VernonW.

Cisney2014
ISSN:18325203
FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659,April2014

ARTICLE

BecomingOther:Foucault,Deleuze,andthePoliticalNatureofThought
VernonW.Cisney,VisitingAssistantProfessorofPhilosophy,GettysburgCollege

ABSTRACT:InthispaperIemploythenotionofthethoughtoftheoutsideasdevelopedby
MichelFoucault,inordertodefendthephilosophyofGillesDeleuzeagainstthecriticismsof
elitism, aristocratism, and political indifferencefamously leveled by Alain Badiou and
Peter Hallward. First, Iarguethattheir chargesof a theophanic conception of Being,which
ground the broader political claims, derive from a misunderstanding of Deleuzes notion of
univocity, as well as a failure to recognize the significance of the concept of multiplicity in
Deleuzesthinking.Fromhere,IgoontodiscussDeleuzesarticulationofthedogmaticim
ageofthought,which,insofarasittakesrecognitionasitsmodel,canonlyeverthinkwhatis
already solidified and sedimented as true, in light of existing structures and institutions of
power.Then,IexamineDeleuzesreadingofFoucaultandthenotionofthethoughtofthe
outside,showingtheoutsideastheunthoughtthatliesattheheartofthinkingitself,asboth
its condition and its impossibility. Insofar as it is essential to thinking itself, finally, I argue
thatthepassageofthoughttotheoutsideisnotanabsoluteflightoutofthisworld,asHallward
claims,butrather,areturnofthedifferentthatconstitutestheSelfforDeleuze.Thinkingisan
ongoing movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, or as Foucault says, death
andlife.Thinking,asDeleuzeunderstandsit,isessentiallycreative;itreconfiguresthevirtu
al, thereby literally changing the world. Thinking is therefore, according to Deleuze, thor
oughlypolitical.

Keywords:Outside,Badiou,Hallward,Deleuze,Foucault,Thought,Difference,Virtual,
Actual,Self,Freedom,Power,Unthought,Subject,EternalReturn,Individuation

Idiedaily.SaintPaulinhisfirstlettertotheCorinthians,Chapter15,Verse31.

Thispaperattemptstwothings:(1)Toprovidearesponsetoafewofthecriticismsthathave
beenposedinthepastdecadeandahalfagainstGillesDeleuze,namelythathisphilosophyis
elitist and aristocratic, and anathema to any possibility of politics or ethics. Deleuze, these
criticssay,contrarytothecommonlyacceptedimage,1isnotathinkeroftruemultiplicity;

AlainBadiou,Deleuze:TheClamorofBeing,trans.LouiseBurchill(Minneapolis:TheUniversityofMinnesota
1

Press,2000),10.

36
FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

heisnotthephilosopherofradicaldemocracy,2ortheliberatoroftheanarchicmultipleof
desiresanderrantdrifts3thatmanyfieryeyed,wouldberevolutionarieswouldhavehimto
be.Histhought,theysay,ishighlyelitist,4andprofoundlyaristocratic.5Itexistsinahi
erarchizedspace,6andisessentiallyindifferenttothepoliticsofthisworld.7Theresponse
itself,(inlightofthebreadthofthecriticisms),willbesomewhatbrief,andwilltreatthecriti
cisms(primarilyofAlainBadiouandPeterHallward),inanalmostmonolithicway.Onthe
one hand this is admittedly somewhat unfair, as each approach offers its own specific criti
cisms,workedoutacrossabroadanduniquespaceofanalysis.Nevertheless,thecriticisms
amount,forpurposesofthispaper,tothesame:thatthephilosophyofGillesDeleuzeisroot
edinanontologythatrejectsanyseriousnotionofagency,andthushasnothingtoofferinthe
worldofgenuinepoliticalcrisesandconditions.ForBadiouandHallward,8thisistieddirect
lytoanexcessivelymonisticinterpretationofDeleuzesontology.
(2) In the pursuit of this first goal, I shall locate the possibility of the political in
Deleuzesphilosophyinhisconceptionofthought,whichiscloselytiedtothatofMichelFou
caults concept of the thought ofthe outside. For Deleuze, thought itself is political; when
thoughtisgenuinelythinking(andmostofthetimeitisnot),itsnatureisdisruptiveandhos
tiletotheestablishedstrataofpower.IlocatethisreadingalmostentirelyinDeleuzeswrit
ingsofthe1960s(i.e.,priortohismoreexplicitlypoliticalengagementwithGuattari).Thus,
againstthosewhowouldsaythatevenDeleuzespoliticsarenotpoliticalenough,Iwillargue
that,forDeleuze(andonDeleuzesreadingofFoucaultaswell),theverypracticeofthinking
isitself,throughandthrough,political;philosophyisbyitsverynaturearevolutionaryprac
tice.

2AlanD.Schrift,Nietzsche,Foucault,Deleuze,andtheSubjectofRadicalDemocracy,Angelaki:Journalof
theTheoreticalHumanities5,No.2(2000):151161.AversionofthispaperisalsofoundinChapters2and3of
Schriftsbook,NietzschesFrenchLegacy:AGenealogyofPoststructuralism(NewYork:Routledge,1995).
3Badiou,Deleuze,10.

4Slavojiek,OrgansWithoutBodies:OnDeleuzeandConsequences(NewYork:Routledge,2012),18.

5Badiou,Deleuze,11.

6Ibid.

7PeterHallward,OutofthisWorld:DeleuzeandthePhilosophyofCreation(NewYork:Verso,2006),162.iek

makesalmostexactlythesameclaim:Deleuzeinhimselfisahighlyelitistauthor,indifferenttowardpoli
tics.iek,OrgansWithoutBodies,18.
8Slavojiek,forhispart,willdistinguishbetweenagoodDeleuzeandabadDeleuze,withthegood

beingDeleuzeonhisown,andthebadbeingtheDeleuzeGuattariassemblage.

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 Cisney:BecomingOther

1.PositioningtheProblem
Primafacie,itwouldatleastappearthatthisradicallydepoliticizingchargewouldbedifficult
toapplytoDeleuze.Didhenotcoauthor(withFlixGuattari)theonethousandpluspage,9
twovolume, Capitalism and Schizophrenia? What about the book on Kafka,10 (also with Guat
tari),wherethetwoaddressthepoliticallysuffusedconceptofaminorliterature,andoneofthe
first places where Deleuze explores the notion of assemblage, which replaces [in A Thousand
Plateaus] the idea [from AntiOedipus] of desiring machines, providing the unity of the for
mer?11 What about Foucaults own attestation that the goal of AntiOedipus is the relentless
pursuitoftheslightesttracesoffascisminthebody,andthatitisthefirstbookofethicsto
be written in France in quite a long time?12 Or what about the countless other interviews,
comments,essays,lectures,etc.,toonumeroustolist,13focusedspecificallyonpoliticalques
tionsandconcerns?Itisimportanttonotethatwhilemanyofthesepoliticallychargedtexts
aresustainedexclusivelyattheconceptuallevel,manyarealsoresponsestospecificpolitical
situations and crises. Thus, while politics is perhaps14 not central to Deleuzes project in the
pervasiveandobviouswaythatitisinFoucaults,itseemsattheveryleast,difficultifnotim
possibletosuccessfullydefendthechargethatDeleuzesthoughtisindifferenttopolitics.
Nevertheless,Deleuzesmoreexplicitlyontologicalworkscontainelementsthat,onthe
surface,mightseemtocommithimtodeterminism.Forthisreasonitisatleastpossibletosee
why one might be tempted to read such a political or ethical indifference in Deleuze.

9Onethousand,onehundred,thirtyeightintheFrench,onethousand,sixtyfourintheEnglishtranslation.
10GillesDeleuzeandFlixGuattari,Kafka:TowardaMinorLiterature,trans.DanaPolan(Minneapolis,Uni
versityofMinnesotaPress,1986).
11In1980,uponthereleaseofAThousandPlateaus,DeleuzegaveaninterviewtoCatherineClment,inwhich

sheposesthequestion,Ifthereisnosinglefieldtoactasafoundation,whatistheunityofAThousandPlat
eaus, to which Deleuze replies, I think it is the idea of an assemblage... Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of
Madness: Texts and Interviews 19751995, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina
(NewYork:Semiotext(e),2007),176177.
12 Michel Foucault, Preface, Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari, AntiOedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,

trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983),
xiii.
13Hereareafew,however.GillesDeleuze,GillesDeleuzeandFlixGuattarionAntiOedipus,inNegotia

tions:19721990,trans.MartinJoughin(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1995),1324;Deleuze,OnA
Thousand Plateaus, in Negotiations, 2534; Deleuze, Control and Becoming, in Negotiations, 169176;
Deleuze,PostscriptonControlSocieties,inNegotiations,177182;GillesDeleuzeandClaireParnet,Many
Politics,inDialoguesII,trans.HughTomlinsonandBarbaraHabberjam(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Press, 2007), 124147; Deleuze, Europe the Wrong Way, in Two Regimes of Madness, 148150; Deleuze,
Spoilers of Peace, in Two Regimes of Madness, 161163; Deleuze, Open Letter to Negris Judges, in Two
RegimesofMadness,169172;Deleuze,ThisBookisLiteralProofofInnocence,inTwoRegimesofMadness,
173174;Deleuze,TheIndiansofPalestine,inTwoRegimesofMadness,194200;Deleuze,TheGulfWar:A
DespicableWar,inTwoRegimesofMadness,379380.
14Isayperhapsherebecause,asIshallattempttodemonstrate,thequestionofthepoliticalisinfactcentralto

theentiretyofDeleuzesproject,inthattheverygoalofphilosophy,accordingtoDeleuze,isthebreakwith
thedoxa,whichis,throughandthrough,apoliticalconcern.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

