ORGOTTEN WARS
HUNGARIAN-BYZANTINE WARS IN THE l0TH_1STH
During the second haU of the 9th century
AD., seven tribes of the Hungarians Iived
between the River Danube and the River
Don together wi th three tribes of the
Kavars who had split away from the
Khazar Empire. The Pechenegs took away
their lands lying east of the River Dnieper
at the end of the century. As a result, the
Hungarian and Kavar tribes, which previ-
ously had had a loose relationship,
elected a common prince.
Byzantium regularly used the peoples
of the steppe to attack her enemies from
the rear. So did she with the new
Hungarian confederation of tribes. When
the empire was at war with Bulgaria,
Byzantium concluded an alliance wi th
rpd, prince of the Hungarians, and they
overcame the Bulgarians together in
894-895. The Bulgarian ruler, however,
turned to the Pechenegs, the eastern
neighbours of the Hungari~ns, for help, so
the land of the Hungarians became soon
under attack from two directions. The
Hungarians therefore decided to leave
their old settlements and moved into the
Carpathian Basin. The conquest of the
new territory was completed by 902.
The Hungarians then attempted to
make the neighbouring territories pay
tribute to them, as it was common pra c-
106
CENTURIES
tice in the steppe. Owing to their raids
directed against Western Europe, the
major part of Italy and Germany became
their taxpayers. Slavic tribes, living
around the Carpathian Basin, presumably
shared the fate of the Germans and the
Italians. The Hungarians, however, were
driven out from some parts of Germany
after their defeat at Merseburg, 933. This
is why they sought compensation on
Byzantine territory.
Between 934 and 970 it was always
the Hungarians who took the initiative.
Military actions were carried out very far
away from the settlements of the
Hungarian tribes, which sui ted the
characteristic of their army made up of
light cavalry. The aim of the attackers was
not to annex territories, but to force their
population to pay taxes regularly.
Therefore they systematically devastated
the southern Balkan territories of
Byzantium, ,plundered villages and took
captives. The Hungarians, if it was possi-
bie, tried to seH them or have th em ran-
somed by the Byzantine authorities on the
spot, since it was difficult to move with
prisoners. Besides "live goods" did not
bear long marches weil.
One of the most important tasks of
defence against the Hungarians was the
monitoring of their future onslaughts. For
these tasks, the Byzantines askeel for the
assistance of the Bulgarians, their north-
ern neighbours. While the main force of
the Empire was tied up by fighting against
the Arabs in Asia Minor, Byzantium was
trying, as far as it was possible, to tackle
conflicts in Europe by eliplomatic means.
If conciliatory actions were unsuccessful.
it was the local troops who had to protect
their territory.
The f1exibility of the provinciai army.
organised into the tlJeme system, made
effective action possible against minor
enemy troops. They succeeded in fighting
back Arab marauders in Asia Minor, anel
the few records which surviveel suggest
that they were not unsuccessful against
the Hungarians, either. Although they
were not able to holel up plundering
horsemen, the attackers were slowed
down by the loadeel wagons and the
masses of the captives as time went by,
so it became easier to scout them out.
Once the place anel the route of the
plunelerers was ielentified, the Byzantines
trieel to raid them unexpectedly. Even
though the Byzantine cavalry adopted the
tactics of the steppe peoples', Hungarian
superiority in clashes between the archer
cavalry troops \Vas obvious. The
Byzantines therefore preferreel to attack
at night. They knew that the Hungarians
elielnot build fortified camps for the night.
and they were not able to use their bows
effectively in elarkness. either. Similarly, it
was advantageous to attack the enemy in
a mountainous area, because on the nar-
row roads they could not play their great-
107
est trump, namely mobility. The Byzantine
infantry, however, coulel be utiliseel very
effectively under such circumstances.
We have a record of only one occasion
when large armies fought each other in
open field, yet, details of this Battle of
Arcaeliopolis (970) are for the most part
unknown. Leo the Wise's Tactcs suggests
that the Hungarians based their tactics on
three things: long-range archery, deceiv-
ing the enemy, and setting snares. In
order to prevent this, the Byzantines tried
to choose battlefielels where the enemy
coulel not line up its troops unnoticeel.
Infantry was preferreel for arrows coulel
easily km the horses of the cavalry.
evertheless, only the cavalry which pro-
ceeeleelwith closeelranks was fit for chas-
ing the enemy. The solution for this con-
traeliction was using heavy cavalry, the so
calleel kJibanophomi. Their horses were
protecteel by armour. so arrows coulel elo
only Iittle harm to thell1. Owing to their
weight, they coulel move fOf\varel only at a
slower pace, so their ranks broke up less
easily anel they were nearly invulnerable
in close combat; therefore they were able
to cover the Byzantine mounteel bowmen.
In the clash of mobility anelfirepower ver-
sus the slow but elevastating armoureel
phalanx, finally the latter gaineel the
upper hanel at Arcaeliopolis (now
Lleburgas, Turkey). This elefeat eneleel
the plunelering. tax-exerting campaigns of
the Hungarians.
The situation changeel significantly in
the 11th century. The Hungarian tribal
alliance turneel into a Christian kingelom
in 1000. It became a neighbour of
Byzantium which had conquered defence of frontiers, reconnaissance and
Bulgaria. The initiators of conflicts fast raids, were recruited from among
remained the Hungarians in most cases, the same peoples (Pechenegs, Cumans
but the main reason for the clashes was and Jazygians) for both parties' military.
the Hungarian kings' intention to conquer At the same time, the traditional
lands in the Balkans. The Byzantines, on Hungarian light cavalry's weapons were
the other hand, wished to expand the probably becoming more and more
Empire's influence to Hungary by sup- suitable for close combat, therefore they
porting pretenders. were turning into something similar to
The Byzantines had more resources, those carried by Byzantine stratiotes of
they had a long tradition of siege warfare the previous centuries. Only the lack of
and they enjoyed a strategic superiority heavy infantry was a serious disad-
alongside the Danube ensured by their vantage for the Hungarians.
fleet. The Hungarians, however, pos- The methods used by the two parties in
sessed considerable advantage since they battle were completely different. The
could mobilise their army faster and also, Hungarians followed the western
their supply lines were shorter. AH these European tactics, and they simply based
created a relative balance of power their plans on the overwhelming attacks
between the two parties. So neither the of their superior heavy cavalry. The
conquering ventures of Hungarian kings Byzantines, on the contrary, clung onta
as Stephen II (1116-1131) and Gza II their tactics worked out in the previous
(1141-1162) nor those of Byzantine centuries. They attempted, for instance,
emperor Mamlel I (1143-1180) could to carry out a surprise atta ck at night
bring lasting results. Although there were against a Hungarian camp in 1166;
four Hungarian-Byzantine wars during whereas at Zimony (now Zemun,
the 12th century (1127-1129, Yugoslavia) in 1167, they stood up against
1148-1155, 1162-1167 and 1181-1185), the Hungarians in a classical order. The
major battles were fought only six times right wing's cavalry, traditionaHy having
because of the considerable risk. The the role of attacking the enemy, encircled
main forces led by the ruiers were never the Hungarian left wing. It was the turn-
put into action. ing point of the battle. This onslaught
The opposing troops had notable simi- stopped the charge of the Hungarian
larities as the tactical superiority of the heavy cavalry and the battle was decided
western European heavy cavalry com- by putting into action the Byzantine
pelled both states' armies to adapt. reserves.
Western mercenaries fought in the battle- Since there were hardly any great bat-
deci ding heavy cavalries on the tles, fighting for the border fortresses
Hungarian as weH as on the Byzantine played a very important role. The
side. Mounted "bowmen, used in the Byzantines took over the fortresses of the

