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APPEARANCES:
Parties Counsel
Richard Jackman
Romola Trebilcock-Thumbadoo
Larry McDermott
[1] This is the first Pre-hearing Conference respecting appeals against the adoption
of Official Plan Amendment No. 143 (OPA 143) and the enactment of Zoning By-law
No. 2014-395 by City of Ottawa Council. These planning instruments relate to the
future development of Chaudire and Albert Islands located in the Ottawa River.
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[2] The OPA 143 designates the islands as Central Area, which will allow for mixed
uses to be developed on the islands. By-law No. 2014-395 rezones the site from
O1L[329]-h (Parks and Open Space, Subzone L, Exception 329, under a holding
zone), to MD5[2172]S332-h (Mixed Use Downtown, Subzone 5, Exception 2,
Schedule 2172, under holding zone) and L2 (Major Leisure Facility).
[3] It is noted that the OPA was City initiated and the zoning by-law amendment was
applied for by Windmill Green Fund LPV (Windmill).
[4] At the outset of the hearing, Michael Swinwood, counsel for Douglas Cardinal
Architect Inc. (Cardinal) brought a motion that I recuse myself from the hearing of this
matter on the grounds that my participation in this hearing raises a reasonable
apprehension of bias against him. Mr. Swinwood argues that I could not be perceived
to be fair and impartial in making a decision on this matter given comments made by
myself concerning his conduct in Arber v. Prescott and Russell (United Counties) [2005]
O.M.B.D. No. 502. (Attachment 1 hereto).
[5] The decision in question made an award of costs against Mr. Swinwoods clients,
who had unsuccessfully appealed official plan and zoning by-law amendments adopted
by the United Counties of Prescott and Russell and the City of Clarence-Rockland
respectively. Mr. Swinwood had represented a number of appellants at the hearing on
the merits but did not represent the appellants on the cost motion brought by the
proponent against Mr. Swinwoods clients.
[6] Mr. Swinwood argues that I made a number of comments in the decision which
impugned him personally and that because he was not present, he did not get an
opportunity to defend himself.
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[7] He relies on the decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v. Hossu [2002] 162
O.A.C. 143; 167 C.C.C. (3d) 344; 98 C.R.R. (2d) 93 (Hossu), to support his allegation
that my comments raise a reasonable apprehension of bias in this matter. In the Hossu
case, the trial judge was found by the Court of Appeal to have made a number of open
and improper comments about witnesses during the course of their giving evidence
raising serious issues of favouritism toward the complainant in the case raising real
concern about whether the accused received a fair trial from an impartial judge.
[8] The Court of Appeal followed the reasoning of Mr. Justice de Grandpr in
Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board) (1976) [1978] 1
S.C.R. 369 (S.C.C.) at page 17:
[9] Mr. de Grandpr also suggested that the grounds for this apprehension of bias
must however be substantial and refused to accept the suggestion that the test be
related to the very sensitive or scrupulous conscience.
[10] Counsel for the City and Windmill are opposed to the motion and argue that the
comments complained of by Mr. Swinwood are in the nature of findings made after the
conclusion of a hearing and that these were measured, calm and professional and were
not inflammatory in any way. These were made in response to submissions made by
counsel for the parties on the hearing of the motion for costs. They argue that the
comments complained of by Mr. Swinwood do not rise to the substantial level necessary
for a recusal. Furthermore, Mr. Cohen argues that Mr. Swinwoods acknowledgement
that he anticipated that I would be assigned to this case, placed an onus on him to
contact the Board prior to the hearing event to communicate his concerns regarding my
presence at this hearing. The comments complained of also refer to the circumstances
outlined in the Rule 103 respecting situations in which the Board could exercise its
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discretion to make an award of costs against a party. The decision was made some ten
years ago.
[11] The Board agrees with the submissions of counsel for the City and Windmill that
there are no substantial grounds raised by the motion, which would suggest that I could
not be fair and impartial in this matter. I will not recuse myself from this matter and
accordingly, the motion is dismissed.
