ELECTION LAW CASE DIGESTS (FROM the reglementary period for filing the protest had,

ELECTION CONTEST) by then, already expired. Petition dismissed.

ELECTION CONTESTS Note: There can be substantial compliance even

16 TOMARONG V. LUBGUBAN after a motion to dismiss has been filed on the
269 SCRA 624 ground of lack of certificate of non- forum
(TAN, L.) shopping but it must be done asap (the next day)
FACTS: otherwise the value of the SC Circular would lose
its value.
Several candidates including Tomarong were
defeated in the 1994 Barangay Elections in 17 BEAGAN V. BORJA
Siquijor. They all filed an election protest before 261 SCRA 474
the respective MCTCs. The winning candidates (TEEHANKEE)
filed their answers praying that the petitions be FACTS:
dismissed based on the affirmative defense that the W May 1994. Barangay Elections in Bislig,
protestants failed to attach to their petitions the Tanauan, Leyte
required certification on non-forum shopping as W Election protest filed by Arnulfo Santillano,
provided for in SC-AC No. 04-94. Egonio as
protestee, Beegan as intervenor
The MCTC initially ruled to dismiss but deferred t W About revision of three ballot boxes
o the Secretary of Justice who then deferred to the completed in October
Court Administrator who ruled that the 1994, Revision Committee presented its report to
certification on non-forum shopping should be the Court
required in elections contests before the MTCs. November 3, 1994
Thus this petition under Rule 65. W Problem arises when the abovementioned
ballots were
HELD: reopened for Xeroxing purposes for the perusal of
The requirement of the certification of non-forum the
shopping is protestees counsel
required for election contests. W Office and Court Administrator viewed acts
of respondents
in effecting the reopening of the ballot boxes and
Yes. The Court, citing Loyola v. Court of Appeals,
copying
said that: We do not agree that SC-AC No. 04-94
tantamount to misconduct in office
is not applicable to election cases. There is nothing
W Balano (clerk of court) and Borja believed
in the Circular that indicates that it does not apply in good faith that
to election cases. On the contrary, it expressly they had the authority to allow such.
provides that the requirements therein, which are HELD:
in addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Photocopying of ballots is not tantamount to
Rules of Court and existing circulars, shall be misconduct in office.
strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, W As long as no tampering or alteration was
petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings manifest in
in all courts and agencies other the Supreme Court Xeroxing/photocopying of court records, no
and the Court of Appeals. Ubi lex non distinguit liability
nec nos distinguire debemus. attaches to anyone.
W Respondents are exonerated.
In this case, the petitioners filed the required
certification 18 days after filing their petitions. It 18 FERMO V. COMELEC
cannot be considered substantial compliance with 328 SCRA 52
the requirements of the Circular. Quite obviously, (VALDEZ)
FACTS:
W LAXINA and FERMO- candidates for the
position of Punong Brgy. in QC. (1997 elections)
LAXINA was proclaimed winner
W FERMO- filed election protest question
results in 4 clustered
precincts on ground of massive fraud and serious
irregularities.
W MTC: ruled FERMO won the contested
post (in 1999) and
granted a motion for execution pending appeal.
COMELEC reversed on ground that the possibility
that the term of contested seat might expire by the
time appeal is decided not a good reason to
warrant execution pending appeal.
HELD:
A motion for executing pending appeal on ground
of term
expiration is not good reason for issuance.
Sec. 2, Rule 39 Rules of Court: court while it has
jurisdiction and possession of original record in
its discretion, order execution of judgment or final
order even before expiration of the period to
appeal
W Exercise of discretion requires that it is
based on good
reasons (combination of 2 or more will suffice):
1. PUBLIC INTEREST INVOLVED OR WILL
OF
ELECTORATE
2. SHORTNESS of remaining portion of term of
contested office
3. LENGTH OF TIME that election contest has
been
PENDING
W Shortness of remaining term- not good
reason for execution
of judgment pending appealRA 8524: extended
term of
office of Brgy. officials to 5 years (negates claim
of FERMO
W Upon nullification of writ of execution
pending appeal,
decision of FERMOs proclamation as winner was
stayed status quo (last actual peaceful
uncontested situation preceding the controversy)
restored
W LAXINA: entitled to discharge functions
19 SAQUILAYAN V. COMELEC
416 SCRA 658
(DINO)
FACTS:
1. SAQUILAYAN and JARO were candidates for
the Office of
Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
2. SAQUILAYAN was proclaimed winner.
3. JARO instituted an Election Protest Case before the
RTC, contesting the results of all 453 election
precincts. He alleges the ff:
a. Votes in favor of JARO were considered stray
b. Ballots and votes were misappreciated
(considered
null and void, or counted in favor of
SAQUILAYAN)
c. Votes that were void (containing stickers or
markings) were counted in favor of
SAQUILAYAN, etc..
4. SAQUILAYAN filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which was denied by
the RTC.
5.Questioning the denial of his Motion to Dismiss,
the
COMELEC (Division) ruled in favor of
SAQUILAYAN and ordered the dismissal of the
election protest. It ruled that JAROs allegations
failed to state a cause of action, on the basis of
Pena v. HRET.
* Pena v. HRET held that the bare allegations of
massive fraud, widespread intimidation and
terrorism, without specification and substantiation
of where and how these occurrences took place,
render the protest fatally defective.
 6.Upon reconsideration sought by JARO, the
COMELECEn
Banc, SAQUILAYANs Motion to Dismiss was
again
dismissed, and the Election Protest Case was
ordered to
proceed.
HELD:
1.The present case is similar to Miguel v.
COMELEC, which
the COMELEC En Banc used as basis in ordering
the
Election Protest Case to proceed.
2. IN both cases, the protestants questioned all the
precincts
in their respective municipalities.
3.As Miguel v. COMELEC is more recent than
Pena v. HRET (as used by the COMELEC
Division), then the former should
prevail in case of a conflict.
4. Furthermore, election contests involve public
interest. Technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they constituted
an obstacle to the determination of the true will of
the electorate.
5. Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technical objections.
6. Allowing the election protest to proceed would be the
best way of removing any doubt as to who was the
real candidate chosen by the electorate.
7.Decision of COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
20 SANTOS V. COMELEC
399 SCRA 611
(PADLAN)
FACTS:
Petitioner (SANTOS) and Respondent
(PANULAYA) were both
candidate for MAYOR of the Municipal of
Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections.
MUNICIPAL Board of Canvassers (MBC)
proclaimed PANULAYA
as Mayor.
SANTOS filed an ELECTION PROTEST in
the RTC.
RTC found that SANTOS obtained 76 votes
more than
PANULAYA. RTC declared SANTOS as winner.
RTC voided MBCs
proclamation in favor of PANULAYA.
SANTOS filed a MOTION FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
with the RTC.
PANULAYA APPEALED the RTC declaration
in favor of SANTOS
to the COMELEC.
COMELEC issued INJUNCTION against
RTC to refrain from
acting on motion for execution pending appeal.
RTC APPROVED motion for execution
pending appeal.
SANTOS took OATH of office and
ASSUMED duties and
functions of his office.
PANULAYA filed with COMELEC a
PETITION FOR STATUS QUO
ANTE.
COMELEC ISSUED ORDER directing
parties to MAINTAIN
STATUS QUO ANTE, at the same time
ENJOINING SANTOS from
assuming functions of mayor.
HELD:
Mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest
the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and
to resolve pending incidents such as motions for
execution pending appeal.
The following constitute good reasons and a
combination of two
or more of them will suffice to grant execution
pending appeal:
(1) public interest involved or will of the
electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining
portion of the term of the contested office; and (3)
the length of time that the election contest has
been pending.
The trial in the RTC took more than a year, while
the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor
continued to run. The will of the electorate, as
determined by the trial court in the election
protest, had to be respected and given meaning.
Between the determination by the trial court of
who of the candidates won the elections and the
finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to
proclaim, it is the courts decision that should
prevail.
All that was required for a valid exercise of the
discretion to allow execution pending appeal was
that the immediate execution should be based
"upon good reasons to be stated in a special order."
The rationale why such execution is allowed in
election cases is to give as much recognition to the
worth of a trial judges decision as that which is
initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by
the board of canvassers.
Why should the proclamation by the board of
canvassers suffice as basis of the right to assume
office, subject to future contingencies attendant to
a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice?
Indeed, when it is considered that the board of
canvassers is composed of persons who are less
technically prepared to make an accurate
appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being
more apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and
that the board must act summarily, practically
racing against time, while, on the other hand, the
judge has benefit of all the evidence the parties
can offer and of admittedly better technical
preparation and background, apart from his being
allowed ample time for conscientious study and
mature deliberation before rendering judgment,
one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing
the immediate execution of decisions in election
cases adverse to the protestees, notwithstanding
the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom,
as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the
court, good reasons therefor.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant
execution pending appeal would bring back the
ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation- prolong the
protest" techniques so often resorted to by devious
politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate
their hold to an elective office. This would, as a
consequence, lay to waste the will of the
electorate.
ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-
PRESIDENT
21 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS
253 SCRA 559
(CONCEPCION)
FACTS:
This is an original action filed before the SC
acting as a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago (DS) ran for
presidency in the 1992 National Elections. She
lost, but filed this present protest against the
winner, Pres. FV Ramos.
Subsequently however, she ran for Senator in the
1995 Senatorial elections. She won and assumed
office as Senator in 1995. Considering this factual
milieu, the issues revolve on whether this present
electoral protest would still be valid, even after the
protestant has already assumed office as Senator,
noting that
should she win this protest, her term as president
would coincide with her term as senator, which
she is now in. Now, in 1996, the SC as PET
decides the case.
HELD:
There was abandonment of protest.
Yes. DS filed her certificate of candidacy to run
for senator without qualification or reservation. In
doing so, she entered into a political contract with
the electorate, that, if elected, she would assume
the office as senator. This is in accord with the
constitutional doctrine that a public office is a
public trust. In assuming the office of Senator, she
has effectively abandoned her determination to
pursue this present protest. Such abandonment
operates to render this protest moot.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the
protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if
after the completion of the revision of the ballots
from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present
evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal
of any such intention, such is a manifest indication
that she no longer intends to do so.
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS,
LOCAL OFFICIALS,
AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS; THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM
22 VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY V.
COMELEC
342 SCRA 244
(AGUINALDO)
FACTS:
Respondent proclaimed 14 party-list
representatives from 13 parties which obtained at
least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system as members of the House of
Representatives. Upon petition for respondents,
who were party- list organizations, it proclaimed
38 additional party-list representatives although
they obtained less than 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system on the ground
that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at
least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.
HELD:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress
with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional
prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to
require parties participating in the system to obtain
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list
system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in
Congress.
**NOTES:
determination of total number of party-list
representatives=
# district representatives x.20
.80
additional representatives of first
# ofvotesoffirstparty
# ofvotesofpartylistsystem party=
additional seats for
# votesofconcernedparty * additionalseatsforconcernedparty
# votesoffirstparty
*
concerned party=
23 ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC
359 SCRA 698
(ENRIQUEZ)
FACTS:
The Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the
COMELEC is challenged insofar as it approves
the participation of 154 organizations and parties
in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek
the disqualification of private respondents as the
party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented and not the
mainstream political parties.
The COMELEC received several petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, etc. for the
2001 elections. The COMELEC allege that
verifications for the qualifications of these parties
take a long process and as a result the 2 divisions
promulgated a separate
Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on
political parties only on February 10, 2001. Before
the February 12, 2001 deadline, the registered
parties and organizations filed their
Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. The
COMELEC approved the Manifestations of 154
parties and organizations but denied those of
several others.
ACAP filed before the COMELEC a petition
praying that the names of some respondents be
deleted from the Certified List of Political
PartiesParticipating in the Party List System for
the May 14, 2001 Elections. It also prayed that the
votes cast for the said respondents be not counted
or canvassed and that the latters nominees not be
proclaimed. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth
also filed a similar petition against some of the
respondents.
ISSUE 1: WON political parties may participate in
the party-list elections
The SC held that under the Constitution and RA
7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Sec. 7 and 8, Article
IX-C provides that political parties may be
registered under the partylist system. In the
ConCom deliberations, Com. Monsod stated that
the purpose of the party-list provision was to open
up the system, in order to give a chance to parties
that consistently place 3rd or 4th in congressional
district elections to win a seat in Congress. Sec. 3
of RA 7941 provides that a party is either a underrepresented. It is illogical to open the system
political party or a sectoral party or a collation of
parties. Sec. 11 of the same Act leaves no doubt
as to the participation of political parties in the
party-list system. Indubitable, political parties
even the major ones-may participate in the party-
list elections.
ISSUE 2: WON the party-list system is exclusive
to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors and organizations
For political parties to participate in the party-list
elections their requisite character must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system
in the Constitution and RA 7941. The purpose of
the party-list system is to give genuine power to
our people in Congress. However, the
constitutional provision is not self- executory,
hence RA 7941 was enacted.
Proportional representation does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because
the party-list election is national in scope. It refers
to the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented as exemplified in Section 5 of
the Act. The party- list organization must factually
and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies. The persons
nominated to the party-list system must also
belong to the underrepresented and marginalized
sectors, organizations and parties.
Lack of well-defined constituency refers to the
absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group. It points to those with disparate interests
defined with the marginalized and
underrepresented. In the end, the COMELECs
role is to see to it that
Only those Filipinos who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress
under the party- list system. Not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. The law
crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of
Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. While the
mega-rich are numerically speaking, a minority,
they are neither marginalized nor
to those who have long been within it those
privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.
The SC held that it cannot allow the party-list
system to be sullied and prostituted by those who
are neither marginalized nor underrepresented.
Mendoza, dissenting: The text of Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)
(2) provides for a party-list system of registered,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations, and
not for sectoral representation. It provides for no
basis for petitioners contention that whether it is
sectoral representation or party-list system the
purpose is to provide exclusive representation for
marginalized sectors. The Record of the ConCom
speaks clearly against the petitioners assertion.
Two proposals for additional representation in the
House of Representatives were submitted namely,
sectoral representation and party-list system.
These two are not the same. In the end, the
ConCom chose the party-list system. In choosing
this system, the
ConCom did not intend to reserve the party-list
system to the marginalized or underrepresented. In
fact, the party-list system mandates the opposite.
Furthermore, Justice Mendoza holds that the
majority misapprehended the meaning of Section
2 of RA No. 7941. The provision states that the
purpose of the party-list system is to promote
promotional representation in the election of
representatives in the House of Representatives.
To this end, a full, free and open party system is
guaranteed to obtain the broadest possible
representation of a party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives. While
the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is a basic purpose of the
law, it is not its only purpose.
ISSUE 3: WON the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785
The SC held that it is proper to remand the case to
the COMELECT to determine whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in
the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In light of this, the SC
provides for guidelines to assist the COMELEC in
its work. (1) The political partymust represent
the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941, (2) Even if
major political parties are allowed to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to be elected to the
House of Representatives, (3) a party or an
organization must not be disqualified under
Section 6 of the Act which enumerates the grounds
for disqualification, (4) the party or organization
must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by the government,
(5) party must not comply with the requirements
of the law, (6) not only the candidate party or
organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, so also must its
nominees, (7) the nominee must likewise be able
to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole.
24 ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC GR
147589, JANUARY 29, 2002 (ENRIQUEZ)
FACTS:
The COMELEC issued a TRO against the
proclamation of APEC, CIBAC and AMIN
because they failed to meet the 8-point guidelines
set forth by this Court. The COMELEC found that
APEC was merely an arm of the Philippine Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PHILRECA) and that it
did not truly represent the marginalized sectors of
society, CIBAC was reported to be merely an
extension of theJesus
Is Lord (JIL) religious movement and did not
represent the interest of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society and that Anak
Mindanao (AMIN) was listed as having obtained
only 1.6865% of the total votes cast for the party-
list system, not sufficient to meet the 2% required
no. of votes.
ISSUE:
WON APEC, CIBAC and AMIN should be
proclaimed winners aside from those already
validly proclaimed by the earlier Resolutions of
the SC.
RULING:
AMIN did not get more than two percent of the
votes cast.
APEC and CIBAC have sufficiently met the 8-
point guidelines of his Court and have sufficient
votes to entitle them to seats in Congress. Issues
are factual in character, Commissions findings are
adopted, absent any patent arbitrariness or abuse
or negligence in its action. No substantial proof
that CIBAC is merely an arm of JIL, or that APEC
is an extension of PHILRECA. The OSG
explained the these are separate entities with
separate memberships. Although APECs
nominees are all professionals, its membership is
composed not only of professionals but also of
peasants, elderly, youth and women. APEC
addresses the issues of job creation, poverty
alleviation and lack of electricity. CIBAC is
composed of he underrepresented and
marginalized and is concerned with their welfare.
CIBAC is particularly interested in the youth and
professional sectors.
TRO partially lifted with regard to APEC and
CIBAC.
25
ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC
GR 147589, APRIL 10, 2002
(ENRIQUEZang bagong bayani ng 2D!)
The COMELEC determined that the following
party-list participants, despite their having
obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast, have
failed to meet the 8-point guidelines set forth in
our Decision: Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga
(MAD), Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC), Veterans Federation Party
(VFP), Abag Promdi (PROMDI), Nationalist
Peoples Coalition (NPC), Lakas NUCD-UMDP,
and Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC).
The OSG, acting on behalf of the Comelec, in its
Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001 and in
a Manifestation dated December 5, 2001, modified
its position and recommended that APEC and
CIBAC be declared as having complied with the
8-point guidelines
ELECTION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
26 OCCEA V. COMELEC
127 SCRA 404
(ZUIGA)
FACTS:
Samuel Occena filed a etition for
prohibition to declare as unconstitutional
the provisions in the Barangay Election
Act of 1982 (BP 222) which prohibited:
any candidate in the 1982 barangay lection
from representing himself as a member of
a political party;
the intervention of political parties in a
candidate's nomination and filing f his
certificate of candidacy; and o the giving
of aid or support of political parties for or
against a candidate's campaign
Occena prayed that the 1982 elections be
declared null and void, and new barangay
elections held without the ban on the
involvement of political parties
In 1982 the court considered the
Comments of the Solicitor General as an
Answer
Note that the decision in the case
was delayed because all
the Justices resigned on May 1982 (*SC trivia:
over allegations that the bar exam results of
Justice Ericta's son were changed in his favor -
there was pre-decoding of his grades before
official decoding and publication)
HELD:
The ban on the intervention of political parties in
the election of barangay officials is NOT violative
of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form
associations and societies for purposes not
contrary to law.
