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Journals, Research Paper, and Publications on How the US Intervened in


Submitted By:
Lovely Bueno
Adrian Mikhos Crispo
Jadeson Ruther Cruz
Tamsim Moran
Jan Carlo Sumisim

February 3, 2016

Table of Contents

US Relations with Iraq.................................................................................................. 3

Petroimperialism:US Oil Interests and the Iraq War......................................................4

One War, Many Reasons: The US Invasion of Iraq........................................................9

The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences........................................12

The Iraq War and Domestic Politics............................................................................17

UNs Role In Iraq........................................................................................................ 19

Sources...................................................................................................................... 20

US Relations with Iraq
US Department of State

The U.S. Mission in Iraq remains dedicated to building a strategic partnership with
Iraq and the Iraqi people. The December 2011 departure of U.S. troops from Iraq marked a
milestone in our relationship as Iraq continues to develop as a sovereign, stable, and self-
reliant country. Iraq is now a key partner for the U.S. in the region as well as a voice of
moderation and democracy in the Middle East. Iraq has functioning government institutions
including an active legislature, is playing an increasingly constructive role in the region, and
has a bright economic future as oil revenues surpass pre-Saddam production levels with
continued rapid growth to come. The U.S. maintains vigorous and broad engagement with
Iraq on diplomatic, political, economic, and security issues in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq
Strategic Framework Agreement.
The Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) between Iraq and the U.S. provides the
basis for the U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship. It covers the range of bilateral issues including
political relations and diplomacy, defense and security, trade and finance, energy, judicial
and law enforcement issues, services, science, culture, education, and environment. Efforts
to implement the SFA are overseen by the Higher Coordinating Committee and several Joint
Coordination Committees, which meet periodically. U.S. Assistance to Iraq U.S. assistance to
Iraq has changed over the last several years, shifting from large scale infrastructure projects
to focus on capacity-building, long-term development, assistance to vulnerable groups, and
democracy and governance. U.S. assistance also continues to help build the capacity of
Iraqs civil society organizations and elected representatives, including assistance in the
modernization of Iraqi law and seeks to increase participation in the democratic process.
U.S. bilateral assistance aims to preserve the strategic, political, and economic
importance of the U.S.-Iraq partnership in a changing Middle East region. U.S. security
assistance supports the development of a modern, accountable, and professional Iraqi
military capable of defending Iraq and its borders. U.S. security assistance programs also
promote civilian oversight of the military, adherence to the rule of law, and the respect for
human rights, while simultaneously increasing the Iraqi militarys capability to respond to
threats and conduct counter-terrorism operations. Embassy Baghdad maintains the Office of
Security Cooperation Iraq to further these goals and to facilitate Iraqs role as a responsible
security partner, contributing to the peace and security of the region. The U.S. Government
strives to work in partnership with Iraqis on initiatives that they support with their own
funds. The U.S. Government seeks to utilize assistance to help Iraq marshal its own financial
resources for the self-sustaining benefit of its people.

Bilateral Economic Relations The Iraqi Government has stated its desire to transition
from a centrally run economy to one that is more market-oriented, though progress has
been slow and uneven. Iraq is gradually deepening its trade with the international
community, with both exports and imports showing rapid growth in recent years. Turkey is
currently Iraqs largest trading partner The United States has designated Iraq as a
beneficiary developing country under the Generalized System of Preferences program and a
number of U.S. companies are active in Iraq, including in the energy, defense, Information
technology, automotive, transportation sectors. Two-way trade in 2011 was $19.3 billion,
with U.S. exports to Iraq at $2.4 billion (a 46.8% increase over 2010), and Iraqi exports to
the United States at $16.9 billion, almost entirely consisting of crude oil. In the first half of
2012, U.S. exports totaled $951.7 million, down from $1.365 billion in the first half of 2011.

Petroimperialism:US Oil Interests and the Iraq War

Nayana J. Jhaveri

The ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction ... a significant portion of the
worlds supply of oil will all be put at hazard ... The only acceptable strategy is ... to
undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing
Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of
American foreign policy. (1998 letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle
(prior to their becoming the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense and
Chairman of the Defense Policy Board) among others sent to President Clinton 26, January
1998, published in the Washington Times 8 March 2001)
This document is revealing in its clear statement of the more predatory objectives
that underlie the justifications for the Iraq war as primarily a preemptive strike to disarm
Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction. If there was one single dimension of
this war that unified popular opinion in the varied countries of the Middle East region, it was
that the real motive behind removing Hussein was in order to control Iraqs oil. Indeed,
during the invasion, a poll showed that 83% of Jordanian people were convinced that oil was
central to the US agenda (Banerjee 2003). In the Middle Eastern press, some of the most
sardonic cartoons have made the same point. For example, Al Akhbar (an Egyptian daily)
depicted two Iraqi women whispering a rumor that whenever a coalition soldier feels dizzy in
the desert, they make him sniff some oil. This perspective strongly resonated with the very
popular slogan seen in the massive anti-war marches throughout the world, namely No
Blood for Oil. There- fore, the intuitive connection between oil and the Iraq war has been
quite widespread. Yet, as the well-known British journalist Robert Fisk has pointed out,
analysis of the relationship between the war and oil interests has been a distinctly invisible

