1. Manay, Jr. vs. Cebu Air, Inc.
(2016) cost to rebook the flight would be P7,000 more expensive than the
G.R. No. 210621 | 2016-04-04
Subject: Computation of extension of period of time to file a
pleading; Obligation of a common carrier to exercise extraordinary
diligence extends to its ticketing operations; Contractual obligation
of the common carrier to the passenger is governed by the terms
on the contract of carriage; Passenger is bound by the terms stated
in the ticket; Petitioners were negligent and not entitled to
damages; Air Passenger Bill of Rights and the obligation of the
passenger to exercise ordinary diligence in the conduct of his or
her affairs
Facts:
Carlos S. Jose purchased 20 Cebu Pacific round-trip promo tickets
from Manila to Palawan for himself and on behalf of his relatives
and friends. He made the purchase at Cebu Pacific's branch office
in Robinsons Galleria.
Jose alleged that he specified to "Alou," the Cebu Pacific ticketing
agent, that his preferred date and time of departure from Manila to
Palawan should be on July 20, 2008 at 8:20 a.m. and that his
preferred date and time for their flight back to Manila should be on
July 22, 2008 at 4:15 p.m. (16:15). He paid a total amount of
P42,957.00 using his credit card. He alleged that after paying for
the tickets, Alou printed the tickets, which consisted of three (3)
pages, and recapped only the first page to him. Since the first page
contained the details he specified to Alou, he no longer read the
other pages of theFLIGHT INFORMATION .
On the afternoon of July 22, 2008, uring the processing of their
boarding passes for their flight back to Manila, they were informed
by Cebu Pacific personnel that nine (9) of them could not be
admitted because their tickets were for the 1005 (or 10:05 a.m.)
flight earlier that day
Upon checking the tickets, they learned that only the first two (2)
pages had the schedule Jose specified. They then learned that the
promo tickets. The sum of the new tickets amounted to P65,000.00
They offered to pay the amount by credit card but were informed
by the ground personnel that they only accepted cash. They then
offered to pay in dollars, since most of them were balikbayans and
had the amount on hand, but the airline personnel still refused.
Jose and his companions sent the airline demand letters asking for
a reimbursement of P42,955.00, representing the additional
amounts spent to purchase the nine (9) tickets, the
accommodation, and meals of the four (4) that were left behind.
Cebu Pacific stated that according to its records, Jose was given a
full recap and was made aware of the flight restriction of promo
tickets "which included the promo fare being non-refundable.
Jose and his companions filed a Complaint for Damages against
Cebu Pacific before the MTC. The Complaint prayed for actual
damages in the amount of P42,955.00, moral damages in the
amount of P45,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and attorney's fees.
The MTC rendered its Decision ordering Cebu Pacific to pay Jose
and his companions P41,044.50 in actual damages and P20,000 in
attorney's fees with costs of suit. The MTC found that as a common
carrier, Cebu Pacific should have exercised extraordinary diligence
in performing its contractual obligations.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC but deleted
the award of attorney's fees for being without basis.
However, the the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the lower courts
and declared that the extraordinary diligence expected of common
carriers only applies to the carriage of passengers and not to the
act of encoding the requested flight schedule. It was incumbent
upon the passenger to exercise ordinary care in reviewing flight
details and checking schedules.
Hence, the present petition. Cebu Pacific further posits that
according to the Parol Evidence Rule, the plane tickets issued to
Jose, et al. contain all the terms the parties agreed on, and it was
agreed that nine (9) of the passengers would be on the July 22,
2008, 10:05 flight to Manila. It argues that Jose, et al. have not
been able to present any evidence to substantiate their allegation
that their intent was to be on the July 22, 2008 16:15 flight to
Manila.
Held:
Obligation of a common carrier to exercise extraordinary
diligence extends to its ticketing operations
6. Common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of its obligations under the contract of
carriage. This extraordinary diligence must be observed not only in
the transportation of goods and services but also in the issuance of
the contract of carriage, including its ticketing operations.
7. When a common carrier, through its ticketing agent, has not yet
issued a ticket to the prospective passenger, the transaction
between them is still that of a seller and a buyer. The obligation of
the airline to exercise extraordinary diligence commences upon the
issuance of the contract of carriage. Ticketing, as the act of issuing
the contract of carriage, is necessarily included in the exercise of
extraordinary diligence.
