1AC

Plan Text
The United States federal government should substantially
increase its space cooperation with the Peoples Republic of
China, including repealing the Wolf Amendment
 Advantage 1: Space Wars
Current US space policy regarding China has incited a
widespread pandemic of China-phobia. Political officials utilize
fear mongering to depict China as an enemy state from
stealing technology to militarizing space.
Costa 2/8/16 [Rebecca D. Costa, Sociobiologist, 2/8/16, The Price of China
Phobia May Be Americas Leadership in Space,
http://www.rebeccacosta.com/blog/the-price-of-china-phobia-may-be-americas-
leadership-in-space-298.htm]
Space is a great stage for diplomacy. Yet, when it comes to cooperating with China's
space program, the United States may have forgotten that lesson. This week,
former NASA Commander of the International Space Station, Leroy Chiao, urged
leaders in Washington DC to strongly consider the consequences of rebuking
China's offer to collaborate in space. "We Americans have taken for granted that
we've been the leader in human space flight. But it's been almost five years since
we gave up the ability to launch astronauts into space ... It's much more
constructive to engage (with China) than to isolate. If we don't we risk being left
behind." Chiao makes a sobering point. While NASA grapples with changing
administrations in Congress and the White House, off-hand budget cuts and shifting
priorities, China has been gaining ground . In 2003, the Chinese launched their first
citizen into space. In 2008, the country conducted their first space walk. By 2013,
they celebrated their longest space mission. And recently, China announced that
within two years they will begin building their own space station - a station
scheduled to be fully operational by 2022. Which, incidentally, is about the time the
current International Space Station will reach the end of its life, potentially setting
China up to have the only permanent presence in space. All of which begs the
question: if the U. S. is in danger of losing its leadership in space, why not
collaborate? It worked before ... In 1957, when Cold War tensions were escalating
between the U.S. and Soviet Union , President Eisenhower faced a similar dilemma.
News that the Soviets launched Sputnik sent shockwaves of paranoia throughout
America. The same rocket technology that catapulted Sputnik far above the Earth's
atmosphere was also capable of launching a nuclear warhead at the U.S. within
minutes. Thankfully, Eisenhower didn't recoil from the Soviet show of power.
Instead, Eisenhower began sending letters to then Prime Minister Khrushchev,
suggesting the two countries "work together to secure outer space for peaceful
purposes." But Khrushchev fired back, demanding the U.S remove nuclear weapons
from Turkey as a precondition for cooperation. And this marked the beginning of
connecting diplomacy on Earth to space collaboration. Sensing space exploration
would play a vital role in preserving future peace; the U.N. convened the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - which both the U.S. and
the Soviet Union quickly joined. The 1958 Space Act, permitting U.S. scientists to
collaborate and share information with Soviet scientists without fear of laws
governing espionage and treason, also facilitated open dialogue between experts. In
truth, Soviet and U.S. scientists have maintained back-channel communications for
over fifty years regardless of political tensions from the U-2 incident, Cuban Missile
Crisis and Vietnam War, to President Reagan's characterization of the Soviet Union
as the "Evil Empire" and more recently conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine
scientists have proven they can and do remain agnostic. Though political tensions
with China come nowhere close to those during the Cold War era, leaders heedlessly
dismiss the opportunity to work together . In 2011, Republican Frank Wolf (R-VA)
chair of the House spending committee which oversees NASA inserted a clause
into the federal spending bill prohibiting develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, funds from
being used "to order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or
coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned
company." The bill was so anti-Chinese it went so far as to bar Chinese journalists
from attending the launch of Endeavor's final mission. "We don't want to give them
the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain
from dealing with them," Wolf told Science Magazine. "And frankly, it boils down to
a moral issue... Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?" Wolf's paranoia
continued, "China is spying against us.... They are stealing technology from every
major U.S. company. They have taken technology from NASA, and they have hit the
NSF computers. ... You name the company, and the Chinese are trying to get its
secrets." Regrettably, the Congressman's sentiment and 2011 bill had an anti-
Chinese ripple effect. In 2012, The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission prepared an extensive report warning against China's view of
international space travel. And in 2015, a report by UCSD's Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, argued that "China's efforts to use its space program to
transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may come at the
expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for U.S. interests." Sounds
eerily similar to opponents who vigorously fought Eisenhower's efforts to partner
with the Soviet Union. And what do the Chinese think of the U.S reaction?
According to Wang Jin, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense there is no rational
reason for fear, "The Chinese government has always advocated the peaceful use of
outer space - it opposes space weaponization and an arms race in outer space ." To
prove their intentions, the Chinese government invited former International Space
Station Commander, Chiao, to visit their Astronaut Center and speak openly with
Chinese astronauts who according to Chiao were conducting scientific work
very similar to astronauts in the U.S. He saw no evidence to support Wolf and other
leader's accusations. If there's no real evidence that working with China
would be any less advantageous than collaborating with the Soviet Union,
then we are left with only one possibility: irrational fear. China-phobia . And
the regrettable possibility that China-phobia may continue to drive public policy,
costing America their leadership in space. So what it would take for
diplomacy to surmount fear? For cooperation to supplant competition? John
Logsdon, of the Space Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. says that like other
policies based on irrational fear, it all starts at the top, " The first step is the
White House working with congressional leadership to get current, unwise
restrictions on such cooperation revoked." Commander Chiao couldn't agree
more. According to Chiao, it's not too late to draw upon the hard-learned lessons of
the Cold War. "It makes all the sense in the world for the United States to lead an
international effort... if we can bring in all the international partners we currently
have, plus newcomers like China, then we would retain our leadership position."

This mentality creates a security dilemma in the form of

aggressive space programs. As the US ramps up defense
capabilities in space, China is compelled to do the same in
order to maintain their place in the international arena
-sending the two nations spiraling into a dangerous cycle of
action and reaction.
Zhang 11 (Baohui, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the
Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, JSTOR, The Security Dilemma
in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March/April 2011) (pp.
311-332), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311)
Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks absolute security in
In both cases,
order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9
This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S.
quest for space dominance and missile defense . However, with the chaotic nature of
international relations, one countrys efforts to maximize its security could degrade
the security of others by changing the balance of power . Inevitably, the U.S. quest for
absolute security evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz
observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since maintaining status quo is the
minimum goal of any great power.10 According to Robert Jervis, The heart of the security dilemma argument is
that an increase in one states security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined
hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations. In this context, Even if they can be certain
that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will
become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.11 Inevitably,
when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar
measures. The first factor that caused the security dilemma in the Sino-U.S. military
space relationship is the professed American quest for space dominance. This
quest is a reflection of the U.S. obsession with primacy that predates the Obama
administration. The primacy strategy demands undisputed military dominance in different areas, including
space, to ensure the best possible protection of U.S. national security. The U.S. is
the only country in the world that has articulated a coherent national strategy for
space dominance. As emphasized by Michael W. Wynne, former Air Force secretary, Americas domination of
the space domain provides an unrivaled advantage for our nation and remains critical to creating the strategic and
tactical conditions for victory.12 The U.S. is the leader in the militarization of space. It was the first country that
established a dedicated command, the U.S. Space Command, to unify military operations in space. In fact, as its
Vision for 2020 proclaims, the Space Command seeks to achieve full spectrum dominance in space.13
Furthermore, it envisions permanent dominance in the military dimension of space operations: Today, the U.S. is
the preeminent military space power. Our vision is one of maintaining that preeminenceproviding a solid
foundation for our national security.14 General Lance W. Lord, former commander, Air Force Space Command,
points out the importance of space dominance: Space superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win a war
without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space.15 In December 2007, the U.S. Air Force released
a White Paper called The Nations Guardians: Americas 21st Century Air Force, in which General T. Michael Moseley
made a similar statement: No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority; thus, the Air
Force must attain cross-domain dominance. Cross-domain dominance is the freedom to attack and the freedom
from attack in and through the atmosphere, space and electromagnetic spectrum.16 This strategy of space
dominance, however, generates the classic security dilemma between the U.S. and other countries. Although
the U.S. may be motivated by defensive purposes, such as shielding the
American population from nuclear weapons and other threat s, other countries
have to assume the worst in an anarchic world. As observed by Joan Johnson-Freese, I
would argue that the rest of the world accepts U.S. space supremac y. What the Bush
Administration claims is space dominance, and thats what the rest of the world wont accept.17 Chinese
strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for space dominance as damaging to
Chinas national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning the
next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search
for absolute security jeopardizes other countries security. It is widely reported in
Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in fact implementing a master plan for military
The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too far
dominance in space.
ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, In
recent decades the U.S. has been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order
to become its overlord.18 The study also points out that the U.S. is the first country to develop a full set
of doctrines for space militarization and dominance: In April 1998, the U.S. Space Command published its long-term
strategic development plan, Vision for 2020, which specifically proposed the concept of space dominance and
revealed the goals of allowing the American military to use space weapons to attack the enemys land, sea, air, and
World opinion believes this represented the formal debut of U.S. space
space targets.
war theory and indicated an important first step by the U.S. military toward space
war.19 Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges
that the U.S. has initiated a new space war to maintain its status as the overlord
of space . He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to build a
powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between
earth and moon under American jurisdiction. Under this empire, without U.S. permission, any
country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.20

