The Medieval Distinction between the Potentia Absoluta and the Potentia

Ordinata of God

In medieval theology, it has been usual amongst theologians to employ the distinction between the
potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata of God to discuss divine omnipotence. Roughly
speaking, the potentia absoluta refers to Gods absolute power, while the potentia
ordinata refered to Gods ordained power. The meaning of the phrase would change over the time,
but as it began in medieval theology, the question of the two powers was used primarily to discuss
possibilities or what could God have done in contrast to what did in fact he do. Roughly, his
absolute power referred to Gods unrestrained power, the entire space of possibilities, he could
have caused Napoleaon to win the Battle of the Waterloo, or create unicorns, or command that all of
us must eat rice on every thursday, etc. His ordained power on the other hand referred to what
God did in fact do or ordain in this world, he called Moses to be a Prophet, he made the grass
green, commanded that we should love our neighbours as ourselves, etc.

Thus conceived this way, it would seem that his ordained power is a subset of his absolute power,
going strictly by the modal logic that actuality implies possibility. However, the more interesting
question at hand is how is Gods absolute power related to his ordained power, and how vast are
the scope of the two powers? Could God, for example, command unkindness, make square circles,
non-spatial colours, etc? Is there anything which could restrained Gods absolute powers, such as his
goodness or wisdom?

St Thomas Aquinas and the Classical Tradition

St Peter Damian, an early 11th century saint and hater of philosophy and reason, (in)famously
proclaimed in his De Divina Omnipotentia (On the Omnipotence of God) that if God wanted to he
could jolly well alter the past and cause a past event to have never existed. Hardly amused, virtually
every major doctor of theology after him would have his outrageous thoughts loudly denounced,
until Descartes in the 16th century would once more revive the possibility of God ordaining
contraditions. (He too was also furiously condemned by the entire chorus of the Enlightenment.)

Anyway, two centuries after St Peter Damian blasphemed against reason and logic by his reckless
exaltation of Gods power did St Thomas Aquinas set out determined to keep theology sober from
such drunken intoxication with Gods absolute power. St Thomas Aquinas lived in mortal terror of
the chaos which would be unleashed if Gods absolute power were not properly contained, and
Reason protected from the hands of the Living God (And of course, God cannot possibly be trusted
with such power, no, he needs the theology of Aquinas to restrain him, Good God! Just imagine the
wreck God could cause!). And so Aquinas promptly had Gods absolute power banished to a tiny dark
corner of his theology, never to see the light of day.

[W]hat is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with
His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, so St Thomas
Aquinas was forced to admit, his reverence for the divine majesty compelling. But no sooner was this
admission wringed out of him did he hastily add, What is, however, attributed to the divine power,
according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His
ordained power (de potentia ordinata). Thus are we saved from the horrors of an
unrestrained potentia absoluta, the vast possibilities remain mere possibilities, because dont
worry! God wont actually make them happen. They will be filtered through his just will, and thus
Gods ordained power, what God does actually do, will be nicely and properly regulated by his
justice. The Angelic Doctor would continue to say,God can do nothing but what is befitting to
Himself, and just. Poor helpless God! He cant do anything except what Aquinas prescribes for him!
But its for the best.

With this move, Gods absolute power has been effectively isolated from the rest of his system, tamed
and restrained by Gods justice, it would play no further part in his theology. To appreciate the
significance of this move, we have to understand the significance which natures and universals
played in Aquinass system. According to the classical Greek tradition he inherited, each thing had an
ideal form or nature. There is this man and that man and this woman and that woman, but over and
above all these particular man and woman, there exists an ideal form or universal mankind which
unites all these particular man or woman. Other examples includes things like, goodness, beauty, etc,
whereby there must exist an ideal form of goodness and beauty which unites all the different
particular good and beautiful things. Now, these natures or ideal forms are normally considered to
be fixed, but whether eternally so is another matter. Generally the more platonic one is, the more
transcendent and untouched by time and the movements of history.

