Middle East Policy , V ol. XIX, N o.
3, F all 2012
The Arab Revolutions: A Preliminary Reading
Yusri Hazran
Dr. Hazran is an associate fellow at the Truman Institute of Hebrew
University and teaches at the Open University in Israel.
O
ne of the difficulties a historian
faces is addressing events as
they unfold and before they
have crystallized. Only the
passage of time provides the distance that
allows for the discovery of what is hidden
in sources, the gathering of documents
and the comparison of narratives. While I
regard the historians principal task to be
investigating the past rather than making
prognoses for the future, I shall offer a
preliminary reading of the Arab upheav-
als that emerged in Tunisia and spread to
Egypt, Libya and Syria.
The primary aim of this paper is to
outline the central dynamics of the pro-
test movement that has engulfed the Arab
world since late 2010, with particular focus
on the Syrian uprising. These watershed
events promise to reshape the political, so-
cial, and cultural scene. They surprised all
analysts, observers and specialists, without
exception, raising new doubts concerning
the feasibility of constructing theoretical
models that attempt to extrapolate human
social behaviors. By launching popular
revolutions for wholesale change, the Arab
people have overturned the claim of the
helpless Arab and the logic of the inevi-
tability of defeat. The creativity of these
revolutions in their content, slogans,
and dynamism has led to their influ-
2012, The Author
116
ence even on the social protest movement
recently witnessed in Israel. Perhaps the
best affirmation of their authenticity lies in
the fact that they were not born of politi-
cal parties and ideologies but embody the
popular will to reformulate the relationship
between the people and the state on the
basis of a new contract based on citizen-
ship and civil rights. In the words of the
former leftist and current liberal Lebanese
intellectual Hazem Saghiyyah, the com-
mon denominator is the genuine demand
for freedom.1
With regard to academic discourse,
however, the most important dimension
of the Arab revolutions is that they have
overturned the classic Orientalist argument
long promoted by the prominent historian
Bernard Lewis: that revolution has never
been an endurable behavioral pattern with-
in Islamic political culture. In 1972, Lewis
published an article entitled Islamic Con-
cepts of Revolution, in which he argued
that the Western doctrine of the right to
resist bad government is alien to Islamic
thought. Instead, there is an Islamic doc-
trine of the duty to resist impious govern-
ment, which in early times was of crucial
historical significance, directly contribut-
ing to its defeatist and submissive political
stance.2 The recent revolutions have also
overthrown, however, the longstanding
Middle East Policy 2012, Middle East Policy Council
 Hazran : T he Arab Revolutions : A Preliminary Reading
idea held by establishment scholars and
intrinsically linked to Sunni power since
the Seljuk era (1055-1258) that believ-
ers are religiously bound to obey the sultan
absolutely: Better an unjust king than to
overthrow him and be left with anarchy.3
THE ARAB SPRING Afghanistan between the years 1979-88.5
The most salient feature of the Arab
Spring would appear to be the fact that the
protest movement is still limited to Arab
countries characterized by a republican
political structure exposed to the revolu-
tionary ideologies of Pan-Arab nationalism
and socialism. Those Arab countries with
monarchical traditions and absolutism
most prominently, Jordan and Morocco
have succeeded either in averting or
controlling the protests. This division
calls into question not only the viability
of the nation-building projects in each of
the countries affected by the Arab Spring
(with the exceptions of Egypt and Tunisia),
but also our understanding of the intersec-
tion between modernity and tradition in
the Middle Eastern context. As of now, it
is the most traditionalist and conservative
monarchical regimes that promote modern-
ization projects and manipulate modernity
to subjugate their societies.