Space destabilization risks miscalculation electronic

jamming, nuclear control, and ambiguity all make space the
most probable scenario for conflict
Finch, DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction principal director,
2015
(James, Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth, , JFQ 76, 1st Quarter,
proquest)
As potentially dangerous asthe overlapping ADIZs are, they are far less destabilizing than actions
in space could be during a crisis. All contestants in the great game unfolding in
Asia have fairly similar appreciations of the implications that would follow engaging
military or, worse, civilian aircraft transiting their ADIZ. These understandings have been built over 100 years of
air travel and were underscored dramatically in the miscalculation associated with the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007
Such shared understandings are largely nonexistent in space . Not only do nations have
in 1983.
the criticality of space systems to broader operational
less experience operating in the domain, but
objectives also may create a tempting target early in a crisis. Combined with the
lack of potential human casualties from engagements in space, this lack of common
understanding may create a growing risk of miscalculation in a terrestrial
political crisis. If not explicitly addressed, this instability in space could even create a chasm
that undermines the otherwise well-crafted tenets of strategic or nuclear stability. While
much has been written about how nuclear weapons contribute to, or detract from, crisis stability, space, in some ways, is
more complex than nuclear stability. First, today a clear taboo exists against the use of nuclear weapons.
Crossing that firebreak at any level has immediately recognizable and significant implications. Second, in the context of nuclear
weapons, theorists can (at least arguably) discriminate among escalatory motives based on the type of weapon strategic or
tacticaland based on the type of targetcounterforce or countervalue targeting. This was most famously sketched out in the form
of an escalation ladder in Herman Kahns 1965 book, On Escalation. This convenient heuristic method for understanding escalation
based on the target and the weapon type is arguably more complex for space. This is a byproduct of the lack of mutual
understanding on the implications of the weapon and the value of the target. These factors deserve detailed consideration because
they describe the playing field on which a terrestrial crisis could spiral into space conflict. Efforts to manage crises, therefore, must
there is no taboo against many types of counterspace
account for these complexities. To begin,
systems. Starting a framework with weapon type, the threshold for use of temporary and
reversible counterspace weapons appears much lower. There are documented
instances of electronic jamming happening all over the world today, and the number of actors
who possess counterspace weapons such as communications jammers is much higher. Given the low cost and relative simplicity of
some counterspace weapons, even nonstate actors have found utility in employing them. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Lynn noted, Irregular warfare has come to space.8 Consequently, this type of
weapontemporary and reversiblemay appear at first glance to be less escalatory and less prone
to miscalculation than kinetic weapons. At the other end of the weapons spectrum are weapons that have permanent and
irreversible effects. The extreme version of such a weapon would be a debris-generating kinetic kill device such
as the kind that was tested by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War and by China in 2007. These weapons are
generate large amounts of debris that indiscriminately
particularly insidious because they
threatens satellites and other space systems for decades into the future. One additional
dimension to the weapons spectrum that merits consideration in the context of crisis stability relates to the survivability of a
weapon. It is commonly accepted that space is an offense-dominant domain, which is to say that
holding space targets at risk is far easier and cheaper than defending them . This
could lead to first-strike instability by creating pressure for early action at the
conventional level here on Earth before counterspace attacks could undermine the
capability for power projection. But the offense-dominant nature of the domain has implications for both peaceful
satellites as well as space-based weapons. This could also create first-strike instability regarding
space-based weapons since the advantage would go to the belligerents who use
their space weapon first. In this way, space-based weapons may be uniquely destabilizing in ways that their more
survivable, ground-based relatives are not. Adding complexity to Kahns heuristic, however, is the situational context surrounding
the employment of counterspace systems. In the space context, strategists will have to consider weapon type, the nature of the
target, and also the terrestrial context. Todays electronic jamming has primarily been witnessed in the Middle East, where regimes
have sought to deny freedom of information to their populations by jamming commercial communications satellites. The same
weapon typea
satellite communications jammerapplied against a satellite carrying
strategic nuclear command and control communications during a crisis could be
perceived much differently. In such an instance, decisionmakers might conclude that
the other side is attempting to deprive them of nuclear command and
control as a prelude to escalation. Similarly, the application of permanent, irreversible force against a
commercial or third party satellite would have a much different effect on crisis dynamics than mere jamming. Physically destroying
or otherwise rendering inoperable such assets could raise a partys stake in the conflict, by threatening either its power projection
Many militaries use commercial
capabilities globally or its assured ability to retaliate against a nuclear strike.
assets to communicate with deployed forces, and a show of force strike against a
commercial satellite could inadvertently engage an adversarys vital interests. Simply
put, the weapon, target, and context all contribute to the perceived intent and effects
of a counterspace attack. Unlike in other domains, tremendous ambiguity exists
regarding the use of counterspace weapons. This means that all of these variables
would be open to interpretation in crises, and it should be remembered that an
inherent characteristic of crises is a short timeframe for decisionmaking. When time
is short and the potential cost of inaction is significant, or even catastrophic,
decisionmakers tend to lean toward worst-case interpretations of an adversarys
actions. This is a clear recipe for inadvertent miscalculation .
Space conflict goes nuclear flashpoints with China are
inevitable outweighs probability of ground-based conflicts
Billings, Scientific American editor, 2015
(Lee, War in Space May Be Closer than Ever, 8-10,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever)

The worlds most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the
Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to
find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-mans-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is
unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place youd
expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isnt so empty anymore. About 1,300
active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide
communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance.
For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has
become the ultimate high ground , with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and
Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military
space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that
could cripple [destroy] the entire planets space-based infrastructure. And though
it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth . The long-
simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events,
including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well
as last months failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations. Testifying before Congress
earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials
China and Russia are both developing
about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that
capabilities to deny access in a conflict, such as those that might erupt over
Chinas military activities in the South China Sea or Russias in Ukraine. China in
particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated the need to interfere with, damage
and destroy U.S. satellites, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007.
There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply
approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers
can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellites components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or
microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers.In response to these possible threats, the
Obama administration has budgeted at least 5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the
defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also
attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal
success; in late July at the United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European
Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia,
China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed
diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo , likely leading to years of further debate
within the UNs General Assembly. The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space, says Frank Rose,
assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a
space arms race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. But let me make it very clear: we
will defend our space assets if attacked. Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet
nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs
in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the
ban, space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-
warning systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the
U.S.S.R. developed and tested space mines, self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by
peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administrations multibillion-dollar
Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles.
And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a
missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted.
According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was
because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites wereparticularly the ones in geosynchronous
satellites effectively hover over one spot on the
orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such
planet, making them sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those
satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth , both
superpowers backed down. Neither one of us signed a treaty about this, Krepon says. We just independently came to the
conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the other guy
Today, the situation is much more complicated. Low- and high-Earth orbits
would, too.
have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity, filled with hundreds
upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and
every satellite is at risk, in part because not all members of the growing club of
military space powers are willing to play by the same rules and they dont have to,
because the rules remain as yet unwritten. Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through
space at very high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even
the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation
uses such a kinetic method to destroy an adversarys satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris, potentially
cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when
China launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-
lived shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008,
repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into
the atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was
More recently, China has launched what many experts say are
generated at a much lower altitude.
additional tests of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent
launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss,
rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of last year. Chinese officials
one test in May 2013
insist the tests only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific experimentation. But
sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe
haven of strategic geosynchronous satellites.

Causes nuclear war, collapses all vital systems crucial to

human civilization
Lamrani, Stratfor security analyst, 2016
(Omar, What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War, 5-18,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-
space-war-16248)

The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends

future
on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover,

breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements,

nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would
disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital
regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In
severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of

nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings
could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a
wider conflagration. The small satellite revolution promises the speedy replacement of disabled satellites in the event of attack
theoretically securing the U.S. military's use of space constellations in support of operations during a conflict. Small satellites are not a magic bullet,

key satellite functions will still depend on bulkier and more complex systems,
however;

such as the large but critically important nuclear-hardened command-and-control

mission satellites. Many of these systems involve hefty antennas and considerable
power sources. Given that access to orbit may not be guaranteed during a war in space, the United States has also been exploring alternative
ways to perform some of the core functions that satellites now provide. At this stage, high-flying unmanned aerial vehicles with satellite-like payloads offer
the most advanced alternative. But considering the vehicles' vulnerability to sophisticated air defenses, their lower altitude and endurance relative to
orbital satellites, and their limited global reach, this remains a tentative solution at best. Overall, the United States is getting far more serious about the
threat of space warfare. Investment in new technologies is increasing, and the organizational architecture to deal with such a contingency is being put in

In the race between shield and sword , however, there is no guarantee that offensive
place.

