, therefore, the contract of carriage had It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and
already terminated. Although the Court of Appeals sustained this passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from
theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi- the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And,
of Appeals did not only find the petitioner liable, but increased the what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
damages awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead of determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
P3,000.00 granted by the trial court. alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered
still a passenger.2 So also, where a passenger has alighted at his
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
erred (1) in holding it liable for quasi-delict, considering that premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his
respondents complaint was one for breach of contract, and (2) in brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and
raising the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother,
respondents did not appeal from the decision of the lower court. he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues
to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain company and its agents.3
the judgement holding petitioner liable for damages for the death of the
child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it is true that In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his
respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus.
deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father.
disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus
the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus
one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the
moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which
the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be the claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the
claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the
a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent." This
transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that
stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor,
started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the and while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and
signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the
baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the
of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this
the protection under their contract of carriage. presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to
overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.
terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its
driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by
Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads the Court of Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the
appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues
That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of raised and argued in appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that
Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them on P3,000.00
negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does it appear that, as
very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their
agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the P3,000.00 was merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be
operation of their vehicle. treated as an exception to the general rule.5Herein petitioner's
contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals committed error in
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently,
for quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the meritorious.1wph1.t
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991,
ROMERO, J.:
private respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and
Before us is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Japan Airlines, Inc. (JAL) seeking the reversal
meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21,
which affirmed with modification the award
of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when
of damages made by the trial court in favor of herein private respondents they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana, Adelia Francisco and Jose
Miranda. Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on
July 25, 1991, commenced an action for damages against JAL before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. 2 To support their
claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to WHEREFORE, with the foregoing Modification, the
provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 other respects.
at Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to
shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. On JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and
the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline unavailing. 4
passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is
cancelled due to "force majeure."
Failing in its bid to reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant
petition.
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of
private respondents holding JAL liable for damages, viz.:
The issue to be resolved is whether JAL, as a common carrier has the
obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the
plaintiffs ordering the defendant Japan Airlines to pay delay were caused by "force majeure."
the plaintiffs Enrique Agana, Adalia B. Francisco and
Maria Angela Nina Agana the sum of One million Two
To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
Hundred forty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six
prevented JAL from proceeding to Manila on schedule. Likewise,
Pesos (P1,246,936.00) and Jose Miranda the sum of
private respondents concede that such event can be considered as
Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred sixteen
"force majeure" since their delayed arrival in Manila was not imputable
and 31/100 (P320,616.31) as actual, moral and
to JAL. 5
exemplary damages and pay attorney's fees in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held
(P200,000.00), and to pay the costs of suit.
responsible for the delayed arrival in Manila, it was nevertheless liable for
their living expenses during their unexpected stay in Narita since airlines
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, have the obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience of its
which, however, with the exception of lowering the damages awarded passengers. While we sympathize with the private respondents' plight, we
affirmed the trial court's finding, 3 thus: are unable to accept this contention.
Thus, the award of moral damages should be as it is We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have
hereby reduced to P200,000.00 for each of the consistently ruled that a contract to transport passengers is quite
plaintiffs, the exemplary damages to P300,000.00 and different in kind, and degree from any other contractual relation. It is
the attorney's fees to P100,000.00 plus the costs. safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public interest.
Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting
standards of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that
may be sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say that The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates
common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages its failure to grasp the exacting standard required by
even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to
would render the defense of "force majeure," as an exception from any inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless,
liability, illusory and ineffective. such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with
its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is
his obligation because of "force majeure," the general rule is that he deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case
cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. 6 Corollarily, at bar. What we said in one case once again must be
when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger
effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form continues until the latter has been landed at the port of
of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be destination and has left the carrier's premises. Hence,
charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses PAL necessarily would still have to exercise
of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991. extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort,
convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an they have reached their final destination. On this score,
exasperating experience for the private respondents. To be sure, they PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle
underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in between government forces and Muslim rebels in
Narita, but their predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent
JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, was a stranger to the place.
