1
GREGORIO B. HONASAN II vs. THE PANEL OF Ombudsman recognizes its concurrent jurisdiction with other
INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 159747 April 13, 2004
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Department of Justice.
Facts:
Senator Gringo Honasan was charged with the crime of coup
detat before DOJ. , Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf
of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public
statement aired on nation television, stating their withdrawal
of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the
Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and they
are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National
Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they believe is the
only program that would solve the ills of society. Subpoena
was issued for preliminary investigation.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's
jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed
acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the
Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the
jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary
investigation; that should the charge be filed in court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take
cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to the
group of public officials with Salary Grade 31.
He is directed to file a counter-affidavit, but instead Senator
Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the
DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo
Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in
issuing the aforequoted Order on the ground that the DOJ has
no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Honasans contention:
Ombudsman and not DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation over all public officials, including
him as he is a senator. Since, Honasan is charged with coup
detat in relation to his office. As according the Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, it confers to the Ombudsman the
power to investigate moto proprio, or by complaint of any
person, any act or omission that appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987
Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot
prevail over the Constitution.
DOJs contention:
DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation
pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code. And Coup detat
is not directly related to his public office as a senator. Thus,
the jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant and is not
derived from provisions of the joint circular.
Ombudsman;s contention:
DOJ has the jurisdiction because coup detat falls under the
Sandiganbayan only if its committed in relation to office.
Thus, Joint Circulat need not be published because it is
merely an internal arrangement between DOJ and
Ombudsman and it neither regulates nor penalizes conduct of
persons.
Issue: Whether or not DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation over the charge of coup detat
against Senator Gringo Honasan II.
Held: The Court finds the petition without merit.
The jurisdiction of DOJ is not derived from the Joint Circular,
OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but on the provisions of the
1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV,
governing the DOJ. Sec. 1. As a principal law agency which
shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm;
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of
the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the
correctional system; and investigate the commission of
crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system. Thus, in Section 13(1),
it does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law
to investigate and prosecute public officials. However, under
Ombudsman Act of 1987, was enacted empowering
Ombudsman with primary jurisdiction over cognizable cases
by Sandiganbayan. It may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the government. Moreover,
investigative body of the government.
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation because petitioner is a
public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case against
him falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ
has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against
public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade
31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the
authority to investigate the charge of coup d'etat against
him.
301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999 LACSON
VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included
in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and
the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel
found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However,
a review board modified the panels finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against
twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged
as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as
accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where
petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal
accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word principal from the phrase principal
accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.
8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have
been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to
acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-
post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged
members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation
to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to
the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
RULING:
1.) RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED.
Petitioner and intervenors contention that Sections 4 and 7
of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law
is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant such a

declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all
cases involving certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any
court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
2.) NOT EX POST FACTO LAW.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249
is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which
is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for
their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters,
has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly
a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure
by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
3.) RTC HAS JURISDICTION.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to
have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such
intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was
intimately related to the discharge of their official duties
as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does
not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The
stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to
his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and
not the Sandiganbayan.
G.R No. 176508 January 12, 2015
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF
BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC vs. HON. TEODORO T.
RIEL, University of the Philippines, Intervenor
FACTS: The petitioner claimed in its petition that the original
copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that
quitted the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Respondent Judge
initially gave due course to the petition, but after the
preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for
reconstitution.
2
The petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration but
was denied by the RTC. Hence, the petitioner came to the
court alleging that respondent judge had unfairly abused his
discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which is specifically enjoined upon him under Rule 7, Sec. 8 of
the Revised rules of Court; that the judge acted without and
in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of discretion
to the further damage and prejudice of the herein petitioner,
thus, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE: WON the petition for certiorari ad mandamus is proper.
HELD: The petition for certiorari and mandamus, being devoid
of procedural and substantive merit, is dismissed.
Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only
under the conditions defined by the Rules of Court. The
conditions are that: (1) the respondent tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Without
jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority; there is excess of jurisdiction when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority;
grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how
respondent Judge could have been guilty of lacking or
exceeding his authority, or could have gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under
Section 1221 of Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial
reconstitution of a Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court (as
the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial
reconstitution of title. Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor
exceeded its authority in acting on and dismissing the
petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
considering that the petition for reconstitution involved land
already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed by the
LRA. Instead, it would have been contrary to law had
respondent Judge dealt with and granted the petition for
judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
The petitioner consequently did not present the duplicate or
certified copy of the OCT No. 1609. Thereby, it disobeyed Sec
2 and 3 of R.A. No. 26 that states the provisions expressly
listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an
existing Torrens.
With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed
of the application for judicial reconstitution, nothing more was
left for the RTC to do in the case. As of then, the proper
recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of
Appeals by notice within 15 days from notice of the denial of
its motion for reconsideration. B allowing the period of appeal
to elapse without taking action, it squandered its right to
appeal. Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an
extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for
a lost appeal. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not an
alternative to an available remedy in the ordinary course of
law. No error of judgement by a court will be corrected by
certiorari, which corrects only jurisdictional errors.
The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this
Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court
of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is
allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or

compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces
the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free
itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and
thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and
more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
There being no special, important or compelling reason, the
petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of
courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
DUNCANO V. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 191894, July
15, 2015
Doctrine:The Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over violations
of Section 3(a) and (e), RepublicAct No. 3019, as amended,
unless committed by public officials and employeesoccupying
positions of regional director and higher
with Salary Grade "27" or
higher,under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758)in relation to their office.Facts:Petitioner Danilo
A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional
Director ofthe Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary
grade 26 as classified under RepublicAct (R.A.) No. 6758.
On March 24, 2009,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),Office of the Ombu
dsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Sectio
n 8, inrelation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713. Duncano wilfully
, unlawfully
and criminally fail todisclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002.Prior
to his arraignment, petitioner, Duncano filed a Motion to Dism
iss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest before respondent
Sandiganbayan SecondDivision. He asserted that under Presi
dential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended bySection 4 (A) (
1)
of R.A No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try
andhear the case because he is an official of the executive
branch occupying
the position ofa Regional Director but with a
compensation that is classified as below Salary
Grade 27.The OSP argued that the position of
Regional Director
was specifically mentionedwithout indication as to its salary g
rade signifies the lawmakers intention that officialsoccupying
such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the origin
al and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue,
it is claimed, was already resolvedin
Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motio
n to dismiss is
prematureconsidering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acq
uire jurisdiction over the person of theaccused.On August 18,
2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Re
solutiondenying theinstant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid
of merit. It ruled that the positionof Regional
Director is one of
those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction e
ven if such position is not Salary Grade 27
Petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over
him, who is merely aRegional Director
with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains tha
t aRegional Director, irrespective of salary grade,
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganb
ayan.
Issue:Whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,only Regional Directors
with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as
classified under R.A. No.6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdic
tion of the Sandiganbayan.
Held:Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salar
y Grade 27 or higher. Neitherdoes he hold any position partic
ularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he
correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours with
Cuyco.The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations
of Section 3(a) and (e), RepublicAct No. 3019, as amended,
unless committed by public officials and employeesoccupying
positions of regional director and higher
with Salary Grade "27" or
higher,under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758)in relation to their office.
3
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner
admittedly occupied the position of Director II
with Salary Grade "26" under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the
Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error
of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion amou
nting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner
from office, entitlingpetitioner to the reliefs prayed for.Assista
nt Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that,
although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his
position is classified as Director II with Salary
Grade 26.There is no merit in the OSPs
allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the
ground that respondent court has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
CE Casecnan Water and Enerfy Co. vs Province of
Nueva Ecija
G.R. No. 196278 June 17, 2015
It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for
Certiorari assailing an interlocutory order of the RTC relating
to a local tax case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to
act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the
consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks
jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide the case on the
merits and must dismiss it.
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its
rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This expanded
jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate
jurisdiction.
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA,
CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF
QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
Petitioner, a QC property owner, assails the constitutionality
of two QC ordinances, namely Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011
or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City and Ordinance
No. SP-2235, S-2013 on garbage collection fees.
A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is
improper since they are not tribunals, boards or officers
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner,
however, counters that in enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-2095
and SP-2235, the Quezon City Council exercised quasi-judicial
function because the ordinances ruled against the property
owners who must pay the SHT and the garbage fee, exacting
from them funds for basic essential public services that they
should not be held liable. Even if a Rule 65 petition is
improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number
of cases like in Rosario v. Court of Appeals,13 has taken
cognizance of an improper remedy in the interest of justice.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where
he has the power to determine what the law is and what the
legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of
the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which
applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and

draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that
gives rise to some specific rights of person s or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy en suing therefrom is brought before a tribunal,
board, or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.14
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must
concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The enactment by the Quezon City
Council of the assailed ordinances was done in the exercise of
its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under
Republic Act (R.A.) No.7160, or the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC), local legislative power shall be exercised by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city. 15Said law likewise is
specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or
charge , or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the
sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through
an appropriate ordinance.16
Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for
certiorari, it essentially seeks to declare the
unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned
ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief, over which this Court has only appellate,
not original, jurisdiction.17
Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated
as one for prohibition or mandamus, over which we exercise
original jurisdiction, in cases with far-reaching implications or
one which raises transcendental issues or questions that
need to be resolved for the public good.18The judicial policy is
that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the
redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or
when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of
Our primary jurisdiction.19
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what
circumstances a petition for prohibition may be filed:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceeding in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions who has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner
prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the
respondents to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified in the petition. In this case, petitioner's
primary intention is to prevent respondents from
implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235.
Obviously, the writ being sought is in the nature of a
prohibition, commanding desistance.
4
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and
City Assessor are performing ministerial functions. A
ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs
in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner
and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done.20 Respondent Mayor, as chief executive of the city
government, exercises such powers and performs such duties
and functions as provided for by the LGC and other
laws.21 Particularly, he has the duty to ensure that all taxes
and other revenues of the city are collected, and that city
funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement
of obligations of the city, in accordance with law or
ordinance.22 On the other hand, under the LGC, all local taxes,
fees, and charges shall be collected by the provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay treasurer, or their duly-authorized
deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among others,
of ensuring that all laws and policies governing the appraisal
and assessment of real properties for taxation purposes are
properly executed.23 Anent the SHT, the Department of
Finance (DOF) Local Finance Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16,
1997, is more specific:
6.3 The Assessors office of the Identified LGU shall:
a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands
within its jurisdiction which shall be subject to the
levy of the Social Housing Tax (SHT) by the local
sanggunian concerned;
b. inform the affected registered owners of the
effectivity of the SHT; a list of the lands and
registered owners shall also be posted in 3
conspicuous places in the city/municipality;
c. furnish the Treasurers office and the local
sanggunian concerned of the list of lands affected;
6.4 The Treasurers office shall:
a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real
Property Tax, SEF Tax and other special assessments;
b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, and the Mayors office the
monthly collections on Social Housing Tax (SHT). An
annual report should likewise be submitted to the
HUDCC on the total revenues raised during the year
pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the manner in
which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to
why direct recourse to us should be allowed. Aside from
presenting a novel question of law, this case calls for
immediate resolution since the challenged ordinances
adversely affect the property interests of all paying
constituents of Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a
test case for the guidance of other local government units
(LGUs).Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental
importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et
al. v. Lim ,24the Court cited the case of Senator Jaworski v.
Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp.,25 where We ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly
treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that
we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar . x x x This is in
accordance with the well entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. 26
PCGG VS DUMAYAS