Throughout his writings, one finds the repeated expression of Nietzschean amor fati,15 an af
firmation of necessity,16 and an almost unrecognizable redefinition of ethics: Either ethics
makesnosenseatall,orthisiswhatitmeansandhasnothingelsetosay:nottobeunworthy
ofwhathappenstous.17ThenotionofthesubjectinDeleuze,fromhisearlybookonHume18
throughtohisfinalessay,19isalmostalwaysdissolvedorfractal.Moreover,Deleuzesunder
standing of Nietzsches eternal return can at times sound like a thoroughgoing determinism.
ForDeleuzeitsignifiesthegreatgameofbeing,ortheanarchicruleofthegame.InNietzsche
and Philosophy, Deleuze calls it the dicethrow;20 in Difference and Repetition, the divine
game,21 which is synonymous with the ideal game22 of The Logic of Sense. In this ideal
game,therearenofreshinjectionsofchance,butrather,allthethrowsofthedicearequalita
tivelydistinct,butarethequalitativeformsofasinglecastwhichisontologicallyone,23;each
moveinventsitsownsetofrules,whichareimmanenttothemultiplicityofbeingitself.There
are,strictlyspeaking,nonotionsofresponsibilityorofwinnersandlosers.Beingisnolonger
requiredtojustifyitselfbeforeatribunal,nolongeratheodicy,butacosmodicy,24wherethe
creative play of being itself serves as its own justification. For reasons such as these, even
Deleuzessupporterscanfindthemselvesonthedefensiveregardinghisnotionofagencyand
freedom.25Yet,IcannothelpbutechotheassertionofConstantinBoundas:Iamconvinced
thatDeleuzesphilosophyisaphilosophyoffreedom,justascommittedtofreedomasSartres
philosophy was.26 But like the Stoics, but also Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Bergsonall of

15 See, for instance, Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia
UniversityPress,1983),27;GillesDeleuze,TheLogicofSense,ed.ConstantinV.Boundas,trans.MarkLester
withCharlesStivale(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1990),149,151.
16 Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is af

firmedofmultiplicity.Itwillbereplied,invain,thatthrowntochance,thedicedonotnecessarilyproduce
thewinningcombination,thedoublesixwhichbringsbackthedicethrow.Thisistrue,butonlyinsofaras
theplayerdidnotknowhowtoaffirmchancefromtheoutset.Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,26.
17Deleuze,TheLogicofSense,149.

18GillesDeleuze,EmpiricismandSubjectivity:AnEssayonHumesTheoryofHumanNature,trans.Constantin

V.Boundas(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1991).
19GillesDeleuze,Immanence:ALife,inTwoRegimesofMadness,388393.

20Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,2527.

21Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,116,282284.SeealsoDeleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,2229.

22Deleuze,TheLogicofSense,60.ThoughinTheLogicofSense,Deleuzeexplicitlyclaims,Itisnotenoughto

opposeamajorgametotheminorgameofman,noradivinegametothehumangame,(59),andasserts
thatthegamecannotbeplayedbyeithermanorGod,(60),itisclear,basedbothuponthestructureand
theterminologicalconflationoftheidealandthedivineinDifferenceandRepetition(282).
23Deleuze,TheLogicofSense,59.

24Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,25.

25See,forinstance,ConstantinV.Boundas,GillesDeleuzeandtheProblemofFreedom,ined.EugeneW.

Holland,DanielW.Smith,andCharlesJ.Stivale,GillesDeleuze:ImageandText(London:ContinuumInterna
tionalPublishingGroup,2009),221246.Seealso,inthesamecollection,HlneFrichot,OnFindingOneself
Spinozist: Refuge, Beatitude, and the AnySpaceWhatever, in ed. Holland, Smith, and Stivale, Gilles
Deleuze:ImageandText,247263.
26Boundas,GillesDeleuzeandtheProblemofFreedom,222.

39
 Cisney:BecomingOther

thosethinkersthatBadiouandHallwardpointtoasevidenceofDeleuzeselitism,orhistheo
phanicontologyforDeleuze,thefirststeptowardfreedomliesinthefull,unflinchingaware
nessofjusthowdetermined,(i.e.,constituted),onetrulyis.Itliesinanexposureoftheopera
tivepresuppositionsgoverningtheactivityofonesthinking.Thus,thenextfewsectionswill
look at Hallwards and Badious claims, before turning to Deleuzes critique of the dogmatic
imageofthought.

2.UnityandMultiplicity:BadiouandHallward
We could, as we have done, simply rest upon the ubiquity of political concerns in Deleuzes
writingsasevidenceagainstHallwardandBadiou.ButasJonRoffenotes,Inordertocon
siderthestrengthofBadiouspresentation...itisnotenoughtosimplycitethemanypassages
in Deleuzes work that would seem to depart from it, a procedure that is necessary but not
sufficient.Whatisrequiredistheexaminationoftheconsequencesofthiscentralclaimasitis
unfolded alongside Deleuzes philosophy.27 Put otherwise, to attempt to truly rescue
Deleuzesthinkingfromthechargesofhiscriticsbysimplypointingtowardapparentcounter
examples in the text would be to make things too easy on ourselves. Some of the most im
portantcriticalworkinphilosophyisconductedbydemonstratingtheimplicitcommitments
thataphilosopherorphilosophymaynot,itself,recognizeasitsown,therebyrevealingdan
gerouspresuppositionsandtendencies.Withthisinmind,letusbrieflystatethethrustofthe
criticismsofHallwardandBadiou,criticismsthattheremainderofthispaperwillrefute.
Hallwardsbook,OutofthisWorld:DeleuzeandthePhilosophyofCreation,issignificant
inthatit:(1)isoneinasmallclassoftextsthatgenuinelyattemptstoprovideabroad,over
archingreadingofDeleuzesprojectfrombeginningtoend,guidedbyasingle,basicempha
sis,namelythatDeleuzesisaphilosophyofcreation,withallthenecessaryundoingthataphi
losophyofcreationentails;(2)attemptstoreadDeleuzeagainstDeleuze,usinghisowncon
ceptsinordertobuildthecasethatthephilosopherwhowasmorecriticaloftranscendence
thananyothercontemporaryphilosopher,wasinfactpreoccupiedwiththelinesofflightout
ofthisworld.28Hallwardspointofdeparture,situatingDeleuzeinthecampofcontemporaries
suchasHenryCorbinandMichelHenry,isthatthelogicofDeleuzesworktendstoproceed
broadly in line with a theophanic conception of things, whereby every individual process or
thingisconceivedasamanifestationorexpressionofGodoraconceptualequivalentofGod
(pure creative potential, force, energy, life...).29 While admitting that Deleuze certainly
doesnt acknowledge any transcendent idea of God, Hallward argues that in a number of
importantways his work is consistent withthe generallogicof a cosmic pantheism, i.e.,the
notionthattheuniverseandallitcontainsisafacetofasingularandabsolutecreativepow
er.30 With this in mind, Deleuzes philosophy does not so much eliminate the question of
transcendence as distribute it throughout creation as a whole, assigning the task of self

27JonRoffe,BadiousDeleuze(MontrealandKingston:McGillQueensUniversityPress,2012),8.
28Seealso,ErinnCunniffGilson,PeterHallward:OutofthisWorld:DeleuzeandthePhilosophyofCrea
tion,ContinentalPhilosophyReview42(2009):429434.
29Hallward,OutofthisWorld,4.

30Ibid.

40
FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

transcendencetoitseverycreature.31Whileontheonehandadmittingthatasingularcrea
tiveforceisnothingotherthanthemultiplicationofsingularcreatings,(apointthat,Imust
admit,seemsinconsistentwitharobusttheophanicontology),heasserts,youareonlyreally
anindividualifGod(orsomethinglikeGod)makesyouso.32BysimplyequatingDeleuzian
univocitywithSpinozisticsubstance,Hallwardattemptstoobliterateanyapparentdifferences
betweenDeleuzeandSpinoza(andapparently,DeleuzeandBergsonaswell).33
He does this in three basic steps: (1) Defining, (echoing Spinoza, who defines the es
sence of God as power34), Deleuzes sense of univocal being as unconditional creativity.35
Lifes essence lies in its perpetually expressing its self, which is in reality an indivisible
flow,36differentiallyalongmyriadlinesandpatternsofactivity.ForSpinoza,justasGods
essence is power, the essence of each individual thing is precisely the degree to which it ex
pressesGodspower,orwhatSpinozacallstheconatusofeachlivingthing,itsstrivingtoen
hance.Likewise,asHallwardreadsDeleuze,iftheessenceofunivocalbeingisunlimitedcre
ativity,thenthemoreeachindividualthingexpressesthisessence,themorerealitwillbe;(2)
Hallward then conceives Deleuzes virtualactual distinction in a fundamentally ontological
andunilaterallydeterminativeway.Thevirtualistheconditionoftheactual(justasBergsons
virtualpastispresupposedastheconditionofthepresentmoment),37thereisarealontological
distinctionbetweenthetwo,andtheactual,whollydeterminedbythevirtual,innowayde
terminesthevirtual.Thedeterminationiswhollyonesidedandcreaturescaninnowaytake
partincreation:asaresult,theactual,thoughwehabituallytreatitassolidorsubstantial,is
inrealityephemeralandillusory.Thevirtualaloneisreal;38(3)Theessenceofphilosophical
lifewillthereforebetheongoingprocessofdeterritorialization,whichistosay,awayofliving
andthinkingthatreversesthemovementthatcreatedus.39Evolutionhasbredintousfinite
creatures the tendencyto cognize things, (includingourselves), precisely as things, that is,as
individualspossessingsomethinglikeaselfcontainedidentity,(apple,tree,tiger,etc.).These
things,however,(again,includingourselves)haveonlyephemeralbeing,andwefinitecrea
tures in fact impede the activity of divine unlimited creativity when we seek to assert and pre
serveanymeasureofourownautonomy.Thetrulyphilosophicalmind,however,willrecog
nizethisephemeralnaturealongwiththedivinityofunlimitedcreativity,andwillthusseekto
dissolvethatselfbackintotheonenessofunivocalbeing:Ifbeingiscreationandifbeingbe
comesmorecreativethelessitscreatingsareobstructedbycreatures,thentheprivilegeofphi

31Ibid.,6.
32Ibid.,5.
33Forexample,AlongwithSpinoza,itisaboveallBergsonwhoguidesDeleuzesthinkingofthispoint.

Hallward,OutofthisWorld,14.
34BenedictdeSpinoza,Ethics,PartI,Proposition34.