element of mainstream war coverage. If anything, the Bush administration has been
unmistakably tightlipped about its oil interests in determining war policy.
Nonetheless, control over the bountiful Middle Eastern oil endow- ment has been one
of the central goals of the Project for a New American Century whose members are the real
masterminds behind the Iraq war. Much has been written about the bombastic imperialistic
goals of this group that was founded in 1997 for the promotion of American interests in the
new century (see, for example, Ali 2003). Since its inception, PNAC has been agitating for a
war with Iraq and to that end had formed the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. The
letter sent in January 1998 by some of its key members to President Clinton makes it
explicitly clear that they believe that control over Iraqi oil should lie not in Husseins hands,
but in those of the United States. For these hawks, long frustrated with Clintons lack of
military global assertiveness, the 9/11 attacks were a timely geopolitical gift for muscling
into place their bellicose enterprise. The difficulty is that although we now have a good
grasp of the imperial ambitions of the Bush administration, I think we still lack a systematic
analysis of why oil was a driving force behind this war. What kind of ecoliquidity would be
provided to the United States by controlling Iraqi oil at this particular political conjunction?
By ecoliquidity, I mean the dual and fluid circulation of oil both as an asset to be
interchanged with money, as well as creating physical power, that collectively furnish
capitalism with its dynamic energy. If a strategic and sustained alter-globalization movement
is to be viable then we must bring to intelligibility the specific ways in which oil, as a
geoecological form of power, enables the pursuit of geoeconomics in creating the emergent
architecture of this post-Cold War imperial enterprise that the hawks have been seeking.
Susan Buck-Morss (2000) sets out that the end of the Cold War was marked not so
much by the power of the enemy other, but by the need to rectify the fundamentally
materialist contradictions constituent of the mass utopia dreamworlds of both East and
West. Thus, geo- economics came to replace geopolitics, that is, as its key promulgator
Edward Luttwak (1999) says, war by other means. Now, the new and arguably the first
global ideological form is consumerism in its hyperreal, differentiated, and constantly
morphing forms. In propelling this latest dreamworld, the Clinton administration successfully
engaged in aggres- sive policies for economic restructuring that furthered geoeconomic
interests. However, as Michael Klare (2001) explains, when neolib- eralizing restructuring
alone is unable to sweep aside the obstructions to easy resource access for ensuring
geoeconomic goals, it is inevitable that armed conflict again becomes the order of the day.
Often taken for granted, and yet central to capitalisms fluidity, given the require- ments of
todays techno-infrastructure, is the ecoliquidity of that strategic commodity, oil, which has
entered dangerous waters in recent years. After all, geoeconomics was, strictly speaking,
born from the shock waves of the 1970s OPEC oil crisis geographically epicentered in the

Middle East (Achcar 2002; Bromley 1991; Little 2002). These shocks not only
reconfigured the global oil regime but they were also intimately connected to the massive
post-Bretton Woods transformation of the global financial order (Gilpin 2000; Keohane 1984).
As Keohane ex- plained, the development of an open and nondiscriminatory monetary and
trade system sought by the United States needed a readily avail- able supply of reasonably
priced oil. Oil, therefore, was at the center of the redistributive system of American
hegemony (Keohane 1984: 140). And the Middle East was what Caspar Weinberger,
Secretary of Defence, called in 1981 the umbilical cord of the free industrialized world. The
Carter Doctrine of 1980 states An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States
of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military
Although the international oil market has undergone considerable change since the
1970s, the Middle Easts oil base tangibly remains the center of economic gravity in the long
term given the brute fact that the region still holds two-thirds of global oil reserves. Right
now, outside this region, producers are being forced to venture into less productive and
more difficult localities. So, projections show that in the long term, OPEC and the Arab Gulf
producers will become ever more important (Amirahmadi 1998). While Saudi Arabia
possesses the largest reserves globally standing at 262 billion barrels, Iraqs proven reserves
rank second at 113 billion barrels (Alkadiri 2001; Research Unit for Political Economy 2003).
Moreover, the US Energy Department estimates that Iraq has as much as 220 billion barrels
in undiscovered reserves that would bring the Iraqi total to the equivalent of 98 years of
current US annual oil imports. As Raad Alkadiri (2001), senior analyst at the Petroleum
Finance Company in Washington, DC, has recently said, the international oil industry
regards Iraq as one of the ultimate prizes on offer in the world today, and it will be the
Klondike of the 21st century. Of its 70-odd discovered fields where oil is easy to access,
only 15 have been developed so far.
Therefore, given these realities, it is easy to chalk this war up to a particularly
hawkish US administration (in which oil interests seem pervasive) bullishly extending its 70-
year history of petropolitical intervention in the region (Painter 1986; Little 2002). However,
a closer look at the dynamics of oil politics over the last few years will reveal that a more
specific and complex set of oil supply conditions resulted in the US decision to attack Iraq at
this particular time. Given the sequence of events, coupled with the rhetoric of the Bush
admin- istration, we might begin by asking whether the 9/11 attacks, in fact, have anything
to do with this US ambition to reconstruct the Iraqi oil regime. It is well known that 15 of the
19 suicide bombers were Saudi, and that, in the aftermath of the attack, the Saudis were not
particu- larly cooperative with the US administrations investigations. For the United States,

this raised the question of whether Saudi Arabia, its largest supplier of oil, would in practice
continue to be a reliable ally.
What was the evidence that these political developments would actually impinge on
the Saudi supply of reasonably priced oil to the United States? We can begin by situating the
recent developments within a chronological analysis of the factors affecting the relationship
between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The United States has developed an intimate
relationship with Saudi Arabia that spans some 70 years since the time oil was first
discovered in the Gulf (Yergin 1991). The alliance with the Saudi royal family, first
established by the Roosevelt administration, has continued to bring privileged access to oil
in return for military protection. In particular, since the oil embargoes of the 1970s, the
United States boosted its sales of highly sophisticated military armaments to the Saudis.
After the oil-motivated first Gulf War, the United States extended its network of military
bases and arms provision from Saudi Arabia to include Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar in order to
secure regional oil control. Up until today, Saudi oil supply is centrally important to the
United States. In 2002, the Saudi national oil company, Aramco, was the United States
largest oil supplier, providing some 16.8% of total crude imports.
For Saudi Arabia, as with most Gulf states, it is often said that it would be impossible
to use oil as a political weapon because that income enables these states (primarily
sustained by oil rents) to maintain social stability through the financing of extensive
patronage systems and public welfare systems (Mohamedi 1997). Indeed, even after the
9/11 attacks, the Saudis have always stepped up their production of what can be called
political oil to deal with turbulence in oil supply from events such as the Venezuelan oil
strikes in late 2002 (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 2003a). Saudi Arabia is, after all, a
swing producer being the only country in the world with the excess production capacity to
achieve this role at any given time. While this role works to main- tain supply balance and
prices, it involves both gaining from lucrative profits and having to absorb losses. For Saudi
Arabia, retaining this power to sustain elevated prices and prevent market volatility is of
uppermost importance because dependable oil profit is the basis of its stability as a
domestic and regional political power.
Although Saudi Arabias share of the global oil market substantially grew for a brief
period after the oil shocks of the 1970s, significant changes in the global oil production
system starting undermining its centrality soon thereafter. From the late 1970s onwards,
Saudi Arabia has not been one of the primary beneficiaries of the slowly increasing global
demand in oil. This growth was taken up by the smaller prod- ucers in OPEC (Venezuela and
Algeria) as well as non-OPEC producers from the North Sea that offered better oil extraction
technology and terms (Philip 1994; Mohamedi 1997). These producers flooded the oil market
that created the 1986 oil crash in which the Gulf producers lost the market battle from which

