Romualdez v.

Marcelo (Sec 1)
FACTS: Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of
February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal
and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo.

The Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new
informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its
preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989
interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from
1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The PCGG avers that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish
Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run
when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in
the negative, should be applied.

MAIN ISSUE: whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal
Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity? No

HELD: The preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
is a valid proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan. The flaw in the
information is not a mere remediable defect of form, here the wording of the certification in the information
was found inadequate, where the required certification was absent. Here, the informations were filed by
an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation.
An invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. In effect,
we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan petitioners Motion to Quash and directed the dismissal of
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because the informations were filed by an unauthorized party, hence
void.

An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or
double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the
same facts. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant cases was not a
violation of petitioners right to be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases
investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those cases which have already been
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. The use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for
reference. Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-referred
preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, petitioners right
was violated when the preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an
officer without jurisdiction over the said cases.

OTHER ISSUE: W/N the action had prescribe?

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally
extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case, the
accused can very well invoke the defense of prescription.

Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior
to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years.
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall
prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the
period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987,
which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the
petitioner with the PCGG.

OTHER ISSUE 2 : interruption of period when offender is not in the Philippines.

HELD: One may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is supplemented
by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory
application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only
when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter . Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326
did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the
prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as
a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Francisco v. People (Sec 2)

FACTS: Private complainant Bankard, Inc. is a credit card company engaged in issuing credit cards and
in acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from the purchase of goods
and services by credit card holders. Mastercard or Visa pays Bankard for the amount Bankard has paid
the commercial establishments for the invoices it acquires. On the other hand, Mastercard or Visa debits
Bankard for the amount due to other credit card companies or banks which acquire the invoices where
the credit card used for the purchase is issued by Bankard. Petitioner Francisco was an employee of
Bankard at the time the alleged crime occurred.

Bankard engaged the services of Equitable Computer Services, Inc. (Equicom) to encode and post credit
card transactions and submit reports on those services. Procedurally, Bankard transmits to Equicom the
invoices, instructions for debiting, credit advances and other documents relevant to encoding and posting.
Equicom then transmits through electronic mail the reports on the transactions to Bankard. Petitioner
Francisco was tasked to convert the Equicom reports sent through electronic mail from its original ARJ
Text Format to the Amipro Format used by Bankard. Petitioner Francisco was the only one assigned to
perform this task.

In August 1999, Solidbank, a company which issues credit cards, relayed to Bankard that there were four
questionable transactions reflected in a Solidbank Mastercard Account under the name of petitioner
Francisco. An amount of P663,144.56 was allegedly credited to said account of petitioner Francisco, the
credit apparently being a reversal of charges from four establishments. The amount of P18,430.21 was
also credited to petitioner Franciscos AIG Visa Card based on another supposed credit advance. As a
result of the fraudulent crediting of the amount of P663,144.56 to petitioner Franciscos Solidbank credit
card account, Bankard was made to pay the same to Solidbank in the course of the settlement of
transactions between the issuing banks.

Petitioner Eliseo Francisco, Jr. (Francisco) was charged with Estafa in an Amended Information, as
defined in Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. He was found guilty by the trial court. This
was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Bankard had personality to file the complaint, since the credit card companies were the ones
which really suffered damage in the case at bar. Yes.

HELD: Petitioner Francisco further argues that Bankard had no personality to file the complaint, since the
credit card companies were the ones which really suffered damage in the case at bar. Stated otherwise,
this element speaks of an offended party which undoubtedly may only refer to Solidbank Mastercard and
AIG Visa simply because it was these two credit card companies that extended credit facilities to herein
petitioner when the latter used his credit cards.

The element of estafa referred to by petitioner Francisco is the third one under Article 315(a) of the
Revised Penal Code in the following list provided by this Court in several cases:

(1) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits;
(2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is,
he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; and
(4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Firstly, as discussed above, it was duly proven that Bankard also suffered damages by reason of
fraudulent acts committed by petitioner Francisco.
Secondly, even assuming for the sake of argument that Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa were the
proper offended parties in this case, petitioner Francisco is mistaken in his assertion that it was essential
for either Solidbank Mastercard or AIG Visa to have filed the complaint for estafa.

Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction
and acts of lasciviousness, a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the
institution of a criminal action. The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is sufficient.

A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of
crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted with
the criminal action. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be
filed by the "offended party" but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense subject thereof
cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
Ong v. Genio (Sec 5)

FACTS: Petitioner Elvira O. Ong (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against respondent Jose Casim
Genio (respondent) for Robbery which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Makati City. However,
through the Department of Justice, respondent was charged with the crime of Robbery.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of Probable Cause. The RTC dismissed the case
because the other elements of the crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and
either violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not specifically alleged in
the Information filed against respondent. Despite the dismissal of the case, respondent filed a Partial
Motion for Reconsideration, reiterating that the Information should be dismissed in its entirety for lack of
probable cause, which was granted pursuant to Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that the RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, since the said provision relates to the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, and it does not cover the determination of probable cause for the filing of the
Information against respondent, which is executive in nature, a power primarily vested in the Public
Prosecutor. This motion was denied.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA. Respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss the petition, raising the issue of lack of personality of petitioner to appeal the dismissal of the
criminal case, because the authority to do so lies exclusively with the State as represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG). The CA observed that the People of the Philippines was impleaded as
petitioner without showing, however, the OSG's participation. Thus, the CA ordered petitioner to furnish
the OSG with a copy of the Petition, and the latter to comment thereon.

