Astorga v.

Villegas

Political Law Journal When to be Consulted

In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of
offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor
Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by
Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for Mandamus, Injunction
and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al
and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent
denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act
Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law
passed the 3 reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to
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the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas.
Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for
deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were
subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter
approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was
later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval
and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no
amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the
Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and
invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still
vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute.
Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof
of a bills due enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly
enacted.

HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks
of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked
to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed
by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do
this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and
lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and
the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill
intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making
body.

US v. Pons

Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals

Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to
Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs
authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed
merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby
discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and
dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence
arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in
session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914
while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is
the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381
was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to
go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and
to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by
which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness
of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at
12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to
go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this
particular case.

Bondoc v. Pineda

Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a
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member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista
Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently
declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One member of the Electoral
Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs
leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved
that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman
Justice Herrera.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion?

HELD: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function
of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the
constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are
affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing
that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy.
Since a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as
to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the
responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the
mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was
rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already
voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP
cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a
decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the
HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives

Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

En Banc

Doctrine: citizenship

Date: July 30, 1991

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district
of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in

the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners,
Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of

the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private

respondent premised on the following grounds:

1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines;

and

2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of

Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on

November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar
on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate

of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born
in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the
year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province
of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside

community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and
practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years
passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina
Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932
according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong
who was born in 1948.

Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided

to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the
vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a

result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application
for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose
Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of
First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision
of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong
Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of

Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was
issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent)
 was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the
province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos

insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private

respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in
order to acquire his secondary and college education.

Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and

passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment
opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for
work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the
hardware business of his family in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to

the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural
born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention
which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal
treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the
mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of
natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the
article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV

read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the

adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who

elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

 SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying

not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after
February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The
provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous
situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born
citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so
elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of
a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of

the Constitution accords natural born status to children born
of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing

elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father
had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine
(9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in

1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have

been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who
had been a citizen since he was nine years old

In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
 The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right
of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.

SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of

stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his death.
An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through
a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to
declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents
father as null and void would run against the principle of due
process because he has already been laid to rest.

Coseteng v. Mitra

Coseteng v Mitra G.R. No. 86649 Digest

Coseteng v. Mitra (Digest)
G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990
Topic: Commission on Appointments

Facts:

1. The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of the candidates
of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-
Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA),
and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected
under the banner of KAIBA.

2. Then, House , upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected
from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in
the Commission on Appointments (CA).

3. Upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL,
as the 12th CA member, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.

4. A year later, the LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House
affiliated with it the House committees, including the House representation in the CA, had to be
reorganized to conform with the new political alignments.
5. Petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of
KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the CA and HRET. Her request was endorsed by nine (9)
congressmen. After the reorganization, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member
representing the House minority.

6. Hence the petition of for Extraordinary legal writs by Coseteng to declare as null and void the election
of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial,
Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin
them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as
members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission
violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation on following grounds:

a. the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine
(9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House;

b. the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their
respective political parties or coalitions;

c. the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the
minority was clearly invalid; and

d. that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission
because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House.

7. Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA as a representative of the
Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the
Minority .

8. Respondents contention was that: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of the CA is a political
question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the
reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e.,
on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition
"as a form of a political party"

ISSUE: W/N the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

YES.
1. The Court held that the petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, (which
it does not), but because the revision of the House representation in the CA is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the
CA should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties, as they were
nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by
their party) in accordance with the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on
Appointments eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is
unassailable.

2. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership
(which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the
LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the
next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in
the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein.

3. The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a
member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to
be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or
less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in
the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission
on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it
should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.

4. The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's
election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they
signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.