FRANCISCO SALUNGA v.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular
September 27, 1967 | C.J. Concepcion
By: Perry
SUMMARY:
The petitioner dissatisfied with the way the Union was being run due to, what he
believed to be, several illegal or irregular disbursements of union funds, tendered his
resignation from the Union. The Union then informed the Company of such
resignation and sought to compel the Company to dismiss the petitioner by virtue of
his resignation from the Union. The Company then told the petitioner that resigning
from the Union would result in the termination of his employment. Petitioner then
wrote to the Union seeking to withdraw or revoke his resignation. However, this
withdrawal of resignation was not accepted by the Union, which eventually resulted in
his dismissal. Petitioner then filed an ULP case against the Union, the Union officers
and the Company.
The SC found the Union and the Union officers guilty of ULP and acquitted the
Company. It ruled that generally, membership in voluntary associations cannot be
compelled by the state. However, with regard to labor unions, the privilege of
choosing its members is qualified because it is imbued with public interest. Therefore,
the courts may compel the Union to reinstate Petitioner as a member of the Union.
FACTS:
The petitioner was an employee of the Company and a member of the Union. Both
parties, entered into a CBA which provided, among others, a closed-shop agreement.
Sometime in 1961, the petitioner, due to his dissatisfaction with the way the Union
was being run, filed his resignation from the Union, which accepted it. The Union then
transmitted it to the Company and requested the immediate implementation of the
closed-shop agreement. The Company then informed the petitioner that his
resignation from the Union would result in the termination of his employment. Upon
being informed of that fact, the petitioner sought to withdraw his resignation from the
Union. This request for withdrawal was however, not accepted by the Union and it
sought to compel the company to terminate the employment of the petitioner.
The petitioner appealed the decision of the Union of not accepting the withdrawal of
his resignation to the National President but his appeal was not given due course.
Eventually, the petitioner was dismissed causing him to file ULP charges against the
Union, its officers, and the Company. The trial judge found all parties charged guilty of
ULP. On appeal to the CIR en banc, the decision of the trial judge was reversed.
Hence, this petition with the SC.
ISSUE / HELD:
WON the Courts may compel the Union to reinstate the petitioner as its member.
YES.
RULING:
Although generally, a State may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit
thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be accorded or
withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is qualified in respect of labor unions holding
employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement.
The closed-shop agreement and the union shop cause the admission requirements of
the trade union to become affected with public interest. Likewise, a closed-shop, or
union shop, or maintenance of membership clauses, cause the administration of
discipline by unions to be affected with public interest.
Therefore, such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in
discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of and employee whom the
union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground. Needless
to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members, who have the
requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the
coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who,
owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which
he forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those
who seek admission for the first time, and cannot arbitrarily be denied readmission.
As to the Company, the court found that the former is not guilty of ULP because it
deferred the discharge of petitioner and informed him of the consequences of his
actions. The Company gave due regard to the petitioners plight and was not unfair to
the petitioner. It did not merely show commendable understanding and sympathy
towards the petitioner but even tried to help him. The Company cannot be blamed for
the petitioners dismissal as it had the right to rely on the decision of the Union of not
accepting the readmission of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the CIR en banc is REVERSED.
HACIENDA FATIMA and/or VILLEGAS & SEGURA v NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGARCANE WORKERS (NFSW)
January 28, 2003|Panganiban| By Ron San Juan
Summary:
Hacienda workers organized themselves into a union. Petitioners refused to sit down
with the union for the purpose of collective bargaining. Instead, petitioners did not
give the workers work for more than a month. Union filed for illegal dismissal and
ULP. SC held that the workers are regular employees, hence, can only be dismissed
for cause. SC also held that the acts of petitioners constitute ULP.
Doctrine:
The respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in
the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to
prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members,
1
one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a union in their hacienda a
clear interference in the right of workers to self-organization.
Facts:
Petitioners did not look with favor workers having organized themselves into a
union. Thus, when complainant union NFSW was certified as the collective
bargaining representative in the certification elections, petitioner under the
pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit down with the union for the
purpose of entering into a CBA. Moreover, the workers including complainants
herein were not given work for more than one month. In protest, complainants
staged a strike which was however settled upon the signing of a MOA.
However, alleging that NFSW failed to load the fifteen wagons, petitioners
reneged on its commitment to sit down and bargain collectively. Instead,
petitioners employed all means including the use of private armed guards to
prevent the organizers from entering the premises.
Moreover, starting September 1991, petitioners did not any more give work
assignments to the complainants forcing the union to stage a strike. But due to
the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another MOA was signed by the
complainants and petitioners which provides.
Pursuant thereto, the parties subsequently met for a Conciliation Meeting. When
petitioners again reneged on its commitment, complainants filed the present
complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP.
Petitioners: argued respondents refused to work and being choosy in the kind of
work they have to perform. They are seasonal workers, not regular.
LA ruled for petitioners. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed NLRC.
Issues/Held:
Whether or not the respondent workers were illegally dismissed. (YES)
Respondents were regular employees as provided by Article 280 of the Labor Code.
For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not
enough that they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must
have also been employed only for the duration of one season. The evidence proves
the existence of the first, but not of the second, condition. The fact that respondents
repeatedly worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for several years is not
denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one
season. Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable.
Herein respondents, having performed the same tasks for petitioners every season
for several years, are considered the latters regular employees for their respective
tasks. Petitioners eventual refusal to use their services -- even if they were ready,
able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were available -- and
hiring of other workers to perform the tasks originally assigned to respondents
amounted to illegal dismissal of the latter.
Having failed to provide just cause for termination, petitioners illegally dismissed the
respondents.
Whether or not petitioners were guilty of ULP. (YES)
Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements
resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed
guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and
members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a union in their
hacienda a clear interference in the right of workers to self-organization.
The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction
of moral and exemplary damages.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS CIR
November 29, 1977 | Fernandez, J.
Sam
SUMMARY: Complainant-employees that were members of ACEA were discriminated
against by PDC by not giving them their working schedules, lessening their number of
working days and eventually dismissing them from their employment, because of their
refusal to disaffiliate from ACEA and join the Progressive Employees Union (a union
allegedly setup by PDC).
FACTS:
In September 1962, Araneta Coliseum Employees Association (ACEA) a legitimate
labor organization in behalf of forty-eight (48) members, instituted a case ULP for
unfair labor practice in the Court of Industrial Relations against Progressive
Development Corporation (PDC), a domestic business entity operating the Araneta
Coliseum, Jorge Araneta, Judy A. Roxas, Manuel B. Jover and Ramon Llorente, as
officers of the corporation PDC and Progressive Employees Union (PEU), a labor
organization existing in the PDC.
The complaint alleged that the PDC, through its officers, initiated a move to
disauthorize the counsel of the complainant ACEA from appearing in a union
conference with the respondents, petitioners herein; that the supervisors of PDC
encouraged, and assisted in, the formation of the Progressive Employees Union
(PEU) and coerced the employees, particularly the individual complainants, to
disaffiliate from the complainant union and to affiliate with the PEU; that in July and
August 1962 the respondents, petitioners herein, discriminated against the individual
complainants by either not giving them their working schedules, lessening their
number of working days and eventually dismissing them from their employment,
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because of their refusal to disaffiliate from their union and join the Progressive
Employees Union.
PDC: the individual complainants were merely casuals or temporary employees and
their services depended on the availability of work as ushers, usherettes, guards and
janitors when there were shows, performances or exhibits at the Araneta Coliseum.
They alleged that they did not interfere with the complainant union and in fact they
met and conferred with said union's counsel; that they did not initiate nor assist the
PEU; that they did not discriminate against the individual complainants nor dismiss
them as said complainants were only casuals or temporary employees.
Union: Denied that the officers and supervisors of the corporation PDC initiated and
assisted in its formation and claimed that its organization is the joint efforts of the
overwhelming majority of the employees and laborers of the corporation PDC, free
from any undue influence, interference and/or intimidation from any party. The PEU
claimed that the institution of the unfair labor practice case by the complainants is a
desperate attempt to unduly delay the proceedings for certification election.
CIR: found PDC guilty of ULP
ISSUES/HELD:
W/N PDC was guilty of Unfair Labor Practices (through their union busting activites)?
YES.
RATIO:
It appears that the individual complainants, during show days, were always scheduled
to work until June 1962 when they were not included in the schedule anymore. This
virtually amounted to dismissal, without prior notice. Their not being included in the
list of schedule since June 1962 could only be the result of petitioners' earlier threat of
dismissal should said complainants refuse to heed petitioners' admonition for them to
resign from the ACEA.
From the facts of record, it is clear that the individual complainants were dismissed
because they refused to resign from the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association
and to affiliate with the Progressive Employees Union which was being aided and
abetted by the Progressive Development Corporation.
The assertion of the petitioner Progressive Development Corporation and its officials
that they have nothing to do with the formation of the Progressive Employees Union is
not supported by the facts of record.
The President then of the Progressive Employees Union was Jose Generoso, Jr.,
Stage Manager of the Progressive Development Corporation. The stage Manager,
Generoso, has supervisory power over the twenty-two (22) employees under him.
Generoso was then the No. 2 man in the Araneta Coliseum, being an assistant of the
Director of said Coliseum. While the Progressive Employees Union was allegedly
organized on June 26, 1962, it was only on July 11, 1962 that its existence was
publicly announced when the management of the petitioner corporation refused to
meet with the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association. The Progressive Employees
Union never collected dues from its members and all their members are now regular
employees and are still working in the construction unit of the Philippine Development
Corporation. There is evidence that the Progressive Employees Union became
inactive after the death of Atty. Reonista the former counsel of the Progressive
Development Corporation. This shows that the Progressive Employees Union was
organized to camouflage the petitioner corporation's dislike for the Araneta Coliseum
Employees Association and to stave off the latter's recognition.
Manila Mandarin Employees Union v NLRC, Melba C. Beloncio
G.R. No. 76898; 29 September 1987; Gutierrez, Jr., J.
By: Dudday
FACTS:
1. Private respondent, Melba C. Beloncio, an employee of Manila Mandarin Hotel
since 1976 and was the assistant head waitress at the hotels coffee shop, was
expelled from the Manila Mandarin Employees Union for acts allegedly inimical to
the interests of the union. The charge of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from
her emotional remark to a waitress who happened to be a union steward, "Wala
akong tiwala sa Union ninyo." The remark was made in the course of a heated
discussion regarding Beloncio's efforts to make a lazy and recalcitrant waiter
adopt a better attitude towards his work. The union demanded the dismissal from
employment of Beloncio on the basis of the union security clause 1 of their
collective bargaining agreement and the Manila Mandarin Hotel acceded by
placing Beloncio on forced leave effective August 10, 1984.
2. Two days before the effective date of her forced leave, Beloncio filed a complaint
for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against herein Petitioner Union and
Manila Mandarin Hotel Inc. before the NLRC Arbitration Branch. Petitioner-Union
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action.
3. LA denied the motion to dismiss and decided in favor of Beloncio. It held that the
Union was guilty of ULP when it demanded Beloncios separation. NLRC
modified the LAs decision and ordered the Union to pay the wages and fringe
benefits of Beloncio from the time she was placed on forced leave until she is
actually reinstated, and for Manila Mandarin Hotel was ordered to reinstate
Beloncio and to pay her whatever service charges may be due her during that
period which amount would be held in escrow by the hotel.
ISSUES
1. Whether NLRC has no jurisdiction over the present controversy because the
same involves intra-union conflicts NLRC HAS JURISDICTION
2. Whether NLRC erred in ruling that Petitioner Union committed ULP and is
liable to pay Private Respondent - NO
1
Section 2. Dismissals.
xxx xxx xx
b) Members of the Union who cease to be such members and/or who fail to maintain their membership in
good standing therein by reason of their resignation from the Union and/or by reason of their expulsion from
the Union in accordance with the Constitution and ByLaws of the Union, for nonpayment of union dues and
other assessment for organizing, joining or forming another labor organization shall, upon written notice of
such cessation of membership or failure to maintain membership in the Union and upon written demand to the
company by the Union, be dismissed from employment by the Company after complying with the requisite due
process requirement;
3

RULING AND RATIO
1. NLRC has jurisdiction over the present controversy because the same
involves an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement provisions
and whether or not there was an illegal dismissal.
Under the CBA, membership in the union may be lost through expulsion only if
there is nonpayment of dues or a member organizes, joins, or forms another
labor organization.
As correctly explained by the Labor Arbiter, "(I)f the only question is the legality of
the expulsion of Beloncio from the Union undoubtedly, the question is one
cognizable by the BLR (Bureau of Labor Relations). But, the question extended
to the dismissal of Beloncio or steps leading thereto. Necessarily, when the hotel
decides the recommended dismissal, its acts would be subject to scrutiny.
Particularly, it will be asked whether it violates or not the existing CBA. Certainly,
violations of the CBA would be unfair labor practice."
Article 250 of the Labor Code provides it is considered as an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect
to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an
employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which
membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members.
Reading Article 250 with Article 217 of the Labor Code which provides that Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide ULP
cases and the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereto, it
becomes pretty obvious that the case falls squarely within the NLRC jurisdiction.
2. There is no error in the questioned decision. The Petitioner-Union is guilty of
unfair labor practice for which they must be held liable.
The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio to go on forced leave were it not
for the union's insistence and demand to the extent that because of the failure of
the hotel to dismiss Beloncio as requested, the union filed a notice of strike with
the Ministry of Labor and Employment on August 17, 1984 on the issue of unfair
labor practice. The hotel was then compelled to put Beloncio on forced leave and
to stop payment of her salary from September 1, 1984.
The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains a union security clause
a closedshop agreement. A closedshop agreement is an agreement whereby
an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who
must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. By holding
out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closedshop, it welds group
solidarity.
While the Court has held in numerous cases that a closed-shop agreement is a
valid form of union security, union security clauses are also governed by law and
by principles of justice, fair play, and legality. Union security clauses cannot be
used by union officials against an employer, much less their own members,
except with a high sense of responsibility, fairness, prudence, and judiciousness.
A union member may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her
job, for personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closedshop
agreement and in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality.
This is particularly true in this case where Ms. Beloncio was trying her best to
make a hotel bus boy do his work promptly and courteously so as to serve hotel
customers in the coffee shop expeditiously and cheerfully. Union membership
does not entitle waiters, janitors, and other workers to be sloppy in their work,
inattentive to customers, and disrespectful to supervisors. The Union should
have disciplined its erring and troublesome members instead of causing so much
hardship to a member who was only doing her work for the best interests of the
employer, all its employees, and the general public whom they serve.
Petition dismissed. NLRC affirmed.
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC
Narvasa, J.
Unfair Labor Practice
FACTS
The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions" affecting the
employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by
Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act.
Upon the effectivity of the Act on June 5, 1989, the union known as "Ilaw at
Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" said to represent 4,500 employees of
San Miguel Corporation, presented to the company a "demand" for
correction of the "significant distortion in . . . (the workers') wages."
o In that "demand," the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d) of RA
6727 which reads as follows: (d) . . . Where the application of the
increases in the wage rates under this Section results in distortions
as defined under existing laws in the wage structure within an
establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall
first be settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a
deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through compulsory
arbitration by the regional branches of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) having jurisdiction over the workplace. It shall
be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and
decide any dispute arising under this Section within twenty (20)
calendar days from the time said dispute is formally submitted to it
for arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage
distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of the increase
in the wage rates prescribed under this Section.
Union claims that "demand was ignored
When SMC rejected the reduced proposal of the UNION, the members , on
their own accord, refused to render overtime services
The workers involved also issued a joint notice: SAMA-SAMANG PAHAYAG:
KAMING ARAWANG MANGGAGAWA NG POLO BREWERY PAWANG
KASAPI NG ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) AY
NAGKAISANG NAGPASYA NA IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS
WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC
MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION.