they have never fully recovered. Between 1988 and 1996, the Gulf region only took up one-
third of incremental demand growth. Ironically, the new and more expensive non-OPEC
operations were only able to exist because of the elevated prices sustained by OPEC. Faced
with declining revenues, Saudi Arabia has sought to move downstream in the commodity
chain to secure grow- ing Asian markets (in the way the Venezuelans did in North America)
but with very limited success so far (Bromley 1998; Mohamedi 1997). As Simon Bromley
(1998) has underscored, what this demonstrates is that Saudi Arabia, as the key producer
within OPEC, does not possess the supreme power to rig prices. In sum, the Saudi state has
increasingly struggled to uphold its revenue base for fulfilling domestic functions. The Saudi
government, like other Gulf states, lacking the capital with which to develop new oil
facilities, has increasingly turned to private investors to develop natural gas that holds much
promise for most oil majors. Politically, the Saudis cannot afford to privatize oil because of its
nationally strategic role in the economy.
When things worsened financially after the first Gulf War, there were significant
negative repercussions for Saudi Arabias relationship with the United States. That conflict
left Saudi Arabia in a state of deficit after it both paid for the war costs and purchased more
US arms (Mohamedi and Sadowski 2001). In forging a response to this growing crisis, we
start to see the beginnings of an intriguing new grand strategy that is at the heart of a
substantial political reconfiguration in the Middle East. The Saudis started to diversify their
network of global and regional political-economic alliances (often called new polygamous
relations). Of these, the most notable new alliance was with its neighbor, Iran, in ways that
the United States evidently did not appreciate. In addition, when Crown Prince Abdullah took
control after the debilitating stroke of King Fahd in 1995, he reduced US arms purchases
thereby reducing their reliance on its protection. By conjoining the power of two of the most
populous and oil-rich nations in the Gulf, they succeeded (through OPEC) at abating the
1997 slide in oil prices. Moreover, Prince Abdullah has stood out as a new political voice
openly critical of the US sanc- tions against Iraq and an advocate of the Palestinian cause.
He has also attempted to build a base of support for the introduction of some democratic
reforms while reining in some of the conservative clergy. His is a progressive voice on many
counts. After 9/11, this tension with the United States was destined to intensify. Shockwaves
went through Saudi Arabia when a classified Pentagon briefing was leaked out describing it
as the kernel of evil backing Islamic terrorism (Bradley 2003). Then, late last year, Prince
Abdullah himself flew to the United States to caution Bush that unless he reduced his
support for Israel, oil sales and military cooperation could be in jeopardy.
These new strategies are responding to the growing domestic turbulence resulting
from the precarious nature of the Saudi states oil revenue base from the 1980s onwards.
This is an area in which, as Timothy Mitchell (2002) has pointed out, very little research has

been done. In Saudi Arabia, Anglo and American oil interests have had to negotiate with a
national government that itself retains legitimating power through close alliances with the
muwahhidun (whom outsiders call Wahhabists). It is oil money that has helped consolidate
these ties. The muwahhidun first emerged in the era of British colonial expansion to
transform and remoralize the community, but later worked hand- in-hand with the Saudi
state. In the late 1970s, however, with declining state revenue, the muwahhidun came to
oppose the corrupt ruling dynasty and the relationship started to become more disjunctive
and engaged in what Michael Watts (2001) calls petroviolence. The cause of this disjunctive
turn requires, as Robert Vitalis (2002) emphasizes, an examination of material encounters

on the ground.5 Such studies can help us understand how the persistence of a significant
US military presence on Saudi soil after the end of the first Gulf war led to deep resentment
and the fueling of Islamic fundamentalisms. We know this was a primary motive behind bin
Ladens declaration of a Jihad against America, and why so many Saudis were among those
carrying out the suicidal 9/11 attacks. The US media, instead of pursuing care- ful analyses
of these disjunctive processes, has become saturated with perversely orientalist readings of
how the House of Saud is breaking down because of a dysfunctional royal family (see Baer
2003), or cir- culates hardline denunciations of the Saudi kingdoms austere brand of Islam,
Wahhabism (see Dore Golds new book Hatreds Kingdom). Inevitably, the Saudis are
speculating they will be next in line after Iraq.
In sum, the changes in the global oil market as well as domestic political instabilities
have made it increasingly difficult for the Saudi government to maintain a simple
relationship of allegiance with the United States. The response by the Saudi leadership from
the mid- 1990s resulted in the emergence of a new power nexus in the region that began to
circumscribe the capacity for US regional dominance. For the United States, however, it was
clear that this was likely to lead to negative consequences because Saudi Arabia is not just a
major US oil supplier but it continues to play a significant role as swing producer that
substantially influences global oil prices. Seen in this light, the pressure to determine a way
of undermining the power of the Saudi government in the oil market intensified. The tension
created by the new Gulf political alliances was, at the same time, exacerbated in the United

