SANTOS VS NORTHWEST

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992
AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal guardian,
Augusto Benedicto Santos vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and CA
FACTS: The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent
Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota,
U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines.
On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San
Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The
scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for
his return to San Francisco.
On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco
airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to
Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.
On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC of Makati. On April 13,
1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of
the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.
The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its
principal place of business. Neither was the petitioners ticket issued in this country nor was
his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case. (Issue raised by the party is
WON the provision of the Warsaw convention was constitutional)
HELD: No jurisdiction (the provision is constitutional)
The Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government
and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The petitioners allegations are
not convincing enough to overcome this presumption. Apparently, the Convention
considered the four places designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for the
litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its passenger, as
distinguished from all other places.
 NOTES:
WON Warsaw convention applies.
Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for
hire. Whether the transportation is international is determined by the contract of the
parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage
provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, the provisions of the Convention
automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its
passenger.
WON MNL or SFO was the destination.
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by
the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the
passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioners ticket shows that his ultimate
destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the
contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the
petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an
agreed stopping place and not the destination.
WON Northwest has domicile in the Philippines
Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is allowed
to be filed under Article 28(1). By specifying the three other places, to wit, the principal
place of business of the carrier, its place of business where the contract was made, and the
place of destination, the article clearly meant that these three other places were not
comprehended in the term domicile.

G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

o INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention is constitutional, a treaty

commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force
and effect of law in this country.
o INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, when applicable: To all "international
transportations of persons by aircraft for hire." Whether the transportation is "international"
is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket.
When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between
certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the
provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and
liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
o INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction: Place of Destination vis-a-
vis Agreed Stopping Place: The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the
place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this
 expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract
of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place
where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient
Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed
to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased
from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the petitioner
checked in the at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his departure to Manila.
Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no
reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March
12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance

with the constitution so as to deprive the Philippine Courts jurisdiction over the
case

HELD:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of
the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw
Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the
Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of
accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited
with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to
the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay
issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the
same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by
the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine

government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

Does the Warsaw Convention apply in this case?

By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons
performed by aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation" shall
mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place
of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the
transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties . . .

Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties,

which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the
transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically
apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United
States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four places where an
action for damages may be brought.

Does Article 28(1) refer to Jurisdiction or Venue?

...where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual
concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court
must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of
which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second
question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.

Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiffs destination was Manila?

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by
the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the
passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate
destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the
contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the
petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an
agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping
place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes
of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and
ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the
understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one
place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage
may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
 210 SCRA 256 Political Law Constitutional Law The Judicial Department Judicial
Review Constitutionality of a Treaty Warsaw Convention
Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986, he bought
a round trip ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) in San Francisco. His flight would be
from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back to San Francisco. His scheduled flight was
in December. A day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOA said he made no
reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year, due to the incident, he sued NOA
for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over the matter pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that
complaints against international carriers can only be instituted in:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOAs domicile is in the USA);
2. the court of its principal place of business (which is San Francisco, USA);
3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made
(ticket was purchased in San Francisco so thats where the contract was made);
4. the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a round trip ticket which final
destination is San Francisco).
The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the case and he questioned the constitutionality of Article 28 (1) of the
Warsaw Convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to conduct
judicial review.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC is
bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was ratified by the Senate. Until
& unless there would be amendment to the Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for
Santos III is to sue in any of the place indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco,
USA.
The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. In
the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by the legislative and the executive. The
presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before
it was adopted and given the force of law in this country. In this case, Santos was not able
to offer any compelling argument to overcome the presumption

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS VS. CA

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et al vs.CA et al.
G.R. No. 102223
August 22, 1996
FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC
MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC.
and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as Representative Agreement.
Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its exclusive representative in the
Philippines for the sale of ITECs products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a
stipulated commission. Through a License Agreement entered into by the same parties
later on, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name ITEC in its own name. Thus ,
ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).
One year into the second term of the parties Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to
terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual
commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another
Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of
which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITECs products
specifications to develop their own line of equipment and product support, which are
similar, if not identical to ITECs own, and offering them to ITECs former customer.
The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed a MTD the
complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and
SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the
application against it of the principle of forum non conveniens. The MTD was denied.
Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence
this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner corp,
despite allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of non-registration?
2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of
forum non convenience?
HELD: petition dismissed.
1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been engaged in or doing business
in the Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the
different contracts and agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts
in the country. Its arrangements, with these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is
actively engaging in business in the country.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts
although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had
contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is
estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same
by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence
applies to a foreign as well as to domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a
corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate
existence and capacity.
In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this commonly used
scheme of defaulting local companies which are being sued by unlicensed foreign
companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to invoke the lack of capacity to sue
of such foreign companies. Obviously, the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to prevent the
injunctive action filed by ITEC to enjoin petitioner from using knowledge possibly acquired
in violation of fiduciary arrangements between the parties.
2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non
application, of the private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled
rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its
discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having
no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the
original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question
plaintiffs standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into
the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of
the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non
convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its
having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if
it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and,
3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the courts disposition to give
due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present forum not being the most
convenient as a ground for the suits dismissal, deserves scant consideration.

COMMUNICATIONMATERIALSANDDESIGN,INCetalvs.CAetal.G.R.No.102223August22,1996
FACTS:PetitionersCOMMUNICATIONMATERIALSANDDESIGN,INC.,(CMDI)andASPACMULTI
TRADEINC.,(ASPAC)arebothdomesticcorporations..PrivateRespondentsITEC,INC.and/orITEC,
INTERNATIONAL,INC.(ITEC)arecorporationsdulyorganizedandexistingunderthelawsoftheStateof
Alabama,USA.ThereisnodisputethatITECisaforeigncorporationnotlicensedtodobusinessinthe
Philippines.ITECenteredintoacontractwithASPACreferredtoasRepresentativeAgreement.Pursuanttothe
contract,ITECengagedASPACasitsexclusiverepresentativeinthePhilippinesforthesaleofITECsproducts,
inconsiderationofwhich,ASPACwaspaidastipulatedcommission.ThroughaLicenseAgreemententeredinto
bythesamepartieslateron,ASPACwasabletoincorporateandusethenameITECinitsownname.Thus,
ASPACMultiTrade,Inc.becamelegallyandpubliclyknownasASPACITEC(Philippines).Oneyearintothe
secondtermofthepartiesRepresentativeAgreement,ITECdecidedtoterminatethesame,becausepetitioner
ASPACallegedlyviolateditscontractualcommitmentasstipulatedintheiragreements.ITECchargesthe
petitionersandanotherPhilippineCorporation,DIGITALBASECOMMUNICATIONS,INC.(DIGITAL),the
PresidentofwhichislikewisepetitionerAguirre,ofusingknowledgeandinformationofITECsproducts
specificationstodeveloptheirownlineofequipmentandproductsupport,whicharesimilar,ifnotidenticalto
ITECsown,andofferingthemtoITECsformercustomer.ThecomplaintwasfiledwiththeRTCMakatiby
ITEC,INC.DefendantsfiledaMTDthecomplaintonthefollowinggrounds:(1)Thatplaintiffhasnolegal
capacitytosueasitisaforeigncorporationdoingbusinessinthePhilippineswithouttherequiredBOIauthority
andSEClicense,and(2)thatplaintiffissimplyengagedinforumshoppingwhichjustifiestheapplicationagainst
itoftheprincipleofforumnonconveniens.TheMTDwasdenied.Petitionerselevatedthecasetotherespondent
CAonaPetitionforCertiorariandProhibitionunderRule65oftheRevisedROC.Itwasdismissedaswell.MR
denied,hencethisPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45.

ISSUE:1.DidthePhilippinecourtacquirejurisdictionoverthepersonofthepetitionercorp,despiteallegationsof
lackofcapacitytosuebecauseofnonregistration?

2.CanthePhilippinecourtgiveduecoursetothesuitordismissit,ontheprincipleofforumnonconvenience?

