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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES . _


~Ull FEB,2l M1//:23
1
SUPREME COURT
Manila

LEILA M. DE LIMA,
Petitioner,

-versus-

HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, in


her capacity as presiding judge,
G.R. SP No. 229781 I
Regional Trial Court of II

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Muntinlupa City, Branch 204,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
P/DIR. GEN. RONALD M. DELA
ROSA in his capacity as Chief of
For Certiorari
Prohibition
Application
and
with
for
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the Philippine National Police, P1eliminary Injunction,
PSUPT PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS, and Urgent Prayer for
in his capacity as Directo1, TRO and Status Quo Ante
Headquarters Support Service, Order
SUPT. ARNEL JAMANDRON
APUD, in his capacity as Chief,
PNP Custodial Service Unit, and
ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER

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THEIR CONTROL, !~~,.m~rnt'J~~
\\(~ ~\'~t:-~ 'f'.!!ll';~ll! ~r('i~~i:i. ':i~~
(111 ~~..1 "1 lil t''"'" i'l ~~
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SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION
\. l , \
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OR DIRECTION IN RELATION
TO THE ORDERS THAT MAY BE
ISSUED BY THE COURT,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------x

PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WITH APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, AND.URGENT PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND STATUS Quo ANTE ORDER
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI {Rule 65)
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
Page 2
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SUPREME COURT

Petitioner, LEILA M~ DE LIMA, by undersigned counsel and unto


this Honorable Court, 111ost respectfully alleges that:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

"The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people


against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. This
bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights
which include personal liberty and security against invasion by the
government.or any of its branches or instrumentalities. Certainly, in
the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the
right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each
other, the scales of justice tilt in favor of the former. Thus, relief
may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal
law where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration
of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the Jaw in an
oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights. "1

There is a Brazilian proverb that says, "Haste is the 111other of


imperfection." Yet, haste, when unduly applied in the context of the
crin1inal justice syste1n, such that it constitutes a blatant failure to
respect and uphold a person's fundan1ental rights, and to observe the
guarantees ensluined in the Constitution to protect the rights of the
accused, it results in son1ething far inore deshuctive, inore pestilent
'.... _~ and graver than 111ere 11 in1perfection." It constitutes injustice.

Petitioner, thus, respectfully co1nes before the I-fonorable Court,


seeking its intervention to ensure that justice and judiciousness shall
ulti111ately prevail; in particular, to correct an injustice that was
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con1111itted in the handling of her case by the court a quo, which Ii


resulted in the precipitous deprivation of her liberty, and placed her I!
under conditions where her life and security are seriously 1:

con1pron1ised.
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She seeks the I-Ionorable Court's intervention, not just for the /,

vindication of her rights as an individual and as an accused, but also 11

to prevent an even n1ore far-reaching offense against our nation fron1 11


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being con1111itted. For while the offense of 111aking a person, an I

accused, suffer an injustice is in itself an affront to the Fundan1ental

Atty. Al/ado v. Judge Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994.


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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 3
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et a/.
SUPREME COURT

Law of the Land and to our notions of fairness and justice, such
offense takes on an even 111ore repiehensible, virulent and expansive
dimension when what is at stake is not just a single person's life,
liberty and property, but also the very shength of the foundations of .,:i
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our den1ocratic way of life and republican fonn of governn1ent, if
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nan1ely, the people's right to be secure fr01n political persecution, and i'
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the ability of an elected official to perforn1 the duties of the position 11

for which she was elected by the people without fear of political i11
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re tribu ti on.
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The dan1age to both is clear and present. ii


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By showing that even a Senator of the Republic, a fon11er 11
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Secretary of Justice and Chairperson of the Con1111ission on I-Iun1an


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Rights, and a pro1ninent 111ei11ber of the legal profession caiu1ot save j!
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\ t herself ro111 the vindictiveness of a tyrant; that she caiu1ot hope to I

voice her dissent and objection to the ra1npant abuses being 11


perpetrated against the Filipino people without exposing herself to Iifl
political persecution; that her persecutors can bypass and violate the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional institutions that properly have the
authority to decide the charges against her; and that even the courts
cannot be relied upon not to act precipitously and in1prudently in
depriving her of her liberty and, effectively, of her ability to II
discharge her duties as a representative of all Filipinos in the Upper
House of Congress, we are allowing a culture of in1punity1 corruption
and depravity to once again descend upon our nation.
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We would be allowing tyranny to once again rule over our
people.

For who would have the courage to speak up for the victin'ls of
extrajudicial killings? Who will dare fight for the truth to con1e out
during Senate inquiries, particularly those probing into the
corruption scandals involving the President's fraternity brothers, or
the n1urderous and extortionist operations being perpelTated by
n1en1b~rs of the law enforcen1ent agents who have, thus far, been
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virtually given a free pass by the President for the thousands of
killings supposedly con1111itted during "legitin1ate police
operations"? Who will dare stand in the way of the atte111pts to
railroad critical pieces of legislation, such as the re-in1position of the
Death Penally, which has serious and severe ilnplications on the
Crin1inal Justice Systen1 and our international con1n1itn1ents, which '!i
all need to first be fully threshed out? I'
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page4 I
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et a/. li
SUPREME COURT ii
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Who will dare oppose what deserves to be opposed, and


question what needs to be questioned, if even son1eone like the
J_ ,.[,

Petitioner, who was elected Senator by 111ore than 14 1nillion Filipino ,,;1
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voters, was not accorded her right to due process before she was
pren1alurely deprived of her liberty and severely ilnpaired fro111
perforn1ing her duties as a public servant?

Indeed, injustice has a price. In this case, with the chilling effect
that injustice creates, the price is our syste1n of checks and balances.

The President n1ay be right. This ti1ne, he need not even


declare Martial Law. I-le need only ensure in other ways that neither
the Legislature: iior the Judiciary can effectively function to check the
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abuses being done under his regin1e, which he has apparently .: I

successfully done through his so-called "War on Drugs", and the


"Tokhang Operations" and spate of ran1pant killings that go with it.
These have apparently ta1ned 1nany public servants into "toeing the
line" to avoid being included in the President's" drug n1atrices" and
"narco lists", which have been so notoriously and in.fan1ously
unreliable that they even included long-dead n1en1bers of the
judiciary. ii
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To be very, very clear, the dan1age to the Filipino people's right
to be represented by the Petitioner in the I-Ialls of the Senate is no
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longer inerely inchoate or speculative, but is already extant and
further being ai11plified with every second that she is incarcerated
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and unable to perforn1 her duties. Just to cite son1e exa1nples, in the
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c01ning week:
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1. Public hearings have been scheduled to take up, arnong


others, (a) Senate Bill No. (SBN) 1313, a critical and tirne-
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sensitive piece of proposed legislation that will be taken up I
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by the Senate C01nmittee on I-Iealth and Den1ography, of I

which Petitioner is a 1nen1ber, jointly with two other


Con1111ittees, seeking to 1nainstrean1 .the public health -+- "
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approach to the Philippine govern1nent's Drug Policy, to
establish and in1plen1ent con1111unity-based progran1s and
shategies for drug-related issues and concerns, and to
prohibit harn1ul and discrin1inatory interventions and
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page S
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

practices; and (b) the tax refonn bills and reforn1 agenda of
the Duterte ad111inishation;2

2. Technical W orl<ing Group n1eelings will be held to take up,


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a111ong others, a bill authored by the Petitioner that will have
a great i111pact on both the people's right to privacy and law r-
enforcen1ent agencies' enhanced capacity to look into the 1
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bank accounts of governn1ent officials and en1ployees, i.e.,
SBN 196, or /1 An Act Arnending Republic Act No. 1405, Also
I<rwwn As The Bank Secrecy Latu, As Arnended, By Removing I I:
From 1ts Coverage, Government Officials And Etnployees, And
For Other Purposes" i and

3. Hearings in aid of legislation probing the so-called "Jack


Lcu11/Bureau of Ii111nigration Bribery Scandal" are set to I
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\ continue its investigation, which in the past Petitioner has 1:

religiously been attending and actively participating in as a


n1e111ber of the Blue Ribbon Con11nittee.

Therefore, on the shength of the libertarian dochines


enunciated in the landn1ark decisions in Allado, 3 Salonga 4, and
Ladlad5, which interestingly share shnilar factual and legal n1ilieu I,
with this case, and to prevent further dan1age to our de111ocratic way I:
of life and representative fonn of governn1ent, Petitioner Leila M. de I
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President Duterte's Unnumbered bill entitled, "Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion" with focus on
the following:
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\ 1. PSRN 118 (Resolution Directing The Proper Senate Committee To Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid Of
Legislation, Ori The Tax Reform Proposals Of The Department Of Finance With The Ultimate Goal
Of Improving The Country's Tax Collection Effort While Ensuring That The Country's Tax System Is
Simpler, More Equitable And Progressive);
2. SBN 308 (An Act Creating The Office Of The National Taxpayer Advocate To Safeguard The Rights
Of The Taxpayers And For Other Purposes);
3. SBN 815 (An Act Ordaining A Bill Of Rights For Taxpayers);
4. SBN 132 (An Act Amending Section 3 Of The National Internal Revenue Code Of 1997, As
Amended, Establishing A Taxpayer Assistance Service In Th.e Bureau Of Internal Revenue And For
Other Purposes);
5. Hernoval of VAT Exemption on Materials used on Socialized Housing and Money Remittance
Centers - Senate Bill No. (SBN) 1044 (An Act Exempting Sales Of Construction Materials And
Lease Of Construction Equipment Intended For Socialized Housing Projects And Housing Or
Rehabilitation Projects For Victims Of Disasters, From Value-Added Tax; Amending For The
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Purpose Of Section 109 Of The National Internal Revenue Code);
6. Removal of Income Tax Exemption on PCSO/Horse Race Winnings - SBN1099 (An Act Amending
SecUon 24 And 25 Of Republic Act No. 8424, Otherwise Known As The National Internal Revenue
Code Of 1997, As Amended By Removing The Tax Exemption On Sweep takes And Lotw Winnings
In The Philippines); and
7. Limiting VAT Zero-rating to Direct Exports only.
Atty. Al/ado v. Judge Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994.
Salonga v. Cruz-Pano, G.R. No. 59524, 18 February 1985.
Lad/adv. Velasco, G. R. Nos. 172070-72, 01 June 2007.

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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 6
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al
SUPREME COURT

Li1na vigorously asserts her inherent right to liberty and security


guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution.

She further hun1bly invokes the supervisory authority of this


I-Ionorable Court to correct serious errors of jurisdiction co1n1nitted
by the lower court in: (a) finding without basis probable cause
against her; (b) erroneously issuing against her a warrant of arrest
with no bail rec01nn1ended for her provisional liberty; and (c)
effectively refusing or failing to act first on a n1otion that seriously . I

questions the jurisdiction of the court. The abuse of discretion by the


lower court is so patent and gross that it ani.ounts to an evasion of a
posilive duly or a refusal to perforn1 a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is being exercised in an arbihary and despotic
1nmu1er. 6

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NATURE OF THE CASE


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This is a Petition for Special Civil Action for Certiorari and


Prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure ["PETITION"] seeking to correct the grave abuse of
discretion con1111itted by. Public Respondent JUANITA GUERRERO,
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 204 ["RESPONDENT JUDGE"] an1ounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction con1111itted tluough the capricious, whirnsical, arbitrary
and despotic acts in connection with the crilninal action for alleged
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' illegal drug trading docketed as Crini.inal Case No. 17-165, and
'\, entitled People of the Philippines v. Leila M. de Linia, et al.
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Specifically assailed in this Petition are the following acts and
0111ission of respondent judge: I

(a) The Order dated 23 February 2017 wherein respondent judge


found probable cause for issuance of arrest warrant against
all accused, including Petitioner Leila M. de Lini.a;

(b)The Warrant of Arrest against Petitioner Leila M. de Lin1a


also dated 23 February 2017 issued by respondent judge
pursuant to the Order dated the san1e day;

(c) The Order dated 24 February 2017, con1111itting Petitioner to


the custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and

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People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 140690, 19 June 2001.

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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 7


De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME Cou1n
...,.....,.....,...._

(d) The on1ission of respondent judge in faili~1g or refusing to


act on Petitioner's Leila M. de Lilna Motion to Quash, through
which Petitioner seriously questions the jurisdiction of the
lower court.

Considering the urgency of preserving the substantive rights of


Petitioner Leila M. de Lin1a pendiI~g the certiorari and prohibition
proceedings and in view of the propensity of respondent judge to
continue violating such rights, it is prayed that a ten1porary
restraining order (TRO) be in1111ediately issued and a writ of
prelin1inary injunction be granted pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 65 to
suspend the proceedings in the lower court and to restore the parties
to the status qu? before the issuance of the Order dated February 23,
2017, and the warrant of arrest of even date.

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Likewise, pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of the san1e Rule,
" Petitioner de Lin1a pleads for other incidental reliefs as law and
justice 111ay require, such as but not li1nited to the inhibition of
respondent judge and the lTansfer of venue of the crin1inal case to
avoid iniscarriage of justice.

Other than the present recourse to this I-Ionorable Court, there


is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate re1nedy in the
ordinary course of law. While, as a general rule, a 111olion for
reconsideration of the act or order of the lower court con1plained of
111ust be filed, such n1otion on an interlocutory order 111ay be
dispensed with under justifiable circu1nstances such as the following,
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a. Where the order is a patent nullity;7

b. Where, under the circurnstances, a 1notion for


reconsideration would be useless;8
c. Where Petitioner was deprived of due process and there
is extren1e urgency for relief;9

d. Where, in a crin1inal case, relief fro1n an order of arrest is


urgent and granting of such relief by the nial court is
in.1probable;10 and

Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission [L-19850, Jan. 30, 1964]; Luzon Surety Co. v.
Marbella, et al. [L-16088, Sept. 30, 1960]; Dir. of Lands v. Santamaria, (44 Phil 594).
People v. Palacio [L-13933, Mar. 26,1960].
Luzon Surety Co. v. Marbel/a [L-16088, Sept. 30, 1960]. --L
10
Matutina v. Bas/on [L-14637, Aug. 24, 1960).
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI {Rule 65) Pages
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

e. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for


lack of due process.11

Petitioner is conscious of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.


Petitioner, however, is likewise aware that, as held in a recent case,12
the Supren1e Court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and
assunw jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly
with if: for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of
the issues clearly and specifically raised in !:he petition. 11 13 In so holding, it
reiterated the exceptions to the dochine of hierarchy of courts, son1e
of which are applicable here, to wit:

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First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed
at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court
!.. includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative
and executive branches of the government [See Aquino Ill v.
COMELEC,G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 623,
637-638 [Per J. Perez, En Banc]; Magallona v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476, 487-488 [Per J.
Carpio, En Banc].].

In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice


not only Petitioners' right to freedom of expression in the
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present case, but also of others in future similar cases. Xxx

("-..., ' xxx xxx xxx

A second exception is when the issues involved are of


transcendental importance [See Initiatives for Dialogue and
Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc.
(IDEALS, INC.) v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM},G.R. No. 192088, October
9, 2012, 682 SCRA 602, 633 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc];
Agan, Jr. v. PIATCO, 450 Phil. 744, 805 (2003) [Per J. Puna, En
Banc].]. In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the
threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to
constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents
courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when
clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

u Matute v. CA [L-26751 1 Jan. 31, 1969].


12
The Diocese of Baco/od v COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728 1 21January 2015.
n Id, Citations omitted.

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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 9
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the


paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of
expression which warrants invocation of relief from this
court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely
influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, ~-.""'-

especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage


not only includes the right to vote for one's chosen
candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the
public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It
may be said that in an election year, the right to vote
neces~arily includes the right to free speech and expression.
The p'rotection of these fundamental constitutional rights,
therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.

xxx xxx xxx

\. Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided


by this court. In Drilon v. Lim [G.R. No. 112497, August 4,
1994, 235 SCRA 135 [Per J. Cruz, En Banc]], this court held
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that:

... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a


becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment
of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which
is better determined after a thorough deliberation by
a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion
(G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135 [Per
\ __ J. Cruz, En Banc], at 140.]. (Citation omitted) -~--~
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In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined I


judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed
act~ contrary to the Constitution through the assailed
issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be


ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period.
Although the elections have already been concluded, future
cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. ~--

Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception


for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional


organ. xxx
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 10
Oe Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. +
SUPREME COURT

xxx xxx xxx

Seventh, Petitioners rightly claim that they had no other


plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law that could free them from the injurious effects of
respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of
expression.