Now of course while God could have created mankind with the nature of having three arms or four
legs etc, but then there exists this essence or nature or form of man which God could not alter
without it ceasing to be a man altogether, such as his soul or righteousness or love for example. Thus,
the essence or form of man was essentially fixed and ordered. But what does these natures or
ideal forms or essences have to do with Gods justice?

According to St Thomas Aquinas, Gods justice is Gods acting towords each thing according to its
nature. This sort of justice is called distributive justice, because it is that sort of justice whereby
God distributes to each thing according to what it is. It would be instructive to quote the Angelic
Doctor at length here.
The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward
gives to each what his rank deserves Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): We must needs see
that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of
each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it.

Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and
condition.

(Summa Theologica, Q. 24, A. 1)

The significance of this for the broader questions of Gods power should be clear. To recapitulate,
according to Aquinas, Gods absolute power is filtered through his ordained power, which is Gods
power or acting according to his justice. And what is his justice? Gods justice is God giving to each
thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. Thus, Gods ordained power, what God
can actually do, is remarkably restricted; despite the vastness of Gods absolute power, his ordained
power or actual acting is subject to this fixed system of universals, essences and natures which all
existing things have. Naturally we can raise questions as to what things within creation are part of
this natural fixed order and what are accidents and changable by God, e.g. the difference between
being mans essence of righteousness and him possessing two arms, but the point being that for
Aquinas, there does exist this set of fixed essences which God cannot act against. Thus for Aquinas,
God cannot for example command unkindness or cruelty or rape, because these would be against our
fixed natures. God is obliged to command us to do good, since goodness presumably is part of our
natures or essence, etc. Thus, upon the basis of natures is the system of natural law established
which God obliges us to obey. To Benjamin Franklins creed that, the most acceptable service of God
is doing good to men, D.H. Lawrence sarcasically noted, God having no choice in the matter.

Divine Power Unleashed; John Duns Scotus and Divine Voluntarianism

The chains with which St Thomas Aquinas has bound Gods ordained power would soon be
unraveled by subsequent medieval nominalism. This liberation would come in two stages, (1) Divine
Voluntarianism, whereby Gods power would be liberated from the need to pander to this scheme or
order of fixed universals, forms and nature, and would be dependent upon Gods will alone, that is,
God can ordain whatever the hell he wanted and no natures or forms is going to get in his way. (2)
Nominalism, whereby the very idea of essences and ideal forms would become exorcised and
banished from metaphysics altogether.

There are considerable doubts as to whether or not Duns Scotus was a nominalist because there
seems to be considerable evidence that Scotus still held on to Thomisms realism about universals
and essences which are entities which objectively exists in the world. But regardless, even if there are
some doubts about his nominalism, there arent any doubts about his voluntarianism. The Subtle
Doctor took great strides in exalting the role of the divine will for how God exercises his divine power
over every other considerations, including that of natures or forms. The Subtle Doctor only placed
two constrains on the divine will, first, that God cannot ordain any contradictions, secondly, God
necessarily ordains his own glory, thus, for example, it is necessary for God to command us to love
Him, for God necessarily ordains his glory as our end, but everything else was pretty fair game.

Thus, there is a considerable amount of tension, and some might even say, instability in Scotuss
system. Holding on to the supremacy of the divine will on the one hand, and still acknowledging the
reality and being of universals, he held that there is an ordered system of righteousness and morality
in the world which God has ordained according to their natures or essences, that is, the natural laws.
However, God was free to interrupt or suspend this order as and when he wills it. Thus, for
example, God has ordained that child sacrifice is wrong, but God could and did suspend this law
when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.

According to this scheme, the line between Gods absolute power and his ordained power is
dramatically altered, the barrier between them becomes much more porous. If we recall, for St
Thomas Aquinas, Gods justice towards the fixed essences or forms or natures was the wall which
held back Gods absolute power from wrecking chaos in Gods ordained power. Thus, because of our
natures, God will not, and cannot, ordain anything against the natural laws, such as torturing the
innocent, lying or cruelty. But for Scotus, while agreeing that torturing the innocent, lying or cruelty
is against our natures, but Gods will is independent of such considerations. God could, if he wanted,
ordain that rape would be permissable, and there is no one to say otherwise. But how Scotus
reconciles the tension between the righteousness which is determined by our natures and the
righteousness which is determined purely by his divine will, is a difficult interpretative question
which we need not enter.