in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its
stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a The reliance is misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is
burden to assume. different from the instant petition. In that case there was indeed a
fortuitous event resulting in the diversion of the PAL flight. However,
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such the unforeseen diversion was worsened when "private respondents
risks incident to the mode of travel. 7 In this regard, adverse weather (passenger) was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride in a
conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel," 10 not to mention the apparent
air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or apathy of the PAL station manager as to the predicament of the stranded
expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks. 8 passengers. 11 In light of these circumstances, we held that if the fortuitous
event was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance by the carrier's
Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of "force employees, an action for damages against the carrier is permissible.
majeure," still ruled against JAL relying in our decision in PAL v. Court of Unfortunately, for private respondents, none of these conditions are
Appeals, 9 thus: present in the instant petition.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where
from any liability. It must be noted that private respondents bought any property right has been invaded. 13
tickets from the United States with Manila as their final destination.
While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of
expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, Appeals dated December 22, 1993 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of
JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport actual, moral and exemplary damages is hereby DELETED. Petitioner JAL
private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. is ordered to pay each of the private respondents nominal damages in the
Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and sum of P100,000.00 each including attorney' s fees of P50,000.00 plus
convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents costs.
from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which
private respondents were obliged to make the necessary
arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private
respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24.
To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were
compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it
was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that
they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00
a.m. the next day.
We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to
Manila from June 15 to June 21, 1991 caused considerable disruption
in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it would be
unreasonable to expect, considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flight
operations would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this
does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary
arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available
flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private
respondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination.
PARAS, J.:
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to
negligence (Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the
SCRA 87 [1985]) and it must be shown that the carrier had observed skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all
the required extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person as far as members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), without any
human care and foresight can provide or that the accident was caused connection with private respondent, hence, independent of the will of
by a fortuitous event (Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 [1976]). either the PAL or of its passengers.
Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be responsible for those
"events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking
inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is synonymous incident which could have been avoided had there been a more
with caso fortuito (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is of the thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of baggages as
same sense as "force majeure" (Words and Phrases Permanent authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question occurred
Edition, Vol. 17, p. 362). during Martial Law where there was a military take-over of airport
security including the frisking of passengers and the inspection of their
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and international flights. In
exempt a person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is fact military take-over was specifically announced on October 20, 1973
necessary that the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of by General Jose L. Rancudo, Commanding General of the Philippine
the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the Air Force in a letter to Brig. Gen. Jesus Singson, then Director of the
will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event must be either Civil Aeronautics Administration (Rollo, pp. 71-72) later confirmed
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render shortly before the hijacking incident of May 21, 1976 by Letter of
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; Instruction No. 399 issued on April 28, 1976 (Rollo, p. 72).
and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to
[1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527 [1971]; Estrada v. perform its obligations in a nominal manner and obviously it cannot be
Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 faulted with negligence in the performance of duty taken over by the
[1985]; Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 Armed Forces of the Philippines to the exclusion of the former.
[1986]). Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been
or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough satisfied. Consequently the existence of force majeure has been
that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is established exempting respondent PAL from the payment of damages
commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to to its passengers who suffered death or injuries in their persons and for
avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility loss of their baggages.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit and the decision of the Court of First Instance of South
Cotabato, Branch I is hereby AFFIRMED. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The instant has no merit. Second. Seizure of Petitioner's Bus not a Case of Force Majeure
First. Petitioner's Breach of the Contract of Carriage. The petitioner contends that the seizure of its bus by the armed
assailants was a fortuitous event for which it could not be held liable.
