This article was downloaded by: [84.205.244.

138]
On: 25 February 2013, At: 01:36
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office:
Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription
information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rspr20

Ego, self and otherness

a
Judy Gammelgaard
a
Olufsvej 37, DK-2100, Copenhagen , Denmark E-mail:
Version of record first published: 21 Jan 2013.

To cite this article: Judy Gammelgaard (2003): Ego, self and otherness, The Scandinavian Psychoanalytic
Review, 26:2, 96-108

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01062301.2003.10592918

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial
or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the
contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae,
and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not
be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this
material.
 Scand Psychoanal. Rev. (2003) 26, 96-108 Copyright 2003
--THE--
SCANDINAVIAN
PSYCHOANALYTIC
REVIEW
ISSN 0106-2301

Ego, self and otherness

Judy Gammelgaard

The concept of self has been introduced as a core concept in several contem-
porary psychoanalytical theories. This study undertakes a critical examina-
tion of the historical and theoretical presuppositions of the concept of self
and its corollary, the object. The proposed thesis is that the concept of self
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013

on a theoretical level has grown out of ego-psychology and the ambition is

to bring consistency into the ambiguous concept of the ego left by Freud. On
a clinical level, the concept of self is seen as an attempt to adjust psychoana-
lytical theory and technique to what, broadly speaking, we call non-neurotic
patients. While the concept of self on a theoretical/eve/ dates back to Hart-
mann, it was left to those following the tradition of ego-psychology to work
out the implications for our understanding of the pathology of the self and
its proper treatment. The work of Heinz Kohut is seen as an exponent for
those analysts who have been wrestling with the task of adjusting psychoana-
lytical theory and technique to our understanding and treatment of non-neur-
otic patients. A re-reading of the Freudian concept of the ego allows the
author to present an alternative to ego-psychology and selfpsychology. While
the concept of the self implies a re-centred theory of subjectivity, the author
points to the de-centeredness of classical psychoanalytical thinking. Freud
did not find an independent concept of the self necessary. On the contrary,
psychoanalytical theory rejected the idea of the psyche as a complete and
unified entity. Defining the ego as a representative of the divided psyche
encompassing the other, the author suggests that incorporating contributions
from French psychoanalytical thinking and the ideas of Winnicott places the
self as a concept in accordance with classical psychoanalytical thinking.

Key words: the ego - the self- the object - otherness

Freud left a body of scientific work that in some
ways has remained unfinished. The positive conse-
quence of this is that reading Freud's texts requires
work, such as facing its contradictions and finding
the logical results of the modifications Freud him-
self found necessary to undertake.
Of course, each person can adopt his/her own
position regarding these contradictions and ambi-
guities. You can either try to dissolve them and
bring greater consistency to the concepts or, as a
starting point, regard them as meaningful expres-
sions of the complexity of the phenomena to
which the concepts refer. In the present discussion
of the concepts of ego and self, I have followed the
latter approach. For the purposes of the current
paper, I am primarily curious regarding the con-
cept of the self and why it has become the core
concept in many contemporary psychoanalytical
theories, as a supplement to the tripartite model
of the psychic apparatus developed by Freud.
Freud did not think that an independent con-
cept of the self was necessary. In his psychoana-
lytic theory, from his earliest models of the psychic
apparatus (Freud, 1895, 1900) to the structural
 model of 1923, Freud rejected the idea of the psy-
che as a complete and unified entity.
A concept about the self spanning the psychic
structures introduces exactly such a unity and, as
a consequence, hints to the possibility that we can
understand ourselves in everything we embody,
which is impossible, according to classical psycho-
analytical thinking (Green, 2000).
The psychoanalytical concept of the self arises
from different approaches: ego-psychology, infant
research and self-psychology, to mention only
those theories arguing for a concept of self as a
core construct in theories of subjective phenom-
ena. Heinz Hartmann's (1950) introduction of the
doubling of the Freudian ego, that is, supple-
menting it with the concept of self, can be seen
as an indication of Hartmann's ambition to bring
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
consistency into the ambiguous concept of the ego,
which Freud had left, and to isolate and purify the
ego, leaving the self within the place of narcissistic
cathexis. This bipartition was taken over by the
developing self-psychology, exemplified by the
work of Heinz Kohut, who set himself the task of
solving the riddle of the non-neurotic patient and,
in particular, investigating the narcissistic states.
In other words, a gap arose when ego-psychology
made the ego more precise and unambiguous,
leaving a model of the mind not well suited for
studies of borderline and narcissistic patients. The
self and its complementary, the object, seem to
have filled the gap, and self and object became the
matrix in many contemporary psychoanalytical
theories. In the following, I shall try to elaborate
this history of the concept of ego and self, and
introduce the idea that an alternative reading of
the Freudian ego may contribute some critical re-
flection on the relevance of the concept of both the
self and the object. Contrary to the ego of ego-
psychology, I will argue for a model of the ego
that accepts the ambiguousness of the Freudian
concept and that outlines the other as part of the
ego. I will follow the tradition of French philos-
ophy (Ricoeur, 1992) and psychoanalysis (Laplan-
che, 1999; Green, 2000; Aulagnier, 1975) and pro-
pose the term otherness as an alternative to the
concept of the object.
This does not necessarily make the concept of
self superfluous, but situates it in a certain area of
experience. We can grasp the idea of this area of
experience by looking at Winnicott's theory of an
intermediate area of experience and his emphasis
on the difference between relating to the object
and using the object.
In 1950, Hartmann introduced the concept of
self into psychoanalysis. To fully understand the
reason for and implications of this, we must exam-
ine this introduction in light of the background
of the whole project of that which is termed ego-
psychology.
THE EGO AND THE SELF
Hartmann had ambitions to bring psychoanalysis
into contact with academic psychology and dem-
onstrate that psychoanalysis has the "potentiality
to become a general theory of mental develop-
ment, broader, both in its assumptions and scope,
than any other psychological theory" (Hartmann,
1958, p. 5). In order to realize this potentiality,
psychoanalysis had to incorporate knowledge
available from developmental psychology, neuro-
psychology and social psychology (Hartmann,
1944, 1950). Consciousness, perception, and mo-
tor function - all ego functions - link the biologi-
cal organism to the external world, and these func-
tions were well-known to academic psychology.
According to Hartmann, ego-psychology was for
psychoanalysis the "general meeting ground with
non-analytic psychology" (Hartmann, 1958, p. 6).
This ambition of ego-psychology undoubtedly has
influenced later generations of psychoanalysts
(Bergmann, 2000).
At the 26th International Psycho-Analytical
Congress in Rome, 1969, one of the main speakers
referred to Hartmann's work several times, under-
lining that "We could not, I believe, abandon the
recent advances (either in ego psychology or in the
continuing movement of psychoanalysis towards
becoming a really general psychology) ..." (Levin,
1969, p. 41).