Under the Barangay Election Act of 1982, the right to
organize is intact. Political parties may freely be
formed although there is a restriction on their
activities, i.e., their intervention in the election of
barangay officials on May 17, 1982 is prescribed.
But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on
concerted or group action of political parties. The ban
against the participation of political parties in the
barangay election is an appropriate legislative
response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias
in the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on
the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our
political and social structure. It would definitely
enhance the objective and impartial discharge of their
duties for barangay officials to be shielded form
political party loyalty.
Some reasons for the restriction:
- "the barangay is the basic unit not only of our
social structure but also of our political structure.
It would be a more prudent policy to insulate the
barangays from the influence of partisan politics.
The barangays, although it is true they are already
considered regular units of our government, are
non-partisan; they constitute the base of the
pyramid of our social and political structure, and
in order that base will not be subject to instability
because of the influence of political forces, it is
better that we elect the officials thereof through a
non-partisan system." (Deliberations on
Parliamentary Bill 2125 which later became BP
Blg. 222)
- The Barangay Captain and the Barangay
Council, apart from their
legislative and consultative powers, also act as an
agency for
neutral community action such as the distribution
of basic foodstuff
and as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and
referenda.
- The Barangay Captain, together with the
members of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by
him, exercises administrative supervision over the
barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of
settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain
himself settles or helps settle local controversies
within the barangay either through mediation or
arbitration.
The case of Imbong v. COMELEC also involved
the restriction as that prescribed in Sec. 4 of BP
222. In upholding the constitutionality of what
was then Sec. 8(a) of Republic Act No. 6132, the
court said that "While it may be true that a party's
support of a candidate is not wrong per se, it is
equally true that Congress in the exercise of its
broad law-making authority can declare certain
acts as mala prohibita when justified by the
exigencies of the times." The primary purpose of
the prohibition was to avoid the denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The sponsors of the
provision emphasized that under this provision,
the poor candidate has an even chance as against
the rich candidate. Equality of chances may be
better attained by banning all organization support.
The ban was to assure equal chances to a
candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism
as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country
can utilize their services if elected.
Fernando's Concurring Opinion:
Test of the permissible limitation on freedom of
association: How should the limitation 'for
purposes not contrary to law' be interpreted? It is
submitted that it is another way of expressing the
clear and present danger rule for unless an
association or society could be shown to create an
imminent danger to public safety, there is no
justification for abridging the right to form
associations or societies."
Teehankee's Dissenting Opinion:
The restriction denies "non-political" candidates
the very freedoms of effectively appealing to the
electorate through the public media and of being
supported by organized groups that would give
them at least a fighting chance to win against
candidates of the political kingpins. The political
bigwigs are meanwhile left to give their
"individual" blessings to their favored candidates,
which in actuality is taken by all as the party's
blessings.
27 KANDUM V. COMELEC
GR 136969, JANUARY 18, 2000
(CHOTRANI)
FACTS:
Petitioner Amilhamja Kandum and respondent
Hadji Gapur Ballaho were candidates for Punong
Barangay in Barangay Look Bisaya, Tipo-Tipo,
Basilan in the 1997 barangay elections. Petitioner
garnered 61 votes over respondent's 59 votes.
When petitioner was proclaimed the winner by the
BBC, respondent filed an election protest in the
MCTC and secured a favorable decision.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the RTC. But
when the RTC dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner filed a notice of appeal to
the COMELEC through the MCTC .
The COMELEC issued a resolution dismissing the
appeal for having been filed out of time. (Appeal
was filed 37 days after petitioner received copy of
the decision of the MCTC)
HELD:
RTC doesn't have jurisdiction over election
protests involving barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective barangay officials decided by
courts of limited jurisdiction (the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts) lies with the
COMELEC, not the RTC.
Under paragraph (2), Section 2, subdivision C,
Article IX of the Constitution,
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive . . . appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
28 BUHISAN V. COMELEC
GR 127328, JANUARY 30, 2001
(PEAFLORIDA)
FACTS:
Petitioner Jane Buhisan and private respondent
Gordon Gorospe were candidates for the position
of Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of
Barangay Poblacion, San Juan, Siquijor during the
May 6, 1996 elections. Buhisan garnered 35 votes
against Gorospe's 34 votes. Buhisan was
proclaimed by the Board of Election Tellers as the
duly elected SK Chairman.
On May 13 Gorospe filed before the MCTC of
Lazi, Siquijor an election protest which seeks the
annulment of the proclamation of Buhisan and to
declare the former the duly elected SK Chairman.
MCTC nullified Buhisan's proclamation and
declared Gorospe as the SK Chairman.
Buhisan appealed with the COMELEC. Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department of COMELEC
returned the appeal. A motion for reconsideration
was filed. Also, Buhisan re-filed with the
COMELEC her appellant's brief insisting that
public respondent take cognizance of her appeal.
COMELEC dismissed the appeal and informed
Buhisan that the MCTC decision in the election
protest may only be elevated to the Commission
en banc via a petition for review and not by
ordinary appeal.
HELD:
The COMELEC didn't commit any grave abuse of
discretion with
dismissing the appeal due a mere technicality.
Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824
dated February 6, 1996, governing the conduct of
Sangguniang Kabataan elections provides:
Sec.49. Finality of Proclamation.-The
proclamation of the winning candidate shall be
final. However, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall have original jurisdiction over
all election protest cases, whose decision shall be
final. The Commission en banc in meritorious
cases may entertain a petition for review of the
decision of the MeTC/MTC/MCTC in accordance
with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An
appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall be required, which
shall be refundable if the appeal is found
meritorious.
Also, the COMELEC may entertain such petitions
only on meritorious gronds. By prescribing a
specific mode to be adopted in assailing the
MCTC's decision, COMELEC is afforted
opportunity to examine the allegations on the face
jof the petition if there is a prima facie showing
that the MCTC committed an error of fact or law
or gravely abused its discretion to warrant reversal
or modification of the decision. In other words,
this manner of appeal is discretionary on the part
of the election tribunal. It is essential that a prior
determination be made regarding the existence of
meritorious reasons for the petition. Unlike in
ordinary appeals, acceptance of the petition is not
a matter of course. Here an appeal is obviously not
the proper remedy allowed by the COMELEC
Rules Accordingly, public respondent cannot be
faulted for grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners appeal
29 MONTESCLAROS V. COMELEC
382 SCRA 2
(VALDEZ)
FACTS:
MONTESCLAROS (petitioners), all 20
y.o. claims being in danger of
disqualification to vote and be voted for in
the SK elections should it be postponed
from original date (MAY 02) to NOV 02
RP Pres. Signed the bill into law
postponing the elections.
During pendency of petition Congress
enacted RA 9164- synchronization of brgy.
and SK elections on JUL 02; provides that
voters and candidates for SK elections
must be at least 15 but less than 18 on the
day of election
HELD:
The subject law doesn't disfranchise the
petitioners. It also doesn't deprive them of any
property right.
SK: youth organization originally
established by PD 684 as KABATAANG
BARANGAY (KB) composed of all
brgy. residents less than 18 y.o.
LGC renamed KB to SK and limited
membership to youths at least 15 but not
more than 21 yo
SK tasked to enhance social, political,
economic, cultural, devt. of youth
No vested right to the permanence of age
requirement under LGC; every law passed
is always subject of amendment or repeal
Court cannot restrain Congress from
amending or repealing law; power to make
laws includes power to change laws; Court
cannot direct COMELEC to allow over-
aged voters to vote or be voted in an
election limited under RA 9164
Congress has power to prescribe
qualifications
PETITIONERS: no personal and
substantial interest in the SK elections
seeking to enforce right which has been
already limited with the passage of RA
9164ceased to be members of SK and no
longer qualified to participate
Only those who qualify can contest, based
on a statutory authority, any act
disqualifying them embership in the SK
is mere statutory right conferred by law
No one has vested right to any public
office, much less vested right to an
expectancy of holding public office
30 MONTESCLAROS V. COMELEC
GR 152295, AUGUST 13, 2002
FACTS:
HELD:
ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES AND
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
31 RECABO V. COMELEC
308 SCRA 793 (1999)
(FLORES)
FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari seeking to
annul the Comelecs resolution cancelling
Kaiser Recabos certificate of candidacy
for Vice-Mayor in Surigao Del Norte
Kaiser Recabo claimed to be LAKAS
NUCD-UMDPs official candidate to the
 aforementioned position, substituting his
mother Candelaria Recabo
Kaiser Recabos certificate of candidacy
was only signed by Governor Matugas, and
not jointly with Robert Barbers (space left
blank) as intended by the certificate of
nomination
On the other hand Respondent Reyes
certificate of nomination for Vice-mayor
was signed by no other than Fidel V.