35Hallward,OutofthisWorld,15.

36Ibid.,17.

37Ibid.,33.

38Ibid.,35.

39Ibid.

41
 Cisney:BecomingOther

losophyisthatitisthedisciplinemostadequatetoourexpressionofbeingassuch.40This,in
short,isHallwardsreading:Deleuze,attheendoftheday,isamystic,whoseethicsconsists
of, (borrowing an expression from Keswick theology), letting go and letting God, in this case
understoodasunlimitedcreation.Assuch,itsimplycannottakeanyinterestwhatsoeverin
thelivesandsufferingsofbeings,whoare,attheendoftheday,nothingmorethanephemeral
expressionsofunlimitedcreativity.Thus,ithasnothingtrulyinterestingtoofferinthewayof
ethicsandpolitics:thoseofuswhostillseektochangeourworldandtoempoweritsinhab
itantswillneedtolookforourinspirationelsewhere.41
Formypurposes,BadiouscriticismsarenotsignificantlydifferentfromthoseofHall
ward. CitingDeleuze,Asingleandsamevoiceforthewholethousandvoicedmultiple,a
42

singleandsameOceanforallthedrops,asingleclamorofBeing43forallbeings:oncondition
thateachbeing,eachdropandeachvoicehasreachedthestateofexcessinotherwords,the
difference which displaces and disguises them and, in turning upon its mobile cusp, causes
themtoreturn.44Again,inDifferenceandRepetition,Badioucitesthefollowingpassage,What
is important is that we can conceive of several formally distinct senses which none the less
refer to being as if to a single designated entity, ontologically one.45 Badiou removes the
wordsbeingasiftofromhisowncitation,sothatweareleftwith,referto...asingledesig
nated entity, ontologically one.46 (Leaving the words as if would weaken Badious case
somewhat). Elsewhere, in The Logic of Sense, Being is the unique event in which all events
communicatewithoneanother.47Onthebasisofpassagessuchasthese,andwithlittleelse
inthewayofargumentation,Badiouconcludes,Deleuzesfundamentalproblemismostcer
tainlynottoliberatethemultiplebuttosubmitthinkingtoarenewedconceptoftheOne.48
NotingthattheconceptofunivocityistheguidingthreadoftheentiretyofDeleuzesreading

40Ibid.,127.
41Ibid.,164.
42WhileitistruethatinBadiouspublishedreviewofDeleuzesLeibnizbook,Badiouclaimsthatthecentral

choiceinthehistoryofphilosophyhasalwaysbeenthechoicebetweentheorganicandthemathematical,
andthatDeleuzealwayschoosestheorganic,(anentirelydifferentlineofargumentationfromanythingthat
Hallwardoffers),neverthelessasBadiouarticulateshismostforcefulcriticismsinDeleuze:TheClamorofBe
ing,IseelittledifferencebetweenthecriticismsofHallwardandthoseofBadiou.Indeed,Hallwardalmost
appears at times to be at pains to prove just how different they are: See Hallward,Out of this World,8182,
167n23. For the aforementioned review, see, Alain Badiou, Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Ba
roque, in The Adventure of French Philosophy, ed. Bruno Bosteels (New York: Verso, 2012), 241267. For a
readingoftheBadiouDeleuzerelationthatattemptstoreadBadiouscriticismsinlightofBadiousownpro
ject, see John Mullarkey, Badiou and Deleuze, published on his academia.edu website:
http://www.academia.edu/212618/Badiou_and_Deleuze,(accessed05/25/2013).
43Thisphrase,theclamorofBeing,isthesubtitleofBadiousbook.

44Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,304.

45Ibid.,35.

46Badiou,Deleuze,19.

47Deleuze,TheLogicofSense,p.180.

48Badiou,Deleuze,10.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

ofthehistoryofphilosophy(atbestapartialtruth),Badiouclaimsthattheelucidationofthe
conceptofunivocityisthesingularmotivationofhisanalysis.
Proceeding, Badiou highlights two theses regarding Deleuzian univocity: In the first
place,univocitydoesnotsignifythatbeingisnumericallyone,whichisanemptyassertion.49
TheOnethatDeleuzeisafter,Badiouargues,isnotanumericalOne,somuchasasubstantial
One,andhereagainBadiouleansonSpinoza,offeringapassagefromDifferenceandRepetition
ashisevidenceforthisclaim:thereareindeedformsofbeing,butcontrarytowhatissug
gestedbythecategories,theseformsinvolvenodivisionwithinbeingorpluralityofontologi
calsenses.50ThesecondthesisthatBadiouformulates:IneachformofBeing,therearetobe
foundindividuatingdifferencesthatmaywellbenamedbeings.Butthesedifferences,these
beings, never have the fixedness or the power of distribution and classification that may be
attributed, for example, to species or generalities, or even individuals...51 For Badiou, the
combination of these two theses entails that individual beings, on Deleuzes ontology, are
nothingmorethanlocalizeddegreesofintensity,orexpressivemodalitiesoftheOne,52such
thattherearenorealnumericaldistinctionsbetweenbeings,andtheapparentdiversityofthe
livingisjustthat,apparent:theequivocalstatusofbeings,hasnorealstatus.53Relyingheav
ilyonDeleuzesuse(inDifferenceandRepetitionandTheLogicofSense)ofthetermsimulacrum,
Badiouwillarguethattheworldofbeings,forDeleuze,canonlybeatheaterofthesimulacra
ofBeing.54ItisforthisreasonthatBadioucharacterizesDeleuzesthoughtasalatterdayNe
oplatonism. We can therefore see very close parallels with Hallwards diagnosis of the
ephemeralnatureofindividualbeings.
WhenweturntothevirtualandtheactualinBadiou,weagainfindasimilarparallel.
Declaring, without argumentation or textual support, that the virtual marks the principal
nameofBeinginDeleuzeswork,55Badiouproceedstoarguethat,intryingsodesperatelyto
sustainthedoctrineofunivocity,Deleuzeisforcedtopushtherealtoitsbreakingpoint,rele
gatingtheactualitselftothesphereofirreality.Thatthevirtualis,forBadiou,theBeingof
beings56entailsthatitisidenticalwiththeOneofDeleuzianunivocity,orwhathecallsthe
dynamic agency of the One.57 Badiou rightly notes the great pains Deleuze takes to distin
guish the virtual from the possible. The possible, Deleuze claims, is little more than an ideal
identity that merely doubles the real, and subsequently divests it conceptually of existence.
Thepossiblecanthusservenogroundingorexplanatoryfunction(inasmuchasitresembles
thatwhichitispurportedtoexplain).Thus,Deleuzeclaims,thevirtualisopposednottothe

49Ibid.,23.
50Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,303.
51Badiou,Deleuze,24.

52Ibid.

53Ibid.

54Ibid.,25.

55Ibid.,42.

56Ibid.,47.

57Ibid.,48.

43
 Cisney:BecomingOther

real,buttotheactual.Thevirtualisfullyrealinsofarasitisvirtual.58Thoughtrequiresaformal
distinctionbetweenthevirtualandtheactual,inordertocomprehendtheprocessofactualiza
tionitself;andthevirtual,Badiouclaims,justisthisprocess.However,thevirtualisnottobe
understood as undetermined, but is, rather, completely determined.59 Here Badiou cites
Deleuzes comparison of the virtual to a mathematical problem, and the actual to its corre
spondingsolution.Justastheelementsofthemathematicalproblemaredetermined,sotooare
theelementsofthevirtual.Buttheproblems,(orvirtualities),Badiouclaims,relatenotonlyto
their solutions, but also to other problems. So while the problems of the virtual completely
determinetheirownsolutionstheyarealsofurtherdeterminedbythenetworkofproblemsin
which they inhere. For this reason, It follows that the sovereignty of the One is double,60
inasmuchasthevirtualdeterminesitself(likethetheistsGod),butalsodeterminescompletely
theactualaswell.
But the virtual, Badiou reminds us, though it is determinative of the actual, cannot be
thoughtasseparatefromtheobjectofwhichitisthegeneticground,asthiswoulddestroythe
univocity that Deleuzes ontology requires. Therefore, every object, Deleuze claims, is
doublewithoutitbeingthecasethatthetwohalvesresembleoneanother,onebeingavirtual
image and the other an actual image.61 From here Badiou makes an unexplained leap from
DifferenceandRepetition(1968)toCinema2:TheTimeImage(1985).While,inprinciple,thereis
nothingwrongwithcomparingaDeleuzianconceptinonetextwithitsnamesakeinanother
text,(thiscan,afterall,beausefulmethodofenrichment),nevertheless,itseemsthatitshould
be carefully prefaced with all the necessary caveats, namely that the terms are separated by
nearlytwodecadesandmotivatedbyanentirelydifferentsetofquestions.Asstated,Badiou
doesnotexplaintheleap.Nevertheless,thepassageheciteshere,whereDeleuzearticulates
theBergsonianforkingstructureofthepresent,isthefollowing:distinctandyetindiscernible,
and all the more indiscernible because distinct, because we do not know which is one and
whichistheother.Thisisunequalexchange,orthepointofindiscernibility,themutualim
age.62Onthebasisofthispassage,Badiouclaimsthatultimately,Deleuzecanonlymaintain
theunivocityofBeingbyarguingforindiscernibilitybetweenthevirtualandtheactual.They
mustbethoughtofasformallyseparate,andyettheycannotbethoughtasseparateitisim
possible.Furthermore,sinceBeingmustbeconceivedasunivocal,itfollowsthattheactual,

58Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,208.
59Ibid.,209.
60Badiou,Deleuze,49.

61Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,209.

62GillesDeleuze,Cinema2:TheTimeImage,trans.HughTomlinsonandRobertGaleta(Minneapolis:Univer

sityofMinnesotaPress,1989),81.Inthispassage,Deleuzeisexaminingcharacteristicsofwhathecallsthe
crystalimage, which is one of the types of what Deleuze calls the timeimage, the moment in cinema
where time is no longer subordinated to movement, but rather, conversely, movement is subordinated to
time. The indiscernibility that Badiou, by reference to Deleuze via Bergson, cites, isindeed a reference to
Bergsons forking structure of time, where the present is contemporaneous with its past, and the past is
formed in the present. The indiscernibility then refers to certain directors and their affection for reflection
and indiscernibility, (like Welles, Resnais, Godard, Fellini, etc.). While the concepts are without question
related,neverthelesstheunexplainedleapfromoneusetotheotherseemsproblematictosaytheleast.

44
FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

strictlyspeakingforDeleuze,mustbeirrealandnonobjective.Thisisbecause,asweknow,
thevirtualisthenameoftheBeingofbeingsinDeleuze,andtheactualisthedeterminationof
thevirtual.
Finally,onthebasisoftheBergsonianforkingstructureofthepresent,Badiouequates
theDeleuzianvirtualwiththeBergsonianpast.Furthermore,Philosophymergeswithontol
ogy, but ontology merges with the univocity of Being...63 To think philosophically, Badiou
claims,is, forDeleuze, tothinkunivocity, butthismeans tothinkthe One, which is synony
mouswiththeFoucaultianoutside.Badiourightlynotesthat,accordingtoDeleuze,thinkingis
precisely the opening of oneself to the outside, coupled with the process of folding; this is
whatconstitutesasubject.However,onBadiousreading,giventhattheoutsidetowhichone
opensoneselfisnothingotherthanthecompletelydeterminedandimmutableOne,64itfollows
thatthissubjectisnothingmorethananenfoldedselectionofthepast.65Itisforthisreason,
explicitly,thatBadiourejectstheDeleuziansystem,stating,allinall,iftheonlywaytothink
apoliticalrevolution,anamorousencounter,aninventionofthesciences,oracreationofart
as distinct infinities...is by sacrificing immanence...and the univocity of Being, then I would
sacrifice them.66 If that were what were necessary, in order to render eternal one of those
rarefragmentsoftruththattraversehereandthereourbleakworld,67Badiouclaims,itisa
sacrificeworthmaking.
Withthat,wecanbegintodissectthesecriticisms,startingwithunivocityandthetheo
phanicOne.Ibegin,first,bynotingthefollowing:thetwothesesregardingDeleuzianunivoci
tythatBadiouclaimstohaveabstractedfromDeleuzesthought,arenotBadiousabstractions
at all. Rather, they are Deleuzes abstractions. Furthermore, they do not apply strictly to
Deleuzesownunderstandingofunivocity,buttotheunderstandingsofDunsScotusandSpi
nozarespectively:Accordingtoone,thereareindeedformsofbeing,butcontrarytowhatis
suggestedbythecategories,theseformsinvolvenodivisionwithinbeingorpluralityofonto
logicalsenses.Accordingtotheother,thatofwhichbeingissaidisrepartitionedaccordingto
essentiallymobileindividuatingdifferenceswhichnecessarilyendoweachonewithaplural
ityofmodalsignifications.68Badiouevencitesexcerptsofthispassage,buthecitesthemas
though he were offering his own textual evidence for what he calls his abstracted theses re
gardingDeleuzianunivocity.InfacttheyaretwoaspectsofunivocitythatDeleuzeattributes
tootherthinkers,namelyJohnDunsScotusandSpinoza.Interestingly,(perhapsevenneces
sarily),BadioudoesnotcitewhatDeleuzesaysjustafewsentenceslater:AllthatSpinozism
neededtodofortheunivocaltobecomeanobjectofpureaffirmationwastomakesubstance
turnaroundthemodesinotherwords,torealizeunivocityintheformofrepetitionintheeternal

63Deleuze,TheLogicofSense,179.
64Badiou,Deleuze,90.
65Ibid.

66Ibid.,9091.

67Ibid.,91.

68Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,303.

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 Cisney:BecomingOther

return.69Inotherwords,thesetwothesesalmostgetustoathoroughgoingunivocity,butnot
quite,andSpinozaiscountedinthiscritique.
ThisposesasignificantproblemforthemonisticchargeagainstDeleuze,whetherinits
BadiouianorHallwardianform.BothoverlooktheexplicitcriticismthatDeleuze,despiteall
his affection for Spinoza, levels against him. It is true that Spinoza, (along with Scotus and
Nietzsche),occupies a central place in Deleuzes thought, as one of the great thinkers of uni
vocity,70 the philosopher who embraces an immanent conception of univocal being. While
thesetwoconcepts,univocityandimmanence,areconceptuallydistinct,71inthehandsofSpi
nozaasreadbyDeleuze,theyareinseparable:Univocalbeingbecomesidenticalwithunique,
universal,andinfinitesubstance:itisproposedasDeussiveNatura.72WhileJohnDunsScotus
(fearingtheverypantheismintowhichSpinozafearlesslyleapt),73hadaffirmedtheunivocity
of being, but only in an abstract and neutral way, Spinoza, on the contrary, posited the full
identityofGodandbeing,turningthewholeofbeingintoanobjectofpureaffirmation,dareI
say,worship.
However,accordingtoDeleuze,Spinozasontologydoesnotgoquitefarenoughinthe
direction of radical immanence. This is because a conceptual privileging of the identity of
Substance,whichservesastheontologicalgroundofitsexpressions(themodes)isleftintact:
Substance is prior in nature to its affections,74 according to Spinoza. Substance, Spinoza
says,isthatwhichisinitselfandisconceivedthroughitself;thatis,thatwhichdoesnotneed
theconceptofanotherthing,fromwhichconceptitmustbeformed.75Thereis,inthissense,a
definitionaldistinctionbetweenSubstanceandthemodes,andasaresult,anontologicalpri
ority of Substance over modes. Substance can be conceptualized on its own, apart from the
modes, while the converse cannot be said of the modes themselves. For Deleuze, however,
substancemustitselfbesaidofthemodesandonlyofthemodes.76Spinozaultimatelymain
tainsanessentialunityoridentityoftheonesubstance,whichforDeleuzedoesnotsufficient
ly free up difference in itself. This transition is made possible only by Nietzsches notion of
eternalreturn.AsFoucaultsays,ForDeleuze,thenoncategoricalunivocityofbeingdoesnot

69Ibid.,304.
70Onthisconcept,seeDanielW.Smith,TheDoctrineofUnivocity:DeleuzesOntologyofImmanence,in
EssaysonDeleuze(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,2012),2742.IamdeeplyindebtedtoDanielW.
Smith both personally and professionally; Seealso,Miguelde Beistegui,Immanence:Deleuze and Philosophy
(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,2010),esp.2739.
71 That this is the case is evident in the Spinoza/Duns Scotus divide. Duns Scotus affirms the univocity of

being,distinguishingthenbetweeninfiniteandfinitebeing,thusleavingintacttheorthodoxyofthehetero
geneityofGodandNature;Spinoza,onthecontrary,affirmstheunivocityofbeingbywayofabolishingthe
distinctionbetweenGodandNature.
72Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,40.

73 For instance, Furthermore, univocity in Scotus seems compromised by a concern to avoid pantheism,

GillesDeleuze,ExpressionisminPhilosophy:Spinoza,trans.MartinJoughin(NewYork:ZoneBooks,1992),67.
SeealsoDeleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,39.
74BenedictdeSpinoza,Ethics,PartI,Proposition1.

75Ibid.,Definition3.

76Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,40.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

directlyattachthemultipletounityitself(theuniversalneutralityofbeing,ortheexpressive
force of substance); it puts being into play as that which is repetitively expressed as differ
ence.77InplaceofSpinozisticSubstance,Deleuzethusemploystheconceptofthemultiplicity,
whichprovidestheorganizationalandsystematizingoperationofunivocalbeing.However,
thisisdonewithoutanysemblanceofunifiedagency:multiplicitymustnotdesignateacom
binationofthemanyandtheone,butrather,anorganizationbelongingtothemanyassuch,
whichhasnoneedwhatsoeverofunityinordertoformasystem.78GivenDeleuzescritique
of Spinozistic Substance, and the concept of the multiplicity with which he replaces it, it
wouldappearthatanycriticismmovingfromastrictDeleuzeSpinozaalliancetoanassertion
ofaDeleuzianmonismthatentailsanindifferencetopolitics,isdifficult,ifnotimpossibletode
fend.
Thesecondpieceofthesecriticismsthatmustbedismantledistheassertionoftheuni
lateral determination of the actual by the virtual. BothHallward and Badiouarguethat the
virtual,beingthegeneticgroundoftheactual,whollydeterminestheactualityoftheactual;
the expressivity runs only one way, with Badiou referring to it as the inversion of teleology.79
Butthisisadrasticallysimple,indeedwrongheadedandreductionistwayofdescribingapro
cessthatDeleuzespendsagreatdealoftimearticulating(twochaptersofDifferenceandRepeti
tion,asIseeit).Tocharacterizetherelationbetweenthevirtualandtheactual,Deleuzeem
ploysanotherconceptualdistinction:thedifferentiationdifferenciationdistinction:Whereas
differentiationdeterminesthevirtualcontentoftheIdeaasproblem,differenciationexpresses
theactualizationofthisvirtualandtheconstitutionofsolutions(bylocalintegrations).80The
Ideais,forDeleuze,thematerialofthevirtual,theproblematicmultiplicityofdifferentialrela
tions,eachofwhichisperplicated,ultimately,withallothers.WhatDeleuzecallsdifferentia
tion is the perpetual restructuring and redetermination of the virtual. On the basis of these
configurations,thevirtualisactualized,andtheactualizationisanalogoustosolvingtheprob
lem.Thisactualizationisitselftheresultofaprocessofdiffering,whichDeleuzealsocallsdiffer
enciation.Inthisregard,fourtermsaresynonymous:actualize,differenciate,integrate,and
solve.81WecanalreadyseethatthebinarysystemofferedbyBadiouandHallwardisinfact
muchmorecomplicatedthantheywouldhaveusbelieve.ToquoteRoffe,Itisthedifferenti
ationindividuationdramatizationexplication structure that is fundamental in Difference
andRepetition,notthevirtualactual.82
Butmoreimportantly,theirrespectiveaccountsoverlooktheveryimportantnotionof
reciprocal determination in Deleuzes account. For what connects the virtual to the actual is
whatDeleuzecallsthesingularity:Ontheonehand,completedeterminationcarriesoutthe

77 Michel Foucault, Theatrum Philosophicum, in ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley, et. al. The
EssentialWorksofFoucault:19541984,Volume2:Aesthetics,Method,andEpistemology,seriesed.PaulRabinow
(NewYork:TheNewPress,1998),360.
78Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,182.