In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on


this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason
to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other
sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient
ground to allow direct resort to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by


public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
de~anded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
co~plained of were found to be patent nullities, or the I
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy"
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[Chong v. Dela Cruz, 610 Phil. 725, 728 (2009) [Per J.
Nachura, Third Division], citing Gelindon v. De la Rama, G.R.
'
No. 105072, December 9, 1993, 228 SCRA 322, 326-327 [Per
J. Vitug, Third Division]]. In the past, questions similar to
these which this court ruled on immediately despite the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens' right to bear
arms [Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431
SCRA 534 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]], government
contracts involving modernization of voters' registration lists
[COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, 438 Phil. 72 {2002} [Per J.
(\ I"
'--' Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].], and the status and existence
of a public office [Buklod ng l<awaning EllB v. Zamora, 413
Phil. 281 (2001) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].]. 14
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Furthern1ore, in another case, the I-Iigh Tribunal held that:

xxx a strict application of the [hierarchy of courts] is


unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate
courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions. In
fact, Rule 41, Section 2(c) of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that a decision or order of the RTC may as it was
done in the instant case, be appealed to the Supreme Court
by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided
that such petition raises only questions of law.
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65)
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT
Page 11 j
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A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy


concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for the
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation
to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
whole situation. Thus, the test of whether a question is one
of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question
by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. 15
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TIMELINESS OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION

1. On 23 February 2017, Petitioner de Lilna learned about the


issuance of the questioned Order dated the saine day by the
respondent judge, which directed the issuance of an arrest warrant
against Petitioner. The one-paragraph body of the Order reads as
follows:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all


(
\~.- the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the
Court finds ,5ufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants
of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL
MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE PALISOC DAYAN.

2. A certified copy of the said Order dated 23 February 2017 is


attached as Annex 11 A". Petitioner also sought to obtain a certified
LTue copy of the Warrant of Arrest, but was inforni.ed that the court
does not release certified hue copies of the sani.e. Thus, a plain copy
of the Warrant of Arrest issued pursuant to the 23 February 2017 Order
is attached hereto as Annex "B."

2.1. In any case, considering the huge ni.edia interest


generated by the case at the court a quo, the questioned

"' ,.,,_ .,_ r .. 1..:- n~ .. nA~~lnn C:vnlnrnfnri11rn lnr h R l\ln 1 ~qr;~? l1inp 11 ?014. Emohasis supplied;
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 12
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

Order and Warrant of Arrest are within the public


knowledge, as shown by the attached news article, -......
appended hereto as A1111ex "C."

3. 1-Ience, this Petition is tin1ely filed within the sixty (60)-day


period prescribed under the Rules of Court to assail the above-stated
orders.

3.1. Siinultaneous with the filing of this Petition is the


payni.ent of docket and other legal fees.

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THE PARTIES

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4. LEILA M. DE LIMA is a Filipino, of legal age, a Senator of the
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Republic, and with office address at Roon1 502, Senate of the
Philippines, Jose W. Diokno Blvd., Pasay Cily. She ni.ay be served
with pleadings, orders and other processes in c01u1ection with this
case through her counsel at the address stated below.

5. Respondent JUDGE JUANITA TOMAS GUERRERO is being sued


in her capacity as the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 204. She 1nay be served with sun1111ons and
other processes at the Muntinlupa City I-Iall of Justice, National Road,
1773 Tunasan, Muntinlupa City.
I
I
'
6. Respondent PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ("PEOPLE"] are the
plaintiffs in the 'case of People of the Philippines v. Leila M. de Li-rna, et al.
for alleged illegal drug hading, docketed as Crilninal Case No. 17-165
pending before Regional Trial Court- Muntinlupa City, Branch 3,
presided over by Respondent Judge. The People are represented in
this I-Ionorable Court by the Office of the Solicitor General with
address at No. 134 An1orsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City where
the People n1ay be served with suni.ni.ons and other processes.
--
7. Respondent DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA ["PNP
Chief"] is being i1npleaded in his capacity as the Chief of the
Philippine National Police, tasked to enforce the arrest warrant
issued against Peli honer de Lirna. 1-Ie 1nay be served sun1ni.ons and
other processes at NHQ-PNP, 3..c1 Floor Gen. Delos Reyes St., Can1p
Crame, Quezon City.

_;_
'
ii.

PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 6:1) Page 13


De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

8. Respondent PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS is being


in1pleaded in his capacity as Director of the PNP Headquarters !i
Support Service, which is in charge of the PNP Custodial Service Unit.
I-Ie 111ay be served sun1111ons and other processes at Can1p Cran1e,
Quezon City.
.!
9. Respondent SUPT. ARNEL JAMANDRQN. APUD is being
in1pleaded in his capacity as Chief of the PNP Custodial Service Unit.
'
It is the unit to which the respondent judge co1ninitted the person of :/
the Petitioner, and the unit in charge of the PNP Custodial Center.
fle 111ay be served sun1n1ons and other processes at Can:1p Crani.e,
Quezon City.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND OF THE CASE _,_ i


'

10. On 21 Noven1ber 2016, a DOJ Panel of Investigators (Chair


- Senior Asst. State Prosecutor Peter Ong; Men1bers - Senior Asst.
City Prosecutor Alexander Rainos, Senior Asst. City Prosecutor Leila
Llanes, Senior Asst. City Prosecutor Evangeline Viudes-Canobas, and
Asst. State Prosecutor Editha Fernandez) issued Subpoenas to
Petitioner, which ordered Petitioner to obtain on 2 Dece1nber 2016
copies of the con1plaint and other supporting evidence in the
following cases:
I'
I

i',
a) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled Volunteers against
Crfrne and Corruption (VACC), represented by Dante Jimenez
versus Senator Leila M. de Linza et al.;
T
b) NPS XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled Reynaldo Esrneralda and
Ruel Lasala versus Senator Leila M. de Lima et al.;
'

c) NPS XVI-INV-161<-00331, entitled ]aybee Nino Sebastian,


represented by his wife Roxanne Sebastian, versus Senator
Leila M. de Lima et al.; and

d) NPS XVI-INV-16-K-00336, entitled National Bureau of


Investigation (NBI) versus Senator Leila M. de Lirna et al.

11. During the hearing on 2 Dece1nber 2016, through her


:I
'
authorized representative, Petitioner secured copies of the con1plaints
and their attachn1ents in the afore-cited four (4) cases. During the

:1
I
I
II
:J
'i
7"--
!
I:
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 14 I

De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.


SUPREME COURT

san1e hearing, a Supple1nental C01nplaint was filed by VACC,


through its lawyer, Atty. Eduardo Bringas.

12. Still during the saine hearing on 2 Decen1ber 2016,


Petitioner filed her Omnibus Motion. to Irmnediately Endorse the Cases to
the Office of the Otnbudsman and for the Inhibition. of the Panel of
Prosecutors and the SecretanJ of justice, a copy of which (sans Annexes)
is attached as Annex 11 D 11 In the On1.nibus Motion, the counsel for
Petitioner entered "his special and lindted appearance in these cases for the
purpose of filing th.e in.shmt Omnibus Motion, and for any possible hearing
and/or pleading lhat rnay be required in relation to this motion."

12.1. In the n1ain, Petitioner argued in that Ornnibus Nlotion


that:

(.,_. a. The investigation of the cases is within the exclusive


a~1thority and sole jurisdiction of the Office of the
On1budsn1anl6; and

b. Considering the evident partiality, bias and lack of


ii
objectivity of the Secretary of Justice 17 and the panel of
investigating prosecutorsrn in these cases, these
officials should inhibit the1nselves and instead refer
the cases to the Office of the 0111buds111an. 19 A copy of
ii
I
a con1pilation of the reported acts and public :1
pronouncen1ents of Secretary Agu1rre, which was
attached as Annex "C" to the Ornnibus Motion is
~-
attached herewith as Annex "D-1".

13. On 9 Decen1ber 2016, a hearing was set on the Oninibus


Motion. In attendance were Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Eduardo --
if
1
'I

Bringas on behalf of con1plainants VACC (LS. No. INV-16}-00313)


and Reynaldo Es1neralda and Ruel Lasala (I.S. No. INV-16}-00315).
The Chainnan of the Panel, I-:Ion. Peter Ong, was on official leave and
the hearing was presided temporarily by Asst. City Prosecutor Alex
Ran1os.

13.1. During the said hearing, Petitioner's counsel reiterated


the prayer for the in1111ediate lTansfer of the cases to the

16 -~-
See pages 3 to 11 of the Omnibus Motion, attached as Annex "D" hereof. I
17 I
See pages 11to16 of the Omnibus Motion, attached as Annex "D" hereof, and Annex "C" of said
Omnibus Motion (a compilation of the reported acts and public declaration of Secretary Aguirre) I
I
attacl1ed as Annex "D-1" hereof.
11 "-"'"'1 ___ -.t.-1< ....... L... .... ...J """" f\..,,,...,.,,v "n" horonf ,,
,,'i

I
'
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERT~ORARI (Rule 65) Page 15
Oe Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

OffiCe of the On1budsn1an. Atty. Bringas then filed his


joint Cormnent/Opposition to the Omnibus Motion.
Thereafter, respondent DOJ Panel gave Petitioner a non-
extendible period of three (3) days or until 12 Decen1ber
2016 within which to sub1nit her reply to Atty. Bringas'
con1111ent/ opposition.

13.2. Likewise, during that hearing, Petitioner's counsel 111ade


an oral n1anifestation to the Panel, seeking to defer
further proceedings, including the sub1nission of
Petitioner's counter-affidavit, pending resolution of the
-- !

above stated Ornnibus Motion. Instead of ruling on the


I
san1e, respondent DOJ Panel required the Petitioner to I
sub111it on or before 12 Dece111ber 2016 a written n1otion to
that effect to allow the other parties to co1n1nent thereto.
\..
14. On 12 Decen1ber 2016, in con1pliance with the directive of
the DOJ Panel, Petitioner filed her Reply to the joint
Cmmnent/Opposition filed by con1plainants VACC (LS. No. INV-16]-
I
00313) and Ruel Lasala and Reynaldo Esn1eralda (LS. No. INV-16}- i
00315). At the san1e tin1e, Petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion --"--
l:o First J<,esolve Pending Incident and to Defer Further Proceedings.

15. On 21 Decen1ber 2016, a hearing was conducted on the


aforesaid four (4) cases. All of the respondents therein were either
personally present or were duly represented by their respective
I
counsels, except respondent R01u1ie Dayan who failed to appear. ,I
\
Petitioner's counsel invited the attention of the DOJ Panel to the
unresolved Onu1ibus Motion and Urgent Motion to Defer
Proceedings and cited the sa1ne as basis of the decision not to subrnit,
in the 111eanti111e, Petitioner's Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner asked for
the resolution of the san1e so that Petitioner will be guided on the
proper course to take. The DOJ Panel agreed and stated that they will
resolve all n1otions before the end of the hearing. In the 111eantin1e, . '' --
the DOJ Panel called on the individual respondents for the
subn1ission of their respective counter-affidavits, to wit: '!

15.1. During the san1e hearing, Solicitor General Jose Calida


entered the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor,
allegedly in its capacity as the Tribune of the People and
offered to act as counsel for the V ACC and con1plainants
Ruel Lasala and Reynaldo Es1neralda.
I
---1--
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 16
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

15.2. Respondent DOJ panel 111ade the following ruling ,J__


towards the end 0 the hearing on 21Decen1ber2016:

a. Peter Co, Vicente Sy and Jojo Baligad's request for


additional tin1e to sub1nit counter-affidavit was
denied;

b. Rainier Cruz was given until 27 Decen1ber 2016 to


file his counter-affidavit;

c. Jaybee Sebastian was directed to sub1nit a duly


subscribed counter-affidavit until 27 Decen1ber
2016;

d. Respondents with no counter-affidavits, including f!

!
Petitioner, will no longer be allowed to belatedly
~ . subn1it their counter-affidavits; and

e. The case was declared sub1nitted for resolution and


all pending incidents will be resolved together with
the 111erits of the case in one resolution.

16. Petitioner's counsel 1nade an oral request for


reconsideration. The san1e was orally denied. When Petitioner's
counsel inquired if a written order will be issued, the DOJ Panel
stated that they see no need for the san1e and will just resolve all --
I

pending incidents.

( 17. Aggrieved by the grave abuse of discretion con1111itted by


the DOJ Panel, Petitioner filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibition
and Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Court. It is currently pending
with the Special 6Lh Division of the Court of Appeals. A copy of the
petition in that case is attached as Annex "E".

18. On 17 February 2017, an Inforn1ation for illegal drug


trading against Petitioner de Lin1a was filed with the court a quo. A _;_
copy of the Inforn1ation is attached as Annex "F." The said
Infonnation was based on the findings and conclusions of the DOJ
Panel contained in a Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2017. A copy
of the said Joint Resolution is attached as Annex "G."

18.1. The Inforn1ation charges Senator de Lin1a, Rafael Ragos


and R01u1ie Dayan of illegal drug lTading punishable
under Section 5, in relation to Section 3 Qj), Section 26 (b)
,....r"'\ I' T"\ 1 1' A .1 l\T_ l\'1/.'.C: ff""'~ .,..,. ..,..,,....1..,,....,-,C'.j"tTO
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 17
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), com1nitted allegedly as


follows:

18.1.1. By citing acts that, on their face, constitute Direct


Bribery punished under the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:

"That within the period from November


2012 to March 2013, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of
the Department of Justice, and accused
Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, being then the
Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of -~

Corrections, by taking advantage of their


public office, conspiring and confederating
with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then an
employee of the Department of Justice
detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral
ascendancy or influence over inmates in the
New Bilibid Prison, did then and there
commit illegal drug trading, in the following
manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of
their power, position and authority, demand,
solicit and extort money from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to
support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in the
May 2016 election; xxx"(emphasis supplied)

18.1.2. And, thereafter, in the sa1ne In.forn1ation alleging


acts constituting the offense of engaging in illegal
drug hade, punished under R.A. No. 9165,
against drug convicts who are, for son1e dubious
reasons, not even charged:

"xxx by reason of which, the inmates,


not being lawfully authorized by law and
through the use of mobile phones and other
electronic devices, did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous
--- 1

drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De


Lima, Through Ragos and Dayan, the
proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to
Five Million (PS,000,000.00) Pesos on 24
l\lm1omhor ?01? l=h!P Million (PS.000.000.00)

----
i
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 18
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

Hundred Thousand (Pl00,000.00) Pesos


weekly "Tara" each from the high profile
inmates in the New Bilibid Prison." (Emphasis
supplied)

18.1.3. I-Ience, by charging two different offenses against


two different sets of offenders in one Inforn1ation,
the Infonnation 1nakes it appear that it is
charging Petitioner with violation of R.A. No. .. .

9165, even though the 1naterial factual allegations,


on their face, constitutes, at best, Direct Bribery.

18.2. The alleged illegal drug lTading happened during the


period of Noven1ber 2012 to March 2013 and allegedly
carried out through then DOJ Secretary de Lin1a's alleged
intern1ediaries Ronnie Dayan and Rafael Ragas.

19. In the afternoon of 20 February 2017, just a couple of hours


after the raffle of the case to the court a quo, Petitioner pron1ptly filed
---1---
!1
,,I'
a Motion to Quash, 111ainly raising the issue of the court's lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged against Petitioner, the DOJ
Panel's lack of authority to file the Infonnation, that the Inforn1ation
charges 1nore than one offense, and that the allegations and the
recital of facts, both in the In.fon11ation and in the resolution, do not
allege the corpus delicti of the charge of violation of R.A. 9165.

In the san1e Motion, Petitioner likewise placed on record


20.
l
'- son1e of her observations that, at any rate, the evidence on record
does not justify the filing of the subject case in court. A copy of the ---
Motion to Quash is attached as Annex "I-I".

20.1. The said Motion to Quash was scheduled for hearing on 24


February 2017.

20.2. The DOJ Panel filed a Motion to Reset the above-scheduled


hearing to 3 March 2017. A copy of the said Motion is
attached as Annex 111."

21. I-Iowever, on 23 February 2017, despite the pendency of the


Motion to Quash, which seriously in1pugns the jurisdiction of the
court and incidentally prays for a suspension of the proceedings in
the 1neantin1e,. the respondent judge issued the questioned Order
-~- ... 1~~,.,1~ ~-1-.,.... ..... ., . . . .,,;larl TATn1'N111f nf Arnn:;f nrii-Pcl the sa111e day, was
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 19
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
-r~--
SUPREME COURT

issued. The saine acts of respondent judge were even attended with
undue haste and inordinate interest as there is still a Motion to Quash
that is yet to be resolved, and that she could not have 111ade a
personal detern1inalion of probable cause given the volu1ninous
records subn1itted by the prosecution and the likewise volun1inous
Motion to Quash filed by Petitioner. There is report that respondent
judge just arrived in her court a few hours fro1n a trip fron1 out of the
country.