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 The Union's position was that the workers' refuse "to work beyond eight (8)
hours everyday starting October 16, 1989" as a legitimate means of
compelling SMC to correct "the distortion in their wages brought about by the
implementation of the said laws (R.A. 6640 and R.A. 6727) to newly-hired
employees.
o That decision to observe the "eight hours work shift" was
implemented on October 16, 1989 by "some 800 daily-paid workers
,all members of IBM .
o This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the
reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused substantial
losses to SMC. These losses occurred despite such measures
taken by SMC as organizing "a third shift composed of regular
employees and some contractuals," and appeals "to the Union
members, through letters and memoranda and dialogues with their
plant delegates and shop stewards," to adhere to the existing work
schedule.
SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against the Union and its members "to declare the
strike or slowdown illegal" and to terminate the employment of the union
officers and shop stewards.
Then on December 8, 1989, on the claim that its action in the Arbitration
Branch had as yet "yielded no relief," SMC filed another complaint against
the Union and members thereof, this time directly with the National labor
Relations Commission, "to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for
damages, with prayer for the issuance of a cease-and-desist and temporary
restraining order. TRO was issued, but case remained pending.
ISSUE/RULING
Whether the workers' abandonment of the regular work schedule and their
deliberate and wilful reductoon of the plant's production efficiency is a
slowdown, which is an illegal and unprotected concerted activity. YES
Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of
engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives.
Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, declares that in line with "the
policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective
bargaining, . . (w)orkers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities
for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and
protection."
A similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and
protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of employers.
The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are
concerned are: strikes the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute; picketing the marching to and fro at the
employer's premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and
other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute; and boycotts
the concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to
persuade others to a like refusal.
On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly
undertake is the lockout the temporary refusal to furnish work on account
of a labor dispute, In this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the
"right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to
lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized
and respected."
The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the
purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor.
It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be
forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of
"distortions of the wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the
application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage
order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and
comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly
excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of
settlement of the issue.
o The provision states that . . the employer and the union shall
negotiate to correct the distort-ions. Any dispute arising from wage
distortions shall be resolved through the grievance procedure
under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains
unresolved, through voluntary arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed
by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be decided by the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators within ten (10)
calendar days from the time said dispute was referred to voluntary
arbitration. In cases where there are no collective agreements or
recognized labor unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor
to correct such distortions. Any dispute arising therefrom shall be
settled through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and,
if it remains unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation,
shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC
to conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute within
twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted
for compulsory arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from a
wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of any
increase in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the provisions of law
or Wage Order. x x x xxx xxx
o The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage
distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or abitration,
and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the
employees or management, is made clear in the rules
implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment12 pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of
the Act.13 Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after
reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily
by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares
that, "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for
a strike/lockout."
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the
5
 Union also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related
concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes or controversies,
generally, said agreement clearly stating that settlement of "all disputes,
disagreements or controversies of any kind" should be achieved by the
stipulated grievance procedure and ultimately by arbitration.
o The Union was thus prohibited to declare and hold a strike or
otherwise engage in non-peaceful concerted activities for the
settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of wage
distortions, or for that matter; any other issue "involving or relating
to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or
employer-employee relations."
o The partial strike or concerted refusal by the Union members to
follow the five-year-old work schedule which they had therefore
been observing, resorted to as a means of coercing correction of
"wage distortions," was therefore forbidden by law and contract
and, on this account, illegal.
Case remanded.
San Miguel Corp v. NLRC and San Miguel Corp Employees Union- PTGWO
(1999)
PURISIMA, J.
July 1990, San Miguel Corporation, alleging financial losses, shut down some of
its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant, listed as follows:
seventeen(17) employees in the Business Logistics Division (BLD),
seventeen (17) in the Ayala Operations Center (AOC), and eighteen (18) in the
Magnolia-Manila Buying Station (Magnolia-MBS.)
The union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees,
praying for the redeployment of the said employees to the other divisions of the
company.
The grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to Sections 5 and 8, Article
VIII of the parties 1990 Collective Bargaining Agreement.2
2 SEC. 6. Conciliation Board. - There shall be a conciliation Board per Business Unit or Division. Every
Sec.5. Processing of Grievance. - Should a grievance arise, an earnest effort shall be made to settle the
grievance expeditiously in accordance with the following procedures:
Step 1. - The individual employee concerned and the Union Directors, or the Union Steward shall, first take up
the employees grievance orally with his immediate superior. If no satisfactory agreement or adjustment of the
grievance is reached, the grievance shall, within twenty (20) working days from the occurrence of the cause or
event which gave rise to the grievance, be filed in writing with the Department Manager or the next level
superior who shall render his decision within ten (10) working days from the receipt of the written grievance. A
copy of the decision shall be furnished the Plant Personnel Officer.
Step 2. - If the decision in Step 1 is rejected, the employee concerned may elevate or appeal this in writing to
the Plant Manager/Director or his duly authorized representative within twenty (20) working days from the
receipt of the Decision of the Department Manager. Otherwise, the decision in Step 1 shall be deemed
accepted by the employee.
The Plant Manager/Director assisted by the Plant Personnel Officer shall determine the necessity of
conducting grievance meetings. If necessary, the Plant Manager/Director and the Plant Personnel Officer shall
meet the employee concerned and the Union Director/Steward on such date(s) as may be designated by the
Plant Manager. In every plant/office, Grievance Meetings shall be scheduled at least twice a month.
During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the employees were
redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a result only 17
employees remained when the parties proceeded to Step 3 of the grievance
procedure.
In a meeting on October 26, 1990, SMC informed the union that if by October 30,
the remaining 17 employees could not yet be redeployed, their services would be
terminated on November 2.
Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a rep of the union, declared that there was nothing
more to discuss in view of the deadlock.
November 7, 1990, the union filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) of the DOLE a notice of strike on the following
grounds: a) bargaining deadlock; b) union busting; c) gross violation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such as non-compliance with the
grievance procedure; d) failure to provide private respondent with a list of vacant
positions pursuant to the parties side agreement that was appended to the 1990
CBA; and e) defiance of voluntary arbitration award. Petitioner on the other hand,
moved to dismiss the notice of strike but the NCMB failed to act on the motion.
SMC asked to dismiss the notice of strike given by union and for it to comply
with the provisions of the SBA on grievance machinery, arbitration, and the no-
strike clause.
NLRC dismissed the SMC complaint, hence this certiorari petition.
ISSUE: WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing SMCs
complaint?- YES
See Rule XXII, Section I, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V the
Labor Code.3 In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by the
The Plant Manager shall give his written comments and decision within ten (10) working days after his receipt
of such grievance or the date of submission of the grievance for resolution, as the case may be.A copy of his
Decision shall be furnished the Employee Relations Directorate.
Step 3. - If no satisfactory adjustment is arrived at Step 2, the employee may appeal the Decision to the
Conciliation Board as provided under Section 6 hereof, within fifteen (15) working days from the date of
receipt of the decision of the Plant Manager/Director or his designate. Otherwise, the decision in Step 2 shall
be deemed accepted by the employee.
The Conciliation Board shall meet on the grievance in such dates as shall be designated by the
Division/Business Unit Manager or his representative. In every Division/Business Unit, Grievance Meetings of
the Conciliation Board shall be scheduled at least once a month.
The Conciliation Board shall have fifteen (15) working days from the date of submission of the grievance for
resolution within which to decide on the grievance.
Conciliation Board shall be composed of not more than five (5) representatives each from the Company and
the Union. Management and the Union may be assisted by their respective legal counsels.
In every Division/Business Unit, the names of the Company and Union representatives to the Conciliation
Board shall be submitted to the Division/Business Unit Manager not later than January of every year. The
Conciliation Board members shall act as such for one (1) year until removed by the Company or the Union, as
the case may be.
Sec. 8. Submission to Arbitration. - If the employee or Union is not satisfied with the Decision of the
Conciliation Board and desires to submit the grievance to arbitration, the employee or the Union shall serve
notice of such intention to the Company within fifteen (15) working days after receipt of the Boards decision. If
no such written notice is received by the Company within fifteen (15) working days, the grievance shall be
considered settled on the basis of the companys position and shall no longer be available for arbitration.
3
Section 1. Grounds for strike and lockout. -- A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of bargaining
deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Violations of the collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice
and shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout may be declared on grounds involving inter-union and intra-
6
private respondent union are non-strikeable. The grounds appear more illusory
than real.
Collective Bargaining Deadlock- the situation between the labor and the
management of the company where there is failure in the collective bargaining
negotiations resulting in a stalemate.
o This situation is non-existent in the present case since there is a Board
assigned on Step 3 of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting
views of the parties.
o Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five
representatives each from the company and the union to decide the
conflict, union declared a deadlock & filed a notice of strike.
o It failed to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and
arbitration proceedings provided in the CBA, thus the notice of strike
should have been dismissed by the NLRC and the union ordered to
proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
o Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co: the strike staged by the union is
illegal for not complying with the grievance procedure provided in the
collective bargaining agreement. The main purpose of the parties in
adopting a procedure in the settlement of their disputes is to
prevent a strike. This procedure must be followed in its entirety if it
is to achieve its objective. x x x strikes held in violation of the
terms contained in the collective bargaining agreement are illegal,
especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have
to be achieved.
Re: alleged violation of the CBA, such a violation is chargeable against the
union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail
of the remedies under the CBA, it violated the mandatory provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.
Abolition of departments or positions in the company is one of the recognized
management prerogatives.
o The union does not question the validity of the business move of
petitioner.
o It is presumed that SMC acted in good faith. In fact, it redeployed most
of the employees involved; such that from an original 17 excess
employees in BLD, 15 were successfully redeployed. In AOC, out of the
17 original excess, 15 were redeployed. In the Magnolia - Manila Buying
Station, out of 18 employees, 6 were redeployed and only 12 were
terminated.
o SMC having evinced its willingness to negotiate the fate of the
remaining employees affected, there is no ground to sustain the notice
of strike of the private respondent union.
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint of petitioner SMC
for the dismissal of the notice of strike, issuance of a temporary restraining order,
and an order compelling the respondent union to settle the dispute under the
grievance machinery of their CBA.
union disputes or on issues brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration.
DISPOSITIVE: PETITION GRANTED. 3rd Step of Grievance Procedure to
commence.
San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM)
G.R. No. 119293
June 10, 2003
Azcuna, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner SMC and respondent IBM, the exclusive bargaining agent of
petitioners daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a CBA under which
they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. 4
It also included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement.5
April 11, 1994 IBM, through its VP Colomeda, filed with the NCMB a notice
of strike against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of
union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out
of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6)
harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-
elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.
Next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time though its President
Galvez raising similar ground.
Galvez group requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with
that of the Colomeda group, to which the latter opposed, alleging that Galvez
lacks authority in filing the same.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to
Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and
that they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from
each other.
NCMB Director Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable
grounds. He issued an order converting their notices of strike into preventive
mediation.
May 16, 1994 Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a
strike vote. This was opposed by petitioner. Colomeda group notified the
NCMB of the results of their strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike.
The strike paralyzed the operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly
worth P29.98 M in daily lost production.
5
7
 May 23, 1994 Galvez group filed its second notice of strike. NCMB
however found the grounds to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the
first notice.
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a Petition for Injunction. NLRC resolved to
issue a TRO directing free ingress and egress from petitioners plants,
without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful picketing and continuous
hearings on the injunction case.
Petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with IBM,
calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of
good faith talks. The MOA, signed in the presence of DOLE officials,
expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and
will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. The picket
lines ended and work was then resumed.
November 29, 1994 NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying SMCs
petition for injunction for lack of factual basis. It found that the circumstances
at the time did not constitute or no longer constituted an actual or threatened
commission of unlawful acts.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) WON NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to enforce, by
injunction, the parties reciprocal obligations to submit to arbitration and not
to strike. YES.
(2) WON NLRC gravely abused its discretion in withholding injunction which is
the only immediate and effective substitute for the disastrous economic
warfare that arbitration is designed to avoid. YES.
HOLDING/RATIO:
Article 254 of the LC provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall
be issued by any court or other entity except as otherwise provided in
Articles 218 and 264.
o Under the first exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code
expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to enjoin or restrain
actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts, or to require the performance of a particular act in
any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
o The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor
organization or the employer engages in any of the prohibited
activities enumerated in Article 264.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the
respondents strike. A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in
protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of
their employment. However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal
bounds. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code
and its IRR prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB.
Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of
disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which
shall render a strike illegal.
In the present case, NCMB converted IBMs notices into preventive
mediation as it found that the real issues raised are non-strikeable. Such
order is in pursuance of the NCMBs duty to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably, and in line
with the state policy of favoring voluntary modes of settling labor disputes. In
accordance with the IRR of the LC, the said conversion has the effect of
dismissing the notices of strike filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL v.
Drilon, where the Court declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of
strike, in view of the NCMBs conversion of the notice therein into a
preventive mediation case.
Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar, when the
NCMB ordered the preventive mediation, respondent had thereupon lost the
notices of strike it had filed. Subsequently, however, it still defiantly
proceeded with the strike while mediation was ongoing, and notwithstanding
the letter-advisories of NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike.
Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of the
IRR, which explicitly oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good faith
and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.
The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction, petitioner sought
recourse from the public respondent. The NLRC issued a TRO only for free
ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, but did not enjoin the unlawful
strike itself. It ignored the fatal lack of notice of strike.
Moreover ruled that there was a lack of factual basis in issuing the
injunction. Contrary to the NLRCs finding, the Court finds that at the time the
injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to revive the unlawful
strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by the IBM-NCR
Council which led the union. These flyers categorically declared: Ipaalala
nyo sa management na hindi iniaatras ang ating Notice of Strike (NOS) at
anumang oras ay pwede nating muling itirik ang picket line. These flyers
were not denied by respondent, and were dated June 19, 1994, just a day
after the unions manifestation with the NLRC that there existed no threat of
commission of prohibited activities.
8

Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor Code explicitly
states that a declaration of strike without first having filed the required notice
is a prohibited activity, which may be prevented through an injunction in
accordance with Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted
the injunctive relief to prevent the grave damage brought about by the
unlawful strike.
Also noteworthy is public respondents disregard of petitioners argument
pointing out the unions failure to observe the CBA provisions on grievance
and arbitration. In the case of San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, we ruled that the
union therein violated the mandatory provisions of the CBA when it filed a
notice of strike without availing of the remedies prescribed therein.
As in the abovecited case, petitioner herein evinced its willingness to
negotiate with the union by seeking for an order from the NLRC to compel
observance of the grievance and arbitration proceedings. Respondent
however resorted to force without exhausting all available means within its
reach. Such infringement of the aforecited CBA provisions constitutes further
justification for the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As we said
long ago: Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective
bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive
arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and
respected if their ends have to be achieved.6
As to petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA,
jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses only bar strikes which are
economic in nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair labor practices. The
notices filed in the case at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial
determination of which would entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor
arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of the invalidity of the notices of
strike dispenses with the need to discuss this issue.
The Court cannot sanction IBMs brazen disregard of legal requirements
imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of promoting voluntary
modes of settling disputes. The states commitment to enforce mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than
our Constitution. Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor
granted by our statutes. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject
of judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to a business enterprise.
Baptista v Villanueva
July 31, 2013 | Mendoza, J.
By: AP
SUMMARY:
6
Petitioners were expelled from their union because they violated a provision in their
Constitution and By-laws which prohibit filing of case in court before all internal
remedies are exhausted. They were expelled from the union, then terminated by RPN
pursuant to the CBA union security clause. They then filed a ULP case against
respondent. LA in their favour. NLRC, CA and SC ruled for respondents.