In the tradition of ego-psychology, I propose
that what seems evident is a consequence of the
definition of the ego, which Hartmann introduced
in his eagerness to bring consistency to the am-
biguous ego of Freudian thinking. Reading Freud,
one is struck by the diversity of meanings in the
usage of the Ich. Freud seems to deliberately play
on the ambiguity of the Ich, maybe as Laplan-
che & Pontalis (1973) have suggested, to make use
of all connotations normally attached to the ego,
the me and the I. In this diversity, Hartmann saw
a conceptual ambiguity to be dispelled, and he set
himself the task of conceptualising a more precise
and unambiguous ego.
Hartmann's writings are comprehensive and
exemplary of a systematic way of thinking. Of
97
 course, I cannot go into detail and shall limit my
examination of the ego to a few references focus-
ing on three aspects: (I) the genetic, (2) the dy-
namic - confining myself to its relation to the ex-
ternal world, and last, but not least, (3) the econ-
omic. It is in reference to this last- mentioned
aspect that I touch upon the narcissistic dimension
and examine Hartmann's reasons for introducing
the concept of the self.
THE GENESIS OF THE EGO
Hartmann used the ego of the structural model as
his starting point, which he rendered as "a sub-
structure of personality ... defined by its func-
tions" (Hartmann, 1950, p. 114). Hartmann knew,
of course, that Freud introduced the ego in his
earliest writings. However, not until the structural
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
model is it reasonable simultaneously to talk
about a more precise psychoanalytical concept of
the ego and a general psychoanalytical psychology
(Hartmann, 1956).
In his theory of the genesis of the. ego, Hart-
mann (1952) speaks of an undifferentiated id-ego
stage, and then introduces the idea of a series
of differentiating processes that in "ontogenesis
... follows the leads of outer and inner percep-
tion, of motility, and of the systems of precon-
scious memory traces, of experience and learn-
ing" (ibid p. 166). Although he admits that these
ego functions are activated in the infant by in-
stinctual needs, "their use, independent of im-
mediate needs, is already part of the develop-
ment of the reality ego" (ibid. p. 167). Referring
to a comment from Freud's "Analysis terminable
and interminable", Hartmann proposes that we
must take for granted the existence of "primary
congenital variations in the ego", and finishes by
saying that "we come to see ego development as
a result of three sets of factors: inherited ego
characteristics, ... influences of the instinctual
drives and the influences of outer reality" (Hart-
mann, 1950, p. 120). From there, he develops
the idea of "autonomous functions of the ego",
the "conflict-free spheres" and "desexualised"
and "neutralised energy". What we learn from
Hartmann regarding the genesis of the ego seems
to be essentially two things: (I) functions that
later will serve the ego, exist from the beginning
of life - they develop according to processes of
differentiation through maturation and learning;
(2) the ego serves mainly adaptive and regulating
functions.
98
Was Hartmann right in assuming that this de-
scription of the ego is an elaboration of the Freud-
ian ego? I believe that the answer is only partly
affirmative.
In "Outline", Freud (1940) refers to an "undif-
ferentiated ego-id", but he also states that "the
ego - has been developed out of the id's cortical
layer, which, through being adapted to the recep-
tion and exclusion of stimuli, is in direct contact
with the external world (Reality)" (Freud, 1940, p.
198-99). In "The ego and the id", we learn that
"the ego is the part of the id which has been modi-
fied by the direct influence of the external world
through the medium of the Pcpt.-Cs" (Freud,
1923, p. 25). Hartmann is right in pointing to
those functions that are turned towards external
reality as ego functions. But as Laplanche (1987),
Pontalis (1977) and Green (1988) have rightly
pointed out, Freud explicitly distinguishes the ego
of the psychic apparatus from the biological or-
ganism. Freud's interest seems exclusively to be the
ego as it is developed psychically. It is thus necess-
ary to differentiate between the surface of the or-
ganism and the surface of the psychic apparatus,
and outline the development of the ego from the
last mentioned (Laplanche, 1970).
From his paper "Instincts and their vicissi-
tudes", we learn that "originally, at the very begin-
ning of mental life, the ego is cathected with in-
stincts and is to some extent capable of satisfying
them by itself. We call this condition "narcissism"
and this way of obtaining satisfaction, "auto-
erotic" (Freud, 1915, p. 134). The ego, according
to this view, is not given, but developed into a rep-
resentation cathected with libidinal energy. This
way of looking at the ego is exactly incompatible
with Hartmann's purified ego.
In the same text, we learn about the "original
reality-ego", which manages to distinguish inter-
nal and external stimuli by a "sound objective cri-
terion". These formulations do not mean that
Freud considers the ego to be biologically original
or something that exists from the beginning of the
infant's life. He is explicitly referring to the begin-
ning of mental life, indicating that the ego is the
result of psychical processes. It is in the paper "On
Narcissism" that Freud most unequivocally states
this: "I may point out that we are bound to sup-
pose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot
exist in the individual from the start; the ego has
to be developed ... " He continues: " ... something
[must be] added ... a new psychical action" (Freud,
1914, p. 77).
 To make this clear, let us follow Freud's line of
thought in defining the reality ego.
In passing, we may notice the slight displace-
ment of meaning from the German "Real-Ich" to
the Anglo-Saxon "Reality-Ego". In "Ego and the
id", Freud defines the ego as "first and foremost a
bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is
itself the projection of a surface" (1923, p.26). In
a footnote, he elaborates on this: "The ego is ulti-
mately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly
from those springing from the surface of the body.
It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of
the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen
above, representing the superficies of the mental
apparatus" (ibid.). In other words, the ego may be
seen as a specific movement or process, a projec-
tion of the organism into the psyche, which is not
the same as the displacement of the organism into
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
the psyche.
THE EGO AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD
In the ego's relation to the external world, there
are further discrepancies between Hartmann's ego
and the ego of Freudian thinking. Hartmann con-
centrated his study on those ego functions that, in
his own words, might be named "reality syntonic"
(Hartmann, 1958, p. 3).
The ego of ego-psychology, according to Hart-
mann, is first and foremost defined by functions
centred around their relation to reality. This means
that "the ego organises and controls motility and
perception .... It also serves as a protective barrier
against excessive external, and in a somewhat dif-
ferent sense, internal stimuli. The ego tests reality,
action too, ... and thinking (as well as) inhibition
of delay of discharge" (Hartmann, 1950 p. 115),
just to name a few of its "long catalogue" of func-
tions. It would have been interesting if Hartmann
had been a little more explicit about what he
meant by "a somewhat different sense". Does
Hartmann mean that the protective barriers
against external and internal stimuli fundamen-
tally are the same, although they function in dif-
ferent ways? It seems as if Hartmann derives the
protective barrier of the ego against internal stim-
uli, from what he says about the barrier against
external stimuli. Although it is correct that Freud
(1940) compares them, he does not see a similarity,
but rather an analogy (Green, 1988). In other
words, Freud sees a difference in the ego's protec-
tive function according to whether this concerns
external or internal stimuli, indicating that the two
barriers do not have the same origin and do not
function according to identical principles. Exter-
nal stimuli can be eliminated or the organism may
shy away from them. This is not possible with
stimuli coming from the inside. Neither elimin-
ation nor flight is possible. The link between the
two modes of activity is not conclusive. This sug-
gests that Freud's formulations of ego-functioning
permit us to take account of this difference regard-
ing external stimuli and internal stimuli.