Contractual obligation of the common carrier to the
passenger is governed by the terms on the contract of
carriage
8. Once a plane ticket is issued, the common carrier binds itself to
deliver the passenger safely on the date and time stated in the
ticket. The contractual obligation of the common carrier to the
passenger is governed principally by what is written on the
contract of carriage.
9. According to the contract of carriage, respondent's obligation as
a common carrier was to transport nine (9) of the petitioners safely
on the 10:05 a.m. flight of July 22, 2008.
Passenger is bound by the terms stated in the ticket
10. Cebu Pacific relies on the Parol Evidence Rule in arguing that a
written document is considered the best evidence of the terms
agreed on by the parties. Petitioners, however, invoke the
exception in Rule 130, Section 9(b) of the Rules of Court that
evidence may be introduced if the written document fails to
express the true intent of the parties.
11. The only evidence petitioners have in order to prove their true
intent of having the entire group on the 4:15 p.m. flight is
petitioner Jose's self-serving testimony that the airline failed to
recap the last page of the tickets to him. They have neither shown
nor introduced any other evidence before the lower courts.
12. The common carrier's obligation to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the issuance of the contract of carriage is fulfilled by
requiring a full review of the flight schedules to be given to a
prospective passenger before payment.Based on the information
stated on the contract of carriage, all three (3) pages were
recapped to petitioner Jose.
13. Even assuming that the ticketing agent encoded the
incorrectFLIGHT INFORMATION , it is incumbent upon the
purchaser of the tickets to at least check if all the information is
correct before making the purchase. Once the ticket is paid for and
printed, the purchaser is presumed to have agreed to all its terms
and conditions.
14. Such provisions (in the plane ticket) have been held to be a
part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the
passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to
the regulation." It is what is known as a contract of "adhesion," in
regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein
one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as
the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to
reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent. (see Ong Yiu
v. Court of Appeals)
Petitioners were negligent and not entitled to damages

15. An air passenger has the correlative duty to exercise ordinary
care in the conduct of his or her affairs. Petitioners' flight
information was not written in fine print. It was clearly stated on
the left portion of the ticket above the passengers' names. If
petitioners had exercised even the slightest bit of prudence, they
would have been able to remedy any erroneous booking.
16. Petitioners, in failing to exercise the necessary care in the
conduct of their affairs, were without a doubt negligent. Thus, they
are not entitled to damages. Before damages may be awarded,
"the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the
factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant's
acts." Thecause of petitioners' injury was their own negligence;
hence, there is no reason to award moral damages. Since the basis
for moral damages has not been established, there is no basis to
recover exemplary damages and attorney's fees as well.
Air Passenger Bill of Rights and the obligation of the
passenger to exercise ordinary diligence in the conduct of
his or her affairs
17. The increase of promo fares and air travel prompted
concerned government agencies to issue Department of
Transportation and Communications-Department of Trade and
Industry (DTC-DTI) Joint Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2012,
otherwise known as the Air Passenger Bill of Rights.
18. Section 4.4 of the Air Passenger Bill of Rights requires that "all
rebooking, refunding, baggage allowance andCHECK-IN policies"
must be stated in the tickets. The Air Passenger Bill of Rights
acknowledges that "while a passenger has the option to buy or not
to buy the service, the decision of the passenger to buy the ticket
binds such passenger." Thus, the airline is mandated to place in
writing all the conditions it will impose on the passenger.
19. However, the duty of an airline to disclose all the necessary
information in the contract of carriage does not remove the
correlative obligation of the passenger to exercise ordinary
diligence in the conduct of his or her affairs. The passenger is still
expected to read through theFLIGHT INFORMATION in the
contract of carriage before making his or her purchase. If he or she
fails to exercise the ordinary diligence expected of passengers, any
resulting damage should be borne by the passenger.
2. DESIGNER BASKETS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. AIR SEA
TRANSPORT, INC. AND ASIA CARGO CONTAINER LINES, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
DBI is a domestic corporation engaged in the production of
housewares and handicraft items for export.[4]Sometime in October
1995, Ambiente, a foreign-based company, ordered from DBI [5] 223
cartons of assorted wooden items (the shipment).[6] The shipment
was worth Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Ninety and Eighty-Seven
Dollars (US$12,590.87) and payable through telegraphic transfer.