Ramos (National Chairman LAKAS) and
Jose De Venecia (Secretary General
LAKAS)
HELD:
The certificate of candidacy of petitioner and that
of his mother who he substituted as candidate for
Vice Mayor DID NOT substantially complied with
the requirements of being official candidates of the
LAKAS party.
To allow Recabo to run would put the
election process in mockery for we would
in effect be allowing an anomalous
situation where a single political party may
field in multiple candidate for a singe
election position
Lakas designated 2 party officers to issue
certificates of nomination, petitoners
nomination was signed only by one, while
respondents signed by Ramos and JDV
Comelec declared petitioners mother as
and independent candidate on account of
the invalidity of her nomination, thus there
can be no valid substitution by petitioner
for an invalid nomination
Besides, petitioner filed his candidacy out
of time for an independent candidate
(although w/n prescriptive period of a
substituted candidate, useless because
already adjudged as an invalid nomination
and substitution)
Well-settled certificate filed beyond
deadline not valid.
But Reyes motion to be declared winner,
garnering the second highest number of
votes to Recabo can not be granted, wound
be tantamount to substitution of judgment
for the mind of the voter
32 BAUTISTA V. COMELEC
414 SCRA 299
(AQUINO, T.)
FACTS:
HELD:
DISQUALIFICATIONS
33 SOCRATES V. COMELEC
391 SCRA 457
(NEPOMUCENO)
FACTS:
Petitioner is mayor of Puerto Princesa, who
was removed from office thru a recall
proceeding initiated by the majority of the
incumbent barangay officials of the city
Petitioner filed a motion to nullify the
recall resolution but was dismissed by the
Comelec for lack of merit
Comelec set date for conducting the recall
election; former 3 term mayor Edward
Hagedorn files his certificate of candidacy
Petitioner Adovo and Gilo files petition
before Comelec to disqualify Hagedorn
claiming that he is disqualified from
running for a 4th term; petition was
dismissed
HELD:
Hagedorn is qualified to run in the recall election
Art. X Sec. 8 of 1987 Constitution: the
term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be 3 years and no
such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall
 not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Sec. 43 (b) RA 7160: Term of office no
local official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official
was elected
These constitutional and statutory
provisions have 2 parts
The first part provides that an elective local
official cannot serve ore than 3 consecutive
terms
The clear intent is that only consecutive
terms count in determining the 3-term limit
rule
The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of
service
The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to
form a continuous service or consecutive
terms
After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term
The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive
term
Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons
First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms
Second, the intervening period constitutes
an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service
Clearly, the constitution prohibits
immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms
The constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a
fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term
A recall election midway in the term
following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term
Neither does the constitution prohibit one
barred from seeking immediate reelection
to run in any other subsequent election
involving the same term of office
What the constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term
The prohibited election referred to by the
framers of the constitution is the
immediate reelection after the third term,
not any other subsequent election
The framers expressly acknowledged that
the prohibited election refers only to the
immediate reelection, and not to any
subsequent election, during the 6 year
period following the two term limit
The framers of the constitution did not
intend the period of rest of an elective
official who has reached his term limit to
be the full extent of the succeeding term
34 ADORMEO V. COMELEC
376 SCRA 90
(HOSAKA)
FACTS:
Pet Raymundo Adormeo and private resp Ramon
Talaga were the only candidates who filed the
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City
in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga was then the
incumbent mayor.
Adormeo filed a with the Provincial Election
Supervisor a Petition To Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and or
Disqualification of Talaga on the ground that the
latter was elected and had served as city mayor for
3 consecutive terms as follows: 1) election of May
1992 where he served the full term; 2) election of
May 1995, again he served a full term; and 3) in
the recall election of May 12, 2000 where he
served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after
having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election.
Adormeo contended that Talagas candidacy as
Mayor was a violation of Sec 8 Art X of the
Constitution---
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such
official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Talaga claims that he only served for 2
consecutive terms and that his service from May
2000 was not a full term because he only served
Tagaraos unexpired term by virtue of the recall
election. He cites the case of Lonzanida giving 2
conditions for the disqualification 1) that the
official has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in
the same local govt post; and 2) that he has fully
served 3 consecutive terms.
Comelec division ruled in favor of Adormeo.
Comelec en banc reversed, hence this petition.
HELD:
Talaga is qualified to run for mayor.
Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms
having lost his 3rd bid in the May 11, 1998
elections, said defeat is an interruption in the
continuity of his service as city mayor of Lucena.
The term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position.
Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms and
for nearly 2 years he was a private citizen. The
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the 1998 elections. It was only by virtue
of the recall that he served Tagaraos unexpired
term. This did not amount to a third full term.
Fr. Bernas comment that if one is elected
representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired term, no matter how short,
will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms
allowed only pertains to the members of the
House of Representatives and not to local govt
officials.
Neither can Talagas victory in the recall election
be deemed as voluntary renunciation under the
Constitution.
35 DIANGKA V. COMELEC
323 SCRA 887
(REYES)
FACTS:
Petitioner Maimona Diangka filed a petition for
certiorari questioning the decision of COMELEC
in disqualifying her as candidate for Mayor of
Ganassi, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner was the wife of
the incumbent Mayor. Ali Balindong, the other
mayoralty candidate, filed a special action for
disqualification against Diangka and her husband
alleging that they committed 2 acts of terrorism:
* First, that they loaded the ballot boxes into
an ambulance then subsequently, through force
and threats, made the watchers of Balindong go
down from the vehicle.
* Second, that Diangkas husband went to the
voting areas and caused a commotion that
prevented voters from voting.
In the results of the elections, Diangka emerged
the winner. COMELEC ordered the board of
anvassers to cease and desist from declaring
Diangka as ayor, but that order came in late and
still Diangka was declared mayor. In the hearing
for the disqualification, only Balindong and
lawyer appeared, hence COMELEC disqualified
Diangka. Diangka now assails the decision via
certiorari, meanwhile vice-mayor elect Macapodi
assumed the mayor position.
HELD:
Diangka can be held liable for the two acts of
terrorism of her husband thus, she could be
disqualified by the COMELEC.
1. COMELEC determined that Diangka was at
the front seat beside the driver in the ambulance
when the watchers of Balindong were made to go
down via threats. Her excuse that she did not
know nor was she in collusion with her husband
can not hold water. First, she admitted that she
requested that the driver, after they threatened the
watchers, drop her off at the school. Such shows
she had control over the driver. Second, her mere
presence in the ambulance shows that she
acquiesced to her husbands acts and
hence guilty also.
2. COMELEC determined that it was actually
Diangkas husband who caused the commotion
which prevented the voters from voting. While it
was not actually Diangka who committed the acts,
she did not prove that her running was not a mere
alter ego of her husband who is in his 3 term as
mayor. This together with her presence in the
ambulance makes her guilty of the acts of
terrorism in violation of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Note: Grounds for Disqualification (Section 68 of
Omnibus Election Code):
a) Giving money of other material
consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
b) Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy;
c) Spent in his election campaign in amount
in excess of that allowed
d) Solicited, received or made any
contribution which are prohibited.
36 SOON-RUIZ V. COMELEC
GR 144323, SEPTEMBER 5, 2000
(TAN, E.)
FACTS:
Petitioner (SOLLER) and respondent
(SAULONG) were both candidates for mayor of
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.
Municipal board of canvassers proclaimed
SOLLER duly elected mayor.
SAULONG filed two actions:
a. COMELEC: petition for annulment of
the proclamation/exclusion of election
return
b. RTC: election protest against SAULONG
SOLLER filed motion to dismiss
COMELEC granted, RTC denied The
denial by RTC of SOLLERs motion to
dismiss was questioned via petition for
certiorari with COMELEC. This certiorari
was dismissed by the COMELEC en banc.
HELD:
1. W/N COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not
ordering the dismissal of SAULONGs
election protest.
YES. The decision of the COMELEC en banc is
null and void. The authority to resolve petition for
certiorari involving incidental issues of election
protest falls within the division of the COMELEC
and not on the COMELEC en banc. The
COMELEC en banc does not have the requisite
authority to hear and decide election cases
including pre-proclamation controversies in the
first instance. Any decision by it in the first
instance is null and void. If the principal case,
once decided on the merits, is cognizable on
appeal by a division of the COMELEC, then, there
is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to
incidents of election protest should not be referred
first to a division of the COMELEC for resolution.
2. W/N RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in failing to dismiss respondents election
protest.
Yes. Close scrutiny of the receipts show that
respondent failed to pay the filing fee of P300.
Thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over respondents election protest. COMELEC
erred in not ordering the dismissal of respondents
protest case. Errors in the payment of filing fees in
election cases is no longer excusable.
The protest should have also been dismissed for
lack of proper verification (tantamount to filing an
unsigned pleading), and for failure to comply with
the required certification against forum shopping.
This requirement is mandatory, and cannot be
excused by the fact that a party has not actually
resorted to forum shopping. Good faith is not an
excuse.