States by its ever-voracious appetite for oil that could only be met through further imports. 6
After the Asian financial crisis in 1998, OPEC (supplying 40% of global oil) tried to bring
prices back up by cutting production. In fact, through cooperation with non-OPEC producers
it succeeded in containing price volatilities over time (Nkrumah 2002). This, however, led
the United States in 2000 to turn to more heavy-handed methods for pressuring OPEC to
increase production. It had to undergo the humiliation of lobbying OPEC in a fashion seldom
seen in the 40-year history of the oil cartel (Andoni 2000). The tension led to many furious

demands within the United States for breaking up OPEC, and Clinton came under intense
criticism for dealing so timidly with oil-producing countries. A few even demanded the arrest
of OPEC ministers for price fixing. Therefore, in the same year, the United States dropped its
long-held objections to easing UN limits on the funds Iraq could use once Baghdad had
agreed to release more oil (Andoni 2000). Around this time, studies on energy security
cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James Baker III Institute for Public
Policy (2001, 2002) concluded that the growing role of Iraq as a new kind of swing producer
posed difficulties for the US administration. According to the Energy Intelligence Group,
when the Venezuelan oil strikes took place in December 2002, Iraq (along with other
nations) helped compensate for the loss by increas-ing production by 140,000 b/d
(Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 2003b).
Given this tangled conjunction of Gulf oil anxieties for the United States, the
reformation of Iraqi oil control could not come soon enough, and hence the war on Iraq. The
plans are to dismantle the nationalized Iraqi oil industry by privatizing it (Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly 2003c) to create a new oil order that harks back to the glories of an
earlier time when oil majors ruled the trade (see Sampson 1975). Thus, the enormous power
of the governing elites will be disconnected from the profits supplied by state oil. At the
same time, this move will counter OPECs centrality so that, in the end, a reasonably priced
supply of oil to both the United States and global markets can be ensured. Iraq will be the
frontier of a bonanza boom for the majors where oil is very cheap to extract (Barlett and
Steele 2003). The most vexatious problem, though, is that it is highly doubtful that the Iraqi
public would actually accept privatization of the oil sector, even if it is delivered as part of a
package of democracy and prosperity. Without political stability, the oil majors will not invest
irrespective of their desperation for access to such a cheap source of oil (Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly 2003c). That time of stability, for the majors, is still a few years off.
Contrary to conventional interpretations, this war does not appear at present to be an
imperial manoevre in the sense that the US government or private corporations obtain the
direct gains from the Iraqi oil wealth for their own aggrandizement. Yahya Sadowski (2003)
has pointed out that the Bush administration does not have strong ties to the oil
supermajors, of which only one is American (Exxon). While it is true that lucrative contracts
have been handed out in closed-door sessions to US oil engineering and servicing
companies such as Bechtel (Vallette et al 2003) and Halliburton (in some cases even before
the war began), these are not the long-term deals that the oil majors are waiting for. Michael
Watts (2001) has said that one of the eight natures of oil is an enduring character:
petroimperialism. Here we see a form of petroimperialism that is true to the intentions of
post-Cold War geoeconomics (Sparke and Lawson 2003) aimed at chaos management by
implementing privatization structures (along the lines of Alain Joxes (2002) assertions).

Given the fact that the US dreamworld continues to be, rather short-sightedly, anchored in
the abundant oil bedrock of the Gulf region, it could be argued that they had no choice but
the use of imperial strategems. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to claim that the Americans
are the architects of their own violent embroilment with Islamic terrorists because of their
own growing need to control the petropolitical order. The main problem, though, lies in the
fact that this consumeristic dreamworld, produced by the smooth effects of oil, has
effectively lulled the American public into a fundamentalist somnolent reverie.

One War, Many Reasons: The US Invasion of Iraq

Markus Nikolas Heinrich

Iraq has been the focus of the international community and has been featured
prominently in the media in recent times, as the radical Islamist group known as the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has dramatically increased its power and influence in the region
in the latter half of 2014. The political turmoil and drastically deteriorated security
environment, which characterises modern day Iraq, can be traced back to the United States
(US) invasion of that country and ISIS, which has recently emerged in Iraq and Syria, in the
insurgency against the resultant US occupation, back then in the form of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
But why did the US invade and occupy Iraq in the first place? To this day, there is a divisive
debate about what the Bush administrations motives were, with the most likely explanation
being a combination of all of the reasons offered. What must also be considered is that the
events leading up to the 2003 invasion only go half way to explain why the US chose to
launch this campaign, and in order to understand the complex and multidimensional factors
contributing to the Bush administrations decision to invade Iraq, one must go back further
and examine pre 9/11 US policy. Likewise, the official and publically stated reasons for
military action only go some way to explain the invasion, and one must look at the unofficial
factors and goals which were determinants of equal importance.
The immediate considerations behind the invasion of Iraq were characterized by
concerns brought to the forefront by the events of September 11th 2001, namely global
terrorism, and more importantly, the weapons at its disposal in a new era of transnational
asymmetrical war waged by non-state actors. As President George W. Bush made it clear in
his State of the Union on January 29th 2002, in meeting this challenge, the US would not
differentiate between terrorist groups and nations which harbour or arm them (Bush, 2002).
This policy led to the invasion of Afghanistan, motivated by the need to remove al-Qaedas
safe haven and training ground.
Iraq did not specifically harbour al-Qaeda, but it had provided training camps and
other support to terrorist groups fighting the government of Turkey and Iran, as well as hard-

line Palestinian groups. In fact, the question of Iraqs link to terrorism grew more urgent
with Saddams suspected determination to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
which Bush administration officials feared he might share with terrorists who could launch
devastating attacks against the United States (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005).
Nonetheless, the official reason that the US cited for launching the invasion was exemplified
by Colin Powells statement to the United Nations on February 5th 2003 (Washington Post,
However, the unofficial reasons why the US led the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 are
equally important. The main unofficial consideration was that removing Saddam Hussein
would be a demonstration of US military might against a visible enemy, a demonstration
which hawkish elements within the Bush administration and the military establishment
considered necessary to deter others and to dispel any appearance of weakness following
9/11 (Karon, 2011). This consideration is motivated by Realism, and, according to Daniel
Lieberfelds explanatory perspectives on the Iraq Invasion, was meant to maintain
unipolarity, maintain hegemony and avoid post-9/11 decline by demonstrating U.S.
willingness to use force (Lieberfeld, 2005).
The fact that Iraq has the worlds second largest reserves of oil can also not be
overlooked. Although major critics of the war such as the political scholars Paul Pillar,
Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer generally disagree that the war was about oil, Pillar did
state that Iraqs oil resources are part of what makes it an important and influential state in
the Middle East, and thus one where it was hoped that change would serve as a catalyst for
change elsewhere in the region (Pillar, 2008). The Bush administration hoped that removing
Saddam Hussein would result in a domino effect, where all regimes in the greater Middle
East hostile to the US and its interests in the region would be intimidated into cooperation,
or toppled by their populations following the example the US had set freeing the Iraqi people
(Gauss III, 2009).
Saddam Husseins Iraq was considered the perfect country to be made an example of
as animosity between the US and Saddam Hussein went back many decades, and removing
him was considered unfinished business by many senior Neo-conservatives in the Bush
administration such as Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney
(Manne, 2004). Thus, this essay aims to examine both the immediate and official reasons
why the US led the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the unofficial goals of this campaign, as well as
other contributing considerations which had been present long before 9/11.
The invasion of Iraq and its intended effects cannot be simply seen by themselves,
but must be understood in the greater context. The US intended the invasion to not only
topple Saddam Hussein and remove the threat of WMD production and diffusion, but also to
bring democracy to a country in the centre of a region almost completely devoid of it. In his

State of the Union, President Bush made it clear that he intended to bring democracy to the
Middle East. His doctrine at its core was that people who are free and prosperous do not fly
airplanes into skyscrapers. In his speech, he made his point that all fathers and mothers, in
all societies, want their children to be educated and live free from poverty and violence. No
people on earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight
knock of the secret police (Bush, 2002). His policy in Iraq, derived from Wilsonianism
(Bhansali, date unknown) and Manifest Destiny (Jones, 2014) was:
Once Iraq was a flourishing democracy prosperous from massive oil revenues which
would pay for reconstruction, it would become an example which other states, or at least
their populations, would emulate. Hostile regimes in the region would find it harder and
harder to paint the US in a negative light and to control and oppress their citizens. One
regime after another would be toppled, supplanted by friendly governments representing
grateful populations which would end in a stable, peaceful, and secure Middle East,
constituting victory in the war on terror, safeguarding the United States, improving Israels
security, and ensuring uninterrupted global access to oil reserves.
According to The Telegraphs Toby Harnden, the creation of a democratic regime in
Iraq could fundamentally reshape the Middle East and make it easier to resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, said yesterday [6 February
2003] (Harnden, 2003). Powell stated, I think there is also the possibility that success
could fundamentally reshape that region in a powerful, positive way that will enhance US
interests, especially if in the aftermath of such a conflict, we are also able to achieve
progress on the Middle East peace (Powel, 2003, cited by Harnden, 2003). The US had in
the past invaded, occupied and transformed totalitarian regimes into democracies, notably
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, now firm allies. These were highly industrialised societies,
however, in nations utterly destroyed in ruinous wars which had lasted years and then
occupied for the better part of half a century. Whether this feat could be repeated in Iraq
was a very open question. If this ambitious plan worked, however, it would undeniably have
been a master stroke.
There were democratic movements in other authoritarian countries in the region,
such as Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Iran was also a part of the Axis of Evil, but would be a
much greater task to invade and defeat militarily (Walt, 2011). If the regime could be
toppled from within, by a population wishing to enjoy the same freedoms the people of Iraq
now enjoyed after Operation Iraqi Freedom, then the US could claim victory in three wars by
fighting only two. Syria, which was seen as a proxy of Iran, could also succumb to pro
democracy forces, and a democratic Lebanon, no longer run by the Muslim paramilitary
group Hezbollah, would greatly increase Israels security.

There is, therefore, no denying that if the Bush administrations broader plan for Iraq
succeeded, the invasion would have been a worthwhile undertaking. Although the US has
now withdrawn from Iraq, it could be argued that the events known as the Arab Spring
(Blight et al, 2012), which refers to democratic uprisings across the Arab world in 2011, are a
spin off from the US campaigns to bring democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq. Whether or not
one shares that view, it is clear that the Bush administration had such an effect in mind as
one of the possible positive effects when it invaded Iraq in 2003.
This desire to spread democracy was a part of US policy for centuries and was one of
the stated goals of President Franklin D. Roosevelt when he decided to supply Britain against
Nazi Germany. This policy eventually led to US involvement in World War Two and the defeat,
occupation, and transformation of Germany from a dictatorship into a democracy. One could
argue, therefore, that President Bush was applying a strategy which was ingrained in US
policy and had worked for it in the past. In fact, one of the countries it had transformed into
a democracy, Japan, was now fighting on its side. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
and his cabinet voted on December 9 to deploy Japans ground, air, and maritime self-
defence forces (SDF) to participate in the US-led occupation of Iraq (Conachy, 2003).
The ambitious goal of transforming the Middle East was not the main stated goal of
the US invasion, but it was no doubt one of the long term objectives of it. Rather than just
fighting the symptom of terrorism and WMD proliferation, the US sought to address the root
causes of this problem in its grand strategy. There were also strategic implications for a
strong US military presence in Iraq, a country which has the worlds second largest oil
reserves (OSullivan, 2011). These implications include: deterring Iran from interfering with
its neighbours, being close to the Straits of Hormuz, ensuring this vital oil corridor remains
open, keeping an eye on Pakistan, and having a springboard for other possible invasions,
notably Iran which the US accused of seeking to illicitly develop a nuclear weapon (Goldberg,
2012). This springboard that an occupied Iraq would present would enable the US to take
military action to stop Iran from achieving nuclear weapon status, something Israel says it
will not tolerate (Hirschfeld, 2012).

The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences

Raymond Hinnesbuch

As the Middle East has become the centerpiece of its drive for global hegemony,
Americas de-stabilizing impact on the region has deepened; equally, the reaction from the
Middle East to US policy carries important consequences for US hegemony globally. The Iraq
war is the pivotal event around which these developments centre.

Explaining the US Invasion of Iraq

The invasion of Iraq can only be properly understood by bringing together three
levels of analysis: 1) US global grand strategy 2) the US strategic position in the Middle East;
and 3) the interests of Bush's ruling coalition. Understanding the Iraq war, in turn, exposes
the inner mainsprings of US Middle East policy and the region's pivotal role in overall US
global strategy.