The SC held the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and
resolve suits involving sequestered coco-levy assets and
coco-levy funds.
The Court noted that under Section 4 (c) of Presidential
Decree 1606 (the law that created the Sandiganbayan) as
amended by Republic Act (RA) 7975 and RA 8249, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan include suits for recovery of
ill-gotten wealth and related cases.
They insisted on their claims and on their argument that
Makati City RTC Branch 59 has jurisdiction over the case.
It will be recalled that the Court en banc sided with the
petition filed by the PCGG asking it to set aside the 2013
ruling issued by Makati RTC Judge Winlove Dumayas denying
its motion to junk the petitions for declaratory relief filed by
UPCB and United Coconut Planters Life Assurance
Corporation.
In dismissing the petition by UCPB and Cocolife, the high
court said the Makati RTC has no jurisdiction to hear the suits
involving the sequestered coco levy assets and coco levy
funds since only the Sandiganbayan has the right to do so
under Republic Act 7975 and RA 8249.
The RTC has no jurisdiction over suits involving the
sequestered coco levy assets and coco levy funds.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to
hear, try, and decide a case.26 Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and the relief
prayed for, regardless of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recovery upon all or some of the claims prayed for therein.
Jurisdiction is not acquired by agreement or consent of the
parties, and neither does it depend upon the defenses raised
in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.27redarclaw
Under Section 4 (C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975 and R.A. No. 8249, the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of ill-gotten wealth
and related cases:
(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction
over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme
Court. (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In PCGG v. Pea, we made the following clarification on the
extent of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
x x x Under section 2 of the Presidents Executive Order No.
14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission
regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally
Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or
Nominees whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall
likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original
jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the
Supreme Court.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Soriano III v. Yuzon reiterated the above ruling,
thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Now, that exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the
Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the
5
principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged
ill-gotten wealth, but also to all incidents arising
from, incidental to, or related to, such cases, such as
the dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the
issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative
thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made
the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another
forum. As explained by the Court in Pea:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily
understood. Given the magnitude of the past regimes
organized pillage and the ingenuity of the plunderers and
pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal
minds available in the market, it is a matter of sheer
necessity to restrict access to the lower courts, which
would have tied into knots and made impossible the
commissions gigantic task of recovering the
plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in
the process had saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27
billion foreign debt that has since ballooned to $28.5 billion.
(italics and emphasis supplied.) (Additional emphasis
supplied)
Respondents petitions for declaratory relief filed in the RTC
asserted their claim of ownership over the sequestered CIIF
companies and indirectly the CIIF SMC Block of Shares, in the
following percentages: 11.03% (UCPB) and 11.01%
(COCOLIFE). Undeniably, these are related to the ill-gotten
wealth cases (Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F) involving
the issue of ownership of the aforesaid sequestered
companies and shares of stock, which have been tried and
decided by the Sandiganbayan, and the decision had been
appealed to and finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. Nos.
177857-5831 (COCOFED and Lobregat, et. als ownership
claim over the CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares)
and G.R. No. 18070532 (Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.s claim over
UCPB shares under an Agreement with PCA).
Contrary to respondents contention, the subject matter of
their petitions for declaratory relief, i.e., their purported
contribution to the acquisition of four CIIF OMG companies
and the 14 holding companies, as well as indirect ownership
of a portion of the CIIF SMC Block of Shares, is inextricably
intertwined with the issue of ownership judicially settled in
the aforementioned appeals from the Partial Summary
Judgments rendered in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F.
The allegation that no coconut levy funds were actually used
to purchase stockholdings in the CIIF companies is of no
moment. Since the CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of
Shares have long been sequestered and placed under the
administration of the PCGG, the latters functions may not be
interfered with by a co-equal court. In Republic v. Investa
Corporation33 involving the propriety of dilution of the
Governments percentage in the stockholdings of a
sequestered corporation (DOMSAT), we held that it is the
Sandiganbayan and not the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) which has jurisdiction over the petition
filed by the Republic and DOMSAT. As conservator of
sequestered shares, PCGG has the duty to ensure that the
sequestered properties are not dissipated under its watch.
Previously, this Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC in a
suit also involving a claim of ownership in the sequestered
corporation, and ruled in this wise:34redarclaw
We disagree with the RTC and the CA on the issue of
jurisdiction. While there can be no dispute that PCOC was
sequestered, the fact of sequestration alone did not
automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction to decide
upon the question of ownership of the subject gaming
and office equipment. The PCGG must be a party to
the suit in order that the Sandiganbayans exclusive
jurisdiction may be correctly invoked. This is deducible
from no less than E.O. No. 14, the Pea and Nepomuceno
cases relied upon by both subordinates courts. Note that in
Section 2 of E.O. No. 14 which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 2. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal,
with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction thereof.
it speaks of the PCGG as party-plaintiff. On the other hand,
the PCGG was impleaded as co-defendant in both the Pea

and Nepomuceno cases. But here, the PCGG does not
appear in either capacity, as the complaint is solely between
PAGCOR and respondents PCOC and Marcelo. The Pea and
Nepomuceno cases which recognize the independence of
the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan in sequestration cases,
therefore, cannot be invoked in the instant case so as to
divest the RTC of its jurisdiction, under Section 19 of B.P. 129,
over PAGCORs action for recovery of personal property. 35
(Emphasis supplied)
In Cuenca v. PCGG,36 we upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan over all incidents affecting the shares of a
sequestered corporation considering that the action before
the RTC is inexorably entwined with the Governments case
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth pending with the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners contend that even if UHC was indeed sequestered,
jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners Complaint
for enforcement or rescission of contract between petitioners
and respondents belonged to the RTC and not the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners cited Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals, x x x, this Court held
that the fact of sequestration alone did not automatically oust
the RTC of jurisdiction to decide upon the question of
ownership of the disputed gaming and office equipment as
PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the
Sandiganbayans exclusive jurisdiction may be correctly
invoked, and as Section 2 of EO 14 was duly applied in PCGG
v. Pea and PCGG v. Nepomuceno, which ineluctably spoke of
respondent PCGG as a party-litigant.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the
instant case
A rigorous examination of the antecedent facts and existing
records at hand shows that Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction over the instant case.
Thus, the petition must fail for the following
reasons:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First, it is a fact that the shares of stock of UHC and CDCP, the
subject matter of Civil Case No. 91-2721 before the Makati
City RTC, were also the subject matter of an ill-gotten wealth
case, specifically Civil Case No. 0016 before the
Sandiganbayan. In Civil Case No. 91-2721 of the Makati City
RTC, petitioners prayed for a judgment either transferring the
UHC shares or restoring and reconveying the PNCC shares to
them. In the event a final judgment is rendered in said Makati
City RTC case in favor of petitioners, then such adjudication
tends to render moot and academic the judgment to be
rendered in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0016 considering
that the legal ownership of either the UHC or PNCC shares
would now be transferred to petitioners Rodolfo Cuenca and
CIC. Such adverse judgment would run counter to the rights
of ownership of the government over the UHC and PNCC
shares in question. x x x
Moreover, inasmuch as UHC was impleaded in Civil Case
No. 0016 as a defendant and was listed among the
corporations beneficially owned or controlled by
petitioner Cuenca, the issue of the latters right to
acquire ownership of UHC shares is inexorably
intertwined with the right of the Republic of the
Philippines, through PCGG, to retain ownership of said
UHC shares.
It must be borne in mind that the Sandiganbayan was created
in 1978 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. Said
law has been amended during the interim period after the
Edsa Revolution of 1986 and before the 1987 Constitution
was drafted, passed, and ratified. Thus, the executive
issuances during such period before the ratification of the
1987 Constitution had the force and effect of laws.
Specifically, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued the
following Executive Orders which amended PD 1606 in so far
as the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over civil and
6
criminal cases instituted and prosecuted by the PCGG is
concerned, viz:
Bearing on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases
of ill-gotten wealth, EO 14, Secs. 1 and 2
provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
SECTION 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor
General and other government agencies, is
hereby empowered to file and prosecute all cases
investigated by it under Executive Order No. 1, dated
February 28, 1986 and Executive Order No. 2, dated
March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its findings.
SECTION 2. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal,
with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notably, these amendments had been duly recognized and
reflected in subsequent amendments to PD 1606, specifically
Republic Act Nos. 7975 and 8249.
In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that
it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC
that has jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC
shares, being the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca.
The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case involved the
performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC
shares is of no importance. The benchmark is whether
said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses and their perceived cronies. More
importantly, the interests of orderly administration of
justice dictate that all incidents affecting the UHC
shares and PCGGs right of supervision or control over
the UHC must be addressed to and resolved by the
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon split
jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result
in much lost time, wasted effort, more expenses, and
irreparable injury to the public interest.
Second, the UHC shares in dispute were sequestered
by respondent PCGG. Sequestration is a provisional remedy
or freeze order issued by the PCGG designed to prevent the
disposal and dissipation of ill-gotten wealth. The power to
sequester property means to
place or cause to be placed under [PCGGs] possession or
control said property, or any building or office wherein any
such property or any records pertaining thereto may be
found, including business enterprises and entities, for the
purpose of preventing the destruction of, and otherwise
conserving and preserving the same, until it can be
determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings,
whether the property was in truth ill-gotten. (Silverio v.
PCGG, 155 SCRA 60 [1987]).
Considering that the UHC shares were already
sequestered, enabling the PCGG to exercise the power
of supervision, possession, and control over said
shares, then such power would collide with the legal
custody of the Makati City RTC over the UHC shares
subject of Civil Case No. 91-2721. Whatever the outcome
of Civil Case No. 91-2721, whether from enforcement or
rescission of the contract, would directly militate on PCGGs
control and management of IRC and UHC, and consequently
hamper or interfere with its mandate to recover ill-gotten
wealth. As aptly pointed out by respondents, petitioners
action is inexorably entwined with the Governments
action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth the
subject of the pending case before the
Sandiganbayan. Verily, the transfer of shares of stock of
UHC to petitioners or the return of the shares of stock of
CDCP (now PNCC) will wreak havoc on the sequestration case
as both UHC and CDCP are subject of sequestration by PCGG.
Third, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and
Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. are not analogous to the case at bar.