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence
acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could which could not be foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of
have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good Appeals, 7 we held that to considered as force majeure, it is necessary
father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the that (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of
negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
Mananggolo and his men was made possible. (3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of
participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro
any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from
that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by
being excused from liability.
burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation
manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 8 it was held that the common
taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
carrier was liable for its failure to take the necessary precautions against
an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in the loss of
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have the lives of several passengers. The event was forseeable, and, thus, the
failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by
analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory
that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve something. But Atty.
to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the
bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous intended targets of the violence were petitioners and its employees,
event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty. not its passengers. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss
of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 9 and De bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding.
Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 10 in support of its contention that the seizure Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus,
of its bus by the assailants constitutes force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it
Appeals, 11 it was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to
install window grills on its buses to protect the passengers from injuries retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was
cause by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was
in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 12 it was ruled that a common carriers is
playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot
not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by
considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness.
grave or irresistable threat, violence, or force.
7. cost of suits.
THIRD DIVISION
The trial court found the following facts: A thorough examination of the records, however, show that there are
material facts ignored by the trial court which were discussed by the
The parties presented conflicting evidence as to how appellate court to arrive at a different conclusion. These circumstances
the two deceased Narcisa Rautruat and Ornominio show that the petitioner common carrier was negligent in the provision
Beter met their deaths. of safety precautions so that its passengers may be transported safely
to their destinations. The appellate court states:
However, from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs,
the Court could not see why the two deceased could A critical eye must be accorded the lower court's
have fallen off the bus when their own witnesses conclusions of fact in its tersely written ratio decidendi.
testified that when the commotion ensued inside the The lower court concluded that the door of the bus was
bus, the passengers pushed and shoved each other closed; secondly, the passengers, specifically the two
towards the door apparently in order to get off from the deceased, jumped out of the window. The lower court
bus through the door. But the passengers also could therefore concluded that the defendant common carrier
not pass through the door because according to the is not liable for the death of the said passengers which
evidence the door was locked. it implicitly attributed to the unforeseen acts of the
unidentified passenger who went amuck.
On the other hand, the Court is inclined to give
credence to the evidence adduced by the defendants There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion
that when the commotion ensued inside the bus, the that the solitary door of the bus was locked as to
two deceased panicked and, in state of shock and fear, prevent the passengers from passing through. Leonila
they jumped off from the bus by passing through the Cullano, testifying for the defense, clearly stated that
window. the conductor opened the door when the passengers
were shouting that the bus stop while they were in a
It is the prevailing rule and settled jurisprudence that state of panic. Sergia Beter categorically stated that
transportation companies are not insurers of their she actually saw her son fall from the bus as the door
passengers. The evidence on record does not show was forced open by the force of the onrushing
that defendants' personnel were negligent in their passengers.
Pedro Collango, on the other hand, testified that he (Tsn. p. 3, August 8, 1984).
shut the door after the last passenger had boarded the
bus. But he had quite conveniently neglected to say Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the
that when the passengers had panicked, he himself deceased passengers jumped from the window when it
panicked and had gone to open the door. Portions of was entirely possible for them to have alighted through
the testimony of Leonila Cullano, quoted below, are the door. The lower court's reliance on the testimony of
illuminating: Pedro Collango, as the conductor and employee of the
common carrier, is unjustified, in the light of the clear
xxx xxx xxx testimony of Leonila Cullano as the sole uninterested
eyewitness of the entire episode. Instead we find Pedro
Q When you said the conductor opened the door, the Collango's testimony to be infused by bias and fraught
door at the front or rear portion of the bus? with inconsistencies, if not notably unreliable for lack of
veracity. On direct examination, he testified:
A Front door.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And these two persons whom you said alighted,
where did they pass, the fron(t) door or rear door? Q So what happened to the passengers inside your
bus?
A Front door.
A Some of the passengers jumped out of the window.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
(Tsn., p. 4, Aug. 8, 1984)
Q While the bus was in motion?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, your Honor, but the speed was slow because we
Q What happened after there was a commotion at the have just picked up a passenger.
rear portion of the bus?