79Badiou,Deleuze,52.

80Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,209.

81Ibid.,211.

82Roffe,BadiousDeleuze,148.

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 Cisney:BecomingOther

differentiation of singularities, but it bears only upon their existence and their distribution.
The nature of these singular points is specified only by the form of the neighboring integral
curvesin other words, by virtue of the actual or differenciated species and spaces.83 The
singularity,forDeleuze,isthedifferentialelement,ordifferenceinitself,knownastheintensity,
whichhesaysisanimplicatedmultiplicity;84anelementalimbalanceordifferenceincapableof
changingitsquantitywithouttherebychangingitsnature.Whatisabsolutelycrucialforour
rejectionofHallwardsandBadiousrenderingofunilateraldeterminationispreciselythat,for
Deleuze,thevirtualdifferentiatessingularities,butonlywithrespecttotheirexistenceanddis
tribution. In other words, the intensities borne by the virtual are themselves teeming with
vitality,whichiscontrarytotheunilaterallydeterminative(anddeterministic)readingofthe
actual that Hallward and Badiou impose upon Deleuze. Here, the actual is but a series of
dead letters sent by the One,85 the actual is itself, on Deleuzes understanding, vibrant and
vital.
Nevertheless, we have yet to arrive at our promised possibility of Deleuzian agency.
ForthisreasonweturntoanalyzeDeleuzesunderstandingofthethoughtoftheoutside,in
ordertoexplainhowitisinasystemthataffirmsallofchance,allatoncethatonebecomesa
subject. To do this we must first look at Deleuzes understanding of the Dogmatic Image of
Thought.

3.TheDogmaticImageofThought
Martin Heidegger writes, Most thoughtprovoking is that we are still not thinking...86 Deleuze
agrees,locatingthisincapacitationorsedimentationinafundamentallyreactiveconceptionof
thenatureofthoughtitself,whichinitsvariousformswouldseektolimit,restrain,confine,or
constraintheactivityofthinking.Despiteitsselfconceptionasthepresuppositionlessscience,
andeveninitsmostseeminglyradicalandtransformativemoments,philosophyseemsinca
pable of escaping the model of the circle: the presupposition that thought can only recognize
what was already there inthe beginning. Descartes, after doubting the veracity of allofhis
beliefs,reliesuponthepresuppositionsofselfandthoughttobuyitallback:itispresumed
thateveryoneknows,independentlyofconcepts,whatismeantbyself,thinking,andbeing.87
EdmundHusserlrejectsthetraditional,punctilinearmodeloftime,onlytoreinstateitwith
hisnotionoftheprimalimpression,whichhecallsthesourcepointofretention;88andHeidegger
himselfexplicitlyinvokesapreontologicalunderstandingofbeing,relyinguponthenotionof

83Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,210.
84Ibid.,244.
85Roffe,BadiousDeleuze,143.

86MartinHeidegger,WhatisCalledThinking?,trans.J.GlennGray(NewYork:HarperandRow,Publishers,

1968),4.
87Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,129.

88 See, Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (18931917), trans. John

BarnettBrough(Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1992),70.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

the circle in his explication of Dasein.89 The philosophical conception of thought is in fact
founded upon a prephilosophical and natural Image of thought, borrowed from the pure
elementofcommonsense.90Thatthereisassumedafundamentalframeworktotheactivity
ofthinking,abodyofcontentthateverybodyknowshas,accordingtoDeleuze,perenniallybeen
thecripplingstrokeofphilosophicalendeavor,thatwhichpreventsthinkingfromfulfillingits
transformativefunction:Wemaycallthisimageofthoughtadogmatic,orthodox,ormoral
image.91
ThenotionofadogmaticimageofthoughtmarksDeleuzesworkfromhisfirstpublished
bookonNietzsche,92anditplaysacentralroleinDifferenceandRepetition.Thedogmaticim
age of thought consists of three key elements: common sense, good sense, and a method of
thinking.Commonsense,Deleuzesays,isunderstoodunderthedoubleaspectofagood
willonthepartofthethinkerandanuprightnatureonthepartofthought.93Thoughthasanatural
affinity with truth, and the thinker naturally loves and desires truth, or, All men by nature
desiretoknow.94Itisforthisreasonthateverybodyknowswhatitmeanstothink.Therecip
rocalcomponenttocommonsenseisgoodsense,thecapacityforthought,95thepresupposed
abilitythatthoughtnaturallypossessestoattaintruth.Thinking,itisheld,isthenaturalexer
ciseofthefacultyofthought,whichisunderstoodtobetheunityofalltheotherfaculties,cen
tralized in a single and unified subject.96 Common sense dictates that the faculty of thought
naturallydesirestruth,whilegoodsensedeclaresthatitisessentiallycapableofattainingit.
Thought,therefore,isnaturallysound,97inherentlypure,andmorallyupright.98
Nevertheless,andinspiteoftheassumptionofthoughtsnaturalaffinitywithtruth,phi
losophers almost without exception have held that truth is very difficult to attain, and most
humanbeingsaresimplynotuptothetask.ForChristianity,thisisbecausehumannatureis
fallenandcorrupt.ForPlatonism,itisbecauseoursoulisconstitutednotonlybyreason,but
alsobyspiritandappetites.ForDescartes,itisbecauseourwill,beinginfinite,exceedsour
judgmentwhichisfinite.Iftruthisunderstoodasthenaturalobjectofthought,thenitsnatu
ralenemyiserror.Thethinkerisledastrayinheractivityofthinkingwhensheallowsforces,
externaltothefacultyofthoughtitself,(body,passions,sensuousinterests)99toinfiltratethe

89MartinHeidegger,BeingandTime,trans.JohnMacquarrieandEdwardRobinson(NewYork:Harperand
Row,1962),195.
90Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,131.

91Ibid.

92SeeDeleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,103110.

93Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,131.

94Aristotle,Metaphysics,BookI,PartI.

95Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,132.

96HereitisworthnotingthatDescartes,inthesecondMeditation,explicitlyclusterstogetherdoubting,un

derstanding, affirming, denying, willing, wanting, refusing, imagining, and sensing, under the banner of
thinking.
97PaulPatton,DeleuzeandthePolitical,(NewYork:Routledge,2000),18.

98HereweshouldnotethatinKant,thisismadeexplicit,whenintheGroundworkfortheMetaphysicsofMor

als,hedirectlyarguesthatmoralityisinseparablefromrationality.
99Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,103.

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 Cisney:BecomingOther

actofthinkingandcontaminateitwithwhatisforeigntoit.Errorthen,orthefailuretoreach
orisolatethetruth,isunderstoodastheeffect,inthoughtassuch,ofexternalforceswhich
areopposedtothought.100Whatisthereforerequiredinordertokeeptheactivityofthinking
onthestraightandnarrowpathtowardstruthisanexplicitandmeticulouslyformulatedmethod.
Themethod,Deleuzeclaims,isfoundeduponthemodelofrecognition,understoodas
the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object: the same object
may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined, or conceived.101 Here we can think of Des
cartesfamouswaxexampleinthesecondMeditation,thatitisofcoursethesamewaxwhich
Isee,whichItouch,whichIpictureinmyimagination,inshortthesamewaxwhichIthought
ittobefromthestart.102Alternatively,wemayconsideroneoftheperennialobjectsofphilo
sophicalaffection:thetruthsofmathematics;7+5=12,forexample.Whatmakesthispropo
sitiontrue,Irecognize,isthatinvirtueofthemeaningsofthetermsinvolved,thesolutionholds.
Furthermore, it is undeniably certain to any other rational subject who, like myself, under
standsthemeaningsofthetermsandsymbolsinvolved.Moreover,itwouldbetrue,evenif
therewerenorationalsubjectsatalltorecognizethemeaningsoftherespectivetermsandsymbols.A
question, on this model is akin to the kind of question posed to the schoolchild on an exam:
OnwhatdatedidtheJapanesebombPearlHarbor?Whatisthesquarerootof144?Etc.
Thesolutiontothequestion,thedogmaticimageholds,isonethatisindeedaccessibleevenif
itisnotcurrentlyknowntoallwhowouldembarkfaithfullyuponthepathtoknowledge.
AsPaulPattonnotes,knowledgeinthemodelofrecognitionisunderstoodintermsofsolu
tions to particular puzzles or problems which can be expressed in propositional form.103 In
thismodephilosophicalargumentationproceedsbywayofaseriesofpremises(whichthephi
losopher believes the reader will recognize, prima facie, to be true), to a conclusion, (which,
giventherecognitionofthetruthofthepremisesandthevalidityoftheargument,is,inthe
end,equallyrecognizable).Recognitionthusunitesthepresuppositionoftheidentityoftheob
jectofknowledge(notonlyformyselfbutforallotherrationalsubjects)andtheidentityofthe
subject (insofar as I adhere strictly to the established method of avoiding error); it unites
commonsenseandgoodsense,thetwohalvesofthedoxa.104
Deleuzescriticismsofthedogmaticimageofthoughtarenotthatitisfalseorinerror,
perse,sincerecognitionhasitsuses.Rather,itisthecasethatforDeleuzethinkingdesig
natessomethinglarger.Hiscriticismsarethereforeasfollows:(1)Ifthebeginningofphiloso
phyisindeedtheeliminationofallpresuppositions,105(andDeleuzethinksthatitis),thedogmat
icimageofthought,(insofarasitpresupposescertainrestrictionsontheactivityofthinking)
fails to accomplish this. If, moreover, the task of philosophy is the overturning of the doxa
(and Deleuze thinks that it is), then adhering to a philosophical orthodoxy, (however institu
tionalized,howevertraditional,itmaybe),isinfactantitheticaltothepracticeofphilosophy:

100Ibid.
101Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,133.
102Ibid.Here,DeleuzecitesthispassagefromthesecondMeditation.