HELD:petitiondismissed.1.YES;WearepersuadedtoconcludethatITEChadbeenengagedinordoing
businessinthePhilippinesforsometimenow.Thisistheinevitableresultafterascrutinyofthedifferent
contractsandagreementsenteredintobyITECwithitsvariousbusinesscontactsinthecountry.Itsarrangements,
withtheseentitiesindicateconvincinglythatITECisactivelyengaginginbusinessinthecountry.Aforeign
corporationdoingbusinessinthePhilippinesmaysueinPhilippineCourtsalthoughnotauthorizedtodobusiness
hereagainstaPhilippinecitizenorentitywhohadcontractedwithandbenefitedbysaidcorporation.Toputitin
anotherway,apartyisestoppedtochallengethepersonalityofacorporationafterhavingacknowledgedthesame
byenteringintoacontractwithit.Andthedoctrineofestoppeltodenycorporateexistenceappliestoaforeignas
wellastodomesticcorporations.Onewhohasdealtwithacorporationofforeignoriginasacorporateentityis
estoppedtodenyitscorporateexistenceandcapacity.InAntamConsolidatedInc.vs.CAetal.weexpressedour
chagrinoverthiscommonlyusedschemeofdefaultinglocalcompanieswhicharebeingsuedbyunlicensed
foreigncompaniesnotengagedinbusinessinthePhilippinestoinvokethelackofcapacitytosueofsuchforeign
companies.Obviously,thesameployisresortedtobyASPACtopreventtheinjunctiveactionfiledbyITECto
enjoinpetitionerfromusingknowledgepossiblyacquiredinviolationoffiduciaryarrangementsbetweenthe
parties.

2.YES;Petitionersinsistenceonthedismissalofthisactionduetotheapplication,ornonapplication,ofthe
privateinternationallawruleofforumnonconveniensdefieswellsettledrulesoffairplay.Accordingto
petitioner,thePhilippineCourthasnovenuetoapplyitsdiscretionwhethertogivecognizanceornottothepresent
action,becauseithasnotacquiredjurisdictionoverthepersonoftheplaintiffinthecase,thelatterallegedly
havingnopersonalitytosuebeforePhilippineCourts.Thisargumentismisplacedbecausethecourthasalready
acquiredjurisdictionovertheplaintiffinthesuit,byvirtueofhisfilingtheoriginalcomplaint.Andaswehave
alreadyobserved,petitionerisnotatlibertytoquestionplaintiffsstandingtosue,havingalreadyaccededtothe
samebyvirtueofitsentryintotheRepresentativeAgreementreferredtoearlier.Thus,havingacquired
jurisdiction,itisnowforthePhilippineCourt,basedonthefactsofthecase,whethertogiveduecoursetothesuit
ordismissit,ontheprincipleofforumnonconvenience.Hence,thePhilippineCourtmayrefusetoassume
jurisdictioninspiteofitshavingacquiredjurisdiction.Conversely,thecourtmayassume

jurisdictionoverthecaseifitchoosestodoso;provided,thatthefollowingrequisitesaremet:1)Thatthe
PhilippineCourtisonetowhichthepartiesmayconvenientlyresortto;2)ThatthePhilippineCourtisinaposition
 tomakeanintelligentdecisionastothelawandthefacts;and,3)ThatthePhilippineCourthasorislikelytohave
powertoenforceitsdecision.Theaforesaidrequirementshavingbeenmet,andinviewofthecourtsdispositionto
giveduecoursetothequestionedaction,thematterofthepresentforumnotbeingthemostconvenientasa
groundforthesuitsdismissal,deservesscantconsideration.

Manila Hotel Corporation vs National Labor Relations Commission

In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988, he was recruited by
Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed to the hotels job offer and
so he started working there in November 1988. The employment contract between him and Palace Hotel
was however without the intervention of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In
August 1989, Palace Hotel notified Santos that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In
September 1989, he was officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC)
and Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was impleaded but no summons were
served upon it. MHC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a foreign
corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled
the case ruled in favor of Santos. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor
arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:
1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that Santos is a Filipino;
2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations MHC cannot be held liable because it
merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs of the Palace Hotel. The veil of
corporate fiction cant be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is directly managing the affairs of
MHIL. Hence, they are separate entities.
3. Santos contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the Philippines;
4. Santos contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA (had POEA intervened, NLRC
still does not have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will hear the case);
5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are not
residents of the Philippines;
Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining to the case. It
is not competent to determine the facts because the acts complained of happened outside our
jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case a judgment is rendered, it cannot be
enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it was not served any summons).
The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or
agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts;
and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.