DOCTRINE: (4-fold Test)
Workers and employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their
constitutions and rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their
administration and activities and to formulate their programs; RPNEUs Constitution
and By-Laws expressly mandate that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
internal remedies within the organization.
FACTS:
Petitioners were former union members of Radio Phil Network Employees Union
(RPNEU) which was the SEBA of RPN while respondents are elected officers and
members of the same.
Petitioners filed a complaint for impeachment of their union president before the
executive board of RPN. This was eventually abandoned. They later re-lodged the
impeachment complaint, this time, against all union officers and members of RPNEU
before the DOLE. They also filed various petitions for an audit.
3 complaints were later filed against them before the unions Committee on Grievance
and Investigation (Committee) for alleged violation of the unions Constitution and By-
Law. It was alleged, inter alia, that they violated Article IX, Section 2.5 for urging or
advocating that a member start an action in any court of justice or external
investigative body against the Union or its officer without first exhausting all internal
remedies open to him or available in accordance with the CBL.
After investigation, the committee recommended their expulsion to the unions Board
of Directors. They were then expelled.
The union then informed RPN of the expulsion and requested the management to
serve them notices of termination in compliance with their CBAs union security
clause. They were then terminated.
Petitioner filed 3 complaints for ULP against respondents questioning their expulsion
from the union and their subsequent termination from employment.
LA: ruled in their favour and adjudged respondents guilty of ULP pursuant to Article
249(a) and (b) of the Labor Code. It clarified, however, that only union officers of the
union should be held responsible so it exonerated 6 of original defendants who were
mere union members.
NLRC: reversed LA. It dismissed the ULP charge for lack of merit. NLRC found that
petitioners filed a suit calling for the impeachment of the officers and members of the
Executive Board of RPNEU without first resorting to internal remedies available under
its own Constitution and By-Laws.
CA: affirmed.
9
ISSUES/HELD:
WON respondents are guilty of ULP. NO
RATIO:
ULP concept imbedded in article 247 of LC.
- commission of acts that transgress the workers right to organize;
- As specified in Articles 248 and 249 of the Labor Code, the prohibited acts
must necessarily relate to the workers' right to self-organization and to the
observance of a CBA; Absent the said vital elements, the acts complained, although
seemingly unjust, would not constitute ULP.
Petitioners: Procedure that should have been followed by the respondents in
resolving the charges against them was Article XVII, Settlement of Internal Disputes
of their Constitution and By-Laws, specifically, Section 232
Said rule requires members to put their grievance in writing to be submitted to their
union president, who shall strive to have the parties settle their differences amicably.
Petitioners maintain that any form of grievance would be referred only to the
committee upon failure of the parties to settle amicably
SC: Disagreed
- Based on RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws, the charges against
petitioners were not mere internal squabbles, but violations that demand proper
investigation because, if proven, would constitute grounds for their expulsion from the
union;
- As such, Article X on Investigation Procedures and Appeal Process where
any charge against any member or officer shall be submitted to the Board of Directors
which shall refer it (if necessary) to the committee which shall forward its finding and
recommendation to the board, was properly applied.
Any procedural flaw in the proceedings before the Committee deemed cured when
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard;
- In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process;
- Essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side;
Re: Opportunity to personally face and confront accusers
- Mere absence of a one-onone confrontation between the petitioners and
their complainants does not automatically affect the validity of the proceedings before
the Committee.
- Not all cases necessitate a trial-type hearing;
No ULP
- Well settled: workers and employers organizations shall have the right to
draw up their constitutions and rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, to
organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs;
- Here: RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws expressly mandate that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the internal remedies within the organization;
- Petitioners were found to have violated the provisions of the unions
Constitution and By-Laws when they filed petitions for impeachment against their
union officers and for audit before the DOLE without first exhausting all internal
remedies available within their organization;
o petitioners expulsion from the union was not a deliberate attempt to curtail
or restrict their right to organize, but was triggered by the commission of an act,
expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5 of Article IX of the unions Constitution and By-
Laws;
Onus probandi (for ULP charge to prosper) rests upon the party alleging it to
prove or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of evidence
- In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence
or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support
a conclusion is required;
- Indubitable that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice
should materially relate to the workers' right to self-organization;
- Here: petitioners failed to discharge the burden required to prove the charge
of ULP against the respondents;
o Petitioners were not able to establish how they were restrained or coerced
by their union in a way that curtailed their right to self-organization.
o The records likewise failed to sufficiently show that the respondents unduly
persuaded management into discriminating against petitioners. other than to bring to
its attention their expulsion from the union, which in turn, resulted in the
implementation of their CBA' s union security clause.
T&H Shopfitters Corp. V. T&H Shopfitters Corp. Workers Union7
7
T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN CORPORATION, STINNES HUANG, BEN HUANG
and ROGELIO MADRIAGA, Petitioners,
vs.
T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN WORKERS UNION, ELPIDIO ZALDIVAR, DARI OS
GONZALES, WILLIAM DOMINGO, BOBBY CASTILLO, JIMMY M. PASCUA, GERMANO M. BAJO, RICO L.
10
February 26, 2014| MENDOZA, J.
By: Justin
SUMMARY:
FACTS:
On September 7, 2004, the T&H Shopfitters Corporation/ Gin Queen
Corporation workers union (THS-GQ Union) filed their Complaint for Unfair
Labor Practice (ULP) by way of union busting, and Illegal Lockout, with
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, against T&H Shopfitters
Corporation (T&H Shopfitters) and Gin Queen Corporation before the Labor
Arbiter (LA).
1st CAUSE: In their desire to improve their working conditions, respondents
and other employees of held their first formal meeting on November 23,
2003 to discuss the formation of a union. The following day, seventeen (17)
employees were barred from entering petitioners factory premises located in
Castillejos, Zambales, and ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters
warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) purportedly because of its
expansion. Afterwards, the said seventeen (17) employees were repeatedly
ordered to go on forced leave due to the unavailability of work.
Respondents contended that the affected employees were not given regular
work assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to perform
their functions. Respondents sought the assistance of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board. Subsequently, an agreement between
petitioners and THS-GQ Union was reached. Petitioners agreed to give
priority to regular employees in the distribution of work assignments.
Respondents averred, however, that petitioners never complied with its
commitment but instead hired contractual workers. Instead, Respondents
claimed that the work weeks of those employees in the SBFZ plant were
drastically reduced to only three (3) days in a month.
2nd CAUSE: On March 24, 2004, THS-GQ Union filed a petition for
certification election and an order was issued to hold the certification election
in both T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen.
On October 10, 2004, petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for
its employees. The officers and members of the THS-GQ Union were
purportedly excluded from the field trip. On the evening of the field trip, a
certain Angel Madriaga, a sales officer of petitioners, campaigned against
the union in the forthcoming certification election.
When the certification election was scheduled on October 11, 2004, the
employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center in Zambales
to cast their votes. The remaining employees situated at the SBFZ plant cast
their votes as well. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by petitioners, the
votes for no union prevailed.
3rD CAUSE: A memorandum was issued by petitioner Ben Huang (Huang),
Director for Gin Queen, informed its employees of the expiration of the lease
MANZANO, ALLAN L. CALLORINA, ROMEO BLANCO, GILBERT M. GARCIA, CARLOS F. GERILLO,
EDUARDO A. GRANDE, EDILBRANDO MARTICIO, VIVENCIO SUSANO, ROLANDO GARCIA, JR.,
MICHAEL FABABIER, ROWELL MADRIAGA, PRESNIL TOLENTINO, MARVIN VENTURA, FRANCISCO
RIVARES, PLACIDO TOLENTINO and ROLANDO ROMERO, Respondents.
contract between Gin Queen and its lessor in Castillejos, Zambales and
announced the relocation of its office and workers to Cabangan, Zambales.
When the respondents, visited the site in Cabangan, discovered that it was a
talahiban or grassland. The said union officers and members were made to
work as grass cutters in Cabangan, under the supervision of a certain
Barangay Captain Greg Pangan. Due to these circumstances, the
employees assigned in Cabangan did not report for work. The other
employees who likewise failed to report in Cabangan were meted out with
suspension.
In its defense, Petitioners also stress that they cannot be held liable for ULP
for the reason that there is no employer-employee relationship between the
former and respondents. Further, Gin Queen avers that its decision to
implement an enforced rotation of work assignments for respondents was a
management prerogative permitted by law, justified due to the decrease in
orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost cutting measures to
avoid anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned work on a rotational
basis. It explains that its failure to present concrete proof of its decreasing
orders was due to the impossibility of proving a negative assertion. It also
asserts that the transfer from Castillejos to Cabangan was made in good
faith and solely because of the expiration of its lease contract in Castillejos.
It was of the impression that the employees, who opposed its economic
measures, were merely motivated by spite in filing the complaint for ULP
against it.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether or not ULP acts were committed by petitioners against respondents.
ULP were committed by petitioners against respondents.Petitioners are being
accused of violations of paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of Article 257 (formerly Article
248) of the Labor Code,13 to wit:
Article 257. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful for an employer
to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization;
xxxx
To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when
such will interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization;
xxxx
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions
of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. x x x
The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to
Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the
scheduled certification election; 2) the active campaign by the sales officer of
petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field
11
 trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center; 4) the
continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents functions; 5)
assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters; and
6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members, taken
together, reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such were all
orchestrated to restrict respondents free exercise of their right to self-
organization.
The Court is of the considered view that petitioners undisputed actions prior
and immediately before the scheduled certification election, while seemingly
innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting their
exclusive bargaining representative.
Dispositive: CA Ruling Affirmed. Except: ATTYs fees deleted
Toyota Motors Workers Association v. NLRC
October 19, 2007 || J. Velasco
By: Rose Ann
FACTS:
The Union is a legitimate labor organization duly registered DOLE. It filed a petition
for certification election among the Toyota rank and file employees with the NCMB.
The certification election was conducted. Med-Arbiter Lameyra certified the Union as
the SEBA of all the Toyota rank and file employees. Toyota challenged said Order via
an appeal to the DOLE Secretary.
In the meantime, the Union submitted its CBA proposals to Toyota, but the latter
refused to negotiate in view of its pending appeal. Thus, the Union filed a notice of
strike with the NCMB. NCMB-NCR converted the notice of strike into a preventive
mediation case on the ground that the issue of whether or not the Union is the SEBA
of all Toyota rank and file employees was still unresolved by the DOLE Secretary.
On February 21, 2001, 135 Union officers and members failed to render the required
overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a picket in front of the BLR office
in Intramuros, Manila. More than 200 employees staged mass actions on February
22 and 23, 2001 in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and
anti-union stance of Toyota.
Due to the deliberate absence of a considerable number of employees on February
22 to 23, 2001, Toyota experienced acute lack of manpower in its manufacturing and
production lines, and was unable to meet its production goals resulting in huge losses
of PhP 53,849,991.
Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain why
they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the companys directive to
render overtime work on February 21, 2001, for their failure to report for work on
February 22 and 23, 2001, and for their participation in the concerted actions which
severely disrupted and paralyzed the plants operations.
The Union filed with the NCMB another notice of strike for union busting amounting to
unfair labor practice.
The Union nonetheless submitted an explanation in compliance with the notices sent
by Toyota to the erring employees. The Union members explained that their refusal to
work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise
of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for
redress of grievances. It further argued that the demonstrations staged by the
employees could not be classified as an illegal strike or picket, and that Toyota had
already condoned the alleged acts when it accepted back the subject employees.
Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees for participation in concerted
actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the
Labor Code.
In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went on
strike on March 17, 2001. From March 28, 2001 to April 12, 2001, the Union
intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyotas Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.
The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants.
On March 29, 2001, Toyota filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the
issuance of a TRO with the NLRC. It sought free ingress to and egress from its
Bicutan and Sta. Rosa manufacturing plants. NLRC issued a TRO against the Union,
ordering the removal of barricades and all forms of obstruction to ensure free ingress
to and egress from the companys premises.
Meanwhile, Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC
arbitration branch.
On April 10, 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. In the Order the DOLE
Secretary gave a return to work directive and likewise ordered Toyota to accept the
returning employees under the same terms and conditions obtaining prior to the strike
or at its option, put them under payroll reinstatement. The parties were also enjoined
from committing acts that may worsen the situation.
The Union ended the strike. The union members and officers tried to return to work
but were told that Toyota opted for payroll-reinstatement authorized by the Order of
the DOLE Secretary.
In the meantime, the Union filed an MR of the DOLE Secretarys April 10, 2001
certification Order. SOLE denied. A petition for certiorari was filed in the CA.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 2001,despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretarys
certification Order, several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a protest
rally in front of Toyotas Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in defiance of
the April 10, 2001 Order.
Then, on May 28, 2001, around 44 Union members staged another protest action in
front of the Bicutan Plant. At the same time, some 29 payroll-reinstated employees
12
picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plants main entrance, and were later joined by
other Union members.
On June 5, 2001, notwithstanding the certification Order, the Union filed another
notice of strike. The DOLE Secretary directed the second notice of strike to be
subsumed in the April 10, 2001 certification Order.
CA dismissed the Unions petition for certiorari assailing the DOLE Secretarys April
10, 2001 Order.
Subsequently, the NLRC declared the strikes staged by the Union on February 21 to
23, 2001 and May 23 and 28, 2001 as illegal. Reasons:
failed to comply with the procedural requirements of a valid strike under Art.
263 of the Labor Code.
for staging strikes after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the
Toyota dispute
CA affirmed NLRC with a modification, however, of deleting the award of severance
compensation to the dismissed Union members.
However, in its Resolution, the CA modified its decision by reinstating severance
compensation to the dismissed employees based on social justice.
ISSUE
WON the strikes conducted were illegal strikesYES
WoN the Union Officers are liableYES
WoN the participating Union members are liableYES
WoN separation pay may be granted--NO
RATIO
THE ALLEGED PROTEST RALLIES IN FRONT OF THE OFFICES OF BLR AND
DOLE SECRETARY AND AT THE TOYOTA PLANTS CONSTITUTED ILLEGAL
STRIKES
February 2001 Strikes: ILLEGAL
While the facts in Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization are similar in
some respects to that of the present case, the Union fails to realize one major
difference: there was no labor dispute in Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization. In the present case, there was an on-going labor dispute arising from
Toyotas refusal to recognize and negotiate with the Union, which was the subject of
the notice of strike filed by the Union on January 16, 2001.
Applying pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence, the protest actions undertaken
by the Union officials and members on February 21 to 23, 2001 are not valid and
proper exercises of their right to assemble and ask government for redress of their
complaints, but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor Code.
The Unions position is weakened by the lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold
rallies. The purported reason for these protest actions was to safeguard their rights
against any abuse which the med-arbiter may commit against their cause. However,
the Union failed to advance convincing proof that the med-arbiter was biased against
them. What comes to the fore is that the decision not to work for two days was
designed and calculated to cripple the manufacturing arm of Toyota. It becomes
obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally
acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company. This is not a
legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance.
The Union failed to comply with the following requirements for a valid strike: (1) a
notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15
days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total
union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are
mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal.
The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report
is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of
legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.
Moreover, the February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Sec. D, par. 6 of
Toyotas Code of Conduct which prohibits inciting or participating in riots, disorders,
alleged strikes or concerted actions detrimental to [Toyotas] interest. The penalty for
the offense is dismissal. The Union and its members are bound by the company
rules, and the February 2001 mass actions and deliberate refusal to render regular
and overtime work on said days violated these rules.
March-April 2001 Strikes: ILLEGAL
They were initially legal as the legal requirements were met. However, when the
Union barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants and blocked the free
ingress to and egress from the company premises, these strikes were illegal because
unlawful means were employed. The acts of the Union officers and members are in
palpable violation of Art. 264(e), which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or
intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company
premises.
