MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS. COMPANIA amounted to P23,343.29.

Manila Railroad then filed an

TRANSATLANTICA action against the Streamship Company to recover said
damages. The Steamship Company caused Atlantic
Company to be brought as co-defendant arguing that
Atlantic Company as an independent contractor, who had
38 Phil 875
undertaken to discharge the boilers had become
FACTS: responsible for the damage.

SS/Alicante, belonging to Compania Transatlantica The Court of First Instance decided in favor of Manila
de Barcelona was transporting two locomotive boilers for Railroad, the plaintiff, against Atlantic Company and
the Manila Railroad Company. The equipment of the ship absolved the Steamship Company. Manila Railroad
for discharging the heavy cargo was not strong enough to appealed from the decision because the Steamship
handle the boilers. Compania Transatlantica contracted Company was not held liable also. Atlantic Company
the services of Atlantic gulf and Pacific Co., which had also appealed from the judgment against it.
the best equipment to lift the boilers out of the ships hold.
ISSUES:
When Alicante arrived in Manila, Atlantic company sent
out its floating crane under the charge of one Leyden.
When the first boiler was being hoisted out of the ships
hold, the boiler could not be brought out because the 1. Was the Steamship Company liable to Manila
sling was not properly placed and the head of the boiler Railroad for delivering the boiler in a damaged condition?
was caught under the edge of the hatch. The weight on
the crane was increased by a strain estimated at 15 tons
with the result that the cable of the sling broke and the
2. Was Atlantic Company liable to the Steamship
boiler fell to the bottom of the ships hold. The sling was
Company for the amount it may be required to pay the
again adjusted and the boiler was again lifted but as it
plaintiff?
was being brought up the bolt at the end of the derrick
broke and the boiler fell again. The boiler was so badly
damaged that it had to be shipped back to England to be
rebuilt. The damages suffered by Manila Railroad
Was Atlantic Company directly liable to plaintiff as held by
the trial court?
RULING:
There was a contractual relation between the
Steamship Company and Manila Railroad. There was
also a contractual relation between the Steamship
Company and Atlantic. But there was no contractual
relation between the Railroad Company and Atlantic
Company.
There was no question that the Steamship Company
was liable to Manila Railroad as it had the obligation to
transport the boiler in a proper manner safe and securely
under the circumstances required by law and customs.
The Steamship Company cannot escape liability simply
because it employed a competent independent contractor
to discharge the boiler.
Atlantic Company claimed that it was not liable,
because it had employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family and proper care in the selection of
Leyden. Said argument was not tenable, because said
defense was not applicable to negligence arising in the
course of the performance of a contractual obligation.
The same can be said with respect to the liability of
Atlantic Company upon its contract with the Steamship
Company. There was a distinction between negligence in
the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa
contractual) and negligence considered as an
independent source of obligation (culpa aquiliana).
Atlantic Company wasis liable to the Steamship
Company for the damage brought upon the latter by the
failure of Atlantic Company to use due care in discharging
the boiler, regardless of the fact that the damage was
caused by the negligence of an employee who was
qualified for the work, duly chose with due care.
Since there was no contract between the Railroad
Company and Atlantic Company, Railroad Company can
had no right of action to recover damages from Atlantic
Company for the wrongful act which constituted the
violation of the contract. The rights of Manila Railroad
can only be made effective through the Steamship
Company with whom the contract of affreightment was
made.
14. GILCHRIST V. CUDDY
FACTS:
Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. On April 24, He
rented it to C. S.Gilchrist for a week for P125. A few days
to the date of delivery, Cuddy sent the moneyback to
Gilchrist. Cuddy then rented the film to Espejo and his
partner Zaldarriaga forP350 for the week knowing that it
was rented to someone else and that Cuddy acceptedit
because he was paying about three times as much as he
had contracted with Gilchristbut they didn't know the
identity of the other party. Gilchrist filed for injunction
againstthese parties. The
trial court
and
CA granted
that there is a contract between Gilchristand Cuddy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should
be liable for damagesthough they do not know the
identity of Gilchrist.
SC RULING:
YES. Judgment is affirmed, that Cuddy was liable in an
action for damagesfor the breach of that contract, and
there can be no doubt. The mere right to competecould
not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy
to take away theappellee's contractual rights. Everyone
has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own
enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be
free from maliciousand wanton interference, disturbance
or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as aresult of
competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is
damnum absqueinjuria
(loss without injury), unless some superior right by
contract or otherwise isinterfered with. Cuddy contract on
the part of the appellants was a desire to make aprofit by
exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice
beyond this desire; butthis fact does not relieve them of
the legal liability for interfering with that contract
andcausing its breach. Liability of the appellants arises
from unlawful acts and not fromcontractual obligations, as
they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy
toviolate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of
Gilchrist had been one fordamages, it would be governed
by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code.