In his first metapsychological elaboration of the
psychic apparatus, Freud (1895) pointed to the in-
hibitory function of the ego. Contrary to the adap-
tive ego of Hartmann's theory, the ego of Freudian
theory does not develop primarily in order to
adapt to reality, but intervenes to prevent a cath-
exis of the memory element of the first satisfying
object from acquiring a force so that it releases the
"reality index" in the same way as the perception
of a real object. In order to test reality, the primary
processes of the psychic apparatus must be inhib-
ited so that what is only hallucinated is not taken
as a real object. The ego enables the subject not
to confuse its internal processes with reality, not
because, as Hartmann proposes, the ego has privi-
leged access to reality.
Defining the genesis of the ego as a process of
differentiation basically of maturational character
and focussing on the descriptive features of the
ego according to an average expectable environ-
ment, Hartmann has moved a long way from the
ego of Freudian thinking described as an organis-
ation of representations cathected with libidinous
energy. Hartmann wanted an ego free of narciss-
istic cathexis, a purified ego. He had no other solu-
tion than to separate ego and self, which leads me
to the last point of criticism against the ego of
Hartmann's psychology.
THE EGO AND THE SELF
Having proposed that we understand the ego as
a structure defined primarily by its adaptive and
regulating functions, it is difficult to encompass
the aforementioned ideas of the ego as cathected
with libidinal energy. Hartmann's solution to this
dilemma seems to slip in as by coincidence, but
not without crucial consequences.
Hartmann (1950) suggests that we differentiate
between ego and self in order to solve the difficult
problem left by Freud (1914) in his introduction of
narcissism. The problem according to Hartmann
consists in Freud's refraining from integrating his
99
 concept of narciSSism into the late structural
model. This means that narcissism includes a
topographical as well as an economical problem.
With regard to the latter, we can detect confusion
in the psychoanalytical literature of narcissism and
the libidinal cathexis of the ego.
To solve this problem, Hartmann proposes, "that
we define narcissism as the libidinal cathexis not of
the ego but of the self" (ibid. p. 127), thereby intro-
ducing the matrix of object-relation theories. With
this manoeuvre, the concept of the self has imper-
ceptibly been introduced as a supplement to the ego
of ego-psychology. Thus, the purified ego of ego-
psychology, which functions with neutralised en-
ergy, cannot be the object of cathexis. In order to
find a place for Freud's narcissism, ego-psychology
was left with no choice other than to bifurcate the
Freudian ego. The question is, however, whether
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
this represents anything more than a conceptual
solution (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).
We may also ask if this proposed bipolarity is
justified by psychoanalytical theory and fruitful in
the case of psychoanalytical practice (Pontalis,
1977). In his discussion of the concept of the self,
Pontalis presents us with precise answers to these
questions. Regarding the former question, he ar-
gues that theoretically it is not justified, first of all
because it tends to isolate and to localise narciss-
ism in order to purify the ego. Following the argu-
mentation of Laplanche, he asserts that narcissism
is not a phase, nor a specific mode of cathexis, but
a position, a permanent component of the devel-
opment of the ego. Secondly, self-love is insepar-
able from the libidinal cathexis of the ego as an
internal object. Thirdly, the constitution of the ego
encompasses the outlines of the other, something
that tends to disappear in the idea of an ego devel-
oping according to natural processes of matu-
ration and learning. Lastly, the main function of
the ego according to the paper "The ego and the
id" is to represent the interests of the personality
as a whole. This being the case, there can be no
talk of an autonomous ego. Instead, we are left
with an ego characterised by traces of the agencies
on which it is dependent.
Regarding the latter question, whether Hart-
mann's doubling the Freudian ego is fruitful in the
case of practice, the answer, according to Pontalis,
is subtler. We must give Hartmann credit for di-
recting psychoanalytic investigation towards the
pathology of the ego, which Freud, in one of his
rare allusions to a theory of psychoses, calls the
"follies of man".
100
It was not ego-psychology, however, that opened
up the psychoanalytical field of observations to
clinical phenomena beyond neuroses. Introducing
the self as a separate concept, Hartmann initiated
a movement among clinicians who found the latter
concept better suited for uncovering what seemed
to be a new field of investigation
Heinz Kohut's self-psychology was born as a re-
action to an ego- psychology of the ego, that had
become too cognitive and mechanical, leaving a
gap that the self of self- psychology was supposed
to fill. At first sight, from a clinical perspective,
this seems to be a well-founded supplement to ego-
psychology. However, with the late Kohut and his
successors, it became a veritable break with classi-
cal Freudian thinking.
In the following, I shall try to undertake a criti-
cal evaluation of what seems to be one of the most
influential moments that made the self a core con-
cept in psychoanalytical theory.
TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SELF
At the 26th International Congress in Rome
1969- one year before the death of Hartmann-
ego-psychology was still the main theoretical refer-
ence. But something was amiss. What had gone
wrong? Obviously, progress was lacking in clinical
work with patients. In his conclusions, Levin com-
mented that on a clinical level, psychoanalysts are
increasingly met with patients who do not seem to
suffer from infantile or neurotic conflicts, but from
"a complicating degree of ego/self dys-junction"
(Levin, 1969, p. 50). The focus of Levin's paper
was the self and its contribution to theory and
technique and is a good indicator of what was
lacking in psychoanalysis: conceptual tools that
may help with understanding and treating these
more regressed patients.
Heinz Kohut's work can be considered one of
several attempts to fill in the gap left by the ego
of ego-psychology. Or as Levin has put it: "after
Hartmann solved the problem of the ego by differ-
entiating between the self as "the great reservoir
of libido" ... and the ego as "the great system of
functions and of central control" ... Kohut (1966,
1968) has worked out for us the developmental
paths of the self" (Levin, 1970, p. 17 5).
Of course, I cannot go into the details en-
compassing the whole of Kohut's work. My focus
will be on his reasons for placing the self in the
centre of a psychoanalytical theory. I shall accord-
ingly restrict myself to an examination of Kohut's
 concept of the self and his argumentation for
transforming classical metapsychology into a
phenomenological theory of self. Following the
discussion of the concept of the self, I will go into
a more detailed examination of the concept of self-
object, which, to Kohut's successors, is dis-
tinguished as one of the "foundational constructs
upon which the theoretical superstructure of self-
psychology rests" (Stolorow et al. 1987, p. 15).
Without disparaging the clinical value of Ko-
hut's concept, I will argue that there is a problem
at the theoretical level. Kohut's concept is re-
stricted to a dyadic paradigm.