The OSG filed its Comment, taking the stand of respondent that only the Solicitor General can bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines filed before the CA or the Supreme Court. The
OSG submitted that, for being fatally defective, the said Petition should be dismissed insofar as the
criminal aspect was concerned, without prejudice to the right of petitioner to pursue the civil aspect of the
case. The CA dismissed the case.

ISSUE: W/N the dismissal was proper? Yes.

HELD: Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that the
OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
Likewise, the Solicitor General shall represent the Government in this Court and the CA in all criminal
proceedings. It has been held in numerous cases that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf
of the Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the
CA.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action
on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional circumstance does not
obtain in the instant case. The petition was fatally defective for having been filed without the OSG's
participation.

Petitioner, however, has a recourse. In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said
offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so
doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The
action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.

The RTC judge, upon the filing of an Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue
a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty
days from the filing of the information.

Having not found a probable cause, it was right for the RTC to have dismissed the case, pursuant to
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
People v. Canares (Sec 6)

FACTS: AAA was born on September 8, 1982 and was only about 9 or 10 years old when Canares, a
helper in AAAs grandmothers house at Barangay Sabutan, Silang, Cavite, allegedly first sexually abused
her. The sexual intercourse took place at around midnight sometime in 1992; AAA could no longer recall
the exact date. AAAkept the incident to herself because Canares threatened to kill her. Canares allegedly
repeated the sexual abuse more than ten times between the first incident in 1992 and 1995.

The last incident that immediately gave rise to the present charges occurred on March 25, 1999. He told
AAA that he had something to tell her and pulled her towards the bodega. Inside, Canares embraced her
and pulled down her shorts. AAA resisted and pushed against Canares as she also shouted for help. BBB
AAAs aunt came to her rescue and hit Canares on the head with a flower vase. Triggered by this incident,
AAA disclosed to her mother and relatives the sexual abuse she had long suffered in the hands of
Canares.

Canares was charged in two separate Informations for rape and attempted rape in relation with Republic
Act No. 7610 (the Child Abuse Law). The Information in Case No. TG-3255-99 alleged the date when the
rape of AAA, 9 years old , occurred to be sometimes between the year 1992 to 1995.

ISSUE: W/N the Information in Criminal Case No. TG-3255-99 is defective for the prosecutions failure to
allege the date and time of the rape?

HELD: An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is
deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when the date of commission is a
material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date
as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain
all the essential elements of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and
duly prepare for his defense.

It has been held that when the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense, such
time does not need to be proven as alleged; the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the
offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action.

The reason for this is plain: the precise date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime. The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the woman under
any of the circumstances provided by law.

The situation in the present case can be directly compared with People v. Bugayong where the
information charged that the accused committed multiple rapes before and until October 15, 1994. We
found this allegation sufficient to convict the accused of rape committed in 1993 on account of the
categorical statement in the private complainants sworn affidavit of the year when the rape was
committed. The Court found that this allegation substantially cured the perceived vagueness in the
criminal charge and ruled that the accused has been sufficiently informed under the circumstances.

AAA unequivocally and repeatedly stated that the first sexual intercourse Canares had with her occurred
sometime in 1992. Following Bugayong, this statement removes from Canares any reason to complain
that he was not adequately informed of the charge against him before he was arraigned. Raised for the
first time in this appeal, we can only label the argument as a desperation move that is too late in the day
for the defense to make.
While AAA testified that Canares had raped her more than 10 times, Canares was not charged for all ten
rapes. The Information only sought to hold him liable for a single count of rape committed sometime
between 1992 to 1995. The Information is very specific, too, that the victim was then nine (9) years old so
that the rape referred to was the incident on or about 1992. AAA clearly stated that Canares raped her
when she was 9 years old, but did not report it to her parents because she was scared. At the trial, on the
other hand, AAA was firm and categorical about the fact of rape and of Canares identity as the
perpetrator. Thus, AAA clearly referred to the first incident of rape that happened around midnight in
1992.

In any event, even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the rapes,
the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during the trial and any objection based on this
ground must be deemed waived as a result of accused failure to object before arraignment.
People v. Abello

FACTS: The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She contracted polio when she was
seven (7) months old. She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking. Hence, she could
only read and write her name including that of her friends.

On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 oclock (sic) in the early morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in
Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when
Abello mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again mashed the breast of
AAA practically under the same previous situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions
AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside which illuminated the house.
Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA.
The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed Aray forcing
the accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The victim on the same date
reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.

Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of denial.
In all of the instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his way to his
room after retiring home.

Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) was convicted of one (1) count of violation of paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and two (2) counts of violation of sexual abuse under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Child Abuse Law).

ISSUE 1: W/N the variance in the Information and the allegation proven in trial was fatal to Abellos
conviction?

HELD: AAAs testimony covers the commission of the sexual assault through the insertion of Abellos male
organ into her mouth; AAA also consistently identified Abello as the perpetrator of the sexual assault.
These statements satisfy the first and second elements of the rape. (that offender commits sexual assault
and committed by means of inserting penis into another persons mouth)

AAAs testimony that she was roused from sleep with Abellos male organ inserted in her mouth, goes into
the third element (accomplished by 1) force and intimidation or 2) while unconscious or deprived of
reason) In this respect, the RTC and the CA failed to notice the variance between the allegations in the
Information for rape and that proven at the trial on the mode of committing the offense. The
Information alleges force and intimidation as the mode of commission, while AAA testified during
the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to find Abellos male organ inside
her mouth.