[7]
Ambiente designated ACCLI as the forwarding agent that will
ship out its order from the Philippines to the United States (US).
ACCLI is a domestic corporation acting as agent of ASTI, a US
based corporation engaged in carrier transport business, in the
Philippines.[8]
On January 7, 1996, DBI delivered the shipment to ACCLI for sea
transport from Manila and delivery to Ambiente. To acknowledge
receipt and to serve as the contract of sea carriage, ACCLI issued
to DBI triplicate copies of ASTI Bill of Lading No. AC/MLLA601317.
[9]
DBI retained possession of the originals of the bills of lading
pending the payment of the goods by Ambiente.[10]
On January 23, 1996, Ambiente and ASTI entered into an Indemnity
Agreement (Agreement).[11] Under the Agreement, Ambiente
obligated ASTI to deliver the shipment to it or to its order "without
the surrender of the relevant bill(s) of lading due to the non-arrival
or loss thereof."[12] In exchange, Ambiente undertook to indemnify
and hold ASTI and its agent free from any liability as a result of the
release of the shipment.[13] Thereafter, ASTI released the shipment
to Ambiente without the knowledge of DBI, and without it receiving
payment for the total cost of the shipment.[14]
DBI then made several demands to Ambiente for the payment of
the shipment, but to no avail. Thus, on October 7, 1996, DBI filed
the Original Complaint against ASTI, ACCLI and ACCLFs
incorporators-stockholders[15] for the payment of the value of the
shipment, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit. [16]
In its Original Complaint, DBI claimed that under Bill of Lading
Number AC/MLLA601317, ASTI and/or ACCLI is "to release and
deliver the cargo/shipment to the consignee, x x x, only after the
original copy or copies of [the] Bill of Lading is or are surrendered
to them; otherwise, they become liable to the shipper for the value
of the shipment." DBI also averred that ACCLI should be jointly and
severally liable with its co-defendants because ACCLI failed to
register ASTI as a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines. In addition, ACCLI failed to secure a license to act as
agent of ASTI.
ISSUE: whether ASTI and ACCLI may be held solidarily liable to DBI
for the value of the shipment.
HELD: NO.
A common carrier may release the goods to the consignee
even without the surrender of the bill of lading. In case the
consignee, upon receiving the goods, cannot return the bill
of lading subscribed by the carrier, because of its loss or
any other cause, he must give the latter a receipt for the
goods delivered, this receipt producing the same effects as
the return of the bill of lading.
Here, Ambiente could not produce the bill of lading covering the
shipment not because it was lost, but for another cause: the bill of
lading was retained by DBI pending Ambiente's full payment of the
shipment. Ambiente and ASTI then entered into an Indemnity
Agreement, wherein the former asked the latter to release the
shipment even without the surrender of the bill of lading. The
execution of this Agreement, and the undisputed fact that the
shipment was released to Ambiente pursuant to it, to our mind,
operates as a receipt
Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 of the Civil Code are not
applicable.
DBI, however, challenges the Agreement, arguing that the carrier
released the goods pursuant to it, notwithstanding the carrier's
knowledge that the bill of lading should first be surrendered. As
such, DBI claims that ASTI and ACCLI are liable for damages
because they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods pursuant to Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735
of the Civil Code.
Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 speak of the common carrier's
responsibility over the goods. They refer to the general liability of
common carriers in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of
goods and the presumption of negligence against them. This
responsibility or duty of the common carrier lasts from the time the
goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received
by the carrier for transportation, until the same are delivered,
actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the
person who has a right to receive them.[67] It is, in fact, undisputed
that the goods were timely delivered to the proper consignee or to
the one who was authorized to receive them. DBFs only cause of
action against ASTI and ACCLI is the release of the goods to
Ambiente without the surrender of the bill of lading, purportedly in
violation of the terms of the bill of lading. We have already found
that Bill of Lading No. AC/MLLA601317 does not contain such
express prohibition. Without any prohibition, therefore, the carrier
had no obligation to withhold release of the goods. Articles 1733,
1734, and 1735 do not give ASTI any such obligation.