Atty. Gambe:
A When the commotion occurred, I stood up and I
noticed that there was a passenger who was sounded Q You said that at the time of the incident the bus was
(sic). The conductor panicked because the passengers running slow because you have just picked up a
were shouting 'stop, stop'. The conductor opened the passenger. Can you estimate what was your speed at
bus.' that time?
Atty. Calo: At such speed of not less than 30 to 40 miles ..., or
about 48 to 65 kilometers per hour, the speed of the
No basis, your Honor, he is neither a driver nor a bus could scarcely be considered slow considering that
conductor. according to Collango himself, the bus had just come
from a full stop after picking a passenger (Tsn, p. 4, Id.)
COURT: and that the bus was still on its second or third gear
(Tsn., p. 12, Id.).
Let the witness answer. Estimate only, the conductor
experienced. In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the
common carrier, through its employees, consisted of
Witness: the lack of extraordinary diligence required of common
carriers, in exercising vigilance and utmost care of the
Not less than 30 to 40 miles. safety of its passengers, exemplified by the driver's
belated stop and the reckless opening of the doors of
the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably
COURT:
fast speed. At the same time, the common carrier itself
acknowledged, through its administrative officer,
Kilometers or miles?
Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to
travel and take on passengers and the public at large,
A Miles. while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its
size and loading capacity, in contravention of rules and
Atty. Gambe: regulations provided for under the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code (RA 4136 as amended.) (Rollo, pp.
Q That is only your estimate by your experience? 23-26)
A Yes, sir, estimate. Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver
did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the
(Tsn., pp. 4-5, Oct. 17, 1983). bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door
when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the
conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already
fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in
accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law
governing common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their (considering the state of health of the deceased and
passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners the mortality tables are deemed conclusive) and loss of
to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due earning capacity; (2) pecuniary loss, loss of support
to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe and service; and (3) moral and mental suffering
extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their (Alcantara, et al. v. Surro, et al., 93 Phil. 470).
destinations as warranted by law. (See Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra). In the case of People v. Daniel (No. L-66551, April 25,
1985, 136 SCRA 92, at page 104), the High Tribunal,
The petitioners also contend that the private respondents failed to reiterating the rule in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
show to the court that they are the parents of Ornominio Beter and Appeals (31 SCRA 511), stated that the amount of loss
Narcisa Rautraut respectively and therefore have no legal personality of earring capacity is based mainly on two factors,
to sue the petitioners. This argument deserves scant consideration. We namely, (1) the number of years on the basis of which
find this argument a belated attempt on the part of the petitioners to the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at
avoid liability for the deaths of Beter and Rautraut. The private which the losses sustained by the heirs should be fixed.
respondents were Identified as the parents of the victims by witnesses
during the trial and the trial court recognized them as such. The trial As the formula adopted in the case of Davila v.
court dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that the petitioners Philippine Air Lines, 49 SCRA 497, at the age of 30
were not negligent. one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years based on
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality (2/3 x 80-
Finally, the amount of damages awarded to the heirs of Beter and 32). By taking into account the pace and nature of the
itc-asl
Rautraut by the appellate court is supported by the evidence. The life of a carpenter, it is reasonable to make allowances
appellate court stated: for these circumstances and reduce the life expectancy
of the deceased Ornominio Beter to 25 years (People v.
Ornominio Beter was 32 years of age at the time of his Daniel, supra). To fix the rate of losses it must be noted
death, single, in good health and rendering support and that Art. 2206 refers to gross earnings less necessary
service to his mother. As far as Narcisa Rautraut is living expenses of the deceased, in other words, only
concerned, the only evidence adduced is to the effect net earnings are to be considered (People v.
that at her death, she was 23 years of age, in good Daniel, supra; Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
health and without visible means of support. Appeals, supra).
