A.C. No.

10868
[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]

CHERYLE. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERCURIAM:

Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a pleading merit the
penalty of disbarment.

Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a ComplaintAffidavit before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on
her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her
signature on the Petition. She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration of
1

Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray.

2

Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte
Regala Tamaray. To support her allegation, she attached the Affidavit of Maritess Marquez-Guerrero.
3 4

The Affidavit states:

1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to East Cafe at

Rustan's Makati to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;

2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced to us (Cheryl
and I) Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told us that Atty. Daquis' husband
also worked in Japan and that's how he got to know the latter and got her services;

3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the
presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul his
marriage with Cheryl;

4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother arrived and
shortly after, the group left;

5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and I) went to McDonald's-
Greenbelt where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not to oppose Leomarte's decision to
have their marriage annulled[.] (Emphasis supplied)
5

Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City." In
6

February 2007, Atty. Daquis asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa
City.
7

On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office and met Atty.
Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition but Atty. Daquis refused.8
Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. She was surprised to see that the
Petition was allegedly signed and filed by her. 9

Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was forged by Atty.
Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate appearing on the jurat was not hers
because she never resided in Muntinlupa City. She attached a Certification issued by the
10

Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating that she was "never . . . a resident of #9
Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision, Barangay Putatan." She also 11

attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she has been a resident of "#484-J
Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City... from 2000 till
present." 12

Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was Atty. Daquis'
idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray. 13

She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition states that her
postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa
City[,]" which is the address of her husband's family. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial
14

court were received by Encarnacion T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives ofLeomarte
Tamaray. 15

Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant herself, and
not complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as
October 2006, not December 2006. 16

With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she notarized the
Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray. Atty. Daquis'
17

allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and
Ludy Lorena (Lorena). 18

Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-Tamaray to be a client of
Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated
that she typed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax
certificate was provided by Vasco-Tamaray. 19

Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money from Leomarte
Tamaray but she refused to do so. 20

Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-Tamaray requested
another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable to grant her client's request because she
did not have a copy of the Petition with her at that time. 21

Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son with a certain Reuel
Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity portion of the birth certificate. 22

The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position papers, but based 23

on the record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied. 24

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the Complaint because Vasco-
Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Commission on Bar Discipline noted that Vasco-
Tamaray should have questioned the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she never filed any
petition, but she failed to do so.
25

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in the Resolution dated September 27,
2014.26

The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held
administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl Vasco-
Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage.

This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15 is dismissed.

By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty of doing no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any falsehood in court as stated in the Lawyer's Oath. 27

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.

RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was Leomarte Tamaray's
counsel but was unable to rebut the other allegations against her.
28

Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006, but did not refute the statement
29 30

in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that Leomarte Tamaray introduced her as his

lawyer. Likewise, respondent admitted that she met with complainant subsequently, but did not
31 32

refute Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's statement that in one of the meetings, she tried to convince
complainant not to oppose Leomarte Tamaray's decision to annul their marriage. 33

Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant. Yet, there is no
34

explanation how she was referred to complainant or how they were introduced. It appears, then, that
respondent was contacted by Leomarte Tamaray to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte
told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had
decided to file a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl[. ]"
35

Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. However, respondent made it appear that complainant, not her client Leomarte Tamaray,
was the petitioner. There is a probability that respondent did not want Leomarte Tamaray to be the
petitioner because he would have to admit that he entered into a bigamous marriage, the admission
of which may subject him to criminal liability.

In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there appears to be no reason
for respondent to advise her "not to oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled." 36

The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never received any court
process because her purported address in the Petition is the address of Leomarte Tamaray. The
Petition states that complainant is "of legal age, Filipino citizen, married with postal address at 09
Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[.]" 37

The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that Leomarte's residence
is at "Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while complainant's residence is at "Hermosa St.
Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila." Assuming that complainant lived with her husband after they were
38

married, complainant most likely did not receive court processes because she left their home before
the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As written in the Minutes of the meeting
before the Office of the City Prosecutor:

P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary. They became sweethearts
in 1993 and their relationship as steadies lasted until 1996;

During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she even sleeps in their
house; Theirs was also a long distance relationship as respondent worked in Japan;

Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb, 1996. They had no children,
as respondent immediately left for Japan on March 11, 1996;

Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought another woman. As a result,
petitioner left their house. (Emphasis supplied)
39

Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the prosecutor that she did not file
any petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because during the meeting on March 5, 2007,
complainant had no knowledge that the Petition was filed in her name. She obtained a copy of the
40

Petition after the March 5, 2007 meeting. 41

In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy, this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as follows:

42

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal professions, engraves
an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct- determinative as it is of the errant lawyer's penalty- depends on the
factual circumstances of each case .