ASAT capabilities will not have the advantage, potentially denying critical access to
space during a catastrophic celestial war. The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition
in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences.
Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation
and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may
await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and
extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and
the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the
world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space
warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling key
constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the
opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider
conflagration.
 Advantage 2: Space Leadership
The refusal to cooperate with China over civil space destroys
United States space leadership internationally.
Johnson-Freese, US Naval War College national security affairs professor,
2015
(Joan, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission
Chinas Space & Counterspace Programs, 2/18,
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf)

The question of whether China is challenging U.S. leadership in space has received considerable media attention in the form of a
U.S. China space race, prompted largely by perceptions of declining U.S. space leadership. The U.S. civil space program is not
dying, military space activities continue to expand, and no country is doing anything in space that has not already been done by the
has been difficult to
United States. But having started with such a spectacular accomplishment as the Apollo Program, it
maintain the public enthusiasm required to fund further space spectaculars, such as
a human spaceflight mission to Mars. Although not completely unsupportive, the U.S. public treats the space
program as expendable to other government programs. The reality is that space, as with other areas of international relations,
will likely be a multipolar environment in the future.42 Americas unipolar moment is
over, and as long as it is reluctant to work with rising partners such as China, the
perception of its space leadership will continue to decline as well. That is not to
say that the United States will not continue to lead in some areas of space activity. If only by virtue of a heftier budget, the United
States will be able to lead in select areas. But the days of total leadership are over. It will be a tough pill to swallow for those who
China has
crave exceptionalism but if we are unwilling to pay the price tag, then swallow it, we must.43 In that respect,
not usurped the perception of U.S. space leadership, it is being ceded to them.
This rebuttal to Congressman Wolfs views assumes that the United States has a choice regarding whether or not to work with China.
If, however, sustainability of the space environment upon which the U.S. generally and the U.S. military specifically relies upon for
advantages is to be maintained, the space debris issue alone requires that the U.S. not exclude diplomacy as a policy option. While
missile defense/ASAT testing has been conducted in ways to minimize debris issues since 2007, the potential threat to the space
environment in non-test circumstances has become clear. If there was any upside to the 2007 Chinese test, it was the frightening
realization by all countries of the fragility of the space environment. With regard to China specifically, since this 2007 test China has
done nothing further in space that can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set by the United States. Mankinds
dependence on space assets thereby makes it in the best interests of all spacefaring nations to cooperate to maintain that
environment. China was scheduled to host an international meeting of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee
(IADC) only days after its 2007 ASAT test that significantly worsened space debris, resulting in China cancelling the meeting out of
embarrassment. There is a certain (understandable) glee in the U.S. military, which has the most sophisticated government space
More
tracking abilities, at being able to warn China of potential collisions between its own space junk and its own satellites.44
recent constructive Chinese involvement with the IADC indicates recognition of
need to sustain the space environment and cooperated on relevant issues,
particularly the space debris issue.45 These are the type of common ground issues that provide opportunities
to work with all spacefaring nations to protect the congested, contested and competitive space environment. U .S.
emphasis on counterspace is often presented as in response to actions and
intentions of other countries, specifically China, presumably recent. Increasingly, however, it seems
speculation about Chinese intentions is based on material not publically shared,
making the feasibility of both the speculation and appropriate U.S. responses
difficult to assess. For example, to my knowledge China has done nothing since its admittedly irresponsible 2007 ASAT test
that goes beyond what the U.S. considers international norms of responsible behavior. Pursuing efforts to enhance transparency,
confidence-building measures, toward identifying common ground among all space-faring nations, and resiliency for military
just as
systems (NSSS, p.8) all must be pursued with the same energy and commitment as counterspace operations. Otherwise,
efforts to isolate Chinese space activities have backfired on the U.S. in areas such
as export control, the unintended consequences of a principally deter, defend,
defeat strategy could trigger an arms race that puts the sustainability of the space
environment at significant risk, to the detriment of U.S. national security . With regard to
the resilience, specifically the purview of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
resilience has faced resistance from elements within as being too expensive or, as with space arms control, just too difficult.46 The
Air Force appears to be taking the time honored approach of studying the problem rather than acting on it. Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments analyst Todd Harrison characterized part of the problem as a lack of interest on the part of Pentagon
leaders. He stated, While everyone recognizes space as a critical enabler for the war fighter at all levels of conflict, from low to high
end, it is not the sexy weapon system that puts hot metal on a target. So it doesnt attract much interest from senior leaders.47
Counterspace, however, offers that sexy option. Regarding transparency, the need to share information about satellite locations was
recognized by the private satellite owners and operators, promoting the formation of the Space Data Association. At the government
level, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) efforts have largely been to formalize the existing model of one-way data flow from the
American military to other countries and satellite operators48 and the U.S. signing bi-lateral agreements with France49 and Japan,
and the U.S., United Kingdom (U.K.), Canada and Australia signing a limited agreement in 2014.50 While U.S. efforts to provide
collision-avoidance information to other countries including China are admirable, as an increasing number of countries place an
increasing number of satellites in orbit, improving current techniques and increasing collaboration and cooperation on exchanges of
while the U.S. has rhetorically supported the
information must be aggressively pursued. And
European led efforts toward an International Code of Conduct, continued
Congressional restrictions regarding bilateral U.S.-China space cooperation
sends a powerful signal regarding U.S. seriousness regarding its intent to
work with all space faring nations for the good of the space environment . Anything less
than a comprehensive effort to constructively deal with issues related to the space commons can yield limited success at best.
Regardless of various interpretations of Chinese intent, the United States must pursue all policy goals of the NSS, NSP and NSSS.
That will inherently involve working with China in some areas, and pursuing a full range of approaches to policy goals. The
sustainability of the space environment is as key to protecting assets as is protecting assets from hostile actions. They are
inherently intertwined. Policies attempting to constrain, contain and control Chinese space activities have been repeatedly
demonstrated of limited value. The most viable way for the U.S. to stay ahead of China in space capabilities is to focus on what it
does have control over; its own programs. Funding, acquisition processes, strengthening the industrial base, cultivating and
supporting science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) education programs and opportunities, resilience and broad based
research and development will yield as much or more gain toward achieving U.S. space policy goals are key in the regard. To
summarize, the U.S. cannot control Chinese space ambitions; even influence is limited. Nor can the U.S. control space in the
same way that it can control airspace. Yet space is a global commons the sustainability of which is critical to U.S. national security.
cooperation with China in areas of shared interests is in the best interests
Consequently,
of U.S. national security. In order to protect U.S. assets and achieve stated U.S. goals, all approaches stated in the
nested U.S. space strategies must be pursued with equal attention. Full implementation of U.S. space strategies is the prudent way
forward.

As China has rised in space the US has reactively risen in soft

and hard power compromising its security interests
Pollpeter, Defense Group Inc senior research analyst, 2015
(Kevin, China Dream, Space Dream: Chinas Progress in Space Technologies and
Implications for the United States,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space
%20Dream_Report.pdf)

Whereas space can contribute to the hard power accumulation of military and
economic capabilities, it can also work to increase Chinas soft power. According to
Joseph Nye, soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often

Although measuring the effects of soft power is difficult, Nye writes

leads to acquiescence. 629

that it rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. Chinas burgeoning
space program is used as one of the many barometers of its rise as a military,
economic, and political power. It reinforces the image that China is a dynamic
country capable of doing things well and also a country with which relations
can be beneficial. This could make China more attractive, especially to developing countries without strong democratic traditions. Chinas
strategy thus appears to be a combination of seeking cooperative activities with the
main space powers while at the same time seeking leadership opportunities with
lesser space powers through such activities as its leadership of APSCO and its agreements to build Beidou stations in several countries in Asia. These
activities reinforce the image that China can interact with the major space powers
as equals while also creating an alternative universe where China can
lead space activities free from the interference of the other major space
powers. ASPCO, for example, does not grant other countries observer status.631 Moreover, as China becomes more capable in
space, it will become a more attractive partner for Europe, Russia, and
smaller space powers. These activities may increase multipolarity by presenting
another avenue for countries to participate in space in addition to or
withoutthe United States. This is especially true in the area of human spaceflight
where the lack of an independent capability to launch humans into space by the
United States has made China an attractive new partner for collaboration.
Although Europe states that its collaborative activities with China do not mean a diminution of its activities with the United States, reduced budgets for

space programs and the orbiting of Chinas larger space station at the same time
that the International Space Station will be nearing the end of its service life may
result in increasing influence for China in space. These additional opportunities for
collaboration could not only assist Chinas space program in becoming more
competitive, they could also assist Europes space industry in becoming less
dependent on the United States for space technology. As Chinas space
program continues to improve, countries without the security concerns of the U nited
States will increasingly look upon space as another venue for interacting with China .
China cooperates with many countries in space and looks to Europe in particular for access to technology and expertise denied by the United States. It maintains important cooperative
activities with Russia and Ukraine and has cooperative relationships with the European Space Agency and the countries of the European Union. Spurred on by U.S. export control laws,
European cooperation with China could improve Chinas space technology while at the same time making Europe more technologically independent of U.S. industry. Although the ITAR-
free satellites sold to China were eventually determined to be anything but, the possibility of further collaboration cannot rule out such satellites being developed in the future.