In accordance with Art. 1764 in conjunction with Art. Applying the foregoing rules with respect to Ornominio
2206 of the Civil Code, and established jurisprudence, Beter, it is both just and reasonable, considering his
several factors may be considered in determining the social standing and position, to fix the deductible, living
award of damages, namely: 1) life expectancy and incidental expenses at the sum of Four Hundred
Pesos (P400.00) a month, or Four Thousand Eight WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned
Hundred Pesos (P4,800.00) annually. As to his income, decision dated May 19, 1988 and the resolution dated August 1, 1988
considering the irregular nature of the work of a daily of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
wage carpenter which is seasonal, it is safe to assume
that he shall have work for twenty (20) days a month at
Twenty Five Pesos (P150,000.00) for twenty five years.
Deducting therefrom his necessary expenses, his heirs
would be entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) representing loss of support and service
(P150,000.00 less P120,000.00). In addition, his heirs
are entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
straight death indemnity pursuant to Article 2206
(People v. Daniel, supra). For damages for their moral
and mental anguish, his heirs are entitled to the
reasonable sum of P10,000.00 as an exception to the
general rule against moral damages in case of breach
of contract rule Art. 2200 (Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil.
75). As attorney's fees, Beter's heirs are entitled to
P5,000.00. All in all, the plaintiff-appellants Ricardo and
Sergia Beter as heirs of their son Ornominio are
entitled to an indemnity of Seventy Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00).
That when the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio
Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company
assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line,
happened to be in said station waiting for the same train which
would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was going to
Republic of the Philippines report for duty;
SUPREME COURT
Manila
That Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge Discussing the basis of a carrier's liability under the old Civil Code of
against Tomas Gillaco, same dating back during the Japanese 1889 (which was in force in 1946, when Gillaco was shot) this Court
occupation; said in Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil., 657):
That because of this personal grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco with In our opinion, the conclusions of the court below are entirely
the carbine furnished to him by the Manila Railroad Company correct. That upon the facts stated the defendant's liability, if
for his use as such train guard, upon seeing him inside the train any, is contractual, is well settled by previous decisions of the
coach; court, beginning with the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), and the distinction between extra-
That Tomas Gillaco died as a result of the would which he contractual liability and contractual liability has been so ably
sustained from the shot fired by Devesa. and exhaustively discussed in various other cases that nothing
further need here be said upon that subject. (See
It is also undisputed that Devesa was convicted with homicide by final Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768; Manila
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Railroad vs. Compaia Transatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875; De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad
Appellant's contention is that, on the foregoing facts, no liability & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706). It is sufficient to reiterate that the
attaches to it as employer of the killer, Emilio Devesa; that it is not source of the defendant's legal liability is the contract of
responsible subsidiary ex delicto, under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to
Code, because the crime was not committed while the slayer was in carry the plaintiff safely and securely to their destination; and
the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service; nor is it that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he
responsible ex contractu, since the complaint did not aver sufficient shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes
facts to establish such liability, and no negligence on appellant's party mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads as
was shown. The Court below held the Railroad company responsible follows:
on the ground that a contract of transportation implies protection of the
passengers against acts of personal violence by the agents or "No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen
employees of the carrier. or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception
of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and
There can be no quarrel with the principle that a passenger is entitled those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability."