US Global Grand Strategy and the Middle East

The starting point for understanding the invasion of Iraq is the grand strategy of the
US under Bush to undertake a coercive assertion of global hegemony. The Project for a New
American Century frankly acknowledges this reach for hegemony. The Bush doctrine and the
2002 National Security Strategy, formulated in response to the 9/11 attacks, make explicit
the coercive turn: the call for "full spectrum dominance;" the strategy of dealing with
resistance to the US not simply through traditional containment, but via "preventive wars;"
the resort to unilaterialism, with ad-hoc "coalitions of the willing;" the view that states not
with the US in the war on terrorism are against it; and the claim that only the US liberal
model is legitimate, with sovereignty exempting no nation from the demand that it conform.
This, of course, is all quite a change from traditional US foreign policy which was based on
the containment of threats and which viewed hegemony as being rooted in consent derived
from multilateral consultation (deviation), hence necessarily limited by international law and
institutions; diplomacy, too, was prioritized over military force. By contrast, the architects of
the Bush administration strategy had long advocated a strategy of hegemony based on the
use of American's exceptional military capabilities.

Reshaping the Middle East is pivotal to the success of this project for several reasons.
One of the main pillars of US global hegemony is its protectorate over the "world" oil
reserves concentrated in the Persian Gulf; oil is a strategic commodity that everybody needs
and is crucial to military power while assuring its flow to the world economy makes US
power globally indispensable. The main resistance to US hegemony is also concentrated in
the Muslim Middle East, for two inter-linked reasons: US support for Israel and recurring
Western intervention in the Middle East to control oil supplies. Indeed, securing US
hegemony in the Middle East, at least if it is not to rest on continual coercive intervention,
requires that US support for Israel be balanced by alliances with Arab clients. Specifically,
since support for Israel antagonizes Arabs, balancing requires US leadership in the Arab-
Israeli peace process aimed at a compromise land- for-peace solution to the conflict.

However, this balancing act has been failing: ever-rising Zionist influence has led
Washington to accept-even fund--Israel's colonisation of the very occupied land that had to
be the basis of a compromise peace settlement. Nevertheless, all US presidents sustained
this balancing policy until Bush Jr: as he abandoned (deviation) historic balancing for an
overtly pro-Israeli policy, the invasion of Iraq was seen as an alternative to balancing and a
key to a military version of hegemony in the Middle East that would dispense with one based
on accommodation of Arab interests.

The Mainsprings of War

The 9/11 terrorist attack on the US is central to understanding the war on Iraq even
though Iraq was in no way involved in it. This attack exposed a terrible threat to the US,
originating in the Middle East and Muslim world that had to be countered; at the same time,
hard-liners in the Bush administration who had advocated an attack on Iraq even before
9/11 saw it as an opportunity to mobilize support for a war they thought would be decisive in
transforming the Middle East to suit US interests.
The first hurdle the Bush administration had to clear was to legitimize war on a state
that did not threaten the US. The issue of WMDs was hit upon as a way to turn the 'war on
terrorism' against Iraq; to do so, Bush had to claim that Saddam Hussein was linked to al-
Qaida and was actively developing weapons of mass destruction which he might turn over to
terrorists or use on their behalf, and hence that Iraq represented an imminent threat to the
US. These claims have not only been discredited but, additionally, there is strong evidence
that the war party in Washington deliberated exaggerated unreliable claims and knew Iraq
was no threat to the US. At any rate, the threat was never that WMDs would be used against
the USA but that they could constrain US freedom of action in the Middle East or threaten
To understand the real motives behind the war and why Bush saw an attack on Iraq
as the solution to US problems, we need to shift the focus from security threats to the US,
per se, toward threats to its strategic situation in the Middle East and its hegemony over the
oil market. First, US oil vulnerability was on the rise. US import dependence was rising in an
ever-tighter oil market with global production seemingly peaking, hence shifting the balance
of power to oil producers. These conditions could make the US and the world capitalist
economy vulnerable to an oil shock- historically fatal for US presidents. Iraq was a solution to
these potential threats for it had the world's second largest oil reserves and very low
production costs. However, as long as Saddam was in power, its oil could not be used for US
benefit; the sanctions the US believed essential to contain Saddam meant most Iraqi oil
remained off the market and if Saddam were to find some way to overcome them and get

out of isolation, the risk increased that he would try to use Iraq's oil for political advantage,
as he had tried to do before, specifically by seeking to make access to oil contingent on US
policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
What made developments in the oil market more alarming for Washington, however,
was the fact that US hegemony over the Middle East and its oil was under threat by the
breakdown of the Pax-Americana that had been constructed after the Gulf war of 1991. This
hegemony rested on several pillars-the 'dual containment' of Iran and Iraq, the peace
process, and the Saudi alliance-but all of these were increasingly shaky.
First, Iraq and Iran were gradually escaping from the isolation the US policy of dual
containment had sought to impose on them. The sanctions on Iraq had increasingly been
discredited for the humanitarian damage they caused the Iraqi people, and were being
challenged by the Arab world, while Iraq was selling oil concessions to other countries,
notably Russia, China and France. As for Iran, even Western Europe was keen to engage with
rather than isolate it. While US sanctions kept its own companies out of their oil fields and
markets, its rivals were penetrating both. Second, the breakdown of the peace process
amidst continued Israeli settlement activity in the Palestinian territories and the Islamic
terrorism it provoked drove an increasing wedge between the US and the Arabs who had
been promised a peace settlement in reward for their support of the US in the Gulf War of
1991. Third, Saudi Arabia had traditionally playing an effective 'swing' role in securing oil
and moderating oil prices at the US behest, but the US was dissatisfied with its dependence
on Saudi Arabia: the decline in its excess oil pumping capacity reduced its ability to
moderate oil prices; the US forces that protected Saudi Arabia were a source of discontent
there and, indeed, had turned Osama Bin Laden against America; dependence on the Saudis
placed constraints on US Middle East policy (Crown Prince Abdullah had made a high profile
expression of impatience with Bush's failure to engage in the peace process); and the
participation of Saudi citizens in the 9/11 attacks and in funding al-Qaida gave the neo-cons
the opportunity to demonize Saudi Arabia in American public opinion. Saudi Arabia, feeling
the US ignored its interests, began looking for alternative solutions to ease its total US
security dependence- through conciliating Iran and Iraq. US hegemony in the Middle East
rested on its unique ability to balance special relationships with both Israel and Saudi Arabia,
but this balance was being de-stabilized. In conquering Iraq, the US would acquire a new
compliant swing producer, ending dependence on Saudi Arabia. Iraq's conquest would also
allow the US to achieve privileged access to Iraqi oil at the expense of its economic
competitors in Europe and Asia and its emerging global rival, China. The structural power
deriving from oil hegemony would be restored and underlined.
On the other hand, the war on Iraq was expected to decisively assert the military
dimension of hegemony. Smashing Saddam Hussein, who had famously defied the US, would