Second, the rise of the Islamists is a
pivotal sign of the current phase, setting
a new challenge before society and the
state. The Turkish experience, however,
suggests that the involvement of Islamists
in the democratic process can integrate
these forces within the basic rules of the
democratic game, thereby neutralizing
the political ramifications of their meta-
physical thought patterns.4 Although the
West continues to be worried by the rise
of Islamists, its fears are not inevitable,
permanent or ideological. Just as its closest
allies are the tribal kingdoms of the Gulf
117
Cooperation Council and those controlling
society in the name of religion and Arab
cultural authenticity, it is not inconceiv-
able that the West can craft a formula for
coexistence in the next stage. The United
States, in fact, employed the doctrine of ji-
had in its struggle with the Soviet Union in
However, rather than dividing Arab politi-
cal society during the revolutions into two
camps Islamists vs. secularists/liber-
als it might be more beneficial to adopt
the insight of Fawaz Gerges that there are
political forces that combine Islam and
modernity. The problem is that they were
not organized into political movements. In
Tunisia, 84 parties were registered in July
2011, including those similar to the parties
established by Islamists in past years. 6
Third, most conspicuous by their lack
of participation in the Arab revolutions
were the intellectuals, whom the Syrian
intellectual George Tarabishi characterizes
as being on strike from thinking. Did
intellectuals play any role at all in sparking
the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain
or Syria?
Fourth, in the absence of intellectu-
als the pivotal role of the military estab-
lishment in the revolutions became even
clearer. The neutral position of the army in
Egypt and Tunisia ultimately decided mat-
ters in favor of the downfall of the regime,
while the armys position in Syria contin-
ues to be a primary factor in the regimes
persistence. In Yemen and Libya, the frac-
turing of the army gave birth to civil strife.
We continue to see the aftereffects of these
decisions, except in Bahrain. This histori-
cal fact has raised real questions about the
extent of the political maturity of Gulf so-
cieties while reaffirming the importance of
economic, social and quality-of-life factors
in generating the Arab revolutions. The oil
Middle East Policy , V ol. XIX, N o. 3, F all 2012

boom experienced by the Gulf States pro- identity, a type of primordial attachment.9
vides them with an effective tool to shape Already in the early 1960s, Geertz pointed
and manage popular will and to check any to the difficulty of juggling primordial ties
attempt to alter the status quo. and the national-political institutions of the
Finally, we must note the motivating modern state. In fact, he considered this di-
dynamics of the Arab revolutions and re- rect conflict to be the most serious and in-
bellions. The demonstrations in Egypt and tractable problem faced by the new states.10
Tunisia did not emerge from the mosques Second, this pattern of parochial identity is
but broke out in public squares among the likely to involve alternative definitions of
youth and urban middle class, exhausted what the nation is. Even more important,
by poverty, however, this
unemploy- Civil discontent finds its natural outlet in identity pat-
ment, margin-
alization and
the seizing, legally or illegally, of the state tern carries
the potential
authoritarian- apparatus. Primordial discontent strives to subordi-
ism. In this more deeply and is satisfied less easily. nate peoples
sense, the up- loyalty to
heavals essentially constituted a response the state (their civil sentiments) to this
to internal dynamics, reflecting the depth primordial affiliation.
of the social and political predicament In pointing out the consequences
in which the Arab countries found them- of politicizing primordial attachment
selves. With the exception of the states of to enhance the states integrity, Geertz
the Gulf, they also embodied the failure of distinguishes between primordial and civil
the ruling elite in countries governed by sentiments. While primordial affiliations
revolutionary and socialist regimes. This can threaten governments or forms of
group failed not only to provide its citizens government, primordialism can endanger
with a dignified life, despite the states the very existence of a state and induce
resources, but also to forge a true national partition of its territories and irredentism
identity. Pre-state loyalties clannism, or, at the very least, reduce the states
tribalism and, most dangerous of all, sec- boundaries of control. As Geertz phrases it,
tarianism rose to the surface, especially Civil discontent finds its natural outlet in
in countries characterized by ethnic and the seizing, legally or illegally, of the state
religious diversity. 7
apparatus. Primordial discontent strives
Since the 2003 overthrow of the Baath more deeply and is satisfied less easily.11
regime in Iraq, the Arab intelligentsia has Given the escalation of the Syrian cri-
been occupied with what it calls the de- sis, it seems fitting to close by addressing
cline of territorial national identity and the the Iraqi and Lebanese cases. Both Leba-
rise of new patterns of localism i.e., sec- non and Iraq experienced a total collapse
tarianism.8 Although Clifford Geertz does of their institutions and civil society. More-
not classify sectarianism as a primordial over, the Shiite community, the largest in
tie, the practice of politicized religiosity or both countries, has become increasingly
sectarianism may nonetheless be defined dominated by sectarian and religiously ori-
as such. These patterns of political orga- ented forces. It is clear that the alignment
nization and behavior are based religious of political and sectarian forces in Lebanon

118
 Hazran : T he Arab Revolutions : A Preliminary Reading
since 2005 and in Iraq since 2003 hampers
any popular mobilization aimed at chang-
ing the structure of the political system.
