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Some international human rights norms that began in the 1940s as superficial
declarations of principle have become subject to international enforcement. A series
of events dating to the late 1990s underscores this point. In July 1998, states
reached agreement on the creation of an International Criminal Court with juris-
diction over war crimes and crimes against humanity. Just 3 months later, in a
stunning move, British police arrested former Chilean strongman Augusto Pino-
chet on charges of human rights abuse brought by a Spanish judge. In an equally
unprecedented event, the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal charged a sitting head of
state, Slobodan Milosevic, for war crimes in May 1999 and then put him on trial in
February 2002. During the same period, a variety of states began court proceedings
against foreign nationals once considered safe from prosecution.1
Authors note: I wish to thank Brigham Young University and the David M. Kennedy Center for International
Studies for funding this research. Scott Cooper, Joshua Cooper, Valerie Hudson, Wade Jacoby, Jutta Joachim,
George Kent, Maria Eugenia Villarreal, and a series of anonymous reviewers offered valuable comments on earlier
versions of this article. This research has also benefitted from presentation at the Tuesday Group faculty seminar in
the political science department at BYU. A battery of research assistants, including Jenny Champoux, Ryan Chavez,
Jetta Hatch, Camille Jackson, Maren Mangum, and Jeremy Smith, provided essential help.
1
Wide net in Argentine torture case, New York Times, September 11, 2000; Dictators in the dock: New
attempts to bring despots to justice, The American Prospect, August 14, 2000; NATO troops seize a top Serb facing
war crimes charge, New York Times, April 4, 2000.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, I define international en-
forcement, explain the costs associated with it, and develop the empirical puzzle
posed by the central empirical subject, the convention against torture. Turning to
theory, I then explain why persuasion matters, with a focus on identifying a priori
the content and nature of arguments that are likely to be persuasive. I then ex-
amine the history of the convention against torture in some depth, with a focus on
international negotiations as well as domestic developments in the Netherlands and
the United States. After considering alternative explanations, I generalize the
model in a concluding section, arguing that it can help explain important patterns in
the enforceability of human rights treaties and can be applied to other issue areas.
International Enforcement
I define international enforcement as a formal agreement among states that del-
egates authority to third parties to take adversarial, compulsory action against states
or state agents that are violating international rules, or are suspected of such vi-
olations.2 The authorized enforcers could be other states, intergovernmental or-
ganizations (IGOs), or nonstate organizations either at the international or domestic
levels. By adversarial, compulsory action, I refer to activities that are unwanted by
the accused state or state agent, and that have a legally binding character. To
constitute enforcement, authorized agents do not need to utilize force or even have
force at their disposalFalthough they may. Rather, they must be officially empow-
ered by states to interpret and apply the rule of law, and control resources that can
be used to prevent abuses or to punish offenders. Such resources include weapons
and money, certainly, but also judges, courts, prisons, and institutional privileges
such as membership and decision-making authority within international organiza-
tions. Enforcement authority has become a more prominent feature of interna-
tional institutions since the end of the Cold War and is related to the legalization of
those institutions (Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, and Snidal, 2000).
Prominent examples of enforcement IGOs include the World Trade Organization,
the European Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court.
Enforcement authority is theoretically interesting because it is costly. Delegating
enforcement authority to others requires that states pay sovereignty costs, con-
tracting costs, and agency costs. Sovereignty costs include possible reputational
costs for state violators, an increased probability that violations will be reciprocated,
a restricted range of policy options, and the decreased authority of domestic actors
to make independent, unilateral policy choices (Abbott and Snidal, 2000:436441).
Contracting costs exist for all international agreements but are especially high when
the stakes are higher, as with enforcement provisions. States care more about the
outcome and so are likely to adopt harder bargaining positions, to require more
time to learn about the proposed agreement and its implications, and to subject
international negotiations to closer domestic political and bureaucratic scrutiny
(Abbott and Snidal, 2000:434436). Agency costs refer to the costs of supervising
and monitoring the agent to whom states have delegated enforcement authority.
States do not simply grant enforcement IGOs limitless autonomy, but rather ex-
pend important resources overseeing those agents and checking them if they be-
come too unruly. Further, delegation to IGOs often involves both collective action
problems and long delegation chains, thereby increasing agency costs (Nielson and
Tierney, 2003:247251).
One enforcement mechanism that has recently garnered a lot of attention is
universal jurisdiction, defined as the principle that a states jurisdiction is based on
the nature of the crime rather than other factors such as where the crime occurred
2
This definition draws on Abbott et al. (2000:415418). See also Donnelly (1986:603605) and Arend
(1999:2935).
782 Explaining Costly International Institutions
3
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of ratifications of the principal
international human rights treaties, December 9, 2002. Current version available at http://193.194.138.190/pdf/
report.pdf.
DARREN HAWKINS 783
cifically creates that possibility. At another level, the convention represents more
than just words, for the words are reflective of deeper shared understandings
among states. States are not merely mouthing words without meaning; rather, a
good many of them actually believe that torture is such a heinous crime that it
should be subjected to universal jurisdiction. This shared belief constitutes a change
from previous beliefs about torture and is worthy of explanation. Finally, states
have actually exercised universal jurisdiction in some important cases that are likely
to pave the way for an ever-broader use of the power. What was once a simple
moral vision has now actually occurred, in part because the anti-torture convention
made it possible.
The case of Augusto Pinochet, of course, highlights the practical importance of
universal jurisdiction in general and of the torture treaty in particular (Wilson,
1999; OShaughnessy, 2000:157170). In Spain, prosecutors brought charges
against Pinochet under domestic Spanish laws that recognize the principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction for crimes such as genocide and torture. In Great Britain, the
courts focused on the torture treaty, in large part because it explicitly grants uni-
versal jurisdiction, and Chile, Spain, and Great Britain are all party to it. In fact, the
Pinochet government itself acceded to the treaty on September 29, 1988, thereby
establishing a date from which Chilean officials, including Pinochet, could be held
liable for torture in extraterritorial courts. Although the Pinochet case is the most
well-known use of universal jurisdiction, it is scarcely the only one. A recent study
shows that 109 states have domestic legislation authorizing universal jurisdiction,
that 14 states have initiated cases using that authority, and that high-level courts in
12 of those states have upheld the authority (Hawkins, 2003). Almost all these cases
have occurred since 1994. It is important not to overstate the extent of enforcement
actually occurring, but the use of universal jurisdiction in human rights cases seems
likely to grow further as victims and activists continue to seek justice. Why did states
open this potential Pandoras box in the first place?
learning, actors become convinced through arguments and debate that a different
position is logically or normatively superior. While these two causal mechanisms
vary in theory, it is difficult to separate them in practice. In the first case, individuals
change their position because of demonstrated inconsistencies and a desire for
normative approval; in the second, they change position because they have iden-
tified a new logic that seems superior. In any given communication, actors are likely
to utilize and respond to both tactics.
Further, these two communicative processes share important analytical features
that justify joining them in the same category of argumentative rationality, which I
freely interchange with the term persuasion. Both rhetorical action and learning
assume self-interested actors; both emphasize the importance of collective identities
or understandings; and both assume that state interests and values and the strat-
egies that flow from them are malleable and open to change through communi-
cative interaction. For rhetorical action to operate, states must be motivated by a
combination of strategic individualistic goals and a strong sense of collective identity
and values. The same may be said of social learning, or true reasoning, in which
actors pursue individual goals while seeking reasoned consensus (Risse, 2000:9).
Persuasion models differ from many existing theories not in denying individual
state rationality but rather in the extent to which they emphasize state collective
goals and identities and the malleability of state goals and strategies through social
interaction.
Drafting a new treatyFthe most common basis for international institutionsFis
fundamentally a communicative process in which state delegates argue and delib-
erate the pros and cons of variations in wording. The drafting process provides a
setting in which persuasion can take place. Following Habermas, Risse identifies
two key preconditions that must exist for argumentative rationality to prevail: a
common lifeworld, and relative equality among the participants. Although no
studies exist on this issue, it is at least plausible to believe that these conditions
describe the experts who represent their states at many international negotiating
forums. Despite large cultural differences among countries, the international ex-
perts assigned to hammer out agreements on a particular issue often share im-
portant similarities that approximate the idea of a common lifeworld. Those
similarities include shared educational and professional backgrounds, shared com-
mitments to the ideal of international cooperation, and shared acceptance of the
procedural rules. Further, states interact in an atmosphere of relative equality
thanks to procedural rules that are blind to state power, such as the principle of one
state, one vote. Informally, of course, some state opinions count more than others in
influencing the debate. Yet compared with domestic legislative bodies controlled by
parties and elected officials, international negotiating forums are quite nonhierar-
chical and lack sharp differences in levels of authority among the participants.
While Risses (2000) insights into argumentative rationality provide a potentially
rich framework for understanding international relations, they lack much explan-
atory content. Risse suggests that arguments determine international outcomes,
and that better arguments prevail over less good arguments. However, he says
little about what constitutes a better argument. Realists who argue that interests
determine behavior must specify those interests and construct analytical models
that show how they play out. In the same vein, constructivists who argue that
communication determines outcomes must clarify which types of arguments are
likely to prevail and what types of outcomes are likely.
Ideas and arguments are persuasive when they fit well or resonate with wide-
spread preexisting understandings, a condition that applies to both rhetorical ac-
tion and learning (Kratochwil, 1989:2839; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:2324;
Cortell and Davis, 1996, 2000; Legro, 1997; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Joachim,
2003). Persuasion is a fundamentally social and cognitive process that takes place
within broader sets of understandings that facilitate communication and social
DARREN HAWKINS 785
action. In rhetorical action, persuadees become convinced that their positions are
inconsistent with some collective identity or deeply held norm. In social learning,
actors with uncertain interests facing a complex reality routinely choose between
competing arguments about the best course of action. In the absence of some clear
external criteria by which to judge those arguments, actors are persuaded by ar-
guments that fit well with their preexisting understandings.
In the international arena, such preexisting shared understandings are surpris-
ingly widespread and well developedFa point made by neoliberal institutionalist,
legal, sociological, and constructivist traditions alike (Keohane, 1989:17; Franck,
1990:195207; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez, 1997; Wendt, 1999). As a result,
the content of the argument matters: When that content is congruent with pre-
existing international understandings, states are more likely to be persuaded by the
arguments.
The difficulty is that, with a few prominent exceptions (Ruggie, 1983; Wendt,
1999), international relations scholars have failed to describe the nature of (i.e.,
operationalize) these taken-for-granted beliefs in the international arena. As a re-
sult, scholars slip into circular arguments in which arguments are persuasive be-
cause they are congruent with preexisting understandings, and the evidence for
congruence is that actors were persuaded by the arguments. Clearly, the nature of
the preexisting understandings must be specified prior to undertaking the analysis.
While this discussion often invokes the shared understandings of states, I use this
terminology as shorthand to describe the individuals who represent those states in
their international interactions.
Drawing on insights from literature on the sociology of organizations and trans-
national networks, I identify three widespread, taken-for-granted beliefs relevant to
a wide variety of issues: the value of preventing bodily harm; the importance of
precedent in making decisions and resolving disputes; and the belief that inter-
national cooperation is essential in resolving social problems. While these are not
the only three implicit, taken-for-granted understandings shared by states, they are
broad enough and common enough to provide an initial operationalization of the
background beliefs that shape international communication. It is precisely because
they are taken for granted that they are not widely discussed or analyzed, yet they
can be observed by scholars who look for underlying assumptions in state com-
munications (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:904905).
First, states agree broadly on the need to protect vulnerable individuals from
bodily harm (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:2728). In other words, states take it for
grantedFwhen they are communicating openly with each other at leastFthat
individual physical suffering is bad and should be prevented. This is not to say that
states actually believe that all individual suffering is bad. Rather, they have reached
a common understanding that enlightened and civilized states do not intentionally
inflict harm on individual citizens, and that states should in fact work toward the
easing of individual pain. If states really do believe otherwise, they also understand
that they must keep these beliefs to themselves, as such beliefs would not be ac-
cepted openly by others. Evidence for the widespread nature of the principle
against human suffering may be found throughout the UN Charter and in the
preamble of many resolutions from any UN body. More specific evidence can be
found from cases where states have actually tried to justify the infliction of bodily
harm, as Chile did soon after the inception of authoritarian rule. The overwhelm-
ing nature of the reaction against Chiles arguments suggests that Chile violated a
strong taken-for-granted understanding (Hawkins, 2002:5567).
It is worth noting that the broad mandate against individual suffering can ac-
commodate a variety of more specific norms, from proposals to ban land mines to
efforts to end domestic violence. Keck and Sikkink (1998:204206) theorize that
the prohibition of bodily harm is particularly well ingrained among states because
the issue crosses cultural and ideological boundaries and therefore enjoys
786 Explaining Costly International Institutions
transnational resonance. Others have noted that issues focusing on bodily harm
have strong emotional appeal, are capable of mobilizing large groups, and involve
very high stakes of pain, suffering, and death (Jennings, 1999).
Second, states generally agree that international decisions should draw on pre-
cedents. Sociologists and cognitive theorists have long recognized that organiza-
tions routinely make decisions by relying on precedent-oriented mechanisms like
standard operating procedures and imitation (March and Simon, 1958). More re-
cently, sociological approaches to international relations have suggested that states
themselves can be conceptualized as organizations that value precedent and im-
itation, in part to establish their legitimacy with each other and in part to make
decisions under conditions of complexity (Meyer et al., 1997; Ron, 1997). Re-
searchers in this school have repeatedly shown that states adopt forms and practices
simply because the precedent exists and seems appropriate, even when they have
no functional need to do so (Finnemore, 1996).
Shared state beliefs in the value of precedents are reinforced by the formal
nature of the IGOs within which international negotiation takes place. IGOs rou-
tinely use precedent to make a large variety of procedural decisions, from the
placing of agenda items to voting rules. By simply participating in the process, state
negotiators have already accepted precedents as a way to make decisions and re-
solve disputes. Such acceptance is implicit and taken for granted. Additionally,
many individual representatives from states involved in the drafting process are
legal specialists well acquainted with the importance of precedents in formalized
discussions. As a result, they are more likely to acquiesce to arguments that cite
strong precedent. Evidence of the widespread, taken-for-granted nature of the
precedent norm may be found in virtually every resolution passed by a UN body, as
they routinely cite a wide array of previous resolutions, declarations, and so forth,
as precedent to justify the current proposal. States may argue about which pre-
cedent is more appropriate, but few if any states challenge the assumption that
precedent is itself an appropriate factor in good decision making.
Third, states widely agree that international action constitutes an important and
appropriate method of resolving domestic social problems. This is not to say that all
states endorse all kinds of international action, or that all domestic actors within
states endorse cooperative actions. Rather, it simply asserts that for most identifiable
social problems, an understanding exists that international cooperation in some
form or another would help resolve them. The entire UN Charter, for example, is
founded on the explicit assumption that international cooperation will ameliorate
problems of war, poverty, human rights abuse, injustice, and a host of other ills.
Each new IGO created to meet a social problem is endowed with its own ration-
alized myth, and is created within the background understanding that such or-
ganizations constitute an appropriate way to address these problems (Meyer and
Rowan, 1991). States are not so nave as to believe that these organizations will
resolve the problems, but they do generally agree that cooperation is necessary for
progress.
The best evidence for the widespread nature of this assumption may be found in
the extent to which those who are skeptical of international institutions nevertheless
commonly appeal to the importance of international cooperation. During the run-
up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the second Bush administration consistently accused
other great powers of failing to cooperate on the issue. Likewise, U.S. conservatives
typically argue that the UN is inefficient, that it is biased, and that the United States
carries an unfair share of the burden. In the same vein, the United States does not
object to peacekeeping per se, but rather the way in which it is carried out and the
U.S. role in it. Even in conservative Republican administrations, those most re-
sponsible for forming foreign policy rarely argue that poverty, for example, is the
sole concern of each individual country and should never be subject to international
cooperation. None of these arguments challenges the assumption that international
DARREN HAWKINS 787
controversy and yet survived the drafting process nearly intact to become a cor-
nerstone of the treaty. Draft Article 8 required all states party to the treaty to
establish jurisdiction over torture in any one of four cases: (1) the crime occurred in
that state; (2) the alleged offender was a national of that state; (3) the victim was a
national of that state; or (4) the alleged offender was present in that state and was
not extradited (United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Commission on
Human Rights, 1978a:3). The provision survived the drafting process to become
Article 5 in the convention against torture. The only substantive change to the
article during the drafting process occurred by substituting any territory under [a
states] jurisdiction for the more limited notion of a states territory. Although such
jurisdictional grants can sometimes be permissive in international law, draft Articles
11 and 14 required either state prosecution or extradition to a state willing to pros-
ecute. Article 7(1) in the final treaty reflects this same requirement.
4
The Holy See and Barbados were dropped from the analysis in view of the multiple difficulties in comparing
them with the remaining states. Portugals comments on the treaty were internally contradictory and unclear, and
thus Portugal was also dropped from the analysis.
DARREN HAWKINS 789
TABLE 1. Initial State Positions on Universal Jurisdiction in the Convention against Torture, 1978
Austria Argentina
Denmark Australia
Federal Republic of Germany France
Norway German Democratic Republic
Somalia Great Britain
Switzerland Morocco
United States Netherlands
Italy
Soviet Union
Spain
Uruguay
Sources: United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Commission on Human Rights (1978b), Baehr (1989),
Burgers (1989), Burgers and Danelius (1988).
Communicative Interaction
How and why did a fairly radical proposal that initially received strong opposition
from a wide variety of states come to be adopted by consensus within 5 years? Why
did the opposition, which included some of the worlds most powerful states and
some that had the most to fear from enforceable human rights conventions, fall
apart within 5 years? To answer these questions, I turn to an analysis of the nature
and content of communication among states.
Treaty opponentsFinitially the more numerous groupFoffered three kinds of
objections.5 The first was that some provisions in the treaty, including universal
jurisdiction, violated sovereignty (UN Working Group, 1982:7). Opponents argued
that, while universal jurisdiction traditionally has existed for some crimes, such as
piracy, those crimes are fundamentally international in nature while torture is not.
5
Much of the evidence in this section is drawn from the annual reports of the working group on a draft
convention against torture of the UN Commission on Human Rights (United Nations. Economic and Social Council.
Commission on Human Rights (19741984)). To avoid repeated lengthy and confusing citations, I use the notation
UN Working Group and the year of the report, with page numbers when appropriate. The working group was
composed of a subset of the states sitting on the Commission on Human Rights. Also see the detailed narrative
summary in Burgers and Danelius (1988).
790 Explaining Costly International Institutions
As a result, opponents suggested that the torture convention should stick with
established monitoring mechanisms such as periodic reports submitted by states to
international bodies.
The second type of objection was that the treaty provisions would not really help
end torture. For some, existing international conventions already outlawed torture,
and simply drafting more conventions would not really help. Others argued that
accused torturers would never visit a state that might prosecute them, and that the
barriers to gathering evidence from other countries would be insurmountable
(Baehr, 1989:40). As a result, the entire convention, in this view, was an exercise
in futility.
The third type of objection was that the treaty could actually hurt innocent
victims. The most frequently cited potential victim was the individual unjustly ac-
cused of torture. Many argued that states might be politically motivated to accuse a
foreign national of torture unjustly (UN Working Group, 1982:67; 1983:56).
Treaty opponents also suggested that standards of judicial processes, such as
guarantees of due process rights, or standards of adequate evidence, might be
lowered significantly when trying alleged torturers who were not citizens of the
prosecuting state.
Proponents of a strong treaty, in turn, used three types of arguments to answer
these critiques. The first focused on prevention of state-inflicted bodily harm as the
fundamental goal of the convention. In many ways, this argument gave treaty
proponents the upper hand in the discursive give-and-take of negotiating sessions.
No state could take a position favoring torture simply because such a discursive
position would be so strongly rejected that it was unthinkable. As a result, many
states were forced to begin from a position that they did not in fact endorse. Any
number of states practice torture, and many even justify it to some audiences. Yet in
the careful atmosphere of international diplomacy in which states try to impress
each other with seemingly high levels of enlightenment, such justifications would
have been scorned.
Nor could states argue that sovereignty allowed them to do as they wished, and if
they wished to commit torture, then it was their sovereign right. At the end of
World War II, Hermann Goering had argued that the Holocaust was the sovereign
right of Germany and strictly Germanys business (Lauren, 1998:210). Even 40
years later, few states wished to associate themselves with the arguments of Nazi
Germany in an international forum. Further, for a delegate to argue that sovereign
states can torture people if they wish would be tantamount to admitting that the
delegates state tortures people and wishes to continue to do so. Such an argument
was simply indefensible within the confines of a formal international discussion.
As a result, strong norms of reasonable discourse prevented states from opposing
the torture convention on substantive grounds (i.e., favoring torture) or on
grounds that sovereignty trumps the right of an individual not to be tortured. In
this respect, silence in the documentary record is eloquent. Throughout the draft-
ing histories, no state ever attempted to justify torture or to claim that sovereignty is
a higher value than the right to bodily integrity. Quite the opposite, even states
opposing the torture convention argued that torture was a horrible scourge and
should be eradicated from the earth. Even if some believed that, used correctly,
torture could save lives by producing information about potential terrorist attacks,
no one dared voice that argument. Consequently, opponents framed their argu-
ments in terms of the rights of the accused, as noted above. Their reliance on
human rights standards to contest the treaty simply illustrates the weak rhetorical
position of convention opponents, and the importance of taken-for-granted un-
derstandings against bodily harm.
These same taken-for-granted understandings even made it difficult for states to
adopt a position whereby they favored a torture treaty but opposed universal ju-
risdiction. Treaty proponents sought to shame universal jurisdiction opponents
DARREN HAWKINS 791
with the catch phrase, No safe haven for torturers.6 They argued that to create
locations where torturers could flee to escape prosecution would be, in essence, to
sanction torture. They emphasized over and over again that torture was a partic-
ularly horrible violation that deserved particularly strong measures. Although it is
impossible to observe directly the impact of such arguments, process-tracing ev-
idence suggests that proponents made these arguments, that diplomats understood
them, that states changed their positions, and that the alterations in state discourse
incorporated language formulated by treaty proponents. Year after year, propo-
nents repeated their arguments during negotiations; each subsequent year, more
states would return with statements that incorporated the language and positions
adopted by proponents.
A particularly large change occurred in 1982. In the first 2 years (19801981),
negotiators placed the universal jurisdiction clause in brackets, signaling a conten-
tious passage. A variety of states suggested deleting the passage because they were
opposed to the principle or because it could not be realistically implemented (UN
Working Group, 1981:5657). Several others sought conditions on its use. Sweden
and other proponents, however, argued that universal jurisdiction was desirable in
order not to provide torturers with any places of refuge (Burgers and Danelius,
1988:58). The following year, negotiators removed the passage from brackets and
widely endorsed the Swedish discourse. In a marked change of tone, the diplomatic
summary of the negotiating session records that, Several speakers considered that
a system of universal or quasi-universal jurisdiction . . . was indispensable in a con-
vention against torture in order to ensure that there would be no safe havens for
torturers (UN Working Group, 1982:6). Many delegations explicitly reversed po-
sition while others scaled back their objections. Nigel Rodley, chief legal adviser to
Amnesty International and a key lobbyist for the treaty, recalls that the Australian
delegate gave a speech against universal jurisdiction where Rodley expressed ob-
vious displeasure.7 In private conversation later, the delegate expressed a desire to
change his governments position and wondered if he could invoke Amnestys
reaction to his speech in discussions with his government. A short time later, Aus-
tralia changed its position.
Second, proponents of a strong treaty invoked precedent, in careful, calculated
ways. Rather than citing common law traditions outlawing piracy, they turned to
specific provisions (black-letter law) of recent international conventions on ter-
rorism and other types of crimes. Proponents argued that universal jurisdiction had
been enshrined in four prominent treaties in the previous 1015 years; namely,
treaties on hostage-taking, hijacking, crimes against diplomats, and crimes endan-
gering the safety of civil aviation (UN Working Group, 1982:6). Further, propo-
nents argued that these treaties dealt with crimes that were no less horrifying or less
important than torture.8 If hijacking an airplane can be considered such a loath-
some crime that the perpetrator should be denied refuge in every state in the
world, then why not torture? Given these precedents, it became difficult for treaty
opponents to argue convincingly that torture was a less serious crime than hijack-
ing, or that torturers should be granted de facto safe haven by failing to write
universal jurisdiction into the convention. In an attempt to bridge the divide be-
tween opponents and proponents, Brazil proposed a system in which states would
have jurisdictional preference if the crime occurred in their territory (UN Working
Group, 1983:67). Proponents beat back this attempt to weaken universal juris-
diction by pointing out that this proposal differed from the precedent set by uni-
6
Interviews with Hans Danelius, a former Swedish foreign ministry official instrumental in drafting and ne-
gotiating the treaty, January 31, 2003, and Nigel Rodley, former legal advisor to Amnesty International, who was
heavily involved in lobbying for the treaty, January 27, 2003.
7
Interview, January 27, 2003.
8
Danelius interview, January 31, 2003.
792 Explaining Costly International Institutions
versal jurisdiction clauses in other treaties. In the end, even although states dis-
cussed a variety of different ways to approach the principle of universal jurisdiction,
they settled on language that was as close as possible to the four treaties routinely
invoked as appropriate precedent.
Where proponents of strong enforcement could not invoke precedent, however,
they lost to opponents. The original Swedish draft contained a path-breaking en-
forcement mechanism allowing an international committee to independently in-
vestigate alleged instances of torture. Led by the Soviet Union, states eventually
watered down this provision into a very weak call for cooperation between the
committee and torturing states, and Article 28 of the final convention even
allows states to opt out of this toothless measure (Burgers, 1989:5152). Further,
Costa Rica proposed an optional protocol with the similar intent of granting an
international body independent investigatory power (Voorhis, 1981). Strong op-
position led Costa Rica to postpone its proposal until drafting of the initial con-
vention was completed. Since then, states have continued to discuss the Costa
Rican proposal, finally adopting it in December 2002, although it only had two rat-
ifications and 20 signatures as of November 2003.9 One fundamental problem was that
both these proposals lacked precedents and thus could not be adequately defended.
The third argument that won support for universal jurisdiction focused on the
widespread belief that international action is beneficial and can resolve social
problems. In the case of the torture treaty, proponents argued that it was better to
do something than to do nothing (UN Working Group, 1982:7). Menno
Kamminga, a key Amnesty lobbyist, said that foreign ministry officials tended to
be more open to this type of argument than justice department officials, reflecting
different bureaucratic missions.10 According to him, foreign ministry officials tend-
ed to hold principled commitments to international cooperation while justice of-
ficials fretted about the practicality of translating universal jurisdiction into law and
practice. The international institutional settingFthe UN Human Rights Commis-
sion and its working group, with a General Assembly mandate to draft a torture
treatyFobviously favored pro-cooperation arguments. Even repressive states
skeptical of international action on behalf of human rights did not feel free to
play a simple obstructionist role by opposing any and all agreements. Since they
could not argue that torture is an unimportant crime or that torturers should be
granted safe haven in other states, they had to fall back on weaker arguments.
These consisted of fears that universal jurisdiction would not work or that it would
be used against innocent foreign nationals for political reasons.
Proponent states conceded that the convention would not stamp out torture, but
consistently argued that it was a step in the right direction and that its provisions
could be realistically implemented. For example, when Argentina argued against
universal jurisdiction by suggesting that no one would ever actually implement it,
the United States responded that most states practicing torture would never pros-
ecute their own officials either (Burgers and Danelius, 1988:7879). As a result,
proponents deftly associated opposition to universal jurisdiction with a do-nothing
attitude:
9
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/
proratification.htm, accessed December 8, 2003.
10
Interview, January 29, 2003.
DARREN HAWKINS 793
ment in their States if, for legal or other reasons, extradition to that State would
not be possible (UN Working Group, 1982:7).
Opposing states had no reply for this logic. Once states favoring the convention
drafted clauses that protected the rights of the accused, opposing states had no
other arguments remaining. Specifically charged to do something to outlaw torture,
delegates could not simply do nothing. As a result, they slowly acquiesced to the
principle of universal jurisdiction.
As some states switched positions to support universal jurisdiction, arguments in
favor of action became even more persuasive. Generally, states worked to avoid
positions in which they would stand alone against other states, especially those with
similar identities. Kamminga recalled that one of Amnestys major arguments was,
How can you be in the same camp as Uruguay and Argentina on this?11 When
some states began to switch to favor universal jurisdiction, a variety of other states
quickly followed. Further, informal voting rules required treaty provisions to be
adopted by consensus (Burgers, 1989:46), thereby putting pressure on states to join
the growing majority. Hans Danelius, who worked in the Swedish foreign affairs
ministry, participated in all stages of the negotiations, and wrote the first draft of the
convention, put it this way: Once there was a clear majority in favor of universal
jurisdiction . . . no government would wish to give the impression of preventing or
obstructing the successful termination of the work on a stronger protection of such
a fundamental human right as the right not to be exposed to torture. This could
indeed give rise to unpleasant internal or external criticism.12
Because states could always refuse to sign the treaty later, they were reluctant to
draw attention to themselves as obstructionists in the interim. Once most Western
states accepted universal jurisdiction, for example, Australia declared in 1982 that it
too accepted the principle (with reservations) with a view to facilitating progress
towards agreement on a final text (Burgers and Danelius, 1988:79; Burgers,
1989:4849). Once Argentina became democratic and switched its position in 1984,
Uruguay avoided isolation by saying it would no longer oppose universal jurisdic-
tion (Baehr, 1989:45; Burgers, 1989:49). Brazil, which had long argued that uni-
versal jurisdiction should depend on denying an extradition request, then began to
claim that it had only been trying to bridge the gap between proponents and
opponents, and said it would drop its proposal (UN Working Group, 1984:6). It
soon became evident that only China and East Germany wanted to qualify and to
weaken universal jurisdiction. At that point, China declared its acceptance of the
principle and East Germany reserved the right to determine its final position later,
thereby allowing the treaty to move forward and ultimately be adopted (UN
Working Group, 1984:67).
The preceding evidence demonstrates that, in the aggregate communicative
process, proponents utilized three types of arguments, that preexisting under-
standings gave these arguments important persuasive power, that opponents found
no enduringly useful counter-arguments, that opponents gradually changed their
positions to favor universal jurisdiction, and that when proponents used other
kinds of arguments they were not so successful. All of this evidence lends credibility
to my hypotheses. It is impossible, of course, to directly observe the ways in which
argumentation might change the ways that people think about an issue. At the
multilateral level, I have provided the best possible evidence by examining the
diplomatic record and participants memoirs and by interviewing those partici-
pants, both lobbyists and diplomats. I now extend the evidence and causal chain by
examining the changeFand lack of changeFin two particular countries.
11
Interview, January 29, 2003.
12
Interview, January 31, 2003.
794 Explaining Costly International Institutions
The Netherlands
Participants and analysts agree that when the Netherlands switched its position to
favor unqualified universal jurisdiction in 1982, it marked the key turning point in
the battle for this provision.13 Prior to 1982, principled Dutch opposition allowed
authoritarian regimes and others to clothe their naked arguments against universal
jurisdiction in legitimate robes. The negotiating record demonstrates that after
the Netherlands changed its position, universal jurisdiction ceased to be a key
point of contention. Opposition remained, but it was isolated and marginalized
(Burgers and Danelius, 1988:7273; 7880). What triggered the change in the
Dutch position?
Careful process-tracing illustrates both the importance and limits of communi-
cation.14 Amnesty International first convinced some members of the Dutch par-
liament, both in opposition and in government, to present a motion on March 17,
1980 favoring universal jurisdiction in the draft treaty. The government responded
13
This section draws on primary documents, interviews, and the published analyses of key Dutch participants.
The official position of the Dutch government on the treaty, including a recounting of the history of the treaty and
the Dutch position, is found in The Netherlands, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (198586). I interviewed, by
correspondence, J. Herman Burgers, the key human rights officer within the Dutch Foreign Affairs ministry at the
time and later chairman of the UN working group to draft the convention. Peter Baehr, chairman of the Dutch
Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the late 1980s, provided additional useful information.
Also see Baehr (1989), Burgers (1989), and Burgers and Danelius (1988).
14
I rely in this paragraph on the source material cited in the previous footnote.
DARREN HAWKINS 795
in a letter on April 2, 1980, arguing that universal jurisdiction would not prove an
effective tool for preventing torture and that successful prosecutions of foreign
torture cases would be impractical. Amnesty responded by writing the Dutch gov-
ernment on April 17 and by lobbying members of parliament, arguing in both cases
that torture was a crime of sufficient magnitude to merit universal jurisdiction, that
there should be no safe haven for torturers, and that adequate precedent existed
in the anti-terrorist treaties. In large part because of their own principled beliefs
about international criminal law and appropriate methods of combating torture,
Dutch government officials continued to express doubts. Dutch parliamentarians,
on the other hand, overwhelmingly approved the motion on May 6, 1980, opposed
only by a small farmers party of the time. As Herman Burgers, the key Dutch
foreign ministry official, recalled it, The adoption of the motion settled the issue,
for this was not a matter on which the government would want to have a conflict
with parliament.15
In this case, it seems clear that pure communicative interaction was insufficient
to change the governments position and that it had to be combined with political
pressure. Yet it would go too far to say that persuasion was irrelevant. Amnesty and
other norm entrepreneurs used information and framing to make their case to
parliamentarians. Clearly, the Dutch government was not persuaded in the sense
that government officials altered their views. Indeed, nearly 20 years later Burgers
demonstrated that he had not changed his mind when he strongly reiterated his
ongoing doubts about universal jurisdiction.16 Yet persuasion does not require that
others become convinced that someone else is right. Rather, it requires that com-
munication occurring within a political process will result in an outcome that can be
explained by the extent to which the various arguments match up with prevailing
understandings. In the Netherlands specifically, just as in the broader international
system generally, arguments pointing to the importance of bodily harm and pre-
cedent trumped other sorts of arguments.
Back at the UN negotiating table, the norm of political cooperation played an
important role in completing the change in the Dutch position. Reacting to its
parliamentary vote, in 1981 the Dutch delegation introduced a motion that would
support yet weaken the universal jurisdiction provision by making it contingent on
a complaint by an interested party. Finding few allies for this proposal, Burgers
dropped it in 1982, the same year he was elected the chair of the negotiating body.
As he recalls it: When I entered the working group in 1982 and was elected its
chairman, it was already clear to me that the only chance for a successful conclusion
of its work depended on acceptance of the universal jurisdiction idea by the greatest
possible majority.17 As a result, he set aside his personal skepticism to help ensure
the treaty would be widely endorsed. In other words, the norm of political coop-
eration prevailed over other kinds of concerns. Two years later, the negotiators
approved the treaty with universal jurisdiction intact.
15
Burgers interview, March 18, 2003.
16
Burgers interview.
17
Burgers interview.
796 Explaining Costly International Institutions
istration continued these efforts and the Senate subsequently ratified the conven-
tion on October 27, 1990, with wide approval from both conservatives and liberals.
Although the Senate attached a variety of reservations, declarations and under-
standings, none affected universal jurisdiction.
A costbenefit model would suggest that the United States accepted the torture
treaty because officials discounted the chances that universal jurisdiction would be
turned against U.S. citizens. Some evidence exists to support this contention. The
conventions definition of torture, for example, excludes sanctions imposed by do-
mestic law, thereby leaving out punishments that are legal in the United
StatesFsuch as the death penaltyFthat might be considered torture by others.
Additionally, in the document accompanying submission of the treaty for ratifica-
tion, the Reagan administration dismissed concerns that other states would use
universal jurisdiction to prosecute U.S. citizens by noting that the convention insists
on fair treatment for the rights of the accused, and that the U.S. Government
would strongly resist such an action (Reagan, 1988:911).
At the same time, other evidence points in the opposite direction. The treaty
clearly opens all states to risk, and provides no special assurances to powerful states
or key decision makers. The definition of torture in the convention is broad enough
to apply to a variety of activities, and, rather than being narrowly and specifically
drawn, could be interpreted in different ways by courts in different countries
(Lippman, 1994:313314). In the convention, torture refers to any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted . . .
(Article 1). Further, state officials are guilty of torture under the treaty not only for
the physical act of applying pain, but also for encouraging torture, or merely con-
senting or acquiescing to it (Article 1; Lippman, 1994:313314; Boulesbaa,
1999:2325). This provision clearly conflicts with state interests of decreasing the
liability of their officials.
Further, the United States has scarcely been reassured by nice legal language
guaranteeing rights of the accused and assertions of its intent to resist prosecution
in other enforceable international human rights agreements. Despite multiple legal
and power-oriented safeguards built into the proposed International Criminal
Court, for example, the United States still refuses to give its assent.
A more compelling explanation of U.S. behavior recognizes that while the United
States has interests in protecting its citizens against human rights prosecutions,
those interests are open to interpretation, and thus to persuasion. The evidence
suggests that all three types of arguments (preventing bodily harm, precedent, and
international cooperation) helped persuade conservative Reagan and Bush admin-
istration officials and U.S. senators to negotiate, sign, and ratify the treaty and to
support universal jurisdiction. The idea that torture is a particularly reprehensible
form of human rights abuse turns up repeatedly in official government documents
and the Senate hearing on the treaty. Secretary of State George Shultz, for example,
boasted of the U.S. role in ensuring that the Convention focus on torture rather
than on other relatively less abhorrent practices (United States, 1988). At various
points in the written record, U.S. officials essentially adopt the rallying cry of pro-
ponents No safe haven for torturers, using more legalistic, official language. Be-
cause the definition of torture was focused on severe individual harm rather than on
fuzzier issues like degrading practices, U.S. officials were much more supportive of
the treaty.18
U.S. officials also repeatedly insisted on the importance of existing precedents. In
the document transmitting the treaty to the Senate, the Reagan administration
stressed the fact that the system of universal jurisdiction conformed closely to the
precedent set by other treaties and that it closed loopholes that would otherwise be
18
Rodley interview, January 27, 2003. Rodley was closely involved with high-level negotiations in the Reagan
administration while it readied the treaty for submission to the Senate.
DARREN HAWKINS 797
available to torturers (Reagan, 1988:911). In the only Senate hearing on the treaty,
Bush administration officials strongly defended universal jurisdiction by citing the
precedent of other treaties, by noting that the United States was already a party to
those treaties, and by arguing that torture was equal to hostage-taking and hijack-
ing with respect to the nature of the criminal activity (U.S. Congress. Senate.
Committee on Foreign Relations, 1990a). Staunch conservative senators with strong
preferences for defending sovereignty, such as Sen. Jesse Helms, did not even raise
the issue of U.S. citizens being tried abroad (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on
Foreign Relations, 1990b).
Even the importance of international cooperation turns up regularly in the his-
torical record. In Ronald Reagans official transmittal letter to the Senate (United
States, 1988), his first argument in favor of the treaty was that it marks a significant
step in the development during this century of international measures against tor-
ture and other inhuman treatment or punishment. Reagan then went on to praise
the establishment of a regime for international cooperation in the criminal pros-
ecution of torturers based on universal jurisdiction. When Helms and others at-
tempted to attach a reservation asserting the general supremacy of the U.S.
Constitution over this treaty, Bush officials beat back the attempt by arguing that it
would undermine all sorts of international cooperative efforts and anger European
allies (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, 1990b:3545).
I am not arguing that the United States had no political motives related to the
torture treaty. Although the Cold War was drawing to a close, the United States was
still waging a public image battle with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. The
torture treaty offered another vehicle (however small and publicly obscure) by
which the United States could demonstrate its virtue compared with Communist
degeneracy.19 On the other side of the coin, the United States was motivated to
protect its citizens from being prosecuted for torture, and the Justice Department
reportedly opposed universal jurisdiction because of concerns about FBI agents
being so prosecuted.20 I am arguing that these contradictory motives were insuf-
ficient to guide the United States to a clear position on the treaty and that therefore
the government was open to persuasion.
In conclusion, it is impossible to understand acceptance of the treaty (norm
creation) as a simple calculation that the costs would be negligible because the treaty
was written in narrow ways that would create little trouble for states. That states
have an interest in protecting their citizens from harm in other countries seems
undeniable. At the same time, the extent to which states emphasize that interest,
and the degree of threat they perceive to that interest, are subject to persuasion.
Strong arguments centered on bodily harm, precedent, and the need for interna-
tional action persuaded states to downplay concerns about misuse of the treaty, and
opened their officials to the risk of foreign prosecution.
Alternative Explanations
Do any existing theories of international institutions provide a better explanation
for the torture treaty and the pattern of events laid out above? State power variables
are of little help. Initial proponents of a strong treaty included both powerful and
weak states, as did opponents, suggesting stalemate in the negotiating process.
Sweden, and later the Netherlands, provided most of the initiative to keep the
negotiations moving forward, and the United States did not make the treaty a
priority (Baehr, 1989; Burgers, 1989). It seems unlikely that Swedish or Dutch
power convinced the Soviet Union to buy into the treaty. Nor did initial state
19
Even this motive was undercut by the fact that the Soviet Union ratified the treaty in March 1987 before the
Reagan administration even sent it to the Senate.
20
Rodley interview, January 27, 2003.
798 Explaining Costly International Institutions
positions divide along the typical bipolarity of the Cold War. While it is true that the
bulk of support came from Western democracies, a number of Western states also
initially opposed universal jurisdiction. Both Great Britain and France, for exam-
ple, joined the Soviet Union and East Germany in opposition to the treaty. Many
Western democracies switched positions to support universal jurisdiction only
shortly before Soviet-bloc states did.
In an important article, Moravcsik has argued that new or unstable democracies
are most likely to support enforcement mechanisms for human rights norms be-
cause they fear domestic threats from autocrats. Authoritarian regimes and estab-
lished democracies, on the other hand, are likely to oppose enforcement because
they have no need for such institutions and are unwilling to pay the sovereignty
costs. Some evidence supports this theory: authoritarian regimes initially lined up
against the treaty and Argentina dramatically changed its position to support the
treaty when a new democratic government came to power in 1984 (Burgers,
1989:49). Unfortunately, changes in position by the Netherlands, France, Australia,
the Soviet Union and its allies, and Uruguay cannot be explained in this way. Nor
does the theory help explain initial state positions among either established or new
democracies. Treaty proponents did not include any new democracies among their
ranks, including, notably, Spain, and established democracies split fairly evenly
between proponents and opponents.
Finally, a model focusing on the costs and benefits of the treaty cannot adequately
account for the changing state preferences on the question of universal jurisdiction
because neither the costs nor the benefits of the universal jurisdiction clause
in the treaty changed during the drafting process. A variety of states attempted to
weaken universal jurisdiction during the drafting process, but consistently failed.
Thus, the potential cost of universal jurisdiction remained constant. Nor is there
any evidence that states dropped their opposition to universal jurisdiction because
they became convinced that no one would actually utilize it. On the contrary,
drafting debates were peppered with comments that universal jurisdiction consti-
tuted a realistic enforcement mechanism. Indeed, the prolonged opposition of
authoritarian states suggests that they feared that universal jurisdiction might in
fact be exercised at some point. Even during the last 2 years of drafting sessions,
China, Uruguay, and Brazil expressed strong doubts about universal jurisdiction
(Burgers and Danelius, 1988:85, 9495). It is equally difficult to argue that the
benefits of the treaty increased over time. The treaty never generated much
international attention and thus offered states few opportunities to score public
relations points.
None of this denies that states actually calculate costs and benefits. States may
indeed have calculated the costs and benefits of universal jurisdiction somewhat
differently at the end of the negotiating process than at the beginning. Yet this
change in calculation was not rooted in any substantive changes in the nature of
universal jurisdiction. In other words, the treaty remained the same with respect to
universal jurisdiction, and yet states came to view it differently. If states altered their
costbenefit calculations, it was because of persuasion.
The main difficulty with these alternative theories revolves around their static
rather than dynamic approach. Most of the explanatory variables identified by
these approaches change little over time, yet states changed their positions quickly.
In 1979, more than half of the states engaged in the debate opposed the proposal;
by 1982, most states accepted it, and by 1984, all did (Burgers, 1989:4849). One of
the most striking features of the negotiating process is that states moved from
opposition to support, but not the other way around. No state, once it expressed
support for universal jurisdiction, ever withdrew its support, yet multiple states
withdrew their strong objections to universal jurisdiction. Variables that focus on
state power, domestic institutions, or costbenefit calculations have little hope of
capturing such a dynamic process. To do so, such approaches would have to focus
DARREN HAWKINS 799
on bargaining and side payments to losers. Yet the West was not capable of buying
off the East; new democracies were incapable of buying off authoritarian regimes
and established democracies; and treaty proponents offered no concessions to op-
ponents on universal jurisdiction. Power, interest, and bargaining models are thus
less helpful than a persuasion model at explaining the treaty.
21
This count includes conventions and protocols adopted by states acting collectively or in the Security Council.
See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm for a nearly comprehensive listing.
DARREN HAWKINS 801
The causal factors developed above are not unique to human rights treaties and
could be tested in other contexts. The central taken-for-granted international beliefs
identified above are broad enough to apply to a variety of issue areas. With respect
to criminal issues, for example, a theoretical focus on interests or power might lead
analysts to expect stronger treaties on drug trafficking than on hijacking. Drug
trafficking is far more frequent than airline hijackings, affects more domestic in-
terests, has larger overall consequences for states and has disproportionate negative
effects on powerful states. Yet states have done little to set up international en-
forcement on drug trafficking issues while they have implemented universal juris-
diction for hijackings. This pattern may reflect the relative prominence of innocent
victims suffering bodily harm, a central image in hijacking cases but less important
in drug trafficking cases where those suffering harm are not usually associated with
innocence. It may also reflect the importance of precedent. The oldest universal
jurisdiction norms stem from 19th century British crusades against piracy, a crime
that has an obvious modern counterpart in hijacking (Randall, 1988).
Even in security issues, a hard issue area for persuasion models, a variety of cases
suggest that background international understandings could be an important fac-
tor. Many of the most prominent security treaties focus on bodily harm issues,
especially on weapons and practices that cause indiscriminant harm. These include
land mines, chemical weapons, submarine attacks on merchant ships, the bombing
of non-military targets, and the treatment of the wounded and prisoners of war
(Price, 1995, 1998; Legro, 1997). With respect to precedent, Richard Price has
shown how proponents of a land mine ban strategically used moral suasion and
social pressure to graft these new norms onto preexisting norms. The 1949
Geneva Conventions and their follow-up protocols also provide a constructive ex-
ample in the importance of precedent (van Elst, 2000:82325). They are the only
security-related norms that utilize enforcement mechanismsFin this case, univer-
sal jurisdictionFand they also have a very long history, with the first norms es-
tablished in the mid-1800s.
Other issue areas exhibit similar patterns. The womens movement has claimed
the most institutional success in recent years when they have framed the issue as
one of bodily harm (Joachim, 2003). Violence against women has received the most
attention among womens issues and has even been incorporated into a legally
binding (although not enforceable) treaty in the Americas (Hawkins and Humes,
2002). Despite the deep contentiousness surrounding abortion and reproduction
generally, womens groups have made the most progress on reproductive rights
when they have linked them to womens health. If womens rights follow human
rights patterns, these initial steps will set precedents for more costly international
institutions in the future.
In short, this article cautions against an over-reliance on interests and power as
default explanations for international institutions. At the least, scholars should
consider persuasion as a causal mechanism in their analyses. Approaches focusing
on social interaction have been criticized for failing to specify the mechanisms by
which that interaction translates into state interests and international outcomes,
and the conditions in which the processes occur (Legro, 1997; Checkel, 1998).
Some previous theoretical formulations have tended to suggest that when an issue
is correctly framed, or when persuasive arguments are made, action will result.
These arguments are unfalsifiable because they do not specify what constitutes a
correct frame or a persuasive argument. Other formulations are falsifiable but
more narrowly drawn and not clearly generalizable. In an important article,
Schimmelfennig (2001:48) has argued that European states successfully used rhe-
torical action to expand the European Union because they were able to draw on the
communitys standard of legitimacy in the form of a pan-European community
of liberal-democratic states. As with many studies of the EU, the argument is
insightful but of unclear generalizability.
802 Explaining Costly International Institutions
In this article, I have offered generalizable yet falsifiable propositions about the
ways in which communicative interaction produces new international institutions,
and about which types of arguments are likely to produce the strongest forms of
international action. It improves on existing theories that have either offered non-
falsifiable propositions or that have drawn narrower hypotheses that cannot clearly
be applied beyond the cases considered. Gradually, then, the constructivist research
program is gaining testable propositions about international behavior that can be
placed head-to-head against those from other research traditions. Rather than re-
solving the superior explanatory ability of one approach or another, this article
contributes an additional plausible explanation to the question: Where do inter-
national institutions come from? To the realist answer of powerful states and the
liberal response of self-interested governments is added the constructivist propo-
sition of state communication and persuasive arguments. All three propositions are
specific and testable, and deserve further research.
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