Conf%cianand Feminist Perspectives on the Self

seen as the greatest weakness of classical Confucianism (and much feminist

moral philiosophy): its particularism.
What is supposedly wrong with particularism is that, by definition, ap-
propriate rules of conduct in specific situations cannot be generalized; they
cannot become universal. These rules, varying as they d o from situation to
situation, apply only t o the per?;andl reatm. Genuine moral theory, however,
requires the impersonal stance, that of the impartial judge o r ideal observer,
as noted earlier. Episremologicltlly, the implication is that u'e become more
competent moral agents as our rnoraf understanding more nearly ltpproaches
systematic universality,
A sympathetic reading of the Confucian texts, however, suggests a rather
difirenr ryistemologicat view: that our moral understanding decreases as its
form approaches universality, and we become increasingly incompetent
moral agents. Free, autonamous, rights-holding individuals are indeed im-
personal: They have nu faces, no abilities, n o histories, personalities, hopes,
fears, o r anything else. Unfortunately, I have never met anyone of this kind.
Virmally without exception, the others I need to understand ixi order tu con-
sider my moral obligations t o them are always concrece individuals, o r
groups of them, all with specific histories, hopes, fears, needs, and so on. To
the extent that I am encouraged to see them merely as replaceable occupants
of a universal stams, &erefore, to that same extent will 1 nor be required to
attempt to understand their specific histories, cares, o r needs.
Put another way, the Confucian persuasion rejects the distinction between
&c personal and the impersonal in moral theorizing, in f vor of the inlcrper-
sonal: What I should d o is largely determined not by some universal princi-
ple but by the unique characteristics of the person o r persons with whom I
am concretefy interacting. This Confucian view is by no mcans out of date:
Consider the following quote from the feminist philosopher Margaret
WaX ker.

Universalism presses me to view you, for ins~nce,as a holder of a ce~ainright, or

a satisfaction-func~ion,or a focus of some specifialsle set of obligatov responses. 1
am pressed to stmcture my response or appeal to YOU in terms which I can tl-rinkof
as apptying repeatably to any number of other cases. We thus see universalist
morality as "curbing our imaginations" by enforcing communicative and reflec~ive
strategies which are interpersonaliy evasive, Worse, it legitimates unihrmly assum-
ing the quasi-administrative or juridical posture of "the" (i.e., universal) moral
point of vim. Yet in many cases assuming that viewpoint may foreclose the more
reveding, if sometimes painful, path of expression, acknowledgement, and collab-
oration that could othewise lead ro genuinely responsive solutions,
Feminists have special and acute needs to fend off this systematic de-person-
alizing of the moral and Je-moralizing of rhe personal. For on a practical level
what feminists aspire to depends as much on restructuring our senses of moral
responsibility in intimate partnerships, sexual relations, communities of per-