This variance is not fatal to Abellos conviction for rape by sexual assault. In People v. Corpuz, we ruled
that a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object
to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In the
present case, Abello did not object to the presentation of evidence showing that the crime charged was
committed in a different manner than what was stated in the Information. Thus, the variance is not a bar
to Abellos conviction of the crime charged in the Information.

ISSUE 2: W/N he is guilty for acts of lasciviousness under RA7610? No. But he is liable under the RPC.

Abello was convicted of two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child. The elements of which are:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. 2. The said act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. The child whether male or
female, is below 18 years of age.
The second element of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child requires that the lascivious
conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
This second element requires evidence proving that: (a) AAA was either exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse and (b) she is a child as defined under R.A. No. 7610. Other sexual abuse in
the provision covers not only a child who is abused for profit, but also one who engages in lascivious
conduct through the coercion or intimidation by an adult. In the latter case, there must be some form
of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys will.

The prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that force or coercion attended Abellos sexual
abuse on AAA; the evidence reveals that she was asleep at the time these crimes happened and only
awoke when she felt her breasts being fondled. Hence, she could have not resisted Abellos advances as
she was unconscious at the time it happened. In the same manner, there was also no evidence showing
that Abello compelled her, or cowed her into silence to bear his sexual assault, after being roused from
sleep. Neither is there evidence that she had the time to manifest conscious lack of consent or resistance
to Abellos assault.

Also, AAA cannot be considered as a child. Under the Implementing rules, it defined a child as one who is
below 18 years of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a qualified physician, psychologist
or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of taking care of herself fully because of a physical or
mental disability or condition or of protecting herself from abuse. The prosecution did not present
any evidence, testimonial or documentary, of any medical evaluation or medical finding from a qualified
physician, psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that AAAs physical condition rendered her incapable of
fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse.

Abello is not liable under R.A. No. 7610. However, he is still liable for acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.

The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed is determined by
the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. In the present
case, although the two Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law violated; the
allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article 336 of the RPC whose
elements are:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;

2. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and
3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

The presence of the first and second elements of the offense has been earlier discussed. The
prosecution established these elements through AAAs testimony that her breasts were fondled while she
was asleep. While she did not actually see Abello fondling her, she related that she identified Abello
because she saw him enter her mothers room immediately after she felt her breasts fondled and after he
stepped with his knees on her hand. AAA also testified that Abello was illuminated by a light coming from
outside their house. Further, the perpetrator could only be Abello as the only other occupants of the
house at the time were her mother, her sister-in-law and her young nephew who were all asleep. The
third element was proven by her testimony that, on two occasions, Abello mashed her breasts while she
was sleeping.

The Informations alleged the element of violence and intimidation as the mode of committing the sexual
abuses, contrary to what the prosecution established during the trial that AAA was asleep on the two
occasions when the offenses were committed. Pursuant to our above discussions citing Corpuz, the
deficiencies in the allegations will not relieve Abello of liability under the circumstances of this case.
Firaza v. People (Sec 6)

FACTS: Petitioner, appointed as a confidential agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), was
issued a firearm and a mission to gather and report to the NBI such information as may be relevant to
investigations undertaken by it. Petitioner served as manager for RF Communications in connection with
which he dealt with Christopher Rivas, Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur, for the establishment of a
Public Calling Office in the Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.

In the course of a meeting between petitioner and Rivas at the latters restaurant regarding the delivery of
a defective machine for the Public Calling Office, a heated exchange ensued during which petitioner is
alleged to have pointed a gun at Rivas. Petitioner was thereupon accosted by P/Insp. Alberto A.
Mullanida, and PO2 Nilo Ronquillo, who discovered that his permit to carry firearm outside residence had
expired more than a month earlier or on July 5, 2000.

A criminal complaint was filed against petitioner before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for
unauthorized carrying of license outside residence. Petitioner claimed that while he was explaining to
Rivas the defect in the machine subject of their meeting, P/Insp. Mullaneda and PO2 Ronquillo
apprehended him and seized his firearm tucked inside his shirt, even as he identified himself as an NBI
agent. The MCTC found him guilty.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner can be convicted of an offense different from that charged in the
Complaint.

HELD: Petitioner alleges that the Complaint charged him with "illegal possession of firearms," hence, he
cannot be convicted of carrying firearms outside of residence, the phrase in the Complaint reading "with
expired license or permit to carry outside residence . . ." being "merely descriptive of the alleged
unlicensed nature of the firearm."

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the

name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

The allegations in a Complaint or Information determine what offense is charged. The alleged acts or
omissions complained of constituting the offense need not be in the terms of the statute determining the
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as the qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

Complaint alleged that the "accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess [sic] one (1) unit Pistol
Cal. 45 with serial number 670320 [and] entered . . . the residence of Christopher Rivas at Lianga,
Surigao del Sur with expired license or permit to carry outside residence." The words used to indicate or
describe the offense charged that petitioner unlawfully carried his firearm outside his residence
because he had no permit for the purpose are clear. They are self-explanatory.