This is not to speak of the fact that neither
Lebanon nor Iraq suffers from the absence
of an active state role or in the words of
Waddah Shararah a lack of consensus
regarding anything but the prevention of
state collapse and disintegration, rather
than state dominance over the people.12
To this must be added the fear and un-
certainty regarding the situation in Syria,
together with the self-induced sectarian
monolithism which hinders mobilization in
Lebanon and Iraq.
The challenge of sectarianism obvious-
ly also applies to Syria, sufficient reason to
assume that it will have a corrosive impact
on the process of creating a democratic
alternative and may even threaten Syrias
existence as a polity.
THE SYRIAN UPRISING
Syria is the fault line in the Middle
East . . . generally very diverse in ethnici-
ties, in sects, in religions, but Syria is the
most diverse . . . When you play with it,
you will have [an] earthquake that is going
to effect the whole region.13 For the rea-
son President Assad adduces here, and no
doubt others, Syria most likely represents
an exceptional case, although not in terms
of the causes of the revolution and the fac-
tors that set it in motion. A pillar of the re-
gime, Member of Parliament Muhammad
Habash, acknowledged that 85 percent
of the factors behind the revolution are
internal. This statement can be verified; the
Syrian peoples rising up not only against
poverty and unemployment (20 percent,
81 percent of university graduates being
forced to wait four years before finding a
job), but also against the most notorious
intelligence service in the Middle East.14
119
The exceptional nature of the Syrian
case derives from projections concerning
the possible consequences of the collapse
of the regime, complicated by the absence
of a real alternative to the current system
and the historical complexities of Syrias
ethnic and sectarian composition. Despite
the fact that the presidency and security
posts have been reserved for the Alawite
community, the Baath regime has never
been a minority in control of a major-
ity. Since the early 1980s, the regime has
invested an immense effort into integrating
the Sunni majority into the public sphere
via the party, the governmental adminis-
tration, and openness in economic policy
making. Communal minorities nonetheless
constitute a quarter or more of the Syrian
population (Alawites, 12 percent; Druze,
3 percent; Christians, 14 percent; and
Ismailis, 1.5 percent).15
This fundamental factor is of great
significance with respect to the rise of
the Islamic alternative. Unlike Hizbal-
lah, which understood that the Islamic
model of government does not apply to
the pluralistic Lebanese fabric, the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood is still committed to
a model that ignores the possible future
consequences for the social and political
fabric of Syrian society.16 It is no exaggera-
tion to say that Islamic rule in Syria could
lead either to the exclusion of minorities
or to Syrias territorial disintegration. After
almost a year, the opposition has still not
succeeded in uniting its ranks and reaching
consensus on a unified and clearly defined
political program for post-Baath Syria.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood recently
published their vision of a future Syria. The
first articles of what they called a pledge
and charter emphasize the need to estab-
lish a modern civil state a democratic
regime and equality in the eyes of the law.
Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2012
What the SMB means by democracy
appears to be aggressive majoritarianism,
however, with the Sunnis constituting more
than 60 percent of the Syrian population.17
A further indication of the unique-
ness of the Syrian case is the position of
the Gulf monarchies. How to explain the
rallying of the media, led by the two royal-
family-owned satellite channels of the Gulf
al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera in favor of
democratic revolution and freedom in Syr-
ia, while some of these same monarchies
continue to prohibit women from driving?