22. In the ni.orning of 24 February 2017, the subject Warrant of


Arrest was served upon Petitioner by the ele1nents of the CIDG. She
is now currently detained at the PNP Custodial Center located in
Can1p Cran1e, Quezon City, in accordance with the Order issued by
respondent judge con1111itting her to the Custodial Service Unit, a
copy of which is attached as Annex "J" to the Petition.

23. Later that san1e 1norning, during the'hearing set to hear the
Motion to Reset filed by the DOJ Panel, respondent judge defended
the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest despite her failure to first
consider and resolve the Petitioner's Motion to Quash, by 111aking the
gravely erroneous clailn that she had to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the Petitioner first before she could resolve her Motion to
Quash, to wit:
During Friday hearing, Executive Judge Juanita T. Guerrero, the
Presiding Judge of Muntinlupa Regional Trial Court Branch 204
explained that she has to acquire jurisdiction over De Lima
i before she could resolve her motion to quash.
\,,,_

Thus, she said she made a judicial determination of probable


cause to determine if there is a basis to issue a warrant for her
arrest. 20

-1-
24. Definitely dissatisfied with the acts and 0111issions of
respondent judge, which grossly violated her substantive and
procedural rights, that ani.ounted to grave abuse of discretion on the 1
part of respondent judge, Petitioner files this Petition for Certiorari
I
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. i

i
I

I__
.. ,......,.;
,,., ........... ,.. ,. , I - - w I . . I ... , , .~.. \., ..., ,., ; " .-.. /.' .,,. ,..,,,. \
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 20
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

f;
ISSUES

I. Whether respondent judge conunitted grave abuse of


discretion ainounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the questioned Order and Warrant of
Arrest both dated 23 February 2017, despite the
pendency of Petitioner's Motion to Quash that
seriously questions the very jurisdiction of the court.

II. Whether respondent judge co111111itted grave abuse of --,.__.


I

discretion a111ounting to lack Ol' excess of jurisdiction !

when she issued the assailed Ordel' and W anant of


Anest in clear violation of constitutional and
procedural rules on issuing an arrest warrant.

III. Whether respondent judge con1111itted grave abuse of


discretion a111ounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
when, without basis in fact and in law, respondent
judge found probable cause against Petitioner and
thereby issued an anest warrant against her.
__._

ARGUMENTS
1'
\,

25. Petitioner posits the following argtu11ents in support of the


instant Petition:

Respondent judge gravely abused her discretion,


which a111ounted to lack of jurisdiction, when she
issued the questioned Order and Warrant of AIrest '
- f.,' -

despite the pendency of Petitioner's Motion to '

Quash and despite the clear 111erits of the said


Motion that hnpugns the jurisdiction of the court.

II

RP~nondent iudire gravely abused her discretion,


PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 21
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

issued the questioned Order and Warrant of Arrest


in clear violatiqn of constitutional and procedural
rul~s on issuing an arrest warrant.

III

Considering that there is no substantive basis on


record in finding probable cause against Petitioner,
and in view of the series of flagrant irregularities in
the issuance of the prosecutor's resolution and the
1

filing of the Inforn.i.ation, 1espondent judge gravely


abused her discretion, which a111ounted to lack of
jurisdiction, when she issued the assailed Order
and Warrant of Arrest.

'- ....-~ IV

The DOJ Panel of Prosecutors' disregard of the


substance beyond forni.alities of a prelhninary
investigation a111ounts to a violation of the
Constitutional rights of the Petitioner as accused.

DISCUSSION

IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED .I


-:-:-:+~
l~) ORDER AND WARRANT OF
ARREST, RESPONDENT JUDGE
IGNORED A PENDING INCIDENT
AND EFFECTIVELY BRUSHED
ASIDE THE MERITS OF THE .
MOTION TO QUASH, WHICH
SERIOUSLY IMPUGNS THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT i

I
!
26. As discussed above, respondent judge proceeded to issue
the assailed Order and Warrant of Arrest on 23 February 2017, when
I
_.._
i
there was still a pending Motion to Quash that was filed on 20
February 2017, and that the said Motion was still set for hearing on 24
February 2017. The prosecution even filed a n1otion to reset the said
I
hearing to a ni.uch later date, i.e., to March 3, 2017, thus negating any
notion of urgency on the part of the prosecution. Inarguably, the said
n1()Jinn w::-i.c:: .c::till nrndirnr and unresolved at the tin1e the questioned
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule !,55) Page 22 +
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

acts of respondent judge were 111ade. There is, therefore, an obvious


and undue haste and inordinate interest on the part of respondent to
issue the i111pugned Order and Warrant of Arrest. In fact, nothing was
even said of the Motion to Quash in the one-paragraph text of the
Order.

27. As stated above, the respondent judge claiined that she had
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the Petitioner first before
she could resolve her Motion to Quash.
-- I

28. This patently erroneous claini. violates the basic principle


that the court n1ust first resolve the issue of lack of jurisdiction before
issuing a Warrant of Arrest, because such act is itself an exercise of
I
jurisdiction, which forces the accused to seek affinnative relief fron1
the very court whose jurisdiction she is assailing. :j
(
I
....
,
29. In the case of Miranda v. Tuliao,21 the Supren1e Court _J_._
explicitly distinguished between custody of the law and jurisdiction
over the person, stating that "[o]ne can be under the custody of the
law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a 111otion
before arraignn1ent to quash the warrant."

30. It likewise cited Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar


I-Ierrera, who wrote:

<.,_ Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court
to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to
dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of
the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule r I
112 of .tfie Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Revised .Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. .I

Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of


the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused
having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254
SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary
of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary {[301 SCRA
298]}, the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the
dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. [Oscar Herrera, ----
'
Remedial Law, Vol. IV, pp. 38-39 (2001 ed.).]
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 23
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. --" -~
SUPREME COURT

31. In fact, the Supren1e Court has held that the very filing of a
Motion to Quash particularly puts the court on notice that it 111ight be
about to deprive an iiu1ocent person of her liberty, thus 111aking it
in1perative for the court to act with judicious deliberation. Failing to
act with the required prudence is, in the words of the I-Ionorable
Court, a 111istake that cmu1ot be condoned, to wit:
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued
a warrant for the arrest of the petitioners, including, Mr. Ben
Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash,
Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation raising
among others the issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a
member of the board of directors. With the filing of the
motion, the judge is put on alert that an innocent person may
have been included in the complaint. In the Order dated 13
November 1998, in denying the motion to quash, Judge
Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
I
\ _,.
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider
facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which
do not appear on the face of the information because said
motion is hypothethical admission of the facts alleged in
the information xx x. (citations omitted.) .....,......__.._

We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent


judge since it was at the expense of liberty. This cannot be
condoned.

xxx xxx xxx

(,_ An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure


of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not
to be intruded by the State. 22

I
32. More in1portantly, as the court a quo has no jurisdiction I

--~-
over the subject case, as extensively explained in the Motion to Quash,
the questioned Order and Warrant of Arrest is a patent nullity. In the
case of Leonor v. Court of Appea.ls,23 the Supren1e Court ruled that:

A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It


cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any

22 Citations omitted.
23
G.R. No. 112597. April 2, 1996. In the US case of Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Ov.App.,
80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092, it was held that:
"One which from its inception is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy,
ineffectual to bind parties or support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of
confirmation, ratification, or enforcement in any manner or to any degree. Judgment is a "void
" r - '-- ---..l---..l : .. ..J-~~~+ 1~.-1,,..,.1 ;,.,;rrli,..tirm "ftho c11hii>rt m;:iltpr nr nf thP. oarties.
1_:
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 24
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims


-~~-
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never ,j
I

become final and any writ of execution based on it is void; x x x ;!

it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an


outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it !

exhibits its head.

33. In the Motion to Quash, Petitioner argued that it is the


Sandigabanyan, not the Regional Trial Court, that has jurisdiction
over the subject offense allegedly con1111itted by Petitioner, who was
the DOJ Secretary at all tilnes n1aterial to the Infonnation.
---~~-
34. One .of the grounds for the quashal of an Infonnation is
that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Section 3 (b), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
' (,
Section 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged;

35. In the case at bar, the Infonnation charges the accused of -


con1111itting the following acts:
\ __. That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in
the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then
the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accused
Rafael Marcos Z. Ragas, being then the Officer-In-Charge of
the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of their public
office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P.
Dayan, being then an employee of the Department of Justice _._.,.,,.__
detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or
influence over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and
there commit illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De
Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position and
authority, demand, solicit and extort money from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the
Senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; xxx. 24

_, .. ......,___

i[
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI {Rule 65) Page 25
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT
,I
.I
36. The Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2017, upon which
the Inforn1ation is based, states under paragraph 2 of page 3 that:

The personalities and exalted positions held by the parties


make the present complaints an extraordinary and exceptional
narco-politics story. Officials entrusted with governmental ...
powers, abuse and misuse their authority not only for I
illegitimate gain and personal aggrandizement, but in I
furtherance of their vicious agenda and political ambitions. i
Even the most ideological leader in spiritual realm can be
manipulative by means of the pervasive fallacy of power and
indulged in onslaught drugs and corruption issues [sic]. 25

37. As to the NBP inn1ates, the Infonnation alleges, as follows:

\__..
... [B]y reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully
authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and
-r-
other electronic devices, did then and there wilfully and I .

unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter I


give and deliver to De Lima, Through Ragos and Dayan, the
proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million
(PS,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(PS,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos weekly "Tara" each i

from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison. I


I

I
38. On the basis of such actual allegations, the Inforn1ation
-+
I

charges the accused with violation of Section 3 Qj), Section 26 (b) and
\ Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9165.
'-

39. In the allegations and recital of facts, it is stated that the


position of the accused as Secretary of Justice was used in relation to
the alleged criininal acts, specifically that she de111anded, solicited
and extorted n1oney ro1n the New Bilibid Prison ("NBP") Inn1ates
through her ?-lleged intern1ediaries/ bagn1en, nan1ely, Ragas and
Dayan.

40. Fron1 the following, it is apparent that the acts allegedly


co1n1nitted by the accused are distinct fron1 the cha1-ges actually
levied against her. For while the Infonnalion invokes her
participation in the illegal drug hade, the recital of inculpatory facts
only 1nentions that she has allegedly de111anded, solicited, and
extorted 111011ey fro1n the NBP inn1ates. Glaringly absent fron1 the
-
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 26
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. ,,
SUPREME COURT

I.,.'I
Ii
recital of facts is any allegation of actual or even in1plied con1plicity JI

of the accused in the illegal drug bade, as it does not even allege, for 11
/1
1:
instance, that the accused gave instTuctions to the NBP inn1ates to
gather the n1oney that she den1anded fr0111 the illegal drug trade.
/i
11

41. Distinct fron1 the alleged acts of den1anding, soliciting, and /i

extorting inoney, therefore, are the various crin1inal activities


r-- 1;
I'
attributed to the NBP in1nates, including their participation in the 11

/;
illegal drug bade. There is no allegation, 11u1ch less proof fro111 the
records that would show that the crhninal activities of the NBP I/
II
huuates were participateq in by the accused. /1
11
1!
I!
42. In other words, nowhere does the Inforn1ation allege that /1

there was unity of action and purpose between the accused on the
one hand, and the NBP in1nates on the other. On the contrary, the
(
\ Infonnation itself is unequivocal that the alleged acts and purpose of
the accused are distinct fron1 those of the NBP inn1ates.
1!
!j
43. Therefore, as there is no allegation, n1uch less proof of t1
actual participation in the illegal drug bade, the proper designation 11

for any alleged den1and, solicitation, and extortion of governn1ent II


officials and pers01u1el would be direct bribery under Article 210 of the i
Revised Penal Code. i
IiI
44. Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that:

( Art. 210. Direct bribery. - Any public officer who shall agree
to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the I
performance of this official duties, in consideration of any 1i-
offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, ,I
,1
personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer 1
the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum 11

periods and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and]
not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the i
penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same /I
shall have been committed. I
I:
I!
II
45. Direct bribery exists when the following ele1nents are i/
present: /.
11

First, that the offender be a public officer within the


scope of Art. 203.
i
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65)
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
Page 27 Ii
ii

.l
SUPREME COURT , . IrI

Second, that the offender accepts an offer or a pron1ise


I
or receives a gift or present by hin1se1 or through i!

another.
I
Third, that such offer or pron1ise be accepted or gift 11

or present received by the public officer with a view to I/


con11nitting son1e cri111e; or in consideration of the I:
execution of an act which does not constitute a crin1e, but i
I
the act 111ust be unjust; or to refrain fr01n doing son1ething i
_I
which it is her official duty to do. r"'"""'"
i
I
Lnst/11, that the act which the offender agrees to
perforn1 or which he executes be connected with the I
perfonnance of her official duties.

\,._. 4'6. Juxtaposing the recital of facts in the Infon11ation dated 17


February 2017 :against the above-enu1nerated requisite elen1ents
would show that the alleged violations in the instant case constitute
direct bribery, and not any alleged con1plicity in the illegal drug
trade.

47. First, the accused is a public officer as conten1plated under


Article 203, which provides that:

Art. 203. Who are public officers. - For the purpose of


applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of this
~- book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take
part in the performance of public functions in the Government
of the Philippine Islands, of shall perform in said Government
or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or
suborqinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be
a publ'ic officer.

48. Second, the lnforn1ation includes an1ong its allegation that


the accused has received inoney fron1 the NBP Inn1ates. As
explained in the Con1111entary of noted jurist Luis B. Reyes:

Gift is either (1) voluntarily offered by a private person, or (2)


solicited by a public officer.

Bribery exists, not only (1) when the gift is offered voluntarily
by ayrivate person, or (2) when the gift is solicited by a public
I I-- :.1. ..__ "-h"' -1---
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 28


De L1i11a v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

public officer, but also (3) when the gift is solicited by a public
officer;, as the consideration for his refraining from the
performance of an official duty and the private person gives
the gift for fear of the consequences which would result if the
officer performs his functions (Dec. of Nov. 3, 1879, Sup. Ct.
Spain, cited in People vs. Sope, 75 Phil. 810) 26

49. Third, it is also alleged that the 111oney is given in exchange


for special considerations and/ or protection inside the NBP.

50. Lastly, the In.fornl.at-i.on also alleged facts that relate the
special consideration/ protection to be a function of the accused as
Secretary of Justice.

51. On the lJasis of the Panel of Prosecutors' own findings, it


I

(__, is clear that the. ct,~itne allegedly co111111itted is Direct Bribery. I


::i; l '
~
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. I.
I:
52. Section. 4 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 1606, as I
I
an1ended, provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive I'
original jurisdiction in the following cases: I
11

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -The Sandiganbayan shall exercise


exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: r
1- !
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, I

otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, I


.i
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
\__ Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are offic\als occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the


positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position -r;-
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically 1!

/i
including: 1!

I!
xxx xxx xxx

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed


with other crimes committed by the public officials and
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 29
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

employees mentioned in subsection (a} of this section in


relation to their office. 27

53. Repuhlic Act ("RA") No. 6758, on the other hand, provides i
--,..,.--
ii
that the posilio1: of the Secretary of Justice is assigned the Salary 11
I
I'
G raL:l e o f- "3'1" '
'" , v1.z.:

Section 8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and their


Equivalent. - Pursuant to Section 17, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, the salary of the following officials shall be in I
I!
accordance with the Salary Grades indicated hereunder: i1

11

!1!
xxx xxx xxx
I
, 1
,!

GRADE 31 - This Grade is assigned to Senators and Members


of the House of Representatives and those with equivalent
-- iI
11

!!
,i',
ii
rank as follows: the Executive Secretary, Department lj
Secretary, Presidential Spokesman, Ombudsman, Press
Secretary, Presidential Assistant with Cabinet Rank,
Presidential Adviser, National Economic and Development
AuthoriW Director General, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice,
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice, Secretary of the Senate,
Secretary of the House of Representatives, and President of
the University of the Philippines. 28

54. Fron1 the foregoing provisions, it is beyond debate that the


acts allegedly con1111itted by the Petitioner constih1te an offense
( exclusively cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, considering that:
-.._...

54.1. The inculpatory allegations in the In.fonnation


constitutes no offense other than Direct Bribery,
which is an offense defined and punished under
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code;

54.2.. The Petitioner, at the tin1e of the alleged


corn.ni.ission of the offense, was an official in the
"executive branch occupying [a position]
I
I
-11-
classified as Grade '27' and higher"; and 1 !
I

54.3. Furthennore, the crime alleged is clearly in relation


to the office of the accused, as the Inforn1ation I
I,
,., .- I - - ' - - - - ...... !...,,.. ..... ..-. ..... lif'\rJ ,I

I
I

1:-
I.
1 .

PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) I


Page 30
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

itself, in its recital of facts, states that it was done in


relation to her power, position, and authority as
. Secretary of Justice.

55. Assuming atguendo that the violation still relates to a


violation of R.A. 9165, the case ren1ains to be intin1ately c01u1ected
with the office of the accused because the role played by the accused
when she allegedly tried to collect the n.1oney fro1n the convicts, can
only be accon.1plished if she had influence, power, and position to
shield and protect those who sell, trade, dispense, deliver, distribute,
and transport dangerous drugs fron.1 being arrested, prosecuted, and
convicted. As such, subsection (A) in relation to subsection (B) of
Section 4 of PD 1606 still applies.

56. This is because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive original


jurisdiction over offenses or felonies other than those 1nentioned in
I
subsection (A) if the following conditions are 1net: II
--~-
11
First, the offense or felony is co1nn1itted by one of
those public officials and en.1ployees 1nentioned in 11

subsection (A) of Section 4 of PD 1606, which include,


among others, officials of the Executive Branch occupying
I
the positions of Regional Director and higher, othe1wise
classified as Grade '27' and higher of the Con1pensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758); and

Second, when the offense or felony was con11nitted in


relation to their office.

57. Based on the allegations in the Inforn1ation, the two (2)


aforen1entioned conditions are satisfied in the instant case.

58. As to the first condition, as previously discussed, the


position of the Secretary of Justice is given the Salary Grade level of
"31" under RA No. 6758.

59. As to the second condition, it is necessary that the offense


or felony be c01nn1itted in relation to their office. This was explained
in the case of People vs. Sandiganbayan,29 where the I-Ionorable I
Supren1e Court ruled that "as long as the offense charged in the o.,_
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 31
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT .:r- i

inorrnation is intin1ately c01u1ected with the office and is alleged to


have been perp,etrated while the accused was in the perforn1ance,
though in1proper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal 111otive to con1111i t the crin1e and had the accused not have
con1111itted it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held
to have been indicted for an offense con11nitted in relation to his

o ice.II

60. To bolster this clailn, People vs Sandiganbayan3 is


instructive, wherein the Supren1e Court held that:

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision


shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandi'ganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379
\',_ ~'
or Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but
also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office.
The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are
limited only to those that are committed in relation to the
public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as
long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there
being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the
accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid
office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an
offense committed in relation" to his office. (underscoring
\ supplied)

In expounding the ineaning of offenses deemed to have been


61.
cmmniUed in relation to office, the Supre1ne Court:
-~,.....___
.I
II

... elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense


committed in relation to [an accused's] office" by referring to i:
I,.

the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49


{1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be
considered as committed in relation to the accused's office if
"the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the
office [is] a constituent element of the crime xx x." In People
v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said
that "although public office is not an element of the crime of

,.., __ , ,...., _ _,_, __ 1 --...I n-1~~..J- n/,....,,.. r:o f\lr. 1 (.;Q()()A 1 i:;
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 32
Oe Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

11
murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may
show that:

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately


connected with [the accused's] respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accusedJ had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices.
xx x11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 31

62. Furthern1ore, in People vs. Montejo32, the Supren1e Court


ruled:

... that a public officer commits an offense in relation to his


( office if he perpetrates the offense while performing, though
in an improper or irregular manner, his official functions and
he can'not commit the offense without holding his public
office. In such a case, there is an intimate connection between
the o'ffense and the office of the accused. If the information
alleges the close connection between the offense charged and
the office of the accused, the case falls within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. {underscoring supplied).

63. Fron1 the Infonnation and Joint Resolution, it is clearly


adn1itted that the offense allegedly comn1itted was done in relation to
the office. I-Jenee, the second condition is likewise fulfilled. Therefore,
(
the Sandiganbayan should exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction
over the case of the accused.

64. Furthern1ore, the Panel of Prosecutors erroneously insists


that the jurisdiction of the instant case should be before the Regional
Trial Court by vfrtue of Section 90 of RA 9165, to wit:

Section :go. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate


special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts
in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of this Act. The number of courts
designated in each judicial region shall be based on the
population and the number of cases pending in their
respective jurisdiction.

3
l Ibid, citing Cunanan v. Arceo, G.R. No. 116615, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 88, citing Sanchez v .
~ r'"''"'"""r-rn" r.,1/1nn'J\l
,I

PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 33


De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

65. The Panel of Prosecutors alleges that its clain1 of exclusive


jurisdiction finds support in Section 28 of RA 9165, where n1axin1un1
penalties are in{posed on public official and employees. Section 28
provides:

Section 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and


Employees. - The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts
provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to
absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if
those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government
officials and employees.

66. A careful reading of the provision would show, however,


that Section 90 en1powers the Supren1e Court to designate between
and an1ong Regional Trial Courts the power to exclusively hear and
try drug cases that are already within the jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts. It does not purport to exclude the exercise of
jurisdiction by other Courts, such as the Sandiganbayan, over drug
cases if such cases fall within their exclusive original jurisdiction.

67. In the case of People of the Philippines vs Azarraga,33 the


I-Ionorable Supren1e Court, in deciding the propriety of Chapter V,
Section 9 of Adn1inislTative Order 03-8-02-SC that prescribed the
manner in which executive judges ni.ay reassign cases in instances of
inhibition or disqualification of judges sitting in special courts,
highlighted that Section 90 grants the Supren1e Court the power to , .... 1'~

assign an1ong the different Regional Trial Courts exclusive original


jurisdiction to try cases under RA 9165.

68. Fr01n the following, it is respectfully subn1itted that the


designation does not deprive other Courts, such as the
Sandiganbayan, of their jurisdiction over offenses or felonies falling
under their exclusive original jurisdiction. Rather, the provision
1nerely grants the Supren1e Court the authority to designate
parlicular branches of Regional Trial Courts in a judicial region to
exclusively try drugs cases to the exclusion of other branches of
sin1ilar Regional Trial Courts.

69. The repealing clause of RA 9165 (quoted below) never


divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiclion over violations of said
law, where such are con1111itted by the public officials enun1erated in
Section 4(a) of PD 1606, as ani.ended, in relation to their public office:
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 34.
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

Section 100. Repealing Clause. - Republic Act No. 6425, as


amended, is hereby repealed and all other laws,
administrative orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provision of this Act, are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly. 34 {Emphasis supplied and
underscoring)
'

70. Clearly, it was only RA 6425, which was expressly repealed


by RA 9165. Other laws inconsistent with the Act were 111erely
generally repealed. A general repealing provision is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a substantial
conflict n1ust be found in existing and prior acts.35 This situation falls
under the category of an in1plied repeal.

Tl. It is a well-settled principle in statutory conshuction that


in1plied repeals of stalute are not favored. The Honorable Supren1e
I
' Court ruled that. "repeals by in1plication are not favored, and will not
be decreed unless it is ina11ifest that the legislature so intended. As
laws are presu1ned to be passed with deliberation with full
knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that .in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere
with or abrogate any fonner law relating to son1e ii1atter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear
and convincing, and flowing necessarily fron1 the language used,
unless the later act fully e1nbraces the subject matter of the earlier, or
unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed.
I-Ience, every effort n1ust be used to n1ake all acts stand and if, by any
reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier."36

72. In the instant case, it is clear that the legislature did not
intend to hansfer the jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165
con1n1itted by officials rnentioned in Section 4(a) of PD 1606, as
ainended, in relation to their public office to the regional trial courts
because if it did, it could ha.ve expressly stated so in RA 9165. It did
not.

73. Moreover, the lwo provisions are not inconsistent with


each other, rather it can be harni.onized. It can be conshued that
Section 90 will only apply, ineaning the drug cases will be heard by . J_
Ii
special courts, if they fall witlun the jurisdiction of the regional trial I'

11

i
~,, Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
v; n A------ .... rl"'I,, r n 1\1,.., 1rv"Jno""l 11 n ..................... h,....,.. 1nn"'l
I

i
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. '11

PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65)


De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et at.
SUPREME COURT
Page 35 .
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courts, without prejudice to the provision of the Section 4(b) of PD


1606, as an1ended.

74. The Panel of Prosecutors' clain1 that the existence of Section


28 is proof that the Regional Trial Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction is e:rroneous. This is because Section 28 n1erely provides
the penalty that n1ay be in1posed by the Courts covering govern1nent
personnel and e1nployees. It does not have any direct relationship to
Section 90 on jurisdiction.

75. Jurisdiction over the instant case should, therefore, be with


the Sandiganbayan.

76. Thus, given the circumstances, had it not been for the grave
abuse of discretion con1111itted by respondent judge, either (a) the
crin1inal case should have been dis1nissed as there is no probable .I
cause against Petitioner, or, at the very least, (b) the proceedings, :I
I
including the issuance of arrest warrant against Petitioner, should 11

have been held in abeyance during the pendency of the petition for
review with the DOJ Secretary. _L i

,,
11

i!
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RESPONDENT JUDGE GROSSLY ,,
:i
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ii
VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL 11

AND PROCEDURAL RULES ON THE Ii


ISSUANCE OF AN ARREST II
ii

WARRANT.
l
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77. The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
i
1!
1"- .
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their Ii,

persons, houses, papers, and effects against


unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
'search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except"
.upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
{emphasis supplied)

78. On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of Rule 112 of


.j
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11
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 36 11
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De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
11
SUPREME COURT

' :/

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By .,......__


:1
11
the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from ,1
,,11
1i
the filing of the complaint or information, the judge if
Ii
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the !iI
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may i
Ii
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record l1
I
1

I'

clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds i

probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a II


l
commitment order if the accused has already been Ii
11
II
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge 1)

who conducted the preliminary investigation or when i'


the complaint or information was filed pursuant to 1:
11

section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence -~-~-


i
of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the
court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
( complaint of information. (emphasis supplied}

79. The requisites of a valid warrant of arrest are the following: Ii


II
Ii
a. It 1nust be based on probable cause; i'
1/
/,
b. The probable cause 1nust be detennined personally by 11

fl
the judge;
11
-~I
c. The detern1ination n1ust be n1ade after exa111ination
under oath or affir111ation of the con1plainant and the
\
wil11esses he n1ay produce;

d. It 111ust particularly describe the persons to be seized.37

80. In this case, requisites (a), (b), and (c) are utterly inissing.
1 The first requisite, as it touches on the substantive aspect of
,/
evaluating the evidence on record to detennine whether there is
actual basis to support a finding of probable cause, will be tackled
extensively. in the next section. This part of the discussion dwells on
-4-
the procedural irregularities and anon1alies co1n1nitted by respondent
judge.

81. First, respondent judge did not determine personally the i/


11
probable cause. In Soliven. v. Makasiar3B, this I-1onorable Court 1,

pronounced that: Ii
I~
11
11

ii
if
),
--r-
IiIi1'

/1
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 37


De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. I
SUPREME COURT

"What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and


personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the exist.ence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procei::lure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and :I
the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause."

82. Again, the one-paragraph body of the questioned Order


(
reads as fallows:

"After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and


all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the
Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants
of Arrest. against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA xxx"
(emphasis supplied)

83. The clear language itself of the foregoing text just shows i
that what was carefully evaluated supposedly by respondent judge I
were the Inforrnation and all evidence presented during the prelirninary -tr
'
\\ investigation of the case. It did not evidently comply with the .. /..
requiren1ent in Soliven that what should have been evaluated "'Was
the report and the supporting documents subrnitted by the prosecutor.

84. Obviously, th.e Infor1nation is not the sani.e as the "report",


nor the "evitjence presented at the stage of prelini.inary
investigation" equivalent to the" supporting docun1ents sub1nitted to
the court by the prosecutor." In the first place, the general class of
evidence presented during the preli1ninary investigation does not
necessarily correspond to the specific evidence finally used by the
Panel of Prosecutors in its Joint Resolution finding probable cause,
and subni.itted to respondent court together with the Inf~rn1ation. -- ~
i
.;1.
11 '
PETITION FOR PROHI~ITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 38 I;
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT ,. :1
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85. The docun1ents required to be studied by the judge to II'I
detern1ine probable cause were not the ones evaluated by her, based I
on the obvious wording of the questioned Order. 1:
i'
I!

85.1. Likewise noticeable is the brief length of the Order that i


faile,d to discuss the factual and legal issues concerning
substantive Inatters that touch on such aspects as the
t-- I

11

ad1nissibility and probative value of alleged evidence, 11

l.1

ani.ong others. It also failed to provide the rationale for


the decision that is necessary to allow the Petitioner to
seek necessary reni.edies as a consequence.

85.2. This palpable error breaches no less than the 1987


Constih1tion, which n1andates that "no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
I
~.,,' , and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based." 39

86. In Borlongan v. Pena,40 it is further ruled by the Supren1e


Court that:

What he is never allowed to do is to follow blindly the :I


:i1'

prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable j:


.1
cause. Much more is required by the constitutional 'I
11

provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the ii


1,
II
transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents
!/
supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although the extent I.
(,
of the judge's personal examination depends on the ii
circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on
the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is
because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the
-i- i
1:
Ii
certification standing alone but because of the records which i'
sustain it. He should even call for the complainant and the L
witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the Ii
circum,stances warrant. (emphasis supplied) ji
I:
i"~
87. By respondent judge's own ad1nission in the iinpugned l
Order, she did not evaluate the 11report, the affidavits, the transcript Ii
I

of stenographic notes if any, and other docum.ents supporting the /:


prosecutor's certification."

+
/!
i1!
1'

<O ,.._ -"'-- -.:-1- 11111 nf hn 1007 Dhilinnino (nnctih1tirm


I
i
I
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 39 ,
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. . '' 1;'
-~:
SUPREME COURT

88. Second, the detern1ination rnust be 111ade after exan1ination


under oath or affinnation of the c0111plainant and the wih1esses he
inay produce. This was not done likewise despite the following
Certification in the Infon11ation stating that:

"We hereby certify that a preliminary investigation has been ii


I

conducted' in this case in accordance with law and pursuant to


Department Orders No. 706 and 790; that we have, or as shown by
the record an authorized officer has, personally examined the
complainants and their witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn
+--
i

statements and other evidence submitted before us, there is


reasonable ground to believe that the crime charged has been
committed and accused are probably guilty thereof; that accused
were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against them and were given the opportunity to submit
controverting evidence" (emphasis supplied)
(
89. The foregoing Certification of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors
is a false certification. The DOJ Panel did not personally exan1ine the
witnesses for the con1plainants, as inost witnesses are Bilibid inn1ates,
who just testified before the House Com1nittee on Justice that
conducted a probe on the alleged proliferation of illegal drugs. They
were not presented during any of the hearings at the preli1ninary
investigation stage of the case. This is clear fro1n the DOJ Joint
Resolution itself, which reads in paragraph 3 of page 5 that:

The complaints stemmed from the affidavits and testimonies


of inmates and other resource persons given before the hearing on
(
the Proliferation of Drug Syndicates at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP)
conducted by the House of Representatives - Committee on Justice
{HOR-COJ) under the chairmanship of Representative Reynaldo V.
Umali. A separate hearing was conducted in a Senate Committee
chaired by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, with Espinosa and Dayan in
attendance. f.
'i

THERE IS UTTER LACK OF BASIS


FOR THE FINDING OF PROBABLE
CAUSE.

90. In Allado, the Supre1ne Court ordered the disn.1issal of the


crin1inal case and the quashal of arrest warrant noting the grave
abuse of discretion con.1111itted by the judge who failed to perforn1 her
._......,...__
duty in determ.ining probable cause against the accused. Thus:

,i
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 40
:1
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, (!t al.
SUPREME Cou1n . ~
1
Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of ~-

discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of Petitioners, it


appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did
he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their
incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification
of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he
would have found out that the evidence thus far presented, was
utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of Petitioners. [emphasis
supplied]

91. The standards in finding "probable cause" is expounded in


Baltazar v. People 41 that:

The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed


with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
\. accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
the offense charged in the Information, or any offense included
therein, has 'been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
In determin:ing probable cause, the average man weighs the facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules
of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence
that would justify conviction. The purpose of the mandate of the
judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the
i
\.,-~~ accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with
crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

92. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: I


SEC 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. iI
I
-.I--

xxx xxx xxx

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within (10) days froll] the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge"shcI
personally evaluate the resolution of the pr_p:secuto~
and its supporting evidence. He may iQ:lmedfate1\i"
dismiss the case if the evidence on recor4i'clearly-fails
to establish probable cause. If he finds_.J>robable
cause, he shall issue a warrant ~ arrest, or a
~
~

~
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1
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 41
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. , I

SUPREME COURT

commitment order if the accused had already been


arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who conducted preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to
Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
(5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of
the complaint or information.

