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James and Anne Jones


123 Shady Road
2 Los Alamitos, California
Plaintiffs, In Propria Persona
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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
8 COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL DISTRICT
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James Francisco Jones,
10 Case No.:30-2016-00871234
Anne Marie Jones
11 Plaintiffs
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
vs. MOTION TO VACATE VOID
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ORDER SUSTAINING
13 DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,
14 MS. MARIANNE LAKE, CFO
15 QUALITY LOAN SERVICING CORP.,
KEVIN MCCARTHY, CEO
16 MALAGA ASSET MANAGEMENT and
17 all persons of entities unknown, claiming
any legal or equitable right, title, estate,
18 lien or interest in the property described
19 in this complaint adverse to Plaintiffs'
title, or any cloud upon Plaintiffs' title
20 thereto and DOES 1 through 100
21 Defendants
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23 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on February _____, 2017, at 9:00 AM, in
24 Division 2 of this court, located at at 700 Civic Center Drive West Santa Ana, California.

25 Plaintiffs will move the court to vacate the void order sustaining defendant,

26 JPMorgan's Demurrer. The motion will be made on the grounds that court denied

27 Plaintiffs' due process rights, thereby losing jurisdiction. Further, court denied

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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order
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Plaintiffs their Constitutional right to rely upon precedent, have been denied due
process, and have no confidence in Judge Chaffees honesty, or his willingness uphold
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his oath to be fair and impartial. He has refused to comply with precedent, and has
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demonstrated extreme bias on behalf of Esquire, John M. Sorich and his client,
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JPMorgan Chase Bank, in case no.30-2016-00871956, and against Plaintiffs. This
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motion is based upon the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure section
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170.1(a)(6), and upon the declarations of James-Francisco Jones and Anne Marie
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Jones in their Statements of Disqualification (EXHIBIT A) attached hereto, upon the
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Memorandum of Law and points and authorities served and filed herewith, on the
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records and file herein, and on such evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the
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motion.
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Respectfully Submitted by,
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________________________________ ________________________________
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James-Francisco: Jones Anne Marie Jones
16 In Propria Persona, Sui Juris In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
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VERIFICATION
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The foregoing statement is by the hand of James Jones and Anne Marie Jones, and is
21 given subject to the penalties of perjury under the laws of this California Republic the
United States of America.
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________________________________ ________________________________
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James-Francisco: Jones Anne Marie Jones
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order
1 PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECUSE
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Plaintiffs ask the judge of the court to recuse himself under CCP 170.1(a)(6)(iii)
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28 U.S.C. 144/455.
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A. Introduction
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1. Plaintiffs are James Francisco Jones and Anne Marie Jones; defendants are
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JPMorgan Chase Bank, et. al
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2. Plaintiffs sued defendant to Quiet Title due fraud by defendant(s).
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3. Plaintiffs file this motion asking Judge David R. Chaffee to recuse himself
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because he cannot be an impartial arbiter of this case.
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4. Plaintiffs file this motion at least ten days before this case is set for trial.
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B. Argument
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5. The statutory language of the California Code of Civil Procedure is quite clear:
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A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true for any
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reason a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge
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would be able to be impartial.CCP 170.1(a)(6)(iii) A judge should recuse himself or
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herself if the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. 455(a);
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In re Kensington Intl, 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004); Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338
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F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir.
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2001); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1995). Recusal is
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proper if the court determines that a reasonable person would perceive a significant
21 risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits. See Sao Paolo
22 State of Federative Republic of Braz. v. American Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. 229, 232-33,
23 122 S. Ct. 1290, 1292 (2002); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
24 847, 865, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 2205 (1988).
25 6. The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution entitles a person to an
26 impartial and disinterested tribunal in all cases. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S.
27 238, 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980).