send the message that the limits of American military power had been overcome. Bush
wanted to establish the right to attack countries the US deemed threats and Iraq, being both
weak and easily demonized, was an exemplary case to establish the precedent. An easy
victory in Iraq followed by images of Iraqis welcoming U.S. troops as liberators would
demoralize Arab/Islamic opposition to US hegemony. The US had long sought permanent
bases in the Gulf and conquering Iraq would allow their establishment. From this Iraqi base,
the US could intimidate remaining resistance from nationalist states like Syria and Iran and
impose a pro-Israeli Pax-Americana in the region. And, invading Iraq would allow the
imposition of liberalism there and, in a domino effect, spread to the rest of the Middle East,
undermining ideologies and regimes inimical to American influence.
Yet obviously, a war on Iraq carried grave risks, not least to a disruption of the oil
market that could damage the US and world economy. Moreover, the threats the US faced
were neither so immanent that it had to act immediately nor immune to solutions that
stopped far short of an invasion of Iraq. Hence US national interests cannot wholly explain
the war and why these risks were accepted. The extra ingredient is the special interests of
the ruling coalition because a different administration would arguably not have gone to war
with Iraq and would have pursued other less risky ways of addressing US dilemmas-such as
re-starting the peace process and adjusting dual containment; after all, Iraq posed no threat
to the US and war with it was on nobody's agenda until the Bush administration put it there.
The Bush Jr administration was to the far-right of the mainstream US foreign policy
establishment (delineating the coalition for foreign-policy making). Its foreign policy-making
was dominated by a coalition of the extremist/militarist wings of the Zionist lobby (the
Likudist neo-cons) and the arms/oil lobbies (Cheney and Rumsfeld). These lobbies were
traditionally opposed over Middle East policy, with the arms-oil lobby believing that access
to oil and arms profits depended on good relations with the Arabs, and hence some even-
handedness in the Arab-Israeli conflict; but under Bush its extremist wing dropped the
lobbys traditional concern to appease the Arab regimes and embraced the Zionist agenda.
It appears that the likes of Rumsfeld and Cheney had been brought together with neo-cons
like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz in the group formed to petition the Clinton
administration for the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime and in the Project for the New
American Century which championed a muscular US global hegemony; hence from the
beginning, US hegemony and war on Iraq had been linked in their minds.
In addition to this, the oil/arms lobbies had more particular interests that they
thought a war might serve. Conflict in the Middle East leads to high oil prices-especially
needed for high-cost Texas producers-and to high oil company profits and renewed arms
spending and sales; the war was also seen by some oil men as a chance to restore the direct
ownership of oil curtailed by the rise of OPEC through the privatization of Iraqi oil. And the

prospect was good that the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq would mean very good
pickings for companies, such as Halliburton, associated with the ruling coalition-as indeed it
As for the neo-cons, the ideologues of the war, they were intimately tied to Israel's
right-wing Likud party and supported Israel's policy of colonization in the occupied
territories. But this obstructed a peace settlement and endangered the Arab relations on
which oil access depended (particularly with Saudi Arabia); their nightmare was that the US
would subordinate Israel's expansionist ambitions to appeasement of the Arab oil producers,
especially Saudi Arabia (as Bush Sr. had done). The alternative was the conquest of Iraq. The
seizure of Iraq's pivotal oil fields would make appeasement of the Arabs superfluous; Iraq
could be used to break OPEC and de-stabilize unfriendly Muslim oil states. In short, the
seizure of Iraq would allow the US to secure access to Arab oil without Arab alliances and
consent and the last remaining constraints on total US commitment to Israeli interests would
be removed.
How Bushs extremist faction was able to carry the United States into a war nobody
else really wanted, is outside the scope of this paper but crucial to winning the wider public
was the alliance between the neo-cons, the wider Zionist lobby, and the right-wing 'Christian
Zionists,'' (further delineation of the alliance) a mass movement whose literal reading of the
Bible convinced them that Christ would reappear only after the Jews repossessed the whole
"promised land" and who viewed Islam as "a very wicked and evil religion." Congress, under
the influence of these lobbies, was brought to abdicate its war-deciding responsibilities. The
opposition of the defense and foreign policy bureaucracies had to be systematically
overcome by the neo-con network appointed across its command posts. Additionally, public
opinion was systematically softened up by a concerted propaganda campaign led by right-
wing think-tanks, advertising agencies and pro-Israeli pundits, largely uncontested by a
critical or even an objective press. In other words, the "checks and balances" of the
American political system all failed utterly.

The Iraq War and Domestic Politics

Ross Douthat

There was a lot of pushback, much of it from liberals, to my column

yesterday arguing that the Obama era as we know it has been made possible by George W.
Bushs decision ten years ago to launch an invasion of Iraq. Some of this pushback, on
Twitter and elsewhere, reflects a slight misreading of my point, so let me clarify: I
was not arguing that absent the Iraq War, the Democratic Party would necessarily still be in
the minority today, or that the Democratic presidential nominee would necessarily have lost