The lnforination does not even allege the


specific idenfity of the dangerous drugs
traded under the schedule of dangerous _...,.{>lo.. ~"'

drugs enurnera.ted in RA 9165.


,
<. ,

93. A reading of the Infon11ation patently shows on its face the


failure of the prosecution to even allege the specific identity of the
dangerous dru~gs fro1n the schedule of dangerous drugs en11111erated
in RA 9165. Sh1ce the alleged dangerous drugs haded are not
specified, there iS even no way of knowing if they actually fall within
the definition of dangerous drugs as enu1nerated under the law. For
all we know, petitioner is being accused of trading in substances that
might not even fall within the schedule of dangerous drugs as
provided in RA 9165. In the first place, this general n1aiu1er of
alleging the identity of the object of the offense is not in accord with
the standard n1aiu1er, as shown in a n1yriad of Infonnations charging
violations of the Dangerous Drugq Act the resolutfon of which have
reached the I-Ionorable Court.

94. In the case of People v. Michael Ros~ et al. 42, the


lnfonnation dated March 28, 2006 filed against the appellants David
Navarro and Michael Ros specifically identified the dangerous drugs
involved, to wit:

That on or about the 16th day of March 2006 in the City of


Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and
-- 1

mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,


unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly sell and deliver one (1)
kilogram of marijuana, a dangerous drug, to P01 Jonie

,__,__
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 42
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

Domingo, a police poseur-buyer, without any license or


authority to do so, in violation of the aforecited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 43

95. Likewise, in the case of People v. Nacua44, the Inforn1ation


against the Nacua couple, filed before RTC-Branch 58 of Cebu City
on Nove1nber 8, 2005, reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of September 2005, at about


4:35 o'clockP.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with deliberate intent, and without authority of
law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur
buyer one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet of white
\~ crystalline substance, weighing 0.02 gram, locally known as
shabu, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. 45

96. In the instant case of petitioner, there is conspicuously


absent any inc'ulpatory allegation as to the sale and delivery of any
specified dxug, 1nuch less any allegation as to the dangerous or
illegal characte1 thereof or the quantity of the drugs subject of the
charge. All that the Infonnation alleges is that the convicted felons -
and not even herein Petitioner - l-rafficked dangerous drugs. Whether
these drugs fall under the schedule of dangerous drugs enu1nerated
,,_, under RA 9165 is anybody's guess. The point is that the Inforn1ation,
which is supposedly a recital of the ultilnate allegations of the < .~,....._..

prosecution charging the accused of an offense and its 1naiu1er of


con1ni.ission, keeps as guessing. The Information ni.erely alleges:

xxx by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully


authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and
other electronic devices, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter
give and deliver to De Lima, Through Ragos and Dayan, the
proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million
(PS,000,000.00} Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(P5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One

. i -
43
Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.
1
"' G.R. No. 200165, January 30, 2013.
. 11
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 43 I!
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. +--
SUPREME COURT \i
I
I
Hundred Thousand (Pl00,000.00) Pesos weekly "Tara" each
from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison. 46
I
I
97. In fact, even where the identity and illegal character of the !

drugs has been alleged, a 111ere ainbiguity in the allegation as to the


quantity of the. drugs is also fatal to an Infonnation, as held in the
case of People v. Posada47:

Before we proceed in discussing the guilt of the couple, we


must first take into account a discrepancy in the Information
for Criminal Case No. 3490. In the said information, the
accused-appellants were charged for selling 12 pieces of
transparent sealed plastic sachet of shabu. xxx

The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather than separately


charging Emily for the sale of the one sachet of shabu and
,
\.
__ charging both Emily and Roger for possession of the 12 sachets
of shabu, the public prosecutor lumped the charges together
to sale of 12 sachets of shabu. This is wrong. The Information
is defective for charging the accused-appellants of selling 12
sachets of shabu when, in fact, they should have been charged I
i
of selling one sachet of shabu and possessing 12 sachets of
/I
shabu .. From the evidence adduced, Emily and Roger never ;I
1!
sold the 12 sachets of shabu. They possessed them. Thus, they I.I
should have not been convicted for selling the 12 sachets of i
shabu. However, this was exactly what was done both by the
trial court and the CA. Without basis in fact, they convicted the I,:1
if
couple for selling the 12 sachets of shabu.
11
I

\ ...~-- ' Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a I
defective Information. An Information is fatally defective I
when it is clear that it does not really charge an offense or 11

when an essential element of the crime has not been I:


'I
:1
sufficiently alleged. In the instant case, while the prosecution -.~._.._-

\!
was able to allege the identity of the buyer and the seller, it i;1
failed to particularly allege or i.dentify in the Information the Ii
subject matter of the sale or the corpus delicti. We must 11
'.
if
remember that one of the essential elements to convict a
II),
person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify with certainty
II1,
the corpus delicti. Here, the prosecution took the liberty to
/1

lump:together two sets of corpora delicti when it should have I'


jl
separa.ted the two in two different informations. To allow the 1!
;1
1:
prosecution to do this is to deprive the accused-appellants of
.Ii'
their right to be informed, not only of the nature of the 'I

offense being charged, but of the essential element of the 1:


,1
I'

-16 Emohasis suoolied. ~


1:
I'
1'
I,
11
I
i

I
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 44
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

offense charged; and in this case, the very corpus delicti of


the crime.
t I
I
I

Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or


information, the court has no other recourse but to resolve
the ambiguity in favor of the accused. Here, since there exists
ambiguity as to the identity of corpus delicti, an essential
element of the offense charged, it follows that such ambiguity
must be resolved in favor of the accused-appellants. Thus,
from the foregoing discussion, we have no other choice but to
acquit the accused-appellants of sale of 12 sachets of shabu.

--~--

98. In this case, the defect .in the Inforn1ation is inuch worse
than n1ere an1biguity, as there is absolute absence of any allegation as
to both the identity of the drugs allegedly traded, or the quantity
thereof.
i
\.. _
_.,

99. 1-Ience, respondent judge could not have found probable


cause to issue a Warrant for the arrest of Petitioner where the
lnforn1ation failed to even allege the specific identity of the
dangerous drugs traded under the schedule of dangerous drugs
enun1erated in RA 9165, 1nuch less the quantity thereof. iI
___.;...., __

Since the lnfonnation does not allege the


specific identity and quantity of the :I
11
'i
dangerous drugs, necessarily there is also a I
,,ii
' (___ _ft1ilure l:o allege the corpus delicti of the :II

cri1ne charged
.,!

100. It is clear that the allegations and the recital of facts do not
provide the corpus delicti of the alleged cri1ne.

"l 00.1. Sedion 5 of RA 9165, provides that:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation,


Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and .!I

Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life


imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (PS00,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (Pl0,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to

ii
'!
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 45
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

another, dis.tribute dispatch in transit or transport any


dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

100.2. Instructive of Section 5 are the definitions of illegal


trafficking, sale, and hading, to wit:

Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, the


following terms shall mean:
I

JI

xxx xxx xxx

(r) Illegal Trafficking. - The illegal cultivation, culture,


delivery, administration, dispensation,
manufacture, sale, trading, transportation,
<, ~
distribution, importation, exportation and
possession of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical.
xxx xxx xxx

.: (ii) Sell. - Any act of giving away any dangerous drug


and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other
consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
~'.".""""

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal 1

(
trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text
messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way
radios, internet, instant messengers and chat
rooms or acting as a broker in any of such
transactions whether for money or any other I

1
consideration in violation of this Act."

100.3. The participation of the accused is qualified under


Section 26 (b), which provides that:

Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. - Any attempt or


conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall
be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the
commission of the same as provided under this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 46
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT I:,
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(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation of any
~
11

dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and


essential chemical;" Il
101. In the prosecution of crin1inal cases, it is necessary for the
Information or Con1plaint to provide the corpus delicti of the crin1e
I
T-
that is alleged to have been coni.ni.itted. I-Ience, in the case of Yadao
vs. People of the Pltilippines,48 the I-Ionorable Supren1e Court held
~
!
that: 1
~
~

Basic is the principle in criminal law that the evidence 1


presented must be sufficient to prove the corpus delicti - the
body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers
to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. The
corpus delicti is a compound fact composed of two things: 1)
\ the existence of a certain act or a result forming the basis of
"'-~"

the criminal charge, and 2) the existence of a criminal agency


as the cause of this act or result. 30 In all criminal prosecutions,
the burden is on the prosecution to prove the body or
substance of the crime xxx.

xxx xxx xxx


I
102. In relation to the violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the case
of People of the Philippines vs. Clfrnaco,49 citing People of the I:
Philippines vs. Roble,so stipulates that the corpus delicti in cases I i

involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous drug I


itself, hence: 11

i
Ji

Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved +I--


,,
to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The
corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous .drugs is the
presentation of the dangerous drug itself. 51

ti
11I
I'

--~-
11
11
11
11
18
' G.R. No. 150917, 27 September 2006. 11
9 11
" G.R. No. 199403, 13 June 2012. 11
i!
1
~
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 47 1!
I
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
Surr~EME COURT


I
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103. In the case of People of the Philippines vs Capalads2 , the Ii
"
r
elen1ents for the violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, n1ore specifically 1:
,ii

the sale of illegal drugs are:

a. the identities of the buyer and the seller, the


object, and the consideration; and

b. the delivery of the thing sold and the payn1ent


for it.

104. Noting Section 3 Qj), it is also necessary to require the


existence of eleclTonic devices that are used for drug trafficking or
brokering.

105. In relation to conspiracy provided under Section 26 (b),


Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code is instructive. Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 8. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felony.

Conspir,acy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only


in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty
therefor.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an


agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.
I
\.. ..
xxx xxx xxx

106. For there to be conspiracy, it is necessary that there be -.-f.... H __

"concurrence of will" or "unity of action and purpose." 53 In relation


to the sale of illegal drugs, the conspiracy to sell is highlighted by the
concerted conduct that shows the c01n1non design to deal with illegal
drugs.5 4

107. The following cases, where the conviction of the accused


for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26 was affirn1ed by the
Supre1ne Court, are inslTuctive on the requisite elen1ents of the crin1e
that m.ust be alleged in the Inforn1ation:

01
People v. Copa/ad, GJ\. No. 184174, 7 April 2009, citing People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, 28 July
2008.
r,:i: n
1 . r.i. - nL'"--'--- - n .. ..J~.,..Jr o ~1~ I '1C:7'.l1 :in l11no 1071
!
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65)
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
Page 48 I
SUPREME COURT

107.1. A conviction for atternpted sale of illegal drugs was


affirn1ed upon showing that the elen1ents for the sale of
}-
illegal drugs have been proven albeit the sale not being /
consun1111ated as a result of the police introducing
then1selves and arresting the accused.SS

107.2. Conviction was also affinned on the basis of an


Inforn1ations that contained 111aterial allegations that
provided the identities of the buyer and the seller, the
object, the consideration, the delivery of the thing sold
and the payni.ent for it, as well as the acts showing their
conspiracy.56

108. A reading of the foregoing provisions of law and case law


would show that the violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26 (b)
(~, under RA 9165, necessitates proof of the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; the delivery of the thing
sold and the pay1nent for it, including the allegation of conspiracy to
sell dangerous drugs. In other words, it requires allegation and
proof of the corpus delicti of the case.

109. The Panel of Prosecutors 1nay not sin1ply bypass the


requiren1ent of alleging and proving the essential ele1nents of the
crin1e of violation of Section 5 by the n1ere expediency of 1naking the
absurd clain1 that the offense of "trading" does not require a corpus
delicti where there has been an ad1nission. This is absurd, especially
'
\. considering that herein Petitioner never adn1itted to being involved
in the drug l-rade.
--v:,

110. Regardless of whether or not there has been an adn1ission,


proof of illegal trafficking - i.e., who were the buyers and the sellers,
what kind Ol' type of illegal substance or drug was h'aded for which
consideration, how was the object sold and paid 01, etc. - is still
required because lTading, by its very definition, still involves illegal --r-
1
trafficking. Illegal trafficking, in turn, 1neans the illegal cultivation,
culture, delivery, adn1inisnation, dispensation, 1nanufacture, sale,
trading, l-ransportation, disl-ribution, hnportation, exportation and
possession of any dangerous drug and/ or conholled precursor and
essential chen1ical. I-Ience, it is still essential for the corpus delicti to be
alleged and presented.,

55
People of the Philippines vs. Layla G.R. No. 192235, 6 July 2011.
r" - I -- - "--~ .. -- r n ~1-1 OAOC:7 17 nrtf'lhcr ?nnq :rnrl PPnnle of the Philiooines vs.

---
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 49 )

De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. I'


SUPREME COURT

111. Needless to say, notwithstanding the Panel's creative


interpretation, "trading" under RA 9165 should be construed to n1ean
that the act of illegal b"afficking is 111erely qualified by the inethod of
using electronk devices.

112. In People of the Philippines vs Torres,57 the Supren1e Court


clearly stated that equally in1portant in every prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the presentation of evidence
of the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited
drug 111.USt be proved With 1110ral certainty.

113. The Inforrnation, Con1.plaint-Affidavit, and Attached


Affidavits, and TSNs, all n1iserably fail to provide the existence of
drugs that was alten1pted or actually being sold by the accused, .........._
II
hence the corpus delicti in the instant case is lacking. !i
i1
'i
l1

The only 111ention of the existence of the corpus delicti is the I:


allegation that, at one point, illegal iten1s that include the illegal drug
shabu were seized fron1 the inn1ates of the NBP as a result of a raid of I!
1'
the cells of iiuna tes.

114. In a, 10ng line of cases58, the Supren1e Court consistently l


held that in the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, !
the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the ~
~

offense and, in sustaining a conviction, the identity and integrity of ~


II
the corpus delicti inust definitely be shown to have been .. i
11
I ,
,

preserved.59
(._.

115. In Valencia vs People of the Philippines 60, the Supre1ne


Court explained that the require1nent to identify and preserve the
dangerous drugs is necessary because of illegal drug's unique
characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and
easily open to tan1pering, alteration or substitution either by accident
or otherwise. I-Ience, the Supren1.e Court requires that to ren1ove any
doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,

57
G.R. No. 191730, 05 June 2013.
58
Valencia vs People of the Philippines, G.R. 198804, 22 January 2014 citing the cases of Fajardo v. People,
G.R. No. 185460, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 541, 548; People v. Alcuizar, G.R. No. 189980, April 6, 2011,
647 SCRA 431, 437 .. See also People v. Nacua, where the Supreme Court held:
Sale or posses~ion of a dangerous drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of
the prohibited drug. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction I
!
beyond reasonable doubt. Of paramount importance, therefore, in these cases is that the identity of II

the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. !


i,
i

!I
/'
11

i
I
11
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 50
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

evidence n1ust definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court
is the san1e illegal drug actually recovered fro111 the accused-
appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165 fails.

116. Asi~e fron1 the inissing corpus delicti, the Panel of


Prosecutors ilTyentively adduces that the consideration, i.e., the
inoney, is proven by the existence of confiscated n1oney gathered
during a raid il:i the NBP.

117. Yet again, they conveniently disregarded that the inoney


111ay not be identified as the considerali.on for the illegal drug hade as
the actual selling and trafficking is not even alleged, n1uch less
supported, by evidence on record. Hence despite the existence of the
confiscated 111oney, such has no established link to the drug hade.
\.__ I

118. Without allegations, n1uch less proof, of actual selling and


lTafficking, the prosecution likewise failed to establish that the
an1ounts allegedly given to the accused were derived fro111 the illegal
drug trade, or that they were actually received by the accused,
especially given that they failed to establish that the bank accounts
I
belong to the acqused.

119. Furthern1ore, there is also no showing of the existence of


any buyer in the illegal drug hade, given that the evidence on record
only provides that the NBP inmates provided n1oney to the accused
l__ . through her intern1ediaries. Again, another essential elen1ent is
n11ss1ng.

120. Despite the allegation of hading under Section 3 Qj),


which requires the use of elechonic devices to sell, traffic, or broker
the illegal drug hade, the evidence on record fails to provide for any
allegation regarding the existence of the elecfronic devices and its
actual use in the illegal drug hade.

121. The 'Panel of Prosecutors reduces the ele1nents necessary


to prove the viblations of Section 5, however, they c01npletely neglect
that the predicate crini.e of illegal b.afficking is still necessary.
Consequently, they have utterly failed to prove their case.

122. Fron1 the foregoing, the Inforrnation and its recital of facts
would readily reveal that the ele1nents of the predicate crii11e of
:~~,i,
1
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 51
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. J
SUPREME COURT
11,
~I
I
selling or trading illegal drugs is absent. There is also no corpus delicti
for the offense and its integral ele1nents are deficient. I
/1

The lnfonnation is solely based on the /!