343 SCRA 1 Private International Law Forum Non Conveniens

 In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988, he was
recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed
to the hotels job offer and so he started working there in November 1988. The employment
contract between him and Palace Hotel was however without the intervention of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace Hotel
notified Santos that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In September 1989, he was
officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was
impleaded but no summons were served upon it. MHC is a government owned and
controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL
manages the affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in
favor of Santos. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:
1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that Santos is a Filipino;
2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations MHC cannot be held
liable because it merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs of the
Palace Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction cant be pierced because it was not shown that
MHC is directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are separate entities.
3. Santos contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the Philippines;
4. Santos contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA (had POEA
intervened, NLRC still does not have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will hear
the case);
5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their
agents/officers are not residents of the Philippines;
Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining
to the case. It is not competent to determine the facts because the acts complained of
happened outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case
a judgment is rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it
was not served any summons).
The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine
court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.

Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi

(62 N.Y.2d 474, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, N.Y. 1984 - July 05, 1984)

Plaintiff, the Islamic Republic of Iran, brings this action against Iran's former ruler, Shah Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi, and his wife, Empress Farah Diba Pahlavi. It alleges in its complaint that defendants
accepted bribes and misappropriated, embezzled or converted 35 billion dollars in Iranian funds in
breach of their fiduciary duty to the Iranian people and it seeks to recover those funds and 20 billion
dollars in exemplary damages. It asks the court to impress a constructive trust on defendants' assets
located throughout the world, for an accounting of all moneys and property received by the
defendants from the government of Iran, and for other incidental relief. The action was commenced
in November, 1979 by substituted service on the Shah made at New York Hospital where he was
undergoing cancer therapy. The Empress was personally served at the same time at the New York
residence of the Shah's sister. Thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that it
raised nonjusticiable political questions, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction due to defective
service of process on them and that the complaint should be dismissed on grounds of forum non
conveniens.

Special Term granted defendants' motion based on forum non conveniens, concluding that the parties
had no connection with New York other than a claim that the Shah had deposited funds in New York
banks, a claim which it found insufficient under the circumstances to justify the court in retaining
jurisdiction.The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens, also articulated in CPLR 327(a),
which permits a court to stay or dismiss [an action] where it is determined that the action, although
jurisdictionally sound, would be better adjudicated elsewhere. In a motion to dismiss on the ground
of forum non conveniens, the burden is on a defendant challenging the forum to demonstrate relevant
private or public interest factors which militate against accepting the litigation here. A divided
Appellate Division affirmed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as against defendant Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and
affirmed the order of the Appellate Division as against defendant Farah Diba Pahlavi, holding, in an
opinion by Judge Simons, that the courts below did not abuse their discretion as a matter of law in
dismissing the action on the ground of forum non conveniens since the record does not demonstrate a
substantial nexus between New York State and plaintiff's cause of action, even though there may be
no other forum in which plaintiff can obtain the relief it seeks; and that the provisions of the January,
1981 agreements between the United States and Iran, commonly known as the Algerian Accords, did
not require reversal.

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs sued Defendants, in state court arising from injuries sustained in a plane
crash in Scotland. The cases were removed to federal court and transferred to the District Court of
Pennsylvania. Defendants moved to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that
the better forum was located in Scotland.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to dismiss a case that
was brought in the wrong forum. When all or most of the significant events, witnesses and evidence are
centered in one location, then a court must dismiss a case brought in another location under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens unless the alternate forum provides the plaintiff with absolutely no remedy.
Whether the law of the forum chosen by the plaintiff is more favorable to the plaintiff should not be given
weight.