The applicable provision instead is Article 353 of the Code of
Commerce, which we have previously discussed. To reiterate, the
Article allows the release of the goods to the consignee even
without his surrender of the original bill of lading. In such case, the
duty of the carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence is not
violated. Nothing, therefore, prevented the consignee and the
carrier to enter into an indemnity agreement of the same nature as
the one they entered here. No law or public policy is contravened
upon its execution.
We rule for the defendants-appellants [ASTI and ACCLI]. They are
correct in arguing that the nature of their obligation with
plaintiff [DBI] is separate and distinct from the transaction
of the latter with defendant Ambiente. As carrier of the
goods transported by plaintiff, its obligation is simply to
ensure that such goods are delivered on time and in good
condition. In the case [Macam v. Court of Appeals], the Supreme
Court emphasized that "the extraordinary responsibility of the
common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the
cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has the right to
receive them." x x x diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
It is therefore clear that the moment the carrier has
delivered the subject goods, its responsibility ceases to
exist and it is thereby freed from all the liabilities arising
from the transaction. Any question regarding the payment
of the buyer to the seller is no longer the concern of the
carrier. This easily debunks plaintiffs theory of joint liability. [70] x x
x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
The contract between DBI and ASTI is a contract of carriage of
goods; hence, ASTI's liability should be pursuant to that contract
and the law on transportation of goods. Not being a party to the
contract of sale between DBI and Ambiente, ASTI cannot be held
liable for the payment of the value of the goods sold.
3. G.R. No. 199282, March 14, 2016 - TRAVEL & TOURS
ADVISERS, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO CRUZ,
SR., EDGAR HERNANDEZ AND VIRGINIA MUOZ,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu Passenger
Jitney (jeepney) that he owns along Angeles-Magalang Road,
Barangay San Francisco, Magalang, Pampanga, on January 9, 1998,
around 7:50 p.m. Meanwhile,. a Daewoo passenger bus (RCJ Bus
Lines) owned by petitioner Travel and Tours Advisers, Inc. and
driven by Edgar Calaycay travelled in the same direction as that of
respondent Edgar Hernandez vehicle. Thereafter, the bus bumped
the rear portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree
which resulted in the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. and the serious
physical injuries of Virginia Muoz.
Thus, respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Muoz and Alberto
Cruz, Sr., father of the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., filed a complaint
for damages before the RTC claiming that the collision was due to
the reckless, negligent and imprudent manner by which Edgar
Calaycay was driving the bus, in complete disregard to existing
traffic laws, rules and regulations, and praying that judgment be
rendered ordering Edgar Calaycay and petitioner Travel & Tours
Advisers, Inc. to pay.
For its defense, the petitioner claimed that it exercised the
supervision of its employee Edgar Calaycay and further argued
that it was Edgar Hernandez who was driving his passenger
jeepney in a reckless and imprudent manner by suddenly entering
the lane of the petitioner's bus without seeing to it that the road
was clear for him to enter said lane. In addition, petitioner alleged
that at the time of the incident, Edgar Hernandez violated his
franchise by travelling along an unauthorized line/route and that
the jeepney was overloaded with passengers, and the deceased
Alberto Cruz, Jr. was clinging at the back thereof.
HELD: On the other hand, it is indisputable that the jeepney was
traversing a road out of its allowed route. Necessarily, this case is
not that of "in pari delicto" because only one party has violated a
traffic regulation. As such, it would seem that Article 2185 of the
New Civil Code is applicable where it provides that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
The above provision, however, is merely a presumption. From the
factual findings of both the RTC and the CA based on the evidence
presented, the proximate cause of the collision is the negligence of
the driver of petitioner's bus. The jeepney was bumped at the left
rear portion. Thus, this Court's past ruling,13 that drivers of vehicles
who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, can
be applied. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver
of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a
position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
Consequently, the petitioner, being the owner of the bus and the
employer of the driver, Edgar Calaycay, cannot escape liability.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 which states the
following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible x x x.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry x x x.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code provides
that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the
damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of
the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer
either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over
him after such selection. The presumption, however, may be
rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape
solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the
employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such
degree of care.17 In this case, the petitioner failed to do so. The RTC
and the CA exhaustively and correctly ruled as to the matter, thus:
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required
to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.19 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of
employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees, the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons
with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees
and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon
employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the
performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial
to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the
constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.20 In this case, as shown by the above findings of the RTC,
petitioner was not able to prove that it exercised the required
diligence needed in the selection and supervision of its employee.