It is clear that Saudi Arabia and those in its
orbit are attempting to use the erosion of
the regimes legitimacy to weaken Syria,
the most important link in the regional
forces allied with Iran.18 In light of this,
President Assad has frequently declared
that the Baath regime will fight tooth and
nail for its survival, convinced that it faces
a regional and Western conspiracy not
unlike that generated in the past due to its
defiant nationalism.19
The political, cultural, historical, social
and religious elements characterizing the
Syrian scene further complicate the at-
tempt to turn the regimes overthrow into
a first step toward pluralistic democracy
or other desired civil state. This is due to
the nature of the regime and the complexi-
ties of the countrys social and religious
composition. Both of these factors create
a situation in which the overthrow of the
regime or the collapse of its authority in
some regions or cities could lead Syria
into civil war or total chaos. The repercus-
sions would certainly not be confined to its
own borders, but could presage a repeat of
the chaotic scenario experienced by Iraq
in the aftermath of the overthrow of the
Baath regime there in 2003. Bathism is a
totalitarian ideology that regulates the life
of the individual and society in every area
120
and is characterized by endless interven-
tions of the party into the state, from the
political and constitutional system through
the school system and the administrative
apparatus, not to speak of the security and
military institutions.20 This overlap means
that the removal of the party from power
will lead to the disintegration of state insti-
tutions, particularly because pre-state loyal-
ties are still present and powerful in Syria.21
The demonstrations in Syria, 11
months after they began, continue to be
confined to a single segment of the Syr-
ian people the Sunni majority and
exhibit a clear sectarian dimension, even
if nonsectarian slogans are emphasized.
This reading is reinforced by the fact that
the principal ethnic Syrian minorities
Christians, Alawites and Druze have
yet to collectively take part in the protest
against the regime. This stance does not
represent their support of tyranny but
their fear of anarchy on the one hand and
the Islamic alternative on the other. This
fear is shared by the Sunni urban middle
class. What else can explain the apathetic
reaction of Aleppo and Damascus to the
protest movement?22 Confirmation of this
fear is found in the words of the famous
Syrian poet Adonis: I cannot participate
in a political demonstration launched from
the mosques.23 The regimes durability
can also be explained by the international
and regional support provided by Russia
and Iran. Moscow regards Syria as the
last stronghold of its influence in the Arab
Middle East; Iran views the country as the
key component in its strategic alliances
and is thus boosting military and economic
aid to Damascus.24
While the regime bases its official
legitimacy on a secular Arab nationalism
that embraces all sects and communities,
it does not hesitate to exploit the minority
 Hazran: The Arab Revolutions: A Preliminary Reading
complex of the Alawite community
from which the top echelons of the regime
are drawn and stir up fear among other
minority groups. The opposition harnesses
religious sentiments to gain legitimacy
as well as to wrest legitimacy from the
regime. The regime, in turn, employs reli-
gion to counter its compromised legitima-
cy. Indeed, former president and father of
Bashar, Hafez al-Assad, a secular Baathist,
requested a fatwa from Imam Musa al-
Sadr, leader of the Shiites in Lebanon, to
confirm the Islamic identity of the Alawi-
tes. The overthrow of the Syrian regime
is portrayed as an existential threat to the
Alawite sect as a whole, not merely to its
loss of control over the security establish-
ment. In the event of the regimes collapse,
according to this logic, an unprecedented
degree of sectarian militarization will oc-
cur in Syria, the sects withdrawing to their
geographical strongholds and holding fast
to their weapons outside the authority of
the state.25
More dangerous still is the possibility
that the fall of the Baath regime will lead
to a state of civil-sectarian militarization
extending into neighboring areas, especial-
ly Lebanon, where the marginalized Shiites
have long relied upon Syria to compensate
for their institutional marginalization. It
is not unimaginable that the marginalized
Shiites of Lebanon will remain allied to the
nucleus of the Syrian regime even after its
fall. This is especially true in light of the
fact that they feel threatened by a con-
spiracy under the guise of the international
tribunal investigating the assassination
of Rafiq al-Hariri the source of which
is the same constellation of forces target-
ing the other defiant regime in the Arab
world.26 As the Syrian Baath regimes alli-
ances will continue to cast a shadow over
the post-Baath period if the Assad regime
121
falls, a civil war could ignite the region.
Increasing the probability of catastrophic
repercussions from the overthrow of the
regime is the lack of any real alternative,
opening the door to many possibilities.