May 2001 Strikes: ILLEGAL
The Union asserts that the rallies held on May 23 and 28, 2001 could not be
considered strikes, as the participants were the dismissed employees who were on
payroll reinstatement. It concludes that there was no work stoppage.
SC: While it may be conceded that there was no work disruption in the two Toyota
plants, the fact still remains that the Union and its members picketed and performed
concerted actions in front of the Company premises. This is a patent violation of the
assumption of jurisdiction and certification Order of the DOLE Secretary, which
ordered the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that might lead to the
worsening of an already deteriorated situation. While there are no work stoppages,
the pickets and concerted actions outside the plants have a demoralizing and even
chilling effect on the workers inside the plants and can be considered as veiled
threats of possible trouble to the workers when they go out of the company premises
after work and of impending disruption of operations to company officials and even to
customers in the days to come.
UNION OFFICERS ARE LIABLE FOR UNLAWFUL STRIKES OR ILLEGAL ACTS
DURING A STRIKE
13
Art. 264(a) sanctions the dismissal of a union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike or who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
lawful strike.
The Union officials were in clear breach of Art. 264(a) when they knowingly
participated in the illegal strikes held from February 21 to 23, 2001, from March 17 to
April 12, 2001, and on May 23 and 28, 2001.
MEMBERS LIABILITY DEPENDS ON PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGAL ACTS
Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is liable when he knowingly
participates in an illegal act during a strike. While the provision is silent on whether
the strike is legal or illegal, we find that the same is irrelevant. As long as the
members commit illegal acts, in a legal or illegal strike, then they can be terminated.
However, an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike.
No precise meaning was given to the phrase illegal acts (committed in a strike). It
may encompass a number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal laws, such as
the following:
(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that [n]o person engaged
in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the
free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct
public thoroughfares;
(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike; and
(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary or
NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order under Art.
263(g) of the Labor Code.
This enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other breaches of existing laws.
After a scrutiny of the records, the 227 employees indeed joined the February 21, 22,
and 23, 2001 rallies and refused to render overtime work or report for work.
Anent the March 28 to April 12, 2001 strikes, evidence is ample to show commission
of illegal acts like acts of coercion or intimidation and obstructing free ingress to or
egress from the company premises. The strikers badmouthed people coming in and
shouted invectives such as bakeru at Japanese officers of the company. The strikers
even pounded the vehicles of Toyota officials. More importantly, they prevented the
ingress of Toyota employees, customers, suppliers, and other persons who wanted to
transact business with the company. These were patent violations of Art. 264(e) of the
Labor Code, and may constitute crimes under the RPC such as threats or coercion
among others.
Lastly, the strikers, though on payroll reinstatement, staged protest rallies on May 23,
2001 and May 28, 2001 which are patent violations of the April 10, 2001 assumption
of jurisdiction/certification Order issued by the SOLE, which proscribed the
commission of acts that might lead to the worsening of an already deteriorated
situation. Art. 263(g) is clear that strikers who violate the assumption/certification
Order may suffer dismissal from work.
SEPARATION PAY CANNOT BE GRANTED IN THIS CASE
GENERAL RULE: when just causes for terminating the services of an employee
under Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay.
The apparent reason behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that
lawbreakers should not benefit from their illegal acts. The dismissed employee,
however, is entitled to whatever rights, benefits and privileges [s/he] may have under
the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or
voluntary employer policy or practice or under the Labor Code and other existing
laws.
One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is validly
dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice
well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. In PLDT v. NLRC, the Court laid down the
rule that severance compensation shall be allowed only when the cause of the
dismissal is other than serious misconduct or that which reflects adversely on the
employees moral character.
Explicit in PLDT are two exceptions: serious misconduct (which is the first ground for
dismissal under Art. 282) or acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee.
A painstaking review of case law renders obtuse the Unions claim for separation pay.
In a slew of cases, this Court refrained from awarding separation pay or financial
assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to
their participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes.
PHIL BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORG (PBMEO) V PBM CO. INC.
June 5, 1973; Makasiar, J.:
By: Paola
FACTS:
1. PBMEO is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of PBM Co. 393
members joined the demonstration at issue.
2. On March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police, to be participated in by workers in the first shift (6 AM to 2 PM), as
well as those in the second (7 AM to 4 PM) and third (8 AM 5PM) shifts. The
company was informed of the proposed demonstration.
3. On March 2, 1969, PBM Co. allegedly learned of the demonstration.
4. March 3: A meeting was again held between department heads for the union and
the management was called by the company on March 3, asking that the union
panel confirm or deny the mass demonstration. It was confirmed by the union
spokesperson Pacu.
a. Pacu, informed management that the demonstration cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon and explained that
it had nothing to do with the company bec. the union had no quarrel with
the management.
b. Management informed that the demonstration is an inalienable right
granted by the constitution, but emphasized that the demonstration
should not unduly prejudice the normal operations of the company.
14
 c. The company suggested that the first shift from 6am-2pm should report
to work in order to avoid loss or damage to the firm.
d. They warned that those in the 1st and 2nd shift who participate without
filing for leave, and who fail to report on the day of the demonstration
shall be dismissed for violating the no strike no lockout policy
provision in the CBA tantamount to an illegal strike.
e. The union countered that it was too late to change their plans sinche the
demonstration will be held the following morning.
5. March 4, 1969: Adviser of PBMEO, Mr. Aniston, sent PBM Co a cablegram to
Company received 9:50 AM reiterating request excuse day shift employees
joining demonstration march
6. Because preparations had been made, the union proceeded with the
demonstration (400 union members went to the protest)
7. Complaint was filed by the company to the CIR for violation of section 4(a)-6, in
relation to sections 13 and 14 of RA 875 (Act to Promote Industrial Peace) and
their CBA.
8. In their answer, PBMEO said that:
a. They did not violate CBA because they notified PBM Co. prior to the
demonstration
b. That the mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional
right of free speech against the abuses of Pasig policemen.
c. That their demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was
not directed against PBM Co.
9. CIR: PBMEO was guilty of bargaining in bad faith, and its officers Florencio,
Rufino, Marioano, Asecion, Bonifacio, Benjamin, Nicanor and Rodulfo (petitioners
here) were held directly responsible for perpetrating the ULP, thus they were
dismissed. Decision was allegedly received on September 22, 1969.
10. An MR was filed on September 29. The company argues that under the CIR
Rules of Court, the petitioners had 5 days to file MR, and since it was filed 2 days
late, the MR should be dismissed.
11. CIR on MR: dismissed for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Decision
was appealed to the SC.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
W/N the Union was engaged in ULP for holding the demonstration NO.
The court went into a lengthy discussion about rights and freedoms, but it
highlighted that in the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression
and assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions [] [And] that
while the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized.
Because there freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society and the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions, they need
breathing space to survive, permitting government regulation only with
narrow specificity.
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government
and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political,
economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions.
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the
fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means
employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a
constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
The CIR, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike, concluded that by their concerted act and the occurrence
temporary stoppage of work, [sic] PBMEO is guilty of bargaining in bad
faith. HOWEVER, the CIR is incorrect
o The demonstration was against the abusive Pasig policemen, not
against PBM Co. Thus, they were merely exercising freedom of
expression in general and of the right of assembly and of petition of
redress of grievances in particular [before the Chief Executive, the
proper government agency, against abusive policemen]
o As a matter of fact, it was the duty of [PBM Co] to protect its
employees from the harassment of the police officers. It was to the
interest of [PBM Co] to rally in defense of, and take up the cudgels
for its employees so that they could report to work free from
harassment.
o The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 AM to 2
PM is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights []
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
in spirit can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The
wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying
day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is
like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
o To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech"
o According to CIR the CBA fixes the work shift of the employees and
as such it imposes a duty on part of employees to observe working
hours. This strained construction, denying right to stage a
15
 mass demonstration against police abuses during working
hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life of
workers.
o
o Injunction by court of the mass demonstration would be
trenching upon freedom of expression of workers.
o PBM Co claims that there was no need for all workers to participate
in the demonstration, to avoid loss or damage to th firm. This stand
fails to appreciate that the condition sine qua non of an
effective demonstration especially by the labor union, is the
complete unity of its members as well as their total presence
at the demonstration site in order to generate maximum sympathy
for the validity of their cause but also immediate action from the
government agency concerned.
o At any rate, Union notified PBM Co 2 days prior to demonstration.
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the
part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from
work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration
W/N PBM Co. is guilty of ULP YES.
The company is actually the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because
refusal on the part of the company to permit all employees to join the
demonstration, and the subsequent dismissal of the 8 petitioners constituted
an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, assembly,
and freedom to petition for redress of grievances.
o The Company committed an unfair labor practice as defined in
Section 4(a-1) in relation to section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act.
Sec 3 guarantees the right of employees to engage in
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, while 4(a-
1) makes it a ULP for an employer to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of rights granted in Sec. 3.
o Obviously, the facts show that the demonstration staged was for
their mutual aid and protection, and the company with its threat of
dismissal on the employees committed an act interfering with the
exercise of this right.
o Further, the CIR failed to make any finding as to the fact of
losses actually sustained by the firm. This can only mean that
firm did not sustain damage: no evidence to show it lost expected
profits, or that penalties were exacted by customers whose orders
could not be filled that day.
o The SC held that on the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of
fuel, water and electric consumption for that day [which could amply
compensate unrealized profits or damage that day] lol
W/N dismissal of the 8 leaders valid NO.
The dismissal of the 8 leaders is also contrary to the principles of social
justice enunciated in the Constitution [promotion of social justice to insure
economic security of all people; and protection to labor]
Further, the violation of the employees constitutional right divested the CIR
of jurisdiction, and as a consequence, its judgment is null and void and
confers no rights.
Does the fact that the MR was filed 2 days late defeat the rights if the
employees NO.
The rules of procedure here were promulgated by the CIR pursuant to
legislative legislation.
According to the SC, the constitution is superior to any statute or
subordinate rules. The court highlighted that the rights involved in this case
were the rights of free expression, assembly and petition.
o It is an accepted principle that the SC has the inherent power to
suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require.
o The suspension of the provision involved (Sec 15) is also
authorized by the CIR charter, which enjoins the CIR to act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms
o These doctrines have been upheld in Kapisanan v Hamilton, Palma
v Oreta.
Even if the CIR orders were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination
of the 8 leaders is harsh for a 1 day absence in work. The appropriate
penaltyif any at all is deservedshould have been to charge the one
day absence against vacation or sick leave.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a
complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who
claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police.
Dismissed 8 employees should be reinstated with full back pay from date of
separation from service
Biflex Phils Inc Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Filflex Industrial and Biflex Phils. Inc.
December 19, 2006 / Carpio-Morales, J.
Digest by Cate Alegre
Summary
There was a welga ng bayan. Two labor unions, on the date such welga was held
joined in and conducted work stoppage and prevented ingress and egress at their
office. Management claimed that such work stoppage was illegal. SC sided with
management claiming what the union did was in the nature of sympathy strike, did not
follow the proper procedure in staging a strike, and assuming arguendo that the
procedural rules were followed, the act of preventing ingress and egress was also
illegal
Doctrine
16
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are
scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an
illegal work stoppage. Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were considered
merely as an exercise of their freedom of expression, the exercise of such rights is
not absolute. For the protection of other significant state interests such as the "right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth"
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered. The legality of a strike is
determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by the means by
which it is carried out.
FACTS:
The unions involved in this case were Biflex (Phils) Inc. Labor Union and Filflex
Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union (Petitioners), which are affiliated with
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU).
o Unions are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of
the corporations
Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation
(Respondents) are sister companies engaged in garment business. They are
situated in one big compound and have a common entrance
October 24, 1990 a welga ng bayan was staged to protest the oil price hike.
Petitioners also staged a work stoppage to join the welga which lasted for several
days.
o October 31 - Respondents filed a petition to declare the work stoppage
illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirements
November 13, 1990 upon resumption of operations, Petitioners claimed that they
were illegally locked out by the respondents.
o Respondents were slighted by their no-show and as a punishment they were
barred from the company premises
o They placed tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate because
these were for the convenience of union members who check everyday if
they will be allowed to go back to work (basically saying that they didnt
conduct a strike)
Respondents the work stoppage was illegal since they failed to comply with the
following: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission
of a report of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment
LA strike was illegal! Respondents then terminated the employment of petitioners
union members
NLRC reversed
CA reversed NLRC and reinstated LA
ISSUE: WON the strike was illegal? YES
RATIO
Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an
extended sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do
not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of
employment.
o Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an
exercise of their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to
petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is
not absolute.
o The right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments and to
expansion and growth which is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also
be considered.
There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or
that they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan, their work
stoppage is beyond legal protection.
Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with
legal formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal, for by blocking the
free ingress to and egress from the company premises, they violated Article
264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that "[n]o person engaged in picketing
shall obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for
lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares."
In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal
formalities but also by the means by which it is carried out. Article 264 (a) of the
Labor Code provides:
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall
not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,22 this Court, passing on the use of the word "may" in the immediately
quoted provision, held that "[t]he law . . . grants the employer the option of
declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment." Reinstatement of a striker or retention of his employment, despite his
participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative which this Court may
not supplant.
Hyatt Enterprises, 588 SCRA 497
YSS Employees Union v. YSS Laboratories
December 4, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J.
By: Jadd
SUMMARY:
YSS implemented a retrenchment program to avoid increasing business losses. YSS
terminated the services of 11 employees (including union members and officers)
when no one availed of early retirement. The Union staged a strike after the NCMB
supervised the strike vote. After the NCMBs conciliation proceedings failed, the
SOLE certified the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and issued a
return to work order. YSS refused to readmit 9 union officers and members alleging a
valid retrenchment and illegal strike. The SOLE found for the Union and ordered their
readmission, but the CA reversed the SOLE. The SC reversed the CA, and granted
the Unions Petition for Review on Certiorari, holding that YSS should readmit all
17
striking employees, including the retrenched ones, because allowing the employer to
decide which strikers should be admitted back to work would strip the
certification/AJO of the necessary coercive power and violate their compulsory and
executory nature.
DOCTRINE:
Employers are not allowed to determine which strikers should be covered by a return-
to-work-order because it is compulsory and executory, aimed at serving the national
interest by preserving the status quo ante and industrial peace.
FACTS:
The Union (YSS EU) is a duly-registered labor organization, and is the SEBA
of YSS rank-and-file employees.
YSS implemented a retrenchment program to avoid increasing business
losses.
o 11 employees8 were affected, and allegedly chosen in accordance
with the companys reasonable standards as established. 4 were
union officers9 while 5 were union members10.
o At first, they were given the option to avail of YSS early retirement
program.
o When no one availed of early retirement, YSS exercised its option
to terminate their services based on Art. 289 (then 283).
March 19, 2001 Copies of the termination notices were served on the
DOLE.
March 20, 2001 Copies of the termination notices were served on the
employees concerned.
April 20, 2001 The Union staged a strike after the strike vote was taken
under the NCMBs supervision.
The NCMBs conciliation proceedings were unsuccessful.
May 11, 2001 SOLE certified the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration. The RTWO (Return to Work Order) directed the employees to
return to work within 24 hours from receipt, and directed YSS to accept them
under pre-strike terms and conditions.11
o YSS refused to comply.
YSS Urgent MR argued that the 9 union officers and
members should be excluded due to valid retrenchment
and participating in an illegal strike.
8
Resie Santos, Edwin Perona, Rogelio Salmorin, Joselina Victoria, Dominador Monterola, Jacqueline Tubale,
Loreto Esteves, Jetner Argamaso, Teofilo Pagaduan, Jr., Bernardita Mesias and Alexander Reig.
9
Secretary - Joselina Victoria, Auditor - Edwin Perona, Rogelio Salmorin - PRO, Teofilo Pagaduan, Jr. - Board
Member
10
Resie Santos, Dominador Monterola, Jacqueline Tubale, Loreto Esteves, Jetner Argamaso
11
CONSIDERING THESE PREMISES, this Office hereby certifies the labor dispute at [YSS Laboratories] to
the [NLRC] for compulsory arbitration, pursuant to Article [269](g) of the Labor [Code], as amended.
All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this
Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to
the strike.
The parties are further directed to cease and desist from committing any act which might further worsen the
situation.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the NLRC for its appropriate action.
o The Union moved to cite YSS in contempt.
June 9, 2001 The SOLE found for the Union, ordering YSS to immediately
accept back to work the 9 retrenched employees and 9 union officers who
allegedly initiated the strike, or otherwise reinstate them in the payroll if
actual reinstatement was not possible.
November 26, 2001 The CA granted YSS Petition for Certiorari, and
reversed the SOLEs orders, finding that there was a valid retrenchment and
that the strike was illegal.
August 29, 2002 The CA denied the Unions MR.
The Union goes up to the SC through a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES/HELD: WON the retrenched employees should be part of the return to work
order? YES
RATIO:
Yes, the retrenched employees should be part of the RTWO. YSS failed to show that
the SOLE gravely abused its discretion by issuing the orders in an arbitrary/despotic
manner. The national interest is served by preserving the status quo ante and
industrial peace pending determination of the main issues, which is why the orders
(AJO, RTWO) are compulsory and executory.
1) Character of SOLEs labor dispute powers: Plenary and broad, with wide
latitude of discretion to adopt the most expeditious and reasonable way to
resolve the issue. (Citing Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v.
CA (2000))
2) On the Assumption of Jurisdiction (AJO)
A) Character The assumption of jurisdiction in Art. 269(g) is the States
exercise of police power for the common good. (Citing Phimco
Industries, Inc. v. Acting Secretary of Labor Brillantes (1999))
1. Police Power
a. Definition A government's inherent power to enact laws to
promote society's order, safety, health, and general welfare,
within constitutional limits.
b. Character Inherent and does not need explicit constitutional
basis. (Citing Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v. Confesor
(1997))
B) Purpose of granting the assumption of jurisdiction power to the SOLE
Enable the SOLE to quickly, fairly, and justly resolve the dispute to
minimize or avert damage to the national interest by avoiding work
stoppage or industrial activity lag, or even just the threat of such. (Citing
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. CA (2000))
C) Effects upon the strike/lockout (Citing Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.-
Unlicensed Crews Employees Union-Associated Labor Unions (Tasli-
Alu) v.CA (2004)):
i. If it has not yet taken place Automatically enjoined
ii. If it has taken place Striking workers return to work, and employer
shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike/lockout.
3) On Compulsory Arbitration Certification
A) Purpose Quick dispute resolution, not interference with management
rights.
18
 B) Regarding the dynamics between the SOLE and labor arbiters as seen
in Art. 269(g) The provision means for shared jurisdiction between the
SOLE and labor arbiters, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the
SOLE would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the
primary dispute, and there might be conflicting rulings. This
interpretation of the provision breathes life into it, rather than defeating
it. (Citing International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. SOLE, 1999)
4) On Return to Work Orders
A) Character Compulsory and executory.
B) Effect Must be obeyed until set aside. (Citing PALEA v. PAL, 1971)
C) Basis A courts exercise of its compulsory arbitration power.
5) On Grave Abuse of Discretion
A) Definition Capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment.
B) Effect Equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
C) Requisite So patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. (Citing Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v. Confesor, (1997))
6) In this case: There was no grave abuse of discretion.
A) YSS failed to prove that the SOLE issued the orders in an
arbitrary/despotic manner.
B) The orders were issued to preserve the status quo ante and industrial
peace while the main issues (retrenchment validity and strike legality)
were being decided in the proper forum. This protects the common good
because a continued strike is against the employer and employees
interest.
C) YSS assertion of the retrenchments validity and the strikes illegality as
grounds for not accepting certain employees violates the compulsory
and executory character of AJOs and compulsory arbitration
certifications.
D) YSS must readmit all striking employees.
7) Allowing the employer to decide which strikers should be admitted back to
work would strip the certification/AJO of the necessary coercive power.
Solid Bank, 634 SCRA 554
Solidbank Corp. v. E.U. Gamier (Mel)
November 15, 2010
G.R. No. 159460: SOLIDBANK CORPORATION (NOW KNOWN AS FIRST METRO
INVESTMENT CORPORATION)
VS. ERNESTO U. GAMIER, ELENA R. CONDEVILLAMAR, JANICE L. ARRIOLA
AND OPHELIA C. DE GUZMAN
G.R. NO. 159461: SOLIDBANK CORPORATION AND/OR ITS SUCCESSOR-IN-
INTEREST, FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, DEOGRACIAS N.
VISTAN AND EDGARDO MENDOZA, JR.,
VS. SOLIDBANK UNION AND ITS DISMISSED OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,
NAMELY: EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, 136 others
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
SUMMARY: After deadlock, Union filed a Notice of Strike. SOLE issued an
assumption order & eventually dismissed ULP charge. Union members & officers
staged a protest infront of the SOLE office, boycotted provincial branches & picketed
at the banks Head offices. Employees who did not return to work were terminated.
Individual respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal & ULP. Individual resps. argue
that union held a mass action not to exert any undue pressure on the employer, but to
express dissatisfaction over the decision of the Labor Secretary subsequent to his
assumption of jurisdiction. HELD: The mass protest was an illegal strike, not merely
an exercise of free expression since the concerted work abandonment/boycott was
the result of a labor dispute. They were in reality temporary stoppages of work
perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who deliberately failed to
report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the DOLE
offices. Because they held such mass action after the assumption order and while
proceedings before SOLE were still pending, the strike is a prohibited activity and
thus illegal. Dismissed employees staged a strike ultimately aimed at realizing their
economic demands. Whether such pressure was directed against Solidbank or the
SOLE, or both, is of no moment. All the elements of strike are evident in the Union-
instigated mass actions.
DOCTRINE: A strike comprises not only concerted work stoppages, but also
slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant
equipment and facilities, etc. The mass actions did not only stem from the Secretary
of Labors order, but from the labor dispute caused by the bargaining deadlock. Once
the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction
should not be interfered with by a strike or lockout. A strike that is undertaken despite
the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification is a
prohibited activity and thus illegal. Art. 264 also prohibits a strike during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike.
Solid Bank Union (now First Metro Investment Corp.) v. METROBANK
September 17, 2012 | del Castillo, J.
By: Kiko del Valle
SUMMARY:
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
In October 1999, petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank
Employees Union (Union) were set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their
1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to cover the remaining two years.
Negotiations commenced but seeing that an agreement was unlikely,
the Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike. During the collective
bargaining negotiations, some Union members staged a series of mass actions. In
view of the impending actual strike, the SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. The assumption
order directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that
might exacerbate the situation.
19

SOLE resolved all economic and non-economic issues submitted by the parties, as
follows:
a. Directing Solidbank Corporation and Solidbank Union to conclude their Collective
Bargaining Agreement for the years 2000 and 2001, incorporating the dispositions
above set forth;
b. Dismissing the unfair labor practice charge against Solidbank Corporation;
c. Directing Solidbank to deduct or check-off from the employees lump sum payment
an amount equivalent to seven percent (7%) of their economic benefits for the first
(1st) year, inclusive of signing bonuses, and to remit or turn over the said sum to the
Unions authorized representative, subject to the requirements of check-off;
d. Directing Solidbank to recall the show-cause memos issued to employees who
participated in the mass actions if such memos were in fact issued.
Dissatisfied with the Secretarys ruling, the Union officers and members decided to
protest the same by holding a rally infront of the Office of SOLE in Intramuros, Manila,
simultaneous with the filing of their motion for reconsideration. an overwhelming
majority of employees, including the individual respondents, joined the mass leave
and protest action at the DOLE office while the banks provincial branches
in Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod and Naga followed suit and boycotted regular work. The union
members also picketed the banks Head Office in Binondo and Paseo de Roxas.
Solidbanks business operations were paralyzed. The President of Solidbank,
Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a memorandum addressed to all employees calling their
absence from work and demonstration infront of the DOLE office as an illegal act, and
reminding them that they have put their jobs at risk as they will be asked to show
cause why they should not be terminated for participating in the union-instigated
concerted action. The employees work abandonment/boycott lasted for three days.
On the third day of the concerted work boycott, Vistan issued another memorandum.
Vistan issued another memorandum, this time declaring that the bank is prepared to
take back employees who will report for work starting the next day, provided these
employees were/are not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their co-
employees into participating in this illegal act.
Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-day work boycott, a total of 513
returned to work and were accepted by the bank. The remaining 199 employees
insisted on defying Vistans directive, which included respondents Ernesto U. Gamier,
Elena R. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and Ophelia C. De Guzman. For their failure
to return to work, the said 199 employees were each issued a show-cause memo
directing them to submit a written explanation within twenty-four (24) hours why they
should not be dismissed for the illegal strike.
The herein 129 individual respondents were among the 199 employees who were
terminated for their participation in the three-day work boycott and protest action. On
various dates in June 2000, twenty-one (21) of the individual respondents executed
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of Solidbank.
SOLE denied the motions for reconsideration filed by Solidbank and the Union.
The Monetary Board approved the request of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank) to acquire the existing non-real estate assets of Solidbank in
consideration of assumption by Metrobank of the liabilities of Solidbank, and to
integrate the banking operations of Solidbank with Metrobank. Subsequently,
Solidbank was merged with First Metro Investment Corporation, and Solidbank, the
surviving corporation, was renamed the First Metro Investment Corporation (FMIC).
Solidbank ceased banking operations. FMIC duly filed a Termination Report with the
DOLE and granted separation benefits to the banks employees.
Labor Arbiter
LA Caizares dismissed the complaints of Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De
Guzman. It was held that their participation in the illegal strike violated the SOLEs
return to work order.
Respondents appealed the decision of LA Caizares.
LA Flores rendered a decision in favor of the Union declaring complainants dismissal
as illegal and unjustified.
FMIC appealed LA Flores decision.
NLRC
As to Respondents appeal, NLRC SECOND DIVISION reversed the decision of LA
Caizares, protest action staged by the banks employees before the DOLE did not
amount to a strike but rather an exercise of their right to express frustration and
dissatisfaction over the decision. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the activity is per
se illegal or violative of the assumption order considering that at the time, both parties
had pending motions for reconsideration of the Secretarys decision. Moreover, it was
found that Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman were not fully investigated
on the charge that they had instigated or actively participated in an illegal activity;
neither was it shown that the explanations submitted by them were considered by the
management. Since said employees had presented evidence of plausible and
acceptable reasons for their absence at the workplace at the time of the protest
action, their termination based on such alleged participation in the protest action was
unjustified.
As to FMICs appeal, NLRC THIRD DIVISION reversed the decision of LA Flores and
ruled that the mass action held by the bank employees infront of the Intramuros Office
was not a legitimate exercise of the employees freedom of speech and assembly.
Such was a strike as defined under Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code which does not
distinguish as to whom the action of the employees is directed against, nor the
place/location where the concerted action of the employees took place. It was
stressed that the mass action of the bank employees was an incident of a labor
dispute, and hence the concerted work abandonment was a prohibited activity.
Both decisions were appealed.
Court of Appeals
CA consolidated the petitions. CA found that it was a legitimate exercise of their right
to free expression, and not a strike proscribed when the Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction.
20

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the mass demonstration was a valid exercise of the right of the workers to
freedom of expression? NO
2. WON the respondents were validly terminated? NO
3. WON the respondents are entitled to separation pay or financial assistance? YES
RATIO:
1. Art. 212 of LC defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The term strike shall
comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves,
sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and
similar activities. The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the
striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential,
since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.
The mass action held by the employees constituted an illegal strike. It must be
stressed that the concerted action of the respondents was not limited to the protest
rally infront of the DOLE Office on April 3, 2000. Respondent Unionhad also picketed
the Head Office and Paseo de Roxas Branch. About 712 employees, including those
in the provincial branches, boycotted and absented themselves from work in a
concerted fashion for three continuous days that virtually paralyzed the employers
banking operations. Considering that these mass actions stemmed from a bargaining
deadlock and an order of assumption of jurisdiction had already been issued by the
Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike, there is no doubt that the concerted
work abandonment/boycott was the result of a labor dispute.
In TMPCWA v. NLRC, where union members held similar protest rallies in front of the
offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the company plants, the SC ruled that
such activities constituted illegal strikes. Shrouded as demonstrations in said case,
the activities of the employees were in reality temporary stoppages of work
perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who deliberately failed to
report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and
DOLE offices in Intramuros.
In the case at bar, the respondents staged a strike ultimately aimed at realizing their
economic demands. Whether such pressure was directed against the petitioners or
the Secretary of Labor, or both, is of no moment. All the elements of strike are evident
in the Union-instigated mass actions.
Article 264 (a) of LC considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike. There is no
dispute that when respondents conducted their mass actions, the proceedings before
the Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties filed motions for
reconsideration. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the aforesaid provision by
holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration simultaneous with concerted work
abandonment/boycott.
2. Notwithstanding the illegality of the strike, petitioners act of indiscriminately
terminating the services of individual respondents who admitted joining the mass
actions and who have refused to comply with the offer of the management to report
back to work constitutes illegal termination.
The Labor Code protects an ordinary, rank-and-file union member who participated in
such a strike from losing his job, provided that he did not commit anillegal act during
the strike. Petitioners have not adduced substantial proof that respondent-union
members perpetrated any act of violence, intimidation, coercion or obstruction of
company premises and public thoroughfares. It did not submit in evidence
photographs, police reports, affidavits and other available evidence.
Note however that at the dispositive portion of the SC decision, SC declared that
union officers were validly dismissed.
3. Petitioner Solidbank Corporation (now FMIC) is due to pay each of the individual
respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service. Whatever sums already received from petitioners under any release, waiver
or quitclaim shall be deducted from the total separation pay due to each of them.
Phimco v. Pila
2010 August 11 | Brion, J.
By: Jocs Dilag
SUMMARY:
Union filed NOS, conducted a strike vote, submitted the results to NCMB and 35 days
later, staged a strike. ER dismissed 10 Union officers & 36 mems for illegal acts
committed during the strike. SC held strike illegal. Even if Union complied w/ the
procedural requirements of a valid strike, the strike is illegal for the illegal acts
committed when they blocked the free ingress to and egress from companys
premises and picket attended with intimidation. Art 264/278(a) makes a distinction on
the liabilities of participating workers and Union officers (see below). In this case, the
participating Union officers and members stand to be dismissed.
DOCTRINE: (Strikes, Lockouts, and Picketing)
While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the protection of
freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble to air
grievances, these rights are by no means absolute. Protected picketing does not
extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises.
Pickets may not aggressively interfere with the right of peaceful ingress to and egress
from the employers shop or obstruct public thoroughfares; picketing is not peaceful
where the sidewalk or entrance to a place of business is obstructed by picketers
parading around in a circle or lying on the sidewalk.
21
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code tells us that picketing carried on with violence,
coercion or intimidation is unlawful. According to American jurisprudence, what
constitutes unlawful intimidation depends on the totality of the circumstances.
Force threatened is the equivalent of force exercised. There may be unlawful
intimidation without direct threats or overt acts of violence. Words or acts which are
calculated and intended to cause an ordinary person to fear an injury to his person,
business or property are equivalent to threats.
FACTS:
CBA was about to expire so Phimco, manufacturer of matches (posporo) & PILA
negotiated for its renewal, which resulted in a deadlock on economic issues:
disagreements on salary increases and benefits.
Mar 1995: PILA filed w/ NCMB a Notice of Strike on the ground of the
bargaining deadlock.