Be that as it may, this doesn't erase the fact that at the time of the
vehicular accident, the jeepney was in violation of its allowed route
as found by the RTC and the CA, hence, the owner and driver of the
jeepney likewise, are guilty of negligence as defined under Article
2179 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
The petitioner and its driver, therefore, are not solely liable for the
damages caused to the victims. The petitioner must thus be held
liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. 21 It
is, therefore, proper to mitigate the liability of the petitioner and its
driver. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant's
liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.
In the present case, it has been established that the proximate
cause of the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. is the negligence of
petitioner's bus driver, with the contributory negligence of
respondent Edgar Hernandez, the driver and owner of the jeepney,
hence, the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall recover damages of only
50% of the award from petitioner and its driver. Necessarily, 50%
shall be bourne by respondent Edgar Hernandez. This is pursuant
to Rakes v. AG & P and after considering the circumstances of this
case.
4. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v ALLIED GUARANTEE
INSURANCE, CO. INC.

Commercial Law; Transportation Law; Arrastre operator. The
arrastre operator's principal work is that of handling cargo, so that
its drivers/operators or employees should observe the standards
and measures necessary to prevent losses and damage to
shipments under its custody. In the performance of its obligations,
an arrastre operator should observe the same degree of diligence
as that required of a common carrier and a warehouseman. Being
the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre
operator's duty is to take good care of the goods and to tum them
over to the party entitled to their possession.
Same; same; same. In instances when the consignee claims any
loss, the burden of proof is on the arrastre operator to show that it
complied with the obligation to deliver the goods and that the
losses were not due to its negligence or that of its employees.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: The petitioner is an arrastre operator. A shipment of kraft
linear board from US to be delivered to San Miguel Corp in Manila,
was made on board M/V Nicole owned by the Transocean, a foreign
corporation whose Philippine representative is Philippine
Transmarine. Upon arrival and shortly thereafter, the said linear
boards were offloaded from the vessel to the arrastre petitioner.
However, upon assessment, 158 rolls of the goods were reported
to be damaged during shipping. Further, upon withdrawal to the
arrastre to be delivered first to San Miguels broker Dynamic and
later on to consignee San Miguel, another 54 rolls of board were
reported to be damaged. The respondent Allied, being the insurer
of the goods, paid San Miguel of the damage and later on seek
reimbursement against Transocean, Philippine Transmarine,
Dynamic and petitioner for the lost suffered in paying the
consignee San Miguel by filing a Complaint in RTC Makati. It
alleged that from the port of origin, the goods were in good
condition and it was merely damaged due to the negligence of the
abovementioned defendants. However, petitioner denied the
allegations contending that the goods are already in bad condition
when they deliver it to the broker and consignee and assailed
exercise of due diligence in the taking care of the said goods. The
RTC however ruled in favor of Allied and found all the defendants
liable for losses. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this appeal made only by the petitioner. Petitioner
claims that the CA erroneously failed to note the so-called Tum
Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes and the Requests for Bad Order
Survey which supposedly could release it from liability for the
damaged shipment. The reports were apparently made prior to the
shipment's turnover from petitioner to Dynamic and they
purportedly show that no additional loss or damage happened
while the shipment was in petitioner's custody as the reports only
mention the 158 rolls that were damaged during shipping or prior
to petitioners possession hence not liable to the additional 54
damaged rolls.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner shall be held liable for the
losses sustained by respondent.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The petitioner wanted the Court to
reexamine the decisions and evidence presented before the RTC
and CA who have the same ruling which is not allowed by law,
except upon the existence of exceptions allowed. However, none of
those exists in this case.
There is no misapprehension of facts nor the evidences
presented by the petitioner such as the Tum Over Survey of Bad
Order Cargoes and the Requests for Bad Order Survey. The trial
court correctly gave little credence to the said reports since
between the arrastre operator and the consignee exist a
relationship similar to that of a warehouseman and a depositor. The
relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is
similar to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator. Both the
arrastre and the carrier are, therefore, charged with and
responsible to deliver the goods in good condition to the
consignee.