US leadership in space is necessary to keep strong

partnerships and alleviate tensions on Earth
Salhani and Gawel, Washington Diplomat writer and editor, 2016
(Justin and Anna, NASA Chief Says 21st-Century Space Is About Cooperation, Not
Competition, 5-27, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=13640:nasa-chief-says-21st-century-space-
is-about-cooperation-not-competition&catid=1545&Itemid=428)
China and Russia may not be Americas preferred partners when international
relations are at play, but both countries have proven invaluable allies when
it comes to issues slightly out of this world in space. The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) is not only behind the first steps mankind took on the moon, but it is also behind a number of giant
NASAs use of soft and smart
steps here on Earth, according to NASA Administrator Charles F. Bolden Jr.
power has led to myriad international partnerships between the United States and
a number of other countries, including Russia and China, which in many foreign
policy arenas are considered rivals or antagonists. But in space collaboration,
the United States can take global leadership by example and action, said
Bolden, a former astronaut and retired major general in the Marine Corps who spoke at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) in late April. When the United States landed on the moon in 1969, it did so almost entirely on its own, according to
Future forays into space, however, will require cooperation and
Bolden.
coordination among many countries. Bolden, who was nominated by President
Obama to head the U.S. space agency in 2009, quoted the president when he
stressed that NASA will not only extend humanitys reach into space, we
will strengthen Americas leadership here on Earth. Bolden said Obama has set a goal for
NASA to reach Mars by the 2030s and land on an asteroid by 2025. To do that, it does not make sense for one country to build
every instrument, launch every satellite or conduct every research experiment, Bolden said, noting that NASA has roughly 700
agreements with more than 120 international partners. Japan, China, Germany and India are just some of the major economic
powers contributing to the study and observation of the planet. Bolden said that all sides of the political spectrum are
represented. In particular, he cited the diplomatic benefits of the International Space Station (ISS), a microgravity lab launched in
2000 that has an international crew of six people who orbit the Earth every 90 minutes. Today, a child who is 15 years old or
younger has lived every day of his or her life while human beings from multiple countries are living and working together in space
aboard the International Space Station, Bolden pointed out. Tens of thousands of people from across 15 countries have been
involved in its operation. Astronauts from 18 countries have spent time on board. It has hosted 1,700 investigations from
researchers in more than 83 countries. He added: I truly believe it ought to be considered for the Nobel Peace Prize. Bolden noted
that American astronaut Scott Kelly and Russian cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko recently returned from a year of living together on
board the ISS. This at a time when sometimes the relationship between their two home countries back here on Earth presented
incredible challenges. [The U.S. shares] a common mission with Russia, Bolden told the CSIS crowd. Both [American and
Russian] leaders have a belief in the critical importance of the International Space Station. Bolden said that cooperation can be
traced back to the height of the Cold War with the launch of the Apollo Soyuz, the first joint U.S.-Soviet space flight in 1975 that
served as a symbol of dtente between the two superpowers. Bolden, who traveled to space four times between 1986 and 1994,
said the Apollo Soyuz mission represented the type of confidence-building measures that could be applied to China today, another
economic and geopolitical rival that is seen as a potential ally for NASA. However, the Marine Corps veteran was careful to
distinguish between military and civilian space cooperation. On the military front, the Pentagon remains wary of Beijings ambitious
space program, which could challenge Americas uncontested dominance in space and result in a new era of modern warfare one
that targets satellites responsible for guiding bombs and spying on adversaries. On the civilian front, Bolden said China is a
potential partner. He noted, for instance, that NASA already works with the Chinese on analyzing the glacial makeup of the
He said the mere act of reaching out to
Himalayas and researching the causes of earthquakes.
potential space partners might alleviate tensions in other areas. Having
spent 34 years in the Marine Corps, I cant think of a nation that we
havent talked to. We talk to some pretty bad people from time to time
because we have to sometimes it works, sometimes it doesnt, he said.
But I think that if you talk to anybody in the military, most of them will
tell you that engagement always beats isolation. As NASA collaborates with
more nations, the pool of stakeholders expands, creating a powerful source of
stability, Bolden said. The International Space Station is one of many examples of
working with other countries. In addition, the NASA administrator outlined the practical applications of space
technology, ranging from home insulation to GPS satellite navigation (though, Bolden quipped, NASA is not responsible for the
NASA-developed technology
development of two iconic products often credited to the agency: Velcro and Tang).
has not only sent us stunning pictures of places like Mars and Pluto, it beamed
nightly television into our homes and improves the eyeglasses many of us like me
wear, Bolden explained. Technologies we developed to recycle wastewater aboard
the International Space Station are being put to use to provide our global neighbors
in remote parts of Asia and South and Central America with clean drinking water,
not to mention some parts of our own country. Among the other technologies that
have found their way into the private sector are machines that listen for beating
hearts below rubble and portable ultrasound machines that evaluate ailments and
are used in remote regions where doctors arent always available.

These relations are key to US hegemony

Stone, former National Space Society Board of Directors member,
2011
(Christopher, American leadership in space: leadership through capability, 3-14,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1797/1)

First, let me start by saying that I agree with Mr. Friedmans assertion that American leadership is a phrase we hear bandied about a
lot in political circles in the United States, as well as in many space policy discussions. I have been at many space forums in my
career where Ive heard the phrase used by speakers of various backgrounds, political ideologies, and nation. Like Mr. Friedman
states, it has many different meanings, most derived from cultural or political biases, some of them contradictory. This is true:
many nations, as well as organizations and individuals worldwide, have different preferences and views as to what American
leadership in space is, and/or what it should be. He also concludes that paragraph by stating that American leadership
in space could also be viewed as synonymous with American hegemony. I
again will agree that some people within the United Stats and elsewhere have this view toward American leadership. However, just
because people believe certain viewpoints regarding American leadership does not mean that those views are accurate
assessments or definitions of what actions demonstrate US leadership in the space medium. When it comes to space exploration
and development, including national security space and commercial, I would disagree somewhat with Mr. Friedmans assertion that
space is often overlooked in foreign relations and geopolitical strategies. My contention is that while space is indeed overlooked
space is used as a tool for foreign
in national grand geopolitical strategies by many in national leadership,
policy and relations more often than not. In fact, I will say that the US space program has
become less of an effort for the advancement of US space power and exploration, and is used more as a foreign policy
tool to shape the strategic environment to what President Obama referred to in his National Security
Strategy as The World We Seek. Using space to shape the strategic environment is not a bad thing in and of itself. What concerns
me with this form of shaping is that we appear to have changed the definition of American leadership as a nation away from the
traditional sense of the word. Some seem to want to base our future national foundations in space using the important international
collaboration piece as the starting point. Traditional national leadership would start by advancing United States space power
The
capabilities and strategies first, then proceed toward shaping the international environment through allied cooperation efforts.
United States goal should be leadership through spacefaring capabilities , in all
sectors. Achieving and maintaining such leadership through capability will allow for
increased space security and opportunities for all and for America to lead the
international space community by both technological and political example . As other
nations pursue excellence in space, we should take our responsibilities seriously , both
from a national capability standpoint, and as country who desires expanded international engagement in space. The world
has recognized America as the leaders in space because it demonstrated
technological advancement by the Apollo lunar landings, our deep space exploration probes
to the outer planets, and deploying national security space missions. We did not become the recognized
leaders in astronautics and space technology because we decided to fund billions into research
programs with no firm budgetary commitment or attainable goals. We did it because we made a national level
decision to do each of them, stuck with it, and achieved exceptional things in
manned and unmanned spaceflight. We have allowed ourselves to drift from this traditional strategic definition
of leadership in space exploration, rapidly becoming participants in spaceflight rather than the leader of the global space
community. One example is shutting down the space shuttle program without a viable domestic spacecraft chosen and funded to
commence operations upon retirement of the fleet. We are paying millions to rely on Russia to ferry our astronauts to an
International Space Station that US taxpayers paid the lions share of the cost of construction. Why would we, as United States
citizens and space advocates, settle for this? The current debate on commercial crew and cargo as the stopgap between shuttle and
whatever comes next could and hopefully will provide some new and exciting solutions to this particular issue. However, we need to
made a decision sooner rather than later.