Mar.16: Union conducted a strike vote - majority voted in favor of strike
Mar.17: Union filed strike vote results w/ NCMB.
Apr.21: Union staged a strike.
May 3: Phimco filed w/ NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction and TRO, to
enjoin the strikers from preventing the ingress and egress of non-striking EEs
into and from the company premises. ex-parte TRO issued, valid for 20 days
June 23: Phimco sent a letter to 36 Union members, directing them to explain
within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they
committed during the strike.
June 26: These 36 Union members were informed of their dismissal.
Union filed a complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal (Case 1).
Acting SOLE Brillantes assumed jurisdiction, and issued return-to-work order for
all the striking employees (except those 36 terminated) and for Phimco to re-
admit them. Union ended strike on the same day.
Phimco filed a petition to declare strike illegal w/ prayer for the dismissal of PILA
officers and members who knowingly participated in the illegal strike (Case 2):
strikers prevented ingress to and egress, paralyzing companys operations.
Respondents filed their position paper: They complied with all the legal
requirements for staging strike, put up no barricade, and conducted strike
peacefully, in an orderly and lawful manner, without incident.
LA (Case 2): Illegal strike; prohibited acts committed during the strike by
blocking ingress and egress of companys premises and preventing the non-
striking EEs from reporting for work.
NLRC: Set aside LA. Union conducted a peaceful moving picket.
LA (Case 1): Illegal dismissal. Reinstatement w/ backwages.
NLRC: Consolidated 2 cases. Ruled in favor of Union. Case 2: not an illegal
blockade, did not obstruct ingress and egress, moving picket was moving. Case
1: striking EEs not given ample opportunity to explain their side.
Without waiting for the result of MR, Phimco elevated its case to CA through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
CA: Dismissed petition (in favor of Union). Hence, present petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUES/HELD:
WoN Unions strike was legal NO
RATIO:
In the present case, Union fully satisfied the legal procedural requirements for
staging a strike. However, despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and
compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike may still be held illegal.
Commission of Prohibited Acts
A strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal, as
provided under Art.264 (now 278) (e):
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence,
coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares.
Based on SCs examination of the evidence, it found the strike illegal. 1 While the
strike undisputedly had not been marred by actual violence and patent intimidation,
the picketing that Union undertook as part of its strike activities effectively
blocked the free ingress to and egress from Phimcos premises, thus
preventing non-striking EEs and company vehicles from entering. In this
manner, the picketers violated Art.264/278(e).
While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on
publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is
happening in the company struck against.
(See doctrine) While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within
the protection of freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble to air
grievances, these rights are by no means absolute. Protected picketing does not
extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises.
As applied.
That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual
violence may not free it from taints of illegality if the picket effectively blocked
entry to and exit from the company premises.
Significantly, the photographs taken of the strike area, capturing the strike in
its various stages and showing how the strikers actually conducted the picket,
validated the testimonies adduced. While the picket is moving, the movement was
in circles, very close to the gates, with the strikers in a hand-to-shoulder
formation without a break in their ranks, thus preventing non-striking workers and
vehicles from coming in and getting out. Supported by actual blocking benches
and obstructions, what the union demonstrated was a very persuasive and quietly
intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the operations of the
company, not solely by the work stoppage of the participating workers, but by
excluding the company officials and non-striking employees from access to
and exit from the company premises. No doubt, the strike caused the company
operations considerable damage. The blockade even went to the point of causing the
build up of traffic in the immediate vicinity of the strike area.
Intimidation (see doctrine)
22
 Art.264/278(e) likewise provides that picketing carried on with violence,
coercion or intimidation is unlawful. The manner in which the respondent union
officers and members conducted the picket had created such an intimidating
atmosphere that non-striking employees and even company vehicles did not dare
cross the picket line, even with police intervention. 2 Those who dared cross the picket
line were stopped. The testimonies of non-striking employees, who were prevented
from gaining entry into the company premises, and confirmed no less by two officers
of the union, are on record.
Liabilities of union officers and members
As explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., the effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Art.264/278(a), make a
distinction between participating workers and union officers. The services of an
ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing that he or she committed illegal
acts during the strike. The services of a participating union officer, on the other
hand, may be terminated, not only when he actually commits an illegal act
during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegal strike.
In all cases, the striker must be identified. Substantial evidence, available
under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal.
In the present case, the 10 respondent Union officers stand to be dismissed
as participating union officers, while the 37 respondent Union members stand to
be dismissed for their illegal acts in the conduct of the unions strike as Phimco was
able to individually identify them thru the affidavits of co-employees (Panis and
Ortiz) and Personnel Manager Cinco, and photographs.
Phimco failed to observe due process
Phimco violated the twin-notice requirements of due process under LC when it
dismissed the respondents: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination
and giving the employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another
written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee.
In the present case, it does not appear that the Union officers were specifically
informed of the charges against them and given the chance to explain and present
their side. As to the Union members, only 36 Union members were notified of the
charges against them, but they were not given an ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend themselves.
Therefore, apply Agabon ruling: Employer, despite the just cause for dismissal,
must pay the dismissed workers nominal damages (P30K) as indemnity for the
violation of the workers right to statutory due process.
STA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, et al. V. COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.
January 24, 2007 | Callejo, Sr., J.
Prof. Sobrevias for Coca-Cola Bottlers.
SUMMARY: When the negotiation for CBA reached an impasse, the union, by virtue
of the mayors permit, conducted a picketing where union members and officers left
their works for 3 hrs and marched to and fro on the side of the highway. The company
filed a case to declare the activity as a strike and an illegal one at that. The contention
is on whether the said acts constitute a strike. The SC ruled that it was a strike and
not a mere picketing, using the definition of a strike in the LC.
DOCTRINE: Art. 212, LC defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional
term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course
of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The term strike encompasses not
only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs,
attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar
activities. . . what is definitive of whether the action staged by petitioners is a strike
and not merely a picket is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation.
FACTS:
The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the SEBA of the regular
daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to
renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the
Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union
insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be
allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and
members also insisted that their wages be basedon their work shift rates. For its part,
the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of
the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the
Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an
impasse ensued.
On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a
Notice of Strike with the NCMB. The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging
that the reasons cited by the Union were not valid grounds for a strike. The Union
then filed an Amended Notice of Strike.
Meanwhile, the Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the
Alyansa in front of the Companys premises. 106 Union members, officers and
members of the BoD, and shop stewards, individually filed applications for leave of
absence for September 21, 1999. Certain that its operations in the plant would come
to a complete stop since there were no sufficient trained contractual employees who
would take over, the Company disapproved all leave applications and notified the
applicants accordingly. A day before the mass action, some Union members wore
gears, red tag cloths stating "YES KAMI SA STRIKE" as headgears and on the
different parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.
The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it "to conduct a mass
protest action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola plant on September 21, 1999
23
from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon." Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket
along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. All of the 14 personnel
of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production
personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated
during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift with
cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills
requirement. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical
cases versus budget.
On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal alleging
that the mass concerted action was clearly a strike and since the Union did not
observe the requirements mandated by law, i.e., strike vote, cooling-off period and
reporting requirements, the strike was therefore illegal. The NCMB recommended that
the Notice of Strike of the Union be converted into a preventive mediation case. After
conciliation proceedings failed, the parties were required to submit their respective
position papers. LA declared the strike illegal. NLRC affirmed LA. CA dismissed
petition.
The Union answered by alleging that it was not a strike but just a valid exercise of
their right to picket, which is part of the right of free expression as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
LA: the mass leave was a strike under art. 212, LC:
1) Union itself admitted that on the said date, members and officers did not report
for work. Instead, they all assembled in front of the Sta. Rosa Plant and picketed
the premises. Very clearly, there was a concerted action here on the part of the
respondents brought about a temporary stoppage of work at two out of three
bottling lines at the Sta. Rosa Plant
2) It is evident that respondents concerted activity resulted in a temporary
stoppage of work at the Sta. Rosa Plant of the company
3) Such concerted activity by respondents was by reason of a labor dispute
The strike was illegal since there was no showing that the Union conducted a strike
vote, observed the prescribed cooling-off period, much less, submitted a strike vote to
the DOLE within the required time. Consequently, for knowingly participating in the
illegal strike, the individual petitioners were considered to have lost their employment
status.
NLRC and CA: affirmed LA.
ISSUES:
1. WON the mass action was a strike? YES
2. If in the affirmative, was it legal - NO
3. WON the individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner Union be
dismissed from their employment? YES
RATIO:
The mass action was a strike
Union: It was not a strike but a picket, a valid exercise of their constitutional right to
free expression and assembly. It was a peaceful mass protest action to dramatize
their legitimate grievances against respondent.
They did not intend to have work stoppage as they knew beforehand that
there was no bottling operation scheduled on that day.
They applied for leaves of absences.
They obtained a mayors permit and they faithfully complied with the
conditions therein.
They merely marched to and fro at the side of the highway, did not block
ingress or egress of companys premises.
Request to hold the activity for 4 hrs was reduced to 3 hrs and they all went
back to work after.
IBM-KMU in San Fernando Plant staged simultaneous walkout from work
and there the SOLE declared the walkout as a mass action and not a strike.
Coca-Cola accepted the SOLEs decision. It should likewise apply here.
SC: It was a strike and not a mere picket. The factual findings of LA that it was a
strike which was affirmed by both the NLRC and CA are conclusive to the SC.
Strike: Art. 212, LC defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The fact that the
conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and
not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The term strike encompasses
not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs,
attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar
activities. (Bangalisan vs CA)
Picketing: involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer,
usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the
facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the
stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of
pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.
Labor dispute: includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.
ICAB, there was a labor dispute. The basic elements of a strike are present in this
case: 106 members of petitioner Union, whose respective applications for leave of
absence on September 21, 1999 were disapproved, opted not to report for work on
said date, and gathered in front of the company premises to hold a mass protest
action. Petitioners deliberately absented themselves and instead wore red ribbons,
carried placards with slogans such as: YES KAMI SA STRIKE, PROTESTA KAMI,
SAHOD, KARAPATAN NG MANGGAGAWA IPAGLABAN, CBA-WAG BABOYIN,
STOP UNION BUSTING. They marched to and fro in front of the companys
premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity
which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity
constituted a strike. Mayors permit is not conclusive evidence that their action/activity
did not amount to a strike. The Mayors description of what activities petitioners were
allowed to conduct is inconsequential. What is definitive of whether the action staged
24
by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the situation.
On the illegality of the strike
Art. 263 states the requirements for a strike to be valid 12. The said requirements are
MANDATORY. In the case at bar, the union totally ignored the requirements.
There is no showing that respondents had observed the prescribed cooling-off period,
conducted a strike vote, much less submitted a strike vote report to the Department of
Labor within the required time. . . the intention of the law in requiring the strike notice
and strike-vote report as mandatory requirements is to reasonably regulate the right
to strike which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied
in the law. Verily, substantial compliance with a mandatory provision will not suffice.
Strict adherence to the mandate of the law is required.
Aside from the above infirmity, the strike staged by respondents was, further, in
violation of the CBA13. The union had not referred their issues to the grievance
machinery as a prior step. Instead, they chose to go on strike right away, thereby
bypassing the required grievance procedure dictated by the CBA.
On shop stewards being considered as officers
Under Section 501(a) and (b) of the Landrum Griffin Act of 1959 14, shop stewards are
officers of the Union. Admittedly, there is no similar provision in the Labor Code of
12
Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the
intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
strike.
13
SECTION 1, Art. VI - The UNION agrees that there shall be no strike, walkout, stoppage or slowdown of
work, boycott, secondary boycott, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sitdown strikes of any kind,
sympathetic or general strike, or any other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the
term of this Agreement, so long as the grievance procedure for which provision is made herein is followed by
the COMPANY.
14
Sec. 501 (a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization occupy
positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each
such person, taking into account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money
and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the
same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted
thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party in any matter connected with his
duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interest of such
organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in
connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A general
exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the
duties declared by this section shall be void as against public policy.
(b) When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organization is alleged to have
violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this section and the labor organization or its governing board
or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a
reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organization, such member may
sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court of the United States or in any State
court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the
benefit of the labor organization.
the Philippines; nonetheless, petitioners who are shop stewards are considered union
officers:
Officers normally mean those who hold defined offices. An officer is any person
occupying a position identified as an office. An office may be provided in the
constitution of a labor union or by the union itself in its CBA with the employer.
The unions constitution and by-laws define the position of a shop steward. 15 Likewise,
sec. 6, rule 19, book 5 of the Implementing rules of the LC provides the duties of a
shop steward.
Thus, a shop steward is appointed by the Union in a shop, department, or plant
serves as representative of the Union, charged with negotiating and adjustment of
grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer.
The jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the determination of
the issues arising from the interpretation or even implementation of a provision of the
CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or assignments issued by the
appropriate authority in the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the
continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace
among the employees and their employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden
with awesome responsibilities.
In this case, instead of playing the role of "peacemakers" and grievance solvers, the
petitioners-shop stewards participated in the strike. Thus, like the officers and
directors of petitioner Union who joined the strike, petitioners-shop stewards also
deserve the penalty of dismissal from their employment.
Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant v. CA, NLRC, Philippine Labor Alliance
Council (PLAC) Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter, and 29 workers (6
officers of the Union, 23 members)
17 July 2006; Austria-Martinez, J.
Digest prepared by Jethro Koon
Union, on the ground of ULP by petitioner, particularly union-busting, filed a Notice of
Strike, then conducted a Strike Vote and reported the same to the NCMB (in short
they followed the procedure). However, the issue which was the SM of the Notice and
Vote were submitted to voluntary arbitration. During the pendency of the arbitration,
petitioner terminated 2 union members which lead to the Union conducting a wildcat
strike 6 months after, re-filed a notice of strike and without conducting a vote, then
reporting the results to the NCMB, conducted an actual strike.
Strike was illegal: no strike or lockout can be made during the pendency of the case.
Even if the ground is for union-busting, only the 15-day cool-off period may be
15
SECTION 6. Shop Stewards. The UNION shall certify a total of eight (8) shop stewards and shall inform
management of the distribution of these stewards among the departments concerned. Shop Stewards, union
officers and members or employees shall not lose pay for attending Union-Management Labor dialogues,
investigations and grievance meetings with management.
25
dispensed with and not the other requirements.
I. Facts
1. March 1998: Majority of the EEs of petitioner organized themselves into a
union which affiliated with Phil. Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) and was
designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter. (Union)
2. Dec 3, 1998: The Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB on ground
of ULP particularly act of harassment, fault-finding, and union-busting
through coercion and interference with union affairs.
3. Dec 10, 1998: A conciliation conference was held and both parties agreed
that there would be no termination of services of respondents during the
pendency of the case
4. Dec 11, 1998: A Strike Vote under the supervision of NCMB personnel was
held
5. Dec 21, 1998: Results of the Strike Vote were submitted to NCMB.
6. Jan 21, 1998: Parties entered into a Submission Agreement agreeing to
submit the issue of ULP (which is the subject matter of the Notice and Strike
Vote) for voluntary arbitration (to prevent the strike)
7. Mar 24, 1999: Petitioner through its president Garcia dismissed a union
member for alleged petty quarrel with a co-EE in Feb. Union filed a
complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
8. June 24, 1999: Petitioner again relieved a union member from post (cook).
Unions VP protested to Garcia the termination. Shortly thereafter, Union
staged a wildcat strike.
9. June 25, 1999: Notice of Strike was refilled. Protest turned into a sit-
down strike
10. June 26, 1999: Strike was converted to actual strike
11. Petitioner filed a complaint for Illegal Strike with NLRC
12. LA: Declared strike illegal, union officers and members validly terminated
Dec 3 and 11s Notice and Vote referred to a dispute submitted for
arbitration, so it cannot apply to a strike 6 months later. Union
failed to comply with mandatory requisites for strike.