....
. . . Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant
measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the
legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice. 43

When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was otherwise, she
committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant.

II

Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she allowed the use of a
forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized. 44

Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged. Respondent merely denied
45

complainant's allegation. 46

The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain "CVasco." The records of
47

this case show that complainant has used two signatures. In her identification cards issued by the
University of the East, she used a signature that spelled out "CVasco." In her Complaint-Affidavit
48

against respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out "CTamaray." 49

A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
on complainant's identification cards show a difference in the stroke of the letters "c" and "o."
Further, complainant's signatures in the documents attached to the records consistently appear to
50

be of the same height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c." Hence, it seems that complainant's signature on the Petition
51

for Declaration ofNullity of Marriage was forged.

While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the fact remains
that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and notarized. In 52

doing so, respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01. These canons state:

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the integrated bar.

RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

....

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

RULE 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr., Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was found guilty of violating
53

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court decision "in a
non-existent court proceeding." This court discussed that:
54

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. 55

In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition she
prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part.

Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are: engaging in a scuffle inside
court chambers; openly doubting paternity of his own son; hurling invectives at a Clerk of
56 57

Court; harassing occupants of a property; using intemperate language; and engaging in an

58 59 60

extramarital affair. 61

Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a court is tantamount to
consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon 10.

In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera, this court discussed the importance of Canon 10, Rule 10.01, as
62

follows:

The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as
well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule
of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence,
therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated
by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice." (Emphasis supplied)
63

III

This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented complainant, who is
the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case.

The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.:64
The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the
highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's interest. The most thorough
groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor
bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer's Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the entire duration of his
practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic
requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the
pursuit of justice[. ]
65

Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the legal profession, as
discussed in Tenoso v. Echanez: 66

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that
"a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State-the
administration of justice-as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
" (Citations omitted)
67

IV

This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when she entered her
appearance as counsel for complainant even though she was engaged as counsel by Leomarte
68

Tamaray. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
69

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his client.

....

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era: 70

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would
be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In
the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with
the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree .

....
. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not be stripped by the
mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer
1wphi1

should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's
confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."

The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs
even to himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the
client.71

The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in Hornilla v. Salunat: 72

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
73

Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel. When the Petition for
74

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the Petition as counsel for
complainant. If respondent was indeed engaged as counsel by complainant, then there is conflict of
75

interest, in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03.

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as counsel by
complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit conflict of interest.

On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015.
Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:

Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

....

Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

 (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall
recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of
disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30)
days from the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.

(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and
submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days
from issuance of the resolution.

(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any. 76

Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was given the
power to "issue a decision" if the lawyer complained of was exonerated or meted a penalty of "less
77

than suspension or disbarment." In addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless an
78

interested party filed a petition before this court.

79

The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the power to impose
disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
are recommendatory, subject to review by this court. 80

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis
is DISMISSED.

The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information
and guidance.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
August 3, 2005

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of Gross
Immoral Conduct and imposed upon him the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. 1 Respondent, who
was already married with three children, had an affair with complainant between 1996 to 1997,
while he was reviewing for the bar until before the release of the results thereof. Complainant
got pregnant and respondent, who was then already a lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit
acknowledging the child as his with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the child,
however, respondent started to refuse recognizing the child and from giving her any form of
support.