2) An Order of the Board abridging the timeline for bringing this Notice of Motion.
1) The matters raised in the Notice of Constitutional Question are matters raise
in Ontario Superior Court of Justice file CV-14-517372;
[15] The materials in opposition to the motion consist of the Motion Record of the
Appellant Mr. Cardinal, which includes the affidavits of Douglas Cardinal, sworn May 27,
2015, Jayne Ann Chartrand, sworn May 29, 2015, and Stacy Amikwabi, sworn May 29,
2015.
[16] The Board has carefully considered the evidence as well as the submissions of
the parties as well as counsel for the parties and finds that the Motion should succeed
for the reasons that follow.
[17] Firstly, with respect to the request for an abridgement of time to serve the
motion materials, the Board finds that it would be proper to allow for such an
abridgement given that the City was served with the Notice of Constitutional Question
late in the day on May 22, 2015 and it would not have been possible for the City to
respond within the prescribed timeline.
[18] Rule 6 of the Boards Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that the Board
may grant all necessary exceptions from the rules to ensure that the real questions at
issue are determined in a just, most expeditious and cost effective manner.
[19] In this case, the Board is satisfied that the City responded within a reasonable
time given the necessity to review and collect the facts of the case in order to make an
informed response and to serve these materials on June 1 and 2, 2015, prior to the
scheduled Pre-hearing Conference on June 3, 2015.
[20] Section 109 of the Courts of Justice Act sets out the requirements, which must
be met by a party serving a Notice of Constitutional Question challenging the
constitutional validity or constitutional applicability of an Act of Parliament of Canada or
the Legislature, of a regulation or by-law made under such an Act or where a remedy is
claimed under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in relation to an
act or omission of the Government of Canada or the Government of Ontario.
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[21] Section (2.2) requires the notice to be served as soon as the circumstances
requiring it become known and, in any event, at least fifteen days before the day on
which the question is to be argued unless otherwise ordered.
[22] The City argues that the appeal filed by the Appellant Mr. Cardinal on November
10, 2014, with this Board refers to the Appellant bringing Notice of a Constitutional
Question in this appeal proceeding pursuant to s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act.
[23] It is noted that a Notice of Constitutional Question was served on the City in
December 2014, in relation to an action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice file CV-
14-517372 by Stacy Amikwabi and others. It is also noted that Stacy Amikwabi also
seeks to be made a party to the proceeding within.
[24] As noted above, the Appellant served its Notice of Constitutional Question within
the appeal on May 22, 2015 and seeks the essentially the same relief as in Ontario
Superior Court of Justice file CV-14-517372.
[25] It was clearly known to the Appellant in November 2014, that a Notice of
Constitutional Question was to be brought but he waited until May 22, 2015, to do so
without giving the required fifteen days before the question was to be argued.
[26] Counsel for the City referred to a number of cases, where the Courts and the
Board considered whether to allow a constitutional Question to proceed even though
proper notice had not been given within the required timeline. The Federal Court in
Ishaq v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2015) FC156, 381 D.L.R.
(4th) 541 referred to a number of tests for granting an extension of time in cases such as
this. One of the relevant tests is whether the moving party had a reasonable
explanation for the delay.
[27] The Board was not offered any reasonable explanation by Mr. Swinwood for the
delay in moving with this request particularly when it was explicitly stated in the appeal
that such a question would be brought. The question was brought in the Ontario
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Superior Court in December 2014 and it was reasonable for the City to assume that that
is what the Appellant was referring to in its appeal.
[28] Accordingly, the Board finds that the Notice of Constitutional Question was
defective in that the clear statutory requirement for notice was not met and on that basis
is quashed.