Decline causes every scenario for extinction

Brzezinski, John Hopkins American Foreign Policy professor, 2012
(Zbigniew, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, google books)

AnAmerican decline would impact the nuclear domain most profoundly by inciting a crisis of
confidence in the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella. Countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Turkey, and even
Israel, among others, rely on the United States extended nuclear deterrence for security . If they were to see the
United States slowly retreat from certain regions, forced by circumstances to pull back its
guarantees, or even if they were to lose confidence in standing US guarantees, because
of the financial, political, military, and diplomatic consequences of an American decline, then they will have to seek security
elsewhere. That elsewhere security could originate from only two sources: from nuclear weapons of ones own or from
the extended deterrence of another powermost likely Russia, China, or India. It is possible that countries that feel threatened by
the ambition of existing nuclear weapon states, the addition of new nuclear weapon states, or the decline in the reliability of
American power would develop their own nuclear capabilities. For crypto-nuclear powers like Germany and Japan, the path to
nuclear weapons would be easy and fairly quick, given their extensive civilian nuclear industry, their financial success, and their
technological acumen. Furthermore, the continued existence of nuclear weapons in North Korea and the potentiality of a nuclear-
capable Iran could prompt American allies in the Persian Gulf or East Asia to build their own nuclear deterrents. Given North Koreas
increasingly aggressive and erratic behavior, the failure of the six-party talks, and the widely held distrust of Irans megalomaniacal
leadership, the guarantees offered by a declining Americas nuclear umbrella might not stave off a regional nuclear arms race
China and India today maintain a responsible nuclear posture of
among smaller powers. Last but not least, even though
uncertainty of an increasingly nuclear world could force both states to
minimal deterrence and no first use, the
reevaluate and escalate their nuclear posture. Indeed, they as well as Russia might even become inclined to extend
nuclear assurances to their respective client states. Not only could this signal a renewed regional nuclear arms race between these
three aspiring powers but it could also create new and antagonistic spheres of influence in
Eurasia driven by competitive nuclear deterrence. The decline of the United States would thus precipitate drastic changes to the
An increase in proliferation among insecure American allies and/or an arms race between the
nuclear domain.
are among the more likely outcomes. This ripple effect of proliferation
emerging Asian powers
would undermine the transparent management of the nuclear domain and increase the likelihood of
interstate rivalry, miscalculation, and eventually even perhaps of international nuclear terror. In
addition to the foregoing, in the course of this century the world will face a series of novel geopolitical challenges brought about by
significant changes in the physical environment. The management of those changing environmental commonsthe growing scarcity
of fresh water, the opening of the Arctic, and global warmingwill require global consensus and mutual sacrifice. American
a decline in American influence would
leadership alone is not enough to secure cooperation on all these issues, but
reduce the likelihood of achieving cooperative agreements on environmental and
resource management. Americas retirement from its role of global policeman could
create greater opportunities for emerging powers to further exploit the
environmental commons for their own economic gain, increasing the chances of
resource-driven conflict, particularly in Asia. The latter is likely to be the case especially in regard to the increasingly
scarce water resources in many countries. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), by 2025
more than 2.8 billion people will be living in either water-scarce or water-stressed regions, as global demand for water will double
every twenty years.9 While much of the Southern Hemisphere is threatened by potential water scarcity, interstate conflictsthe
geopolitical consequences of cross-border water scarcityare most likely to occur in Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and
northeastern Africa, regions where limited water resources are shared across borders and political stability is transient . The
combination of political insecurity and resource scarcity is a menacing geopolitical combination. The threat of water conflicts is likely
to intensify as the economic growth and increasing demand for water in emerging powers like Turkey and India collides with
instability and resource scarcity in rival countries like Iraq and Pakistan. Water scarcity will also test Chinas internal stability as its
burgeoning population and growing industrial complex combine to increase demand for and decrease supply of usable water . In
South Asia, the never-ending political tension between India and Pakistan combined with
overcrowding and Pakistans heightening internal crises may put the Indus Water Treaty at risk, especially because the river basin
originates in the long-disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, an area of ever-increasing political and military volatility. The
lingeringdispute between India and China over the status of Northeast India, an area through which the vital
remains a serious concern. As American hegemony disappears
Brahmaputra River flows, also
and regional competition intensifies, disputes over natural resources like water have
the potential to develop into full-scale conflicts. The slow thawing of the Arctic will also change the face of the
international competition for important resources. With the Arctic becoming increasingly accessible to human endeavor, the five
Arctic littoral statesthe United States, Canada, Russia, Denmark, and Norwaymay rush to lay claim to its bounty of oil, gas, and
metals. This run on the Arctic has the potential to cause severe shifts in the geopolitical landscape, particularly to Russias
advantage. As Vladimir Radyuhin points out in his article entitled The Arctics Strategic Value for Russia, Russia has the most to
gain from access to the Arctic while simultaneously being the target of far north containment by the other four Arctic states, all of
which are members of NATO. In many respects this new great game will be determined by who moves first with the most legitimacy,
since very few agreements on the Arctic exist. The first Russian supertanker sailed from Europe to Asia via the North Sea in the
summer of 2010.10 Russia has an immense amount of land and resource potential in the Arctic. Its territory within the Arctic Circle is
3.1 million square kilometersaround the size of Indiaand the Arctic accounts for 91% of Russias natural gas production, 80% of
its explored natural gas reserves, 90% of its offshore hydrocarbon reserves, and a large store of metals.11 Russia is also attempting
to increase its claim on the territory by asserting that its continental shelf continues deeper into the Arctic, which could qualify
Russia for a 150-mile extension of its Exclusive Economic Zone and add another 1.2 million square kilometers of resource-rich
territory. Its first attempt at this extension was denied by the UN Commission on the Continental Shelf, but it is planning to reapply
in 2013. Russia considers the Arctic a true extension of its northern border and in a 2008 strategy paper President Medvedev stated
that the Arctic would become Russias main strategic resource base by 2020.12 Despite recent conciliatory summits between
Europe and Russia over European security architecture, a large amount of uncertainty and distrust stains the Wests relationship
with Russia. The United States itself has always maintained a strong claim on the Arctic and has continued patrolling the area since
the end of the Cold War. This was reinforced during the last month of President Bushs second term when he released a national
security directive stipulating that America should preserve the global mobility of the United States military and civilian vessels and
aircraft throughout the Arctic region. The potentiality of an American decline could embolden Russia to more forcefully assert its
control of the Arctic and over Europe via energy politics; though much depends on Russias political orientation after the 2012
presidential elections. All five Arctic littoral states will benefit from a peaceful and cooperative agreement on the Arcticsimilar to
Norways and Russias 2010 agreement over the Barents Straitand the geopolitical stability it would provide. Nevertheless,
political circumstances could rapidly change in an environment where control over energy remains Russias single greatest priority.
Global climate change is the final component of the environmental commons and the one with the greatest potential
geopolitical impact. Scientists and policy makers alike have projected catastrophic consequences
for mankind and the planet if the world average temperature rises by more than two degrees over the next century. Plant
and animal species could grow extinct at a rapid pace, large-scale ecosystems could collapse,
human migration could increase to untenable levels, and global economic development could be
categorically reversed. Changes in geography, forced migration, and global economic contraction layered on top of the
perennial regional security challenges could create a geopolitical reality of unmanageable complexity and
conflict, especially in the densely populated and politically unstable areas of Asia such as the Northeast and South.
Furthermore, any legitimate action inhibiting global climate change will require unprecedented levels of self-sacrifice and
international cooperation. The United States does consider climate change a serious concern, but its lack of both long-term strategy
and political commitment, evidenced in its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the repeated defeat of climate-change
legislation in Congress, deters other countries from participating in a global agreement. The United States is the second-largest
global emitter of carbon dioxide, after China, with 20% of the worlds share. The United States is the number one per capita emitter
of carbon dioxide and the global leader in per capita energy demand. Therefore, US leadership is essential in not
only getting other countries to cooperate, but also in actually inhibiting climate change. Others around the world,
including the European Union and Brazil, have attempted their own domestic reforms on carbon emissions and energy use, and
committed themselves to pursuing renewable energy. Even China has made reducing emissions a goal, a fact it refuses to let the
United States ignore. But none of those nations currently has the ability to lead a global initiative. President Obama committed the
United States to energy and carbon reform at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, but the increasingly polarized domestic political
environment and the truculent American economic recovery are unlikely to inspire progress on costly energy issues. China is also
critically important to any discussion of the management of climate change as it produces 21% of the worlds total carbon
emissions, a percentage that will only increase as China develops the western regions of its territory and as its citizens experience a
growth in their standard of living. China, however, has refused to take on a leadership role in climate change, as it has also done in
the maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. China uses its designation as a developing country to shield itself from the demands
of global stewardship. Chinas tough stance at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit underscores the potential dangers of an American
decline: no other country has the capacity and the desire to accept global stewardship over the environmental commons. Only a
vigorous Unites States could lead on climate change, given Russias dependence on carbon-based energies for economic growth,
The protection and
Indias relatively low emissions rate, and Chinas current reluctance to assume global responsibility.
good faith management of the global commonssea, space, cyberspace, nuclear
proliferation, water security, the Arctic, and the environment itselfare
imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation
of basic geopolitical stability. But in almost every case, the potential absence of constructive
and influential US leadership would fatally undermine the essential communality of
the global commons. The argument that Americas decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some
vulnerable states, produce a more troubled North American neighborhood, and make cooperative management of the global
commons more difficult is not an argument for US global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the twenty-
first centuryresulting from the rise of a politically self-assertive global population and from the dispersal of global powermake
such supremacy unattainable. But in this increasingly complicated geopolitical environment, an America in pursuit of a new, timely
strategic vision is crucial to helping the world avoid a dangerous slide into international turmoil.
 Solvency
Recent revisions to the Wolf amendment closed loopholes and
spurred a staggering chilling effect- repeal is key to create
certainty
Kohler, Georgetown JD, 2015
(Hannah, The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment,
and the Future of International Cooperation in Space,
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf)