In Kohut's theory, there is no room for a con-
cept of thirdness, which means, I shall argue, that
Kohut is unable to explain the development from
the self-object's mirroring idealising function to
the kind of identification that is based on symbol-
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
isation. Kohut's theory leaves out something im-
portant both regarding the theory of development
and the theory of change in the psychoanalytical
situation. I shall demonstrate my argument
through a discussion of the famous case of Mr. Z.
THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF
Kohut's self-psychology must, as I said, be under-
stood as a reaction to ego-psychology, both in the
sense that he wants to return to a terminology that
maintains the subjective experiencing ego embed-
ded in Freud's Ich, but also in the sense that he
sticks to the tradition from ego-psychology by re-
ferring to a coherent agency in the person calling
it the self.
In Kohut's writings, there is a line of demar-
cation from his earliest work (1966, 1968, 1970,
1971, 1972) to his later work (1977, 1984, 1985).
In his earliest writings on narcissism, he is in total
accordance with ego-psychological tradition, de-
fining the self as a group of representations within
the three psychic structures. "To be more specific,
various - and frequently inconsistent - self-rep-
resentations are present not only in the id, the ego
and (although with a somewhat different valence)
~n the superego" (Kohut, 1970, p. 179). Although
I? the same period, he maintains that "at present
ti~e, the traditional theoretical framework pro-
VIdes adequate room for the self (as a subordinate
concept)", he nonetheless does not want to "ex-
c!ude the possibility that the continued investiga-
tion of the field of narcissism (e.g., of the narciss-
istic pe~sonalit~ disturbances) will eventually lead
to findmgs which could bring about a change in
our theories even in those concerning the basic
constituents of the mind" (ibid, p. 179). In his
book "The restoration of the self" (1977), he takes
that step and proposes that besides defining the
self as content of a mental apparatus, we need, in
order to grasp "the phenomena encountered in
our clinical work - and beyond - ... a psychology
in which the self is seen as the centre of the
psychological universe" (Kohut, 1977, p. XV). Ko-
hut had in fact already introduced this idea of the
self as centre in a paper published in 1985, which
he wrote in the early seventies. Speaking for the
first time of the "nuclear self", he says: "Certain
qualities and functions of the nuclear self, when
this structure is fully developed, cannot be under-
stood, unless the self is conceptualized as an inde-
pendent, autonomous entity .. :' (Karterud, 1995,
p. 145).
In his description of the self, one can see the
self of the existential phenomenological tradition.
Kohut has deliberately chosen this frame of refer-
ence as a reaction to a theory that objectifies the
living subject. In his early writings, Kohut (1970,
1971) speaks in favour of experience-near con-
cepts, and in his later writings (Kohut, 1977), he
makes it clear that discussions of the self can be
understood according to the basic stand of obser-
vation one chooses. Freud, Kohut says, "gazed at
man's inner life with the objectivity of an external
observer" (ibid., p. 67), whereas those who profess
the psychological phenomena of self-psychology,
for their observation and explanation, require " ...
an introspective-emphatic observation and theor-
etical conceptualization of the participating self"
(ibid' p. 68).
We must understand Kohut's insistence on ex-
perience-near data, I think, as a reaction to Hart-
mann's systematisation of Freudian theory. Ko-
hut's avocation for turning psychoanalysis into a
phenomenological psychology is furthermore a re-
action to an interpretation of Freudian psychoan-
alysis that carries the stamp of ego-psychology. By
this, I mean that in order to fully appreciate Ko-
hut's psychology of the self, we must look at it in
the light of a psychology that has turned psycho-
analysis into a scientific enterprise. Reading Freud
as a natural scientist, as Hartmann did, only cap-
tures part of Freud's whole project and, what is
worse, reduces vital parts of Freudian psychoan-
al~sis}o. bi~logy..Thus, Kohut (1959) repeating
this scientific misunderstanding" of Freudian
psychoanalysis, argues that drives understood as
biological forces, and therefore inaccessible to
101
 empathy and introspection, have no place at all in
self-psychology.
In Kohut's work, there is a deep concordance
between method and object of investigation as
seen in this argumentation. Yet, two things that
differentiate Kohut's psychology from Freudian
psychoanalysis seem to go essentially unnoticed.
First, Kohut represents a returning to what La-
planche (1997) has termed a Ptolemaic re-centring
of subjectivity. Secondly, Kohut in his avocation
for a phenomenological interpretation of psycho-
analysis leaves out the question of meta-psy-
chology. I shall comment on these two issues one
by one.
Notions of the human subject as a multi-levelled
process (Muller, 1996) came into Western philos-
ophy through Hegel's emphasis on the self not as
substance, but rather as process, operating
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
through the dialectics of negation. The concept of
self in this tradition is elegantly expressed by Kier-
kegaard, who says that "the self is a relation that
relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating
itself to itself in the relation" (Kierkegaard, 1980,
p. 13).
The implication of this concept of self is that
the individual does not have an immediate relation
to the self. The self is not - as Kierkegaard sug-
gests - but is always becoming. The process of be-
corning oneself is mediated by the other, and fol-
lowing Hegel, this process accordingly can never
be conflict-free.
Freudian thinking is part of this tradition. In-
sisting on the unconscious such that, in principle,
man does not know himself, but can only arrive
at this knowledge through another, Freud belongs
to "the great protagonists of suspicion" (Ricoeur,
1973). Freud did not doubt that psychoanalysis
has offended humans by pointing to an inten-
tionality beyond consciousness, signifying a kind
of Copernican revolution within a theory of sub-
jectivity. Self-psychology, on the other hand, seems
to implicate a return to a Ptolemaic re-centring of
subjectivity that situates the self as the centre of
an immediate acquisition of self-knowledge. With
self- psychology and the empathic-introspective
method, the unconscious is brought back from its
alienness. This, of course, has implications not
only for our theorising on subjectivity, but also for
analytic treatment. I shall return to this in the last
part of my paper.
A corollary of Kohut's self-psychology is his
break with metapsychology. Insisting on clinical
data as the main reference for theoretical thinking,
102
Kohut runs the risk of confusing conceptual levels.
Although he makes an explicit statement about
different degrees of abstractions, it seems that Ko-
hut's conceptual reflections remain on the descrip-
tive or first level of epistemology. Akin to Green,
we might suggest that Kohut's theory is an ex-
ample of psychoanalytical thinking that does not
differentiate between "a theory of states which
continued to retain the descriptive aspect of clin-
ical forms and a theory of structure which creates
models, if not as pure conventions, at least as the
development of these states to the point at which
their function and their meaning was revealed in
the most abstract terms" (Green, 2001, p. 56).
What Green is saying is that we need to separate
the descriptive level of clinical investigation from
the abstract level of theory generation. It is only
at this abstract level that we can construct models
that may capture the diversity and complexity
of the structures behind manifest clinical phen-
omena.