The RTC correctly held that the broker, Dynamic, cannot
alone be held liable for the additional 54 rolls of damaged goods
since such damage happened (a) while the goods were in the
custody of the arrastre petitioner; (b) when they were in transition
from petitioner's custody to that of Dynamic; and (c) during
Dynamic's custody. While the RTC could not conclude with pinpoint
accuracy who among the ATI and Dynamic caused which particular
damage and in what proportion or quantity, it was unblemished
that both ATI and Dynamic failed to discharge the burden of
proving that damage on the 54 rolls did not occur during their
custody. It was proven that during petitioners custody and while it
will transfer the goods to the broker, there was a use of wrong
lifting equipment thereby deliberating the cause of such damage. It
is a finding of fact of the lower court which the SC will not disturb.
In its operations, the arrastre operator must observe the
same degree of diligence of that required of a common carrier and
a warehouseman. And it must prove more than a fact that other
parties might be liable for the losses but it must prove that it itself
exercised due care in handling thereof, that it complied with the
obligation to deliver the goods and that the losses were not due to
its negligence or that of its employees.
As established, there was negligence in both petitioner and
Dynamic's performance of their duties in the handling; storage and
delivery of the subject shipment to San Miguel thereby resulting in
the loss of 54 rolls of kraft linear board, solidary liability for such
loss shall be imposed.
5. GV Florida Transport, Inc. v Battung (2015)
GV Florida Transport, Inc., Petitioner v Heirs of Romeo L.
Battung GR No. 208802, October 14, 2015
FACTS: Battung boarded the bus of petitioner in Delfin Albano,
Isabela, bound for Manila. He was seated at the first row behind
the driver and slept during the ride. Battung was seated at the first
row behind the driver and slept during the ride. When the bus
reached the Philippine Carabao Center in Muoz, Nueva Ecija, the
bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires.
At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus
stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion.
The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and
thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was
pronounced dead on arrival. Hence, respondents filed a complaint
on July 15, 2008 for damages in the aggregate amount of
P1,826,000.00 based on a breach of contract of carriage against
petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 22-1103.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for damages arising from culpa
contractual
RULING: No.
Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner
was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the
method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of [the
common carrier'sl employees, and therefore involving no issue of
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as well as
competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes
created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is
rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To
rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the
absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the
lawmakers.
The case involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the
surreptitious act of a co-passenger who, after consummating such
crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle.
The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons,
corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public) the highest degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary
diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers.
Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." This disputable presumption
may also be overcome by a showing that the accident was caused
by a fortuitous event.
The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be pointed out
that the law does not make the common carrier an insurer of the
absolute safety of its passengers.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from
common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and
creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not,
however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary
care, vigilance[,] and precaution in the carriage of passengers by
common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can
provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged
with due regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger
is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from
introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a
mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that
the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or
that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a
fortuitous event.
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code
Commission and Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and
operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business
of a transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger's
safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its
passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the
degree of diligence that the law requires.
Therefore, it is imperative for a party claiming against a common
carrier under the above-said provisions to show that the injury or
death to the passenger/s arose from the negligence of the common
carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its
passengers.
In Pilapil v. CA, the Court clarified that where the injury sustained
by the passenger was in no way due
(1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting, or (2) to the negligent or willful acts of the common
carrier's employees with respect to the foregoing
such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by
strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to
prevent there would be no issue regarding the common carrier's
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as
competent employees in relation to its transport business; as such,
the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of
the Civil Code should not apply:
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence
against the carrier is only a disputable presumption.[The
presumption] gives in where contrary facts are established proving
either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence
required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to
a fortuitous event.
Since Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the
applicable provision is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states
that:
"a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."
Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of
diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in assessing
the existence of any culpability on the common carrier's part.
Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a
family "connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an
ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted
with a similar situation.
The test to determine whether negligence attended the
performance of an obligation is:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence."
At bar, no danger i.e. intelligent reports from law enforcement
agents that certain lawless elements were planning to hijack and
burn some of its buses, as to impel petitioner or its employees to
implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of
its passengers. There was also no showing that during the course
of the trip, Battung's killer made suspicious actions which would
have forewarned petitioner's employees of the need to conduct
thorough checks on him or any of the passengers.