The first dealt with ownership of gaming and office
equipment, which is distinct from and will not impact on the
sequestration issue of PCOC. The second dealt with an
ordinary civil case for performance of a contractual obligation
which did not in any way affect the sequestration proceeding
of NRHDCI; thus, the complaint-in-intervention of Holiday Inn
(Phils.), Inc. was properly denied for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
In both cases cited by petitioners, there was a substantial
distinction between the sequestration proceedings and the
subject matter of the actions. This does not prevail in the
instant case, as the ownership of the shares of stock of the
sequestered companies, UHC and CDCP, is the subject matter
of a pending case and thus addressed to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Sec. 2 of EO 14 pertinently provides: The Presidential
Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases,
whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall
have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.
The above proviso has been squarely applied in Pea, where
this Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the
Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the
principal causes of action, that is, recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth, but also to all incidents arising from, incidental
to, or related to such cases, including a dispute over the sale
of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs
of relative provisional remedies, and the sequestration of the
shares, which may not be made the subject of separate
actions or proceedings in another forum. Indeed, the issue of
the ownership of the sequestered companies, UHC and PNCC,
as well as IRCs ownership of them, is undeniably related to
the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth and can be
squarely addressed via the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Fourth, while it is clear that the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan only encompasses cases where PCGG is
impleaded, such requirement is satisfied in the instant case.
The appellate court clearly granted PCGGs petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 49686, assailing the trial courts
denial of its Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion to
Dismiss. Thus, the trial courts April 20, 1998 Order was
reversed and set aside by the appellate court through its
assailed Decision. Consequently, PCGG was granted the
right to intervene and thus became properly
impleaded in the instant case. Without doubt, the trial
court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 91-
2721.37 (Additional emphasis supplied)
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252.
REGULUS DEV. INC. VS DELA CRUZ
The petitioner poses the core issue of whether the RTC had
jurisdiction to levy on the respondents real property.
An issue on jurisdiction prevents the petition from
becoming "moot and academic."
The petitioner claims that the assailed CA petition should
have been dismissed because the subsequent redemption of
the property by the respondent and the release of the price
paid to the petitioner rendered the case moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the case or
the resolution of the issue without any practical use or
value.39 Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case
or dismiss it on the ground of mootness except when, among
others, the case is capable of repetition yet evades judicial
review.40
The CA found that there is an issue on whether the RTC had
jurisdiction to issue the orders directing the levy of the
respondents property. The issue on jurisdiction is a justiciable
7
controversy that prevented the assailed CA petition from
becoming moot and academic.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by
law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. "Even
on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the
issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from
ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the
case."41
Even assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to
the respondents redemption of the property, the CA may still
entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation
capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
Under this perspective, the CA correctly exercised its
jurisdiction over the petition.
Equity jurisdiction versus appellate jurisdiction of the
RTC
The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The
appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter
and parties when an appeal is perfected.42
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide
complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case
because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is
applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of
equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution.43
The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited
funds for the use and occupation of the subject units were
issued pursuant to the RTCs equity jurisdiction, as the CA
held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277.
The RTCs equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its
appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could
not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the
dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the
dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely
blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC
orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTCs equity
jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
This Court takes judicial notice44 that the validity of the RTC
Orders has been upheld in a separate petition before this
Court, under G.R. SP No. 171429 entitled Antonio Dela Cruz v.
Regulus Development, Inc.
The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
The levy of the respondents property was made pursuant to
the RTC orders issued in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed
with the MTC.
An examination of the RTC order dated June 30, 2008,
directing the levy of the respondents real property shows
that it was based on the RTC order dated July 25, 2003. The
levy of the respondents property was issued to satisfy the
amounts due under the lease contracts, and not as a result of
the decision in the ejectment case.
The CA erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its
appellate jurisdiction in the ejectment case when it directed
the levy of the respondents property.
Furthermore, the order to levy on the respondents real
property was consistent with the first writ of execution issued
by the RTC on December 18, 2003, to implement the RTC
orders. The writ of execution states that:
xxx In case of [sic] sufficient personal property of the
defendant cannot be found whereof to satisfy the amount of
the said judgment, you are directed to levy [on] the real
property of said defendant and to sell the same or so
much thereof in the manner provided by law for the
satisfaction of the said judgment and to make return of
your proceedings together with this Writ within sixty (60)
days from receipt hereof. (emphasis supplied)
The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondents
property was merely a reiteration and an enforcement of the
original writ of execution issued.1wphi1

Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders,
the only question that needs to be resolved is which court has
jurisdiction to order the execution of the RTC orders.
The RTC, as the court of origin, has jurisdiction to
order the levy of the respondent's real property.
Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is
the court which issued these orders. The RTC is the court with
jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders.
Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the
writ of execution and levy of the respondent's real property
before the RTC as the court of origin.
RULES 1 TO 5
REYES VS PEOPLE AND SALUD M. GEGATO
Respondent charged with grave threats.
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court states the need to
pay docket fees, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring
to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the
same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket
and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for
costs, x x x.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. 24 In Manchester v. Court of
Appeals,25 it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two
(2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,26 wherein the Court decreed that where the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling
was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees required.27 Thus, in the more recent case
of United Overseas Bank v. Ros,28 the Court explained that
where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the
court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness
to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when
required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply.
Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications.
The Court has declared that in appealed cases, failure to pay
the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period
warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic
dismissal of the appeal and that the court shall exercise its
power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, and with great deal of circumspection considering
all attendant circumstances.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In that connection, the CA, in its discretion, may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file
the petition for review upon proper motion and the payment
of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglemetary
period and that no further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days.30 Therefore, the grant of any extensions for
the filing of the petition is discretionary and subject to the
condition that the full amount of the docket and lawful fees
are paid before the expiration of the reglementary period to
file the petition. In its Resolution dated November 23, 2009,
the CA clearly explained its denial of petitioner's motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
8
Clearly, there are pre-requisites before a motion for extension
to file a Rule 42 petition for review could even be granted.
The petitioner must pay the full amount of the docket and
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the
expiration of the reglementary period. This requirement was
not met by the petitioner as the docket fees he had paid are
actually deficient by Three Thousand Five Hundred Thirty
Pesos (P3,530.00). Granting the petitioner's two (2) motions
for extension of time to file petition for review would have
been beyond the pale of the limits allowed by the Rules for
the Court in that instance, considering that the petitioner
failed to fulfill a requirement.31
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner now begs this Court for leniency in the interest of
justice. While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets,
on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for
resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, 32 for it is far
better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial
end, rather than on a technicality that may result in
injustice.33 However, [i]t is only when persuasive reasons
exist that the Rules may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure.34 In the present case, petitioner
failed to convince this Court of the need to relax the rules and
the eventual injustice that he will suffer if his prayer is not
granted.
DYNAMIC BUILDERS VS PRESBITERO G.R. No. 174202,
April 07, 2015
Petitioner counters that it was compelled to file the separate
petitions pursuant to, and in view of, Article XVII, Section 58
of Republic Act No. 9184:58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 58. Report to Regular Courts; Certiorari. - Court action
may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated in
this Article shall have been completed. Cases that are filed in
violation of the process specified in this Article shall be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The regional trial court
shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head
of the procuring entity. Court actions shall be
governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
This provision is without prejudice to any law conferring
on the Supreme Court the sole jurisdiction to issue
temporary restraining orders and injunctions relating
to Infrastructure Projects of Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 58 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort
to this court by one that had already filed an action before
the Regional Trial Court without violating the basic rules on
proscription against the splitting of a cause of action,
multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.
Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party
may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single
cause of action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of
action "violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits,
whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the
dockets of the courts."59
This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public
respondent's Decision and Resolution on the protest the
same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the
Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence, petitioner
seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed
before separate courts. This violates the rule against forum
shopping.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires the plaintiff or
principal party to certify under oath that he or she has not
commenced any action involving the same issues in any
court. This court has discussed this rule against forum