Moreover, respondents petition was a pre-
proclamation case, which may no longer be
entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidates have been proclaimed. By resorting to
the wrong remedy, respondent may be claimed to
have abandoned the pre-proclamation case that he
filed.
PETITION GRANTED.
37 PAPANDAYAN, JR. V. COMELEC
381 SCRA 133
(BAUTISTA)
FACTS:
Petitioner Papandayan and respondent Balt
were contending candidates for mayor of
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur in the May 14,
2001 elections.
COMELEC 2nd Division issued a
resolution declaring petitioner to be
disqualified based on affidavits submitted
by respondent as evidence; ordered
petitioners name to be stricken off the list
of candidates and all votes cast in his favor
not to be counted but considered as stray
votes.
On election day, petitioner was
voted by the electorate as municipal mayor.
The following day, he received a telegram
from the COMELEC notifying him that the
COMELEC en banc denied his MR.
Petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC 1st Division seeking the
issuance of an order directing the Board of
Election Inspectors to count and tally the
ballots cast in his favor during the elections
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 4116.
Resolution provides that if the
disqualification case has not become final
and executory on the day of the election,
BEI shall tally and count the votes of the
candidate declared disqualified.
Respondent filed pre-proclamation case;
COMELEC issued an order suspending the
proclamation of petitioner but despite said
order, Municipal Board of Canvassers still
proclaimed petitioner as winner.
Upon motion of respondent, COMELEC
1st Division set aside petitioners
proclamation; COMELEC en banc
sustained annulment of proclamation of
petitioner
HELD:
Petitioner shouldn't be disqualified.
# At the time the elections were held in
May 14, 2001, the assailed resolution, had
not become final and executory. Hence, the
Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) was
duty bound to tally and count the votes cast
in favor of petitioner.
# COMELEC Resolution 4116 pertains to
the finality of decisions or resolutions of
the Commission en banc or division,
particularly on Special Actions
(Disqualification cases)
# Sec. 13, paragraphs (b) and (c) of said resolution
provide: (b) In Special Actions and Special cases,
a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five
(5) days from its promulgation unless restrained
by the Supreme Court. (c) Unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or
resolution of a Division shall become final and
executor after the lapse of five (5) days in Special
Actions and Special cases and after fifteen (15)
days in all other actions or proceedings, following
its promulgation.
COMELEC Resolution 4116 further
provides that: 3. where the ground for the
disqualification case is by reason of non-
residence, citizenship, violation of election
laws and other analogous cases and on the
day of the election the resolution has not
become final and executory, the BEI shall
tally and count the votes of such
disqualified candidate.
Respondent, therefore, is in error in
assuming that the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by this Court within five
(5) days after the date of the promulgation
of the assailed resolution is the operative
act that prevents it from attaining finality.
# With due regard for the expertise of the
COMELEC, we find the evidence to be
insufficient to sustain its resolution.
Petitioner has duly proven that, although
he was formerly a resident of the
Municipality of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal in the
Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his
actual and physical presence therein for 10
years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
# The principle of animus revertendi has
been used to determine whether a
candidate has an intention to return to
the place where he seeks to be elected.
Corollary to this is a determination
whether there has been an abandonment
of his former residence which signifies an
intention to depart therefrom.
# Caasi v. Court of Appeals: respondents
immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Being a green card holder was proof that
he was a permanent resident or immigrant
of the United States.
# Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives: this Court, citing Faypon
v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus
revertendi or intent to return, The fact
that respondent made periodical journeys
to his home province in Laoang revealed
that he always had animus revertendi.
# Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City:
The term residence, as used in the
election law, imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return.
# The Court explained that in order to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.
There must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose
to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.
# The record shows that when petitioner
and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got
married in 1990, they resided in Tangcal,
Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest
intention on the part of petitioner to reside
in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the
place of his conjugal abode with his wife.
The fact that he and his wife transferred
residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows
that petitioner was relinquishing his former
 place of residence in Bayang and that he
intended Tubaran to be his place of
domicile. Although petitioner worked as a
private secretary of the mayor of Bayang,
he went home to Tubaran everyday after
work. This is proof of animus manendi.
# It is the fact of residence that is the
decisive factor in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the
Constitutions residency qualification
requirement.
# When the evidence of the alleged lack of
residence qualification of a candidate for
an elective position is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears that the
purpose of the law would not be thwarted
by upholding the victors right to the
office, the will of the electorate should be
respected.
38 MAGNO V. COMELEC
390 SCRA 495
(GO)
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor Magno ran for MAYOR
of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in 2001.
Private Respondent filed a petition for
disqualification of Magno because he was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 4
counts of Direct Bribery and sentenced.
Magno applied for probation and was
discharged on March of 1998.
COMELEC disqualified petitioner based
on a provision of BP 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) disqualifying a candidate
convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude until after the lapse of 5 years
from the service of sentence.
Magno claims Sec 40 (a) RA7160 (Local
Government Code) should apply instead of
BP 881: A person convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude may run after the
lapse of 2 years after the service of
sentence.
Sonia Isidro was declared Mayor while the
case was pending.
HELD:
First, Direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines it as an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men or society
in general Direct bribery contemplates taking
advantage of his position and is a betrayal of the
trust reposed to him by the public.
Second, he is not qualified.
RA 7160 should apply. First, RA 7160 is the more
recent law. It impliedly repeals BP 881 should there
be any inconsistencies. Second, RA 7160 is a
special law applying specifically to local
government units. BP 881 applies for the election
of any public office. Special law prevails. Since he
was discharged on March 1998, Magnos
disqualification ceased on March 2000.
*Court declared that it could not rule on Magnos
prayer for his proclamation as winner of the
mayoralty race, it being outside its jurisdiction.
39 CODILLA, SR. V. DE VENECIA
393 SCRA 639
(AGUINALDO)
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates
for representative. A voter filed with the
COMELEC a petition to disqualify petitioner on
the ground that petitioner, who was then a mayor,
violated Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
by distributing gravel and sand to voters to induce
them to vote for him. The COMELEC delegated
the hearing to the Regional Director. On election
day, no hearing has been done yet. Petitioner won.
Respondent intervened in the disqualification case
and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation
of petitioner. Petitioner was not furnished a copy of
the motion. COMELEC suspended the
proclamation because of the seriousness of the
allegations against petitioner.
Petitioner has not been served any summons.
Petitioner filed his answer. He alleged that the
repair of the roads was undertaken without his
authority. After a hearing on the motion to suspend
the proclamation of petitioner, the COMELEC
issued a resolution disqualifying petitioner and
declaring the immediate proclamation of the
candidate who received the highest number of
votes. The votes of petitioner were declared stray.
Respondent was proclaimed elected and she
assumed office. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc nullified
the proclamation of respondent and ordered the
proclamation of petitioner. Respondent didnt
appeal from the decision. She argued that since
she assumed office, the COMELEC doesnt have
jurisdiction to annul her proclamation.
HELD:
Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his
disqualification through the service of summons
nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons
was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a
copy of the summons allegedly served on the
petitioner and its corresponding proof of service.
Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted
petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not
properly notified of the petition for his
disqualification because he never received
summons.71 Petitioner claims that prior to
receiving a telegraphed Order from the
COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001,
directing the District Board of Canvassers to
suspend his proclamation, he was never
summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for
his disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy
of the petition and the May 22 Order of the
COMELEC Second Division by personally going
to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23,
2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the
disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was
suspended in gross violation of section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and
priority.- The Commission and the courts shall
give priority to cases of disqualification by reason
of violation of this Act to the end that a final
decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, his
violation of the provisions of the preceding
sections shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption to office." (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been
disqualified by final judgment when the elections
were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional
Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the
petition for his disqualification. After the
elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide
margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however,
respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for
the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. The
Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the
effect that a copy was served to the petitioner
through registered mail. The records reveal that no
registry receipt was attached to prove such
service.72 This violates COMELEC Rules of
Procedure requiring notice and service of the
motion to all parties.
Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall
under the exceptions to notice and service of
motions. First, the suspension of proclamation of a
winning candidate is not a matter which the
COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu
proprio. Second, the right of an adverse party, in
this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected. Given
the lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to
the petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of
paper.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC
can suspend proclamation only when evidence of
the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case
at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not
make any specific finding that evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in
suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is
the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition
for disqualification. Absent any finding of
evidence that the guilt is strong, then clearly, there
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC.
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS; PRECINCTS
AND POLLING PLACES; BOARD OF
ELECTION INSPECTORS; WATCHERS;
OFFICIAL BALLOTS AND ELECTION
RETURNS; CASTING AND
COUNTING OF VOTES
40 BAUTISTA V. COMELEC
298 SCRA 480
(SINGSON)
FACTS:
Petitioner Cipriano Efren Bautista and
private respondent were duly registered
candidates for the position of Mayor of
Navotas in the 1998 Elections. Aside from
them, a certain Edwin Efren Bautista
(Edwin Bautista) also filed a certificate of
candidacy for the same position.
Petitioner filed a petition praying that
Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance
candidate.