Relevantly, the Court, in Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company,
has held that common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in
assuming that the passengers they take in will not bring anything
that would prove dangerous to himself, as well as his co-
passengers, unless there is something that will indicate that a
more stringent inspection should be made. Not to be lightly
considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is
entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he
protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to
indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar.
in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection,
after the passenger had already declared that the box contained
mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified
invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
6. METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION vs. REYNALDO
CUEVAS
G.R. No. 167797, June 15, 2015
FACTS: Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and Minas
Transit Corporation (Minas Transit) entered into an agreement to
sell dated August 31, 1990, whereby the latter bought several bus
units from the former at a stipulated price. They agreed that MMTC
would retain the ownership of the buses until certain conditions
were met, but in the meantime Minas Transit could operate the
buses within Metro Manila.
On October 14, 1994, one of the buses subject of the agreement to
sell hit and damaged a Honda Motorcycle owned by Reynaldo and
driven by Junnel. Reynaldo and Junnel sued MMTC and Minas
Transit for damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
MMTC denied liability claiming that although it retained the
ownership of the bus, the actual operator and employer of the bus
driver was Minas Transit; and that, in support of its cross-claim
against Minas Transit, a provision in the agreement to sell
mandated Minas Transport to hold it free from liability arising from
the use and operation of the bus units.
ISSUE1: Whether or not MMTC is liable considering that it was not
the actual operator and employer of the bus driver
HELD1: YES. In view of MMTCs admission in its pleadings that it
had remained the registered owner of the bus at the time of the
incident, it could not escape liability for the personal injuries and
property damage suffered by the Cuevases. This is because of the
registered-owner rule, whereby the registered owner of the motor
vehicle involved in a vehicular accident could be held liable for the
consequences.
The Court has reiterated the registered-owner rule in other rulings,
like in Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, to wit:
x x x It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the
employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for
the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
In Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, we ruled that in so far
as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor
vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual
employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
MMTC could not evade liability by passing the buck to Minas
Transit. The stipulation in the agreement to sell did not bind third
parties like the Cuevases, who were expected to simply rely on the
data contained in the registration certificate of the erring bus.
ISSUE2: May MMTC recover from Minas Transit (the actual
employer of the negligent driver)?
HELD2: YES. Although the registered-owner rule might seem to be
unjust towards MMTC, the law did not leave it without any remedy
or recourse. According to Filcar Transport Services
Espinas, MMTC could recover from Minas Transit, the actual
employer of the negligent driver, under the principle of unjust
enrichment, by means of a cross-claim seeking reimbursement
of all the amounts that it could be required to pay as damages
arising from the drivers negligence. A cross-claim is a claim by one
party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or
of a counterclaim therein, and may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-
claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the
cross-claimant.
8. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs.
BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., & MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE
CO., LTD.
G.R. No. 182864, January 12, 2015
FACTS:
For two separate transactions in 2004, Sumitomo
Corporation, a corporation based in Yokohama, Japan shipped on
board the vessels of petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. (ESLI)
coils of various steel sheet for transportation and delivery at the
port of Manila in favor of consignee Calamba Steel Center located
in Saimsim, Calamba, Laguna. The Shipments were insured with
the respondents BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS) and Mitsui
Sumitomo Insurance Company (Mitsui) against all risks.
The first shipment arrived at the port of Manila in an
unknown condition and was turned over to Asian Terminals Inc.
(ATI) for safekeeping. Upon withdrawal of the shipment by
Calamba Steel, it was found out that part of the shipment was
damaged and was in bad order condition such that there was a
v. Request for Bad Order Survey. It was found out that the damage
amounted to US$4,598.85 prompting Calamba Steel to reject the
damaged shipment for being unfit for the intended purpose.
Sumitomo Corporation again shipped on board ESLIs
vessel coils of various Steel for transportation to and delivery at
the port of Manila in favor of Calamba Steel. Again, the shipment
was insured by respondents against all risk. The second shipment
arrived at the port of Manila partly damaged and in bad order. The
coils sustained further damage during the discharge from vessel to
shore until its turnover to ATIs custody for safekeeping. Upon
withdrawal from ATI and delivery to Calamba Steel, As it did before,
Calamba Steel rejected the damaged shipment for being unfit for
the intended purpose.