103Patton,DeleuzeandthePolitical,20.

104Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,134.

105Ibid.,129.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

The supposed three levelsa naturally upright thought, an in principle natural common
sense, and a transcendental model of recognitioncan constitute only an ideal orthodoxy.
Philosophyisleftwithoutmeanstorealizeitsprojectofbreakingwithdoxa;106(2)Recognition
asthemodelofthinkingfundamentallyservesasajustificationforsystemsofoppressioncur
rentlyinvogue.Throughouthistorythemosthorrificactshavealmostalwaysbeenfounded
upon the assertion of everybody knows. For instance, at various moments in time, everybody
knewthatpeopleofAfricandescentwerenaturallyinferiortopeopleofEuropeandescent;that
Jewswereparasiticgreedmongers;thatwomenwerenaturallyemotionalcreatures,incapable
ofthinkingorbehavingrationally;thatnonhumananimalscouldnotfeelpain,andsoforth.
IntheUnitedStates,everybodyknowsthatthesolutiontogunviolenceistheexpansionofac
cessibilitytoguns;thatmarketcompetitionissynonymouswithdemocracy;thatanIraqicivil
ianslifeisworthlessinthegrandschemeofthingsthanthelifeofanAmerican;thatAmerica
wasfoundedupontheteachingsoftheBible;thatsocialismisafailedexperiment;etc.Agreat
manyatrocitiesandtyrannieshavebeenperpetratedinhistoryinthenameofprinciplesthat
everybodyknows;(3)Finally,andmostfundamentally,itignoresothermodesandpossibilities
of thought, such as malevolence, madness, and stupidity. From the perspective of the dog
maticimageofthought,madnessandstupiditycanonlybeconceivedasempirical,inessen
tial,andaccidentalstatesofthesubject.Theyareunderstoodasconditionedbyforcesexternal
tothinking.Hence,Thesoleeffectoftheseforcesinthoughtisthenassimilatedpreciselyto
error,whichissupposedinprincipletoincludealltheeffectsoffactualexternalcauses107;yet,
schizophreniaisawayinwhichthoughtoccurs;stupidityisawayinwhichthought(unfortu
nately, quite frequently) occurs. The dogmatic image is thus an account of thought, which
deliberatelyandexplicitlyfailstotakenoteofsomeofthemostcommontypesofthought,that
istosay,ofanythingthatunderminesitsalreadyacceptedunderstandingofwhatthoughtis:
Cowardice, cruelty, baseness and stupidity are not simply corporeal capacities or traits of
character or society; they are structures of thought as such. The transcendental landscape
comes to life: places for the tyrant, the slave and the imbecile must be found within it
withouttheplaceresemblingthefigurewhooccupiesit...108Thetranscendentalmustnotre
sembletheempirical,forifitdoes,then,justasPhiloexplainsinPartIVofHumesDialogues
ConcerningNaturalReligion,it(thetranscendental)isnothingmorethananimagineddoubleor
copyoftheempirical.Thisthenalsorequiresanexplanationandthereforeexplainsnothingat
all.Atrulyphilosophicalconceptionofthinkingmusttakeintoaccounttherealforcesthat
form thought...109 the forces that make possible not only recognition, but also the myriad
formsofwhatwecallerror:Thereductionofstupidity,malevolenceandmadnesstothesin
gle figure of error must therefore be understood to occur in principlewhence the hybrid
characterofthisweakconceptwhichwouldnothaveaplacewithinpurethoughtifthought
were not diverted from without, and would not be occasioned bythis outside if the outside

106Ibid.,134.
107Ibid.,149.
108Ibid.,151.

109Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,103.

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 Cisney:BecomingOther

werenotwithinpurethought.110Thedogmaticimageofthought,takingnonoticeofthisout
side,guidesalmostallofwhatwethinkanddo,andforDeleuze,whatiscrucialisthatwedo
notrecognizeit.ThisiswhytheDeleuziandisruptionissoimportanttoatheoryoffreedom.
Thisbringsustothethoughtoftheoutside,anotioninspiredbyFoucault.

4.TheThoughtoftheOutside
MichelFoucaults1966essay,titled,TheThoughtoftheOutside,isdedicatedtothewritings
ofMauriceBlanchot.ThisessayhasreceivedlittlescholarlyattentionintheUnitedStates,111
likelybecausethelargerpartofFoucaultsworkdealssoextensivelywitharchaeologiesand
genealogicalanalysesofinstitutionsofpowerandknowledge.However,thisessayisargua
bly one of the more significant among Foucaults work from a theoretical or programmatic
perspective.FortheshiftawayfromtheorthodoxyofFoucaultsday,aHegelianismperme
ated with phenomenology and existentialism, centered on the theme of the unhappy con
sciousness,112entailedamovementofthedecenteringofthesubject,amovementforwhich
Foucault found in Blanchot113 a primary source of inspiration: Blanchot... Foucault claims,
represented,First,aninvitationtocallintoquestionthecategoryofthesubject,itssuprema
cy,itsfoundationalfunction.Second,theconvictionthatsuchanoperationwouldbemean
ingless if it remained limited to speculation. Calling the subject in question meant that one
would have to experience something leading to its actual destruction, its decomposition, its
explosion,itsconversionintosomethingelse.114Thus,itseemslikely,givenFoucaultsasser
tion of Blanchots centrality to his thinking, that the essay on Blanchot is more than a mere
literaryforayforanintellectualwhoseworkotherwiseinvolvesmostlyanalysesofanhistori
cophilosophical(indeed,political)sort.Secondly,(andmoreimportantlyforourpurposes),

110Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,149.
111Withafewexceptions;mostnotably,LeonardLawlorsmostrecentbookisorientedentirelyaroundthis
theme. Leonard Lawlor, Early TwentiethCentury Continental Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press,2012),esp.174202.IfIamnotmistaken,theoriginalsubtitleofLawlorsbookwastobe,Towardthe
Outside.IamdeeplyindebtedtoLeonardLawlorforturningmeontothisessayintheFall,2005seminar
at the University of Memphis, titled, Recent Continental Philosophy. Another noteworthy example is in
MillersbiographyofFoucault,ThePassionofMichelFoucault,where,onp.153,hewritesthatthisessayin
particular provides a key to understanding some of the more enigmatic passages of The Order of Things,
which is without question one of the socalled canonical texts of the Foucaultian faithful. See also, Gary
Gutting, Foucault: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1718. The essay does
not,however,figureprominentlyinmanyotherscholarlyworksonFoucault,bothAmericanandinterna
tionally. For instance, Todd May, The Philosophy of Foucault (Montreal: McGillQueens University Press,
2006);HubertL.DreyfusandPaulRabinow,MichelFoucault:BeyondStructuralismandHermeneutics(Chicago:
UniversityofChicagoPress,1982);BatriceHan,FoucaultsCriticalProject:BetweentheTranscendentalandthe
Historical,trans.EdwardPile(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2002);RudiVisker,MicheltFoucault:Gene
alogyasCritique,trans.ChrisTurner(London:Verso,1995).
112MichelFoucault,InterviewwithMichelFoucault,ined.JamesD.Faubion,trans.RobertHurley,et.al.

The Essential Works of Foucault: 19541984, Volume 3: Power, series ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New
Press,2000),246.
113AlongwithGeorgesBatailleandFriedrichNietzsche.

114Foucault,InterviewwithMichelFoucault,247.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

Deleuzeholdsthisessayinveryhighregard,seeingitasthelinchpinthatholdstogetherthe
entirety of Foucaults work: In truth, one thing haunts Foucaultthought. The question:
Whatdoesthinkingsignify?Whatdowecallthinking?isthearrowfirstfiredbyHeidegger
andthenagainbyFoucault.Hewritesahistory,butahistoryofthoughtassuch.115Withthis
in mind, Deleuzes textual engagement with Foucault begins by connecting the early works
(thearchaeologies)116tothemiddleworks(thegenealogies)117bywayofFoucaults1969text
TheArchaeologyofKnowledge.Thenfromthere,hebuildstotheconcludingreadingofTheUse
ofPleasure(1984),tyingtogethertheworksfrom19611976withFoucaultsfinalworksof1984
through an engagement with the question of power, which is inherently tied, for Deleuze, to
thethoughtoftheoutside.118Putmoresuccinctly,thisbrief1966essayisseenbyDeleuzeas
engenderingtheshiftinFoucaultsthoughtthattakesplacebetweentheearlyworksonpower
andknowledgeandthefinalworksonethics.LetuslooktoFoucaultsessay.
Centraltotheessayisthenotionthattothinkthebeingoflanguageopensthesubject
toaradicalexterioritythatthreatensitsownundoing.Thetitleoftheessaysfirstsectionis,I
Lie,ISpeak,andthecentralityoftheIindicatesthecentralityoftheCartesiansubjectasthe
pointofdeparture.ThestatementIspeakisanostensiblyunproblematicstatement.Thereis
nocontentorobjectaboutwhichImightpossiblybemistakeninmyassertion;thesubject,I,
actsmerelyasaplaceholderfortheactofspeaking,soIcannotbewrongwithrespecttothe
speakereither.TosaythatIamspeakingentailsitsowntruth.Itisthereforetrue,undenia
blytrue,thatIamspeakingwhenIsaythatIamspeaking.119Herewemustheartheechoes
of Descartes who, in the second Meditation, writes, I conclude that this proposition, I am, I
exist,mustbetruewheneverIassertitorthinkit.WhiletheCartesiansubjectreliesuponthe
interiorityofthought,theexpressionoftheFoucaultiansubjectisfoundedupontheexterioriza
tionoflanguageitself.
Howeverthesetwosubjectivitiesarenotcomparableorinterchangeable.Inthearticu
lationofthephraseIspeak,thereisanimpliedrecipient,andanimpliedreferentorobjectI
speaktoyouaboutx...However,asFoucaultnotes,intheformulationIspeak,thediscoursethat
wouldserveasourobjectisabsent.Theassertionitselfisisolatedtoitsessentialcore,speaking
speaking. But as a result, the being of language itself takes center stage, and the slight and
singularpointintowhichwehadcrystallizedthespeakingofspeakingopensintotheendless
dissemination of possibility and referentiality, of which language is divested each time an I
attemptstocommunicateasubjectivemeaningtoayou.Foucaultwrites,Anypossibilityof
language dries up in the transitivity of its execution. The desert surrounds it.120 The asser
tion:Ispeak,indeedpointstoareferent,butinitsabsence,thisreferentialityentailsaninfinite
opennessoftheIspeak.ItpointsthesubjecttoanIknownotwhat.Thethoughtofthisasser

115GillesDeleuze,Foucault,trans.SenHand(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1988),116.
116TheHistoryofMadnessintheClassicalAge(1961);TheBirthoftheClinic(1963);TheOrderofThings(1966).
117DisciplineandPunish(1975);TheHistoryofSexuality,VolumeI:AnIntroduction(1976).

