G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014 ARAULLO VS. AQUINO IV.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
HELD:

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
merely being realigned via the DAP.
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case
at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP,
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
Projects, etc.
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional
DAP. Among their contentions was: and is without legal basis.

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUES:
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on
the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
G.R. No. 208566 BELGICA VS. OCHOA
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district.
The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the
Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions
of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and
the House of Representatives.
In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became involved in
project identification.
The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support for
Local Development Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to individual
legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or hard projects but also
covered soft projects such as those which would fall under education, health and livelihood.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was revived
through the Mindanao Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.
In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was meant to
cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies subject
to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify
any kind of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings and bridges to soft projects such as
textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first
time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.
Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF.
Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, and
the Public Works Fund, among others.
The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the representative
of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when
these appropriations were to be spent.
In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food
Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with members
of Congress for the release of funds.
In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior
consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed
realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel benefits.
In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general programs
and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental organizations
in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual legislators.
In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds
but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were also
allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and release of
funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (PSF).
The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed
and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money regularly went
into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed
the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the
government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a
dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners have
legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of
the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional
for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative
power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their utilization are
currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.
The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify
or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
The moot and academic principle cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering that: (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system
presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a
practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the
public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of
the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue
Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case was
a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.
Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering that
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be exercised by individual members of
Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.
The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management[2] does
not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and
hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been violated.
The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive
department.
Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and
the regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law.
Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They
even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the
PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them determines
(a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of
a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto.
It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which
may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of checking
itself or its members.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government,
because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy
The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds
for local development.
The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic
or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various
Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated toassist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development
efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing
local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.
For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of
money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a Special
Fund comprised of all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and
all sources.
It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount:
[a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
P150,000,000.00.
It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of legislation
powers.
The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8
of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of
the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
The law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves
the President without any guideline to construe the same.
The delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of a classification since the said term
could pertain to any kind of facility.
G.R. No. L-45081 ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a
resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the
adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the
petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal
of respondents protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.
II. THE ISSUE
Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
G.R. No. L-18463 P. VS. PERFECTO
"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code,
punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or
other person in authority . . .," is still in force."
public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws
regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
FACTS:
This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given
by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr.
Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of
the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators
who secured their election through fraud and robbery."
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an
information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to
American sovereignty
Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel
HELD:
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the
relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander,
and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights
of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were
nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.
Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the
representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in
authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article
is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of
government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in
the Philippine Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against
executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for
contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our
official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an
agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience
when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of
government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due,
but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of
the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks."
DECISION:
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different
reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de
officio. So ordered.