Calamba Steel attributed the damages on both shipments
to ESLI as the carrier and ATI as the arrastre operator in charge of
the handling and discharge of the coils and filed a claim against
them. When ESLI and ATI refused to pay, Calamba Steel filed an
insurance claim for the total amount of the cargo against BPI/MS
and Mitsui as cargo insurers. As a result, BPI/MS and Mitsui became
subrogated in place of and with all the rights and defenses
accorded by law in favor of Calamba Steel.
 Opposing the complaint, ATI denied the allegations and
insisted that the coils in two shipments were already damaged
upon receipt from ESLIs vessels. It likewise insisted that it
exercised due diligence in the handling of the shipments and
invoked that in case of adverse decision, its liability should not
exceed P5,000.00 pursuant to Section 7.01, Article VII of the
Contract for Cargo Handling Services between Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) and ATI.
On its part, ESLI denied the allegations of the complainants
and averred that the damage to both shipments was incurred while
the same were in the possession and custody of ATI and/or of the
consignee or its representatives.
The RTC Makati City rendered a decision finding both the
ESLI and ATI liable for the damages sustained by the two
shipments. Upon appeal, Both ESLI and ATI invoked the limitation
of liability of US$500.00 per package as provided in
Commonwealth Act No. 65 or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA). The CA absolved ATI from liability in its decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not ESLI is liable for the damaged shipment
transported and delivered by its vessels.
2. Whether or not ESLI can invoke the limitation of liability
of US$500.00 per package as provided
Commonwealth Act No. 65 or the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA).
HELD:
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and on
public policy considerations, are bound to observe extra ordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them.
Subject to certain exceptions enumerated under Article 1734 of the
Civil Code, common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary
responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods
are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by
the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually
or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person
who has a right to receive them.
In maritime transportation, a bill of lading is issued by a
common carrier as a contract, receipt and symbol of the goods
covered by it. If it has no notation of any defect or damage in the
goods, it is considered as a "clean bill of lading." A clean bill of
lading constitutes prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier
of the goods as therein described.
Based on the bills of lading issued, it is undisputed that
ESLI received the two shipments of coils from shipper Sumitomo
Corporation in good condition at the ports of Yokohama and
Kashima, Japan. However, upon arrival at the port of Manila, some
coils from the two shipments were partly dented and crumpled as
evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes prior to
turnover to ATI. Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order
to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their
destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence
against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how
the deterioration, loss, or destruction of the goods happened, the
transporter shall be held responsible. From the foregoing, the fault
is attributable to ESLI. While no longer an issue, it may be
nonetheless state that ATI was correctly absolved of liability for the
in
damage.
In the issue of limitation of liability, the law of the country
to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability
of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or
deterioration. The Code takes precedence as the primary law over
the rights and obligations of common carriers with the Code of
Commerce and COGSA applying suppletorily. The New Civil Code
provides that a stipulation limiting a common carriers liability to
the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading is binding,
unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value. In addition, a
contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or
shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is
valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has
been fairly and freely agreed upon.
COGSA, on the other hand, provides under Section 4,
Subsection 5 that an amount recoverable in case of loss or damage
shall not exceed US$500.00 per package or per customary freight
unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by
the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
Accordingly, the issue whether or not ESLI has limited liability as a
carrier is determined by either absence or presence of proof that
the nature and value of the goods have been declared by
Sumitomo Corporation and inserted in the bills of lading.
There is no question about the declaration of the nature,
weight and description of the goods on the first bill of lading. The
bills of lading represent the formal expression of the parties rights,
duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of
the parties which is to be deciphered from the language used in
the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of
the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract.
Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
As to the non-declaration of the value of the goods on the
second bill of lading, we see no error on the part of the appellate
court when it ruled that there was a compliance of the requirement
provided by COGSA. The declaration requirement does not require
that all the details must be written down on the very bill of lading
itself. It must be emphasized that all the needed details are in the
invoice, which "contains the itemized list of goods shipped to a
buyer, stating quantities, prices, shipping charges," and other
details which may contain numerous sheets. Compliance can be
attained by incorporating the invoice, by way of reference, to the
bill of lading provided that the former containing the description of
the nature, value and/or payment of freight charges is as in this
case duly admitted as evidence.
Wherefore, the petition for review on certiorari of ESLI was
denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.