13. NLRC: Reversed LA, dismissed the complaint and ordered workers to
return to work and for Sukhothai to accept them.
Petitioner is guilty of union-busting and violated their Dec 10
agreement not to terminate during pendency of arbitration.
Dec 3 and 11s Notice and Vote are applicable to the June 24,
25, 26 strike since same issues of ULP are involved.
II. Issues
WON strike staged by Union was illegal YES
WON private respondents are deemed to have lost their employment by committing
illegal acts during the strike YES
III. Unions arguments
1. Filing of the Notice on Dec 3 and the Strike Vote on Dec 11, the submission
to NCMB of the results and the observation of the 15 day cooling off period
in case of ULP, all satisfy the mandatory requirements under Art 269 of the
LC and are applicable to the June 1999 strike, as per Art 269 (f) (decision
to strike valid for the duration of the dispute)
2. Even assuming that they cannot be applied to the June strike, since
petitioner was guilty of union-busting, union can take action immediately
IV. Ratio
1. Undisputed is the fact that when Union staged the strike in June 1999,
voluntary arbitration between the parties was ongoing. The issues to be
resolved there were the same issues stated in the Notice of Strike of Dec 3,
1998.
2. Art 270(a) second paragraph of the LC states that no strike or lockout shall
be declared after submission of the dispute to voluntary arbitration or
during pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or
lockout (see LC for whole provision)
The rationale for the prohibition: once jurisdiction over labor dispute
is acquired by competent authority, jurisdiction should not be
interfered with by applying the coercive processes of a strike.
Policy of the state to promote and emphasize primacy of free
collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary
arbitration, mediation, and conciliation as modes of settling
labor or industrial disputes. Relations between ERs and EEs rest
on essentially voluntary basis and industrial peace cannot be
secured by compulsion of law.
3. The dismissals of the 2 union members which allegedly triggered the wildcat
strike are not sufficient grounds to justify radical recourse on part of
the Union
The questions regarding their dismissal are connected to the
alleged breach of the guarantee, and other incidents of ULP which
should have been raised in the voluntary arbitration which was
commenced precisely to address said issues.
Other recourse of the Union: could also have just instituted illegal
dismissal cases, or submitted it to the grievance machinery under
their CBA, or to just terminate the voluntary arbitration case
and complete the mandatory procedure for lawful strike.
4. Union was aware of the fact of the pendency of the arbitration proceedings,
and thus it cannot invoke good faith as a defense.
5. With all these considerations: Strike was ILLEGAL.
As to the second argument of the Union re: ULP so we can dispense with the
requirements.
1. It is only the 15-day cooling off period that may be dispensed with.
2. Art 269 (f) should be read with Sec 3, Rule XXII, Book V of the IRR which
states that in case of union-busting, 15 day cooling off period shall not apply
and union may take action immediately after the strike vote is conducted
and results are submitted to NCMB.
3. NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing and Lockout also provides the same
26
 wording.
4. IRR clarifies Art 269(c) of the LC in that union may strike immediately in
case of union busting provided that strike vote is conducted and the
results submitted in every case at least 7 days before the intended
strike or lockout.
In sum: if there is union-busting the requirements of 1) notice; 2)
strike vote; 3) 7 day report period cannot be dispensed with.
5. Even if the strike was declared as valid because the objective was lawful,
strike may be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal
270 provides for illegal activities during the strike.
Jurisprudence have also provided for some activities that are
prohibited like shouting slanderous and scurrilous words,
unnecessary and obscene language, libelous remarks, abusive and
threatening language, formation of human cordon to block ways,
coercing others to prevent them from working, threatening bodily
harm, where EEs hijacked ERs bus, destruction of company
property, use of Molotov bombs, etc. (See FN 31 in SCRA for more
activities)
6. For the union officers: knowingly participating in an illegal strike is ground
for dismissal; also when he commits illegal acts. For union members:
Substantial proof or evidence is that they committed illegal acts is enough to
justify imposition of penalty of dismissal.
7. In this case, evidence on record show that the respondents (both union
officers(6) and 23 members) engaged in illegal acts during the strike
Intimidation and harassment of customers to discourage them from
patronizing petitioner, waving their arms and shouting Nilagyan
naming ng lason ang pagkain dyan!,
discredited the reputation of the establishment
Angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion affecting
nearby establishments in the mall
Openly cursing and using abusive language towards the
management.
Preventing non-strikers from entering, plus deliberate blocking their
movements inside the restaurant
And even shouting Granada! causing panic among the customers
(it was the Union President Emmanuel Cayno who shouted
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS
UNION, et al
October 23, 1981 | J. Guerrero
By: Perry
SUMMARY:
The striking union prevented the employees of the plaintiff, Liwayway Publications
from entering the bodega that the latter was leasing. Other than the fact that the
bodega of the plaintiff and the workplace of the members of the striking union are in
the same premises, there is no other connection between the plaintiff and the striking
union. Therefore, the plaintiff sought the issuance of a permanent injunction against
the striking union to prevent the latter from preventing the former from accessing its
bodega.
The SC ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. The right to strike is necessarily
subsumed in the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the
exercise of the right is not without limitations. The Courts may intervene and regulate
the right to protect innocent bystanders or those who have no industrial connection
or have an interest totally foreign to the dispute of the striking union and its company.
FACTS:
The Plaintiff is leasing the premises of the Permanent Concrete Products in Sta.
Mesa. The premises of the plaintiff is separated from the premises of the Lessor-
Corporation by a concrete wall and has its own entrance and road leading to the
national road. Moreover the distance between the two entrances is more or less 200
meters.
On 10 September 1964, the employees of the lessor-corporation staged a strike
against the corporation. However for unknown reasons, the striking employees
prevented the truck of the plaintiff from entering the compound and intimidated and
threatened its employees with bodily harm. The plaintiff made repeated demands to
the defendants to stop their actions and allow them to access their bodega. However,
their demands were left unheeded prompting them to bring an action with the CFI for
the issuance of an injunction.
The Respondent moved to dismiss the action of the plaintiff alleging that the CFI had
no jurisdiction. They alleged that it was the Court of Industrial Relations who had
exclusive jurisdiction since this is a labor dispute involving ULP. Moreover it alleged
that the plaintiff had no cause of action as it was not the real party in interest.
The Court denied the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants and rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff. It declared permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The defendants bring this
matter to the SC seeking the reversal of the decision of the CFI.
ISSUE / HELD:
WON had jurisdiction over the case at bar. YES.
Corollarily, WON this case involves or has arisen out of a labor dispute. NO.
RULING:
The SC points out that the plaintiff is not in any way related to the striking union
except for the fact that it is the lessee of a bodega in the companys compound. The
business of the plaintiff has absolutely no connection whatsoever with the cause of
27
the strike of the union against their company, much less with the terms, conditions or
demands of the strikers. The plaintiff, being an innocent bystander, is entitled to
protection by the regular courts.
The SC notes that the right to picket is a phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed
by the Constitution. However, the right is not an absolute one. The courts are not
without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the
demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, and to insulate establishments or
persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of
the dispute. Thus, the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or
innocent bystanders. If the law fails to afford said protection, men will endeavor to
safeguard their rights by their own might, take the law in their own hands, and commit
acts which lead to breaches of the law.
MSF TIRE AND RUBBER, INC. vs. CA and PHILTREAD TIRE WORKERS UNION
MENDOZA; August 5, 1999
SUMMARY:
During the pendency of the labor dispute between the union and Philtread, Philtread
entered into a MOA with Siam Tyre hereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a
new company, MSF Tire 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by
Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another
company, 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre. As the
union refused to desist picketing outside the plant, MSF Tire filed a complaint for
injunction asserting its status as an innocent bystander. SC held the petitioner is not
an innocent bystander because its personality is closely linked to Philtread.
DOCTRINE:
The right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it
appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor
dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the
picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights.
Thus, an innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the
court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is
entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the
dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.
FACTS:
A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread)
and private respondent, Philtread Tire Workers Union (Union)
Union filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in union-
busting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of Philtreads plant.
Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout.
The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it
for compulsory arbitration.
During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam
Tyre) whereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a new company,
herein petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by
Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to
another company, 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by
Siam Tyre.
Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its plant.
As the respondent Union refused petitioners request, petitioner filed a complaint
for injunction with damages before the RTC Makati.
Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial court.
RTC denied petitioners application for injunction and dismissed the complaint.
However, on petitioners motion, the trial court reconsidered its order and granted
an injunction.
The respondent Union filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
CA ruled in favor of respondent Union, hence, petitioner filed this petition
asserting that its status as an innocent bystander entitled it to a writ of
injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a
writ of injunction under the innocent bystander rule. (NO)
HELD: Petition denied.
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court,
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the innocent bystander rule as follows: The
right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of
the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it can
not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to
protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without
power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration
to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to
insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute.
Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent
bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an
impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest
exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their
rights.
Thus, an innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the
court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is
28
entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the
dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection to the
dispute.

As correctly observed by the appellate court: we find that the negotiation, contract of
sale, and the post transaction between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as
vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of petitioner, we
cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not
a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold
assets. On the contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and
60% owner of Sucat Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance
with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now
owns the land were subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that private
respondent uses the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working
conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same
products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private respondents personality
is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ.

VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION CASES

Philtranco Service Enterprises. v. Philtranco Workers Union-Association of

Genuine Labor Organizations
February 26, 2014 | Del Castillo, J.
By: Kat
SUMMARY:
A case between Philtranco and the union that failed at the conciliator-mediator level
was referred to the DOLE Secretary. He ruled in favor of the union, so Philtranco filed
MR and then certiorari. Secretary said nope, should have been Rule 43, not Rule 65.

DOCTRINE:
MR from a decision or resolution of the Secretary, then seasonably file certiorari
within 60 days from denial of the MR. It cannot be said that in taking cognizance of
the case, the Secretary did so in a limited capacity. By referring the case to the
Secretary, the Conciliator-Mediator conceded that the case fell within the coverage of
Art. 263.

FACTS:
Due to business losses, Philtranco, a local land transportation company engaged in
the business of carrying passengers and freight, retrenched 21 of its employees. The
union then filed a notice of strike with the DOLE, claiming that Philtranco engaged in
ULP. They were unable to settle their differences at the preliminary conference before
Conciliator-Mediator Aglibut of the NCMB. The case was then referred to the Office of
the Secretary of the DOLE. Acting DOLE Secretary Danilo Cruz issued a decision
ordering Philtranco to reinstate the illegally terminated 17 union officers and pay them
backwages, maintain the status quo and remit the withheld union dues to the union.

Philtranco MR'd after receiving the decision, while the union submitted a partial
appeal. The Secretary cited a DOLE Regulation providing that voluntary arbitrators'
29
decisions, orders, resolutions or awards shall not be the subject of MRs. Philtranco
went to the CA, which held that Philtranco erred in filing a Rule 65 because it should
have filed a petition for review under Rule 43, which covers decisions of voluntary
labor arbitrators. Assuming Rule 65 was the proper remedy, the petition was filed out
of time because the MR did not toll the running of the reglementary 60-day period
within which to avail of certiorari.
ISSUES/HELD:
What is the proper remedy to assail the DOLE Acting Secretary's decision?
(CERTIORARI AFTER YOUR MR)
RATIO:
It cannot be said that in taking cognizance of the case, the Secretary did so in a
limited capacity (as a voluntary arbitrator). By referring the case to the Secretary, the
Conciliator-Mediator conceded that the case fell within the coverage of Art. 263. The
impending strike in a public transportation company whose business is imbued with
public interest required that the Secretary of Labor assume jurisdiction over the case.
By assuming jurisdiction, Art. 263 becomes applicable, any representation to the
contrary or that he is deciding the case in his capacity as a voluntary arbitrator
notwithstanding.
It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or
resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file MR as a precondition for any
further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65. There is no distinction: when the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an industry indispensable to national
interest, "he exercises great breadth of discretion" in finding a solution to the parties
dispute. Such authority to assume jurisdiction includes and extends to all questions
and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature
to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.
National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma: Though appeals from the NLRC to the
Secretary of Labor were eliminated, there are several instances in the Labor Code
and its IRR where an appeal can be filed with the Secretary or the Secretary issues a
ruling, including Art. 263. Though the decisions of the Secretary become final and
executory 10 days after receipt, they can still be certiorari'd even beyond that period
as long as it is within the reglementary period under Rule 65. It is procedurally
feasible as well as practicable that Rule 65 petitions be filed initially with the CA (St.
Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC). The 60 days should be counted from the notice of
the denial of the motion. The very nature of certiorari which is an extraordinary
remedy resorted to only in the absence of plain, available, speedy and adequate
remedies in the course of law requires that the office issuing the decision or order
be given the opportunity to correct itself.
Before certiorari under Rule 65, filing MR is a condition sine qua non to afford an
opportunity for the correction of the error or mistake. Considering that a decision of
the Secretary of Labor is subject to judicial review only through a special civil action of
certiorari and cannot be resorted to without the aggrieved party having exhausted
administrative remedies through MR, the aggrieved party, must be allowed to move
for a reconsideration of the same.
While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of MR with respect to its
decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari inherently requires the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the opportunity
given to the office to correct itself. Unless it is filed, there could be no occasion to
rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari would be unavailing. Having filed the MR on
June 25 after receiving the Acting Secretary's decision on June 14, it was timely filed
but denied. The decision denyingt he MR was received on August 17 and the
certiorari was filed on August 29, well within the 60-day period.
TENG v PAHAGAC
ALBERT TENG, doing business under the firm name ALBERT TENG FISH
TRADING, and EMILIA TENG-CHUA, Petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO S. PAHAGAC, EDDIE D. NIPA, ORLANDO P. LAYESE, HERNAN Y.
BADILLES and ROGER S. PAHAGAC, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
November 17, 2010
Summary: Teng had a fishing business. His master fishermen hired respondent
workers. The workers were dismissed on the suspicion that they werent reporting the
correct number of fish caught. An illegal dismissal case was filed. VA ruled for Teng
and denied the subsequent MR as it wasnt allowed for under the rules. CA reversed
and SC affirmed. An MR is not prohibited and Teng was the employer who exercised
control.
Doctrine: Art. 262-A makes the voluntary arbitration award final and executory after
ten calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.
Presumably, the decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the
basis of a motion for reconsideration duly filed during that period.
FACTS
Albert Teng Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishing and, for this
purpose, owns boats (basnig), equipment, and other fishing paraphernalia.
As owner of the business, Teng claims that he customarily enters into joint
venture agreements with master fishermen (maestros) who are skilled
and are experts in deep sea fishing; they take charge of the management of
each fishing venture, including the hiring of the members of its complement.
The maestros hired the respondent workers as checkers to determine
the volume of the fish caught in every fishing voyage.
2003, the workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng
Fish Trading, Teng, and Chua (Manager) before the NCMB
o Teng hired them, without any written employment contract, to
serve as his "eyes and ears" aboard the fishing boats; to
classify the fish caught by baera; to report to Teng via radio
communication the classes and volume of each catch; to receive
instructions from him as to where and when to unload the catch; to
30
 prepare the list of the provisions requested by the maestro and the
mechanic for his approval; and, to procure the items as approved
by him.5
o They received regular monthly salaries, 13th month pay, Christmas
bonus, and incentives in the form of shares in the total volume of
fish caught.
o September 2002, Teng expressed his doubts on the correct volume
of fish caught in every fishing voyage.
o December 2002, Teng informed them that their services had been
terminated.
Teng: the maestros, rather than he, invited them to join the venture. His role
was clearly limited to the provision of the necessary capital, tools and
equipment, consisting of basnig, gears, fuel, food, and other supplies.