Petitioner cannot seriously claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated.

Petitioner, however, justifies, his carrying of the firearm outside his residence with the 60-day July 26,
2000 Mission Order issued to him by the NBI. Petitioner is mistaken. Permit to carry firearm is not the
same as permit to carry licensed firearm outside ones residence. The Mission Order issued to petitioner
authorized him to carry firearms "in connection with confidential cases assigned to [him]." Admittedly,
petitioner was at Rivas restaurant in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally, the
Mission Order did not authorize petitioner to carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.
People v. Almendral (Sec 6)

FACTS: Maria Jessica Estrada was born on December 27, 1976 to appellant and his wife, Emelinda.
Sometime in 1987 when Jessica was eleven (11) years old and there were no other persons in the house,
appellant summoned her to the room, where he raped her. He made her sit on the papag and touched
her breast and her "private organ." At first, he failed to penetrate her but he tried to do it again and
succeeded. Later appellant told Jessica not to tell her mother about what happened, and left the house. It
was then that Jessica noticed that her private part was bloody. Afraid that appellant might harm her
should she tell her mother, she kept mum about the incident.

Appellant did the same sex act to her around twenty (20) more times before she reached the age of
thirteen (13) and twenty (20) more times after that, all in their house in Tubigan, Binan, Laguna.

The last time appellant sexually violated her was in 1992 when she was fifteen (15) years old and in third
year high school. He was lying down on the bed in the room that she shared with her sister Richelle when
appellant called her. Again he raped her.

After her marriage on June 30, 1994, Jessica told her husband about the sexual incidents with her father.
Later, she also told her family. The trial court found appellant guilty of the charge filed against him.
Appellant appealed to the SC.

ISSUE: Appellant contends he should not be convicted on the basis of the Information simply alleging
"that on or about sometime (sic) 1987, prior and subsequent thereto" because it does not specify the
circumstances under which the crime was committed. The vague Information purportedly left the
appellant unable to defend himself properly, as he had no opportunity to explain his whereabouts from
1989 to 1992.

HELD: The victim's failure to recall the exact dates of the sexual assault she experienced in the hands of
appellant, a failure she frankly admitted in court, does not necessarily puncture her credibility. Forcible
sexual invasion committed by no less than one's own father is an agonizing and distressful experience
that, by human nature, is better left buried in the deepest recesses of one's memory. Repeated forty (40)
times, the experience may only result in the victim's subconscious effort to erase and blot out any details
thereof. Under the circumstances, it is enough that the victim was able to recount the first and last of the
around forty (40) bestial sexual attacks against her.

It is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with
exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense. Failure to specify the exact dates or time
when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The date or time
of the commission of the rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when
the rape takes places has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not
be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has
been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.

Moreover, appellant failed to raise the issue of the defective information before the trial court
through a motion for bill of particulars or motion to quash the information. Such failure to object to
the allegation in the information as to the time of commission of the rapes before appellant pleaded not
guilty thereto amounted to a waiver of the defect in the information. Objections as to matters of form or
substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.

Appellant likewise never objected to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to prove that
the offenses were committed "on or about sometime (sic) 1987, prior and subsequent thereto." He cannot
now pretend that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the allegation in the
Information as to when the crimes were committed, as it was shown to the contrary that he participated in
the trial and was even able to give an alibi in his defense.
ISSUE 2: Failure to allege relationship in the Information

The failure to allege in the same Information the relationship between appellant and Jessica is
clearly the trial court's reason in finding him guilty of simple rape and imposing on him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. While Jessica's minority at the time of the commission of the offenses and her
relationship to the offender were established by the prosecution beyond doubt, these qualifying
circumstances were not specified in the Information. It would certainly be a denial of appellant's right to
be informed of the charges against him and to due process if he is charged with simple rape but
convicted of its qualified form even if the attendant qualifying circumstances are not set forth in
the Information.

However, the failure to plead these circumstances in the Information does not affect its sufficiency and
validity as to the charge of simple rape, since the Information alleges facts which would warrant a
conclusion that appellant sexually violated Jessica with its imputation therein of "carnal knowledge" "by
means of force, violence and intimidation," the gravamen of the crime of rape.

ISSUE 3: Multiple rape alleged in the information

The court can also convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them, especially where the accused has
waived his objection to the defects in the information.

In this case, the trial court found appellant guilty of a single count of simple rape, penalized with the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. However, the Information charges the appellant with more than one count of rape,
with its allegation that the acts were committed "on or about sometime (sic) 1987, prior and subsequent
thereto," which the prosecution was able to prove by presenting evidence of the first and the last
incidents of rape committed by appellant against Jessica.

Appellant therefore should have been found guilty for two counts, each act of rape being considered
separate and distinct from one another. The penalty to be imposed on appellant should thus be reclusion
perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of rape.
People v. Dalisay (Sec 8)

FACTS: The victim was, at the time of the incident, a 16-year-old lass, who, together with her siblings,
stayed with her mothers live-in partner, appellant Dalisay, in a rented second-floor room in Fairview,
Quezon City. Their mother worked as a baby-sitter and helper in Makati City and only came home at the
end of every month.