On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking compassion and
forgiveness from this Court. He submitted certificates from government and civic organizations
appreciating his services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance from religious groups, and
certificates of good moral character from judges and lawyers in Occidental Mindoro. 2

On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment thereon. 3

On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution (No. 01-2003)
recommending the exoneration of respondent from administrative liability. It stated that the
suspension of respondent, who has served as Clerk of Court, Public Attorney and 3rd Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, would cause a great loss to the community; that respondent has shown
integrity and moral uprightness in the performance of his official functions; that the acts imputed to
him may be attributed to his "youthful indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended his ways
after taking his oath as member of the bar.4

The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its Comment dated August
15, 2003, stating that the motion for reconsideration should be denied until respondent admits
the paternity of the child and agrees to support her.5

On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that respondents motion for
reconsideration should be denied since respondent has not truly repented as he is still not
supporting his child.6

On August 25, 2003, respondents wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a handwritten letter stating that
respondent is loving and "maasikaso" and while it is true that respondent had an affair with
complainant, such was only because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file
the present case after respondent ended their illicit affair. Complainant also used threat to compel
respondent to sign the affidavit of acknowledgement and support. Livelyn further avers that
respondent is the sole breadwinner of the family and that their family will be gravely affected by his
suspension.7
On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP stating that if the acts
acknowledging and giving support to the child of the complainant are the proofs of his remorse,
then he shall comply unconditionally.8

On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on Livelyns letter.9

On January 13, 2004, complainants counsel said that while he sympathizes with Livelyn and her
children, respondent has not taken any move to support complainant and her child to repair
the damage done to them.10

On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainants Comment, reiterated his willingness
to support the child if only to show his remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks
addressed to complainant for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of P2,000.00
each.11

On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that it is unfair for her
and her three children that respondent had to support complainants daughter when it is not clear
who the childs father is. Livelyn argues that complainant should have filed a case for support where
the paternity of the child could be determined and not use the present administrative case to get
support from respondent.12

On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro, asking whether or not respondent is still connected with
said office despite having been indefinitely suspended by this Court. It replied on May 10, 2005
that respondent is still connected with their office; that he has been regularly receiving his
salary and benefits; and that this was the first time that they received communication concerning
respondents administrative case.13

Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued to discharge his duties
and received salary and benefits in connection therewith since he filed a timely motion for
reconsideration thus the case has not yet attained finality.14

In view of respondents show of repentance and active service to the community, the Court deems it
just and reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite period of two
years suspension.

WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The indefinite suspension

imposed on him by the Court in its Decision dated March 6, 2003 is REDUCED to TWO
YEARS suspension effective from date of receipt of herein Resolution.

Complainants further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a
proper case.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillos record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP, all courts throughout the country and the Department of
Justice including the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003]

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO

CASTILLO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre

against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.

The facts as borne by the records are as follows:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became
officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondent [1]

courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to

be single. Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in
[2]

1996 and lasted until 1997. During their affair, respondent was preparing for
[3]

the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as
a member of the Philippine Bar. It was only around the first week of May
[4]

1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was already married when
his wife went to her office and confronted her about her relationship with
respondent. On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer,
[5]

executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and

recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. On December 09,
[6]

1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. By this time
[7]

however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving
her any form of support.[8]

Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what

transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never
represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was
already married and with children; complainant is almost 10 years older than
[9]

him and knew beforehand that he is already married; the child borne by
[10]

complainant is not his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the
time they were having an affair. He admits that he signed the affidavit dated
[11]

September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save complainant from
embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was
seeing other men. [12]

After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty.
Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be
meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Immoral conduct has been defined as:

xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to

the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. [13]

In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a

notary public, he declared explicitly:

1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;

2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;

3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my
own;

4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal
and medical needs, education, housing, food, clothing and other necessities for living,
which I will give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of
legal age and capable to live on his/her own;

5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my
child; however, my failure to sign does not negate the recognition and
acknowledgement already done herein;

6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a

lawyer, I have full knowledge of the consequence of such acknowledgment and
recognition.[14]

More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which
states in part:

Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging,
Glo, Guy and others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your daughter.

Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise
fix amount for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than
P500 but not more than P1,000. [15]

In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in
castigating a judge stated that:

...even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of

conduct demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a
woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these standards. [16]

Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every lawyer. [17]

Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement

recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a
certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming
a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification. [18]
 This Court has repeatedly held:

as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
[19]

While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with

complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that men by
nature are polygamous, and that what happened between them was nothing
[20]

but mutual lust and desire. The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled
[21]

at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection.
Granting arguendo that complainant entered into a relationship with him
knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross
immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondents
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether
or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.

We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible.
The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:

In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari

delicto because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to
purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts. [22]

The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was
preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is
unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the
bar must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a
requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of
the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to
[23]

the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain

ones good standing in the profession; it is a continuing requirement to the
[24]

practice of law and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a
[25]

subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question

concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is
because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption
that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.

The Court held:

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only
during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. [26]

and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.
[27]

Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his

wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously
recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated
the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be
disciplined accordingly.

As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a

lesser punishment could be given. Records show that from the time he took
[28]

his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with
his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this
fact as an indication of respondents effort to mend his ways or that he
recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law.
Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances
that indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The
suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of
maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the
profession.
 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [29]

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent

GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillos personal record in

the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., on leave.

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992

HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed
against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the
oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of
which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after
considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution
and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he
shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the
highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and
Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989.
These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready
reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant
Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our
Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had
deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of
course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent
had discussed said cases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin

Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed
away so that they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take
his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29
December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has been
careful in his actuations in the community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then
President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without
authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was
respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in
CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the
present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any
testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr.
Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the
IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the
former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles,
addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had
not submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
 Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board
of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it
is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to
entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to
submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25
August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not
aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the
Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747
entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff,
versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural
Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or
Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a
certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a
swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed
and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until
the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990,
signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of
CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr.
Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending
derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does
not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the
Philippine Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to
Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in
BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August
1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court
resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required
Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil
Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by
complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This
comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44,
informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked
forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case
against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission
to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make him
morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated,
"we highly recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to
schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2
October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990,
stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition
which raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate
and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and
finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to
change or amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the
light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should
not in the least be considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the
changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality.
Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court
Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter
having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December
1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of
the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according
to him, was already considered closed and terminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached
between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in
Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for
the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the
mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal
refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant
Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and
the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of
29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to
comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge
Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case
with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was
"Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated
8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion
pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to
comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment,
dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's
sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and
that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the
Resolution of 24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having
elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of
his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several
testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not
received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of
the gravity of the civil case against him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was
instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement
of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as
security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the
Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC
dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with
respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the
mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo,
Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the
approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance
therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra).
It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take
the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this
Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning
the pendency of that civil case against him.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now
entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but
have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral
character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be
erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his
guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor
General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What
is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage
of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the
mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until
the civil case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of
honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion
filed against him during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration
before us also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of
knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government
against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and
lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619)
have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have
already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn
her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint
treating as it does of another subject matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess
good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as
well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves
are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who
are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82
Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as
"including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification
for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of
Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this
Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,

vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral
conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances. 1

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension
without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were
consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from the service of respondent. 4

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic
Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their
eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (now
Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession
until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a
certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave birth
to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.

In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against
respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six
months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of
immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and
grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered
his dismissal and separation from the service. 6

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with
Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea
Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.

Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena
and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a
ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while
the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution
thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from
the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of
the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts, including deception and intrigues
against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976,
complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the
maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own
father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua,
to represent her in this case.

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the
roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously
imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with
Elena. 7

In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him,
respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he
said:

I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in
1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife.
Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If
now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If that's the
law so be it. 8

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on
May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.

Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED
and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by
the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution,
herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec.
12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that respondent's actuations merit the penalty of
disbarment.

Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to
the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. 9 There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in
which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. 10 The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.)

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as
well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the
scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose
conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that
aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he
knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety. 11 For a judge is the
visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a
source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. 12Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest
infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 13 Surely,
respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral
imperatives. 14

Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an attorney-at-law is
also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as
officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is
administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the
community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 16 Exacted from him, as a
member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is
right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor
and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also
the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 17

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and member of the bar. 18 For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto
full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that
those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men
and women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the
bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had
adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the
evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case, 20 a lawyer
was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him
a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar.

In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by this
Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife. The
report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far
from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges
against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges
extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence
of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a
mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and
decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly
shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community,
and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in
disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary
Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of
which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy
with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On
the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her
and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house
and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love
You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000,
the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
 Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but
experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it
because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the
time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will
love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY
TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street,
New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He
also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP
as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of
September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of
French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their
attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001,
on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned:
"Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their
adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their
relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their
respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was
still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity,
making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the
love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love
for her "until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby
making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary
Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-
quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a
piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the
family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he,
as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke
up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

 7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely
personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and
Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to
the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth 13 bearing Irene's signature and naming
respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February
14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10,
2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the
pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer
were adopted as his testimony on direct examination. 16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against
respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
 RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its
above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove
that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are
other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through
counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having
[ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known
only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically
denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a
"special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken
together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-
1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent
and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth
of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information
that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted
his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or
make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who
has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he
maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective
families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed
at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a
denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances
alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent
a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered
on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the
signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows
that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in
the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who
was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently
proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is
more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the
other32 which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant
evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was
not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or

other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
 attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any
of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse
under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling,
or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not
his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is
the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair
with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order
to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by
our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e.,
that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
 ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which
goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring
supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and
Rule 7.03 of Canon7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by
Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the
instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to
Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for
review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No.
70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis
supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and
void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition
for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the
dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation
of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on
the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did
when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages
to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to
complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's
eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted
her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This
becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's
vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live
in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office
for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said
address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout
after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their
illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a
girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the
information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed
illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala
is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus
leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But
even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery
were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

 x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court,
in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006
by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of
his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto
M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:

Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of
the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As
promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the
concerned parties.

On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the
possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle
their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is
about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and
embraced her very tightly.

Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks
coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court.
After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along
the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up
from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in
San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car
and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast.
Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and
immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she
decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from
him. The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

Sent by complainant
At 5:33:46 pm
replied by respondent
at 6:16:11 pm
sent by complainant
at 6:17:59 pm
Follow-up message
- forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer
- "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
(Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
- I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage of
the situation.
- wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you
 Sent by complainant dont have relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent - "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the situation, 2
At 6:32:43 pm put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (Im
very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation, to
put it rightly it is an expression of feeling)
Follow up message - Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can
by respondent show u my sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do it again.
at 6:42:25 pm Will you still see me so I can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32
pm saying "I dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont
know what to do so you may forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).

Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by
her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im
really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt. 2

In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that
he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters
relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel
and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in
his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to
him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the
complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit
the acts imputed to him.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of
Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since
she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their
marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband;
and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent
who always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on
respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and
adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the
behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with
or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months.5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly
immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.

Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations
shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a
continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In
Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the
Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made
him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions
as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained
in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community."

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar
but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive
and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.10

In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate
in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective
term but one which corresponds to objective reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible
purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to
protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek
and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently
on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.

xxxx

35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and
with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips.
There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding
was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual
harassment."

During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue,
Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:

ATTY. MACABATA:

That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa
and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car
somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes
then she arrived. And so I said she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you
like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is
along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then
a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two
glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said its about 9:00 or
beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I stood up and then I
went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her
where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the
last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before
she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and
with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when shes
already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car,
thats it.

COMM. FUNA:

February 10 iyan.

xxxx

ATTY. MACABATA:

Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we
went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So
before she went down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So
I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA:

Pardon?

ATTY. MACABATA:

I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left
hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x
x.14 (Emphases supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. 15

In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:

In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful
wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned
her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction
with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of
her under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a
"bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal
remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent
undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the
rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other
fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."

In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left
complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a
grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession," warranting respondents disbarment.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral
character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and
thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and
integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the
practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as
mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The
acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the
lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be
considered grossly immoral.

Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position
as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The
burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel
the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who
denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum
negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the
burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The
exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote
place where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate
sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to
protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession;
and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of
protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it
is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an
erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court,
to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases
of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit
disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the
lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to
clearly show the lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the
act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly
demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is
also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter
of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and
raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first
offense, reprimand would suffice.

We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her
honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her
lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective
and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more
prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.
ELPIDIO P. TIONG, A.C. No. 4428
Complainant,

Present:

VELASCO, JR., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
ABAD,
- versus - MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO,
December 12, 2011
Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed

1

by Elpidio P. Tiong against Atty. George M. Florendo for gross immorality and grave
misconduct.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong,
are real estate lessors in Baguio City. They are likewise engaged in the assembly and
repair of motor vehicles in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. In 1991, they engaged the
services of respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also
as administrator of their businesses whenever complainant would leave for the
United States of America (USA).

Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that respondent and his wife were
having an illicit affair. His suspicion was confirmed in the afternoon of May 13, 1995
when, in their residence, he chanced upon a telephone conversation between the
two. Listening through the extension phone, he heard respondent utter the words
"I love you, I'll call you later". When confronted, his wife initially denied any
amorous involvement with respondent but eventually broke down and confessed to
their love affair that began in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship.
Subsequently, at a meeting initiated by respondent and held at the Salibao Restaurant
in Burnham Park, Baguio City, respondent and complainant's wife,
Ma. Elena, confessed anew to their illicit affair before their respective spouses.

On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio City
and, in the presence of a Notary Public, Atty. Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma.
Elena executed and signed an affidavit attesting to their illicit relationship and
2

seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness, as follows:

"WE, GEORGE M. FLORENDO, a resident of Baguio City and

of legal age and MA. ELENA T. TIONG, likewise a resident of
Baguio City, of legal age, depose and state:

We committed adultery against our spouses from May 1993 to

May 13, 1995 and we hereby ask forgiveness and assure our
spouses that this thing will never happen again with us or any
other person. We assure that we will no longer see each other
nor have any communication directly or indirectly. We shall
comply with our duties as husband and wife to our spouses
and assure that there will be no violence against them. That
any behaviour unbecoming a husband or wife henceforth shall
give rise to legal action against us; Weshall never violate this
assurance;

We, the offended spouses Elizabeth

F. Florendo and Elpidio Tiong forgive our spouses and assure them
 that we will not institute any criminal or legal action against them
because we have forgiven them. If they violate this agreement we
will institute legal action.

This document consists of four (4) typewritten copies and each

party has been furnished a copy and this document shall have no
validity unless signed by all the parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set out hands this 15th day of

May 1995 at Baguio City, Philippines.

(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
GEORGE M. FLORENDO ELPIDIO TIONG

(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
MA. ELENA T. TIONG ELIZABETH F. FLORENDO"

Notwithstanding, complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment on May 23,
1995 charging respondent of gross immorality and grave misconduct. In his Answer , 3

respondent admitted the material allegations of the complaint but interposed the
defense of pardon.

In the Resolution dated September 20, 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to
4

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and decision.

Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation dated September 21, 2007 for the suspension of respondent from
5

the practice of law for one (1) year, which was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19, 2007. Respondent's Motion
6

for Reconsideration therefrom was denied in the Resolution dated June 26, 2011.
7 8

Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue whether the pardon extended by
complainant in the Affidavit dated May 15, 1995 is sufficient to warrant the
dismissal of the present disbarment case against respondent for gross immoral
conduct.
After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation
of the IBP-CBD except as to the penalty imposed.

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide, thus:

"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD

THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
xxxx

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."

It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is
not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to
maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law
practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a
9

lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
his suspension or disbarment
In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married woman
not his wife, and worse, that of his client. Contrary to respondent's claim, their
consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of indiscretion" considering 10

that it lasted for two (2) years and was only aborted when complainant
overheard their amorous phone conversation on March 13, 1995.

Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his
utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he
11

violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is
prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably,
12

therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. Section 27, Rule 138
13

of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from
his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.

Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be sanctioned for his questioned

conduct because he and Ma. Elena had already been pardoned by their respective
spouses in the May 15, 1995 Affidavit . 14

The Court disagrees.

It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant
to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of
the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his
conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the
Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of
15

desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings. 16

However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months, instead of one (1) year as
recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct
of respondent
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby
found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.