Facts.
There was a plane crash in Scotland, where five citizens of Scotland were killed. The aircraft was
manufactured in Pennsylvania by Piper Aircraft Company (Defendant) and the propellers were made in
Ohio by Hartzell Propeller, Inc. (Defendant). The plane was registered in Great Britain and owned and
operated by people from the United Kingdom. The wreckage was in England. An investigation conducted
by The British Department of Trade concluded that there was no evidence of defective equipment and
that the crash was probably due to pilot error. Reyno, Plaintiff, a legal secretary for the attorney of the
decedents survivors, was appointed administratrix of the decedents estate by a California probate court.
Plaintiff commenced separate wrongful death actions against the Piper and Hartzell in California
Superior Court, claiming negligence and strict liability. They also filed suit in the United Kingdom against
the owner and operator. Plaintiff admits that she filed suit in the United Stat
es because of its laws regarding liability and capacity to sue. Defendant filed motion to remove to the
District Court in California which was granted. Piper moved to transfer to the District Court in
Pennsylvania. Hartzell moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to transfer.
The District Court quashed service and transferred the case to Pennsylvania. Plaintiff then served
Hartzell with process in the District Court in Pennsylvania. Defendants moved to dismiss for forum non
conveniens.
The District Court of Pennsylvania granted the motions based on the analysis articulated in [Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947)], namely that: 1) An alternative forum
existed in Scotland; 2) The plaintiff only filed in the U.S. for the favorable law; 3) There were
overwhelming connections with Scotland; 4) Witnesses and evidence were beyond the reach of
compulsory process.; 5) All of Defendants witnesses are in Great Britain; 6) There should be only one
trial to preserve judicial expense and avoid the risk of inconsistent verdicts; 7) Scottish law would apply
to Hartzell, and Pennsylvania law would apply to Piper, which would be excessively confusing for a jury;
8) The jurors have little connection to the controversy; 9) Scotland has a substantial interest in the
outcome of litigation.
The Circuit Court reversed and remanded District Courts decision. It held that the District Court abused
its discretion when using the Gilbert analysis. In addition, the court baed its argument on several
additional factors: (1) dismissal is never appropriate where the law of the alternative forum is less
favorable to Plaintiffs; (2) Plaintiffs choice of forum deserves substantial weight even though they are
non-residents; (3) Defendants did not prove that all their witnesses were in Great Britain; (4) Defendants
inability to implead other defendants would be burdensome but not unfair; (5) viewing the wreckage and
Scottish topography was not that significant; (6) application of foreign law does not require dismissal; (7)
Pennsylvania and Ohio would be the governing law anyway, because these states have the greatest
policy interests; and finally (8) a dismissal for forum non conveniens should not result in a change in the
applicable law, just a change in the location of the trial. T
he Supreme Court read this holding to mandate that dismissal is automatically barred if it would lead to a
change in the applicable law unfavorable to the plaintiff.

Issue. Should a case be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens when all the witnesses and
evidence are in another country, the other countrys jurors would be more connected to the problem, it is
inconvenient to the parties to try the case in the jurisdiction where it was brought, and the other countrys
law will be applied?

Held. Yes. Reversed.

The possibility of a change of law should not be given substantial weight in a forum non conveniens
analysis. Plaintiffs can choose among many forums, and generally choose the most favorable one. If
they do not choose the most favorable but the action can be dismissed anyway, it would not be proper. In
 addition, courts would have to interpret the law of foreign districts, which would pose a lot of problems
and inconsistencies. This is why there is a doctrine of forum non conveniens, to get rid of this kind of
confusion.
Upholding the Court of Appeals judgment would also increase the flow of litigation, and the courts would
be overwhelmed.
Choice of law should only be considered in this scenario when the remedy in the alternative forum is
totally inadequate or when the alternative forum lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The facts of the case
do not show either scenario.
Giving the plaintiffs interests less weight is justified when the plaintiffs are foreign. Under this
circumstance, the choice of forum is not necessarily convenient. The connections with Scotland were not
necessarily overwhelming, but the District Court correctly found that there would be fewer evidentiary
problems. If Defendants had to prove exactly what persons it would be difficult to identify and bring as
witnesses, Defendants required expenditures would defeat the purpose of their motion.
Even if Scottish law would not apply, the other public interest factors would be sufficient to support
dismissal. There is a local interest. The American interest is not sufficient.
Discussion. Choosing a particular forum because the law is more favorable to the plaintiff cannot be
given any substantial weight under a forum non conveniens analysis. Although the general rule is that a
court should not dismiss a case on grounds of forum non conveniens unless there is an alternate forum
in which the plaintiff can pursue a remedy, this rule only requires that the plaintiff be able to file a proper
lawsuit in that alternate fo