On the evening of July 10, 2003, the victim was alone playing cards in the aforesaid rented room, while
her siblings were watching television in the common area on the ground floor. Appellant entered the room
to change his clothes. He then laid himself down on the floor near the young lady, pulled her shirt up, and
touched her breasts and thighs. Bent on satisfying his lust, he forced the girl down raping her. The
defenseless lass resisted but he remained deaf, warning her that he would kill her family.

Prior to this assault, appellant had already been repeatedly molesting the girl since she was 13 years old
by inserting his finger into her genitalia. However, paralyzed by the terror that he would make real his
threats of annihilating her family, she was compelled to suffer in silence. Her trepidation was further
fueled by her knowledge that appellant always carried a knife with him.

Appellants sister had witnessed the assault and had gone to her aunt. Consequently, an Information for
rape in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 was filed.

That on or about the 10th day of July 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with
lewd design, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with one [name withheld], his stepdaughter, 16 years old, a minor, against her will and
without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.

The RTC found him guilty for qualified rape. The CA convicted the accused not of qualified rape but of
simple rape.

ISSUE 1: W/N the accused is guilty of qualified rape? No.

HELD: The Court, therefore, finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape.
While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim and the
child was a minor at the time of the incident, the Court cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because
the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the
information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant was the stepfather of
the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was not married to the victims
mother, but was only the common-law spouse of the latter. Following settled jurisprudence, appellant
is liable only of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE 2: W/N the aggravating circumstances must be considered in the awarding of damages? Yes.

HELD:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary
damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been
proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the
information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the
Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in
the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating
circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent
are the following sections of Rule 110:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of accusation.The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

In the instant case, the information for rape was filed in 2003 or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
Following the doctrine in the second set of cases, the Court can very well deny the award of exemplary
damages based on Article 2230 because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship, as mentioned above, were not sufficiently alleged. Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article
2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damagestaking into account simply the attendance of
an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why
exemplary damages are awarded.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve
as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These damages are
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230
prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision,
lays down the very basis of the award. In this case, finding that appellant, the father figure of the
victim, has shown such an outrageous conduct in sexually abusing his ward, a minor at that, the Court
sustains the award of exemplary damages to discourage and deter such aberrant behavior. However, the
same is increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
People v. Resty Tigle (Sec 8)

FACTS: In the evening of 17 December 1997, 10:00 oclock in the evening, Luisa returned to buy cigarettes from
Catalina. Luisa came up to the porch, and Catalina sold her P2 worth of cigarettes. Luisa sat on the bench and tried
to start a conversation with her. Catalina told Luisa that she could not attend to her because she would pray the
rosary. Catalina then went inside the house. While Catalina was praying, she heard the sound of a falling object
outside. Catalina went out and saw appellant holding a bolo. Appellants face was bloodied. Luisa was lying face
down in front of appellant. Catalina asked appellant, Whats wrong, Resty? Appellant allegedly replied, You are not
included, Ma. Just put off the light. Catalina went back inside and roused her husband. When she looked out again,
appellant and Luisa were no longer on the porch stairs. Appellant later returned to Catalinas house and slept there.

The Information charged appellant with the crime of murder as follows: That on or about the evening of December 17,
1997 in Barangay Capucao C, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there with malice afterthought [sic], evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to take the
life of Luisa Lapera, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, suddenly, unexpectedly, and treacherously attack the latter with
a bolo directing blows against the vital parts of the body of said Luisa Lapera thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds, which directly caused the death of said Luisa Lapera. CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The trial court found appellant guilty of murder, appreciated treachery to qualify the killing to murder. Evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of
her age and sex were appreciated as aggravating circumstances, sentencing him to death. On automatic appeal, the
case was raised to the SC.

ISSUE: W/N appellant is guilty of murder or homicide? Homicide.

HELD: According to appellant, although the Information alleged treachery and evident premeditation, the Information
did not state these circumstances with specificity as qualifying the crime to murder.

In People v. Alba, it was held that pursuant to the Sec 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the information should state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and omissions
constituting it but shall also specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Guided by the established rule that
when a penal statute, whether substantive or procedural, is favorable to the accused, the courts shall give it a
retroactive application. Thus, we held that since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as a
circumstance qualifying the killing to murder, under the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, treachery has
to be considered a generic aggravating circumstance only.

However, in People v. Aquino, it was held that these circumstances need not be preceded by the words
aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, or qualified by to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is
sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges
against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial.

The resolution in People v. Aquino obviates the requirement of additional verbiage put forward in People v. Alba.
The manner the Information in the present case stated the circumstances satisfies the standard set in People v.
Aquino. The Information specified the circumstances allegedly attending the commission of the crime. These
circumstances need not be preceded by the words qualifying or qualified by to be considered as such.

However, There is no treachery where the sudden attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just
triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim. In this
case, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, due to the fact that Luisa provoked appellant by
striking him with an empty beer bottle on the head, which is why his face was bloodied. Neither can evident
premeditation be appreciated because apart from Saturninos testimony, the victims son, which was merely
speculative, the records of the case do not show any evidence to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation as alleged in the Information. Lastly, abuse of superior strength and disregard of age and sex cannot
affect appellants liability since the Information does not allege these circumstances. Aggravating circumstances, even
if proven during trial, cannot affect appellants liability when the Information fails to allege such circumstances. This is
pursuant not only to Section 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, but also more importantly to
an accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
People v. Puig (Sec 9)

FACTS: 112 cases of Qualified Theft were filed against respondents Teresita Puig (Puig) and Romeo
Porras (Porras) who were the Cashier and Bookkeeper, respectively, of private complainant Rural Bank
of Pototan, Inc.