The VA: no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the
respondent workers
Workers filed an MR, which was denied. The VA reasoned out that Section
6, Rule VII of the 1989 Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary
Arbitration Proceedings (1989 Procedural Guidelines) does not provide the
remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by
the VAs order or decision.
CA reversed the VAs decision after finding sufficient evidence showing the
existence of employer-employee relationship.
ISSUE #1: WON MR allowed (YES)
RATIO #1:
Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 21, 1989, Republic Act No. 671523 took effect, amending, among
others, Article 263 of the Labor Code which was originally worded as:
o Art. 263 x x x Voluntary arbitration awards or decisions shall be
final, unappealable, and executory.
o As amended, Article 263 is now Article 262-A, which states:
o Art. 262-A. x x x [T]he award or decision x x x shall contain the
facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of
the award or decision by the parties.
Notably, Article 262-A deleted the word "unappealable" from Article
263. The deliberate selection of the language in the amendatory act differing
from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change
in the law, and the court should endeavor to give effect to such intent.
Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. Sampang: It is true that the present rule [Art.
262-A] makes the voluntary arbitration award final and executory after
ten calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties. Presumably, the decision may still be reconsidered by the
Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for reconsideration duly
filed during that period.
In Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.: the VAs decision may still be reconsidered
on the basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within 10 days
from receipt thereof. The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration is
a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such decision. [U]nder
Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the
Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision
by the parties x x x unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or
a petition for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court is filed within the same 10-day period.
These rulings fully establish that the absence of a categorical language
in Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the VAs decision within the 10-day period.
Tengs allegation that the VAs decision had become final and executory by
the time the respondent workers filed an appeal with the CA thus fails
The Court notes that despite our interpretation that Article 262-A does not
preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision, a
contrary provision can be found in Section 7, Rule XIX of the Department of
Labors Department Order (DO) No. 40, series of 2003:
o Section 7. Motions for Reconsideration. The decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator is not subject of a Motion for Reconsideration.
In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing rules and
regulations, an implementing agency, such as the Department of Labor, is
restricted from going beyond the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it
should neither modify nor improve the law. The agency formulating the rules
and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the
legislature.
By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending
Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party
adversely affected by the VAs decision to seek recourse via a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more
appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA
via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available
remedies as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.
The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the
doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency,
every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to
exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before
bringing an action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress
has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs,
guided by congressional intent.
ISSUE #2: WON there exists an employer-employee relationship between Teng and
the respondent workers (NO)
RATIO #2:
We agree with the CAs finding that sufficient evidence exists indicating the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between Teng and the
respondent workers.
While Teng alleged that it was the maestros who hired the respondent
workers, it was his company that issued to the respondent workers
identification cards (IDs) bearing their names as employees and Tengs
31
 signature as the employer. Generally, in a business establishment, IDs are
issued to identify the holder as a bona fide employee of the issuing entity.
For the 13 years that the respondent workers worked for Teng, they received
wages on a regular basis, in addition to their shares in the fish caught.44 The
worksheet showed that the respondent workers received uniform amounts
within a given year, which amounts annually increased until the termination
of their employment in 2002.
Tengs claim that the amounts received by the respondent workers are mere
commissions is incredulous
More importantly, the element of control which we have ruled in a number
of cases to be a strong indicator of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship is present in this case. Teng not only owned the tools and
equipment, he directed how the respondent workers were to perform their
job as checkers; they, in fact, acted as Tengs eyes and ears in every fishing
expedition.
To consider the respondent workers as employees of the maestros would
mean that Teng committed impermissible labor-only contracting. As a policy,
the Labor Code prohibits labor-only contracting
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers
to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others,
and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business of such
employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered
merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers
in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by
him.
In the present case, the maestros did not have any substantial capital or
investment.1avvphi1 Teng admitted that he solely provided the capital and
equipment, while the maestros supplied the workers. The power of control
over the respondent workers was lodged not with the maestros but with
Teng. As checkers, the respondent workers main tasks were to count and
classify the fish caught and report them to Teng.
They performed tasks that were necessary and desirable in Tengs fishing
business. Taken together, these incidents confirm the existence of a labor-
only contracting which is prohibited in our jurisdiction, as it is considered to
be the employers attempt to evade obligations afforded by law to
employees.
Accordingly, we hold that employer-employee ties exist between Teng and
the respondent workers.
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
The dismissal of an employee, which the employer must validate, has a
twofold requirement: one is substantive, the other is procedural. Not only
must the dismissal be for a just or an authorized cause, as provided by law;
the rudimentary requirements of due process the opportunity to be heard
and to defend oneself must be observed as well.
Unsubstantiated suspicion is not a just cause to terminate ones employment
under Article 282 of the Labor Code. For his failure to comply with the Labor
Codes substantive requirement on termination of employment, we declare
that Teng illegally dismissed the respondent workers.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
Philec v. CA
December 10, 2014; Leonen
Kat U.
SUMMARY: EEs were promoted after the expiration of previous CBAs and during the
negotiation for a new CBA. The memorandums served upon the EEs provided for a
different schedule of training allowance from the one contained in the new CBA which
was made to apply retroactively before the promotion of the EEs. The union claims
that the provisions of the new CBA should govern the schedule of training allowance
of the promoted EEs. VA, CA and SC ruled in favor of the union.
DOCTRINE:
An appeal to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision must be
filed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the award or
decision.
FACTS:
Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the manufacture and repairs of high voltage transformers. Among its rank-
and-file EEs were Eleodoro V. Lipio and Emerlito C. Ignacio, Sr., former
members of the PHILEC Workers Union (PWU).
PWU is a legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining
representative of PHILECs R&F EEs.
From June 1, 1989 to May 31, 1997, PHILEC and its R&F EEs were
governed by CBAs providing for step increases in an EEs basic salary in
case of promotion
August 18 and 27, 1997: With the previous CBAs already expired, PHILEC
promoted
o Lipio: from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII to Foreman I under Pay
Grade B
o Ignacio: from DT-Assembler under Par Grade VII to Foreman I
They were each served a memorandum, instructing them to undergo
training with allowance as provided in the memorandum.
September 17, 1997: PHILEC and PWU entered into a new CBA, effective
retroactively on June 1, 1997 and expiring on May 31, 1999.
o Article X, Section 4 of the new CBA provided for step increases in
the basic salary of a rank-and-file employee promoted. (See
original case for the numbers)
o To be promoted, a rank-and-file employee shall undergo training or
observation and shall receive training allowance as provided in
Article IX, Section 1(f) of the new CBA
Claiming that the schedule of training allowance stated in the
memoranda served on Lipio and Ignacio,Sr. did not conform to Article X,
Section 4 of the new CBA, PWU submitted the grievance to the grievance
machinery.
PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance.
32
 December 21, 1998: The parties filed a submission agreement with the
NCMB, designating Hon. Ramon T. Jimenez as Voluntary Arbitrator (VA).
PWU: For PHILECs failure to apply the schedule of step increases under
Article X of the June 1, 1997 CBA, PHILEC committed an ULP under Article
248 of the LC.
PHILEC: It promoted Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. while it was still negotiating a
new CBA with PWU. Hence, PHILEC applied the "Modified SGV" pay grade
scale in computing Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance. This
"Modified SGV" pay grade scale, which PHILEC and PWU allegedly agreed
to implement beginning on May 9, 1997, covered both rank-and-file and
supervisory EEs Its past CBAs resulted in an overlap of union membership
in Pay Grade IX of the rank-and-file EEs and Pay Grade A of the supervisory
EEs. Worse, past CBAs resulted in rank-and-file EEs under Pay Grades IX
and X enjoying higher step increases than supervisory EEs under Pay
Grades A and B. To preserve the hierarchical wage structure within
PHILECs enterprise, PHILEC and PWU allegedly agreed to implement the
uniform pay grade scale under the "Modified SGV" pay grade system.
o Pay grade bracket IIX covered R&F EEs, while pay grade bracket
AF covered supervisory EEs.
o Under the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale, the position of Foreman
I fell under Pay Grade B.
o PHILEC then computed Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance
accordingly.
o It did not violate its CBA with PWU when it implemented the
"Modified SGV" scale.
o Even assuming that it violated the CBA, its violation was not "gross"
or a "flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of [the CBA]."
o PHILEC, therefore, was not guilty of ULP
o Considering that Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were promoted to a
supervisory position, their training allowance should be computed
based on the provisions of PHILECs CBA with ASSET, the
exclusive bargaining representative of PHILECs supervisory
employees.
VA (August 13, 1999): PHILEC violated its CBA with PWU. The new CBA
governed when PHILEC selected Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. for promotion. The
provisions of the CBA being the law between the parties, PHILEC should
have computed Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance based on Article
X, Section 4 of the new CBA.
o The alleged salary distortion resulting from the application of the
Art. X, Sec. 4 was "a concern that PHILEC could have anticipated
and could have taken corrective action" before signing the
collective bargaining agreement.
o PHILECs acts "cannot be considered a gross violation of the CBAA
nor a flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of the agreement."
CA: affirmed VA
ISSUE: W/N VAr Jimenez gravely abused his discretion in directing PHILEC to pay
Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance based on Article X, Section 4 of the new
CBA? NO
RATIO:
The Voluntary Arbitrators decision dated August 13, 1999 is already final and
executory
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
PHILEC was not the proper remedy.
The proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrators or a
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators decision or award is to appeal the award
or decision before the Court of Appeals 16
A Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has the exclusive
original jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements. (See LC Art. 261)
Should the parties agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall also resolve the parties other labor disputes, including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. (See LC Art. 262)
Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank
Employees: The proper remedy against the award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator is an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al.: The judgments of courts and
awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time.
The awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence,
their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court.
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al.: "a voluntary arbitrator by
the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity."
The voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in
law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart
from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.
The office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, even
assuming that the office is not strictly a quasi-judicial agency, may be
considered an instrumentality:
o Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of
voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-
judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel
are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very
situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary
arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral
tribunal operating under the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, that the broader term "instrumentalities" was
purposely included in the above-quoted provision.
o An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus,
the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a
government acts, or by which a certain government act or function
16
Rules of Court, Rule 43
Sec. 1. This Rule shall apply to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized
by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. . . . .
Sec. 3. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period
and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law.
33
 is performed. The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state,
contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function.
o The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant
to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions
therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the
contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
Since the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators is considered a quasi-judicial agency, a decision or award
rendered by a Voluntary Arbitrator is appealable before the Court of
Appeals.
Under Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of
Appeals has the exclusive original jurisdiction over decisions or awards of
quasi-judicial agencies and instrumentalities
Luzon Development Bank decided in 1995 remains "good law."
In the 2002 case of Alcantara, Jr. v. CA, this court rejected Santiago
Alcantara, Jr.s argument that the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 43,
Section 217, superseded the Luzon Development Bank
o Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
presently worded, is nothing more but a reiteration of the exception
to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as
provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by Republic Act No. 790218
The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development Bank but,
nevertheless, held that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued pursuant
to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit.
o The fact that [the voluntary arbitrators] functions and powers are
provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the
exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality.
o Although the Employees Compensation Commission is also
provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the
forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95,
laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the
CA under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted
by RA No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
o A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel
of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals,
in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies,
boards and commissions enumerated therein.
Article 262-A of the Labor Code provides that the award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator "shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties":
17
SEC. 2. Cases not covered. -This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines.
18
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day reglementary
period for filing an appeal. The 15-day reglementary period has been upheld
by this court in a long line of cases.
Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that the
Voluntary Arbitrators decision must be appealed before the Court of
Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as
provided in the Labor Code.
Appeal is a "statutory privilege," which may be exercised "only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law."
"Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered the
decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal."
We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of decisions
rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the Voluntary
Arbitrators decision "shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties." Being
provided in the statute, this 10-day period must be complied with; otherwise,
no appellate court will have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd
situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from
receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has
already become final and executory.
Under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution, this court "shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in promulgating rules of
procedure in courts.
The 10-day period to appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right,
this period cannot be diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules
of Court.
Shioji v. Harvey: The "rules of court, promulgated by authority of law, have
the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with positive law." Rules of Court
are "subordinate to the statute." In case of conflict between the law and the
Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail."
The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrators award or decision
shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from
receipt of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to
file a motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the
motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for
reconsideration is filed "within the period for taking an appeal."
A petition for certiorari is a special civil action "adopted to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
An extraordinary remedy, a petition for certiorari may be filed only if appeal is
not available.
If appeal is available, an appeal must be taken even if the ground relied
upon is grave abuse of discretion.
As an exception to the rule, this court has allowed petitions for certiorari to
be filed in lieu of an appeal
34
 o (a) when the public welfare and the advancement of public policy o Since Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were rank-and-file employees when
dictate; they applied for training for the position of Foreman I, Lipios and
o (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance must be computed based on Article
o (c) when the writs issued are null; and IX, Section 1(f) of the new CBA
o (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing United Workers of the
of judicial authority. Philippines (SMTFM-UWP) v. NLRC: Only provisions embodied in the
o Other exceptions: [collective bargaining agreement] should be so interpreted and complied
None of the circumstances similar to Unicraft, Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does not find print in
and Mora (Cases where exceptions were applied) are present in this case. the [collective bargaining agreement], it is not part thereof and the proponent
PHILEC received Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs resolution denying its has no claim whatsoever to its implementation.
motion for partial reconsideration on August 11, 2000. PHILEC filed its VA: Since the signing of the current CBA took place on September 27, 1997,
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on August 29, 2000, which PHILEC, by oversight, may have overlooked the possibility of a wage
was 18 days after its receipt of Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs resolution. The distortion occurring among ASSET-occupied positions.
petition for certiorari was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period for o This matter could have been negotiated and settled with PWU
filing an appeal. We cannot consider PHILECs petition for certiorari as an before the actual signing of the CBA on September 27.
appeal. o Instead, PHILEC, again, allowed the provisions of Art. X, Sec. 4 of
There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary Arbitrator the CBA to remain the way it is and is now suffering the
Jimenezs decision became final and executory after 10 calendar days from consequences of its laches.
PHILECs receipt of the resolution denying its motion for partial PHILEC did not dispute PWUs contention that it selected several rank-and-
reconsideration. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision is already "beyond file employees for training and paid them training allowance based on the
the purview of this Court to act upon." schedule provided in the CBA effective at the time of the trainees selection.
o PHILEC cannot choose when and to whom to apply the provisions
PHILEC must pay training allowance based on the step increases provided in the of its collective bargaining agreement.
June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement o The provisions of a collective bargaining agreement must be
Being the law between the parties, the new CBA must govern PHILEC and applied uniformly and complied with in good faith.
its rank-and-file employees within the agreed period.
Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were rank-and-file employees when PHILEC selected
them for training for the position of Foreman I beginning August 25, 1997.
Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were selected for training during the effectivity of the
June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective bargaining agreement. Therefore,
Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance must be computed based on
Article X, Section 4 and Article IX, Section 1(f) of the new CBA.
Contrary to PHILECs claim, Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were not transferred out
of the bargaining unit when they were selected for training. They remained
rank-and-file employees while they trained for the position of Foreman I.
o Under Article IX, Section 1(e) of the June 1, 1997 collective
bargaining agreement, a trainee who is "unable to demonstrate his
ability to perform the work . . . shall be reverted to his previous
assignment. . . ."
o According to the same provision, the trainee "shall hold that job on
a trial or observation basis and . . . subject to prior approval of the
authorized management official, be appointed to the position in a
regular capacity."
Thus, training is a condition precedent for promotion. Selection for training
does not mean automatic transfer out of the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees.
Moreover, the new CBA states that the training allowance of a rank-and-file
employee "whose application for a posted job is accepted shall be computed
in accordance with Section (f) of [Article IX]."
35