shopping:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In essence, forum shopping is the practice of litigants
resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the
same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment. In determining whether forum shopping exists, it is
important to consider the vexation caused to the courts and
the parties-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts
and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related
causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same
relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
decisions by the different courts or fora on the same issues.
We have ruled that forum shopping is present when, in two or
more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2) rights
or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and (3) the identity
of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.60cralawlawlibrary
Private respondent alleges that petitioner did not even notify
the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, Negros Occidental, of its
Petition filed before this court.61
The second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic
Act No. 9184 simply means it does not preclude a direct filing
before this court in proper cases.
The Rules of Court provides for original concurrent jurisdiction
by the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and this
court in entertaining petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus. However, parties must adhere to the principle of
hierarchy of courts. This was discussed in Dimson (Manila),
Inc., et al. v. Local Water Utilities Administration: y
Clearly, the proper recourse to a court action from decisions
of the BAC, such as this one, is to file a certiorari not before
the Supreme Court but before the regional trial court which is
vested by R.A. No. 9184 with jurisdiction to entertain the
same. In the recent case of First United Constructors
Corporation v. Poro Point Management Corporation, we held
that while indeed the certiorari jurisdiction of the regional
trial court is concurrent with this Court's, that fact alone does
not allow an unrestricted freedom of choice of the court
forum. But since this is not an iron-clad rule and the full
discretionary power to take cognizance of and assume
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari directly filed
with the Court may actually be exercised by it, it is
nevertheless imperative that the Court's intervention be
called for by exceptionally compelling reasons or be
warranted by the nature of the issues involved. In other
words, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue the writ will be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set
out in the petition.64 (Citations omitted)
The hierarchy of courts must be respected. The doctrine with
respect to hierarchy of courts was designed so that this court
will have more time to focus on its constitutional tasks
without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the
lower courts' competence.65 This court acts on petitions for
extraordinary writs under Rule 65 "only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy." 66
Consistent with these rules and doctrines, the remedy
contemplated by Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No.
9184 is either an action under Rule 65 before the Regional
Trial Court or the proper action filed before this court.
However, direct resort to this court can prosper only when the
requisites for direct invocation of this court's original
jurisdiction are present.
NAVARRO VS ESCOBIDO 606 SCRA 1
TOPIC: Real Parties in Interest, Indispensable Parties
FACTS:
Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before
the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages
against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that
the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor
vehicles in Navarros possession. In his Answers, Navarro
alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two
9
complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not
a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase
(collectively, the lease agreements) the actionable
documents on which the complaints were based. RTC
dismissed the case but set aside the dismissal on the
presumption that Glenn Gos (husband) leasing business is a
conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion
for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro, a complaint
which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted
into one with a cause of action by mere amendment or
supplemental pleading. CA denied petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
RULING:
YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business
name Kargo Enterprises, as the registered owner of Kargo
Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit
from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary
to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest,
and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not
state a cause of action because her name did not appear in
the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of
Kargo Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of
Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this
name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of
these properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the
co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The
other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not
even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded
in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an
indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the
leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-
forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the
Rules, which states:
Section 4.Spouses as parties. Husband and wife
shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by
law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable
party to the action, misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground
for dismissal of action as per Rule 3, Section 11 of
the Rules of Court.
Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al.,
Indispensable parties in partition action.
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015
Facts:
Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land in Iloilo City. He
had 2 children with his first wife, namely, Cresencio and
Conrado, Jr.; and 7 children with his second wife, namely,
Mateo, Sr, Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo
and Cebeleo, Sr. He also begot 3 illegitimate children,
namely Eduardo, Rogelio and Ricardo. Both Mateo, Sr. and
Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. leaving children,
namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni,
Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo,
Jr. and Neobel. Santiago, who allegedly bought the shares of
majority of the heirs of a property left by Conrado, Sr. He filed
a complaint for partition but did not implead Mateo, Sr.s
children.
RTC found that through the subject document,
Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such,
has the right to demand the partition of the same. However,
the RTC held that Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.s
share over the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted
the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo,
Sr.s share thereon.
CA, on appeal, dismissed Santiagos complaint for
judicial partition. It held the Mateo, Sr.s children are
indispensable parties to the judicial partition and thus, their
non-inclusion as defendants would necessarily result in its
dismissal. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of the
heirs of Santiago, hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Is the action for partition proper without impleading
Mateo, Sr.s children?
Held: No because the co-heirs are indispensable parties.
The aforementioned heirs whether in their own
capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant have
vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be
impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition
thereof. However, a reading of Santiagos complaint shows
that as regards Mateo, Sr.s interest, only Felcon was
impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-
representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.s
interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his
wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code,
the proper representatives to his interest should have been
his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiagos
omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for
partition defective.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be
affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other
parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which
is effective, complete, or equitable. (Gabatin v. Land Bank of
the Philippines, 486 Phil. 366, 379-380 (2004), citing Bank of
the Philippine Islands v. CA, 450 Phil. 532, 541 (2003); further
citation omitted). Thus, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present. (Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235,
265 (2004).
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule
69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in
the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for
partition of real estate. A person having the
right to compel the partition of real estate
may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of
the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all
other persons interested in the
property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest
in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action
for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of
the complaint on account of Santiagos failure to implead all
the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina
v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013, 695 SCRA
345, the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-
joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to
implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit:
The non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action. At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such
times as are just, parties may be added on
the motion of a party or on the initiative of
the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses
to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, that court may
dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs
failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. x x x
In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action
in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the
inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not
impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits
RULES 6 TO 9
ALBA VS MALAPAJO January 13, 2016 G.R. No. 198752
10
The issue for resolution is whether respondents
counterclaim, i.e., reimbursement of the loan obtained from
them in case the deed of absolute sale is declared null and
void on the ground of forgery, is permissive in nature which
requires the payment of docket fees and a certification
against forum shopping for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the same.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may
have against an opposing party.14 A compulsory counterclaim
is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of
justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the
jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature
thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional
Trial Court, necessarily connected with the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim or even where there is such a
connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third
persons over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. 15 A
compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same
action.
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is
not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim.16 It is essentially an independent
claim that may be filed separately in another case.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive, we have devised the following tests: (a) Are the
issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the
defendants counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim? 17 A positive answer
to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.18
Based on the above-mentioned tests, we shall determine the
nature of respondents counterclaim. Respondents anchored
their assailed counterclaim on the following allegations in
their affirmative defenses in their Answer with Counterclaim,
thus:
xxxx
10. The plaintiff's cause of action is based on his allegation
that his signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.
The Deed of Absolute Sale is a unilateral instrument, i.e., it
was signed only by the vendor, who is the plaintiff in this case
and his instrumental witnesses, who are his parents in this
case. It was presented to defendants already completely
prepared, accomplished and notarized. Defendants had no
hand in its preparation, accomplishment and notarization.
While the plaintiff claims that his signature on the instrument
is forged, he never questioned the genuineness of the
signatures of his instrumental witnesses, his parents Arturo P.
Alba, Sr. and Norma C. Alba, who signed the said instrument
below the words "SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF" and above
the words "Father" and "Mother," respectively.
Furthermore, plaintiff acknowledged in par. 7 of his Complaint
that the stated consideration in the Deed of Absolute Sale is
P500,000.00 and he never categorically denied having
received the same.
11. Before the plaintiff sold the property to the defendants,
he secured a loan from them in the sum of Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) payable on or before
November 10, 2008. The loan is evidenced by a Promissory
Note and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage dated
September 11, 2008, both executed by him, covering the

parcel of land subject of this case, Lot 2332-D, Psd 06-
000738. Like the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Real Estate
Mortgage is a unilateral instrument, was signed solely by the
plaintiff, and furthermore, his parents affixed their signatures
thereon under the heading "WITH MY PARENTAL CONSENT",
and above the words, "Father" and "Mother," respectively.
Prior to this, or as early as July 25, 2008, the plaintiff also
obtained a loan payable on or before September 6, 2008 from
defendants' mother, Alma D. David, and already mortgaged
to her Lot 2332-D, Psd 06-000738. The loan is evidenced by a
Promissory Note and a Real Estate Mortgage, both of which
were executed by plaintiff. Again, the Real Estate Mortgage is
an unilateral instrument, was signed solely by the plaintiff
and furthermore, his parents also affixed their signatures
thereon under the heading, "WITH MY PARENTAL CONSENT "
and above the words, "Father" and "Mother," respectively.
In both instances, the plaintiff was always represented by his
parents, who always manifested their authority to transact in
behalf of their son the plaintiff.1wphi1
As in the case with the Deed of Absolute Sale, the defendants
or their mother did not have any hand in the preparation,
accomplishment or notarization of the two Promissory Notes
with accompanying Real Estate Mortgages, x x x.
Neither of the two Real Estate Mortgages have been
discharged or extinguished.
12. Considering the foregoing, the plaintiff's allegation that
his signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged, and
that the defendants are the "co-authors" of the said forgery,
are absolutely false and baseless.
13. If the Deed of Absolute Sale is declared null and void on
the ground of forgery, then the plaintiff should reimburse the
defendants the loan he obtained from them, which he did not
deny having obtained, plus the agreed monthly interest. 19
Petitioner seeks to recover the subject property by assailing
the validity of the deed of sale on the subject property which
he allegedly executed in favor of respondents Malapajo on
the ground of forgery. Respondents counterclaimed that, in
case the deed of sale is declared null and void, they be paid
the loan petitioner obtained from them plus the agreed
monthly interest which was covered by a real estate
mortgage on the subject property executed by petitioner in
favor of respondents. There is a logical relationship between
the claim and the counterclaim, as the counterclaim is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. Notably, the
same evidence to sustain respondents' counterclaim would
disprove petitioner's case. In the event that respondents
could convincingly establish that petitioner actually executed
the promissory note and the real estate mortgage over the
subject property in their favor then petitioner's complaint
might fail. Petitioner's claim is so related logically to
respondents' counterclaim, such that conducting separate
trials for the claim and the counterclaim would result in the
substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and
the parties.20
Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set
up in the same action; otherwise, it would be barred
forever.21 If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in
a different proceeding, it would be abated on the ground
of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would meet the
same fate on the ground of res judicata.22 There is, therefore,
no need for respondents to pay docket fees and to file a
certification against forum shopping for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.
We agree with the RTCs disquisition in finding that
respondents counterclaim is compulsory, to wit:
The arguments of the plaintiffs that this transaction is a
permissive counterclaim do not convince.
By the manner in which the answer pertaining to this
transaction was phrased, the real estate mortgage was the
origin of the Deed of Absolute Sale after the loan of
P600,000.00 using the same property as security for the
payment thereof was not settled. In short, it is one of
11
defendants' defenses and controverting evidence against
plaintiffs' allegations of falsification of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the property subject of the Deed of Sale being one and
the same property subject of the mortgage. 23
G.R. No. 155701, March 11, 2015
LIM TECK CHUAN, Petitioner, v. SERAFIN UY AND
LEOPOLDA CECILIO, LIM SING CHAN @ HENRY
LIM, Respondents.
The RTC granted the Joint Motion to Dismiss upon the behest
of Serafin, the plaintiff therein on the main ground that the
case had become moot and academic since his title to Lot
5357 had been allegedly quieted and the reliefs prayed for
were obtained. In the Order dated October 21, 2002 denying
the motion for reconsideration, the RTC elucidated
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court in issuing the dismissal order dated April 25, 2002
had already made its position on the matter very clearly such
that it finds no reason to disturb the subject order. As
clarified, a party-litigant in a civil action like the plaintiff
herein, cannot be compelled to so continuously litigate his
case if he does not want to anymore as was obtaining in this
case. More so that the principal reliefs prayed for in the
complaint had already been served as was so admitted by
the plaintiff. Being so, this Court finds it repugnant to go on
with the hearing of movants-defendants counterclaim for
what is to be countered by the movant when the claim of the
plaintiff, at his own instance, had already been dismissed it
having been served and satisfied as aforestated. And this is
so because what is contemplated under the Rules authorizing
the hearing of defendants counterclaim is when the dismissal
is not at the instance of the plaintiff.39cralawlawlibrary
As can be gleaned from the assailed orders, the RTC erred
when it dismissed the case when the present rules state that
the dismissal shall be limited only to the complaint. A
dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the
complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not
the action is dismissed, the defendant in spite of said
dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same
action.40 The case of Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago41 is
quite instructive which this Court finds worth reiterating. In
Pinga, the Court clearly stated that the dismissal of the
complaint does not necessarily result to the dismissal of the
counterclaim, abandoning the rulings in Metals Engineering
Resources Corporation v. Court of Appeals, International
Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, and BA
Finance Corporation v. Co.
At present, even Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion
of the plaintiff, now recognizes the right of the defendant to
prosecute the counterclaim either in the same or separate
action notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint, and
without regard as to the permissive or compulsory nature of
the counterclaim.
In his commentaries on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Justice Regalado expounds on the effects of the amendments
to Section 2 and 3 of Rule 17:
2. Under this revised section 2, where the plaintif moves for
the dismissal of his complaint to which a counterclaim has
been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in
a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same
action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his
right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should
he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same
action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must
manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days
from notice to him of plaintiffs motion to dismiss. These
alternative remedies of the defendant are available to him
regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive. x x x.45
In the instant case, the petitioners preference to have his
counterclaim (and cross-claims) be prosecuted in the same
action was timely manifested. The records show that Serafin

and Leopolda furnished the petitioners counsel with a copy
of their Joint Motion to Dismiss by posting it (via registered
mail) on September 19, 2001. Said motion was filed in court
the following day. On October 4, 2001, the petitioner filed
his Opposition/Comment thereto. Copies of the said
opposition were personally served upon the opposing parties
on the same date.9 In paragraph 1.5 of said opposition, the
petitioner expressed his preference to have his counterclaim
and cross-claim prosecuted in the same case, as he thus
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. That the undersigned defendant manifest to this
5 Honorable Court of his preference that the above[ ]
counterclaims and cross-claims be resolved in the present
case.
METROBANK VS CPR PROMOTIONS
Action for deficiency filed by the mortgagee bank.The
mortgagors claim for refund of the excessover the bid price
was a compulsory counterclaim.On appeal, the CA cannot
award refund even ifexcess was raised as a defense because
contrary to S2 R9. (Metrobank v. CPR Promotions, 22
June2015, Velasco, J.).
Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory
counterclaim
Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines a compulsory
counterclaim follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular
courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be
within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and
the nature thereof, except that in an original action before
the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered
compulsory regardless of the
amount.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out
of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the
claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an
original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the
amount.27chanrobleslaw
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive, We have, in several cases, utilized the following
tests:28chanrobleslaw
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the
counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim?
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial
12
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?
This test is the "compelling test of
compulsoriness."29chanrobleslaw
Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for
recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the amount
due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an
action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee
against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases,
substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove
their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one
will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are
absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be
fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these
two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions.
And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of
separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and
needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the
same transaction, and the same evidence. The only
difference here would be in the findings of the courts based
on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of
whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the amounts
due.
Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in
the bid price should be set up in the action for payment of a
deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, We rule that
respondents failed to timely raise the same.
It is elementary that a defending party's compulsory
counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his
Answer,30 and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such
claim.31 As it appears from the records, what respondents
initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees.32 Then, realizing, based on its
computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the
excess bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim,
this time in their Appellant's Brief filed before the
CA.33 Unfortunately, respondents' belated (assertion proved
fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely
raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents'
claim for the excess, if any, is already barred. With this, We
now resolve the substantive issues of this case.
VALDEZ VS DABON June 22, 2007