118Thechapteronthethoughtoftheoutsideischapter4ina5chapterbook.

119 Michel Foucault, The Thought of the Outside, in The Essential Works of Foucault: 19541984, Volume 2:

Aesthetics,Method,andEpistemology,148.
120Ibid.

53
 Cisney:BecomingOther

tionthushighlightsadimensionofthebeingoflanguage,whereinaspeakingaboutspeakingis
laidbareandlanguageisunderstoodinitspureform,asanunfoldingofpureexteriority.121
Thisunderstandingoflanguage,whereinthecommunicativefunctionoflanguageissuspend
ed,isathoughtofthesubjectwherethesubjectisnolongerthesovereignbearer,responsible
for the communicative enactment of meaning, but rather, the nothing or the void through
which this infinite outpouring flows. Thus, while the Cartesian subject is a selfcontained,
selfidentical Cogito, standing as the locus and guarantor of truth, the Foucaultian subject is
here revealed as nothing more than its own disappearance: ... I speak runs counter to I
think.IthinkledtotheindubitablecertaintyoftheIanditsexistence;Ispeak,ontheoth
er hand, distances, disperses, effaces that existence andlets only its empty emplacementap
pear.122
Thebeingoflanguageonlyallowsitselftobeshownwiththedeathofthesubject,inall
ofitstraditionalandresidualforms.This,however,requiresanewmodeofthought,perhaps
throughaformofthoughtwhosestillvaguepossibilitywassketchedbyWesterncultureinits
margins.Athoughtthatstandsoutsidesubjectivity,settingitslimitsasthoughfromwithout,
articulatingitsend,makingitsdispersionshineforth,takinginonlyitsinvincibleabsence...a
thoughtthat,inrelationtotheinteriorityofourphilosophicalreflectionandthepositivityof
ourknowledge,constituteswhatinaphrasewemightcallthethoughtoftheoutside.123
Theoutsideisconceivedasanabsoluteoutside,radicallyexteriortotheinteriorityof
the subject, and along with it, to any interiority at all. It has no interior essence or positive
presence of its own that a sovereign subject might hope to master or possess within the do
mainofherownsubjectivity,aselfcontainedinterioritythatI,intheselfcontainedinteriority
ofmysubjectivity,bear.NorcanI,strictlyspeaking,hopetoentertheoutsideeither.Fortodo
sowouldentailtwointerioritiesforbiddenbythethoughtoftheoutside:(1)Theinteriorna
tureoftheoutsideitself,intowhichIwillhavepresumablynowpassed;(2)Theinteriorityof
theIwhohasapparentlymaintaineditsintegrityinthepassagetotheoutside.TheIisalways
irremediablyoutsidetheoutside.124Onecanonlyexperiencetheoutsidebybecomingother.
But insofar as one suffersin emptiness and destitutionthe presence of the out
side125anditsirremediableexteriority,theoutsidemust,atleastinacertainsense,bewithinthe
I. But this I cannot be the Cartesian or phenomenological subject, characterized by its pure
interiority. Rather, the experience of the outside is precisely the constant experience of my
own undoing, which opens the subject up to the relations of forces which engender it, as
Deleuzesays,theoutsidewithinpurethought.126
Thisiswhy,forFoucault,thethoughtoftheoutsiderevealsthetwosided,infiniteos
cillationofdeathandorigin:Thepureoutsideoftheorigin,ifthatisindeedwhatlanguageis
eagertogreet,neversolidifiesintoapenetrableandimmobilepositivity;andtheperpetually

121Ibid.
122Ibid.,149.
123Ibid.,150.

124Ibid.,154.

125Ibid.

126Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,149.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

rebegunoutsideofdeath,althoughcarriedtowardthelightbytheessentialforgettingoflan
guage, never sets the limit at which truth would finally begin to take shape.127 To push
thoughttotheoutsideistobringoneselfandonessubjectivityintoexplicitrelationwiththe
forcesofthinkingwhichconstituteonesownsubjectivity.Itistomakepossible,towelcome
even,theconstantdeathandrebirthofoneself,towelcomeonesownundoingwiththeprom
ise of becomingother. When language is revealed to be the reciprocal transparency of the
origin and death, every single existence receives, through the simple assertion I speak, the
threateningpromiseofitsowndisappearance,itsfutureappearance.128

5.Folding:BacktotheInside
The second pole of this oscillationrebirthis what will ultimately be significant for Fou
cault,(andforDeleuze).Thisistheprocesswherebyonefindsthefull,positivepowerofthe
individualassuch.129Thisemphasis,apreoccupationpresentatleastasearlyasDifferenceand
Repetition, is what is absolutely crucial. It is what Hallward misses and Badiou misunder
stands about Deleuzes emphasis on the thought of the outside. The unfolding that opens the
interiority of the subject to the outside is always coupled with a folding that bends and re
shapesforcebackuponitselfintoanewselfrelation:thethemewhichhasalwayshaunted
Foucaultisthatofthedouble.Butthedoubleisneveraprojectionoftheinterior;onthecon
trary,itisaninteriorizationoftheoutside.ItisnotadoublingoftheOne,butaredoublingof
theOther.ItisnotareproductionoftheSame,butarepetitionoftheDifferent.Itisnotthe
emanationofanI,butsomethingthatplacesinimmanenceanalwaysotheroraNonself.It
isnevertheotherwhoisadoubleinthedoublingprocess,itisaselfthatlivesmeasthedou
bleoftheother.130
PowerforFoucault,(asforDeleuze),ispurelyrelationalitisnothingmorethanrela
tionsbetweenforces;assuchitisneversingular,butalwaysessentiallymultiple.Moreover,
everyrelationbetweenforcesisapowerrelation.131Powerthereforehasnoessentialityor
substantialitybywhichitmightbedefinable.Itisnotabadgeofauthoritythatsomepossess
andothersdonot.Insteadpower,insofarasitispurelyrelational,passesthroughthehands
of the mastered no less than through the hands of the masters... A profound Nietzschean
ism.132Powerproducesitsowntruths,itsownselfjustifyingdiscourses,itsstrata,orhis
toricalformations,positivities,orempiricities.133
Onesownsubjectivity,(andhence,thecorpusoftheeverybodyknowswithwhichoneis
inculcated),alwaysbeginsasaconstitutedelementinthenexusofthesestratifiedformations.
Thereforethoughtalwaysseeks,howeverdisruptiveorrevolutionaryitmayappear,tojustify
thestratathemselveswithinthecontextofthesestrata.Thisiswhy,accordingtoDeleuze,the

127MichelFoucault,TheThoughtoftheOutside,168.
128Ibid.
129Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,258.

130Deleuze,Foucault,98.

131Deleuze,Foucault,70.

132Ibid.,71.

133Ibid.,47.

55
 Cisney:BecomingOther

antiquatednotionoffreewillisalwaysmerelyareactionaryabstraction.Withintheconstitut
edsystem,onemayofcoursebefreetodowhatonewills,butthemoreinterestingandrele
vantquestion,(almostalwaysignoredindiscussionsofliberty),forDeleuzeandforFoucault
withregardtofreedom,iswhyonewillswhatonedoes.ForDeleuzeandFoucault,onewillswhat
one wills precisely because the system has constituted it to do soour desires are not our
own. But the outside concerns force: if force is always in relation with other forces, forces
necessarily refer to an irreducible outside which no longer has any form and is made up of
distancesthatcannotbebrokendownthroughwhichoneforceactsuponanotherorisacted
upon by another.134 The strata themselves are rigidified forms,135 sedimented expressions of
differentialrelationsofforces.Thinkingitself,whenunleashed,isaforce.Butforcescanact
onlyuponotherforces;thusifonewouldseektochangeoneselfortheworld,onemustfirst
engageinthinking,andthinkingaddressesitselftoanoutsidethathasnoform.Tothinkis
toreachthenonstratified.136
Butwhenthoughtpushestowardthedirectionoftheunthought,itfindsthattheun
thoughtisnotexternaltothoughtbutliesatitsveryheart,asthatimpossibilityofthinking
whichdoublesorhollowsouttheoutside.137Theunthoughtistheconditionofthinking,be
causeitiswhatcannotbethought,andhenceitiswhatdemandstobethought.Therefore,the
recognitionforthenecessityofthepassageofthoughttotheoutsideisalwaysdoubledbackin
amovementthatfoldsforcebackontoitself,exposingthefloatingandfluidcharacterofin
dividuality itself,138 opening a genuine Deleuzian space of freedom. What his critics often
seemtolosesightofisarealgrapplingwithwhatDeleuzecallsthethirdsynthesisoftime,the
eternalreturn.ThereturnisthereturnoftheSame,buttheSameastheDifferent.Theeternal
returnisthereasonthatbeingisnotsimplyanundifferenciatedchaoticabyss,achaosmosra
therthanachaos.Andtheeternalreturnissaidonlyofthetheatricalworldofthemetamor
phosesandmasksoftheWilltopower,ofthepureintensitiesofthatWillwhicharelikemo
bileindividuatingfactorsunwillingtoallowthemselvestobecontainedwithinthefactitious
limitsofthisorthatindividual,thisorthatSelf.139Willtopowerwillsitself,butitwillsitself
asthatwhichiscapableoftransformingitself,140asthisisthemarkofthehighestdegreeof
power.ThewilltopowerthuswillsadifferencialSelf,whichisnothingmorethananongo
ing,infolding,processofindividuation:

ThegreatdiscoveryofNietzschesphilosophy,whichmarkshisbreakwithSchopenhauer
and goes under the name of will to power or the Dionysian world, is the following: no
doubttheIandtheSelfmustbereplacedbyanundifferenciatedabyss,butthisabyssisnei
theranimpersonalnoranabstractUniversalbeyondindividuation.Onthecontrary,itis
theIandtheselfwhicharetheabstractuniversals.Theymustbereplaced,butinandby

134Ibid.,86.
135DeleuzeusesthistermthroughouttheFoucaultbookinoppositiontoforces.
136Deleuze,Foucault,87.