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno

454 U.S. 235, 102 S. Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed. 2d 419 (1981)
Five UK citizens were killed in a plane crash in Scotland. The administrator of their estates,
Reyno, sued Piper (who made the plane in Pennsylvania) and Hartzell (who made the engines in Ohio)
in California State Court for negligence and strict liability.
o Relatives of the five dead passengers separately sued Air Navigation, McDonald
(operator), and the pilots estate in a UK court.
o Reyno admitted that she brought suit in California because the US had more lenient laws
regarding capacity to sue, damages and liability than the UK.
o UK law has no strict liability in tort, and wrongful-death claims are only good for
loss of support and society.
o Reyno argued that she had standing to sue in California State court because she was a
California resident.
Piper had the case moved to a Federal Court in California, and then, successfully moved to have
the case transferred to a Federal Court in Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 USC 1404(a).
o According to 28 USC 1404(a), you have to use California law, regardless of where you
move the case to. However, Californias conflict principles states that if the case is moved to another
State, and there is a conflict of laws, you have to use that States law.
o For example, if its a case of speeding, its really appropriate to use the speed limit
of the place you were speeding, not in the place where the trial is being held.
o So, under California law, you have to use Pennsylvania Tort law, because under California
law you use the law of where the defendant is. In Pennsylvania, their conflict principles state that you
should use the law of where the tort occurred. So, for the Pennsylvania plaintiffs, you have to apply
Scottish law!
o This conflict of laws principle is an issue-by-issue determination. This starts to get
complicated really fast.
After it was transferred to the Federal Court in Pennsylvania, Hartzell & Piper moved to dismiss
on ground of forum non conveniens.
o Forum non conveniens means that the chosen forum is not where the case should be
heard. In this case, Piper argued that the case was more appropriately heard in a UK Court.
The Pennsylvania Federal Trial Court granted this motion. Reyno appealed.
o The Pennsylvania Federal Trial Court held the trial would be much easier to hold in
Scotland, as the plane, navigation and parties were all in Scotland, as opposed to respondents
contention the plane, testing, design, and manufacture were all in the states.
The Federal Appellate Court reversed. Piper appealed.
o The Appellate Court based their decision on the grounds that dismissal should be barred
when the law of the alternate forum is less favorable to the plaintiff than the forum the plaintiff chose.
o Scottish law is less favorable to plaintiffs than Pennsylvania law. But isnt less
favorable to the plaintiff, more favorable to the defendant? Why should we favor one side over the
other?
The US Supreme Court reversed, and dismissed the case.
o The US Supreme Court found that the private interest factors involved here are more
suited for trying in Scotland. The accident occurred there, as well as the ability to interview critical
witnesses and experts would be better served by trying in Scotland.
o The Court had already established that the argument that the case should be held in the
US because damages and rules were better in the US than in the UK was not convincing (see Canada
Malting Co. v. Patterson Steamships, Ltd. (285 US 413 (1932))).
o This was a clear case of forum shopping.
o Now, under 28 USC 1332, the executor of an estate takes on the citizenship of the
decedent. This is specifically to stop this type of forum shopping.
Piper Aircraft Co v. Reyno
SCOTUS - 1981
Facts:
P was executrix of the estates of 5 people killed in a plane crash in Scotland. P brought suit in US against D
(manufacturer of plane and parts) since liability law is better in the US for P than Scottish law.
 Suit was filed in state court and then removed to federal court. Suit was then removed from CDCA to
MDPA district court.
D moved to dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens.
Procedural History:
District Court granted D's motion to dismiss, forum non conveniens valid.
3rd Cir COA reversed and remanded, forum non conveniens not valid.
SCOTUS reversed, granted D's motion to dismiss, forum non conveniens valid.
Issues:
What kind of analysis should a court do to determine if a motion to dismiss based upon forum non
conveniens should be granted?
Should the possible change in substantive law be given weight in a forum non conveniens action?
Holding/Rule:
In determining if a motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens should be granted, a court should
analyze the facts through Gilbert.
o A plaintiff's choice of forum should only be disturbed if an alternative forum has jurisdiction and the
chosen forum would "establish oppressiveness and vexation to a D out of all proportion to the P's
convenience" or if the chosen forum is "inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's
own administrative and legal problems."
o The court should weigh the "private interest factors" and "public interest factors" of a chosen forum.
A court should not give much weight to the possibility of a change in substantive law in a forum non
conveniens action.
Reasoning:
An alternative forum existed in Scotland.
o Witnesses are in Scotland.
o Scotland has an interest in the case.
P is a representative of foreign citizens and residents seeking a forum in the US because of the more liberal
rules concerning products liability law.
o If upheld, all sorts of litigation would flow into the US.
Gilbert addressed the fact that US courts should not usually have to apply foreign law. Applying foreign law
is confusing for courts and juries. "The need to apply foreign law points towards dismissal."
Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a
foreign P's choice deserves less deference.
The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court; it may be
reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
Dissent:
None given.
Notes:
Difference in law is not a bar on forum non-conveniens.
This opinion was based in part on not wanting to impose "Americana" on the rest of the world.

