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Name: Anna Beatrice Quijano

Case: Nenita Quality Foods Corporation vs. Galabo GR No.


174191; Jan. 30, 2013
Subject: Civil Law
Topic: Possession; Ownership; Unlawful Detainer

Principle:

Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual


or material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these
are different legal concepts for which the law provides different remedies for
recovery of possession.

Bar Question:

7D Corporation (7D) filed a case complaint for forcible entry against David on
Lot No. 515. 7D claimed ownership over the land because it purchased the
same from Boy Nabua evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. According to
7D, Nabua acquired the land from David sometime in July 10, 1970 as shown
in the Deed of Transfer of rights. On the contrary David contended that he is
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession over the land since
1948. 7D contended that it has the rightful possession of the property
because it validly acquired ownership over Lot No. 515 when it purchased it
from Nabua, entitling it to the right, among others, to possess the property
as ancillary to such ownership. The court ruled in favor of 7D stating that the
right of 7D was anchored on the Deed of Absolute Sale. Is the decision of the
court correct?

Suggested Answer:

No.

In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of is possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person
with a better right lawfully ejects him. The possession contemplated by the
concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a
forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession
de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of
ownership; these are different legal concepts for which the law provides
different remedies for recovery of possession. The word possession in
forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or
possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue.
In the case at bar, 7D merely anchored its claim to possession over said
property on its alleged ownership. It did not prove its prior physical
possession. On the other hand, Davids allegation of prior physical
possession had not been refuted. Since in an unlawful detainer case, physical
possession is the issue not ownership. The ground relied upon by 7D to claim
right of possession is misplaced.

Name: Anna Danessa Valdez


Case: Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc., vs Paper City Corporation of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 169211, March 6, 2013
Subject: Civil Law
Topic: Property

Principles:
*If the language used is as clear as day and readily understandable by any
ordinary reader, there is no need for construction.
*Even if not expressly so stated, the mortgage extends to the improvements.
*Chattels permanently located in a building, either useful or ornamental, or
for the service of some industry even though they were placed there after
the creation of the mortgage shall be considered as mortgaged with the
estate, provided they belong to the owner of said estate.

Bar Question type:

Problem:
Paper City applied for and was granted four loans and credit
accommodations by RCBC, secured by four (4) Deeds of Continuing Chattel
Mortgages on its machineries and equipments found inside its paper plants.
RCBC eventually executed a unilateral Cancellation of Deed of Continuing
Chattel Mortgage. Thereafter, RCBC together with Metrobank and Union
Bank, entered into a Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI), with Paper City. In the
MTI, Paper City acquired additional loans secured by five (5) Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage, plus real and personal properties in an annex to the MTI,
which covered its machineries and equipment.The parties subsequently
executed amendments and supplements to the MTI but still including as part
of the mortgaged properties the various machineries and equipments
located in and bolted to and/or forming part of buildings and with an
additional security composed of a newly constructed two-storey building and
other improvements, machineries and equipments located in the existing
plant site.
Paper City defaulted in its obligations prompting RCBC to file a Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure. It filed a Complaint against the creditor banks
alleging that the said extra-judicial sale was null and void. It contends that
the machineries and equipments should not form part of the real estate
mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure sale as these are considered as
personal properties. Rule on the contention.
Suggested answer:
Paper City's contention is not correct. In the case of Bischoff v. Pomar and
Cia. General de Tabacos, the Court ruled that even if the machinery in
question was not included in the mortgage expressly, Article 111 of the old
Mortgage Law provides that chattels permanently located in a building,
either useful or ornamental, or for the service of some industry even though
they were placed there after the creation of the mortgage shall be
considered as mortgaged with the estate, provided they belong to the owner
of said estate. The provision of the old Civil Code was cited. Thus:
Article 1877 provides that a mortgage includes the natural accessions,
improvements, growing fruits, and rents not collected when the obligation is
due, and the amount of the indemnities granted or due the owner by the
underwriters of the property mortgaged or by virtue of the exercise of
eminent domain by reason of public utility, with the declarations,
amplifications, and limitations established by law, in case the estate
continues in the possession of the person who mortgaged it, as well as when
it passes into the hands of a third person.
Considering that the Indenture which is the instrument of the mortgage that
was foreclosed exactly states through the Deed of Amendment that the
machineries and equipments listed in Annexes "A" and "B" form part of the
improvements listed and located on the parcels of land subject of the
mortgage, such machineries and equipments are surely part of the
foreclosure of the "real estate properties, including all improvements
thereon".
The real estate mortgage over the machineries and equipments is even in
full accord with the classification of such properties by the Civil Code of the
Philippines as immovable property. Thus:
Article 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works;