Kohut's concept of narcissism is a good illus-
tration of this. In spite of his penetrating obser-
vations of the narcissistic states, Kohut never
worked out a satisfying concept of narcissism from
a structural, dynamic and economic point of view,
and he leaves us with a lot of problems on a theor-
eticallevel. Kohut accepts without reservation the
distinction Hartmann introduced defining narciss-
ism as "the libidinal investment of the self" (Ko-
hut, 1966, p. 243).
With this as his starting point, he leaves unre-
solved the problems Hartmann introduced as are-
sult of a merely conceptual solution. In Kohut's
writings, we find no solution to the ambiguousness
of the ego. Accordingly, we are left with a concept
of narcissism that does not resolve whether it is to
be conceived as a state or as a permanent libidinal
cathexis of the ego.
Placing the self as the centre of activities, we are
left with only one version of narcissism: the posi-
tive, or as Green (2001) terms it, life narcissism.
This is a consequence of making the self, so to
speak, a self-motivating centre, a solution very
alien to a psychoanalytical theory of the subject.
Pontalis has formulated it thus: "If one directly
postulates a "natural primal self" as the hyposta-
sis of the subject, the contribution of psycho-
analysis to the formation of and differentiation of
the personality agencies ... and to the intrinsically
irreducible conflicts between them, is to a certain
extent nullified" (Pontalis, 1977, p. 133).
This nullification of the "multilevelled subject"
 is apparent in Kohut's theory. "The establishment
of the narcissistic self must be evaluated both as a
maturationally predetermined step and as a devel-
opmental achievement, and the grandiose fantasy
which is its functional correlate is phase-appropri-
ate and adaptive just as the overestimation of the
power and perfection of the idealized object" (Ko-
hut, 1966, p. 250).
It might seem that what Kohut is arguing for is
a kind of natural self, which in order to ac-
complish itself, only has to unite with a potential
whole. There is no doubt that the concept of co-
herence and unity is deeply embedded in Kohut's
self-psychology. However, it would not be fair to
criticise Kohut for postulating the self as a self-
generating phenomena from the very beginning of
life. Although presupposing a nuclear self, he ac-
knowledges the other or the object as a generating
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
part of self-development. However, the self-object
of Kohutian theory does not reflect the alienness
of the other embedded in the developing self, as
formulated by the French psychoanalysts, or the
sphere of not-me, as proposed by Winnicott.
THE SELF-OBJECT AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE TWO
CASES OF MR. Z
Kohut's (1979) well-known case of Mr. Z. serves
as an illustration of the therapeutic value of self-
psychology, focussing especially on the usefulness
of the concept of self-object.
This case is especially well-suited for this pur-
pose because the analyses were carried out in two
phases, with an interval of 52 years between. Al-
though during the first part of the treatment Ko-
hut looked at the material from a classical instinct
theory, the second phase of treatment coincided
with Kohut's development of self-psychology.
To the reader, two important things seem to
have undergone a considerable change from the
first to the second analysis. One change has to do
with Kohut himself: "I was now able more genu-
inely than before to set aside any goal-directed
therapeutic ambitions. Put differently, I relinquish-
ed the health-and-maturity-morality that had for-
merly motivated me, and restricted myself to the
task of reconstructing the early stages of his ex-
periences, particularly as they concerned his en-
meshment with the pathological personality of his
mother" (ibid, p. 12). The other change concerns
his view of the patient. Where he saw resistance
in the first analysis against relinquishing infantile
gratifications and focussed on the narcissistic de-
fence as he then understood it, in the second
analysis, he became attentive to "a chronic de-
spair" ... and now he considered the patient's self
"desperately- and often hopelessly- struggling to
disentangle itself from the noxious self-object, to
delimit itself, to grow, to become independent"
(ibid., p. 12).
The reader is left with no doubt that Kohut's
newly developed approach allows far more open-
ness to the patient's pre-Oedipal pathology and
might wonder, as Kohut does himself, why this
"critical material had failed to claim his attention"
(ibid, p. 15).
Let us ponder further how Kohut perceives this
new material and consider how he, in the second
analysis, succeeds in terminating the analysis with
a much better result than the first.
It was the issue of the self-object father that
seemed to be a turning point. The relation to the
father was posed at the beginning of the second
analysis. Mr. Z had a dream that Kohut inter-
preted as referring to a composite of a childhood
friend, the father and the analyst. In the dream,
there was a man standing "in quiet relaxation, he
seemed to be strong and confidence-inspiring ....
He was wearing a ring ... a handkerchief protruded
from his breast pocket .... He was holding some-
thing in each hand, perhaps an umbrella in one
hand, and possibly a pair of gloves in the other
... (ibid., p. 11 ). Among other things, the patient
associated this with a dream from the first analy-
sis, where "he was in a house, at the inner side of
the door which was a crack open. Outside was the
father, loaded with gift-wrapped packages, want-
ing to enter. The patient was intensely frightened
and attempted to close the door in order to keep
the father out" (ibid, p. 8). According to the Oedi-
pal theme that dominated the first analysis, this
dream was at that time taken as an expression of
ambivalence and the patient's retreat from Oedipal
competitiveness. Following the dream of the sec-
ond analysis, the patient began to express intense
curiosity about the analyst's person, his past and
his relation to his wife. Now, Kohut finally ven-
tured, the guess that it was his need for a strong
father that lay behind his questions; he wanted to
know "whether I too was weak - subdued in inter-
course by my wife, unable to be the idealizable
emotional support of a son" (ibid, p. 18).
As mentioned, this happened to be a turning
point in the analysis and from then on, the father,
who until that point had been only "a shadowy
figure", was described "with positive features
103
 about which he spoke with an increasing glow of
joy" (ibid., p. 20). These idealised images of the
father according to Kohut are to be considered as
the deepest layer of repression. Having overcome
the "most formidable repressions", what the pa-
tient reached was a feeling of pride for his father
and "a glow of joy and the invigorating sense of
having finally found an image of masculine
strength to merge with temporarily as a means of
firming the structure of his self" (ibid., p. 22). The
termination of the second analysis was different
from the first. The idealisation of the analyst was
short-lived. In conclusion, Kohut noticed that
"working through his transference relationship to
me enabled him to re-establish a link with his
father's maleness and independence, and thus the
emotional core of his ambitions, ideals and basic
skills and talents was decisively altered" (ibid., p.
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
25).
Kohut sees the dream of the second analysis as
an expression of Mr. Z's need via a masculine self-
object to develop his own masculinity. It is this
need that manifests itself in the analysis. In the
working through of idealised transference via
transmuting internalisation, the patient completed
a process "that had remained unfinished in child-
hood" (ibid, p. 24).
I do not want to contest the validity of Kohut's
observations about his patient's pathology. I will
only question two of his assumptions regarding his
explanation of this. One is related to the concept
self-object. The other concerns idealisation as cru-
cial in producing therapeutic change.