the elections of 2008 and 2012. As I said at the top of the piece, its entirely plausible that in
a world with no Iraq invasion we would be presently entering Hillary Clintons second term,
and I agree (and have acknowledged many times before) that the current Democratic
advantage is founded on deep demographic and social trends as well as the accidents of
But there are many ways that advantage could have manifested itself, and various
ways that it could have been blunted and what I was arguing is that the Iraq War played a
major and often underappreciated role in shaping the kind of Democratic majority weve had
under Obama (highly mobilized, ideologically ambitious, culturally confident), and the kind
of Republican opposition (retrenched, reactive and uncreative) that todays liberalism
faces. More than any other issue, it was the Iraq debate that catalyzed a new progressive
movement within the Democratic Party, inspiring a rebellion of young turks and digital
natives that helped push Howard Dean to prominence, elevated Obama over Clinton in
2008, and continues to bear fruit for the party today. (You can draw a pretty clear line from
Deans party in a laptop presidential campaign to the Obama teams remarkable base-
mobilizing efforts in 2012.) More than any other issue, it was the Iraq War that demolished
George W. Bushs popularity and with it, movement-conservative support for his attempt to
fashion a post-Reagan center-right governing synthesis. (For conservatives who didnt want
to turn on a Republican president in wartime, the post-2005 backlash against his
compassionate conservative heresies represented a safe way to work out their
disappointment with his presidency.) And it seems fairly clearly to me that these forces
together the rise of a movement left within the Democratic Party and the crisis of
Bushism within the G.O.P., plus the harder-to-pin-down cultural impact of having the God
and country party lead America into a quagmire pushed the nations center of political
gravity further leftward than it might have otherwise have gone.
So again, yes take away Iraqs imprint on our politics, and America might well have
still elected a Democrat to replace George W. Bush. But because of Iraq, the Democratic
majority that did come to power in 2006 and 2008 has been more aggressive on public
policy, less defensive in the culture war, and more proficient in the art of base mobilization
than a hypothetical Clinton Restoration would have been and their Republican opposition
has been more ideologically bunkered-down, less nimble and less inclined to woo the center,
than the G.O.P. might have been absent the trauma of Iraq.
Actually, it strikes me as quite plausible indeed. Post-Cold War American foreign
policy has almost always featured more continuity than change from administration to
administration, and this has held true even after failed or mismanaged wars. Presidents and
parties may be punished at the polls, but grand strategy is rarely altered there: The same
elites keep circulating, the same programs and alliances and commitments continue, the

same basic ideas about Americas role in the world endure. The country turned against
Vietnam and wearied of Korea, but it put Richard Nixon and Dwight Eisenhower rather than
George McGovern or, say, Douglas MacArthur in charge of extricating us from those
conflicts, and in the case of Nixon it gave him two terms in office to finish the job. Obama
got us out of Iraq in just one (mostly, it should be said, because the Bush White House had
already course-corrected their way toward a non-disastrous outcome), and that was all that
was explicitly expected of him: Ending the occupation was the break with the Bush era that
the public wanted, and with that accomplished its not surprising that the Obama White
House would continue Bushs second-term policies on other fronts, or that the public would
more or less accepted this continuity.
Its true that Vietnam, our last great foreign policy debacle, shifted American
statesmanship more than Iraq seems to have done giving us detente and Nixon-to-China,
as well greater congressional oversight at home. (Though Obama would have probably
embraced some kind of detente with Iran if it had been on offer ) But Vietnam was also a
bigger disaster than Iraq in many ways, with more than ten times the casualties and
(eventually) outright defeat. And even there, I think you can make a strong case that the
long-term domestic political consequences of the Vietnam era the hastened crack-up of
the New Deal coalition, the birth of neoconservatism in its intellectual and popular forms, the
undercutting of Great Society liberalism just as the grand welfare state project seemed
about to be completed were more enduring than our defeats short-term impact on the
Cold War, presidential power, and so on.
Would some version of the Nixon-to-Reagan realignment have happened in any case,
in some form or another, because of domestic issues and deeper demographic trends?
Possibly. But it would have been a different realignment, and a different conservative
ascendancy, absent the cracks that Vietnam opened up and the political legacy the war left
behind. And the same goes for Iraq and our own era: Whatever realignment we might have
had, the one we actually got was made in Baghdad, Fallujah, and all the places those
weapons of mass destruction turned out not to be.
UNs Role In Iraq
Global Policy Forum

Because the UN Security Council refused to endorse the US-UK invasion and
occupation of Iraq in March 2003, Washington and London hoped to ignore the UN and
operate with a free hand in the country. But a fierce Iraqi resistance, persistent economic
and political problems, and continuing international criticism forced the US-UK to seek
international partners for their enterprise, including assistance from the UN. A debate
ensued between those who thought that the UN could be the wedge for internationalization

and US-UK withdrawal and those who thought a UN presence would only discredit the world
body. Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1483 two months after the war,
then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed a Special Representative for Iraq and the
UN assumed some small responsibilities there. Many critics warned, though, that the UN
should not be identified with the illegal war and occupation.
In August 2003, a massive bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad confirmed the
critics' fears, killing fifteen UN staff including the Special Representative. The UN then pulled
out of Iraq and kept its distance, but in February 2004, under heavy US pressure, the UN
agreed to send a mission to the country, to help construct a new interim government. Again,
Washington kept the UN's political role weak, while seeking legitmacy from the UN. After the
establishment of an interim government in June, the US pressured the UN to take a larger
role in planning national elections, but security dangers and reluctance by the Secretary
General and UN staff kept the UN role to a minimum.
Now, as the situation spirals more and more out of control, Washington is citing the
worsening humanitarian crisis as reason enough for the UN to step in. But critics say the US
intends to use the UN to push Iraqis to accept US-imposed "benchmarks" for reconciliation,
including a controversial oil law and debaathification. The new Secretary General, Ban Ki-
Moon, seems to be more pliant to the US and more supportive of greater UN involvement in
Iraq. Despite strong opposition from the UN Staff Council which represents 25,000 UN
workers the Security Council succumbed to US and UK pressure and voted on August 10,
2007 to expand the UN's role in Iraq. Only if the US occupation ends can there be a
substantial and politically viable UN role.


U.S. Department of State. (2009, January 19). U.S. Relations with Iraq. Retrieved February 2,
2017, from U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy In Action:

Jhaveri, N. J. (2004). Petroimperialism: US Oil Interests and the Iraq War. University of
Washington, Department of Geography. Washington: Blackwell Publishing Limited.
Heinrich, M. N. (2015, March 9). One War, Many Reasons: The US Invasion of Iraq. Retrieved
February 3, 2017, from E-International Relations Students: http://www.e-
Hinnesbusch, R. (2007, April 28). The American Invasion: Causes and Consequences.
Perceptions, p. 19.
Douthat, R. (2013, March 25). The Iraq War and Domestic Politics. Retrieved February 2,
2017, from The New York Times: https://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/the-
Global Policy Forum. (2008, September 10). UN Role in Iraq. Retrieved February 3, 2017,
from Global Policy Forum: https://www.globalpolicy.org/political-issues-in-iraq/un-role-


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