[29] Furthermore, the Board has consistently held that questions relating to ownership
of land were more properly brought in another forum such the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice. In this case, the Appellant and others have initiated an action in that court for
very similar if not the same relief. The Board on that basis would also quash the Notice
of Constitutional Question.
MOTION TO DISMISS
[30] The City had served its Motion Record on the Appellants on May 15, 2015, for an
Order of the Board pursuant to s. 17(45)(a)(i) and 34(25)(a)(i) of the Planning Act
dismissing the appeals against OPA 143 and Zoning By-law No. 2014-395. Mr.
Simmons who was retained by the Appellant Lindsay Lambert on the eve of the hearing
sought an adjournment of the hearing of this Motion on the grounds that he had not had
an opportunity to adequately prepare and to force him to proceed would be prejudicial to
his client. Before the Board could issue its ruling, Mr. Simmons fell ill requiring him to
be brought to the hospital for medical attention. The hearing was adjourned late in the
day on June 3, 2015, until June 4, 2015. Mr. Simmons returned on June 4, 2015 but it
was clear that he could not proceed. The hearing was adjourned on consent of the
parties.
[31] Counsel for the City and Windmill were looking for the earliest available date to
resume the hearing. Ms. Trebilcock-Thumbadoo, however is not available until she
returns from an overseas trip on August 13, 2015. The hearing is adjourned to 10 a.m.
on Monday, August 17, 2015. Three days have been set aside and this date is
peremptory. The hearing will take place at:
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[32] The Board notes that the parties have agreed to a set of dates for cross-
examination on the affidavits filed in support of the Citys Motion for dismissal without
holding a full hearing. Ms. Trebilcock-Thumbadoo agreed to make herself available to
cross-examine on Friday, June 5, 2015, prior to her departure from the country. The
Board expects all cross-examinations on the affidavits filed to be completed prior to the
next hearing event on August 17, 2015.
R. G. M. Makuch
R. G. M. MAKUCH
MEMBER
ATTACHMENT 1
Planning
Case Name:
Arber v. Prescott and Russell (United Counties)
50 O.M.B.R. 56
May 2, 2005.
(17 paras.)
COUNSEL:
P. Champagne, K.D. Yelle, for Francoscnie Inc.
M. Swinwood, for Tina Hopson and Bruce Meness.
P.A. Webber, for Ghislaine Rozon, Gerry Rozon, Sylvian Prevost, Dr. Erik Petersen and Donna Pe-
tersen.
Phil Arber, on his own behalf.
... would a reasonable person, having looked at all the circumstances of the case,
the conduct or course of conduct of a party proven at the hearing and the extent
of his or her familiarity with the Board's procedure, exclaim, "that's not right;
that's not fair; that person ought to be obligated to another in some way for that
conduct.
Rule 106 provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of the type of conduct, which might attract cost
consequences.
14 The appellants through their counsel engaged in almost every example of such conduct
throughout the course of the hearing. The appellants adopted a strategy of "win at all costs" without
regard for the truth. Mr. Swinwood continued to advance his position on certain issues even after
his own witnesses freely admitted that the facts relied on by the appellants to support that position
did not exist or were proven to be based on inadequate/incomplete research and false assertions.
15 Although the Board finds the costs as submitted by counsel for Francoscenie Inc. to be very
reasonable under the circumstances, it is not prepared to make an award, which would compensate
Francoscenie Inc. for 44% of its legal costs. The Board finds after having regard to all of the facts,
that an award in the total amount of $15,000.00 would be appropriate under the circumstances to
compensate Francoscenie Inc. for the additional legal costs incurred by it as a result of the appel-
lants' frivolous, vexatious and unreasonable conduct.
16 Accordingly, the Board hereby orders the appellants Ghislaine Rozon, Sylvian Prevost, Erik
Petersen, Tina Hopson and Bruce Meness to pay forthwith to Francoscenie Inc. the sum of
$15,000.00 in costs.
17 It is so Ordered.
R.G.M. MAKUCH, Member