Kohut has elaborated a theory of narcissistic
development in which the notion of self-object is
offered to account for how one person may be
used by another to carry out one's own psycho-
logical functions, the most important being the
maintenance of a sense of cohesiveness. As we wit-
ness in Kohut's narrative of Mr. Z., the concept
of self-object is formulated as a dyadic relation,
making identification a result of mirroring pro-
cesses or restricting it to a process in what Lacan
has termed the imaginary register.
The self-object father, as introduced in the case
of Mr. Z, is conceived of as nothing but a doubling
of the self-object mother, and the theory of struc-
turalisation, as transmuted internalisation, does
not transcend what in semiotics is termed iconic
mirroring processes. This term refers to the ident-
ity or likeness of the image that is reflected back
to the subject from the other. But this kind of mir-
roring process does not suffice either when we
104
want to understand infantile development or
change in the analytical situation. We need to
supplement the process of mirroring with that of
symbolisation, thus transcending the dyad. Infant
research (Muller, 1996) has taught us to differen-
tiate between mirroring and recognition, the latter
implying the mother's utilisation of a semiotic
code that the infant begins to use in mutual inter-
action with the mother. "This code - situated in
the symbolic register - functions as a third to the
dyad from the earliest period of development"
(Muller, ibid., p. 14). We see this differentiation
reflected in the concept of identification as defined
by Ricoeur (1992), which encompasses both same-
ness and difference. We might understand the de-
velopment of Mr. Z according to this idea of
identification.
Where Kohut sees a needy self in search of a
mirroring self-object, and conceptualises growth
and change through transmuting internalisation as
idealised identification, we might say that what
Mr. Z demonstrates is not a "merging" with an
idealised "image of masculine strength" for him to
copy, but rather a process of symbolisation, mak-
ing use of the symbol of masculinity. We might
agree with Kohut that the dream of the father
loaded with gifts does not point to castration
anxiety, which was the interpretation offered in the
first analysis. When, in the second analysis, Kohut
is compelled to change the interpretation of this
dream, the explanation offered that "the traumatic
state of being suddenly offered all the psycho-
logical gifts, for which he had secretly yearned"
seems inadequate. The anxiety, I propose in ac-
cordance with Muller (1996), is a response in the
young Mr. Z as a result of being trapped in a co-
ercive dyad in relation to the mother, not allowing
him a delimiting third to identify with through
symbolising processes. The same criticism applies
to Kohut's explanation of transmuting internalis-
ation vis-a-vis an idealised father/analyst self-ob-
ject.
At the moment when memories of the father
emerged, Mr. Z spoke "with an increasing glow of
joy" of his father, stressing his skills and positive
traits. The idealised father was "preceded and ac-
companied by an idealisation" of the analyst.
We might again question whether this idealised
identification allows for the structuralising pro-
cesses postulated by Kohut. It does not seem ade-
quate to explain the "glow of joy" as a result of
an additional merger with a self-object. Instead,
we might say that Mr. Z through symbolising pro-
 cesses has formed an ego ideal delimited from any
object, and thereby facilitated his becoming a sub-
ject on his own. It is moreover not easy to under-
stand why Mr. Z should have preserved behind his
enmeshment with the mother "idealisations that
maintained a bond to his father" (ibid, p. 24), and
why the idealisations of the father should have
been among the most repressed. In conclusion, we
might say that what is missing in a model re-
stricting psychic development to the dyad or self/
self-object relation is the very phenomena of sub-
jectivity and its constitution. Psychic development
and structuring processes cannot be adequately
comprehended by referring to the mother - or the
father's role - as self-object. It is not enough to
refer to a needy self searching for a self-object. The
mother and the father are not needed or sought as
an object but as a subject (Trevarthen, in Muller,
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
1996), allowing for mutual recognition. In Winnie-
ott's conceptual universe, we find the necessary
corrective to the dyad: the intermediate area and
the development from relating to using the object.
THE INTERMEDIATE AREA OF EXPERIENCING
With Winnicott's intermediate area and his differ-
entiating between subjective and objective objects,
it is possible, I think, to get beyond the dyad of
Kohutian thinking.
The intermediate area is of paramount import-
ance for the self to be made conscious and experi-
enced. However, this area is of paradoxical charac-
ter, i.e., it is neither subjective nor objective; it is
potential. According to the Winnicottian paradox,
the psyche cannot be grasped in dualities. Intro-
ducing the necessities of a third element, Winnie-
ott is transcending the dyadic thinking of Kohut's
self-psychology. Conceptualising human nature in
interpersonal terms is not enough, Winnicott ar-
gues, and this applies just as well to any reference
to inner reality. "My claim is that if there is a need
for this double statement, there is a need for a
triple one: the third part of the life of a human
being, a part that we cannot ignore, is an inter-
mediary area of experiencing, to which inner re-
ality and external life both contribute" (Winnie-
ott, 1971, p. 2). The epistemological paradox is ex-
pressed most vividly in his addendum to "Playing
and reality": "I am proposing that there is a stage
in the development of human beings that comes
before objectivity and perceptibility. At the theor-
etical beginning, a baby can be said to live in the
subjective or conceptual world. The change from
the primary state to one in which objective percep-
tion is possible is not only a matter of inherited
growth process .... This conception - perception
gap ... [is] an essential paradox, one that we must
accept and that is not for solution" (ibid., p. 151).
What is important, and that which distinguishes
Winnicott's idea of development from that of Ko-
hut's, is the notion of creativity and destruction
vis-a-vis the object. The self, according to Winnie-
ott, develops as a result of formless activity or
spontaneous play. But for this spontaneous play
to be activated, the infant needs a facilitating en-
vironment or the holding function of the mother.
This third or intermediate area indicates an act
of creativity. Delineating this area within the early
mother-child relation, he sees it as illusionary. "The
mother, at the beginning, by an almost 100 per cent
adaptation, affords the infant the opportunity for
the illusion that her breast is part of the infant .... In
another language, the breast is created by the infant
over and over again out of the infant's capacity to
love or (one can say) out of need. A subjective phe-
nomenon develops in the baby ... . The mother
places the actual breast just where the infant is
ready to create, and at the right moment" (ibid., p.
11 ). Therefore, the human being from birth is con-
cerned with the problem of the relationship between
what is objectively perceived and what is subjec-
tively conceived. What Winnicott calls the inter-
mediate area is the area appearing to the infant be-
tween primary creativity and objective perception.
It comes from without, from our point of view, but
not from the baby's point of view. The status of the
intermediate area is therefore a paradox. Winnicott
sees it as essential to the development of the child
that this paradox is accepted.
Implicit in Winnicott's idea of play is a certain
notion of what is meant by the distinction between
the subjective and the objective object, and what in
Winnicott's thinking is meant by an object. Al-
though not explicitly stated by Winnicott, I think
that what Winnicott is highlighting is different from
what object-relations theories call the object, as op-
posed to the self. The generalisation of the notion
of the object relationship has had the effect of
either, as with the Kleinians, favouring the instinct-
ual object or, as with, for example, Kern berg or Ko-
hut, relegating to the background the very object of
psychoanalytical investigation, e.g., the play and
vicissitudes of cathexes, only to trace the origin and
development of the real object (Pontalis, 1977).
The first object, according to Winnicott, is
created by the child. It has no independent exist-
105
 ence, but is created repeatedly out of the infant's
need, reflecting the incipient creativity of the child.
The status of this object is captured in the para-
dox: the actual breast is just where the infant is,
ready to create it and at the right moment. With
the growing integration of the infant's ego comes
the constitution of external objects. However,
these objects will always be marked by the very
first created and subjective objects. Then we have
the transitional objects characterised by being
both me and not-me. It is important to note that
what is implied in both the subjective object and
the transitional object is an object devoid of any-
thing objective. But neither is it comparable to the
internal object of Kleinian thinking. In fact, the
transitional object is not so much an object as it
is a possession (Winnicott, 1971).
In other words, it is an object created by the
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
subject. But even this is not a satisfying descrip-
tion in so far as the terms subjective and objective
obscure the area or space in which this subjective
object is first created. Having thus defined the de-
velopmental sequence of first relating to the object
before being able to make use of it, Winnicott
makes it clear that object relation is not a receptive
act; it is not only a question of representation.
After relating to the object, the child will at last
be able to use the object.
In "Playing and reality", Winnicott shows that
going from relating to the object to the use of the
object implies that: (a) the subject phantasmatically
destroys the object; (b) the object survives the phan-
tasmatic destruction in order to acquire its own
autonomy and thus contribute to the subject.
A rejection of the fully satisfying object is thus
part of the creative process. It is a necessary pre-
requisite.
This might sound to be optimal frustration
in Kohut's terms. What I want to underline with
Winnicott is the transition from relating to using
the object. In this intermediate area, we infer a third
element escaping the duality inherent in the concept
of self-object. This has an important implication for
psychoanalytic technique. The destructive activity,
Winnicott says, is the patient's attempt to place the
therapist outside the area of omnipotent control, or
in other words, placing him/her out there in the
world. Without the experience of destructiveness,
the patient will never conceive the analyst outside
and will go on using the analyst as a projection of
part of the self. "In terms of feeding, the patient,
then, can feed only on the self and cannot use the
breast to become fat. The patient may even enjoy
106
the analytic experience but will not fundamentally
change" (Winnicott, ibid., p. 91).
OTHERNESS
Throughout Winnicott's writings and especially in
"Playing and reality", we find the idea of an inter-
mediate area. It is not a defined area, but an area
outlined by its limits and thus framed by the hold-
ing function of the mother of the very early
mother-infant relationship. We may speculate
whether this is the first identification the infant
makes - not with an object, but with the func-
tioning of the mother. As I said, this means that
along with Winnicott, we are able to distinguish
the structure of the ego from the coming into exist-
ence of the self, leaving us with a more satisfying
answer as to the relation between the ego and the
self. The self is no longer a self-generating phe-
nomenon struggling towards a unifying wholeness
vis-a-vis a gratifying self-object. Neither is it the
result of a mirroring process. One of the diffi-
culties with theories that take as their starting
point the self-object matrix is finding a satisfying
answer to the question of how something external
becomes something internal. Trying to find theor-
etical terms for this process, we are left with a
series of related concepts, e.g., incorporation,
introjection and identification (see Morris, 1993).
However, referring to introjective and identifica-
tory processes (see, for example, Sandler & Rosen-
blatt (1962)) does not in itself explain how some-
thing external is transformed to the child's psychic
structure, and may be read into this.
For Winnicott, we might say that the self is con-
stituted not on perception or some form of identi-
fication, but is the result of a creative process tak-
ing possession of the object. But what about the
holding function of the mother or the facilitating
environment as a necessary structure for the play-
ing process to get started. How is this primary
structure transmitted to the infant? Are we left
with a concept of primary identification? Not
necessarily, I think.
Piera Aulagnier ( 1975) has proposed that we
differentiate levels of representations of relations,
reserving the term identification to the register of
the I. What is essential is that this very early form
of representating does not surmount to represent-
ing an object, but rather an activity through which
the primitive psyche represents itself as a repre-
senting agent. This is not far from Winnicott's idea
of creativity, which is not simply perceiving, but a
 deliberate relating of ourselves to our perceiving.
It is the activity of perceiving that has an element
of a Me in it. What is supplemented to this idea
of the self, constituted as a first representation of
the I- or Me-element reflecting its own activity, is
an outline of the other addressing this very first
representation of a representing agent, in accord-
ance with Aulagnier and Laplanche.
Differentiating between the primal and the pri-
mary, Aulagnier introduces the thesis of a develop-
mental stage prior to that of primary phantasy
formation, but not outside the sphere of represen-
tation. Introducing the concept of the pictogram,
she says: "My hypothesis concerning the picto-
gram postulates its co-presence, in a locus fore-
closed to the I, where the I cannot hear it, during
any thinking, any experience, any production
claimed by the I as its work and its property" (Au-
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
lagnier, 1975, p. 33). Experiences of schizophrenic
patients have necessitated a postulation of a rep-
resentation forever unthinkable to any subject, but
nonetheless being part of the represented world.
In a psychosis, the pictogram is acted out as some-
thing unthought, even unthinkable.
The pictogram is the first representation that is
given by the very first psychic activity, reflecting
both the activity and the activation made by what
Aulagnier calls "the primal". It is important to
understand, she argues, that this activity - and as
a consequence the first delineation of the activat-
ing primal - encompasses the other. Being first of
all body, the primal will form its first pictogram
as a representation of the prototypical relation be-
tween the psyche and the world in what is termed
the "zone-object complementary" or for Winnie-
ott the inextricable mouth-breast unity. This unity,
however, is forever fragile because the breast only
as illusion belongs to the I or Me existing in the
psyche as a never understood message from the
other. This is the "enigmatic message", one might
say, according to Laplanche (1997).
There is in Aulagnier's thinking a radical de-
centred conception of subjectivity, which - al-
though not made explicitly so in Winnicott- never-
theless echoes his ideas, and, which is very far from
Kohut's theory of subjectivity in spite of the con-
cept of self-object. "The first recognition of an out-
side-self derives from a first relation of identity in
which the recognition of an "otherness" is both rec-
ognised and denied- recognised in the way a double
whom I know is not me may be recognised, denied
because for the reality of difference is substituted
the illusion of sameness." (Aulagnier, ibid., p. 25).
Winnicott (1962) asks, "is there an ego from the
start?" And he answers "that the start is when the
ego starts" (ibid., p. 56). I take this to mean that the
ego Winnicott is referring to is not the adaptive ego
of Hartmann's biological foundation of the human
being. In the same text, Winnicott suggests that we
may study the ego long before the self has any rel-
evance. "The word self arrives after the child has be-
gun to use the intellect to look at what others see or
feel or hear and what they conceive of when they
meet this infant body" (ibid, p. 56). We might con-
clude, as Pontalis (1977) does, that when talking of
the ego we are talking at the level of its correlative:
the object relationship, while the capacity to use an
object is correlative to the self.
Winnicott's term "the use of an object" desig-
nates a process of symbolising, and what he terms
self is not a structure and even less a simple rep-
resentation, but rather an area delimited by a
primitive ego.
The psychoanalytic situation is first and fore-
most the designation of an area, where the analyst
as the concrete other can be recognised as the
other, which is forever lost, and which cannot be
reached, but only roughly articulated. It is the es-
sence of what we call transference. To understand
this essence, it does not help to think in duality of
self and object. We are too inclined to a superficial
consideration, seeing a shift from a primary object
to an analytical object. This analytical object is the
articulation of the other's voice within the frame
of the original self-other, which only with assist-
ance from the analytical object can be interpreted.
The transference in the neurotic, Aulagnier ar-
gues, "requires not only libidinal cathexis of an
image projected on to the analyst ... but that a
demand addressed to the knowledge of the
Other, is transferred to the [analytical] situation"
(Aulagnier, 1975, p. xxvii), thus reminding us that
the psychoanalytic cure is not only a hermeneutic
enterprise, but an encounter where something in
the subject desires something from the other.
A great part of the transformation happening in
the analytical situation is not available to conscious
life. Empathy- as Kohut seems to suggest- is there-
fore not enough (Green, 1972, 2000). We must con-
struct, articulate or, in other words, create a trans-
ference object. And because this does not have ob-
jective existence, it can neither be observed nor
recognised through introspection or empathy. The
object is indeed created as a recognised outline of
the other who is not me, but something that we can
only construct. One is mistaken in defining psycho-
107
 analytical transference as a repetition of object re-
lationships and the phantasmatic structures in-
herent in them. Transference is more likely to be
conceived of as the transitional object and the inter-
mediate area in which each protagonist will be both
created and found by the other. Mter all, could we
not with Pontalis say "that the paradox of the ana-
lytical situation is that I need another, not another
ego [not even a self-object] but a neuter I cannot see
to find myself'' (Pontalis, 1977, p. 147).
REFERENCES
Aulagnier, P. (1975). The Violence of Interpretation. Lon-
don: Brunner- Routledge (2001).
Bergmann, M. (ed. 2000). The Hartmann Era. New York:
Other Press.
Freud, S. (1895). Project for a Scientific Psychology. S.E., I.
Downloaded by [84.205.244.138] at 01:36 25 February 2013
- - (1900). The Interpretation of Dreams. S.E., IV & V.
- - (1914). On Narcissism. An Introduction. S.E., XIV.
- - (1915). Instincts and their Vicissitudes. S.E., XIV.
- (1923). The Ego and the Id. S.E., XIX.
- - (1940). An Outline of Psychoanalysis. S.E., XXIII.
Green, A. (1972). On Private Madness. London: Rebus
Press. (1996).
- - (1988). The Work of the Negative. London: Free As-
sociation Books. (1999).
- - (2000). Andre Green at the Squiggle Foundation (ed.
Jan Abraham). London: Karnac Books.
- - (2001). Life Narcissism and Death Narcissism. Lon-
don. New York: Free Association Books.
Hartmann, H. (1944). Psychoanalysis and Sociology. Essays
on Ego Psychology. New York: International Universities
Press. (1964).
- - (1950). Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of
the Ego. Essays on Ego Psychology. Op.cit.
- - (1952). The Mutual Influences in the Development of
Ego and Id. Essays on Ego Pychology. Op.cit.
- - (1956). The Development of the Ego Concept in
Freud's Work. Essays on Ego Psychology. Op.cit.
- - (1958). Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation.
London: Imago Publishing.
Karterud, S. (1995). Fra Narcissisme til Selvpsykologi. En
indfering i Heinz Kohuts forfatterskab. Arhus: Klim.
Kierkegaard, S. (1980). The Sickness unto Death. (edited
and translated by H. V. Hong and E.H. Hong). The Kier-
kegaard Writings XIX Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Kohut, H. (1959). Introspection, empathy and psychoanaly-
sis. J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 7: 459-483.
- - (1966). Forms and transformations of narcissism. J.
Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 14: 243-272.
- - (1968). The psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic
personality disorders. ThePsychoanalytic Study of the
Child. 23: 86-113.
- - (1970). Discussion of the self: a contribution to it's
Copyright Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review. 2003
108
place in theory and technique. Int. J. Psycho-Analysis.
51: 175-181.
- - (1971). The Analysis of the Self. New York: Interna-
tional Universities Press.
- - (1972). Thoughts on narcissism and narcissistic rage.
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 27: 360-400.
- - (1977). The Restauration of the Self. New York: Inter-
national Universities Press.
- - (1979). The two Analyses of Mr. Z. Int. J. Psycho-
Analysis, 60: 3-29.
- - (1984). How does Analysis Cure? London: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
- - (1985). Psychology and the Humanities. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company.
Laplanche, J. (1970). Liv og Ded i Psykoanalysen. Arhus:
Klim. (1987).
- - (1987). Nye Fundamenter i Psykoanalysen. Arhus:
Klirn. (1990).
- - (1997). The theory of seduction and the problem of
the other. Int. J. Psycho-Analysis. 78,4: 653-667.
- - (1999). Essays on Otherness. London: New York.
Routledge.
Laplanche, J. & Pontalis. J-B. (1973). The Language of
Psychoanalysis. London: Karnac Books (1988).
Levin, D.C. (1969). The self: a contribution to its place in
theory and technique. Int. J. Psycho-Analysis, 50: 41-51.
- - (1970). Discussion of"The Self": A contribution to its
place in theory and technique. Int. J.Psycho-Analaysis,
51: 175-181.
Morris, H. (1993). Narrative representation, narrative en-
actment, and the psychoanalytic construction of history.
Int. J. Psycho-Analysis., 74: 33-55.
Muller, J.P. (1996). Beyond the Psychoanalytic Dyad. New
York. London: Routledge.
Pontalis. J.-B. (1977). Frontiers in Psychoanalysis. Between
the Dream and Psychic Pain. London: The Hogarth
Press.
Ricoeur, P. (1973). Filosofiens Kilder. Viborg: Vinten.
- - (1992). One Self as Another. Chicago. London: The
University of Chicago Press.
Sandler, J. & Rosenblatt, B. (1962). The concept of the rep-
resentational world. The Psychoanalytical Study of the
Child, 17: 128-45.
Stolorow, P.D. et al. (1987). Psychoanalytic Treatment. An
Intersubjective Approach. Hove and London: The Ana-
lytic Press.
Winnicott, D.W. (1962). Ego integration in child develop-
ment. The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating
Environment. London: Karnac Books. (1990).
- - (1971). Playing and Reality. London: Brunner. Rout-
ledge. (2001).
Judy Gammelgaard
Olufsvej 37
DK- 2100 Copenhagen 0
Denmark
e-mail: judy.gammelgaard@psy.ku.dk