1'
/:estirnony of iuit;riesses who are not even Ii
qualified to be discharged as state witnesses, 'I
and zo/wse credibility as ordinary witnesses
is co1npr01nised by the fact of their r-
conviction for crim.es involving nwral 1

turpitude

'
123. It is one thing to disregard jurisdictional requisites. It is
quite another, and far worse to institute tnunped-up charges. For
one, and this is too obvious to ignore, the Panel of Prosecutors relied
solely on testin1onial evidence culled prilnarily fro1n convicted felons
who con1111itted crin1es involving 111oral turpitude.

124. A review of the recital of facts would show that, aside


fron1 ad.111itting inad1nissible evidence, the Panel of Prosecutors relied
prirnarily on the affidavits and testilnonies during the Congressional
I-Iearings. The;:;e are the prosecution wih1esses and the crilnes they
have con1ni.itted against the People:

Natne of Prisoner Critne/s & Sentence

NONILOARILE y ANDAYA Murder - Reclusion Perpetua


Kidnapping - Death Penalty
reduced to Reclusion Perpetua

JOJO BALIGAD y RONDAL I-Io1nicide - Reclusion Perpetua

1-IERBERT COLANGGO Robbery


yROMARATE ;I
ENGELBERTO DURANO Frushated Murder and Murder
- Reclusion Perpetua

RODOLFO MAGLEO Kidnapping for Ranson1


Reclusion Perpetua
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 52
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et a/.
SUPREME COURT

NOEL MARTINEZ Kidnapping for Ranso1n


Death Modified to Reclusion
Perpetua

JAIIYlE PATIO:y.VILLEJO Kidnapping for Ranson1 (2


counts) - Reclusion Perpetua

JA YBEE SEBASTIAN Kidnapping for Ransorn;


Kidnapping Reclusion
Perpetua (2 Counts)
Carnapping

VICENTE SY y VIOLATION OF SEC. 15, ART.


MADLANGBAYAN III OF RA 6425 - Reclusion
Perpehrn
VIOLATION OF SEC. 16, ART.
III OF RA 6425
VIOLATION OF SEC. 16, ART.
III OF RA 6425
VIOLATION OF SEC. 16, ART.
III OF RA 6425

1-IANS ANTON. TAN y CI-IENG Robbery - Direct Assault w /


Murder - Reclusion Perpetua

(
', FROILAN TRESTIZA y Kidnapping Reclusion
LACSON Perpetua

WU TUAN y YUAN (PETER VIOLATION OF SECTION 15,


CO) ART. III of RA 6425

125. Aside fro111 their convictions, 111ost also have pending


crin1inal cases, to wit:

N aine of Prisoner Pending Case/ Court Roo111

JOJO BALIGAD y RONDAL Four Pending Cases - RTC


Quezon City; MTC Manila; 2
RTC Muntinlupa City

-r -rT"'nnrinrr f1f\T Al\ Tf""'f""'(\ -111 Pt:lnnina C::lsP.s involving

.,,
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65)
Page 53
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

yROMARATE Ro bbe1y in Band, Robbery w /


I-Ion~icide, Direct Assault,
Illegal Possession of
Explosives, Swindling and
Threat - RTC Antipolo City,
MTC Cainta, RTC Muntinlupa
City, RTC Quezon City, RTC
Bacoor, RTC San Fernando,
Painpanga, RTC Parafiaque
City, MTC Talisay, Negros
Occidental

ENGELBERTO DURANO RTC Muntinlupa City

JAYBEE SEBASTIAN RTC Muntinlupa City

HANSANTONTANyCHENG 4 Cases - RTC Quezon City,


RTC Muntinlupa City

WU TUAN y YUAN (PETER 10 Pending Cases - Violation of


CO) . RA 9165 - RTC Muntinlupa
City

126. To pin down the accused, the Panel of Prosecutors


c01npletely neglected that these persons are convicted of crin1es
involving 111oral turpitude and have adn1itted that they are drug ...... ._..
i
\\ __ _ traffickers. It gave their testin1ony full evidentiary weight despite the
finding of the Courts that they have coinn1itted acts of n1oral
turpitude, or depravity resulting in their incarceration.

127. The Panel of Prosecutors conveniently ignored the self-


inculpatory adn1issions of these self-confessed crilninals and
bypassed the stringent require1nents for the discharge of state
witnesses, as provided under Section 17, Rule 119, to wit:

Section 17. pischarge of accused to be state witness. - When two -,- !

or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any


offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the
court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when,
after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of
thP rli~rhrirne. the court is satisfied that:

', ,~., " ;.~.


---
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 54
Oe Lima v. Judge 6uerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused/


whose discharge is requested; ' /
I
(b} There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony
of said accused;

(c} The testimony of said accused


: 't
can be substantiallyi
corroborated in its material points; I

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and. I
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any!
offense involving moral turpitude. /

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically


form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge
of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence. (9a) (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

128. The Panel also disregarded the requiren1ents for


in1111unily fron1 prosecution and punish1nent under Section 33 of RA
9165, which pr:ovides for the iinn1unity fron1 prosecution and
punishn1ent ofwih1esses, to wit:

Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. -


Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act
r
~~
r'
of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, '

and 19, Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information


about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II
0

of this Act as well as any vio lation of the offenses mentioned if


committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the
whereabouts, identities and arrest of all or any of the members
thereof; and who willingly testifies against such persons as
described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or
punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her
information, of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the
giving of ; such information and testimony in bar of such
prosecution: Provided, That the following conditions concur:

(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the


conviction of the persons described above;

''
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule GS) Page SS
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. ,,1;
SUPf\EME COUf\T

possession of the State;

(3) Such information and testimony can be corrobQrated on


its material points;

(4) the informant or witness has not been previously


convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, except
when there is no other direct evidence available for the
~1--
State other than the information and testimony of said
informant or witness; and

(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply


without delay, any condition or undertaking, reduced into
writing, lawfully imposed by the State as further
consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution
and punishment.
:
\,, ...

Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such


informant or witness who does not appear to be most guilty for
the offense with reference to which his/her information or
testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no. direct
evidence available for the State except for the information and
testimony ofjthe said informant or witness. (Emphasis supplied)

129. There is, thus, a serious and unbecon1ing over-eagerness


to prosecute when clear requisites for discharge are blatantly ignored.

130. In Ranios vs Sandiganbayan 61 citing People of the


Philippines vs Gongora, the Supre1ne Court held that the testin1ony
\
of a self-confessed co-accused should be received with great caution
and should be carefully scrutinized.

At any rate, the testinwnies of the convicted


witnesses on the alleged participation of the
Petitioner in /:he conspirq.cy, ivhich
constitute the sole evidence against the
Petitioner, are inadmissible as hearsay
evidence and have no probative value
1

131. Notably also, the Panel of Prosecutors, who should serve


as bastions ot the rule of law, con1pletely ignored the glaring
character of the testhnonies against the accused as hearsay evidence !

-~
that have no probative value.

.,,,.
PETITION FOR PROMIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 56
Oe Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

132. The Res Inter Alios Acta Rule as set forth in Section 28 of
the Rules of Court, provides that the rights of a party caiu1ot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or 0111ission of another, to wit:

Section 28. Admission by third party. - The rights of a party


cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided. 62

133. In ~he case of People vs. Cachuela,63 it was reiterated by /


the Honorable Supren1e Court that res inter alios acta rule 1nakes an I
exlTajudicial confession binding only on the confessant, it shall not be 1,--
adn1issible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as
hearsay against then1.

134. The res inter alios acta rule exceplion is found under
Rule 130, Section 30 of the Rules of Court, which provides that:

Section 30. Admission by conspirator. - The act or declaration of


a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of
declaration., 1

135. The only conspiracy alleged in the Infonnation is between


the accused, Rafael Ragas and R01u1ie Dayan, to wit:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the
'.,~~
City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused, Leila M. De Lima, being then the
Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accused Rafael
Marcos Z. Ragos, being then the Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau
of Corrections, by taking advantage of their public office,
conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan,
being then an employee of the Department of Justice detailed to
De Lima, all of them having morc:d ascendancy or influence over
inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit
illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos,
with the use of their power, position and authority, demand,
solicit and ,extort money from the high profile inmates in the New
Bilibid Prison to support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in the May
2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully
authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 57
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

other electronic devices, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver
to De Lima, Through Ragas and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug
trading amounting to Five Million (PS,000,000.00) Pesos on 24
November 2012, Five Million (PS,000,000.00) Pesos on 15
December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand (Pl00,000.00) Pesos
weekly "Tara" each from the high profile inmates in the New
'I
Bilibid Prison. (Emphasis supplied) 'i
1:
11

136. Yet, they have accepted prejudicial declarations that are


clearly hearsay fron1 convicted crin1inals testifying as third parties.
The only exception to the prohibition is if the stateni.ents relate to co-
conspirators, upon showing that: (a) the conspiracy is first proved by
evidence other than the adn1ission itself; (b) the ad1nission relates to
the con1111on object; and (c) it has been 111ade while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.64

137. A careful review of the Infon11ation dated 17 February


2017 would show that the recital of facts only relied on the tesli1nony
of convicted crin1inals as third parties who are not even charged as
co-conspirators in the instant case. What exists are independent
admissions fron1 the convicts that do not relate to an actual
conspiracy and a con1111on identifiable object relating to the crin1e. It
should be reiterated that the testin1onies have no probative value and
as such, the Inforn1ation has no leg to stand on. Despite that, the
____iI___
Panel of Prosec~'tors still proceeded in filing the instant case.
1

TI-IE DOJ PANEL OF PROSECUTORS'


j
'I
DISREGARD OF THE SUBSTANCE I
BEYOND MERE FORMALITIES OF A 1
I

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Al\10UNTS TO A VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIITS OF THE
PETITIONER AS ACCUSED

138. The barren and contrived allegations, which seen1 --.~~-

111alignant but are pure hearsay, loud but en1pty on the existence of
the corpus delicti; and the propensity of the Panel of Prosecutor to
cherry pick the allegations that superficially support their finding of
probable cause, .yet blatantly ignore the glaring inconsistencies and
irreconcilable discrepancies of their convict-witnesses' testin1onies, all
serve as telltale proof of political persecution.
I
'J
; J '

PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule GS) Page SS


De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COUlff

139. The :Honorable Court is t.t1us respectfully urged to ensure


that it does not give its iinprin1atur to the political harassn1ent of the
accused, keeping in 1nind the words of the Supren1e Court in the case
of Ladlad vs Velasco,6 5 "[W]e caiu1ot emphasize too shongly that
prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
ilnpression that their noble office is being used or prostituted,
wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, -r
or subversive of, the basic and fundani.ental objective of observing I
the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and II
all litigants alik~, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or
m.ighty. Only by sfrict adherence to the established procedure 111ay be
public's perception of the in1partiality of the prosecutor be
enhanced."
I
140. In Salonga v. Cruz-Pafto66, the Supre1ne Court took the :f
I

occasion to ren1ind the bench and bar that: _.,;,I __

"It is not enough that the preliminary investigation is


conducted in the sense of making sure that the transgressor shall
not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not
only the purpose of the State. More important, it is part of the
guarantees of freedom and fair pla'( which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or
judge as the. case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of
going through trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a prima fade case or that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.

"This is evident from the very purpose of preliminary


'- ...-'
investigation which is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution to protect the respondents
from public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of prosecutions. It is also intended to protect the accused
from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself
in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall
have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a
competent officer." [emphasis supplied]

Interestingly, in the cited decisions in Allado, Salonga,


141.
and Ladlad, the continuation of cases against Petitioners therein were __,.....,__
i
I
enjoined for being undertaken with grave abuse of discretion and in
violation of the _substantive rights of the accused.

65
G.R. No. 172070-72, 01 June 2007 citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-72335-39, 21 March 1988, 159
-!'..'
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65)
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT
Page 59 t
j,

142. In the Ladlad case, the Supre1ne Court held that:

... (l)n the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor


abused his discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to
support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the accused his
right to substantive and procedural due process, we have not
hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65
to overturn the prosecutor's findings." [underscoring supplied]
'

143. In the san1e land1nark case of Ladlad, the Supren1e Court


allowed the injunction of further prosecution of crhninal actions to
avoid oppression and to protect constih1tional rights of the accused.
Thus:

As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is


\ similarly loath to enjoin the prosecution of offenses, a practice
rooted on public interest as the speedy closure of criminal
investigations fosters public safety. However, such relief in equity
may be granted if, among others, the same is necessary (a) to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner or (b) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights. (underscoring supplied)

144. In this case, the necessity of preventing the further "use of


sl:rong ann of the lmu" and affording adequate protection to constitutional
rights is even inore pronounced than in the Ladlad case.
(
1L15. It is settled that, where the lower court's exercise of
judicial authority is oppressive, i.e., when it renders a decision
without conducting a hearing to allow the parties to present their
respective evidence, such exercise of judicial authority mnounts to
grave abuse of discretion.67

1L16. Worse, as if the deprivation of his right to procedural due


process were not injurious enough, respondent judge con.1.pounded
the injury exponentially by hastily issuing a warrant for the arrest of
the Petitioner with no bail being fixed for her te1nporary liberty. As
discussed earliei, the arrest warrant should not- have been issued at
all considering .the clear insufficiency of evidence, whether direct or
circtn11.stantial, to establish the ele1nents of the offense. And, even
assun1ing without ad111itting that evidence exists to find probable

..' ..;.
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page GO
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

cause for the issuance of any arrest warrant, such warrant should
have fixed bail considering that the evidence of guilt is not strong.

The flagrant violation of the constitutional rights of


147.
Petitioner even warrants the nullification of all proceedings and
abating the case.Gs

148. Incidentally, given the above circun1stances, it is likewise


prayed that o~her than granting the writs of prohibition and
certiorari, incidental reliefs as the law and justice 111ay require are
likewise requested pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Such
incidental reliefs inay include the inhibition of respondent judge69
and the transfer of venue of the crhninal case to avoid 1niscarriage of
justice.

ARGUMENTS
IN SUPPORT OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
URGENT PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND STATUS Quo ANTE ORDER

Petitioner repleads the foregoing where relevant and further


alleges that:

149. Unless a ten1porary restraining order (TRO) and/ or a


preli111inary injunction are issued by this I-Ionorable Court, the n1ere
pendency of this Petition will not interrupt the proceedings at the
lower court.70 If not enjoined ten1porarily while the clain.18 in the
main case have not yet been adjudicated, the continuation of
proceedings in the lower court would certainly cause and/ or
threaten to cause grave and irreparable injuries to Petitioner.

149.1. The TRO and/ or a writ of prelhninary injunction and


Status Quo Ante Order to be issued should both i1-
suspend the proceedings in the lower court and res tore !I
the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the I 1

Order and Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017. 11

I
:: See: La.d/ad v. ~elasco, supra; Gumabon .v. Dir. of Prisons [G.R. No. L-30026, January 30, 1971]. 11
In the case of D1macuha v. Han. Concepcton [G.R. No. L-60842, September 30, 1982], the Supreme
Court, in a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, ordered the judge therein motu proprio to I
I
I

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I!
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65)
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
Page 61 L
SUPREME COURT

150. There are two (2) essential requisites for the issuance of a
r
TRO and/ or a prelin1inary injunction: (a) the showing of a clear and
positive right especially calling for judicial protection or a right in
esse; and (b) the violation and proof of violation of an actually
!
'i
existing right.
i
1:
151. As shown above, Petitioner has clear and positive right to 1i

personal liberty: and security, the right to bail, and the right to due 1:

process of law guaranteed by the Constitul-ion and relevant laws and


rules.
I
Ii
152. Regarding proof of violation of those rights, the acts and
01.11issions of respondent judge, as evidenced by the assailed orders
and the judge's conduct, unequivocally show the gross hansgressions
con1111itted against Petitioner and her personal liberty. Given that the
respondent judge has caused and has the propensity to cause the
< continued violation of Petitioner's rights, causing and threatening to
cause in1111inent, grave and irreparable injury on hhn, a TRO and a
subsequent prelhninary injunction are in order.