Rule 7 Parts of a Pleading
BASAN VS COCA COLA BOTTLERS G.R. Nos. 174365-66,
February 04, 2015
On the procedural issue, We hold that while the general rule
is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature
of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this case, appearing
thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with the
procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings
that the rule on verification is deemed substantially complied
with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.16 Similarly,
this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, as when all the petitioners share
a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the certification requirement. 17 Thus, the fact
that the petition was signed only by petitioner Basan does
not necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in
accord with substantial justice to overlook petitioners
procedural lapses.18 Indeed, the application of technical rules
of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the
demand of justice.
G.R. No. 173186, September 16, 2015
ANICETO UY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
MINDANAO STATION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
CARMENCITA NAVAL-SAI, REP. BY HER ATTORNEY-IN
FACT RODOLFO FLORENTINO,
There was substantial compliance with the
requirements on certification against forumshopping.
A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and
personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the
court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of
action.28 It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to
sign on his behalf.29cralawrednad
Here, the original complaint contained a proper verification
and certification against forum shopping duly signed by
Naval-Sai as plaintiff. The verification and certification in the
amended complaint, on the other hand, was only signed by
her counsel, Atty. Norberta L. Ela. Atty. Ela was not authorized
to sign on behalf of Naval-Sai, as in fact, she assigned one
Rodolfo Florentino as agent.30 The Court of Appeals pointed
out that in the certification in the amended complaint, Atty.
Ela specified that it should be taken and read together with
the original complaint. The Court of Appeals took this as a
cautionary move on the part of Naval-Sai, justifying the
relaxation of the rules on the ground of substantial
compliance. We find, however, that this cautionary move is
13
ineffectual because under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an
amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 31 For
all intents and purposes, therefore, the original complaint and
its verification and certification ceased to exist. This,
notwithstanding, we find there was still substantial
compliance with the Rules.
In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals,32 while we said that, strictly, a certification against
forum shopping by counsel is a defective ce1iification, the
verification, signed by petitioner's counsel in said case, is
substantial compliance because it served the purpose of the
Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another
action or proceeding involving the same issues. We then
explained that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice which should be used to
achieve such end and not to derail it.33cralawrednad
We also find that the prima facie merits of the case serve as a
special circumstance or a compelling reason to relax the rules
on certification against forum shopping.
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,34 we recognized the flaw in the
certification against forum shopping which was signed only
by the counsel, and not by the party. In LDP Marketing, Inc. v.
Monter,35 there was initially no proof that the one who signed
the certification was authorized to do so in behalf of the
corporation. In these two cases, we nonetheless chose to
overlook the procedural lapses in the interest of substantial
justice and the existence of prima facie merit in the petitions.
We have ruled that the general rule is that non-compliance or
a defect in the certification is not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction. However, there are cases where we
exercised leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of
substantial compliance, the presence of special
circumstances or compelling reasons. 36 The rules on forum-
shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and "should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subve1i its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which
is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible."37cralawrednad
J
BANDILLON VS La Filipina Uygongco G.R. No. 202446,
September 16, 2015
Respondent LFUC alleges that several of the concerned
employees did not sign the Special Power of
Attorney (SPA)48 authorizing their union president and co-
petitioner, Ronaldo C. Payda, to file this petition, and to sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping for
such purpose, which allegedly rendered the said petition
defective.
This contention lacks merit. According to prevailing
jurisprudence, neither the fact that Payda alone signed the
petition's verification and certification against forum
shopping, nor the fact that the SPA authorizing the filing of
the petition was not signed by all petitioners, invalidate nor
render the petition defective, as the present case is one of
those instances when the rules are interpreted more liberally
in order to attain substantial justice. We hold that Payda's
lone signature and the SPA signed by most of the petitioners
already substantially comply with the requirements for a
properly and validly filed petition.
Indeed, Payda alone signed the verification and certification
against forum shopping - as the person authorized in the SPA
to do so - but instead of rendering the petition defective or
invalid, this Court, as it has previously ruled in Altres, et at. v.
Empleo, et al.49 regards the same as already in substantial
compliance with the rules. In that case, it was held that in
certain instances, the signature of even just one person out of
many petitioners in the verification and certification against
forum shopping can be deemed as enough to meet the
requirements of the rules. In sum, the Court laid down the
guidelines as follows:cralawlawlibrary
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in
capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already
reflected above respecting non-compliance with the

requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with
the requirement on or submission of defective verification,
and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on
the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed
by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those
who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the
case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share
a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them
in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf, x x x50
In the case at bar, the subject SPA is an authorization granted
by the employees in favor of their union president Payda to,
among other things, "file the appropriate petition before the
Supreme Court relative to the Court of Appeals' Decision and
Resolution dated September 13, 2011 and May 24, 2012,
respectively," and to sign the petition's verification and
certification against forum shopping for such purpose. The
said employees, who are the SPA's principals, along with
Payda himself, became the petitioners in the petition, which
is the case that is now being resolved. Payda performed his
mandate under the SPA and, for himself and for on behalf of
his principals, filed the instant petition and alone signed the
accompanying verification and certification against forum
shopping. The SPA was signed by the great majority of the
persons named as petitioners in the case. 51 We hold the same
to have duly complied with the jurisprudential guidelines on
the rules on verification and certification against forum
shopping as outlined above.
While Payda alone signed, per the SPA, the petition is neither
invalid nor defective as LFUC alleges because, as for the
verification requirement, Payda signed as one who has
"ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the petition's
allegations," being himself a petitioner and the employees'
union president who personally knows the story and facts of
the case; and as for the certification against forum shopping,
Payda, as a co-employee of his co-petitioners, "shares a
common interest and invokes a common cause of action or
defense" as the rest and, as their attorney-in-fact tasked to
initiate the action, he himself has the knowledge of whether
or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in
different courts or agencies. Both already satisfy the
guidelines' requirements on when a lone signature of a
petitioner substantially complies with the requirements for a
14
valid verification and certification against forum shopping.
But more importantly, unlike other lone signatories in
jurisprudence52 whose petitions were declared improperly
filed by this Court due to lack of authority from their co-
petitioners to file such action on the latter's behalf, Payda, in
the case at bar, is armed with such an authority - the SPA
signed by his co-petitioners. It has been held that when an
SPA was constituted precisely to authorize the agent to file
and prosecute suits on behalf of the principal, then it is such
agent who has actual and personal knowledge whether he or
she has initiated similar actions or proceedings before various
courts on the same issue on the principal's behalf, thus
satisfying the requirements for a valid certification against
forum shopping.53 In such a case, when it is the agent or
attomey-in-fact who initiated the action on the principal's
behalf and who signed the certification against forum
shopping, the rationale behind the rule that it must be the
"petitioner or principal party himself who should sign such
certification does not apply; the rule on the certification
against forum shopping has been properly complied with.
We treat the instant case in this manner in part due to the
particular circumstances of the petitioners in the case at
bar. First, the petitioners are so numerous that their filing of a
single petition through a representative is in fact a
commendable act compared to the alternative of flooding this
Court with a multiplicity of suits involving the same parties,
subject matter, cause and relief. Second, as claimed by LFUC
itself,55 most of the petitioners have since been separated
from LFUC's employment, the natural consequence of which
is that the employees have now changed employment and
residences, a development which, combined with their
meager monetary resources, presents logistical difficulties to
them as litigants unless they choose, as they did, the
practical and cost-effective option of appointing a
representative, in this case their union president
Payda, via the SPA, to represent them and file a petition in
this case on their behalf. The Court is not unmindful of such
pragmatic nature of petitioners' stance so that it is one more
reason, in addition to supporting jurisprudence, to allow the
petition instead of dismissing it based on the grounds raised
by respondent LFUC.
We also consider LFUC's allegation that the petition was
defective because the SPA was not signed by all petitioners,
or that it was signed by some only through unauthorized
representatives, to hold no water. In the case at bar, the SPA
was signed by everyone but five (5) of the
petitioners.56 According to Altres v. Empleo, the only
consequence of such an incomplete signing is that "the non-
signing petitioners (as to the certification against forum
shopping) are dropped as parties to the case."57However, the
petition itself survives and not rendered invalid, especially as
to the petitioners who signed, who would remain as parties
therein. As for those petitioners who are not deceased but
who signed through representatives, they, too, remain as
parties, because the acts of such representatives may be
ratified by these petitioners or the representatives may
belatedly submit proof of their authority to act on the
petitioners' behalf.58 As for LFUC's allegation that the
deceased employees were not properly substituted, this
Court already had occasion to rule that the formal
substitution of a deceased worker is not necessary when his
heir already had voluntarily appeared and participated in the
proceedings before the labor tribunals.59 The Court held
further that the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process; it is only when
there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not
represented by any legal representative or heir, that the
court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting
judgment therein.60 In the case at bar, there is no such denial
of. due process as the heirs of the six (6) deceased workers
are considered to have voluntarily appeared before this Court
by signing the SPA authorizing the filing of this petition.
Presumably, they will likewise do the same voluntary
appearance or formal substitution in all the succeeding
proceedings of the case, including execution. This Court has