A coup from within, reform, and some
kind of partnership with opponents are all
more favorable choices for Syria than the
total overthrow of the regime. Perhaps the
best indication of the fear of the potential
consequences of regime collapse are the
vacillations in the Western position and
Israeli uncertainty. Even Assads bitterest
enemies are afraid of toppling the regime,
not out of benevolence or a desire to safe-
guard its regional role or fear for its future.
Rather, all recognize that its fall could
open the door to chaos, disintegration and
the collapse of a country that has long
been the linchpin of stability in the Fertile
Crescent. The toppling of the regime in
Syria also means the dismantling of the
last component of Arabism, established in
the era of independence following World
War II. As Maronite Patriarch Bishara al-
Rai, who called for the unity of minorities
in the face of a rising Sunni fundamentalist
tide, remarked, this forms irrefutable evi-
dence of the political-psychological state
currently facing the region.27
CONCLUSION
The Arab world has not yet reaped the
fruit of the peoples assault on the state in
the spring revolutions. Infighting, instabil-
ity, bloodshed and economic decline have
rendered this a necessary stage of transi-
tion in the overthrow of the dictatorships
and eternal republics in Syria, Egypt, Ye-
men, Libya, Tunisia and other Arab coun-
tries during the post-colonial era (as Leba-
nese thinker Radwan al-Sayyid referred to
them).28 The Arab Spring has inaugurated a
new era in the modern history of the Arab
Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2012

world, similar to vast political changes
following the colonial and post-colonial
periods. While the colonial era was domi-
nated by Western powers allied with liberal
monarchies and the post-colonial period by
revolutionary/republican regimes, the Arab
Spring will be dominated by Islamic forces
brought to power by democratic elections.
This development presents the region with
two major challenges: First, political and
social democratization versus imposed
Islamization; and second, the empower-
ment of statehood versus disintegration
of the state order into sectarianism, tribal-
ism and localism. The direction the region
takes will depend to a great extent on the
course of events in Syria, the last bastion
of the secular and pluralistic Arab sphere.
It is not inconceivable that the next stage
will witness an intellectual struggle over
the reshaping of Arabo-Islamic civiliza-
tion. Will it be joined with modernity and
enlightenment or a dogmatic and inward-
looking oppression?29 It will be combined
either with modernity and enlightenment
as envisioned by Muhammad Abduh,
Muhammad Arkoun, Hisham Sharabi and
Shakib Arslan or with dogmatic, intro-
spective, essentially oppressive reasoning.
Following the latter model of Ibn Taymi-
yya, Muhammad bin Yusuf al-Maliki
(responsible for sentencing al-Husayn bin
Mansur al-Hallaj to death in 922), Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab and those who label others as
infidels would foreclose the possibility of
debate and lead Islam into segregation and
isolation.

1
Interview conducted by Ahmad Ali al-Zayn, with Hazem Saghiyyah, Rawafid, al-Arabiya, May 19, 2011.
2
Bernard Lewis, Islamic Concepts of Revolution, in Revolution in the Middle East (ed. P.S. Vatikiotis;
George Allen, 1972), 33.
3
See the medieval great scholar, Muhammad al-Ghazali, al-Iqtisad fi al-Itiqad (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-
Ilmiyyah, 1983), 150-51.
4
For the Syrian intellectual George Tarabishi, the incorporation of the political Islamic movement within the
secular Turkish political system represents not just a democratization of the former but an Islamization of
modernity: George Tarabishi, Hartaqat (2nd ed.; Beirut: Dar al-Saqi /Association of Arab Rationalists, 2011),
Vol. I, 229-30.
5
See Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islam since 1979 (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2010).
6
Interview conducted by Turki al-Dakhil with Fawaz Gerges, on al-Arabiya Idaat, July 21, 2011.
7
Hazem Saghiyyah, al-Iraq wa al-Mashriq bayn al-Taifiyya wa al-Muqawamah, al-Hayat, December 27,
2011.