COMELEC declared Edwin Bautista as
nuisance candidate and consequently
ordered the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Mayor.
MR was filed by Edwin Bautista;
subsequently denied.
Before final determination of Edwin
Bautistas MR, upon request of petitioners
counsel, the Regional Election Director of
NCR gave instructions to the BEI to tally
separately either in some portion of the
same election return not intended for votes
for mayoralty candidates or in a separate
paper the votes Efren Bautista, Efren,
E. Bautista and Bautista, considered as
stray votes.
When the canvass of the election returns
was commenced, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Navotas refused to canvass
as part of the valid votes of petitioner the
separate tallies of votes on which were
written Efren Bautista, Efren, E.
Bautista and Bautista.
Petitioner filed with COMELEC a Petition
to Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers; dismissed
for lack of merit.
HELD:
There was grave abuse of discretion in denying the
inclusion as part of petitioners valid votes the
Bautista stray votes that were separately tallied by
the BEI and Board of Canvassers.
# It must be emphasized that the case at bar
involves a ground for disqualification
which clearly affects the voters will and
causes confusion that frustrates the same.
# Election Laws give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus,
extreme caution should be observed before
any ballot is invalidated.
# In the appreciation of ballots, doubts are
resolved in favor of their validity.
# Matters tend to get complicated when
technical rules are strictly applied
technicalities should not be permitted to
defeat the intention of the voter, especially
so if that intention is discoverable from the
ballot itself, as in this case.
# Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
 a verified petition of an interested party,
refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy 1) if it is shown
that said certificate has been filed to put
the election process in mockery or
disrepute, 2) or to cause confusion among
voters by the similarity of the names of
registered candidates; 3) or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that a candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the
electorate.
# Fatual circumstances and logic dictate that the
Bautista and Efren votes which were
mistakenly deemed as stray votes refer only to one
candidate, herein petitioner. Such votes, which
represent the voice of approx. 21,000 electors
could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista,
allegedly known in Navotas as a tricycle driver
and worse a drug addict, not known as Efren as
stated in his certificate of candidacy, but Boboy
or Boboy Tarugo as his known appellation or
nickname, and satisfactorily and finally shown as
a candidate with no political line up, no personal
funds that could have supported his campaign, and
no accomplishments which may be noted band
considered by the public, as against a known
former public officer who had served the people of
Navotas as Brgy.
Official, councilor and vice mayor.
# To rule otherwise will definitely result in
the disenfranchisement of the will of the
electorate, which is, as we mentioned, the
situation that our election laws are enacted
to prevent.
41 PUNZALAN V. COMELEC
289 SCRA 702
(FERNANDEZ)
FACTS:
Manalastas, Meneses and Punzalan were
among of the 4 candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Mexico Pampanga
Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) proclaimed Meneses as the duly
elected mayor.
Manalastas and Punzalan separately siled
election protestschallenging the results of
the elections; Meneses filed his answer to
both with counter protests: ordered
consolidated and jointly tried by the court
Election contests sought the nullification of
the election of Meneses allegedly due to
massive fraud, irregularities and other
illegal electoral practices during the
registration and voting as well as during
the counting of votes
B
ecause of irregularities (massive fraud,
illegal electoral practices and serious
anomalies; ballots, election returns and
tally sheets disappeared under mysterious
circumstances and filled up ballots with
undetached lower stubs and groups of
ballot with stubs cut out with scissors were
found inside ballot boxes) found after
hearing the protests, the trial court was
constrained to examine the contested
ballots and the handwritings appearing
thereon and came up with the declaration
that Punzalan was the winner in the
elections
various notices of appeal, motions for
execution, petitions for certiorari,
prohibition with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction
 Comelec promulgated a resolution
affirming the proclamation of Meneses
HELD:
On the first issue
While RA 7166 (An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections
and For Electoral Reforms) requires the
BEI chairman to affix his signature at the
back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so
does not invalidate the same although it
may constitute an election offense
imputable to said BEI
Failure of the BEI chairman or any of the
members of the board to comply with their
mandated administrative responsibility
should not penalize the voter with
disenfranchisement
A ballot without BEI chairman's signature
at the back is valid and not spurious
For as long as the ballot bears any one of
the following authenticating marks, it is
considered valid:
The Comelec watermark
Signature or initials or thumbprint of the
Chairman of the BEI
Where the watermarks are blurred or not
readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red or blue fibers in the
ballots
Every ballot shall be presumed to be valid
unless there is a clear and good reason to
justify its rejection
On the second issue
The appreciation of the contested ballots
and election documents involves a question
of fact best left to the determination of the
Comelec
The Comelec need not conduct an
adversarial proceeding or a hearing to
determine the authenticity of ballots or the
handwriting found thereon; neither does it
need to solicit the help of the handwriting
experts in examining or comparing the
handwriting; even evidence aliunde is not
necessary to enable the Commission to
determine the authenticity of the ballots
and the genuineness of the handwriting on
the ballots as an examination of the ballots
themselves is already sufficient
Minor and insignificant variations in
handwriting must be perceived as indicia
of genuineness rather than of falcity
Carelessness, spontaneity, unpremeditation
and speed in signing are evidence of
genuineness
DOCTRINE:
the laws and statues governing election
contests especially appreciation of ballots
must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities
an election protests is imbued with public
interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice
of the people is imperative
ELECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND
EXPENDITURES
42 PILAR V. COMELEC
245 SCRA 759
(OBERIO)
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days
later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
COMELECimposed upon petitioner a fine of
P10,000 for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures. Petitioner filed
motion for reconsideration which was denied by
COMELEC. Petitioner went to COMELEC en
banc which denied the petition in its Resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD:
Petitioner should be held liable for failure to file
his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held
liable for failure to file a statement of
contribution and expenditures because he
was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn
his certificate of candidacy 3 days after its
filing. Petitioner posits that "it is xxx clear
from the law that the candidate must have
entered the political contest, and should
have either won or lost".
Petitoner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of RA No. 7166 states that
"every candidate" has the obligation to file
his statement of contributions and
expenditures. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
The term "every candidate" must be
deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, but also to one
who withdrew his candidacy.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 of the
COMELEC, in implementation of the
provisions of RA 7166, categorically refers
to "all candidates who filed their certificates
of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses
the word "shall". Such implies that the
statute is mandatory, particularly if public
interest is involvedstate has an interest
in seeing that the electoral process is clean
and expressive of the true will of the
electorate. One way to attain such
objective is to pass a legislation regulating
contributions and expenditures, and
compelling the publication of the same. It
is not improbable that a candidate who
withdrew his candidacy has accepted
contributions and incurred expenditures,
even in the short span of his campaign. The
evil sought to be prevented by the law is
not all too remote.
Resolution No. 2348 also contemplates the
situation where a candidate may not have received
any contribution or made any expenditure. Such
candidate is not excused from filing a statement.
BP Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code
provides that "the filing or withdrawal of
certificate of candidacy shall not affect
whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which a candidate may have
incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his
candidacy did not extinguish his liability
for the administrative fine.
ELECTION OFFENSES
43 LAUREL V. HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE
323 SCRA 779
(AQUINO, P.)
FACTS:
Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo sent a verified
letter-complaint to Jose P. Balbuena
charging Herman Tiu Laurel with
"Falsification of Public Documents" and
violation of [Section 74] of the Omnibus
Election Code.
It alleged that both his father and mother
were Chinese citizens but when petitioner
filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of Senator he stated that his a
natural-born Filipino citizen
An investigation was conducted by the
COMELEC Law Department and a Report
was made recommending the filing of
Information.
During en banc, COMELEC resolved to
file the necessary information against
 respondent and to file a criminal complaint
against respondent for falsification
Director Balbuena filed an information for
Violation of Section 74, in relation to
Section 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Inhibition,
seeking the inhibition of the entire
COMELEC because of its bias in
rendering a resolution.
Plaintiff filed on 07 May 1996 a Motion to
Quash alleging lack of jurisdiction and
lack of authority on the part of Director
Balbuena to file the information.
Court denied.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court
and ruled that the proper procedure was
followed by the COMELEC but directed
the trial court to remand the case to the
COMELEC for reception of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC resolution dated January 25,
1996, which approved the filing of a
criminal complaint against petitioner.
HELD:
1. It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold
there was no flaw in the procedure followed by the
COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation.
-No. There are two ways through which a
complaint for election offenses may be initiated. It
may be filed by the COMELEC motu proprio, or it
may be filed via written complaint by any citizen
of the Philippines, candidate, registered political
party, coalition of political parties or organizations
under the partylist system or any accredited
citizens arms of the Commission
- Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the
Chairman of the COMELEC and need not be
verified.
On the other hand, complaints filed by parties
other than the COMELEC must be verified and
supported by affidavits and other evidence.
- The complaint in question in this case is one filed
by Pardo in his personal capacity and not as
chairman of the COMELEC.
- There is nothing in the rules that require that only
the COMELEC en banc may refer a complaint to
the Law Department for investigation.