to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or
employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a
transport a passenger safely to his destination. But under the law of personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese
the case, this responsibility extends only to those that the carrier could occupation) was entirely unforeseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The
foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of car and latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet,
diligence required of it. nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist
between each one of its many employees and any one of the Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa
thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San
question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of article 105 Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting
of the old Civil Code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was
the given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 a.m., two
resulting breach of appellant's contract of safe carriage with the late hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under
Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby. no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train,
where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done
No doubt that a common carrier is held to a very high degree of care in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another
and diligence in the protection of its passengers; but, considering the would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not
vast and complex activities of modern rail transportation, to require of that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the
appellant that it should guard against all possible misunderstanding Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result,
between each and every one of its employees and every passenger Devesa's assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's
that might chance to ride in its conveyances at any time, strikes us as contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. We
demanding diligence beyond what human care and foresight can agree with the position taken by the Supreme Court of Texas in a
provide. similar case, where it held:
The lower Court and the appellees both relied on the American The only good reason for making the carrier responsible for the
authorities that particularly hold carriers to be insurers of the safety of misconduct of the servant perpetrated in his own interest, and
their passengers against willful assault and intentional ill treatment on not in that of his employer, or otherwise within the scope of his
the part of their servants, it being immaterial that the act should be one employment, is that the servant is clothed with the delegated
of private retribution on the part of the servant, impelled by personal authority, and charge with the duty by the carrier, to execute his
malice toward the passenger (10 Am. Jur. 108; Ed. Note to undertaking with the passenger. And it cannot be said, we
Gassenheimer vs. Wester R. Co. 40 LRA (NS), p. 999, et seq.) But as think, that there is any such delegation to the employees at a
can be inferred from the previous jurisprudence of this Court , the Civil station with reference to passenger embarking at another or
Code of 1889 did not impose such absolute liability traveling on the train. Of course, we are speaking only of the
(Lasam vs. Smith, supra). The liability of a carrier as an insurer was not principle which holds a carrier responsible for wrong done to
recognized in this jurisdiction (Government vs. Inchausti & Co., 40 passenger by servants acting in their own interest, and not in
Phil., 219; Oriental Comm. Co. vs. Naviera Filipina, 38 Off. Gaz., that of the employer. That principle is not the ordinary
1020). rule, respondent superior, by which the employer is held
responsible only for act or omissions of the employee in the
Another very important consideration that must be borne in mind is scope of his employment; but the only reason in our opinion for
that, when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to a broader liability arises from the fact that the servant, in
discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from mistreating the passenger wholly for some private purpose of
his own, in the very act, violates the contractual obligation of
the employer for the performance of which he has put the
employee in his place. The reason does not exist where the Republic of the Philippines
employee who committed the assault was never in a position in SUPREME COURT
which it became his duty to his employer to represent him in Manila
discharging any duty of the latter toward the passenger. The
proposition that the carrier clothes every employee engaged in FIRST DIVISION
the transportation business with the comprehensive duty of
protecting every passenger with whom he may in any way
come in contact, and hereby makes himself liable for every
assault commited by such servant, without regard to the inquiry
whether or not the passenger has come within the sphere of
duty of that servant as indicated by the employment, is G.R. No. 60501. March 5, 1993.
regarded as not only not sustained by the authorities, but as
being unsound and oppressive both to the employer and the CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
employee. (Houston & T. C. R. Co. vs. Bush, 32 LRA (NS), p. APPEALS and TOMAS L. ALCANTARA, respondents.
1205.)
Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako and Tomacruz, Manguiat &
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint Associates for petitioner.
ordered dismissed, without cost. So ordered.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenger & Corpus for private
respondent.
SYLLABUS
The main issue in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the applicability of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, 1 which provides as follows:
Upon arriving in Boston, plaintiffs Purita and Carmina TWA again assured plaintiffs that intensive search was being
proceeded to the carousel to claim their baggages and found conducted.
only three out of the seven they checked in, to wit: one
Samsonite on the carousel, another Samsonite lying on the On October 8, 1990, TWA offered to amicably settle the case
floor near the carousel and a third baggage, an American by giving plaintiffs-appellants two options: (a) transportation
Tourister, inside the unclaimed baggage office. Plaintiffs credit for future TWA travel or (b) cash settlement. Five months
immediately reported the loss of their four baggages to the lapsed without any result on TWA's intensive search.
TWA Baggage Office at Logan Airport. TWA's representative
confidently assured them that their baggages would be located On January 3, 1991, plaintiffs-appellant opted for transportation
within 24 hours and not more than 48 hours. credit for future TWA travel.