153. While it is conceded that as a general rule, crin1inal


prosecution 1nay not be constrained or stayed by injunction,
preli1ninary or final, such rule adn1its of exceptions as enu1nerated in
the case of Ladlad, n1ost of which are present in this case, thus:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of


the accused;7l
(, b. When :necessary for the orderly adn1inistration of justice or
to avoid oppression;72
c. When acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;73
d. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 74
e. Where there is clearly no prin1a fade case against the
accused;7s and
f. To prevent threatened unlawful arrest of Petitioners. 76
I

I
11
11
II

1
-, 1-fernandez v. Albano, et al., 19 SCRA 95 (January 25, 1967).
72
Dimayuga, et al., v.. fernandez, 43 Phil 304; 1-fernandez v. Albano, supra; Fortun v. Labang, et al., G.R. No.
L-38383, May 27, 1981.
73

1<i
75
Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil 62.
Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960
Paderanga v. Ori/of"/, 196 SCRA 86, April 19, 1991 citing Salonga v. Pano, et al., 134 SCRA 438, February
I
11
18, 1985.
'1t.: ... I'
,... I - n "I I ,.. ..... ..., A I\.-- '1 '1 l"'\r'">. I. ... ,... n ... ,....,..J.. ,.. ,.,.,. rrl " /11nn Drinr(.:J t=nrilP (.)1 ~1 1q? I
11

i
~I
/1

/!
I
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65)
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al. Page 62
SUPREME COURT

154. In the cases of Roberts, Allado and Ladlad, TRO's and


writs of preli111inary injunction were ilnn1ediately granted to resLTain
the prosecution of cases and to recall the warrants of arrests issued
against the accused considering the patent violali.on of the
substantive rights.

155. In this case, a TRO and a writ of prelin1inary injunction


n1ust likewise issue in view of the following considerations:

155.1. The in1plen1entation of the no-bail wanant of arrest has


unjustly deprived the Petitioner of her personal liberty
and the continuation of the conduct of the proceedings
at the lower court would definitely work grave injustice
to Petitioner;

155.2. The respondent judge and respondent law enforcen1ent


officers and their subordinates are threatening,
atte1npting to do, procuring or suffering to be done acts
in violation of Petitioner's substantive rights which tend
to render the judgn1ent on the 1nain case ineffectual or
nugatory; and

155.3. Petitioner is clearly entitled to the relief prayed for,


which relief consists of reshaining the con11nission or
continuation of the q.cts co1nplained of by respondent
judge and respondent law enforcen1ent officers and
their subordinates.77
--
156. In support of the foregoing allegations an.cl arguni.ents,
attached is the Petitioner's affidavit in support of the TRO and the
application for the issuance of a writ of preli1ninary injunction.

157. Considering that there are no private interests other than


hers to be prejudiced by the issuance of a TRO and an Injunction, and
that the application is directed towards an act of a govern1nent
insh"un1entality, it is respectfully sub1nitted that the posting of a bond
for the issuance of the TRO and the Injunction be waived.
Nonetheless, should one be required, Petitioner is lik~wise willing to I

post a bond in such an1ount as will be fixed by this I-Ion.arable Court I


pursuant to the requiren1ents under Section 4 Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court.
I
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and. CERTIORARI (Rule 65)
Page 63
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

158. Considering that the warrant has been served, a Status


Ante Order should be granted. This is in order not to render
ineffectual and 111oot the evaluation of the 111erits of the 111ain petition.

159. Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested


situation which precedes a conhoversy7s. In this case, it pertains to
the situation at the ti111e of filing of the huonnation in the court a quo.
'.
160. Accordingly, to restore the situation of the parties prior
to the issuance of the questioned Order and Warrant of Arrest, it is
respectfully n1oved that an order for Status Quo Ante be issued by
this I-Ionorable Court.

CLOSING STATEMENT

l "The sovereign power has the inherent: right to protect itself and its
people front vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of
justice; hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish
violators of the law. This is essential for its self preservation, nay, its
very existence. But this does not confer a license for pointless assaults
on its citizens. Tlte right of the State to prosecute is not a carte
blanche for govermnent agents to defy and disregmd the rigltt-s
of its citizeus undei- the Constitution. Coufiuemeut, 1egardless of
duratiou, iq too high a price to pay for teckless and impulsive
prosecuUau. "79

In Plato's the Republic, he discussed five types of regin1es,


l_ nan1ely, Aristocracy, Tini.ocracy, Oligarchy, De1nocracy, and
Tyranny, and how each one gave rise to the next. Specifically
speaking about the rise of Tyraiu1y, he wrote:

And the protector of the people is like him; /Javing a mob entirely at
llis disposal, /Je is not restrained from shedding the blood of
kinsmen; by t/Je favourite method of false accusation he brings
them into court and murders them, making the life of man to
disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of
llis fellow citizen, some he kills and others he banishes, at the
same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands:
and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at
the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf--that is,
a tyrant?

Inevitably.. .
'
18
Preys/er, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 527 Phil. 129,136 (2006), citing Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Domingo
Samut/Antonia sar:-iut. 491 Phil. 458, 472 (2005); Los Boos Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa, 433 Phil. 930, 945
-i-
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 64
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

In .coining before this I-Ionorable Court and respectfully seeking


its intercession, it is the portions about an erstwhile apparent
11
protector... having a 111ob entirely at his disposal. .. " and the
/1
theorized inevitability" of the rise of a tyrant that Petitioner seeks to
challenge.
I
The Petitioner does not believe that even th.e President, as
sLTong as the popular support for hin1 was during the 2016
T rl

/1
Presidential elections, has a ni.ob entirely at his disposal." For one,
/1

Ii
Petitioner still .believes in the independence and itnpartiality of this
Honorable Court, and, thus, fervently believes that the ni.erit of her 11

Petition will be discerned and the rightful reliefs shall be accorded to J!.
her. Ji

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PRAYER 11
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WHEREFORE, pre1nises considered, and in the interest o.f II
Ir

substantial justice and fair play, Petitioner respectfully prays the 11


,!
Honorable Court that judgn1ent be rendered: II
i
a. Granting a writ of certiorari a1ui.ulling and setting aside the II
Order dated 23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the Iii-
.. [
san1e date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the
Regional Trial Court-Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, in Crin1inal I
Case No. t7-165 entitled People of the Philippines versus Leila M.
de Lima et al.; I:
( b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting the
respondent judge fro111 conducting further proceedings until
and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of II


:)
ten1porary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of prelin1inary
I'
injunction to the proceedings; and
11

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the


status prior to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest,
II
11

both dat~d February 23, 2017, thereby recalling both processes !I


11
and restoring petitioner to her liberty and freedon1. ii
1!
_J_
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. I
I
I

Respectfully subn1itted.

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II
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PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI (Rule 65) Page 65
De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

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5th Floor, Strata 100 Building, I11


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RIGOROSO GALINDEZ & RABINO 11

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Law Offices ii
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' Rm 901-902, 9th Floor, FilGarcia Tower, !II'.
140 Kalayaan Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City i 1

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Office Tel. Nos. 924-2396/924-8552 11

Fax No. 929-1609 _,t.


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By:

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PTR :/Y58038~;1Q.L'Q4/17; Q.C.
IBP# 105589 01/04/17; Q.C.
MCLE Compliance o. V-0005526; 01/14/15
(Valid from April 15, 2016 until April 14, 2019)
Roll# 42240 ,

1-
Copy furnished:
1

1
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO,
Branch 204, Regional Trial Court
Muntinlupa City Hall of Justice
National Road, Tunasan
Muntinlupa City

.
.,

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I

PETITION FOR PROHIBITION and CERTIORARI {Rule 65) Page 66


De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al.
SUPREME COURT

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SOLICITOR GENERAL
Counsel for the People of the Philippines
No. 134 An1orsolo St.
Legaspi Village, Makati City

P/DIR. GEN. RONALD M. DELA ROSA


Chief
Philippine National Police
NI--IQ-PNP, 3rc1 Floor Gen. Delos Reyes St.
Can1p Cran1e, Quezon City
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PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS li
11

Director i11
PNP I-Ieadquarters Support Service
Can1p Craine, Quezon City .......i
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SUPT. ARNELJAMANDRON APUD :f
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Chief :j

PNP Custodial Service Unit :1

Can1p Cran1e, Quezon City if

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EXPLANATION 11

(Re: Service by Registered Mail)

The foregoing Petition is being filed with the I-Ionorable Court


l
11
I,
directly by personal service. Due to pers01u1el conslTaints, copies of 'I
:I
this petition were served upon the other parties via registered
mail as warranted by the Rules of Court.
~... ---

TED~BAN F. RIGOROSO
, I

--;-~ .......-.
,I
I,

Republic of the Philippines )


Quezon City ) S.S.

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION


AGAINST FORUM SI-IOPPING

I, LEILA M. DE LIMA, Filipino, of legal age, and with office


address at the Senate of the Philippines, GSIS Building, Financial
Center, Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard, Pasay City, 1300 Metro
Manila, after being duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby
depose and state under oath that:
--r.....-
1. I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing :1

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION With


(
\
Application for a Writ of PreliJninary In.junction., and II
i
Urgent Prayer for Te1nporary Restraining Order and
Status Quo Ante Order;

2. I attest that I have read the petition and the allegations


therein are true and correct based on iny own personal
knowledge and on the basis of authentic records; and

3. I hereby certify that I have not c01n1nenced any actions or


proceedings involving the same issues as this Petition before
the Supren1e Court, the Court of Appeals, or any divisions
thereof, or before any other courts, tribunals or agencies,
aside fron1 the following, the penclency of which is part of the
(,
basis for filing this Petition.:

a. The Motion to Quash I filed before Branch 204 of the


Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City last 20
February 2017 in Criininal Case No. 17-165, entitled
"People v. De Lima, et al."; and

b. The Petition. for Prohibition. and Certiorari I filed


before the Court of Appeals (currently pending before
its Sixth Division) last 13 January 2017, docketed as CA
G.R. No. 149097, entitled "De Lima v. Panel qf"
Prosecutors of the DOJ, et al."; and

4. I should thereafter learn that a siinilar. action or proceeding


has been filed or is pending before the Supre111e Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other 1!
tribunal or agency, I undertake to pro1nptly infonn the :i'I
1,
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.

pursuant to Supre1ne Court Ad1ninistrative Circular No. 04-


94, dated February 8, 1994.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed this instnunent on the


24fh day of February 2017 in Quezon City. '"

L~IMA
Petitioner
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before ine this 24th day of
February 2017 in Quezon City, affiant exhibiting to ine her C0111petent
Evidence of Identification, which bears her photo and signature,
consisting of Passport No. EC6183823 issued on 10 Dece111ber 2015
by DFA Manila.

Doc. No. 2 fl; t\~'V h\1~~bt' 11..J."~~.i;~ 1 .".ii


u 7. {d-d.
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N6r1\r'1.'/1'1!!'1.r:1' ..,. ,r:,.::: ,, i!';\'1"/
i Page No. ll_; : :.11fi ~~.1v \\.~::T;1 r~1 ::i. '\.
' Book No. _L_;
fli)[','] f ' 1". I / ,

Se1ies of 2017.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES }
QUEZON CITY } S.S.

AFFIDAVIT

I, SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, of legal age, Filipino, with


office address at Roon1 502, Senate of the Philippines Building, J.W.
Diokno Boulevard, Pasay City, depose and state under oath, that:

1. I mn the accused in a case pending before Branch 204 of


the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, entitled and docketed as:

PEOPLE OF THE PI-IILIPPINES vs.


Sen. LEILA M. DE LIMA,
RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS AND t
i
RONNIE PALISOC DAYAN
\
" Crhninal Case No. 17-165

2. On 21 Nove111ber 2016, a DOJ Panel of Investigators


(Chair - Senior Asst. State Prosecutor Peter Ong; Men1bers - Senior
Asst. City Prosecutor Alexander Rainos, Senior Asst. City Prosecutor
Leila Llanes, Senior Asst. City Prosecutor Evangeline Viudes-
Canobas, and Asst. State Prosecutor Editha Fernandez) issued
Subpoenas ordering 111e to obtain on 2 Dece111ber 2016 copies of the
complaint and other supporting evidence in the following cases:

e) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled Volunteers Against-


Crinw and Corruption (VACC), represented by Dante
(,
Jinwnez versus Senator Leila M. de Li111a et al.;

0 NPS XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled Reynaldo Esnwralda


and Ruel Lasala versus Senator Leila M. de Li111a et al.;

g) NPS XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled Jaybee Nino


Sebastian, represented by his wife Roxanne Sebastian,
ve,.sus Senato,. Leila M. de Li111a et al.; and

h) NPS XVI-INV-16-K-00336, entitled National Bureau qf


Investigation (NBI) versus Senator Leila M. de Linw et
al.

3. During the hearing on 2 Dece111ber 2016, I secured copies


of the c0111plaints and their attachn1ents in the afore-cited four (4)
cases through iny authorized representative. During the smne
hearing, a Supple111ental C0111plaint was filed by VACC, through its _,.J,_.
lawyer, Atty. Eduardo Bringas.

- f
4. Still, during the saine hearing on ;2. Dece111ber 2016, I filed
an Omnibus Motion to l111nzediately Endorse the Cases to the Q[fice
<?l the Ombuds111m1 and for the Inhibition of the Panel qf Prosecutors
cmd the Secretary of Justice, a copy of which is attached as An.ncx
"D" to the Petition. In the 011111ibus Motion, n1y counsel entered "his
. ...,..._. .
special and lilnited appearance in these cases for the purpose of
.fi"ling the instant 0111nibus Motion, and for any possible hearing
and/01 pleading that- 111ay be required in relation to this 111otion."

4.1. In the 111ain, petitioner argued in that On111ibus Motion.


that:

4.1.1. The investigation of the cases is within the exclusive


authority and sole jurisdiction of the Office of the
0111buds111an; and

4.i.2. Considering the partiality, bias and lack of


\.
objectivity of the Secretary of Justice and the Panel
of investigating prosecutors in these cases, these
officials should inhibit the111selves and instead refer
the cases to the Office of the 01nbuds111an.

5. On 9 Decen1ber 2016, a hearing was set on the On111ibus


Motion. In attendance were n1y counsel, Atty. Eduardo Bringas on
behalf of c01nplainants YACC (I.S. No. INV-16J-00313), and -"'"'*' -
cmnplainants Reynaldo Es111eralda and Ruel Lasala (LS. No. INV- ,i
16J-00315). The Chainnan of the Panel, Hon. Peter Ong, was on !
official leave and the hearing was presided te111porarily by Asst. City
Prosecutor Alex Rmnos.
\
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5.i. During the said hearing, 111y counsel reiterated the prayer
for the in1111ediate transfer of the cases to the Office of the
0111buds111an. Atty. Bringas then filed his Joint
Conunent/Opposition to the 011111ibus Motion. Thereafter,
resi)ondent DOJ Panel gave ine a non-extendible period of
three (3) days, or until 12 Dece111ber 2016, within which to
sub111it her reply to Alty. Bringas' co111111ent/opposition.

5.2. Likewise, during that hearing, nly counsel nlade an oral


inanifestation to the Panel seeking to defer further
proceedings, including the sub111ission of nly counter-
affidavit, pending resolution of the above stated 01nnibus __... __
Motion. Instead of ruling on the san1e, respondent DOJ I

Panel required the petitioner to subn1it, on or before 12 I


Decc111ber 2016, a wTitten inotion to that effect to allow
the other parties the opportunity to c0111111ent thereto.
Ji
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6. On .12 Dece111ber 2016, in con1pliance vvith the directive of I


the DOJ Panel, I filed n1y Reply to the Joint Co1111nent/Oppositio11
filed by co111plainants VACC (I.S. No. INV-16J- 00313) and Ruel I
.....__ _
Lasala and Reynaldo Es111eralda (LS. No. INV-16J-00315). At the
sainc tilne, I filed a Manifestation with Motion to First Resolve
Pending Incide1it and to Defer Further Proceedings.

7. On 21 Dece111ber 2016, a hearing was conducted on the


aforesaid four (4) cases. All of the respondents therein were either
personally present or were duly represented by their respective
counsels, except respondent Ronnie Dayan who failed to appear. My
...
counsel invited the attention of the DOJ Panel to the unresolved
Omnibus Motion and Urgent Motion to D~fer Proceedings and cited
the smne as basis for not sub1nitting, in the 111eanti111e, 111y Countcr-
Afficlavit. I asked for the resolution of the saine so that I vvill be
guided on the proper course to take. The DOJ Panel agreed and stated
that they will resolve all inotions before the end of the hearing. In the
meanti1ne, the DOJ Panel called on the individual respondents for the
submission of their respective counter-affidavits, to wit:

7.i. During the san1e hearing, Solicitor General Jose Calida


entered the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor ---
General, allegedly in its capacity as the Tribune of the
People and offered to act as counsel for the V ACC and
con1plainants Ruel Lasala and Reynaldo Esn1eralda.

7.2. Respondent DOJ Panel inade the following ruling towards


the end of the hearing on 21 Dece111ber 2016:

(,
a. Peter Co, Vicente Sy and Jojo Baligad's request for
additional tiine to subn1it counter-affidavit was
denied;
b. Rainier Cruz was given until 27 Dece111ber 2016 to
file his counter-affidavit
'
c. Jaybee Sebastian was directed to sub111it a duly
subscribed counter-affidavit until 27 Dece111ber
2016;
d. Respondents with no counter-affidavits, including __ ....._
n1yself, will no longer be allowed to belatedly
subn1it their counter-affidavits; and
e. The case was declared subn1itted for resolution and
all pending incidents will be resolved together with
the inerits of the case in one resolution.