108
old Roman limes, built to protect the The aim of most campaigns was to take
Danube frontier, when they smashed the over or to demolish them.
Bulgarian Empire. The seats of the The split of the Byzantine Empire at
Byzantine [/oux governing the frontier the beginning of the 13th century upset
province were among them: n- the military balance, and Hungary
dorfehrvr, once Singidunum (now became one of the strongest states of the
Belgrade, capital of Yugoslavia) and area in this new situation. King Andrew Il
Barancs (Kostolac, Yugoslavia), which was of Hungary (1205-1235) tl'ied to reorgan-
founded by Emperor Justinian 1 (527-565 ise the Byzantine Empire during the
AD.) near the old Roman castrum called 1210's. Under the reign of his son, Bla IV
Viminacium. On the Hungarian side of the (1235-1270), the Hungarians provided
frontier a similar role was played by help for Michael VIlI Paleologos
Zimony which once was Roman Taurunum, (1259-1282) for the reunification of the
facing Nndorfehrvr. The internal parts Empire. By that time, the internal state of
of the Empire and the road leading to the Hungary and the operational range of its
capital from ndorfehrvr were army had already put a more significant
guarded by fortified towns also of late lim it to the expansion to the Balkans than
Roman origin: aissos (Nis, Yugoslavia) the resistance of the successor states or
and Serdica (Sofia, capital of Bulgaria). the temporarily revitalised Empire.

109
B. Szab Jnos-Somogyi Gyozo

lfeledett hbork
Magyar-biznci harcol<
a X-XIII. szzadban

ZRNYI KIAD, BUDAPEST