- There is no rule against the COMELEC chairman
directing the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, even if he himself were the
complainant in his private capacity.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that
petitioner's protestations on COMELEC's having
acted as complainant, investigator, prosecutor,
judge and executioner in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation ring hollow.
-No. the records show that there is basis to at least
find probable cause to indict the petitioner for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code and it
appears from the records that Chairman Pardo had
no other participation in the proceedings which led
to the filing of the Information.
-The entire COMELEC cannot possibly be
restrained from investigating the complaint filed
against petitioner, as the latter would like the
courts to do. The COMELEC is mandated by no
less than the Constitution to investigate and
prosecute, when necessary, violations of election
laws. This power is lodged exclusively with the
COMELEC. For the entire Commission to inhibit
itself from investigating the complaint against
petitioner would be nothing short of an
abandonment of its mandate under the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
44 FAELNAR V. PEOPLE
331 SCRA 429
(CRUZ)
FACTS:
Eugenio Faelnar filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of barangay chairman during the
1997 barangay elections in Cebu. One day after
filing such certificate (april 9), a basketball
tournament was held in the sports complex dubbed
as, 2nd Jing- Jing Faelnars Cup which lasted
until April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint
for electioneering against petitioner and Gillamac
filed by Antonio Luy. It was alleged that it was
actually a form of campaign done outside the
official campaign period which should start on
May 1, 1997. 1. that there was a streamer bearing
the name of petitioner placed at the faade of the
venue. 2. petitioners name was repeatedly
mentioned over the microphone. 3. it was widely
published in the local news paper. 4. a raffle
sponsored by Gillamac was held with home
appliances as prize. It constituted an election
offense. Initially, Comelec en banc in a Resolution
resolved to dismiss the filing of the case in the
RTC. Antonio Luy moved for reconsideration
prompting the Comelec to proceed with the filing
of the case against petitioner. Petitioner moved to
quash on the basis that the previous dismissal of
the Comelec en banc, was immediately final and
executory. And that Luys motion for
reconsideration was a prohibited pleading under
Commissions rules of procedure.
HELD:
A Motion for Reconsideration is allowed in
election offense cases.
Section 1, Rule 13 of Comelecs Rules of
Procedure states, the following pleadings are not
allowed, (d) motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases
It was also held that the Comelec en banc is the
one that determines the existence of probable
cause in an election offense. But it may also be
delegated to the State Prosecutor or to the
Provincial or City Fiscal but may still be reviewed
by the Comelec.
45 COMELEC V. TAGLE
397 SCRA 618
(LIM)
FACTS:
Florentino Bautista ran for the position of
Mayor in Kawit Cavite
He filed a complaint against the incumbent
Mayor Poblete and others supported by
affidavits of 44 witnesses attesting to vote-
buying activities.
The case was handled by a prosecutor of
the COMELECs law department.
A separate complaint was filed by Rodelas
and Macapagal with the provincial
prosecutor against the witnesses (vote-
selling)
COMELEC en banc declared the
resolution of the provincial prosecutor to
institute criminal actions against the
witnesses as null and void. COMELEC
cited RA 6646 otherwise known as The
Electoral Reforms law of 1987 which
grants immunity from criminal prosecution
persons who voluntarily give information
and willingly testify against those liable for
vote-buying or vote-selling.
Law department of COMELEC filed a
motion to dismiss the case against the
witnesses. This was denied by respondent
judge TAGLE.
According to Tagle, for the witnesses to be
exempt to should have committed the overt
act of divulging information regarding the
vote buying
HELD:
Witnesses are exempt from criminal prosecution.
A free, orderly, honest , peaceful, and
credible election is indispensable in a
democratic society, as without it
democracy would not flourish and would
be a sham.
One of the effective ways of preventing the
commission of vote-buying and of
prosecuting those committing it is the
grant of immunity from criminal liability
in favor of the party whose vote was
bought.
 The COMELEC has the exclusive power
to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the
election laws and to prosecute the same, as
may be otherwise provided by law
When the COMELEC nullifies a resolution
of the Provincial Prosecutor which is the
basis of the information for vote
selling, it in effect, withdraws the
deputation granted to the
prosecutor.
Where certain voters have already
executed sworn statements attesting to the
corrupt practice of vote-buying
in a pending case, it cannot be denied that
they had
already given information in the vote-
buying case.
FAILURE OF ELECTION
46 LOONG V. COMELEC
257 SCRA 1
(LAURENTE)
Under the present state of our election laws, the
COMELEC has been granted precisely the power
to annul elections. Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7166, otherwise known as, "The Synchronized
Elections Law of 1991," provides that the
COMELEC sitting En Banc by a majority vote of
its members may decide, among others, the
declaration of failure of election and the calling of
special elections as provided in Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC may
exercise such power motu proprio or upon a
verified petition. The hearing of the case shall be
summary in nature, and the COMELEC may
delegate to its lawyers the power to hear the case
and to receive evidence.
FACTS:
- This case stemmed from elections held in
Sulu where LOONG and private respondent Tan
ran for the position of Governor while pet.
Tulawie and p.r. Estino ran for Vice-Governor
* Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC)
recommended to the COMELEC a re-canvass of the
election returns of Parang and Talipao.
* COMELEC, accordingly, relieved all the
regular members of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) and ordered such recanvass by
senior lawyers from the COMELEC office in
Manila. During the re-canvass, private respondents
objected to the inclusion in the canvass of the
election returns of Parang.
* The reconstituted MBC, however, merely
noted said objections
and forwarded the same to respondent PBC for
resolution.
* PBC denied the objections of private
respondents and still included the election returns
of Parang municipality. The canvass of respondent
PBC showed petitioners to have overwhelmingly
won in the municipality of Parang.
- The private respondents filed petitions with
the COMELEC regarding the inclusion of the
questioned certificates of canvass and that there
was failure of election in said municipality due to
massive fraud Petitioners, likewise filed for failure
of elections in 5 other municipalities
COMELEC ruled annulling the results of the
elections in Parang as well as holding in abeyance
the proclamation of the winning candidates for
Governor and Vice-Governor until further orders
from the Commission but dismissed other
petitions for other municipalities where it was
alleged that there were also badges of fraud
HELD:
COMELEC was incorrect in annulling elections of
Parang, Sulu but not ordering for special elections
in the same municipality. It was also incorrect in
dismissing other petitions for failure of elections
in other municipalities where there were also
badges of fraud.
 We hold that, before the COMELEC can act
on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure
of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first,
no voting has taken place in the precincts
concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if
there were voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes
not cast would affect the result of the election. We
must add, however, that the cause of such failure
of election should have been any of the following:
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes. This is an important
consideration for, where the propriety of a pre-
proclamation controversy ends, there may begin
the realm of a special action for declaration of
failure of elections.
While the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-
proclamation cases, to an examination of the
election returns on their face and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC
is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in
actions for annulment of election results or for
declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus
Election Code denominates the same.
Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of actions for
annulment of election results or declaration of
failure of elections, may conduct technical
examination of election documents and compare
and analyze voters' signatures and fingerprints in
order to determine whether or not the elections
had indeed been free, honest and clean. Needless
to say, a pre-proclamation controversy is not the
same as an action for annulment of election results
or declaration of failure of elections
The COMELEC is HEREBY ORDERED
TO CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF PARANG, SULU, and is
DIRECTED TO SUPERVISE THE COUNTING
OF THE VOTES AND THE CANVASSING OF
THE RESULTS TO THE END THAT THE
WINNING CANDIDATES FOR GOVERNOR
AND VICE-GOVERNOR FOR THE PROVINCE
OF SULU BE PROCLAIMED AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.
The COMELEC is HEREBY ORDERED TO
REINSTATE SPA 95-289 AND TO CONDUCT
THE NECESSARY TECHNICAL
EXAMINATION, IF ANY, OF PERTINENT
ELECTION DOCUMENTS THEREIN AND TO
HOLD SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES DISPUTED IN SPA 95- 289
IN THE EVENT the COMELEC ANNULS THE
ELECTION RESULTS THEREIN OR
DECLARES THEREAT FAILURE OF
ELECTIONS.
47 HASSAN V. COMELEC
264 SCRA 125
(LABAGUIS POGI)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Hadji Nor Basher L. Hassan,
and Private Respondent, Mangondaya P.
Hassan Buatan, were candidates for Vice-
Mayor in Lanao del Sur
However, due to threats of violence and
terrorism in the area, there was a failure of
elections in six (6) out of twenty-four (24)
precincts. In one of the precincts, the ballot
boxes were burned, while in the other 5
precincts, the members of the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) failed to report
to their respective polling places
The COMELEC team, headed by
Garcillano, recommended the holding of
special elections in said precincts and
scheduled it
The members of the BEI again
failed to report
The COMELEC team rescheduled the
elections in Liangan Elementary School,
which was 15 kilometers away from the
designated polling places
The members of the BEI once more did not
report for duty. This constrained the
COMELEC team to appoint police/military
personnel to substitute for the BEI
The result of the special election was in
favor of the Private Respondent: Petitioner
= 879, Respondent = 1,098
Petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC assailing the validity of the re-
scheduled special election
 COMELEC en banc denied the petition for
a declaration of failure of the elections and
ordered the Board of Canvassers to
proclaim Private Respondent as the
winning vice-mayoralty candidate
Thus, the petition for certiorari
HELD:
There was failure of elections.