137Ibid.,97.

138Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,258.

139Ibid.,41.

140Ibid.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

individuation, in the direction of individuating factors which consume them and which
constitutethefluidworldofDionysus.Whatcannotbereplacedisindividuationitself.Be
yondtheselfandtheIwefindnottheimpersonalbuttheindividualanditsfactors,indi
viduationanditsfields,individualityanditspreindividualsingularities.141

Thinking,therefore,istheonlythingthatcantrulyconstituteasubjectintheDeleuziansense.
Thelastremainingquestionis,how?GivenDeleuzesontologyaswehavediscussedit,
theanswerisnotdifficulttosurmise.Specifically,forDeleuze,thepracticeofphilosophycon
sists of the activity of formulating problems in the face of impossibilities, problems which
DeleuzecallsIdeas.142Thesolutions,(or,shallwesay,thesolvings)totheseproblemsconstitute
the Deleuzian actual. Ideas, we have seen, occupy the Deleuzian virtual.143 Thinking, then,
amountstotheveryreconfigurationofthevirtualitself,thegeneticgroundoftheactual.To
echoSpinoza(whichBadiouandHallwardnevermissanopportunitytodo),wecannotethat,
forSpinoza,thinkingdoesnotdeterminethebodytoaction;144nevertheless,achangeinthought
iscoupledbyachangeinbody.145LikewiseforDeleuze,thoughtonlythinkswhenitisforcedto
think;thisisbutanotherwayofsayingthatthinkingonlyarisesattheinsistenceofanoutside,
(notfrom the spontaneityof theCartesian subject, which, as we have discussed it, is a reac
tionaryillusion);thoughtisfacedwithimpossibilitiesateveryturn,onanearlyconstantbasis.
Philosophicalthinking,then,formulatesIdeasinordertothinktheseimpossibilities.Insodo
ing,ithasahandintheactofcreationitself;itbecomesaself,andinbecomingaself,itchanges
theworld.ItisIdeaswhichleadusfromthefracturedItothedissolvedSelf.Aswehave
seen,whatswarmsaroundtheedgesofthefractureareIdeasintheformofproblemsinoth
erwords,intheformofmultiplicitiesmadeupofdifferentialrelationsandvariationsofrela
tions,distinctivepointsandtransformationsofpoints.146
PerhapsthebestexampleonecanprovideofwhatDeleuzeisdescribingcanbefound
in the philosophical tradition itself, which Claire Colebrook refers to as a virtual body be
yond147humanityitself.Overthecourseofmillennia,philosophershaveparticipatedinthe
constitution and reconfiguration of this virtual body that Colebrook calls the philosophical
archive.148Eachphilosopherinheritsasetofimpossibilities,andattemptstoformulateIdeas
inordertothinktheseimpossibilities.Subsequentphilosophersthenparticipateintherecon
figurationofthevirtualthattheytheninheritfromtheirpredecessors.Heraclitus,Plato,the
Stoics,Lucretius,DunsScotus,Spinoza,Leibniz,Hume,Kant,Hegel,Nietzsche,Bergson,Hus
serl, Heidegger, Proust, Joyce, Sartre, Foucault... All are philosophers and artists who have
contributedtothisvirtualbody.Manyinthiscohortwouldseemirreconcilablewithmanyof

141Ibid.,258.
142Ibid.,168.
143Ibid.,209.

144Spinoza,Ethics,PartIII,Proposition2.

145Ibid.,PartII,Proposition7;PartV,Proposition1.

146Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,259.

147ricAlliez,ClaireColebrook,PeterHallward,NicholasThoburn,JeremyGilbert(Chair),DeleuzianPoli

tics:ARoundtableDiscussion,NewFormations68(2009):143187,164.
148Ibid.

57
 Cisney:BecomingOther

theothers;nevertheless,fromthisconfluxofvirtuality,Deleuze,facedwiththeimpossibilityof
thefailureofrepresentationalthinking,wasabletocreateadifferentialsystemofIdeas,andit
isasystemthathas,quiteliterally,changedtheworld.149
Finally,thequestionthatposesitselfinlightofthisunderstandingoffreedomis,what
arecurrentlyourimpossibilities?Whatisourlightandwhatisourlanguage,thatistosay,our
truthtoday?Whatpowersmustweconfront,andwhatisourcapacityforresistance,today
whenwecannolongerbecontenttosaythattheoldstrugglesarenolongerworthanything?
Anddowenotperhapsaboveallbearwitnesstoandevenparticipateintheproductionofa
newsubjectivity?Donotthechangesincapitalismfindanunexpectedencounterintheslow
emergenceofanewSelfasacentreofresistance?Eachtimethereisasocialchange,isthere
notamovementofsubjectivereconversion,withitsambiguitiesbutalsoitspotential?150Or,
putotherwise,howcanwe,becomeawe?

6.Conclusion:ThoughtastheDiceThrow
This paper does not propose an answer to these questions. I have attempted to argue that
Deleuzes philosophy provides us with a unique and indispensable possibility to genuinely
beginaddressingtheproblemsthesequestionspose.Hence,histhoughtisanythingbutindif
ferenttopolitics,anditisonlybyforciblyoverlookingsignificantaspectsofDeleuzesphilos
ophythatonecanmakesuchacharge.
WhatHallwardgetsrightisthatDeleuzedoesindeedemphasizeadeterritorializationas
a model of thinking. What he gets wrong, however, is that this deterritorialization does not
amounttotheabsolutecreativesubtractionthatHallwardfindsinDeleuze.Itisawillingnessto
becomeother,andinbecomingother,toreturn,nottodissolveintoundifferenciatedchaos,that
drivestheDeleuziannotionofthesubject.AgainstBadiou,wecannoteafewthings:(1)We
have demonstrated herein that the virtual is determinative of the actual in only a qualified
sense,differentiatingthesingularities,whichthendifferenciatetheactualitselftheunilateral
determinationheraldedbyBadiouandbyHallwardisnotnearlysosimple;(2)Wehavealso
demonstratedthatDeleuzianunivocityisinnowayanalogoustotheNeoplatonicOne:being,
for Deleuze, is a multiplicity that forcefully rejects the OneMany distinction and comprises
the organization of the multiple as such, without any presumption, necessity, or even space
for,unity;(3)Finally,wehaveshownthattheoutside,(asBadioudesignatesthevirtual),isnot
exhaustivelyidenticalwiththeBergsonianpast;hencethefoldoftheoutsidethatconstitutes
thesubjectisnotsimplyadeterministicselectionofthepastitisratheranoscillatingprocess
ofthinkingwherebythesubjectopensitselftotheforcesfromwhichitisconstituted,confront
ingtheimpossibleunthought,andreconstitutingitselfinacharacteroffluiditythatiscapable
ofselftransformation.ForDeleuzeitisinthefoldoftheoutsidethatfreedomisfound.
Deleuzefamouslyclaims,Tothinkistocreatethereisnoothercreationbuttocre
ate is firstof allto engender thinking in thought.151 Toengenderthinking inthought isto

149See,forexample,ThomasNail,ReturningtoRevolution:Deleuze,Guattari,andZapatismo(Edinburgh:Edin
burghUniversityPress,2012).
150Deleuze,Foucault,115.

151Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,147.

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.3659.

callintoquestionandactivelydisruptthedogmaticimageofthought,therebyembarkingup
onthedestratificationofsedimentedvalues,or,thinkingthepowerofanewpoliticswhich
wouldoverturntheimageofthought.152Thinkingreconfiguresthevirtual.Itisinthisway
andforthisreasonthatDeleuzereferstotheactivityofthinkingasadicethrow.153Eachthrow
of the dice constitutes a move in the ideal game, the play of becoming. The throws, though
qualitativelydistinct,areformsofasinglecastontologicallyone,whichisjustanotherwayof
denyinganyavatarsoftranscendentinterventionintothegame.If,therefore,thefreedomor
thechoiceoneseeksistheclassicalnotionofspontaneousfreedomofthewill,which,asSpinoza
critiques,iscontradictoryinthatitisatthesametimedistinctfromnatureandyetcapableof
governingit,onewillnotfindsuchafreedominDeleuze.Moreover,suchspontaneitywillal
waysbe,forDeleuze,aconstitutedillusoryidealthatisunawareoftheextenttowhichitisin
factdeterminedbythestratifiedsystemitself.However,forDeleuze,whenonetrulyunder
takestheactivityofthinking,onehastheopportunitytothrowthedice,meaningthatoneprob
lematizes being in new waysthis activity is essentially disruptiveoverturning the doxa,
transforming the strata, andopeningoneself to varying new relations of affirmation and ex
perimentationoneceasestosimplybereactiveandmakesthoughtitselfintoanactivity;one
creates.Andinsocreating,oneliterallychangestheworld.Therefore,whenPeterHallward
says,Butthoseofuswhostillseektochangeourworldandtoempoweritsinhabitantswill
need to look for our inspiration elsewhere,154 we can only conclude that he means that he,
PeterHallward,findsDeleuzeuninspiring,butthisis,asBadiousays,nothingmorethana
questionoftaste.155And,asIhopeIhavemadeclear,Idonotsharehistaste.


Prof.VernonW.Cisney
DepartmentofPhilosophy
CampusBox404
300N.WashingtonSt.
Gettysburg,PA17325
vcisney@gettysburg.edu

152Ibid.,137.
153Deleuze,Foucault,117.
154Hallward,OutofthisWorld,164.

155Badiou,Deleuze,91.

59