Facts of the case

(This summary was prepared by Tom Feledy.)
A British company, flying an airplane manufactured by Piper, a Pennsylvania company,
equipped with propellers made by Hartzell, an Ohio company, conducted a charter flight in
Scotland for five Scottish citizens. When the plane crashed, killing all on board, the next of
kin, also Scottish, had a Los Angeles-based lawyer sue Piper and Hartzell for wrongful
death. The suit was filed in a California state court, then removed to Federal District Court
in California, and finally transferred to Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. There it was
dismissed for forum non conveniens under the determination that the case should be tried
in Scotland: the crash had occurred, the crash investigation had been conducted there by
British authorities, and the pilot's estate, the plane's owners, and the charter company
were all located there. However, respondents successfully appealed, claiming that
substantive law in Scotland would be unfavorable to their case. Scotland, unlike
Pennsylvania, had no strict liability law, which, along with negligence, respondents were
relying upon in order to prevail.

Question
Does the possibility of an unfavorable change in law bar dismissal under forum non
conveniens?

Conclusion
Yes. In a 7-3 majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the District
Court properly weighed private and public interests using the Gulf Oil v. Gilbert test to determine that the
trial should be held in Scotland. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be
given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. Justices Lewis Powell
and Sandra Day o"Connor did not participate.

Gulf Oil Corp. vs. Gilbert Digest

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert

Forum Non-Conveniens

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Gilbert filed an action in New York against the petitioner for negligence due to
the delivery of gasoline to his tanks and pumps. The venue statutes of the United States
permit this. Gilbert resides in Virginia, USA.

2. Petitioner Gulf Oil is a company organized under the laws of Pennsylvania with authority
to do business in both Virginia and New York. It designated officials in each state as agents
to receive the process. Gulf Oil invoked the doctrine of 'forum non-conveniens' and claimed
that Virginia is the appropriate venue for the trial becuase it is where the plaintiff resides,
where corporation does business, where the witness likewise resides and it is also the place
where the events took place.

3. On one hand, plaintiff contends that the action filed in New York is justified since the
action involved an amount for claim for damages close to $400 thousand which may
stagger the imagination of the local jury, the diversity of the citizenship of the parties and
that plaintiff's counsel resides in New York.

4. The District Court of New Yorl dismissed the tort action pursuant to FNC (forum non-
conveniens) while the Appeals Court reversed the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the action was properly dismissed from NY court under the
doctrine of FNC thought personam jurisdiction and venue are proper
HELD:

YES. The application of the doctrine lies in the the discretion of the court. However, tje
interests of the plaintiff, the defendant and the forum state need to be considered. Here,
there is not interest for any party to have the litigation in New York. In fact, interests weigh
against it.

Moreover, the plaintiff may not choose an inconvenient forum to harass the petitioner.
Finally, the state has an interest in avoiding the overcrowding of its own courts and
subjecting its citizens to jury duty in a case having no ties to their state.