On September 2, 1990, plaintiffs received a letter from TWA, On January 11, 1991, TWA disregarded plaintiffs' option and
signed by Mr. J.A. Butler, Customer Relations-Baggage unilaterally declared the payment of $2,560.00 as constituting
Service, apologizing for TWA's failure to locate the missing full satisfaction of the plaintiffs' claim.
luggage and requesting plaintiffs to accomplish a passenger
property questionnaire to facilitate a further intensive and On July 19, 1991, plaintiffs accepted the check for $2,560.00,
computerized search for the lost luggage. Plaintiffs duly as partial payment for the actual cost of their lost baggages
accomplished the passenger property questionnaire, taking and their contents.
pains to write down in detail the contents of each missing
baggage. The total value of the lost items amounted to Despite demands by plaintiffs, TWA failed and refused without
$11,283.79. just cause to indemnify and redress plaintiffs for the grave
injury and damages they have suffered. 4
The petitioners insist that the Warsaw Convention is not applicable to according to the contract made by the parties, the place of
their case because the contracts they had with TWA did not involve departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be
an international transportation. Whether the contracts were a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated
of international transportation is to be solely determined from the TWA either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
tickets issued to them in Bangkok, Thailand, which showed that their within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
itinerary was Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago. an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the
Accordingly, since the place of departure (Los Angeles) and the place sovereignty, mandate or authority of another power, even
of destination (Chicago) are both within the territory of one High though that power is not a party to this convention.
Contracting Party, with no agreed stopping place in a territory subject
to the sovereignty, mandate, suzerainty or authority of another Power, There are then two categories of international transportation, viz., (1)
the contracts did not constitute 'international transportation' as defined that where the place of departure and the place of destination are
by the convention. They also claim to be without legal basis the situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties regardless
contention of TWA that their transportation contracts were of of whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a
international character because of the handwritten notations in the transshipment; and (2) that where the place of departure and the place
tickets re "INT'S TKT #079-4402956821-2" and "INT'L TKT #079- of destination are within the territory of a single High Contracting Party
4402956819." Notwithstanding such notations, the TWA tickets, viz., if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the
(a) No. 015.9475:153:304 and (b) No. 015:9475:153:305 did not cease sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power, even though the
to be for the itinerary therein designated. Besides, it is a fact that power is not a party of the Convention.
petitioners Purita and Carmina Mapa traveled from Manila to Los
Angeles via Philippine Airlines (PAL) by virtue of PAL tickets issued The High Contracting Parties referred to in the Convention are the
independently of the TWA tickets. signatories thereto and those which subsequently adhered to it. In the
case of the Philippines, the Convention was concurred in by the
The pitch issue to be resolved under the petitioner's first assigned error Senate, through Resolution No. 19, on 16 May 1950. The Philippine
is whether the contracts of transportation between Purita and Carmina instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on 13
Mapa, on the one hand, and TWA, on the other, were contracts of October 1950 and was deposited with the Polish Government on 9
"international transportation" under the Warsaw Convention. If they November 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines
were, then we should sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in on 9 February 1951. Then, on 23 September 1955, President Ramon
light of our ruling in Santos v. Northwest Orient Airlines. 25 It appears Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring the Philippines'
clear to us that TWA itself, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals formal adherence thereto, "to the end that the same and every article
impliedly admit that if the sole basis were the two TWA tickets for Los
Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago, the contracts cannot be
and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the As regards the petitioner's entry in YOUR COMPLETE ITINERARY
Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof. 26 column of the Passenger Property Questionnaire wherein they
included the Manila-Los Angeles travel, it must be pointed out that this
The contracts of transportation in this case are evidenced by the two was made on 4 September 1990 27 by petitioners Purita and Carmina
TWA tickets, No. 015:9475:153:304 and No. 015:9475:153:305, both Mapa, and only in connection with their claim for their lost pieces of
purchased and issued in Bangkok, Thailand. On the basis alone of the baggage. The loss occurred much earlier, or on 27 August 1990. The entry
provisions therein, it is obvious that the place of departure and the can by no means be considered as a part of, or supplement to, their
place of destination are all in the territory of the United States, or of a contracts of transportation evidenced by the TWA tickets which covered
single High Contracting Party. The contracts, therefore, cannot come transportation within the United States only.
within the purview of the first category of international transportation.