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order
1 7. Judge Chaffee should recuse himself for the following reasons:
2 a. There is a reasonable factual basis for calling the judges impartiality into
3 question. See U.S. v. Avilez-Reyes, 160 F.3d 258, 259 (5th Cir. 1998);
4 Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1995). On or about
5 November 9th, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Clarification:
6 ...to clarify on what basis the court rejects material facts of record,
7 established on a Notice, Fault, Default basis, and undisputed by
8 Defendants; to clarify and explain how it is fair and impartial to reject
9 said material facts without citing any basis in the California Code of Civil
10 Procedure, the Rules of Court, or other law.
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b. The judge has exhibited actions from which a reasonable inference of
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partiality may be drawn. See U.S. v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir.
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1993). In said motion for clarification, Plaintiffs challenged Judge
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Chaffee for exhibiting bias against Plaintiffs:
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Pursuant to the Judicial Canons and his Oath of Office to be fair and
16 impartial, Judge Chaffee was required to read Plaintiffs' entire
17 complaint, affidavits, and exhibits. In the November 4th hearing,
Judge Chaffee asked Plaintiff Jones what kind of instrument was
18 submitted to Chase, as set forth in Plaintiffs' exhibit 3, thereby
19 confessing that he had failed to read exhibit 3. Plaintiffs have good
reason to believe that Judge Chaffee failed to read any of Plaintiffs'
20 exhibits, Affidavits or other submitted papers, as the court failed to
address any of the material facts of record in its rulings against
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Plaintiffs. For example, the court knew or should have known that
22 Defendant's entire claim to be the holder/beneficiary is based on the
P&A Agreement which required that FDIC convey to Chase all
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assets via Receiver's Deed or Receiver's Bill of Sale, 'as is,'
24 without recourse (see Defendants Exhibit 2, P&A Agreement). This
court knows that there is no Receiver's Deed or Receiver's Bill of Sale,
25 of record anywhere. If there were Chase would have brought it
26 forward years ago. This court was/is required to accept as true the
allegations and facts set forth in Plaintiffs' complaint, A court must
27 accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint... Bell
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order
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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), at 555. It was/is
required to accept as true that Chase is not named on the Note or
2 Deed of Trust; is not the beneficiary, has failed to record or show any
assignment from WAMU, is without lawful possession of the Note,
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without a chain of title, (no Receiver's Deed or Receiver's Bill of
4 Sale), failed to respond to Plaintiffs' Notices of Counterfeit Security
(see attached exhibit 5), as well as the rescission of DOT, and has
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thereby lost any claim it could make, (see complaint, paragraphs 14,
6 15 and exhibit 1). However, the court failed to accept any of these
and other material facts set forth by Plaintiffs as true. By rejecting all
7 of the allegations contained in the complaint and each of Plaintiffs'
8 administrative processes (exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6), without citing any basis
in fact or in law, the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due
9 process. Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered
10 judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Klugh v. U.S.,
11 D.C.S.C., 610 F.Supp. 892, 901
12 c. If the judge does not recuse himself, the publics confidence in the
13 judiciary will be irreparably harmed. Alexander v. Primerica Holdings,
14 Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1993). Judge Chaffee failed to respond to
15 any of the questions contained in said Motion for Clarification, failed to
16 cite any reason for failing to uphold precedent, and simply denied motion
17 for clarification, thereby confirming that Plaintiffs should have no
18 confidence in his fairness or impartiality..
19 d. A reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts
20 about the judges impartiality. Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993; see Pope v. Federal
21 Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1992). A review of the facts
22 of this case would lead any reasonable person to conclude that Judge
23 Chaffee refused to accept as true all of the allegations contained in the
24 complaint.
25 6. The personal bias or prejudice of the judge will deprive Plaintiffs of a fair trial
26 in violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Marshall, 446
27 U.S. at 242-43, 100 S. Ct. at 1613. Specifically, Judge Chaffee appears to be
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order
1 determined to ignore all of the unrebutted evidence presented by Plaintiffs, including
2 admission to JPMorgan's fraud by Ms. Marianne Lake, and clear undisputed evidence
3 of conversion of Plaintiffs' instrument (by failing to issue a receipt, or admit to
4 liability). As Plaintiffs stated in their motion for clarification:
5 Walker Todd, Esq., expert witness of the Federal Reserve Bank verified this FACT in
his unrebutted sworn affidavit: When a bank accepts bullion, coin, currency, checks,
6 drafts, promissory notes, or any other similar instruments from customers and
deposits or records the instruments as assets, it must record offsetting liabilities that
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match the assets that it accepted from customers. The liabilities represent the
8 amounts that the bank owes the customers, funds accepted from customers, (my
emphasis). (BANK ONE, N.A., v. Harshavardhan and Pratima Dave, Oakland County,
9 MI case #03-047448-CZ).
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By refusing to acknowledge the above sworn testimony, and all other facts of record,
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Judge Chaffee is clearly determined to find in favor of JPMorgan Chase Bank, even in
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perjury of his oath of office.
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7. If a judge has a personal bias or prejudice against a party, in favor of an
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adverse party, or about the subject matter of the suit, the judge should recuse himself