Although the treatment of the Amendment prior to 2014 demonstrated widespread confusion
among members of the national space community with regard to its intent and
applicability, Congressman Wolfs statements would seem to settle the question. The Wolf Amendment, as
introduced in 2011, was intended to restrict only bilateral activities, and only Chinese citizens
representing the government were to be excluded from multilateral endeavors. However convenient, this interpretation of
the law from the mouth of its creator may no longer be accurate. IV. THE NEW WOLF AMENDMENT OF 2014 AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION Although the 20112013 Wolf Amendments severely
constricted NASAs ability to interact with other spacefaring nations (there are so few, after all), at the very least their application
evinced careful consideration of a policy balance between national security, morality, international
cooperation, and practicality. That may have changed in 2014. Public Law 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act 2014 (2014 Appropriations Act), was signed by the President in January 2014113 and contained a slight
deviation from the core text of its three predecessorsa change so seemingly insignificant that it might
not seem worth the effort to mention it. However, the potential repercussions are staggering. The
relevant text in Sections 532(a), (c), and (d) is identical to Sections 535(a), (c) and (d) in the 2013 Appropriations Act.114 However,
the newly amended Section 532(b) states that [n]one of the funds made available by
this Act may be used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities
belonging to or utilized by NASA. 115 Considering that the annual appropriations act
dictates the spending of NASAs entire governmental budget, this change appears
to categorically bar official Chinese visitors from NASA facilities (or even facilities
used by NASA!) where any government-granted money is involved, whether the
forum is a bilateral one or not. This could reasonably be read to exclude Chinese
citizens from all multinational conventions or events with NASA , unless the events could be
certified by the House Appropriations Committee as posing no national- or economic-security risk; that is, the 2014 Appropriations
Act could conceivably be enacting the very restrictions that Congressman Wolf protested so vehemently in the wake of the 2013
Ames Conference debacle. It is reasonable to ask whether the wording change, tiny as it is, was an accident or oversight by the
House Appropriations Committee that introduced the bill. Though the available legislative history and relevant congressional reports,
debates, and interviews are mute on the issue, the structure of the 2014 Appropriations Act and its predecessors suggest that the
change was deliberate. Significantly, H.R. 4660 (2015 Appropriations Act) currently under consideration retains the amended
language, continuing to insist that [n]one of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the purpose of hosting official
Chinese visitors.116 If the altered phrasing was an oversight, it would likely have been corrected in the drafting of the 2015
Appropriations Act. As noted infra, in previous years NASAs appropriations have been constrained with regard to internal
management by the prohibitive [n]one of the funds language now found in the Wolf Amendment of 20142015.117 It can be
understood that Congressby using this categorical languageintended to forbid NASA from activities that would harm its ongoing
projects. Congress did not intend to permit NASA to use available nongovernmental funds to harm the space shuttle or ISS projects;
Congress meant to stop the activity from happening at all (subject to exemption if it could be certified harmless). There are multiple
references to limitations on various aspects of funding in the 2014 Appropriations Act, demonstrating that the change cannot have
been made to align the language in Section 532 with the rest of the Act. However, Sections 709, 718, 719, 720, 736, 744, and
numerous others of the 2014 Appropriations Act state that none of the funds in this or any other Act may be used to pay certain
employees or accomplish or prohibit certain activities.118 Furthermore, Section 723 reads, in uniquely severe language, [n]one of
the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Agriculture.119 Thus, the language used in Section
532(b) is not the most restrictive in the statute; we can presume that the congressional language, from least to most restrictive,
progresses from (1) limitations apply 3 (2) none of the funds made available by this Act 3 (3) none of the funds made available
by this or any other Act. How best to interpret this, from a congressional-intent perspective, coming as it did directly on the heels of
a public misunderstanding of the more lenient 20112013 language? If Congressman Wolfs 2013 opinions on the purpose and
character of his legislation have not changed, then perhaps the 2014 Appropriations Act will not affect much at all; if, indeed, the
purpose of the Wolf Amendment is merely to prevent direct bilateral involvement between NASA and the PLA, then the 2014 Act
does not appear to have significantly changed in measure or scope. Congressman Wolf himself has not spoken to the wording
change, and his statements on the purpose of the Act apparently conflict. In an April 2014 speech at the Space Policy Institute, Wolf
stated: [O]ur subcommittee has had strong oversight of NASAs security, including a provision to limit its bilateral cooperation with
the Chinese space program, which is run by the Peoples Liberation Army.... .... . . . [However] it is important to note that the
congressional restriction does provide several venues for the U.S. to maintain its dialogue with Chinese counterparts as well as
opportunities for limited engagement. For instance, the language only restricts bilateral cooperation, not multilateral venues where
representatives from all countries participate. .... . . . So there is some flexibility for NASA when it comes to China.120 However, in
the March 2013 hearing with Administrator Boldenand in contrast to his (Wolfs) statements to the Space Policy Institute
Congressman Wolf insinuated that the 2013 Appropriations Act was meant to be strictly construed. Wolf asked Bolden: Are you
aware of any incidents in which NASA has encouraged an external entity, as they did down at NASA Langley, to undertake with its
own funds a cooperative activity with China that would be prohibited using NASA funding? And are you going to be clarifying that
with the contractors? Because there was almost a workaround to get around the subcommittee language.121 Bolden took severe
umbrage to the veiled criticism, replying: I respectfully disagree with the implication of what you just said.... Lesa [Roe, the Director
of NASA Langley] and her people are not attempting to use contractors as a workaround to the rules. . . . As a matter of fact, we
really feel that we have been fully complying with the law, that our processes are strong.122 Evidently, Wolf and the other
members of the House Appropriations Committee were concerned with the possibility that
NASA might use such a workaround to engage indirectly with the CNSA, and wanted
to prohibit such actions. This seems the most salient explanation for the wording
change, and would align Wolfs continuing insistence that the Amendment is meant to prohibit bilateral conduct only with the
apparent tightening of the congressional noose with regard to funding allocations. It seems most likely, then, that the
language in Section 532 of the 2014 Appropriations Act (and Section 532 of the 2015 Appropriations Act currently under
deliberation in the Senate) was deliberately amended in order to correct this perceived
security flaw. By forbidding the use of any funds made available under the 2014
Appropriations Act to facilitate official Chinese visitors, Wolf might have hoped to
strengthen the restrictive language and ensure that the PLA was not being engaged
even indirectlyby NASA through contracting projects or other such
workarounds, although the focus on facility use rather than cooperative projects is puzzling. The potential
implications of the changed language might even have been inadvertent, as Wolfs
continuing insistence that the Act prohibits bilateral collaboration only does not
seem consistent with a plain reading of the 2014 language. At this point, however, it
must be considered that Congressman Wolfs personal interpretation of the statute
no longer controls; the plain language of Section 532 does restrict multilateral
interaction. The widespread confusion and misapplication of the Amendment between
2011 and 2013 are damning evidence; if the international space community could not
parse the wording of the old legislation, it seems unlikely that they will be any less
liberal in applying the new, stricter language . The heart of the problem lies in the
misapplied focus that Wolf and other members of the House Appropriations Committee have granted to the
Amendment. Congressman Wolf, in many of his statements concerning the Amendment, emphasizes the bilateral/multilateral
nature of a given activity to determine whether it should be considered prohibited.123 However, this is not the heart of the issue.
Although bilateral coordination is unarguably banned in both the 2011 and 2014 versions of the Amendment, the true focus has
consistently been on the issue of officialness, not number of parties or even the nature of the activity. Since its inception, the Wolf
Amendment has restricted the use of funds in hosting... official Chinese visitors.124 It may be that Wolf and the Appropriations
Committee have simply considered this limitation enough to prevent abuse of the provision; Wolf has occasionally suggested as
much.125 The problem with this assumption is that official is never addressed or defined in the Amendment,126 and thus cannot
be facially assumed to refer only to citizens representing the Chinese government. Merriam-Webster defines the adjective official
to be of or relating to the job or work of someone in a position of authority.127 Although this covers representatives of the Chinese
government, it may also fairly be said to extend to other prominent members of the scientific community (in the sense of an official
visitor) or members with sufficient standing and authority in any public organization, even reporters working for an official Chinese
If Congress wishes to curtail broadly restrictive overapplication of the
news agency.128
Amendment through reliance on the official language, it should make this clear by including an internal
definition of official in the text of the 2016 Appropriations Act, making explicit exactly who is being barred from attending events
Until such a definition is agreed upon, both the intention and the effects
funded by NASA.
of the 2014 wording change will be frustratingly obfuscating, and it is likely that
industry leaders will continue to interpret the provision broadly (that is,
restrictively) for fear of crossing Congress and becoming subject to
sanctions under the Antideficiency Act.