To summarise, the implications of Scotuss system for Gods power is this: First, there is a system of
objective natures and forms which exists in the world as ordained by God, and as a result of that, God
ordains that ordinarily, in some historic, empirical sense, we are to obey the natural law derived
from these natures. However, since Gods absolute power exceeds these natures and forms and also
that Gods will is unrestrained by the same, God could ordain a completely system of righteousness
which defies the natural law. But, in practice or actuality, God only suspends the ordinary
system of righteousness at highly particular and unique moments in salvation history, ordaining
particular acts which contradict which natural law, such as the sacrifice of Isaac.

Thus by breaking down the just will requirement and freeing the absolute power from the need to
conform to natures, Scotuss ordained power can be said to be divided into two kinds, (1) The
ordinary system which God ordains in general for mankind and creation according to their natures
or essences, and (2) Special or particular events which God ordains in course of the history of the
world which suspends (1), e.g. the sacrifice of Isaac, certain events in Salvation History, etc.

Nothing but the Word; Ockham and Medieval Nominalism

If Duns Scotus had to struggle to reconcile the integrity of universals or ideal forms with Gods
absolute power, no such scruples would exist in William of Ockham. Ockham effectively completed
the project to liberate Gods power by doing away with these systems of essences or forms altogether.

Let us recall what universals were. According to the classical scheme, over and above the many
particular instances of, say, red objects, there exists a universal form or ideal essence, redness, which
makes all red things red. But Ockham and the medieval nominalists would reject this explanation as
completely superfluous and incoherent. We do not need to go into their arguments against universals
but merely concern ourselves with what they replaced it with.

For Ockham and the nominalists, there are individual red roses, red cars and red houses, but no
ideal form, essences or universal of redness over and above the individual particular red
things in the world. For Ockham, there is only the common name or concept which is formed in
our minds by our contact with these individual things. Thus, to put it crudely, the essence is in our
minds, not in the world. No doubt it is formed in contact to the world, but it doesnt exist in the
world. Thus, Ockham entertained a form of what we call in analytic philosophy the causal theory of
reference, wherein words acquire their significance by the objects which caused its formation. Thus,
the word dog for me refers to dogs because the word in me is caused by being in casual contact with
dogs. While Ockham in the earlier part of his career entertained the theory that these concepts
are ficta or mental objects which resembles the things in the world, but he soon abandoned it for
the intellectum theory, whereby the objects in the world have a causal impact on the mind without
creating any objects.

To explain his intellectum theory, Ockham uses an analogy. Medieval pubs received a shipment of
wine in wooden barrels sealed with hoops, the pub owner would hang a barrel hoop outside the front
door to let the people know that wine was available. Although the hoop did not resemble wine in any
way, it was significant or meaningful to the townspeople. This is because the presence of the hoop
was caused by the arrival of the wine. Likewise, dogs in the world cause concepts in our minds that
are significant even though they do not resemble dogs.

There is a point in which the analogy breaks down. The hoops itself being a thing seems to imply that
concepts are also things in the mind. But for Ockham, concepts are not things but actions. It is not
that the objects in the world causally forms a hoop or concept-thing in the mind, it is rather that
the objects in the world forms a mental action or practice, i.e. taking that object as falling under a
general name. Repeated practice of his action leads to the formation of a habit. Thus, in essence,
concepts are just disciplinedapplications and uses of linguistic terms and concepts.

A Leaky Order; The Invasion of Gods Absolute Power into the World

What are the implications of this? With one stroke, Ockham has effectively exorcised the universe of
essences, natures, potentialities, powers, fixed ideal forms, etc. What are we left? The many various
and particular phenomena or events or occurances without a universal uniting them. It is of course
no accident that medieval nominalism was the direct enabler of the scientific revolution which soon
occured. In place of such essences which reside in things, nominalism has enabled science to simply
replace this scheme withregularity and order, wherein one can simply make observations and
associations between various phenomenon without worrying about occultic powers and potentialities
and natures. As Newton once put it when he refused to give a deeper explanation or cause of
gravitys spooky action at a distance, that is, how can one particle simply exert an attractive force
on another,

I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I
frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called a hypothesis,
and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have
no place in experimental philosophy.

It is enough for Newton to observe that there is such an relation without needing to explain it further
via occult qualities, metaphysical or physical. Thus, what science today calls the Laws of Nature
are simply systematic rationalisations of the regular behaviour of various phenomena observed in
masses and masses of various particular and concrete contexts. Thus, the prior reality of these
masses and masses of particular facts upon which are built the systems of the laws of nature is
known in philosophy as Humean supervenience (after the great 18th century Scottish
nominalistic philosopher David Hume), which David Lewis described it as the doctrine that all there
is in the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then
another.

What then are the implications of this for question of divine omnipotence? Under the system of
Scotus, there still exists a system of natures, essences and universals ordained by God from which are
derived the natural laws which God ordinarily ordains for mankind to obey. But now without these
natures, essences and universals, the foundation of this scheme has been effectively obliterated.
What then are we left with? Under Ockham, the potentia ordinata consists of God ordaining or
acting to bring about masses and masses and masses of particular events, facts and occurences in the
world, and secondly and most vitally, his Word or divine command alone norms our behaviour and
relates God to us. With regard to the first feature of Gods ordained power, God does more or less
run the empirical universe in an orderly fashion, that is, according to the Laws of Nature as
observed by scientists. But this order is derived from the regularity of the many particular facts and
phenomena which God brings about. As David Hume had already observed with regards to the
principle of induction, there is nothing necessasiating the fact that the sun will rise tomorrow. For all
we know, tomorrow the laws of gravitation could just not apply to the earth and we would fly off our
orbit and never see the sun again. Thus, the fact that the sun continues to rise tomorrow is simply
because God continues to run the universe according to this regularity which we call the laws of
nature.

But it must be clarified, that potentia ordinata is not to be identified with the laws of nature,
(which is what the later Presbyterian theologians like Charles Hodge did. He identified the laws of
nature with the potentia ordinata and miracles as instances of Gods exercise of his absolute power
which overcomes the laws of nature). Under the Ockhamist scheme, God does not ordain a general
law, what he ordains is the masses and masses and masses of particular events and facts and
occurance. That these masses and masses of particular events or occurances happens to exhibit a
certain order, system, and regularity just is the result of the convergence of the masses of particular
events with these systems. But Gods ordained power doesntactually ordain the laws of nature
itself.

Thus the semblance of order in the universe is the result of a statistical norm wherein God more or
less frequently and regularly acts by certain laws. Thus, tied to this more or less stable order, arises
the usual natural laws and orders which prudentially guides our actions in this world. However,
herein we see that the role which the potentia absoluta shall play in this system increases. In a
ordinary and prudential context, which is most of the time, we act in expectation of the continuation
of order. But this order is full of holes, its norms are mere statistical norms not absolutely
necessary norms. At every moment and every occasion and everywhere in this world resides always
the possibility that this order is suspended and God does something new and miraculous and highly
particular for us in response to our faith. The possibilities of thepotentia absoluta becomes
existentially real for us. Who knows whether he will not turn and relent, and leave a blessing
behind him as the Prophet Joel puts it. Thus, while St Thomas Aquinas shut up Godspotentia
absoluta in a dark dark corner of his theology and Scotus reluctantly allows Gods potentia absoluta
to crack open slightly the order of this world to allow for rare moments of salvation history, Ockham
practically went on a rampage smashing random holes in the barrier between the potentia
ordinata and thepotentia absoluta so that everywhere and for everyman, the potentia
absoluta can pour right into our lives, and whereby God may amaze us with his wonders
inconceivable and cause us to praise his glory.

To use an analogy from quantum mechanics, when no one is observing, particles exists in a quantum
state of a statistical cloud, but once we observe it, the particles collapse into a fixed location and time.
Likewise, when we look upon the world with our empirical eyes, with our ordinary worldly reason
and deduction, the world seems to us fixed, orderly, regular, according to the laws of nature, and in
the ordinary course of our lives, we normally act in accordance to our reason and our eyes. But when
we shut our eyes or when we arent looking or observing the world with our reason but raising our
faith to the heavens instead, the world would suddenly collapse into a probablistic quantum state,
teeming with possibilities unimagined, and Gods glory and absolute power calls for our faith, our
prayers and our cries, waiting for precisely for the right moment according to his good pleasure and
will, to utterly surprise us with the wonders of his glory, to the praise of his glorious name.

This incidentally explains the nature of miracles. In the Greek, the meaning of miracles doesnt
actually have anything to do with violation of the laws of nature or whatever but is actually more
subjective. It bascially means wonder, that which inspires awe and wonder. It is easy to see under
the Ockham scheme how this is so. Now, let us recall that for Ockham, words, concepts and systems
acquire their meaning by regular exposure to resembling phenomena, wherein we form habits of
thought and practices and disciplines of word and concept use. Now, if subjectively and according to
our particular situation, our understanding of the world has formed by this habit of mind, then for
there suddenly to be an occurence which defies our systems and habits of thought would
undoubtedly surprise us, it would cause awe and wonder, and thus, it is a miracle! This of course
raises all kinds of questions as to how miracles can only operate with a background of regularity
which maybe dependent upon our expectations, frame of mind, which may differ from context to
context and individual to individual, and does how each miraculous event must be highly tailored
to each individual circumstance, each individual, taking into mind their highly particular history, etc.
But I think the point has been sufficiently made.

Word Games and Prayer Requests

The second aspect of the potentia ordinata under the scheme of Ockham is that God has divinely
ordained commandments and covenants in this world to guide and govern our behaviour. Thus in
place of placing our trust in the entire system of universals, ideal forms and essences, Ockham
sweeps away the whole scheme and replaces it with simply his divine Word alone, and here he
develops his covenant concept. Godspotentia absoluta, is pretty much unrestrained, however,
God has ordained and decided to relate to us in a very special way, and that is his covenants. In his
covenants, God both makes promises to us and commands us, thus, we are to trust in his promise
and obey his command and be dependent upon this Word alone.

However, it seems that a lot of our prayers goes unanswered, and that Gods promises are unkept.
We wonder whether the covenants given by his potentia ordinata are true or whether he has been
lying or false to us. Here is where we invoke Gods potentia absoluta and demonstrate how God
cheats in answering our prayers and fulfilling the promises, by giving a completely new and
surprising interpretation of the terms of his promise and of the words of our prayers.
Remember, the meaning of our terms and concepts comes from linguistic discipline and habit of
linguistic application and deduction which ultimately is dependent upon causal exposure to a series
of particular resembling phenomena. But remember also that the potentia absoluta means that we
cannot fix the meaning of our terms or the regulative order of our world, for God can simply
change the meaning of our works by bringing about a highly new, novel, unique and particular event
which would throw off our habitual expectation of how a word is used. Let me illustrate by building
up our intuition with progressively more sophisticated examples.

I believe most of us would be familiar with the example from the Lord of the Rings, wherein the
prophecy says that no man can fell the Witch-king of Angmar. However we realise that technically
the prophecy was still fulfilled, although not in the way we expected, as owyn removes her helmet
and declares that she is no man and promptly stabs him. Here is where we see how a prophecy is
fulfilled but not quite in the sense we expected.

Another example comes from Tristan and Isolde. In one adaptation, Isolde was accused of adultery
by her husband the king who demanded that she prove her innocence. Thus, Isolde, who actually was
sleeping with Tristan, agreed to vow upon certain holy relics before God that she as a matter of fact
was innocent. However, being God-fearing, they devise a plan to not commit sacriledge against Gods
name. She arrange for this oath to take place in the middle of the swamp. Then she got Tristan to
disguise himself and wait for her at the edge of the swamp. After she and her entourage arrived at the
swamp, she lamented as to how was she going to cross and Tristan in disguise offers to carry her
across, and she rides piggy back on Tristan towards the altar table with the sacred relics. Upon
arrival, she places her hands upon the relics and declares that no man has went between her legs
except her husband and the begger who just carried her across.

Thus, technically, she fulfilled her oath, but she did so in an unexpected way but bringing about an
event which would change the meaning of her words.

Finally, and the example most pertinent to us, in one of the adaptations of Jason and the Argonauts,
Jason sets off in search for the Golden Fleece, but was uncertain whether it even existed, Zeus
however permits Hera to aid Jason five times. Thus, Jason asks of Hera two questions, one, does the
Golden Fleece exist, and two where can it be found. However, Hera said that she would answer both
of them by answering one question, then she proceeded to tell him where to find it, and of course, in
so telling him where to find it, she also answered the first question, and thus saved Jason an aid.

Did she answer Jasons prayers, well, yes, and no. No, in that she technically didnt directly answer
the first question, but yes, in that she did answer it implicitly by answering the second question. Yet,
and this is the most vital part, Hera may have cheated, but she did it in a manner which was for
Jasons advantage and good, she helped him save an aid.
Conclusion: Trusting in Gods Will for Us

It has become a frequent meme that we have to be extremely careful when asking wishes from
genies, for the genies would pervert the meaning of our words and technically grant us our wish,
but not necessary in the way we expect or for our advantage. Or consider deals with the devil wherein
we form a contract exchanging something of ours for their services, and hoping like hell (literally),
that we can find a loophole in the contract or cheat the devil of his dues. Yet when it comes to God,
we cannot take the same attitude towards him. We cannot try to word our prayers, do good deeds as
conditions or whatever in the vain attempt to twist Gods arm and force him grant our request, for
believe you me, no matter how clever we phrase it, God is definitely going to be infinitely more
cunning than our wisdom. His foolishness as St Paul declares in 1 Corinthians, is wiser than our
wisdom.

Rather, the difference between the genie and the devil and God is that the genie and devils interest
is not aligned with us. We must therefore attempt to force his hand towards our interest via clever
phrasing of our terms and conditions. However, by faith we grasp that Gods interest is for us and for
our salvation. Therefore, we should not fear Gods cheating in his answering our prayers or
fulfilling his promises, for his infinite cunning would truly be wondrous, amaze us and far from
crying foul, we would cry out instead, Thou art just, O Lord, for Thy ways are revealed! And
therefore, Gods potentia absoluta, the infinite possibilties which it opens for us for the fulfilment
of Gods promises or answer to our prayers, far from discouraging us from prayer should all the more
inspire confidence in God, leading us to eagerful look forward to how God would answer and fulfill
them, which we can be assured cannot help but lead us to praise his glory.

For those who recognise it, the Thou art just, etc, is actually taken from Fyodor Dostoevskys The
Brothers Karamazov, wherein Ivan Karamazov refused to turn to God, because he wants to be true
to the facts, he doesnt want his outrage and existential angst about evil to be nihilised by God. He
knows that there will come that day when he would cry that out with the rest of heavens company
when he sees the redemption of evil, but while he still has his wits about him, he hastens to guard
his heart and return his ticket to heaven.

But we who trust in the promise of the new heavens and new earth cannot likewise guard our hearts
the way Ivan Karamazov does. We must open our soul to that Resurrection Future wherein Eye hath
not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath
prepared for them that love Him. And so commend our whole lives and every event within it, to God
the Father Almighty, not constraining his hands by our limited and finite conceptions, but in eager
expectation and confidence, that indeed when the Lord answers, it would undoubtedly cause praise
and amazement to flow from our lips, for it would definitely far exceed anything our finite minds and
hearts have ever conceived.