Name: Michelle Josephine Eden M. Silva


Case: Rivera-Calingasan v. Rivera; G.R. No. 171555. April 17, 2013
Subject: Civil Law
Topic: Property Ejectment

Principle: In ejectment cases means nothing more than actual physical


possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.

Bar Question Type


Wilfredo filed a case for forcible entry against Evangeline. He claimed that he
lawfully possessed and occupied the two parcels of land with a building used
for his furniture business. That in taking advantage of his absence due to his
hospital confinement, Evangeline took possession and caused the renovation
of the building on the property. He further said that he has been residing in
that address ever since. The court ruled in favor of Wilfredo, that he is
entitled to the land since he has been in possession of such, residing in the
same address. On appeal Evangeline said that the court erred in equating
possession with residence since possession in forcible entry cases means
physical possession without qualification as to the nature of possession, i.e.,
whether residing or not in a particular place. Is Evangeline correct? Decide.

Suggested Answer:
No.
Ejectment cases forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary
proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled
to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure. Indeed, possession in ejectment
cases means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. In a forcible entry case,
prior physical possession is the primary consideration.
The Court did not err in equating residence with physical possession since
residence is a manifestation of possession and occupation. Wilfredo has been
residing in the same address, while Evangeline has been using a different
address as residence. Evangeline was not able to prove her physical
possession.

Name: Rounald Sitoy


Case: LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN
G.R. NO. 191667, APRIL 17, 2013
Subject: Civil Law
Topic: Property

PRINCIPLE:
Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use
and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties.

BAR QUESTION:

The Sanguniang Bayan of Municipality of A, issued a resolution leasing a part


of the municipal plaza. It was opposed by the citizens of the municipality.
Can the public plaza be subject to contract of lease?
Answer:
No.
Under the Civil Code, Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be
devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They
are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased
by the municipality to private parties.

Name: Melissa S. Guillemer-Cotoner


Case: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWARD M. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 185604 June 13, 2013
Subject: Civil Law
Topic: Property Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title

Principles:

1. Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not apply to land


registration cases. (Castillo v. Republic G.R. No. 182980, June 22,
2011, 652 SCRA 600)

2. In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by


a statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed
by a statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be
strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. (Castillo
v. Republic G.R. No. 182980, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 600)

3. When the trial court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it


lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects. All the
proceedings before the trial court, xxx are void for lack of jurisdiction.
(Castillo v. Republic G.R. No. 182980, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA
600 at 614)

4. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a
statute there should be no departure. (National Food Authority v.
Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 250-251 [2005];
PNB v. Garcia, Jr., 437 Phil. 289, 291 & 295 [2002])

Bar Question Type:

Problem:

Edward M. Camacho filed a petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title of


O.C.T. No. (not legible due to wear and tear) .
The RTC held that while the number of the OCT is not legible, it is an
authentic OCT per the findings of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).

The corresponding Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale, the tax
declaration for the year 2003, and the Register of Deeds Certification all
indicated that the number of the OCT is not legible. LRA report did not at all
establish the existence and previous issuance of the OCT sought to be
reconstituted.
Has the RTC properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction to hear and
decide the petition for reconstitution?

Suggested Answer:

No.

Section 9 R.A. No. 26 on the publication, posting and the contents of the
notice of the Petition for Reconstitution provides thus:

SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition xxx
shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the
name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing
in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the
date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and
file such claim as they may have. x x x
Section 9 thereof mandatorily requires that the notice shall specify,
among other things, the number of the certificate of title and the
names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted
certificate of title.

In the instant case, the corresponding Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with


Absolute Sale, the tax declaration for the year 2003, and the Register of
Deeds Certification all indicated that the number of the OCT is not legible.
LRA report did not at all establish the existence and previous issuance of the
OCT sought to be reconstituted.

The LRA did not state the number of the original certificate of title, which is
not sufficient evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution. The deed
of extrajudicial declaration of heirs with sale did not also mention the
number of the original certificate of title.

There is a insufficiency in the publication when the missing title was merely
identified as "OCT No. (not legible)" which is non-compliant with Section 9
hereof.
Thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed with the case since the
mandatory manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by R.A.
No. 26 had not been strictly followed, thereby rendering the proceedings
utterly null and void.

Name: Reynold John F. Gime


Case: Recio vs Heirs of Spouses Aguendo; GR No 182349, July
24, 2013
Subject: Civil Law
Topic: Property

PRINCIPLE: When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through


an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale
shall be void.

BAR QUESTION:
A, B, C, D (refered to as the Z's)owned a parcel of land with irovements as
co-heirs. X leased the parcel of land. The Z's offered to sell the parcel of land
to X for P500,000 the deal was cancelled upon the fault of the Z's. Later G
the son of X renewed the offer. A claiming to be the repesentative of the Z's
negotiated with G and later both parties agrees that the parcel of land will be
sold. G paid partial payments of P110,000 and P50,000 to A. G wanted to pay
the full balance of P340,000. But A kept avoiding G, as a result G filed a case
of specific performance to transfer the land in his name. Prior to the trial G
found out that the parcel of land was sold to spouses H which G impleaded in
his case. A also represented the Z's in majority of transaction and documents
on selling the lands including the sale to spouses H.

Question:
Can A sell the parcel of land without the written consent of the Z's?

Answer:
No.
Art. 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an
agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall
be void.
In Woodchild Holdings, Inc. v. Roxas Electric and Construction Company, Inc.
the Court stated that persons dealing with an assumed agency, whether the
assumed agency be a general or special one, are bound at their peril, if they
would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency but
also the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted,
the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.In other words, when the
petitioner relied only on the words of respondent Alejandro without securing
a copy of the SPA in favor of the latter, the petitioner is bound by the risk
accompanying such trust on the mere assurance of Alejandro.

Name: Jeson Pagapong


Case: GUIDO-ENRIQUEZ, v. VICTORINO G.R. No. 180427 September
30, 2013
Subject: Civil Law
Topic: Property

Principles:
While prescription is unavailing against the owners of the land on the ground
that they are holders of a valid certificate of title, the equitable presumption
of laches may be applied against them for failure to assert their ownership
for such an unreasonable length of time.

It is imperative for those possessors, whose alleged bona fide occupancy of


specific portions of land is not evidenced by Torrens Titles, to prove their
claims in an appropriate proceeding.

Bar Question:
Antonia and herpredecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupation of a parcel of
land for 30 years. One day she decided to register the land but only to find
out that it is covered by a title owned by Guido.
On opposition, Guido argued that the land registration court, cannot
entertain Antonias application for registration of title because the lot is
entirely within the boundaries of a larger tract of land which is already
covered by his TCT. Guido further contends that his TCT has become
indefeasible. Is Guido correct?

Answer:
No.
The Court ruled that while prescription is unavailing against the owners of
the land on the ground that they are holders of a valid certificate of title, the
equitable presumption of laches may be applied against them for failure to
assert their ownership for such an unreasonable length of time.
In the case, the failure of Guido to assert his right over the open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupation" of said land by
Antonia for more than 30 years amounts to a waiver of his right over the
property.