By unmasking the flawed assumptions behind the drive for

space control, the aff unsettles a dangerous political paradigm
in favor of democratic accountability. Only challenging status
quo containment engagement can provide impetus for a new
approach to space.
Macdonald 7 (Fraser Macdonald, Professor of Human Geography at the
University of Melbourne, 2007 Anti-Astropolitik: Outer Space and the Orbit of
Geography) *We do not endorse ableist language
Critical astropolitics Two things should now be clear. First, outer space is no
longer remote from our everyday lives; it is already profoundly implicated in the
ordinary workings of economy and society. Secondly, the import of space to
civilian, commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means there is a
great deal at stake in terms of the access to and control over Earths orbit. One
cannot overstate this last point. The next few years may prove decisive in terms
of establishing a regime of space control that will have profound implications for
terrestrial geopolitics. It is in this context that I want to briefly introduce the
emerging field of astropolitics, defined as the study of the relationship between
outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and military
policy and strategy (Dolman, 2002: 15).It is, in both theory and practice, a
geopolitics of outer space. Everett Dolman is one of the pioneers of the field. An
ex-CIA intelligence analyst who teaches at the US Air Forces School of
Advanced Airpower Studies, he publishes in journals that are perhaps unfamiliar
to critical geographers, like the modestly titled Small Wars and Insurgencies. As
what follows is uniformly critical of Dolmans work, I should say that his
Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age (Dolman,2002) is
unquestionably a significant book: it has defined a now vibrant field of research
and debate. Astropolitik draws together a vast literature on space exploration
and space policy, and presents a lucid and accessible introduction to thinking
strategically about space. (In the previous section I drew heavily on Dolmans
description of the astropolitical environment). My critique is not founded on
scientific or technical grounds but on Dolmans construction of a formal
geopolitics designed to advance and legitimate the unilateral military conquest
of space by the United States. While Dolman has many admirers among
neoconservative colleagues in Washington think-tanks, critical engagements
(e.g.Moore, 2003; Caracciolo, 2004) have been relatively thin on the ground.
Dolmans work is interesting for our purposes here precisely because he draws
on geographys back catalogue of strategic thinkers, most prominently Halford
Mackinder, whose ideas gained particular prominence in America in the wake oft
he Russian Sputnik (Hooson, 2004: 377). But Dolman is not just re-fashioning
classical geopolitics in the new garb of astropolitics; he goes further and
proposes an Astropolitik a simple but effective blueprint for space
control (p.9) modeled on Karl Hausofers Geopolitik as much as Realpolitik.
Showing some discomfort with the impeccably fascist pedigree of this theory,
Dolman cautions against the misuse of Astropolitik and argues that the term is
chosen as a constant reminder of that past, and as a grim warning for the
future(Dolman, 2002: 3). At the same time, however, his book is basically a
manual for achieving space dominance. Projecting Mackinders famous thesis on
the geographical pivot of history (Mackinder, 1904) onto outer space, Dolman
argues that who controls the Lower Earth Orbit controls near-Earth space. Who
controls near-Earth space dominates Terra [Earth]. Who dominates Terra
determines the destiny of humankind. Dolman sees the quest for space as
already having followed classically Mackinderian principles (Dolman, 2002: 87).
And like Mackinder before him, Dolman is writing in the service of his Empire.
Astropolitik like Realpolitik he writes, is hardnosed and pragmatic, it is not
pretty or uplifting or a joyous sermon for the masses. But neither is it evil. Its
benevolence or malevolence become apparent only as it is applied, and by
whom(Dolman, 2002: 4). Further inspiration is drawn from Alfred Thayer
Mahan, whose classic volume The Influence of Seapower Upon History, has been
widely cited by space strategists (Mahan, 1890; Gray, 1996; see also Russell,
2006).Mahans discussion of the strategic value of coasts, harbours, wellworn
seapaths and chokepoints has its parallel in outer space (see France, 2000). The
implication of Mahans work, Dolman concludes, is that the United States must
be ready and prepared, in Mahanian scrutiny, to commit to the defense and
maintenance of these assets, or relinquish them to a state willing and able to do
so (Dolman, 2002: 37). The primary problem for those advancing Astropolitik is
that space is not a lawless frontier. In fact the legal character of space has
long been enshrined in the principles of the OST and this has, to some extent,
prevented it from being subject to unbridled i nterstate competition. While
it is morally desirable to explore space in common with all peoples writes
Dolman without conviction, even the thought of doing so makes weary those
who have the means (Dolman,2002: 135). Thus, the veneer of transcendent
humanism with regard to spacegives way to brazen self-interest. Accordingly,
Dolman describes the rescommunis consensus of the OST as a tragedy that
has removed any lega lincentive for the exploitation of space (137). Only a res
nulliuslegal order couldconstruct space as proper objects for which states may
compete (138). Under the paradigm of res nullius and Astropolitik, the moon
and other celestial bodies would become potential new territory for states. And
here Dolman again parallels Karl Hausofers Geopolitik. Just as Hausofer desired
a break from the VersaillesTreaty ( Tuathail 1996: 45), Dolman wants to see the
US withdraw from the OST, making full speed ahead for the Moon (see also
Hickman and Dolman,2002). Non-space-faring developing countries need not
worry about losing out, says Dolman, as they would own no less of the Moon
than they do now (140).To his credit, Dolman does give some attention to the
divisive social consequences of this concentrated power. Drawing on earlier
currents of environmental determinism and on the terrestrial model of Antarctic
exploration, he ponders the characteristics of those who will be first to colonise
space.
They will be highly educated, rigorously trained and psychologically screened
for mental toughness and decision-making skills, and very physically fit; the
bestand brightest of our pilots, technicians and scientists; rational, given to
scientific analysis and explanation, and obsessed with their professions (26). In
other words, they are a superior subset of the larger group from which
they spring(27). As if this picture isnt vivid enough, Dolman goes on to say
that colonizers of space will be the most capably endowed (or at least the most
ruthlessly suitable, as the populating of America and Australia so aptly
illustrate[s]) (27; myemphasis). Duty and sacrifice will be the highest
moral ideals (27). Society, he continues, must be prepared to make heroes
of those who undertake the risk of exploration (146). At the same time, the
astropolitical society must be prepared to forego expenditures on social
programs to channel funds into the national space program. It must be
embued with the national spirit (146).Dolman slips from presenting what would
be merely a logical outworking of Astropolitik, to advocating that the United
States adopt it as their space strategy.A long the way, he acknowledges the full
anti-democratic potential of such concentrated power, detaching the
state from its citizenry: the United States can adopt any policy it wishes and
the attitudes and reactions of the domestic public and of other states can do
little to challenge it. So powerful is the United States that should it accept the
harsh Realpolitik doctrine in space that the military services appear to be
proposing, and given a proper explanation for employing it, there may in fact be
little if any opposition to a fait accompli of total US domination in space. 156.
Although Dolman claims that no attempt will be made to create a convincing
argument that the United States has a right to domination in space, in almost
the next sentence he goes on to argue that, in this case, might does make
right, the persuasiveness of the case being based on the self-interest of the
state and stability of the system (156; my emphasis). Truly, this is Astropolitik:
a veneration of the ineluctable logic of power and the permanent rightness of
those who wield it. And if it sounds chillingly familiar, Dolman hopes to reassure
us with his belief that the US form of liberal democracy is admirable and
socially encompassing (156) and it is the most benign state that has ever
attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world (158). His sunny view
that the United States is willing to extend legal and political equality to all sits
awkwardly with the current suspension of the rule of law in Guantanamo Bay as
well as invarious other spaces of exception (see Gregory, 2004; Agamben,
2005).Dolmans astropolitical project is by no means exceptional. The
journal Astropolitics, of which he is a founding editor, contains numerous papers
expressing similar views. And it is easy, I think, for critical geographers to feel
so secure in the intellectual and political purchase of Tuathailian critiques
(Tuathail, 1996), that we become oblivious to the undead nature of classical
geopolitics. It is comforting to think that most geography undergraduates
encountering geopolitics, in the UK at least, will in all likelihood do so through
the portal of critical perspectives, perhaps through the excellent work of Joanne
Sharp or Klaus Dodds (Dodds, 2005; Sharp, 2005). But the legacies of Mackinder
and Mahan live on, and radical critique is as urgent as ever. While this is
not theplace for a thoroughgoing reappraisal of astropolitics in the manner of
Gearid Tuathail, a few salient points from his critique can be brought out.
1. Astrography and astropolitics, like geography and geopolitics, constitute
apolitical domination and cultural imagining of space ( Tuathail,
1996:28). While commentators like Colin Gray have posited an inescapable
geography (e.g. of course, physical geography is politically neutral), a critical
agenda conceives of geography not as a fixed substratum but as a highly social
form of knowledge (Gray, 1999: 173; Tuathail, 1999: 109).For geography, read
astrography. We must be alert to the declarative(this is how the Outer Earth
is) and imperative (this is what we mustdo) modes of narration that
astropolitics has borrowed from its terrestrial antecedent ( Tuathail, 1999:
107). The models of Mackinder and Mahanthat are so often applied to the space
environment are not unchanging laws; on the contrary they are themselves
highly political attempts to create and sustain particular strategic outcomes
in specific historical circumstances.
2. Rather than actively supporting the dominant structures and mechanisms of
power, a critical astropolitics must place the primacy of such forces always
already in question. Critical astropolitics aims to scrutinise the power politics
of the expert/think-tank/tactician as part of a wider project of deepening public
debate and strengthening democratic accountability( Tuathail, 1999:
108).
3. Mackinders end of geography thesis held that the era of terrestrial
exploration and discovery was over, leaving only the task of consolidating the
world order to fit British interests (O Tuathail, 1996: 27). Dolmansvision of
space strategy bears striking similarities. And like Tuathailscritique of
Mackinders imperial hubris, Astropolitik could be reasonably described as
triumphalism blind to refused to recognize its own precariousness (O
Tuathail,1996: 28). Dolman, for instance, makes little effort to conceal his
tumescent patriotism, observing that the United States is awash with power
after its impressive victories in the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovocampaign,
and stands at the forefront of history capable of presiding overthe birth of a bold
New World Order. One might argue, however, that Mackinder as the theorist
of imperial decline may in this respect be an appropriate mentor (
Tuathail, 1999: 112). It is important, I think, to demystify Astropolitik: there is
nothing inevitable about US dominance in space, even if the US were to
pursue this imperial logic.
4. Again like Mackinder, Astropolitik mobilizes an unquestioned ethnocentrism.
Implicit in this ideology is the notion that America must beat China into space
because they are not like us. The most ruthlessly suitable candidates for
space dominance, we are told the most capably endowed are like those
who populated America and Australia (Dolman,2002: 27).5. A critical
astropolitics must challenge the mythic properties ofAstropolitik and disrupt
its reverie for the timeless insights of the so-called geopolitical masters. For
Tuathail, geopolitics is mythic becauseit promises uncanny clarity in a
complex world and is fetishistically concerned with . prophecy (
Tuathail, 1999: 113). Tuathails criticalproject, by contrast, seeks to recover
the political and historical contexts through which the knowledge of Mackinder
and Mahan has become formalized.

Engagement with China on benign space projects prevents the

progression of militarized countermeasures in space.
Laura Daniels 16, works at a leading Washington, D.C., think tank where she
specializes in U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, holds a Master of Public
Administration in International Security Policy from Columbia University [Look Up,
America: China Is Playing By Its Own Rules in Space, The National Interest,
February 18, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/look-america-china-
playing-by-its-own-rules-space-15248]
In the film The Martian, China reluctantly decides to come to the aid of the United States in space. While this makes
for a typically saccharine Hollywood ending, the deliberation portrayed reflects a real and growing uncertainty over
Chinas integration as a cooperative or competitive member of the international order. And, like in the movie, China
is asserting itself not only on the globe, but in outer space as well. That China is pushing back against the U.S.-led
international order is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues: duplicating the architecture of
While
the international order, bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons.
much attention has been focused on Chinas pursuits in the Asia Pacific and within
the global economic system, Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars
above. Take for example Chinas plans for a manned space station. Due largely to
counterproductive U.S. legislation, China has been barred from participating in the
International Space Station. Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make
its own station instead. If this sounds familiar, its because China has reacted in the
same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions
on Earth. The textbook example of this is Chinas launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
following the U.S. Congresss refusal to allow Beijing a greater say in the International Monetary Fund, a mainstay of
Experts believe Chinese motivation for the space station
the Western-led international order.
is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the
world stage, which echoes the motivation analysts infer for the AIIB. And as with the AIIB, which attracted fifty-
seven founding nations, including close U.S. allies, the Chinese space station is pulling major powers into
Beijings orbit. The European Space Agency and others have already voiced interest and signed
preliminary cooperation agreements. Also significant is Chinas buildup of its military
capability, a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international
order. This has extended into Earths orbit, where China has advanced its anti-
satellite (ASAT), command and control, and intelligence technology, in line with a
military doctrine that underscores the importance of parity in space . This has strong
implications for the United States and the international order it undergirds, as U.S. superiority in the ultimate high
ground of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield.
With growing military capacity comes the ability to contest freedom of movement in
the global commons. In the expansive global commons of outer space, Chinas ASAT
technology affords it an increasing ability to deny access and disrupt assets critical
to the global economy. While these same developments unfolding in the South and East China Seas are of
more immediate concern, free movement of satellites within space is vital, contributing to
approximately $1.6 trillion of U.S. commercial revenue. The prescription for dealing with
Chinese pressure on the international order is much the same in space as on land: build on the orders strengths,
The United States should pursue
and adjust it for an increasingly multipolar environment.
cooperation with China on benign space research to better integrate China as a
partner in the established order and to afford U.S. security strategists a window into
Chinese decision making and intentions. The State Departments recent cooperation initiative is a
step in the right direction. Simultaneously, the United States should promote deterrence by improving on an array of resilience
the greatest threat to
and counterspace abilities, but without growing alarmismafter all, often cited as
national security in space is floating junk. Finally, reviving the political will to maintain
U.S. leadership in space and abroad will be a boon to national security . All this will help
ensure that destabilization of the international order doesnt fly over our heads.

Wolf Amendment makes false assumptions--- US and China

space co-op actually builds trust and minimize risk tech
sharing
Michael J. Listner 14, an attorney and the founder and principal of Space Law
and Policy Solutions, a think tank and consultation firm that concentrates on legal
and policy matters relating to space security and development, 7/14/14
Commentary | Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space Cooperation,
http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-space-
cooperation/#sthash.85Ut6kP8.dpuf
But cooperation was not to be. In April 2011, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of
the House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing NASA and a long-time China
hardliner, especially regarding freedom of religion issues, inserted two sentences
into funding legislation that prohibits any joint scientific activity between the United
States and China that involves NASA or is coordinated by the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). That legislation has endured. NASA and OSTP
remain banned from bilateral activity with China. Though Wolf is retiring in January
2015, speculation regarding potential successors includes individuals with views
similar to his.
Wolfs rationale for banning bilateral U.S.-China relations, given in a 2011 interview,
includes three key points. We dont want to give them the opportunity to take
advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them,
Wolf said. And frankly, it boils down to a moral issue. Would you have a bilateral
program with Stalin? The three assumptions in that statement are, quite simply,
wrong, and counterproductive to U.S. interests.
First, it assumes that working with the United States would give China opportunities
not otherwise available and implies that the United States would be doing China a
favor. Though China has wanted to participate on the international space station
program and was banned from doing so by the United States, it will have its own
space station soon. In fact, when Chinas space station becomes operational around
2022, it could quickly become the de facto international space station, given that
the ISS is currently funded only through 2024, and that China has already invited
other countries to visit its facility.
In terms of the U.S. doing China a favor, Chinese politicians are still interested in the
ISS for symbolic reasons, specifically, being accepted as part of the international
family of spacefaring nations. But many Chinese space professionals fear that
cooperation with the United States would just slow them down. American politicians
are viewed as fickle and without the political will to see programs to completion, a
view not exclusive to China. Further, other countries, including U.S. allies, regularly
work with and sell aerospace technology to China. China has not been isolated .
Second, Wolfs rationale assumes the United States has nothing to gain by working
with the Chinese. On the contrary, the United States could learn about how they
work their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard
operating procedures. This is valuable information in accurately deciphering the
intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability
in U.S. analysis. Working together on an actual project where people confront and
solve problems together, perhaps beginning with a space science or space debris
project where both parties can contribute something of value, builds trust on both
sides, trust that is currently severely lacking. It also allows each side to understand
the others cultural proclivities, reasoning and institutional constraints with minimal
risk of technology sharing.