The pertinent portion of the Information read above-named [respondents], conspiring, confederating,
and helping one another, with grave abuse of confidence, being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the
Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge and/or consent of the management of
the Bank and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00)...

The trial court did not find the existence of probable cause based on the fact that 1) the element of
taking without the consent of the owners was missing on the ground that it is the depositors-clients,
and not the Bank, which filed the complaint in these cases, who are the owners of the money allegedly
taken by respondents and hence, are the real parties-in- interest; and 2) the Informations are bereft of the
phrase alleging "dependence, guardianship or vigilance between the respondents and the offended
party that would have created a high degree of confidence between them which the respondents
could have abused." Hence, the trial court dismissed the cases.

Petitioner assails the dismissal contending that the Informations for Qualified Theft sufficiently state facts
which constitute (a) the qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence; and (b) the element of
taking, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, which is the Bank.

ISSUE: W/N the Information is sufficient? Yes.

HELD: On the sufficiency of the Information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia,
that the information must state the acts or omissions complained of as constitutive of the offense.

On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly.

It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a Bank who come into
possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in them by their employer.
Banks, on the other hand, where monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is very
clear not only from the express provisions of the law, but from established jurisprudence. The relationship
between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and debtor. The Court has consistently
considered the allegations in the Information that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence,
to the damage and prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of the money
deposits, as sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft.

In past cases, where the Informations merely alleged the positions of the respondents; that the crime was
committed with grave abuse of confidence, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the Bank, without necessarily stating the phrase being assiduously insisted upon by respondents, "of a
relation by reason of dependence, guardianship or vigilance, between the respondents and the
offended party that has created a high degree of confidence between them, which respondents
abused," and without employing the word "owner" in lieu of the "Bank" were considered to have satisfied
the test of sufficiency of allegations.

In summary, the Bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients; and the employees of
the Bank, who are entrusted with the possession of money of the Bank due to the confidence reposed in
them, occupy positions of confidence. The Informations, therefore, sufficiently allege all the essential
elements constituting the crime of Qualified Theft.
Soriano v. People (Sec 13)

FACTS: Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President and General
Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). During their incumbency
as president and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the
loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Maaol
obtained loans of P15,000,000.00 each, when in fact they did not.

Soriano was charged with violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General
Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the Director, Officer,
Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules) for the P15 million loan obtained in the
name of Virgilio Malang. On the same date, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document was also filed against Soriano and Ilagan.

Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against Soriano,
this time, covering the P15 million loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Maaol. Soriano and Ilagan were
also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document for obtaining said loan.

Petitioners moved to quash the informations, arguing that the prosecutor charged more than one offense
for a single act.. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute an
offense. These motions were denied by the two RTCs, and was sustained by the CA.

CRIMPRO ISSUE: W/N the Informations should be quashed? No.

HELD: Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information
under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a
duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By duplicity of charges is
meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense. Section 13 of Rule 110 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of Offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense.

Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than
one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously
invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.

ISSUE: W/N he should be charged with offense since the charges are based on a single act? No.

HELD: Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if
each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or
ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and
other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank
and failure to enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP
supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and
damage, which are essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation.
The filing of several charges against Soriano was, therefore, proper.
Laparasan v. People (Sec 13)

FACTS: Private complainant Menardo Villarin (Menardo) and his sister Vilma Villarin (Vilma) met
petitioner Arlene N. Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet Travel Tours Agency (Silver Jet). For a fee of
P85,000.00, petitioner undertook the processing of the papers necessary for the deployment (under a
tourist visa) and employment of Menardo in South Korea. Petitioner informed Menardo that he would be
employed as "factory worker," which was, subsequently, changed to "bakery worker. Thereafter,
Menardo paid the said fee in installments.

Menardo finally left for South Korea on November 25, 2001. Unfortunately, he was incarcerated by South
Korean immigration authorities and was immediately deported to the Philippines because the travel
documents issued to him by the petitioner were fake. Consequently, Menardo and his sister Vilma
demanded the return of the money they paid, but petitioner refused.

Separate charges for illegal recruitment and estafa against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court,
where she was found guilty of the charges. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner can be found guilty for both illegal recruitment and estafa? Yes.

HELD: It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be convicted of both illegal recruitment
and estafa. The reason, therefore, is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while
estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the
second, such an intent is imperative.

In the first case, petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment, defined and penalized by the Labor Code
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042. Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that
petitioner gave the complainant the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the
complainant abroad for work, such that the latter was convinced to part with his money in order to be
employed. To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must, at
least, be a promise or an offer of employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or
abroad. Petitioners misrepresentations concerning her purported power and authority to recruit for
overseas employment, and the collection from Menardo of various amounts, clearly indicate acts
constitutive of illegal recruitment.

In the second case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) which punishes estafa: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
other similar deceits.

The elements of the crime are: (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit; and (b) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party.

Here, it has been sufficiently proven that petitioner represented herself to Menardo as capable of sending
him to South Korea for employment, even if she did not have the authority or license for the purpose.
Undoubtedly, it was this misrepresentation that induced Menardo to part with his hard-earned money in
exchange for what he thought was a promising future abroad. The act of petitioner clearly constitutes
estafa under the above-quoted provision.
Santiago v. Garchitorena (Sec 13)

FACTS: Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her
favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.

Petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential
candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which
provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." The petition was dismissed.

Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing.
The Sandiganbayan set the criminal case for arraignment, but petitioner moved to defer the arraignment
on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion
for a bill of particulars, which was denied.

Petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars. The motion stated that while the information alleged that
petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and
advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the
names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

Upon motion of petitioner, the SC directed the Sandiganbayan to reset the arraignment to a later date and
to dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena
and the motion for the bill of particulars). The petition on disqualification was denied.

On the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated categorically that they would file only one
amended information against petitioner. However, on the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32
Amended Informations, which the Sandiganbayan admitted.

ISSUE: W/N there was only 1 crime in the case? Yes.

HELD: The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime"
and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."

For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of
penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations
of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration
of the same criminal purpose or aim. In appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in
reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to
crimes penalized under special laws, Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

The trend in American criminal law in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that
is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and
place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under
which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that
the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct
offenses as there are victims The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the
commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as
done on the same "occasion."
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such
privilege.

The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a
law Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party,
the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that
instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file
only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. The 32 Amended
Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October
17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the
stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the
same document.

Other issue: disqualification of Justice Garchitorena due to a letter which"prejudged" the validity of the
information filed against her written by Justice Garchitorena in response to an article published in the
Phillipine Star undermining the justice that issued a hold departure order against Miriam, which prevented
her from taking her Harvard scholarship. The SC held it was not a prejudgment of the charge, but only
written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the SB.
Dayap v. Sendiong (Sec 14)

FACTS: An Information was filed charging petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent
portion reads:

That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler
cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in
the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile,
a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two
female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said
Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy
and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina
P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R.
Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.

On 10 January 2005, petitioner was arraigned and plead not guilty.

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a
motion for leave of court to file an amended information. They sought to add the allegation of
abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the
victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted
from the car by the by-standers." however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that
the motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn. The MTC granted the withdrawal and the
motion to amend was considered withdrawn.

The MTC granted the demurrer of petitioner and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence.
The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the
Information. The RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that there
being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of
the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are null and void.

ISSUE: W/N Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the
RTC? No.

HELD: Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29
December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but
aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however
that respondents attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful
as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to withdraw their motion to amend the
information. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended. Thus, petitioner is
deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any
aggravating circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any
act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless imprudence the use of
a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant
the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious
physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of
felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as
"acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa). Thus,
the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium
period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day
to 6 years).

The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. When this case
was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been
amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over
criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties
including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases
for reckless imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should
fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the
same pertained to the MTC, and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.
Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the
proceedings before it were valid and legal.

The MTC granted petitioners demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed
after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such
dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would
be to place the accused in double jeopardy. But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to
evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing
court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence
is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the judgment void.
Aparis v. People (Sec 15)

FACTS: On January 17, 1996, a buy-bust operation was conducted which led to the apprehension of
accused Edilberto Campos y Ibalid and Francisco Aparis y Santos. It was conducted at Palanan, Makati
City where poseur-buyer PO3 Nelson was to buy from the accused P100,000.00 worth of shabu. A white
Lancer GLI arrived with two (2) male persons on board. A male person seated at the passenger side of
the car alighted and approached the car of PO3 Nelson Labrador. PO3 Nelson Labrador and the
confidential informant proceeded to the car of accused and they went inside at the backseat of the car.
They were accompanied by the man who earlier alighted from the white Lancer GLI and who was later on
identified as Edilberto Campos. In a little while PO3 Labrador executed the pre-arranged signal signifying
that the buy-bust operation had been accomplished. Upon receiving the signal, his police teammates
rushed to where PO3 Labrador and the confidential informant were and they gave their assistance to
effect the arrest of the accused. The police [were] able to confiscate the shabu subject of the buy-bust
and the buy-bust money.

The RTC of Makati and the CA found petitioner Francisco Aparis y Santos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 (RA 6425), otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. With respect to Campos, however, the RTC ruled that the prosecution
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he actually sold or delivered shabu to PO3 Labrador, or
that he was in conspiracy with petitioner in selling the said drugs.

ISSUE: The RTC of Makati had no jurisdiction over his case, as the place where the crime was
supposedly committed is within Manila.

HELD: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. The
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.
Once these are shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.

In the instant case, the Information clearly alleged that the the crime was committed in Makati. The
allegation in the Information was sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA and the RTC that the
defense failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate its allegation that the place where the buy-
bust operation took place was within the territorial jurisdiction of Manila and not of Makati. The trial court
was correct in holding that the testimony of the defense witness, who was an engineering assistant at the
Office of the City Engineer of Manila, cannot be given credence, considering that his claims were not
backed up by any supporting evidence. While the defense referred to a certification issued by a certain
Magdiwang Recato from the Office of the City Engineer of Manila, to the effect that the place where the
buy-bust operation was conducted was within the territorial jurisdiction of the city of Manila, the same was
not offered in evidence and, hence, cannot be given evidentiary value.
Ilusorio v. Bildner (Sec 15)

FACTS: Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueo were charged by Erlinda K. Ilusorio
(petitioner) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City with perjury arising from their filing,
on behalf of Lakeridge Development Corp. (LDC), of a petition in the Makati City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for issuance of new owners duplicate copy of Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT) No. 21578
covering a condominium unit in Makati.

The pertinent portion of the Information read: subscribe and swear to a Petition for Issuance of a
New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before Rafael Arsenio
S. Dizon, a notary public in and for Pasig City That the Petitioners claim that the title was lost, which
fact was material matter and required by law to be stated in said Petition, when in truth and in fact as the
said accused very well knew at the time they swore to and signed the said petition for Issuance of a New
Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, that said statement appearing in
paragraph 4 of said Petition: the said owners duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 could no longer be
located at the places where they may and should likely be found despite earnest and diligent
efforts of all the petitioners to locate the same was false and untrue because the said title was in
the possession of the complainant, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and the above false statement was made in
order to obtain a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

Three similarly worded Informations for perjury were also filed against respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma.
Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor also before the Pasig City MeTC arising from their filing of three
petitions, also on behalf of LDC, before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of new owners duplicate copy
of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) covering properties in Tagaytay. As the purported corporate officers
of LDC, respondents filed the above-mentioned petitions for issuance of new owners duplicate copies of
titles over properties located in Makati City and Tagaytay City after the owners copies thereof could no
longer be found despite earnest and diligent efforts to locate the same.

After the consolidation of the 4 Informations for perjury, respondents moved for their quashal on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue. The MeTC held it was the proper venue, which was
affirmed by the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N the venue was properly laid in Pasig? No.

HELD: The allegations in each of the Informations indicate Pasig as the situs of the offense charged
where respondents petitions were notarized. Albeit the Informations referred to the subscribed and sworn
petitions of respondents as bases of the charges, there is no mention therein that those petitions were
filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City.

The allegation in each of the four similarly-worded Informations that perjury was committed in Pasig is
neither controlling nor sufficient to show that the Pasig MeTC has jurisdiction over them. The purported
perjurious petition quoted in each of the Informations in fact indicates that, with respect to the CCT of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati the TCTs of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay, venue of the criminal action
arising therefrom is in Makati and Tagaytay, respectively.

It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter, however, before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the lawso requires, which is
imperative in perjury.

Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional, the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the
municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any matter was
made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay. It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or
materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the CCT and TCTs may issue.
Whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is
immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement. So United
States v. Caet teaches, viz:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information
that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, swore to and knowingly submitted false evidence, material
to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist
of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false
evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit.
Union Bank v. People (Sec 15)

FACTS: The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first
complaint, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47,
Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against
Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly laid
since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used)
and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has
jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that
the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the
order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC- Makati City
also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case, which ruled that
venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

ISSUE: W/N the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented
to the trial court. MeTC-Makati City

HELD: Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the
case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined
territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which
has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that
the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping
was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth
elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were
also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City. The third element of willful
and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay
City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information.
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is
the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas,
pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential
elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City,
not Pasay City, where the Certificate was submitted.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints
for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and
Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of
the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution
by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and
venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which
the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal
act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.

Not so important ISSUE: Whether the case of Sy Tiong or Ilusorio is more applicable?

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of
the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified
petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates of title.
The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but
were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City
and Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was
only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement found relevance or materiality.

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in Manila.
We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and
sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false statement was made.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their
respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the
case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect. Sy Tiong, on the other
hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937
American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the
present RPC took effect. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury
committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 (art. 183 of
RPC taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) includes the making of a false affidavit. With this, it can be
appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying
under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath. From this
perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense
was committed.
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada (Sec 16)

FACTS: Separate informations were separately filed against herein petitioner before proper courts, for
Estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Upon payment of the assessed and required docket fees
by the private complainant, the informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against herein
[p]etitioner were filed and raffled to the MTC of Quezon City.

On the other hand, the informations for estafa cases against herein petitioner were likewise filed and
raffled to the RTC of Quezon City.Petitioner through counsel filed an Opposition to the Formal Entry of
Appearance of the Private Prosecutor, Atty. Felix R. Solomon, dated 14 June 2002. The RTC issued the
first assailed Order allowing the appearance of the private prosecutor in the criminal cases upon payment
of the legal fees pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

ISSUE: W/N a private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the proceedings of the
estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of the
checks involved which is also subject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases? Yes.

HELD: Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal case pending before
the MTC for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal
case for estafa now pending before the RTC.

SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. -- Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

Based on Sec 16 of Rule 110 of Criminal Procedure and Sec. 1 of Rule 111, an offended party may
intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the
crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and
(2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they
waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already
been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainants interest in the case disappears and
criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply
to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is civilly liable for BOTH crimes? No.

HELD: Each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for estafa
and another for violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil
liability for the offended party, who has sustained only a single injury.

Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal
principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1)
the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2)
the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or
directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we
can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission,
done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal
liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to
another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the
foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it
is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also
causes material damage to another.

Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation
of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action,
even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check. The crimes of estafa and violation of BP
22 are different and distinct from each other. There is no identity of offenses involved, for which legal
jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses charged in the informations are perfectly
distinct from each other in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fact.

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the private prosecutor may intervene before the
RTC in the proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the corresponding civil
action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC. A recovery by the
offended party under one remedy, however, necessarily bars that under the other. Obviously
stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment, this is in essence the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission.