Luz Farms vs DAR

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or
preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations
implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms)
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and
together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section
16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be
declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner questions the following provisions of RA 6657
o Section 3 (b)
o Section 11
o Section 13
o Section 16 (d) and 17
o Section 32
the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced
in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section
3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper
Issue: Whether or not the provisions are constitutional
Held: The petition is impressed with merit.

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word

"agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to
distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and
industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the
general classification of the word "agricultural"
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry
and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the
extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by
the agrarian reform program of the State.
There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the
coverage of agrarian reform.
Section 13 and 32 of RA 6657 is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and
therefore violative of due process
DAR vs Sutton
Facts:

The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents

which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26,
1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) [1] their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not
included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included
livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected
respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and
breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from
the coverage of the CARL.
respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and
requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection
therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.
DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5] which provided that only portions
of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and
placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it
is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.
Issue: Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional
Held: NO.

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,

administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law
and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.
Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative
agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their
regulations
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes
the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including
them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum
 retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-
raising.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which
have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of
agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Milestone Farms Inc vs Office of the President

Facts:

Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the

Securities and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960.
o the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock one of its secondary
purposes
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern
the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine
raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-
documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9. [7]
The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-
hectare property from the coverage of CARP
DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order
dated June 27, 1994, exempting petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from
CARP.
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary
Garilao) issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the
316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring
75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP
Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded
from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine
raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect
Petitioner asseverates that lands devoted to livestock farming as of June 15,
1988 are classified as industrial lands, hence, outside the ambit of the CARP
CA held that the land is not being used for livestock farming hence it cannot
be exepted
Issue: Whether or not the land is exempted
Held: NO.

Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own
livestock is fatal to its cause.
Finally, it is established that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption are
characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well
within the DAR Secretarys competence and jurisdiction.
 Thus, we cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily strip the DAR
Secretary of his legal mandate to exercise jurisdiction and authority over all
ALI cases. To succumb to petitioners contention that when a land is declared
exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of the time
the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely and
forever beyond DARs jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of self-regulation.
Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and
authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP coverage based on
the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and
applicable jurisprudence

Lung Center vs Quezon City

Facts:

The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit

entity established on January 16, 1981
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders
medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying
both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for
real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of
Quezon City.
the petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption
The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is
exempt from real property taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered judgment dismissing
the petition and holding the petitioner liable for real property taxes.
The petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It asserts that its character
as a charitable institution is not altered by the fact that it admits paying
patients and renders medical services to them
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is exempted
Held: The petition is partially granted.

we hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions
he word "charitable" is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. 14 The test of
a charity and a charitable organization are in law the same.
The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry
out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for
gain, profit, or private advantage.
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation
which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the
Office of the President of the Philippines with the Ministry of Health
 Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public
in general in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the
needy without discrimination
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax
are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing power.
Under PD 1823, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes
only.
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its
real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes
Other portions are being leased for non-charitable purposes

Susi vs Razon
Facts:

The Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the

plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon,
the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein
and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of
the Government of the United States under the administration and control of
the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in
accordance with law.
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession
of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly,
personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for
about forty-five years
When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said
land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and
through his predecessors for thirty-four years
Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on
August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C).
Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto
on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five
years
So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi
had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act
No. 2874
 Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands.
the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by
operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the
judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to
recover possession thereof and hold it.

CMU vs Executive Secretary

Facts:

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational

institution owned and run by the State
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that
takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous
peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary,
o seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310
and have it declared unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.
Held: NO. The lands cannot be alienated

the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment
President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and technological
research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public
lands.
hen Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic
Act 8371[9] in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that property rights within the
ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be
recognized and respected.
 In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as
early as 1958.
Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples
around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.
Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several
tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities in the course of the
proceedings for the titling of the lands in CMUs name.
Indeed, eventually, only 3,080 hectares were titled in CMUs name under
OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162. More than 300 hectares were acknowledged to
be in the possession of and subject to the claims of those tribes.

Tanenglian vs Lorenzo
Facts:

This case involves two parcels of land (subject properties), located and
adjacent to the Sto. Tomas Baguio Road, with areas of 7,860 square meters
and 21,882 square meters, named to the petitioner
Respondent filed a Petition[3] for Redemption alleging the subject properties
be declared as ancestral land pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6657
Regional Adjudicator ruled that the lands are ancestral lands

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Adjudicator acted within his authority when he
declared the subject parcels of land as ancestral lands.
Held: NO. Petition granted

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties.
A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
In this case, respondents did not allege much less prove that they are tenants
of the subject properties.
o What they insist upon is that they are occupying their ancestral lands
covered by the protection of the law.
 Under law and settled jurisprudence, and based on the records of this case,
the Regional Adjudicator evidently has no jurisdiction to hear and resolve
respondents complaint.
In the absence of a tenancy relationship, the case falls outside the jurisdiction
of the DARAB; it is cognizable by the Regular Courts.
It is worthy to note that the Regional Adjudicator, in ruling that the subject
properties are ancestral lands of the respondents, relied solely on the
definition of ancestral lands under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6657.
o However, a special law, Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, specifically governs the rights
of indigenous people to their ancestral domains and lands.
The petitioners titles to the subject properties have acquired the character
of indeafeasibility, being registered under the Torrens System of registration.
To permit a collateral attack on petitioners title, such as what respondents
attempt, would reduce the vaunted legal indeafeasibility of a Torrens title to
meaningless verbiage

Reyes vs CA
Facts:

Central to the controversy is a portion of Hacienda Looc consisting of ten

parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,219.0133 hectares which was
previously awarded to petitioners as evidenced by their Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs).
o At the instance of private respondent Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (Fil-
Estate), however, which sought the exclusion of the parcels of land
from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the CLOAs
were cancelled by the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD)
on the ground that the lands were agriculturally undeveloped and had
an average slope of more than 18%.
Petitioners are the tenants of the disputed portion of Hacienda Looc which
has been the subject of application for exclusion from CARP coverage
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1994
o Hacienda Looc is an 8,650-hectare property located in Nasugbu,
Batangas
The hacienda was acquired by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
from the Magdalena Estate, Inc
 DBP executed a Deed of Transfer of the properties in favor of the
government.
petitioners, along with the other farmer-beneficiaries affected by the order,
filed a complaint with the Office of the DAR Secretary objecting to the
cancellation of their respective CLOAs.
ccording to them, even before MSDC and private respondent Fil-Estate
entered into such an agreement, heavily armed security guards brought
several bulldozers and large equipment into the hacienda, and soon launched
a massive operation for the leveling of the area and the eviction of the
farmers.
Issue: whether the disputed ten parcels of land are exempt from CARP coverage.
Held:

Based on the foregoing, and upon a review of the records, the Court agrees
with petitioners that there are factual matters that should be re-examined to
properly resolve this case. This Court is not a trier of facts.
One of the reasons why petitioners are objecting to the cancellation of their
CLOAs and the exclusion of the ten parcels of land from CARP coverage is
because these lots are agricultural and developed.
o While it is true that the DAR officials have generally found the lots to
have an average slope of 18%, the contention that the same have
been cultivated and are actually agriculturally developed so as to make
them subject to CARP is a factual matter that must be looked into.

Guerrero vs CA
Facts:

The petitioners adopt the respondent court's findings of fact excepting,

however, to its conclusion that tenancy relations exist between the
petitioners and the respondents
plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants- spouses Manuel and
Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing
within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria
Aurora
o Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the
plantation where he and his family stayed
o plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion
of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather
nuts.
 Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer
who was dismissed as an employee from the landholding in question and not
ousted therefrom as tenant.
Issue: Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel
Guerrero, et al and Apolinario Benitez, et al. as to determine their respective rights
and obligations to one another
Held:

Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of

tenancy relationships. It is admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan,
with others, who had originally cleared the land in question and planted the
coconut trees, with the respondent coming to work in the landholding only
after the same were already fruit bearing.
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners
and respondent is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a
"tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-
landowners.
The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without question
Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to
continue working until such relationship is extinguished according to law.
it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent's right as share tenant do not
end with the abolition of share tenancy.

DAR vs DECS
Facts:

In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate
area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros
Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental,
these lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS
respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years,
o renewed again for 10 more years
 Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm
workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
of Escalante.
MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS,

Issue: whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657
Held:

The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly
private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were
donated to respondent DECS. From that time until they were leased to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily
planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an
agency of the government
Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the
public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that
all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural
Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby
locality.
Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject hereof are
not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually,
directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact
leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation
it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
o We agree with the petitioner.
in order to be exempt from the coverage
o the land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to
be necessary;
o the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental
farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes."

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:

Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur,

with a total area of 268.5668 hectares
 o Filed several petitions for exemption of certain properties located in
various towns of Camarines Sur from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27
Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director, and sought
exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn which
were registered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres.
o Denied
As Archbishop claims to be merely an administrator of the subject properties,
he argues that these subject properties should have been exempt from the
OLT.
Issue: Whether or not the lands are exempted
Held: NO.

The laws simply speak of the landowner without qualification as to under

what title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may
exercise.
There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds naked title only or
can exercise all the rights of ownership
He cannot demand a deeper examination of the registered titles and demand
further that the intent of the original owners be ascertained and followed.
To adopt his reasoning would create means of sidestepping the law, wherein
the mere act of donation places lands beyond the reach of agrarian reform.
The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further
interpretationthere is only one right of retention per landowner, and no
multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party.
o Furthermore, the scheme proposed by Archbishop would create as
many rights of retention as there are beneficiaries, which could in
effect protect the entire available land area from agrarian reform
Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform by
stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not appear
under the list of exemptions under RA 6657.
His claimed status as administrator does not create another class of lands
exempt from the coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657

DAR vs POLO
Facts:

respondent Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc. (PCPCI) sought to convert 280
hectares of its Polo Coconut Plantation [7] (Polo estate) in Tanjay, Negros
 Oriental into a special economic zone (ecozone) under the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)
PEZA issued Resolution No. 98-320 favorably recommending the conversion
of the Polo estate into an ecozone
The following year, PCPCI applied for the reclassification of its agricultural
lands into mixed residential, commercial and industrial lands with the
municipal government of Tanjay
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanjay adopted Resolution No. 344 granting PCPCIs
application on November 3, 1999.
petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas, notified PCPCI that 394.9020 hectares of
the Polo estate had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP)[10] and would be acquired by the government.
a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
The next day, that title was cancelled and another was issued in the name of
petitioners in G.R. No. 169271 (petitioners-beneficiaries).
Respondents argued that the Polo estate should not be subjected to the
CARP because Resolution No. 16 had already designated it as mixed
residential, commercial and industrial land. Moreover, petitioners-
beneficiaries were not qualified to receive land under the CARP.
Petitioners-beneficiaries, on the other hand, insist that they were qualified
beneficiaries.
While they were neither farmers nor regular farmworkers of PCPCI, they were
either seasonal or other farmworkers.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are qualified beneficiaries
Held: YES

The approval of the DAR for the conversion of agricultural land into an
industrial estate is a condition precedent for its conversion into an ecozone.
This condition proves that the favorable recommendation of PEZA did
not ipso facto change the nature of the Polo estate. The property remained as
agricultural land and, for this reason, was still subject to the CARP.
Section 22 of CARL states who are qualified beneficiaries
Determining whether or not one is eligible to receive land involves the
administrative implementation of the program.
o For this reason, only the DAR Secretary can identify and select
CARP beneficiaries.
Section 22 of the CARL does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants of the
landowners.
Thus, the DAR cannot be deemed to have committed grave abuse of
discretion simply because its chosen beneficiaries were not tenants of PCPCI.
Halili vs CA
Facts:

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real

properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant
appellee [herein private respondent
Helen executed a deed of quitclaim
The heirs of Simeon are American citizens
David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee [also herein
private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and
validity of the two conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David Rey
Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming
ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption
The right of redemption was not granted because the land was deemed to be
urban
Issue: Whether or not the land is urban
Whether or not the sale was valid
Held: YES. YES

the conclusion of the trial court -- that the subject property is urban land -- is
based on clear and convincing evidence
As observed by the court, almost all the roadsides along the national
ghighway [sic] of Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, are lined up with
residential, commercial or industrial establishments.
o There is no doubt, therefore, that the community is a commercial area
thriving in business activities.
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners
have indeed no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes
that the land sought to be redeemed is rural.
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of
the public domain, except only by way of legal succession
Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid
[I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban
lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nations lands for future generations of Filipinos,
o that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization.
since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a
Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The
 objective of the constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands --
has been served.

Locsin vs Valenzuela
Facts:

Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as

"Hacienda Villa Regalado" located in Barrio Panubigan, Canlaon City, Negros
Occidental
A portion of this land, known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and consisting of an area of
60.07464 hectares, was subject to the lifetime usufructuary rights of
respondent Helen Schon
Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated, decreeing the "Emancipation of
Tenants." The tract of land owned in common by the petitioners, including the
portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights, fell within the
scope of "Operation Land Transfer.
The Regional Trial Courts have full authority and jurisdiction to interpret and
apply both the mass of statutes and rules and regulations relating to land
reform and the general civil law, including the law on usufruct
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to:
o (1) REQUIRE the petition and private respondents in G.R. Nos. 51333
and 52289 to file simultaneous memoranda addressing the substantive
issues identified above, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, and
to FURNISH the Solicitor General a copy of their respective
memoranda; and
o (2) to DIRECT the Solicitor General to file a motion for intervention on
behalf of the government and a memorandum on the same
substantive questions within thirty (30) days from receipt of
petitioners' and private respondents' memoranda.
Delos Reyes vs Espineli
Facts:

The petitioner Geronimo de los Reyes is the owner of a 200-hectare coconut

plantation located in Calauan, Laguna.
In 1958 his overseer ("katiwala") therein was Gonzalo Belarmino, who took
into the land the 17 respondents under an agreement that the latter were to
receive 1/7 portion of every coconut harvest.
Respondents filed separate petitions (subsequently amended) against De los
Reyes in the Court of Agrarian Relations, seeking the delivery to them of the
difference between the 1/7 share which the petitioner had been giving them
and the 30% share to which they, as share tenants, were allegedly entitled.
the petitioner contends that
o (1) there existed no contractual relationship between him and the
respondents;
o (2) the respondents were not his tenants; and
o (3) the decision of the Court of Appeals deprives him of his property
without due process of law.
the petitioner alleging, as he does, that his consent, express or implied, had
never been given.
His position, is that at the time the respondents were taken into his land by
Belarmino, the latter was a mere laborer and therefore without the requisite
authority to contract in his behalf, and it was only later that he was promoted
to the position of overseer
Issue: Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship
Held:

We are here primarily interested in the basic differences between a farm

employer-farm worker relationship and an agricultural sharehold tenancy
relationship. Both, of course, are leases, but there the similarity ends.
Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that
of employer and employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the
former over the latter
The petitioner cannot deny that the respondents were all living in the
landholding and that "all of them have banana plantation, small or big,
"though he averred," not one single banana was given to me as my share."
The petitioner clearly expected the respondents to perform the duties of a
tenant, especially, to maintain the land clean and clear "at all times," which
 not only would facilitate harvesting but, more importantly, would necessarily
result in greater production.
Considering then that the respondents are duty bound to cultivate their
respective holdings (of which they have possession), and that they share in
the harvest, the Court of Appeals' conclusion must be upheld. This, especially
in the light of the facts that the respondents raise secondary crops and have
their homes in their respective holdings.
The petitioner having entered into a share tenancy contract with the
respondents, it certainly cannot be seriously claimed that the relationship of
landlord and tenant is unjustifiably being imposed on him without due
process of law.
It was the petitioner himself who voluntarily entered the relationship, and,
therefore, should shoulder the consequences thereof, one of which is that the
tenants must be given, as they are entitled to, a 30% share in the produce.
Mercado vs NLRC
Facts:

This petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment

of wages, non-payment of overtime pay
petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers
utilized by private respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7
1/2 hectares of ace land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the latter
Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied
that said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that
she engaged their services, only to do a particular phase of agricultural work
necessary in rice production and/or sugar cane production, after which they
would be free to render services to other farm owners who need their
services.
The other private respondents denied having any relationship whatsoever
with the petitioners and state that they were merely registered owners of the
land in question included as corespondents in this case.
Issue: whether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and
therefore entitled to the benefits which they pray for
Held: NO.

petitioners submit that it would be unjust, if not unlawful, to consider them as

casual workers since they have been doing all phases of agricultural work for
so many years,
Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct
term, seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of
the project or the season. The termination of their employment cannot and
should not constitute an illegal dismissa
o Referred to Article 280 of Labor Code
Abasolo vs NLRC
Facts:

Private respondent La Union Tobacco Redrying Corporation (LUTORCO), which

is owned by private respondent See Lin Chan, is engaged in the business of
buying, selling, redrying and processing of tobacco leaves and its by-products
Petitioners have been under the employ of LUTORCO for several years until
their employment with LUTORCO was abruptly interrupted sometime in March
1993 when Compania General de Tabaccos de Filipinas (also known as
TABACALERA) took over LUTORCOs tobacco operations
The disgruntled employees instituted before the NLRC Regional Arbitration
Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La Union a complaint [4] for separation pay
against private respondent LUTORCO on the ground that there was a
termination of their employment due to the closure of LUTORCO as a result of
the sale and turnover to TABACALERA.
NLRC ruled that there was no dismissal, the petitioners were not regular
employees, and not entitled to separation pay
Issue: Whether or not the NRLC is correct
Held: NO

Petitioners vigorously maintain that they are regular workers of respondent

LUTORCO since they worked continuously for many years with LUTORCO,
some of them even for over 20 years, and that they performed functions
necessary and desirable in the usual business of LUTORCO
Private respondent LUTORCO, on the other hand, insists that petitioners
employment was not terminated; that it never ceased to operate, and that it
was petitioners themselves who severed their employer-employee
relationship when they chose employment with TABACALERA because
petitioners found more stability working with TABACALERA than with
LUTORCO
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer.
In the case at bar, while it may appear that the work of petitioners is
seasonal, inasmuch as petitioners have served the company for many years,
 some for over 20 years, performing services necessary and indispensable to
LUTORCOs business, serve as badges of regular employment

Hacienda Bino vs Cuenca

Facts: