The Challenger Case

Executive Summary
On January 28, 1986, the American shuttle orbiter Challenger broke up 73 seconds
after liftoff, bringing a devastating end to the spacecrafts 10th mission. The
disaster claimed the lives of all seven astronauts aboard including a teacher. It was
later determined that two rubber O-rings, which had been designed to separate the
sections of the rocket booster, had failed due to cold temperatures on the morning
of the launch. The tragedy and its aftermath received extensive media coverage.
This case presents a study of group behavior in the form of a conference call
in the lead up to the high profile launch of the satellite.
The incident is a conference call between two organizations NASA and
Morton Thiokol (henceforth referred to as MT) an engineering firm contracted to
NASA for building SRBs (Solid Rocket Boosters) for the Challenger shuttle. The
teleconference call took place a day before the scheduled launch and it involved
representatives from both the firms.
The teleconference call
After checking that everyone was online and exchanging pleasantries, the
representatives from the two organizations started talking business. The MT people
had faxed some documents regarding the test results from previous tests to NASA
just prior to the meeting.
An engineer from MT, Roger Boisjoly expressed concern over the launch
temperature of the launch day which was predicted to be around 29 degree
Fahrenheit. As per Roger, the lowest temperature at which they had conducted tests
was about 53 degrees and found that the test flight had some erosion i.e. the test
was not completely successful. So he recommended delaying the launch until the
temperature was above 53 degrees.
Larry Mulloy from NASA expressed dissatisfaction over this
recommendation after he looked at the data and saw no proof that supported
Rogers claim. The launch had been delayed multiple times before so he was
skeptical is doing so again. Larry exclaimed that Roger had hardly any evidence to
back his claim, in fact the chart showing erosion for test flight 2 at 70 degree
seemed to negate Rogers claim of poor performance at lower temperature.
Roger accepted that he didnt have the data to back his claim but proceeded
by stating that erosion was not the only problem to be concerned about. There was
also the problem of blow by occurring at low temperatures. Post this , the discussion
went into a bit of an argument involving representatives from both sides until an
intervention from George Hardy who although supported his colleague Larry, stated
that MTs recommendation would not be overridden. Here Joe Kilminster who had
earlier recommended that launch be postponed took permission from NASA to have
a private discussion with his team.
Being pressured by Hardys appellation at MTs recommendation Jerry Mason
wanted to discuss this with his two engineers Roger and Arnie. The engineers stuck
behind their decision to recommend postponing the launch. At this point Mason
expressed the need for taking a management decision as much as an engineering
decision.
Once the teleconference resumed, Joe Kilminster recommended that NASA
should proceed despite the concerns expressed earlier. When asked, nobody
objected to this recommendation from both side and the teleconference concluded.

3. What issues face Roger Boisjoly, Bob Lund and Larry Mulloy? How should they
have approached the teleconference?

Roger Boisjoly wasnt provided the requisite support by the senior members of his
organization, Morton Thiokol. The official task force which could have collected data
regarding the failure of O-rings was not allowed to be formed by Bob Lund and Joe
Kilminster even on his insistence. Kilminster accused him of being over emotional
(histrionics). Although, Lund and Kilminster helped him get a teleconference on 12
hours prior to the launch of Challenger, they did not stand by him at the crucial
moment of decision.

Bob Lund being the Vice President of Engineering and boss of Roger Boisjoly, did not
disseminate his duties to the best of his abilities. Bob could not convince Kilminster
to set up an official task force even after receiving a mail from Roger who explained
him the criticality of the issue. Boisjoly only ended up getting flak from Kilminster.
Bob succumbed to the pressure when Jerry Mason asked him to take off his
engineering hat and put on his management hat. The kind of support that he could
have extended to Boisjoly both as an engineer and as his boss was missing
throughout the events which ultimately led to the disaster.

Larry Mulloy who was under extreme pressure to launch Challenger failed to
recognize the criticality of the issue. He did not provide any benefit of doubt to
Morton Thiokol team failing to understanding that lives were at stake. He refused to
overlook everything that could have even hinted towards possibility of the failure of
O-rings (namely the unusually dark black color of the soot). He only concentrated on
that part of data that confirmed his belief that O-ring was not affected by low
temperatures. Further, O-ring had not been effective even in the past launches but
it hadnt ever resulted into a disaster, which further re-emphasized his belief that
this was a minor issue. Hence, Mulloys judgment was impaired by what is known as
confirmation bias, the practice of seeking out or accepting information that only
agrees with one's preconceived notions.