Article1902 of that code provides that a person who, by
act or omission, causes damages toanother when there
is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage dodone.
There is nothing in this article which requires as a
condition precedent to theliability of a tort-feasor that he
must know the identity of a person to whom he
causesdamages
.
An injunction is a "special remedy" which was there
issued by the authority and underthe seal of a court of
equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable
relief issought, to cases where there is no "plain, So far as the preliminary injunction issued against the
adequate, and complete remedy at law,"which "will not be appellants is concerned, whichprohibited them from
granted while the rights between the parties are exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist
undetermined,except in extraordinary cases where desired toexhibit it, we are of the opinion that the
material and irreparable injury will be done," whichcannot circumstances justified the issuance of thatinjunction in
be compensated in damages, and where there will be no the discretion of the court
adequate remedy, andwhich will not, as a rule, be .
granted, to take property out of the possession of one The remedy by injunction cannot be used torestrain a
partyand put it into that of another whose title has not legitimate competition, though such competition would
been established by law involve the violationof a contract.
.
Irreparableinjury does not meant such injury as is
beyond the possibility of repair, or beyondpossible
compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or
great damage, butthat species of injury, whether great or
small, that ought not to be submitted to on theone hand
or inflicted on the other; and, because it is so large on the
one hand, or sosmall on the other, is of such constant
and frequent recurrence that no fair orreasonable redress
can be had therefor in a court of law
.
Gilchrist was facing theimmediate prospect of diminished
profits by reason of the fact that the appellants
hadinduced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had
counted upon as his feature film
.
Itis quite apparent that to estimate with any decree of
accuracy the damages whichGilchrist would likely suffer
from such an event would be quite difficult if not
impossible
.
Perez v Pomar
Facts:
The petitioner Don Vicente Perez filed before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint asking the
court to determine the amount due to him for the services
he rendered in the Tabacalera Company and that the
defendant Eugenio Pomar be condemned to the payment
of damages amounting to $3,200, gold, together with the
costs of suit. Prior to this event, the petitioner was asked
to be an English interpreter between the defendant and
the military authorities and that after that incident, the
petitioner continued to render his services to the
respondent and that he obtained passes and
accompanied Pomar upon his journeys to some of the
towns in Province of Laguna( e.g conferences between
the respondent and the colonel commanding the local
garrison, conferences with Captain Lemen in the town of
Pilar, major in command in Pagsanjan about the
shipment of goods from Manila) and that the plaintiff was
assured by the respondent that in every rendered service
to the said company, there would be such payment.
Thus, caused him to abandon his soap business and
suffered damages in the sum of $3,200. The defendant
filed for dismissal of the complaint denying the allegations
stated by the petitioner. He also stated that Perez
borrowed from time to time money amounting to $175 for
his soap business, that Perez purposes in accompanying
him is to extend his business and mercantile relations,
free transportation, and that Perez had acted as
interpreter of his own free will without any offer of
payment and therefore no legal relation between them
existed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the
continued service rendered by the petitioner.
Held:
Yes. The Court decision is that the judgement should
be rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the payment
to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos.
Ratio:
The Court ruled out that if there is a tacit and
mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, the
defendant is still obliged to pay such compensation to the
petitioner even if there is no written contract entered
between the two parties on the basis of quasi-contract.
When one party knowingly receives something for
nothing, the courts may impose a quasi contract. Under a
quasi contract, neither party is originally intended to
create an agreement. Instead, an arrangement is
imposed by a judge to rectify an occurrence of unjust
enrichment. On the services rendered by the petitioner in
the province of Laguna, it follows that there was a
bilateral obligation on the part of both parties because the
defendant accepted the benefit of the service rendered
by the petitioner and that in turn the petitioner expected
him to pay his rendition of service. Provided in Article 22
of the Civil Code, Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him. The fact that the defendant consented to
accept an interpreter's services on various occasions,
rendered in his behalf and not considered as free, it is
just that he should pay the reasonable payment because
it is well-known principle of law that no one should be
permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.
Gilchrist v Cuddy (Torts)
GILCHRIST V CUDDY February 18, 1915 G.R. No. L-
9356 C. S. GILCHRIST, plaintiff-appellee, vs. E. A.
CUDDY, ET AL., defendants. JOSE FERNANDEZ
ESPEJO and MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA, appellants.
FACTS:
One Cuddy, the owner of a cinematographic film
Zigomar, let it under a rental contract to the plaintiff
Gilchrist, the owner of a cinematograph theater in Iloilo,
for a specified period of time or for a number of days
beginning May 26. In violation of the terms of this
agreement, Cuddy proceeded to turn over the film also
under a rental contract, to the defendants Espejo and
Zaldarriaga The arrangement between Cuddy and the
appellants for the exhibition of the film by the latter on the
26th of May were perfected after April 26, so that the six
weeks would include and extend beyond May 26.
Gilchrist thereupon restored to the Court of First Instance
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI - produced an injunction restraining the defendants
from exhibiting the film in question in their theater during
the period specified in the contract of Cuddy with
Gilchrist
ISSUE:
Whether the injunction was properly granted; Whether
Cuddy is liable for damages to Gilchrist
RULING:
Yes, although the defendants did not, at the time their
contract was made, know the identity of the plaintiff as
the person holding the prior contract but did know of the
existence of a contract in favor of someone In the case at
bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist -
Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire
to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater.
There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact
does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering
with that contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore,
clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable to
Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless
they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact
that they did not know at the time the identity of the
original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.
Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who,
by act or omission, causes damages to another when
there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair
the damage do done. There is nothing in this article
which requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity
of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the
chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows
that no such knowledge is required in order that the
injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
One who buys something which he knows has been sold
to some other person can be restrained from using that
thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and
better right.
Chief Justice Wells:"Everyone has a right to enjoy
the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise,
industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free
from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance
or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result
of competition, or the exercise of like rights by
others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some
superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered
with."
"One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between
others, and, for the purpose of gain to himself
induces one of the parties to break it, is liable to the
party injured thereby; and his continued interference
may be ground for an injunction where the injuries
resulting will be irreparable."
VICENTE LAMIS and SANDIGAN PROTECTIVE &
INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC.,
Petitioners, vs.
DAVID Y. ONG,
Respondent.FACTS:Sandigan Protective and
Investigation Agency, Inc. (Sandigan), petitioner, was the
securityagency providing security services at the Manila
Chinese Cemetery. The visiting hours were at6:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m. Sandigan instructed the security guards not to
allow any one to enter thecemetery from 6:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m.
On September 20, 1994, Vicente Lamis, also a petitioner,
was the guard assigned at the southgate of the cemetery
for the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. slot.Around 3:00 in the
morning, a Mitsubishi Lancer, with a PSM 679 plate,
driven by David Y. Ong,herein respondent, arrived at the
south gate of the cemetery. He beeped his car
and continueddoing so, but Lamis did not open the gate.
Eventually, he went outside the gate and
informedrespondent that being beyond visiting hours, he
cannot enter the cemetery. Suddenly,respondent
accelerated the speed of his car, trying to enter the
cemetery. This irked Lamis. Heclosed the gate and took a
shot gun entrusted to him by one of the roving guards.
About thirty minutes thereafter, respondents car returned
at full speed toward the closed gate
where Lamis was standing. He fired a warning shot but
respondent did not stop his car. Lamisfired another
warning shot. Respondent then alighted from his car.
Seeing it was closed, he gotinside the car, but before he
could do so, Lamis shot him, hitting his right arm, left hip,
and rightwaist. He managed to drive to the Chinese
General Hospital where he was examined andtreated.
Thereafter, the hospital guard reported the incident to the
police who immediatelyconducted an investigation.
Petitioner Sandigan conducted its own investigation but
did notturn over to the police the firearm used by
Lamis.Vincent filed a criminal case against Lamis for
frustrated homicide and a civil case against Lamisand the
security agency for damages. Lamis, on the other hand,
that he shot Vincent for self-defense. The trial court ruled
that Lamis was negligent thus, ordering him and the
security
agency liable. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
trial courts judgment, holding that
the acts of Lamis were not the result of negligence but
were deliberate and intentional.Sandigan, as the
employer, also failed to prove that it exercised due
diligence in the selectionand supervision of its security
guards.ISSUE: Whether the acts of Lamis and Sandigan
were acts of negligence.RULING: As to LAMIS, NO. His
acts were deliberate and intentional. Thus, as said by the
Court of
Appeals, Lamis contention of self
-defense when he shot Vincent with TWO GUNS is
barren of merit. However, he remains liable for shooting
Victor Ong.As to Sandigan, YES. The Court
emphasized the act of Lamis of shooting Vincent,
which is adeliberate and intentional act, making Lamis
and Sandigan jointly and severally liable.First it did not
properly show that it had exercised due diligence in
choosing and hiring itssecurity guards. Further, it failed to
adduce in evidence any copy of its Report on the
shootingincident involving appellant Lamis. Neither did it
surrender to the police authorities the .38caliber gun and
shotgun used by appellant Lamis in shooting the
appellee.Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
"Whoever by an
act
or omission
causes damage toanother, there being fault
or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done
. x x x." The
obligation imposed by this Article is "demandable not only
for ones own wrongful acts or
omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is
responsible." Thus, petitioner Sandigan,being the
employer of petitioner Lamis, is likewise liable
for damages caused by the latter.PETITION DENIED