8
Azmi Bisharah, Badil al-Mashru al-Qawmi Huwa al-Ihtirab al-Taifi al-Hayat, May 17, 2007; Muham-
mad Jabir al-Ansari, al-Mashru al-Watani al-Jami Huwa al-Rad, al-Hayat, May 29, 2008; Khalil al-Anani,
Azmat Lubnan wa al-Sira al-Taifi fi al-Mantiqa, al-Hayat, May 21, 2008.
9
Religion is one component of six possible foci of primordialism described by Geertz: assumed blood ties,
race, language, region and customs. By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the givens
or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed givens of social
existence: immediate contiguity involved and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that
stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect
of a language, and following particular social practices (The Interpretation of Cultures [Basic Books, 1973],

122
 Hazran: The Arab Revolutions: A Preliminary Reading

259).
10
Ibid, 260.
11
Ibid, 260-61.
12
Waddah Shrarah, Dawlat Hizb Allah (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1992).
13
Interview conducted by Barbara Walters with President Bashar al-Assad, ABC News, December 7, 2011.
14
See Ziv Barel, A Good Job It Is Hard to Find, Haaretz, November 11, 2010.
15
Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria, Revolution From Above (Routledge, 2001), 20. The Islamic-oriented writer
Yasir al-Zaatirah argues that the vast majority of pro-regime demonstrators and their support bases relied
principally upon these minorities: Qadafi al-Sham wast Jamahirih al-Hashida, al-Dustur, January 15, 2012.
16
Hezbollahs pragmatism found ideological expression in the Political Charter published in November
2009. For the first time since the declaration of its founding communiqu, the Open Letter of February 1985,
the commitment to the ideology of wilayat al-faqih was not referred to: al-wathiqah al-siyasiyah li-Hizb Al-
lah, accessed March 8, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/5f5dd085-f3f0-4f4c-81a9-6bc0b2f21e3b.
17
For majoritarianism and its differentiation from consensus democracy, see Arend Lijphart, Democracies,
Forms, Performance and Constitutional Engineering, European Journal of Political Research 25.1 (1994):
1-17. Yvette Talhamy claims that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhoods official platform of moderation and toler-
ance is less a window into the groups thinking than a reflection of its political tactics; Yvette Talhamy,
The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn, Middle East Quarterly 19.2 (2012): 33-40, quote at 33.
18
See Alastair Crooke, Syria and Iran: The Great Game, Guardian, November 4, 2011.
19
For the full text of President Assads speech, given on January 10, 2012, see: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=SsXFXQoZPEI.
20
Hinnebusch, Syria, Revolution From Above, 52-4.
21
For the consequences of the Baath breakdown, see Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War,
Losing the Peace (Yale University Press, 2007).
22
For the partnership between the regime and the Sunni urban middle class, see Moshe Moaz, Syria: To
Arabism and Back (Raanana: The Open University, 2011), 164-67 (Hebrew); Eyal Zisser, Assads Syria at a
Crossroads (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1999), 38-39 (Hebrew); Aram Nerguizian, Assads Hidden
Strength in Syria Los Angles Times, March 2, 2012.
23
See http://alalemya.com/culture/0_2011_5_/11_/11_5_1/5_1/adonees_arab_thawra.html.
24
See Haaretz, March 4, 2012.
25
For the historical process and social developments which led to Alawite control over the army, see Hanna
Batatu, Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syrias Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for Its
Dominance, Middle East Journal 35, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 331-44.
26
If the French journalist Vincent Nouzille is to be trusted, four days following Hariris assassination the
French and American presidents agreed to accuse the Syrian regime of involvement in the affair. See Vincent
Nouzille, Dans Le Secret des Presidents (Paris: Fayard, 2010), 464-65.
27
See al-Rais statements as quoted by al-Hayat, September 6, 2011 & October 22, 2011; see also Walid
Shqair, Dawr al-Masihien fi al-Rabi al-Arabi, al-Hayat, September 16, 2011.
28
Radwan al-Sayyed, Bashshar al-Assad wa Idrakatuh Lil-al-Thawrah fi Suriya, al-Sharq al-Awsat, January
13, 2012.
29
Hashim Salih, al-Insidad al-Tarikhi (London: Dar al-Saqi, 2007), 220-1.

123
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