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or herself. 28 U.S.C. 144, 455(b)(1); see Sao Paolo State of Federative Republic of
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Braz. v. American Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. 229, 232-33, 122 S. Ct. 1290, 1292 (2002).
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The court should grant Plaintiffs motion to recuse for the following reasons:
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a. Judge Chaffee has personal bias/prejudice in favor of JPMorgan Chase
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Bank. See Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1398 (8th Cir.
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1983). In said motion for clarification, Plaintiffs challenged Judge
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Chaffee for exhibiting bias against Plaintiffs:
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the court's refusal to adhere to precedent established at Blank v.
23 Kirwan, 39 Cal 3d 311, 318 (1985), was also a clear denial of
Plaintiffs right to due process; his right to a fair, impartial hearing
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and his constitutional right to rely upon precedent established at Blank
25 v. Kirwan, 39 Cal 3d 311, 318 (1985). Pursuant to precedent
established at Anastasoff v. United States, litigants constitutional
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rights are violated when courts depart from precedent, in this case
27 Blank v. Kirwan, where parties are similarly situated.
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order
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b. Judge Chaffee's bias casts doubt on his impartiality. Maez v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995); see Murray
2 v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308, 1312 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001). Judge Chaffee was
derelict in his duty to review the record of Case No. 8:12-bk-22571-MW
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confirming that JPMorgan failed to establish standing prior to its MLS.
4 The court sustained JPMorgan's demurrer, despite JPMorgan's admission
to all facts and charges, and admission to all evidence contained within
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Plaintiffs' exhibits, which constitutes uncontested proof of JPMorgan's
6 fraud. The court was without discretion to ignore precedent established at
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Venture Holdings & Acquisitions
7 Grp.,LLC v. A.I.M. Funding Grp., LLC, and to ignore uncontested
8 evidence of JPMorgan's fraud and its acquiescence to the uncontested fact
that Plaintiffs were misled and became the victims of WAMU's fraudulent
9 conversion, which tainted the putative loan, DOT and note, rendering
10 them void. By ignoring these and other facts of record, the court acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process. Judgment is a void judgment if
11 court that rendered judgment acted in a manner inconsistent with due
12 process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 5 -Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp., 892 (D.S.C. 1985). The
13 court was without discretion to ignore Plaintiffs' revocation of the DOT,
and Notices of Fraud to JPMorgan and Quality Loan Service, which
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rendered the alleged foreclosure sale void. Thus, the court denied
15 Plaintiffs due process by failing to consider any of the submitted evidence,
which was clearly unfair and not impartial, thereby rendering its order
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sustaining JPMorgan's demurrer void ab initio and without effect.
17 C. Conclusion
18 8. Extraordinary rights granted by legislature to litigants to disqualify a judge is
19 automatic in the sense that a good-faith belief in prejudice is alone sufficient, proof
20 of facts showing actual prejudice not being required. McCartney v. Commission on
21 Judicial Qualifications, 526 P. 2d 268 (1974)
22 Upon timely motion of disqualification supported by affidavit alleging
23 prejudice, case or matter, without any further act or proof, must be assigned to another
24 judge for trial or hearing, and facts showing prejudice need not be alleged or proved.
25 McClenny v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 388 P. 2d 691, 36 Cal. Rptr. 459
26 60 Cal. 2d 677 (1974)
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order
1 Because Judge Chaffee's bias or prejudice will prevent Plaintiffs from receiving a
2 fair trial, the judge should recuse himself. If Judge Chaffee refuses to recuse, Plaintiffs
3 ask the presiding judge to refer this motion to another judge for a resolution on the
4 merits.
5 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs move the court to have Judge David R. Chaffee to
6 recuse himself from Case No. 30-2016-00871956-CU-OR-CJC forthwith.
7 Respectfully Submitted by,
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9 ________________________________ ________________________________
James Jones Anne Marie Jones
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In Propria Persona, Sui Juris In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
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VERIFICATION
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The foregoing statement is by the hand of James Jones and Anne Marie Jones, and is
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given subject to the penalties of perjury under the laws of this California Republic the
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United States of America.
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17 _____________________________ ___________________________________
James Jones Anne Marie Jones
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I, Ricardo Jones, certify that on the _____ day of February 2017, I mailed a true and
3 correct copy of the above and foregoing Plaintiffs' Motion to Recuse via certified mail
4 return receipt requested to:
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Superior Court of California
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County of Orange
7 700 Civic Center Drive West,
Santa Ana, CA 92701
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9 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA.
& Marianne Lake, CFO
10 Agent for Service of Process
11 CT Corporation System
818 W Seventh Street
12 Los Angeles, CA 90017
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QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP.
14 Mr. Kevin McCarthy
15 2141 5th Avenue
San Diego, CA 92101
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By _____________________________
19 Ricardo Jones
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Void Order

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