The concurrence of the following
preconditions is necessary for declaring a
failure of election: (1) that no voting has
been held in any precinct or precincts
because of force majeure, violence or
terrorism, and (2) that the votes not cast
therein suffice to affect the results of the
elections.
The COMELEC can not turn a blind eye to
the fact that terrorism was so prevalent in
the area.
Elections had to be set for the third time
because no members of the BEI reported
for duty due to impending threats of
violence in the area. This in fact prompted
COMELEC to deploy military men to act
as substitute members just so elections
could be held; and to thwart these threats
of violence, the COMELEC team,
moreover, decided to transfer the polling
places to Liangan Elementary School
which was 15 kilometers away from the
polling place.
The peculiar situation of this case
cannot be overstated.
The notice given on the afternoon of the day
before the scheduled special elections and
transferring the venue of the elections 15
kilometers away from the farthest barangay/school
was too short resulting to the disenfranchisement
of voters. Out of the 1,546 registered voters in the
five (5) precincts, only 328 actually voted.
It was quite sweeping and illogical for the
COMELEC to state that the votes uncast
would not have in any way affected the
results of the elections. While the
difference between the two candidates is
only 219 out of the votes actually cast, the
COMELEC totally ignored the fact that
there were more than a thousand registered
voters who failed to vote.
48 PASANDALAN V. COMELEC
384 SCRA 695
(MACASAET)
FACTS:
W Petitioner Pasandalan and respondent Bai
salamona L.
Asum were candidates for mayor in the
municipality of
Lumbayanague, Lanao del sur- May 14, 2001
elections
W On May 23, Pasandalan filed for
nullification of election
results in certain barangays (Deromoyod, Lagin,
Bualan etc) on the ground that, (1) while the
election was ongoing, some Cafgus stationed near
the schools indiscriminately fired their firearms
causing the voters to panic and leave the voting
centers without casting their votes, (2) failure to
sign of BEIs to sign their initials on certain ballots
and (3) taking advantage of the fist fights, the
supporters of Asum took the ballots and filled
them up with the name of Asum.
W Comelecs ruling: No credence given to the
allegations of
Pasandalan. The 3 instances wherein a failure of
election could be declared is not present (1) The
election is not held (election was still held), (2)
the election is suspended- (it was not), and (3) the
election results in the failure to elect (Asum was
elected through the plurality of votes). The
evidence presented by Pasandalan were only
affidavits made by his own pollwatchers- thus
considered as self serving and insufficient to annul
the results.
W Hence the petition in this court
HELD:
COMELEC didn't commit grave abuse of
discretion in annulling
electionm.
W The irregularities alleged should have been
raised as an
election protest and not in a petition to declare the
nullity
of an election.
W Instances to declare a failure of election does
not exist (1)
the election in a polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure,
terrorism, violence or fraud, (2) the election was
suspended on the same grounds in the 1st and (3)
there was failure to elect still on the same grounds.
W The election was held in the precincts
protested as
scheduled, neither was it suspended (as proved by
the testimony of one of the election officers) nor
was there failure to elect. The alleged terrorism
was not of that scale to justify declaration of
failure of elections.
W Credibility of the affidavits questioned: (1)
it was pre-typed,
all that the poll watchers have to do is to fill it up
and sign it. (2) identical statements- human
perception is different for each. Persons when
asked about a same incident, although present in
the incident, mat have different observations.
49
AMPATUAN V. COMELEC
375 SCRA 503
(MARTINEZ)
FACTS:
W Petitioner Ampatuan and Respondent
Candao were
candidates for the position of Governor of
Maguindanao
during the 2001 elections
W May 2001: respondents filed a petition with
the comelec for
the annulment of election results and/or
declaration of
failure of elections in several municipalities. They
claimed
that the elections were completely sham and
farcical.
The ballots were filled-up en masse by a few
persons the
night before the election day, and in some
precincts, the
ballot boxes, official ballots and other election
paraphernalia were not delivered at all.
W Comelec suspended proclamation of
winning candidates
W Petitioners filed a motion to lift suspension
of proclamation.
Comelec granted and proclaimed the petitioners s
winners.
W June 2001: Respondents filed with SC a
petition to set aside
Comelec order and prelim injunction to suspend
effects of
the proclamation of petitioners.
W July 2001: Comelec ordered the
consolidation of the
respondents petition for declaration of failure of
elections.
W Sept 2001: Petitioners filed the present
petition and
claimed that by virtue of the proclamation, the
proper
remedy available to the respondents was not
petition for
declaration of failure of elections but an election
protest.
The former is heard summarily while the latter
involves a
full-blown trial.
W Oct 2001: Comelec ordered the suspension
of the 2
assailed orders (with regard to respondents
petition fro
failure of elections and directing the continuation
of
hearing and disposition of the consolidated SPAs
on the
failure of elections and other incidents related
thereto)
W Nov 2001: Comelec lifts the suspension
order
W SC issues TRO enjoining Comelec from
lifting suspension
ISSUE:
W/N The Comelec was divested of its jurisdiction
to hear and decide respondents petition for
declaration for failure of elections after petitioners
had been proclaimed
HELD: No. Petition dismissed
W The fact that a candidate proclaimed has
assumed office
does not deprive comelec of its authority to annul
any
Through the joint efforts of the students of Ateneo
Law 2D AY07-08
27
canvas and illegal proclamation.
W Validity of the proclamation may be
challenged even after
the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed
office.
W In the case at bar, the Comelec is duty-
bound to conduct
an investigation as to the veracity of respondents
allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that
attended the conduct of the May 2001 election.
W It is well to stress that the Comelec has
started conducting
the technical examination on Nov 2001. However,
by an urgent motion for a TRO filed by the
petitioners, in virtue of which we issued a TRO,
the technical examination was held in abeyance
until the present.
W In order not to frustrate the ends of justice,
we lift the TRO
and allow technical examination to proceed with
deliberate
dispatch.
Dissent: Justice Melo
W Issue: is the declaration of failure of
elections by the
Comelec an executive-administrative function or a
judicial
function?
W Held The authority given to Comelec to
declare a failure of
elections and to call for the holding and
continuation of
the failed election falls under its admin fxn.
W There are only 3 instances where a failure
of elections may
be declared: 1) the election in any polling place
has not been declared 2) election in any polling
place had not been suspended 3) after voting and
during transmission of ER, such election results in
a failure to elect on the ground of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cause
W Under the circumstances of the present case
and based on
applicable law, an election protest is the
appropriate remedy. Complex matters which
necessarily entail the presentation of conflicting
testimony should not be resolved in random,
technical and summary proceedings
50 BASHER V. COMELEC
330 SCRA 736
(GONZALES)
FACTS:
Failure of elections in Barangay Maidan, Lanao
del Sur was held twice (May and June 1997), and
a special elections was scheduled for August 30.
During the said election, voting started only
around 9:00 pm because of the prevailing tension
in the said locality. Election Officer Diana Datu-
Imam claimed that the town mayor was too
hysterical, yelled and threatened her to declare
failure of election in Maidan as the armed
followers pointed their guns at her and her military
escorts responded in the same manner. With the
arrival of additional troops, the election officer
proceeded to Maidan to conduct the election
starting at 9:00 pm until the early morning of the
following day at the residence of the former
mayor.
The tally sheet showed that respondent Ampatua
got 250 votes; petitioner Basher got 15 votes and
Razul got 10 votes. Respondent was proclaimed
winner. Petitioner now assails the validity of the
COMELEC Resolution dismissing the Petition to
Declare Failure o Election and to Call Special
Election in Precinct No. 12 Baranggay Maidan.
HELD:
There was a failure of election. This
notwithstanding, there was an
invalid postponement of election.
First, the place where the voting was conducted
was illegal. Omnibus Election Code provides that
election tellers shall designate the public school or
ay public building within the Barangay to be used
as polling place, election was held in the residence
of the former mayor which is located in Barangay
Pandarianao.
Second, the law provides that the casting of votes
start at 7 am and end at 3 pm except when there
are voters present within 30 meters in front of the
polling place who have nor yet cast their votes.
Election was held after 9:00 pm until the wee
hours the following day, certainly such was not in
accordance with the law.
Third, Election Day was invalid because
suspension of postponement of election is
governed by law and it provides that when for any
serious cause such as rebellion, insurrection,
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia and any analogous causes such
nature that the free, orderly andhonest election
should become impossible the COMELEC moto
proprio or upon written petition by 10 registered
voter after summary proceedings shall suspend or
postpone the proceedings. The election officer is
without authority to declare a failure of election
for it is only the COMELEC itself has legal
authority to exercise such awesome power.
Election Officer did not follow the procedure for
he postponement or suspension or declaration of
failure of election. She did not conduct any
proceeding summary or otherwise to find out any
legal grounds for the suspension or postponement
or declaration of failure of election.
Finally, the electorate was not given ample notice
of the exact schedule and venue of the election,
mere announcement over the mosque is
insufficient.