Neither can it be under the second category since there was NO It must be underscored that the first category of international
agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, transportation under the Warsaw Convention is based on "the contract
mandate, or authority of another power. made by the parties." TWA does not claim that the Manila-Los Angeles
contracts of transportation which brought Purita and Carmina to Los
The only way to bring the contracts between Purita and Carmina Angeles were also its contracts. It does not deny the assertion of the
Mapa, on the one hand, and TWA, on the other, within the first petitioners that those contracts were independent of the TWA tickets
category of "international transportation" is to link them with, or to make issued in Bangkok, Thailand. No evidence was offered that TWA and
them an integral part of, the Manila-Los Angeles travel of Purita and PAL had an agreement concerning transportation of passengers from
Carmina through PAL aircraft. The "linkages" which have been pointed points of departures not served with aircrafts of one or the other. There
out by the TWA, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals are (1) the could have been no difficulty for such agreement, since TWA admitted
handwritten notations, viz., INT'L TKT # 079-4402956821-2 and INT'L without qualification in paragraph 1 of its Answer 28 to the second
TKT # 079-4402956819, on the two TWA tickets; and (2) the entries Amended Complaint the allegation in paragraph 1.1 of the latter 29 that
TWA "is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines
made by petitioners Purita and Carmina Mapa in column YOUR
with office address at Ground Floor, Saville Building, Sen. Gil. J. Puyat
COMPLETE ITINERARY in TWA's Passenger Property Questionnaire,
Avenue, corner Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila."
wherein they mentioned their travel from Manila to Los Angeles in flight
PR 102.
TWA relies on Article I(3) of the Convention, which provides as follows:
The alleged "international tickets" mentioned in the notations in
3. A carriage to be performed by several
conjunction with which the two TWA tickets were issued were not
successive air carriers is deemed, for the
presented. Clearly then, there is at all no factual basis of the finding
purposes of this Convention, to be one
that the TWA tickets were issued in conjunction with the international
undivided carriage, if it has been regarded by
tickets, which are even, at least as of now, non-existent.
the parties as a single operation, whether it had
been agreed upon under the form of a single
contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall
not lose its international character merely preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to
because one contract or a series of contracts is dismiss had been filed.
to be performed entirely within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, Without any further evidence as earlier discussed, the trial court should
or authority of the same High Contracting Party. have denied the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction because it
did not appear to be indubitable. Section 3 of Rule 16 of the Rules of
It also points to Article 15 of the IATA Recommend Practice 1724, Court provides:
which provides: Carriage to be performed by a several successive
carriers under one ticket, or under a ticket and any conjunction ticket Sec. 3. Hearing and order. After hearing the court may deny
issued in connection therewith, is regarded as a single operation." 30 or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may
defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial
The flaw of respondent's position is the presumption that the parties if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable.
have "regarded" as an "undivided carriage" or as a "single operation"
the carriage from Manila to Los Angeles through PAL then to New WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged
York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago through TWA. The dismissal then of the decision of 31 May 1995 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
second Amended Complaint by the trial court and the Court of Appeals' CV No. 39896, as well as the Order of 24 July 1992 of the Regional
affirmance of the dismissal were not based on indubitable facts or Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102, in Civil Case No. Q-91-9620, is
grounds, but no inferences without established factual basis. REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
TWA should have offered evidence for its affirmative defenses at the The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102, is hereby
preliminary hearing therefor. Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court DIRECTED to proceed with the pre-trial, if it has not been terminated,
expressly provides: and with the trial on the merits of the case and then to render judgment
thereon, taking into account the foregoing observations on the issue of
Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. Any of the jurisdiction.
grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper
venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a