already ruled that formal substitution of parties is not
necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared,
participated, and presented evidence during the
proceedings.61
PEOPLE VS ARROJADO G.R. No. 207041, November 09,
2015
Petitioner contends that: (1) the term "pleadings" as used in
B.M. No. 1922 does not include criminal Informations filed in
court; (2) the failure of the investigating prosecutor to
indicate in the Information the number and date of issue of
her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect
and is not a valid ground to dismiss the subject Information
which is otherwise complete in form and substance.
The petition lacks merit.
Pertinent portions of B.M. No. 1922, provide as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the
Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE
practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings
filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be
applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period.
Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records.
Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines
pleadings as the written statements of the respective claims
and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for
appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated
under Section 2 thereof are the complaint and the answer in
a civil suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule 110 of
the same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court. In accordance with the
above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading
since the allegations therein, which charge a person with an
offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action
which alleges a plaintiffs cause or cause of action. In this
respect, the Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA
on the matter, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A]n information is, for all intents and purposes, considered
an initiatory pleading because it is a written statement that
contains the cause of action of a party, which in criminal
cases is the State as represented by the prosecutor, against
the accused. Like a pleading, the Information is also filed in
court for appropriate judgment. Undoubtedly then, an
Information falls squarely within the ambit of Bar Matter No.
1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850.11cralawlawlibrary
Even under the rules of criminal procedure of the United
States, upon which our rules of criminal procedure were
patterned, an information is considered a pleading. Thus, Rule
12(a), Title IV of the United States Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, states that: "[t]he pleadings in a criminal
proceeding are the indictment, the information, and the pleas
of not guilty, guilty, and nolo contendere." Thus, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An information is a pleading. It is the formal statement on the
part of the state of the facts constituting the offense which
the defendant is accused of committing. In other words, it is
the plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action. It bears the same relation to a criminal action
that a complaint does to a civil action; and, when verified, its
object is not to satisfy the court or jury that the defendant is
guilty, nor is it for the purpose of evidence which is to be
weighed and passed upon, but is only to inform the
defendant of the precise acts or omissions with which he is
accused, the truth of which is to be determined thereafter by
direct and positive evidence upon a trial, where the
defendant is brought face to face with the
witnesses.12cralawlawlibrary
In a similar manner, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that
"[a]n indictment in a criminal case is a pleading, since it
15
accomplishes the same purpose as a declaration in a civil
suit, pleading by allegation the cause of action in law against
[a] defendant."13
As to petitioner's contention that the failure of the
investigating prosecutor to indicate in the subject Information
the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of
Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground
to dismiss such Information, suffice it to state that B.M. No.
1922 categorically provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records." In this
regard, petitioner must be reminded that it assailed the trial
court's dismissal of the subject Information via a special civil
action for certiorari filed with the CA. The writ of certiorari is
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.14 Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.15 To justify the issuance of the writ
of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to
act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction.16 Since the trial court's
dismissal of the subject Information was based on a clear and
categorical provision of a rule issued by this Court, the
court a quo could not have committed a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment nor did it exercise its
discretion in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Thus, the CA
did not commit error in dismissing petitioner's petition
for certiorari.
In harping on its contention that the ends of justice would be
best served if the criminal case would be allowed to proceed
in order to determine the innocence or culpability of the
ciccused, petitioner sounds as if the dismissal of the
Information left the prosecution with no other recourse or
remedy so as to irreversibly jeopardize the interests of the
State and the private offended party. On the contrary, the
Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the
Information, without prejudice, did not leave the prosecution
without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. To
avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal
case and to uphold the parties' respective rights to a speedy
disposition of their case, the prosecution, mindful of its duty
not only to prosecute offenders but more importantly to do
justice, could have simply re-filed the Information containing
the required number and date of issue of the investigating
prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of
resorting to the filing of various petitions in court to
stubbornly insist on its position and question the trial court's
dismissal of the subject Information, thereby wasting its time
and effort and the State's resources.
The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of
the principle on liberal construction of procedural rules by
arguing that such liberal construction "may be invoked in
situations where there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does
not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at
least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules."
The prosecution has never shown any reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922.
Even when the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order
dismissing the subject Information was filed, the required
number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's
MCLE Certificate of Compliance was still not included nor
indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and
compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in
the observance of procedural rules appear to be an
afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of
cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or
her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her
MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane
Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No.
1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required

information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it
with "Failure to disclose the required information would
subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary
action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of
a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and
date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will
no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of
the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will
subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary
action.
G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016 - FERNANDO
MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. WESLEYAN
UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon
motion of the claiming party when the defending party's
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that
purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are
considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for
judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's
pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of
fact.chanRoble
Did the CA commit reversible error in affirming the RTC's
denial of the petitioner's motion for judgment on the
pleadings?
The rule on judgment based on the pleadings is Section 1,
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, which provides thus:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading, x x x
The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is whether or not there are issues of fact generated
by the pleadings.28 Whether issues of fact exist in a case or
not depends on how the defending party's answer has dealt
with the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. The
defending party's answer either admits or denies the
allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts the
answer admit, being undisputed, will not require evidence to
establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations of
ultimate facts the answer properly denies, being disputed,
will require evidence.
The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts
of the adverse party's pleadings not only when it expressly
confesses the truth of such allegations but also when it omits
to deal with them at all.29 The controversion of the ultimate
facts must only be by specific denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the
denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is by the
defending party specifying each material allegation of fact
the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial. The second applies to
the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an
averment, and the denial is done by the defending party
specifying so much of the material allegation of ultimate facts
as is true and material and denying only the remainder. The
third is done by the defending party who is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment made in the complaint by
stating so in the answer. Any material averment in the
complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted
except an averment of the amount of unliquidated
damages.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case of a written instrument or document upon which
an action or defense is based, which is also known as the
actionable document, the pleader of such document is
required either to set forth the substance of such instrument
or document in the pleading, and to attach the original or a
copy thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall then
16
be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or to set forth a copy
in the pleading.31 The adverse party is deemed to admit the
genuineness and due execution of the actionable document
unless he specifically denies them under oath, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an
oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear
to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an
order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Civil Case No. 09-122116, the respondent expressly
admitted paragraphs no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the complaint.
The admission related to the petitioner's allegations on: (a)
the four transactions for the delivery and installation of
various hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the
respondent; (c) the payments made by the respondents; (d)
the balance still due to the petitioner; and (e) the execution
of the February 11, 2009 agreement. The admission of the
various agreements, especially the February 11, 2009
agreement, significantly admitted the petitioner's complaint.
To recall, the petitioner's cause of action was based on the
February 1 1, 2009 agreement, which was the actionable
document in the case. The complaint properly alleged the
substance of the February 11, 2009 agreement, and
contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express
admission of the genuineness and due execution of the
February 11, 2009 agreement, judgment on the pleadings
became proper.33 As held in Santos v.
Alcazar:34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with
respect to documents the genuineness and due execution of
which are admitted by the adverse party. With the
consequent admission engendered by petitioners' failure to
properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled
with its proper authentication, identification and offer by the
respondent, not to mention petitioners' admissions in
paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they are indeed
indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment
may be had solely on the document, and there is no need to
present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed
indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary
acknowledgment receipt, is valid and binding between the
parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the loan
agreement they had entered into. The absence of rebutting
evidence occasioned by petitioners' waiver of their right to
present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best
evidence of the transactions between the parties and the
consequential indebtedness incurred. Indeed, the effect of
the admission is such that a prima facie case is made for the
plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his
part and entitled him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a
special defense of new matter, such as payment, is
interposed by the defendant.35 (citations omitted)
The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the
complaint "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as
the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of
office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-
Philippines." Was the manner of denial effective as a specific
denial?
We answer the query in the negative. Paragraph no. 6 alleged
that the respondent's total obligation as of February 15, 2009
was P123,901,650.00, but its balance thereafter became only
P54,654,195.54 because it had since then paid
P67,357,683.23 to the petitioner. Paragraph no. 7 stated that
the petitioner had agreed with the respondent on February
11, 2009 to reduce the balance to only P50,400,000.00,
which the respondent would pay in 36 months through 36
postdated checks of P1,400,000.00 each, which the
respondent then issued for the purpose. Paragraph no. 8
averred that after four of the checks totalling P5,600,000.00
were paid the respondent stopped payment of the rest,
rendering the entire obligation due and demandable pursuant
to the February 11, 2009 agreement. Considering that
paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters

that the respondent ought to know or could have easily
known, the answer did not specifically deny such material
averments. It is settled that denials based on lack of
knowledge or information of matters clearly known to the
pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been
known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective 36 or
sham denials.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by
subjecting them to its special and affirmative defenses of lack
of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis
pendentia and forum shopping was of no consequence
because the affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved
matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner's claim, and
thus did not negate the material averments of the complaint.
GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY VS BPI FAMILY SAVINGS
G.R. No. 187487, June 29, 2015
The Court concurs with the CA Decision holding that the
genuineness and due execution of the loan documents in this
case were deemed admitted by petitioners under the
parameters of Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules which provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or
defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them,
and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or
when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused. (Emphasis supplied)
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to
specifically deny the execution of the Credit Agreement, PN,
and CSA under the auspices of the above-quoted rule. The
mere statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they
"specifically deny" the pertinent allegations of the Complaint
"for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit
plaintiffs purposes,"44 does not constitute an effective specific
denial as contemplated by law.45 Verily, a denial is not specific
simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated
otherwise, a general denial does not become specific by the
use of the word "specifically."46 Neither does it become so by
the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad
conclusion of law that the allegations contested are "self-
serving" or are intended "to suit plaintiffs purposes."
In Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde47 (Permanent
Savings & Loan Bank), citing the earlier case of Songco v.
Sellner,48 the Court expounded on how to deny the
genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This means that the defendant must declare under oath
that he did not sign the document or that it is
otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement
of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured
by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is
an admission both of the genuineness and due execution
thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground
not affecting either.49 (Emphasis supplied)
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the
defendant "sets forth what he claims to be the facts,"
which requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer
in this case.
Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the "specific
denial under oath" requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the
Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that
petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and
genuineness of the documents evidencing their loan
obligation to respondent.
To this, case law enlightens that "[t]he admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document means that
the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for him and
17
with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the
party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and
that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any
defense relating to the authenticity and due execution
of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one
executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing
thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were
unauthorized."50ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accordingly, with petitioners' admission of the genuineness
and due execution of the loan documents as above-
discussed, the competence of respondent's witness Suio to
testify in order to authenticate the same is therefore of no
moment. As the Court similarly pointed out in Permanent
Savings & Loan Bank, "[w]hile Section [20],51 Rule 132 of the
[Rules] requires that private documents be proved of their
due execution and authenticity before they can be received in
evidence, i.e., presentation and examination of witnesses to
testify on this fact; in the present case, there is no need for
proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the
loan documents because of respondent's implied
admission thereof."52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court clarifies that while the "[f]ailure to deny the
genuineness and due execution of an actionable document
does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence
of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, estoppel and want of consideration [nor] bar a
party from raising the defense in his answer or reply and
prove at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the
writing, or that it does not express the true agreement of the
parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an
intrinsic ambiguity in the writing,"53 none of these defenses
were adequately argued or proven during the proceedings of
this case.
Of particular note is the affirmative defense of payment
raised during the proceedings a quo. While petitioners
insisted that they had paid, albeit partially, their loan
obligation to respondent, the fact of such payment was never
established by petitioners in this case. Jurisprudence abounds
that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden
of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant, i.e.,
petitioners, to prove payment, rather than on the
plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to prove non-payment. When the
creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof of
non-payment is not needed for it is presumed.54 Here,
respondent's possession of the Credit Agreement, PN, and
CSA, especially with their genuineness and due execution
already having been admitted, cements its claim that the
obligation of petitioners has not been extinguished.
Instructive too is the Court's disquisition in Jison v. CA55 on the
evidentiary burdens attendant in a civil proceeding, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the
burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in
a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant
to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendant's. The concept of "preponderance
of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at
bottom, it means probability of truth.56
G.R. No. 199990, February 04, 2015 - SPOUSES
ROLANDO AND HERMINIA SALVADOR, Petitioners, v.
SPOUSES ROGELIO AND ELIZABETH RABAJA AND
ROSARIO GONZALES, Respondents
Consequently, the RTC issued the pre-trial order14declaring
Spouses Salvador in default and allowing Spouses Rabaja to
present their evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador and
Gonzales to present evidence in her favor.

The failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-trial conference
warrants the presentation of evidence ex parte by Spouses
Rabaja
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that
the failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in
the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to
file his Answer within the reglementary period.29On the other
hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference,
the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. Sections 4 and
5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 4. Appearance of parties.
It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear
at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be
excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a
representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to
alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required
pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on
the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the
plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court
to render judgment on the basis thereof.
[Emphasis supplied]
The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance
Company v. Joseph Enario30 discussed the difference between
the non-appearance of a defendant in a pre-trial conference
and the declaration of a defendant in default in the present
Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision
instructs:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the phrase
"as in default" was initially included in Rule 20 of the old
rules, and which read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference
may be non-suited or considered as in default.cralawred
It was, however, amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Justice Regalado, in his book, REMEDIAL LAW
COMPENDIUM, explained the rationale for the deletion of the
phrase "as in default" in the amended provision, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. This is a substantial reproduction of Section 2 of the former
Rule 20 with the change that, instead of defendant being
declared "as in default" by reason of his non-appearance, this
section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow the
ex parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence and the rendition
of judgment on the basis thereof. While actually the
procedure remains the same, the purpose is one of
semantical propriety or terminological accuracy as there were
criticisms on the use of the word "default" in the former
provision since that term is identified with the failure to file a
required answer, not appearance in court.cralawred
Still, in the same book, Justice Regalado clarified that while
the order of default no longer obtained, its effects were
retained, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary
period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole
ground for an order of default, except the failure to appear at
a pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the
part of the defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall
be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment
based thereon may be rendered against defendant.cralawred
From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-
trial has indeed adverse consequences. If the absent party is
the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the
defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to
present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the
plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without
objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the
18
court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having
forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own
evidence.31 The stringent application of the rules on pre-trial
is necessitated from the significant role of the pre-trial stage
in the litigation process. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion
call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was
discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made
mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent
amendments in 1997.32 The importance of pre-trial in civil
actions cannot be
overemphasized.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel
failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February 4,
2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their
non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he
forgot to update his calendar.34 This excuse smacks of
carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply
cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As
a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no
longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja,
as plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the RTC to present
evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants.
Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant was able to
attend the pre-trial conference, she was allowed to present
her evidence. The RTC could only render judgment based on
the evidence presented during the trial.
RULES 10 TO 13
G.R. No. 211113 June 29, 2015
ADERITO Z. YUJUICO, vs. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET
MANAGEMENT, INC., ATTY. RICHARD J. NETHERCOTT
and ATTY. HONORATO R. MATABAN
Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend
his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is
amended only once and before a responsive pleading is
served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply,
within ten days after it is served).31 Otherwise, a party can
only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. 32
As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat
motions for leave to file amended pleadings with
liberality.33 This is especially true when a motion for leave is
filed during the early stages of proceedings or, at least,
before trial.34 Our case law had long taught that bona fide
amendments to pleadings should be allowed in the interest of
justice so that every case may, so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of suits thus
be prevented.35 Hence, as long as it does not appear that the
motion for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to
delay the proceedings,36 courts are justified to grant leave
and allow the filing of an amended pleading. Once a court
grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes
binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears
that the court had abused its discretion.37
In this case, URAMI filed its motion for leave seeking the
admission of its amended answer more than two (2) years
after it filed its original answer. Despite the considerable
lapse of time between the filing of the original answer and
the motion for leave, the RTC still granted the said motion.
Such grant was later affirmed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner, however, opposes the grant of leave arguing that
URAMI is precluded from filing an amended answer by Section
4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court and claiming that URAMIs
amended answer was only interposed for the purpose of
delaying the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027.
We rule in favor of allowing URAMIs amended answer. Hence,
we deny the present appeal.
First. We cannot subscribe to petitioners argument that
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court precludes URAMI
from filing its amended answer. To begin with, the said
provision does not set the be-all and end-all standard upon

which amendments to pleadings may or may not be allowed.
Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily
governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule10 and not by
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rule of Court. Hence, allegations
(and admissions) in a pleadingeven if not shown to be
made through "palpable mistake"can still be corrected or
amended provided that the amendment is sanctioned under
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, even if we are to apply Section 4 of Rule 129 to
the present case, we still find the allowance of URAMIs
amended answer to be in order.1awp++i1 To our mind, a
consideration of the evidence that URAMI plans to present
during trial indubitably reveals that the admissions made by
URAMI under its original answer were a product of clear and
patent mistake.
One of the key documents that URAMI plans to present during
trial, which it also attached in its amended answer as "Annex
8" thereof, is URAMIs Board Resolution38 dated 21 June 2004
that evinces Atty. Nethercotts authority to cause the
foreclosure on the pledged stocks on behalf of URAMI. With
the existence of such board resolution, the statement in
URAMIs original answer pertaining to the lack of authority of
Atty. Nethercott to initiate the 23 June 2004 auction sale thus
appears mistaken, if not entirely baseless and unfounded.
Hence, we find it only right and fair, that URAMI should be
given a chance to file its amended answer in order to rectify
such mistakes in its original answer.
Second. We also cannot agree with the petitioners
accusation that the amended answer was only interposed to
further delay the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027. As the
previous discussion reveal, the amended answer aims to
correct certain allegations of fact in the original answer
which, needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper
disposition of Civil Case No. 70027. It is, therefore, in the best
interest of justice and equity that URAMI should be allowed to
file the amended answer.
Third. The mere fact that URAMI filed its motion for leave
years after the original answer is also not reason enough in
itself to discredit the amended answer as a sheer dilatory
measure. Readily observable from the established facts is
that the perceived delay between the filing of the motion for
leave and the filing of the original answer is not purely
attributable to URAMI. It must be remembered that some time
after the original answer was filed, we issued a temporary
restraining order in G.R. No. 177068 that effectively
suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027 for more
than a year. Thus, even if it wanted to, URAMI really could not
have filed a motion for leave to file amended answer sooner
than it already had. On this score, we note that it only took
URAMI a little over three months after the lifting of the
temporary restraining order to replace its previous counsel of
record in Civil Case No. 70027 and to file its amended answer.
Fourth. All in all, we find absolutely no cause to overrule the
grant of leave granted to URAMI to file its amended answer.
The said grant is consistent with our time-honored judicial
policy of affording liberal treatment to amendments to
pleadings, especially those made before the conduct of trial.
Rule 14 Service of Summons
Fortune Life Insurance Company v. COA & Province of
Antique, 2015
Petitioner received the copy of the COA decision on Dec. 14,
2012. It filed an MR which was denied, the denial being
received on July 14, 2014. Hence, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari before the SC on August 13, 2014.
Petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its
Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review brought under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the
fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition
should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying
the MR or the motion for new trial.
SC held that petitioner's position cannot be sustained. Under
Rule 64, if the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file
19
the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not
be less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from notice of
denial. Thus, petitioner had only until July 19, 2014 to file the
petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014,
which was 25 days too late.
Issues
1. WON Petitioner complied with rule on proof of service
2. WON the fresh period rule applies on Rule 64
3. WON the remedy of Certiorari is proper
Held: Motion for Reconsideration is without merit
1. NO. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of
proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the
registry receipt, viz:
Section 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry
return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the
sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with
the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if
the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall
consist of the affidavit of the person efecting the mailing and
the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the
paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory,
such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not
submitted.
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of
service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared
that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail,
with registered receipts attached to the appropriate spaces
found on pages 64-65 of the petition." 14 The petition only
bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the
registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the
registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be
appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions.
Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with
the rule.
2. NO. Jurisprudence dictates that the belated filing of
the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief
that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to
the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should
suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed
that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied.
Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a
litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for
liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January
14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed
decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to
Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the
denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition.
Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July
14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to file the petition.
However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was
25 days too late.
3. No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.
A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not
sufficiently disclose how the COA committed grave abuse of
its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did
not approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the
supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal
 20

were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the The same conclusion, however, could not be said with respect
mere terseness of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to the service of summons upon the individual petitioners.
was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion. Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules cannot be construed to apply
simultaneously and do not provide for alternative modes of
And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had
service of summons which can either be resorted to on the
been the main proponent of the Local Government Code in mere basis of convenience to the parties for, under our
the Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the
from the COA Commissioners own did not matter, for it was defendants is generally preferred over substituted
the latters adjudication that had any value and decisiveness service.37 Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons
on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and
officials entrusted with the authority for that purpose. after stringent formal and substantive requirements have
It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money been complied with.38 The failure to comply faithfully, strictly
and fully with all the requirements of substituted service
claim of the petitioner for the further reason of lack of
renders the service of summons ineffective. 39redarclaw
sufficient publication as required by the Government
Procurement Act. In that light, the COA acted well within its Manotoc v. Court of Appeals40 painstakingly elucidated the
authority in denying the petitioners claim. requirements of the Rules as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We can break down this section into the following
requirements to effect a valid substituted
G.R. No. 183370, August 17, 2015 - NATION
service:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
PETROLEUM GAS, INCORPORATED, NENA ANG, MARIO
ANG, ALISON A. SY, GUILLERMO G. SY, NELSON ANG,
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
LUISA ANG, RENATO C. ANG, PAULINE T. ANG, RICKY C.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
ANG,1 AND MELINDA ANG, Petitioners, v. RIZAL
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, SUBSTITUTED
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
BY PHILIPPINE ASSET GROWTH ONE, INC., Respondent.
In resorting to the substituted service, the sheriff in this case
Service of summons on domestic corporation, partnership or
pithily declared in his Report that he "also served copies to
other juridical entity is governed by Section 11, Rule 14
other defendants at their given addresses, but they refused
When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein
to acknowledge receipt thereof." Obviously, the Sheriffs
petitioner, service of summons may be made only upon the
Report dated November 13, 2006 does not particularize why
persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules.27 The
substituted service was resorted to and the precise manner
enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is
by which the summons was served upon the individual
restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on
petitioners. The disputable presumption that an official duty
statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio
has been regularly performed will not apply where it is patent
alterius.28 Substantial compliance cannot be
from the sheriffs or server's return that it is
invoked.29 Service of summons upon persons other than those
defective.42redarclaw
officers specifically mentioned in Section 11, Rule 14 is void,
defective and not binding to said corporation. 30
To avail themselves of substituted service of summons, courts
As correctly argued by petitioners, Sps. Mason already
must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriffs actions
resolved that substantial compliance on service of summons
and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite
upon a domestic corporation is no longer an excuse.
diligent and reasonable efforts.43 The Court requires that the
The foregoing notwithstanding, We agree with the CA that
Sheriffs Return clearly and convincingly show the
there was a valid and effective service of summons upon
impracticability or hopelessness of personal service. 44 The
petitioner corporation through its liaison officer who acted as
impossibility of personal service justifying availment of
the agent of the corporate secretary.
substituted service should be explained in the proof of
Petitioner corporation cannot conveniently rely on the sworn
service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed.
statements of the individual petitioners and Abante. Upon
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the
examination, Ang's denial of having spoken with any process
service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or
server to give instruction to serve the summons and other
Officer's Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be
pertinent papers to Abante34 is not incompatible with the
upheld.45redarclaw
Sheriffs Report stating that "[s]aid summons and all pertinent
papers, upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda Ang,
Under exceptional terms, the circumstances warranting
were received by Claudia Abante, [defendants'] [Liaison]
substituted service of summons may be proved by
Officer, as evidenced by her signature at the original copy of
evidence aliunde.46 Substituted service will still be considered
Summons and Writ." While it may be true that Ang had not
as regular if other evidence of the efforts to serve summons
talked to the sheriff or process server, it still does not rule out
was presented.47BPI v. Spouses Evangelista48 teaches Us that
the possibility that she in fact spoke to Abante and instructed
a defect in the service of summons, which is apparent on the
the latter to receive the documents in her behalf. As to the
face of the return, does not necessarily constitute conclusive
Affidavit of Abante, her disavowal of having spoken to Ang or
proof that the actual service has in fact been improperly
receiving telephone instructions from her is truly self-serving.
made. In the interest of speedy justice, the trial court has to
Evidence as simple as a telephone billing statement or an
immediately ascertain whether the patent defect is real and,
affidavit of a disinterested third person, among others, could
if so, to fully determine whether prior attempts at personal
have been presented to refute the sheriffs claim, but there
service have in fact been done and resort to the substituted
was none. Likewise, no substantial proofs were credibly
service was justified. Should the returns not show compliance
shown to support Abante's allegation that the sheriff insisted
with the Rules on substituted service, actual and correct
on having the court processes received and that she was
service may still be proven by evidence extraneous to it. If
"intimidated by the presence of a court personnel who was
substituted service is indeed improper, the trial court must
quite earnest in accomplishing his task."35redarclaw
issue new summons and serve it in accordance with
the Rules.
It is well to note that the certificate of service of the process
server is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out therein.
In the present case, while no actual hearing was conducted to
This is fortified by the presumption of the regularity of
verify the validity of the grounds for substituted service of
performance of official duty. To overcome the presumption of
summons, the parties exchanged pleadings in support of their
regularity of official functions in favor of such sheriffs return,
respective positions.
the evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Sans
According to respondent's version, copies of the complaint,
the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the
summons and writ of attachment, among others, were served
presumption stands deserving of faith and credit. 36redarclaw
to petitioner corporation at its offices in Candelaria, Quezon

and RCBC Plaza. In the Quezon office, the sheriff was
informed that the individual petitioners were all not around to
receive the summons for the corporation considering that
they do not hold office at said address. Likewise, a staff from
the RCBC Plaza office stated that all them were not around
and were probably at home. Thereafter, summons was served
on the individual petitioners at their respective addresses in
Makati City, Quezon City, and Candelaria, Quezon. Their
house helpers told that they were not at home but were in
the RCBC Plaza office. Considering that the sheriff already
went there and its personnel said that they were not at said
office, it became apparent on the sheriff that the individual
petitioners were trying to evade service of summons. Thus,
given this predicament, it was futile for him to go back to the
RCBC Plaza office.
It is argued that the summons was properly served to the
individual petitioners through substituted service because
there were justifiable causes existing which prevented
personal service within a reasonable period of time.
Respondent asserts that requiring the sheriff to return several
times at the residences of the ten (10) individual petitioners
despite their intention to evade service of summons and the
considerable distances of their residences would clearly be
unreasonable.
Respondent's explanations do not suffice.
In the instant case, it appears that the sheriff hastily and
capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons
without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate the
individual petitioners. The "reasonable time" within which to
personally serve the summons - 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-
30 days for the sheriff as stated in Manotoc - has not yet
elapsed at the time the substituted service was opted to.
Remarkably, based on the Sheriffs Report and the narration of
petitioners, the personal service of summons upon the
corporation and the individual petitioners as well as the levy
of their personal and real properties were all done in just one
day. Manotoc stresses that for substituted service of
summons to be available, there must be several attempts by
the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure in order
to prove impossibility of prompt service. To reiterate, "several
attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferrably on at
least two different dates.
Further, except for the Quezon Province, there is, in fact, no
considerable distance between the residences of the
individual petitioners since the cities of Makati and Quezon
are part of the National Capital Region; hence, accessible
either by private or public modes of transportation. Assuming
that there is, the distance would not have been
insurmountable had respondent took its time and not
unnecessarily rushed to accomplish personal service in just a
single day.
Finally, respondent alleges that the summons was served to the
individual petitioners through substituted service by entrusting the
same to their house helpers, all of whom are of suitable age and
discretion. It did not, however, elaborate that these persons know
how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the
summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and
complaint to the individual petitioners at the earliest possible time for
them to take appropriate action. There is no way for Us to
conclusively ascertain that the sheriff ensured, among others, that
the persons found in the alleged dwelling or residence comprehend
the significance of the receipt of the summons and the duty to
immediately deliver it to the individual petitioners or at least notify
them of said receipt of summons.
The foregoing considered, it can be deduced that since there were no
actual efforts exerted and no positive steps undertaken to earnestly
locate the individual petitioners, there is no basis to convincingly say
that they evaded the personal service of summons and merely gave
the sheriff a run-around, thus, justifying substituted service upon
them.
Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the
individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The
second sentence of Section 20,50 Rule 14 of the Rules that "[t]he
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
21
voluntary appearance" clearly refers to affirmative defenses, not
affirmative reliefs.51redarcla
Guy v. Gacott, 2016
Gacott secured a favorable judgment against QSC in a complaint for
damages before RTC Puerto Princesa. During execution, he learned
that QSC was not a corporation but a general partnership with Mr. Guy
as a partner and its general manager. The sheriff then attached Guy's
vehicle by virtue of a Notice of Attachment/Levy upon Personalty.
The SC held that a partner must be separately and distinctly
impleaded before he can be bound by a judgment. It is non sequitur
that a suit against a partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each
and every partner. A partnership has a separate legal personality
from the partners. Art. 1816, NCC states that the partners' obligation
with respect to partnership liabilities is subsidiary in nature. They
shall only be liable with their property after the partnership assets
have been exhausted.
Since Guy was not the judgment debtor in the case before the RTC,
his levied vehicle was released. [Guy v. Gacott, 2016
The service of summons wasflawed; voluntary appearance cured the
defect
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam - the power of
the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a
particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the
action - is an element of due process that is essential in all actions,
civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in
rem.23 Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the
mere filing of the complaint in court. As the initiating party, the
plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by his
voluntary appearance in the action.24
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, the service of summons may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer,
or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements
that such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the
persons authorized to receive summons for juridical
entities.25cralawred
The records of this case reveal that QSC was never shown to have
been served with the summons through any of the enumerated
authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house
counsel. Service of summons upon persons other than those
officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial
compliance is not sufficient service of summons. The CA was
obviously mistaken when it opined that it was immaterial whether the
summons to QSC was served on the theory that it was a corporation. 27
Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest
the court jurisdiction over the defendant, the same is merely
procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the service of
summons may be cured by the defendant's subsequent voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing a responsive
pleading such as an answer. In this case, it is not disputed that QSC
filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus, jurisdiction
over its person was acquired through voluntary appearance.
A partner must be separately and distinctly impleaded before he can
be bound by a judgment
The next question posed is whether the trial court's jurisdiction over
QSC extended to the person of Guy insofar as holding him solidarity
liable with the partnership. After a thorough study of the relevant laws
and jurisprudence, the Court answers in the negative.
Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual
agency, whereby any partner can generally represent the partnership
in its business affairs, it is non sequitur that a suit against the
partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and every partner. It
must be remembered that a partnership is a juridical entity that has a
distinct and separate personality from the persons composing it. 28
In relation to the rules of civil procedure, it is elementary that a
judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties
and their successors-in-interest after the commencement of the
action in court.29 A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action
or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded
therein, for no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a
civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party. 30 The principle
that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action
or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. 31
In Muoz v. Yabut, Jr.,32 the Court declared that a person not
impleaded and given the opportunity to take part in the proceedings
was not bound by the decision declaring as null and void the title from

which his title to the property had been derived. The effect of a
judgment could not be extended to non-parties by simply issuing an
alias writ of execution against them, for no man should be prejudiced
by any proceeding to which he was a stranger.
In Aguila v. Court of Appeals33 the complainant had a cause of action
against the partnership. Nevertheless, it was the partners themselves
that were impleaded in the complaint. The Court dismissed the
complaint and held that it was the partnership, not its partners,
officers or agents, which should be impleaded for a cause of action
against the partnership itself. The Court added that the partners could
not be held liable for the obligations of the partnership unless it was
shown that the legal fiction of a different juridical personality was
being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes. 34
Here, Guy was never made a party to the case. He did not have any
participation in the entire proceeding until his vehicle was levied upon
and he suddenly became QSC's "co-defendant debtor" during the
judgment execution stage. It is a basic principle of law that money
judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly
belonging to the judgment debtor.35 Indeed, the power of the court in
executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued
only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in
court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment
debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's
goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. 36
In the spirit of fair play, it is a better rule that a partner must first be
impleaded before he could be prejudiced by the judgment against the
partnership. As will be discussed later, a partner may raise several
defenses during the trial to avoid or mitigate his obligation to the
partnership liability. Necessarily, before he could present evidence
during the trial, he must first be impleaded and informed of the case
against him. It would be the height of injustice to rob an innocent
partner of his hard-earned personal belongings without giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Without any showing that Guy himself acted
maliciously on behalf of the company, causing damage or injury to
the complainant, then he and his personal properties cannot be made
directly and solely accountable for the liability of QSC, the judgment
debtor, because he was not a party to the case.
Further, Article 1821 of the Civil Code does not state that there is
no need to implead a partner in order to be bound by the
partnership liability.
G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015 - SUNRISE
GARDEN CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS AND FIRST ALLIANCE REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that
voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons,
22
the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance."
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy
Hong Pi, et al., this court discussed that voluntary
appearance in court may not always result in submission to
the jurisdiction of a court.
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is
acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court.
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to
declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the
court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the
concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to
have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e.,
set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution. (Citations omitted)
The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency should not be
deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the
purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The
records of this case show that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly
argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.