8. My counsel inade an oral request for reconsideration. The


o , ~ 'T, - _ l ~-- ---~--~,:i ~,f
I
0 n~t+on f"\1rlp1
- .
--
'"'ill be issued, the DOJ Panel stated that they see no need for the
same and willjust resolve all pending incidents.

9. Aggrieved by the grave abuse of discretion con11nittecl by


the DOJ Panel, I filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibition and
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Court. It is currently pending with the
Special 6t 11 Division of the Court of Appeals. A copy of the petition in
that case is attached as Annex "E" to the Petition.

10. On 17 February 2017, an Inforn1ation for illegal drug


trading was filed against 111e, which was eventually raft1ed to the court
a quo. A copy of the Inforn1ation is attached as Annex "F" to the
Petition. The saicl Infonnation was based on the findings and
conclusions of the DOJ Panel contained in a Joint Resolution datecl
14February 2017. A copy of the said Joint Resolution is attached as
Annex "G" to the Petition.

(
10.i. The Infonnation charges nle, Rafael Ragos and Ronnie
Dayan of illegal drug trading punishable under Section 5,
in relation to Section 3 Gj), Section 26 (b) and Section 28
of Republic Act No. 9165 (C01nprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002), con1n1itted allegedly, as follows:

10.1.1. By citing acts that, on their face, constitute Direct


Bribery, to wit:

"That within the period from


November 2012 to March 2013, in the City
of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Leila M. De Lima, being then
the Secretary of the Department of
Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z.
Ragos, beirig then the Officer-In-Charge
of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking
advantage of their public office,
conspiring and confederating with _,,,,_
I
accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then an
employee of the Department of Justice
detailed to De Lima, all of them having I

moral ascendancy or influence over


inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did
then and there commit illegal drug
trading, in the following manner: De Lima
and Ragas, with the use of their power,
position and authority, demand, solicit
and extort money from the high profile
inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to
support the Senatorial bid of De Lima
in the May 2016 election; xxx"(emphasis
supplied)

10.i.2. And, thereafter, alleging acts constituting the


offense of engaging in illegal drug trade against
convicted felons who, for so111e dubious reasons,
are not even charged:
"xxx by reason of which, the
inmates, not being lawfully authorized by
law and through the use of mobile phones
and other electronic devices, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully trade and
traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter
give and deliver to De Lima, Through
Rages and Dayan, the proceeds of
illegal drug trading amounting to Five
Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24
November 2012, Five Million
(PS,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December
2012, and One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos weekly "Tara" each
from the high profile inmates in the New
Bilibid Prison."

10.i.3. Hence, by charging two different offenses against


two different sets of offenders in one Infonnation,
the Infonllation n1akes it appear that it is charging
Ille with violation of R.A. No. 9165, even though
the Inaterial factual allegations, on their face,
constitutes, at best, Direct Bribery.

10.2. In any case, the alleged illegal drug trading happened


during the period of Noveillber 2012 to March 2013
during Illy tenure as DOJ Secretary and allegedly carried
out through n1y alleged intern1ecliaries Ronnie Dayan and
Rafael Ragas.

11. In the afternoon of 20 February 2017, just a couple of


hours after the raffle of the case to the court a quo, petitioner
promptly filed a Motion to Quash raising the issue of the court's lack
of jurisdiction over the offense charged against Petitioner, the DOJ .i
--1-
Panel's lack of authority to file the Infonllation, and that the
lnfonnation charges 111ore than one offense. In that 111otion, I likewise
placed on record s0111e of 111y observations that, at any rate, the
cvidenc~ on record does not justify the filing of the subject case in
court. A copy of the Motion to Quash is attached as Annex "I-I" to
the Petition.
:;
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16. Unless a te111pormy restraining order (TRO) and/or a
preliminmy injunction are issued by this Honorable Court, the 111ere
pendcncy of this Petition will not interrupt the proceedings at the
lower court. 1 If not enjoined te111porarily while the claiins in the inain
case have not yet been adjudicated, the continuation of proceedings
in the lower court would certainly cause and/or threaten to cause
grave and irreparable injuries to ine.

16.1. The TRO and/or a writ of preliininary injunction and


Status Quo Ante Order to be issued should both suspend
the proceedings in the lower court and restore the parties
to the status prior to the issuance of the Order and
Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017.
17. There are two (2) essential requisites for the issuance of a
TRO and/ or a preli111inary injunction: (a) the showing of a clear and
positive right especially calling for judicial protection or a right in
cssc; and (b) the violation and proof of violation of an actually
existing right.

18. As shown above, I have a clear and positive right to


personal liberty and security, the right to bail, and the right to due
process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and relevant laws and
rules.

19. Regarding proof of violation of those rights, the acts and


omissions of respondent judge, as evidenced by the assailed orders
and the judge's conduct, unequivocally show the gross transgressions
committed against n1e and iny personal liberty and security. Given
that the respondent judge has caused and has the propensity to cause
lhc continued violation o:f n1y rights, causing and threatening to cause
im1ninent, grave and irreparable inju1y on ine, a TRO and a
subsequent prcli1ninary injunction are in order.

20. While it is conceded that as a general rule, crin1inal


prosecution ini1y not be constrained or stayed by injunction,
preli111inaiy or final, such rule ad111its of exceptions as enu111erated in
the case of Lad lad, inost of which are present in this case, thus:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights


of the accused;2
b. When necessary for the orderly ad111inistration of justice
or to avoid oppression;3
I
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Section 7, Rule 65; See: Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993).
7
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HPm::inrfP.7 " A.lh::inn At ::ii SC:RA 95 (Januarv 25. 1967).
J.
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c. When . acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;4
cl. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;s
e. Where there is clearly no prin1a facie case against the
accused; 6 . _JI__ .

f. To prevent threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.7

21. In the cases of Roberts, Allado and Ladlad, TRO's and


writs of preli111inary injunction were inunediately granted to restrain
the prosecution of cases and to recall the warrants of arrests issued
against the accused considering the patent violation of the
substantive rights.

22. In this case, a TRO and a writ of prelin1inary injunction


must likewise issue in view of the following considerations:

a. The i111ple111entation of the no-bail warrant of arrest


has unjustly deprived ine of n1y personal liberty and
the continuation of the conduct of the proceedings at
the lower court woqld definitely work grave injustice to
petitioner; and

b. I mn clearly entitled to the relief prayed for, which


relief consists of restraining the conunission or
continuation of the acts con1plained of by respondent
judge and respondent law enforcen1ent officers and
their subordinates. a

23.Considering that there are no private interests other than


hers to be prejudiced by the issuance of a TRO and an Injunction, and
that the application is directed towards an act of a governn1ent
instnnnentality, it is respectfully subn1itted that the posting of a bond
for the issuance of the TRO and the Injunction be waived.
Nonetheless, should one be required, petitioner is likewise willing to
post a bond in such mnount as will be fixed by this Honorable Court 1
pursuant to the require1nents under Section 4 Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court. I
I?

24.Considering that the warrant has been served, I ain


already detained and the iin111ediate effects thereof can no longer be
reversed, a Status Ante Order should be granted. This is order not to

4
Planas v. Gil, 67 Pllil 62.
r, Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960.
i; Pacleranga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86, April 19, 1991 citing Sa/onga v. Pano, et al., 134 SCRA 438,
February 18, 1985.
Rocffir;uez v. Castelo, G.R. No. L-6374, August 1, 1953; Uno Broc/(a, et al., v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et
render ineffectual and n1oot the evaluation of the 111erits of the n1ain
petition.

25. Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested


situation which precedes a controversy<>. In this case, it pertains to the
situation at the tilne of filing of the Infonnation in the court a quo.

26. Accordingly, as stated in n1y Rule 65 petition, I ask 'fi:o111


the Honorable Snpre111e Court the following reliefs:

a. Grant of a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the


Order elated 23 February 2017 and the Warrant qf Arrest
elated the saine date of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 204,
Muntinlupa City, in Cri111inal Case No. 17-165 entitled People
of the Philippines versus Leila M. de Li1na et al.;
b. Grant of a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting the
\, respondent judge fron1 conducting fu1ther proceedings until
and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;
c. Issuance of an order granting the application for the issuance
of te111porary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preli111inary injunction to the proceedings;
d. Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to
the status prior to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of
Arrest dated February 23, 2017; and
e. Issuance of other orders granting incidental reliefs as law
and justice inay require, such as, but not lilnited to
respondent judge's inhibition.

LEi~A
Alfiant
~7.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before ine this J/f/-l11 day of
February 2017 in Quezon City, affiant exhibiting to 111e her Cmnpetent
Evidence of Identification, which bears her photo and signature,
consisting of Passport No. EC6183823 issued on 10 Dece111ber 2015
by DFA Manila.
U?.~
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'' Preys/er, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 527 Phil. 129, 136 (2006), citing Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of
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1
REPUBLIC OF TI-IE PHILIPPINES )
City of Manila ) S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I, ROMEO R. SIAZON, a 1ne1nber of the staff of Senator Leila


De Lin.1a, with office address at Senate of the Philippines, GSIS Bldg.,
Financial Center, Jose W. Diokno Blvd., Pasay City, after being duly
sworn, depose and state that:

On 27 February 2017, I served a copy of the Petitioner-Senator's


PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION With
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Urgent Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and Status Quo Ante Order dated
24 February 2017, in the case entitled "Leila M. De Linza v. HON.
JUANITA GUERRE.RO, in her capacity as presiding judge, Regional
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, P/DIR. GEN. RONALD M. DELA ROSA in his
capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police, PSUPT Pl-llLIP
GIL M. PHILIPPS, in his capacity as Director, Headquarf-crs Suppor/:
Service, SUPT. ARNEL ]AMANDRON APUD, in his capacity as
Chief, PNP Custodial Service Unit, and ALL PERSONS ACTING
UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION OR
DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE ORDERS THAT MAY BE
ISSUED BY THE COURT," by registered 111ail to the following:

RECIPIENT REGISTRY RECEIPT NO.


-- I I
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO
Branch 204, Regional Trial Court
Muntinlupa City Hall of Justice ~VJ {'2- l( Db1 (,t-7
National Road, Tunasan
Muntinlupa City

SOLICITOR GENERAL
Co1msel for the People of the Philippines
No. 134 Amorsolo St. f2J? :r'-Y 06'1 G5\-
Legaspi Village, Makati City

P/DIR. GEN. RONALD M. DELA ROSA


Chic:{
Philippine National Police ~VJ ~ 1>-l cG9 (;fU-
NHQ-PNP, 3rd Floor Gen. Delos Reyes St.
Camp Crnme, Quezon City
I
I"
'
: -
'

PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS


Director
PNP Headquarters Support Service
J 1-~L\ bb~ pb
Camp Crame, Quezon City
),

SUPT. ARNEL JAMANDRON APUD 1!


I'

Cl1ilif" ~

PNP Custodial Service Unit ~~ :tL'-\ ck( 1- l '!t- 11

Camp Crame, Quezon City Ji

11

I:
ji
with return cards issued by !Qioir.i'oi-.~ i;tt1V11m fo$T offlu:
I!
under the respective Registry Receipt Nuni.bers indicated 11

1]
above, all dated 27 February 2017.

l
I~ WITNESS_ WHERE~~' I l~av.e hereun~~ se~ 111y hand this 27th
day of i:.ebruary 2017 at CJ1YOF MANILA , Ph1hpp1nes.

<

RO~ R. SIAZON
Affiant-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before n1e in i


ClIYO~ E~mtA this 27th day of February 2017, affiant
exhibiting to n1e his Coni.petent Evidence of Identification, which
bears his photo and signature, consisting of Driver's License ID No. I:
NOl-93-150222 issued by the Land Transportation Office and valid -r-
!
until 22 October 2017. "

Doc. No.___lfk
Page No.~{__
ATT.Y. FR
NOT ARY
~~- ZARATE
PU~C~ ~1. - 2018
NOT AIHAL COMMIS~ION N0.2017 OG1/ML:A.
Book No ..f_QJ_ TIN ND. ma-2:::isJ~::f lROU N0.17574
Series of 2017. !Bf' t)Jt NO. ut{i'l"l7J-MLf,.f'l'l/1 citt6 FORYR 2017
Pl'R MO. 59~::5225/V./l.ltl LA/'l-3.. 2017
Mtu: EXEMrnm~. 1.:r..>_ v-o-OC>U!:lUHTll' 201~
GS3P-.EAURASJ.EUVjff/~ NlA.16.., 7145710

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11

II
REPUBLIC OF TI-IE PI-IILIPPINES) S.S. I:
City of Manila )
II
Ii
II
VERIFIED DECLARATION ii
11

(Pursuant to A.M. No. 10-3-7-SC, Re: Proposed Rules on E-Filing) I


I

I, ROMEO R. SIAZON, with office address at Senate of the


II
Philippines, GSIS Bldg., Financial Center, Jose W. Diokno Blvd.,
Pasay City, hereby declare that the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND w
I
. . . . . .' . . . . J

!I
PROHIBITION With Application for a Writ of Prelirninary Injunction, nn.d II
Urgenf Prayer for Tenzporary Restraining Order and Status Quo Ante Order i
I
(and annexes) hereto sub1nitted electronically in accordance with the
Efficient Use of Paper Rule is a con1plete and hue copy of the i
PETITION FOR CERTJORARI AND PROHIBITION With ApplicaNon. for a II
11
l!Vrir of Preliminrzry Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for TenLporary Restraining 1:
Order or Status Quo Ante Order (and am1exes) filed with the Supren1e
Court. I'
III

R~R.SIAZON
~I

:1
Affiant
II

. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before ni.e in the Ci Ly of i11


II"
Ivlanila this 27Lh day of February 2017, affiant exhibiting to n1e his ;l:.
Con1petent Evidence of Identification, which bears his photo and -*1::
j . l

signature, cons.isting of Driver's License ID No. N01-93-150222 issued I:


11,
by the Land Transportation Office and valid until 22 October 2017. 1.11

l
I
Doc. No. 3/7 ii
!,,
Page No._ft!/_ ATTY. FR Ne;""". ' . . . ,...,..,, 1,

NOT ARY PUB DEC~ 31, 2018


Book No._JD!l NOT Af~Lti.L COM f. SION N0.2017 061/MU\.
1;

Series of 2017. TIN NO. 18D-238.3~f IROLI NO. 17574


11
1,I

IBP OJ~. t!0.10~)'\'i77-ML/\Ji1/14/16 FORYR 201.-i


PTR MD. 59Si52:?5/MANI L.L\/1-3-20'17 I,'
, I

MC1.F EIO:MPT10r 1 NO. v-0001n lllffll :l.019 ,,I,


I
CC~. Y:-. r:li.:J~~ ,~,:::;-~ '"l'. :r.11H '"ll!\. 7EL. 7'\4t:i11() I
LIST OF ANNEXES TO PETITION

ANNEX DESCRIPTION

"A" Order dated February 23, 2017


11511 Warrant of Anest Dated February 23, 2017 ..L

"C" Inquirer.Net News Article dated 23 February 2017,


entitled "Arrest Warrant Out vs De Lirna - Even Be.fore Courts
/-lear I-fer Plea"

"D" Onmibus Motfou to lnLmediately Endorse the Cases to the


Office of the 01nbudsn1nn and for Inhibition of the Pnnel of
Prosecutors and the Secretary of jus/:ice filed before the DOJ
on 2 December 2016

"D-1" Annex "C" of the Omnibus Motion: A cmnpilation of the 11


I
1
reported acts and public declaration of Secretary Aguirre 1

I
"E" Petition For Prohibition And Certiorari filed before the
Court of Appeals on 13 January 2017 11

(CA-G.R. No. 149097)


I
JI 1::" . Information filed on 17 February 2017 before the RTC- 11
~-

Muntinlupa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-165


11.
"G" Joint Resolution of the Panel of Prosecutors dated 14 i;

February 2017, in NPS Nos.:


XVI-INV-16J-00313
XVI-INV-16}-00315
XVI-INV-161<-00331
XVI-INV-161<-00336
XVI-INV-16L-00384

"Ii" Motion to Quash filed on 20 February 2017 before the - -


RTC-Muntinlupa Br. 204, in Criininal Case No. 17-165

"I" Motion to Reset filed on 22 February 2017 by the Panel of


Prosecutors before the RTC-Muntinlupa Br. 204, in
Criminal Case No. 17-165

"J" Order dated 24 February 2017


-~.. -

,.