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xxx Firstly, the provisions of RA #6971 insofar as the coverage is concerned,

Chapter 7 refer to business enterprises including government owned and/or controlled


corporations performing proprietary functions.
Blaquera v. Alcala GR 109406 Section 1a of the Supplemental Rules Implementing RA #6971 classified such
FACTS coverage as:
The petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments All business enterprises, with or without existing duly certified labor
and agencies who were paid incentive benefits pursuant to EO 292 (Admin Code organizations, including government owned and/or controlled corporations
1987) and Omnibus Rules Implementing Book 5 of sa Code. Pres. FVR issued AO performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business or
29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in profit and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired in
the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 pursuance of a policy of the State enunciated in the Constitution, or by law and
of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service.
approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed [a]ll departments, (underscoring supplied)
offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity The PTrA is a GOCC created in pursuance of a policy of the State. Section 9 of
Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof [are Presidential Decree No. 189 states that To implement the policies and program
hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a of the Department (Dept. of Tourism), there is hereby created a Philippine
period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this Tourism Authority, xxx. Likewise, Section 21 of the same decree provides that
Order. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of All officials and employees of the Authority, xxx, shall be subject to Civil
the government concerned, who are the herein respondents, caused the Service Law, rules and regulations, and the coverage of the Wage and Position
deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to Classification Office.
cover the alleged overpayments. To prevent the respondents from making Furthermore, although Supplemental Rules and Regulations implementing R.A.
further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come #6971 was issued only on December 27, 1991, the law itself is clear that it
before this Court to seek relief. pertains to private business enterprises whose employees are covered by the
In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a common Labor Code of the Philippines, as mentioned in the following provisions:
issue with the other consolidated cases. The petitioner, Association of Section 5. Labor Management Committee. xxx that at the request of any party
Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (ADEPT), is an to the negotiation, the National Wages and Productivity Commission of the
association of employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) who were Department of Labor and Employment shall provide the necessary studies, xxx.
granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant toRepublic Section 8. Notification. - A business enterprise which adopts a productivity
Act No. 6971 (RA 6971), otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of incentive program shall submit copies of the same to the National Wages and
1990. Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the Productivity Commission and to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for their
ground that it was prohibited under Administrative Order No. 29 dated January information and record.
19, 1993. The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought on appeal Section 9. Disputes and Grievances. - Whenever disputes, grievances, or other
to the Commission on Audit (COA) which denied the appeal in its Decision [7]of matters arise from the interpretation or implementation of the productivity
March 6, 1995, ratiocinating, thus: incentive program, xxx may seek the assistance of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment for such purpose. Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
xxx subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
Therefore, considering the foregoing, the PTrA is within the exclusion provision the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It has been held that "[t]he
of the Implementing Rules of RA #6971 and so, it (PTrA) does not fall within its President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify
coverage as being entitled to the productivity incentive bonus under RA #6971. any action, or decision, of his subordinate in the executive departments,
Secondly, Administrative Order No. 29 which is the basis for the grant of the bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise this power motu proprio without
productivity incentive bonus/benefits for CY 1992 also expressly provides need of any appeal from any party."
prohibiting payments of similar benefits in future years unless duly authorized When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
by the President. enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without
Thirdly, the disallowance of the Auditor, PTrA has already been resolved when prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the
this Commission circularized thru COA Memorandum #92-758 dated April 3, prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over
1992 the Supplemental to Rules Implementing RA 6971 otherwise known as the executive departments.
Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. xxx Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the
Lastly, considering the title of RA #6971, i.e. An Act to encourage productivity Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO 29
and maintain industrial peace by providing incentives to both labor and capital, and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive
and its implementing rules and regulations prepared by the Department of Labor benefits. The same merely regulated the grant and amount thereof.
and Employment and the Department of Finance, this Office concludes that said Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of
law/regulation pertains to agencies in the private sector whose employees are government are basically executive functions, 34 not the Commission's. Implicit
covered by the Labor Code. is this recognition in EO 292, which states:
With the denial of its appeal, petitioner found its way here via the petition in Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. There
G.R. No. 119597, to seek relief from the aforesaid decision of COA. shall be established a government-wide employee suggestions and incentive
awards system which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and
ISSUE standards as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
WON AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential In accordance with rules, regulations and standards promulgeted by the
control over the executive departments Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is
authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary
HELD recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of
executive departments government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or
The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to their official
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully execute. (Section 17, Article employment. (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V) (emphasis ours)
VII, 1987 Constitution)
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's
recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant
the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such function cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego. proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
Audit, Commission on Elections, and Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
fiscal autonomy, are not covered by the amount fixed by the President. court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive
it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed
and imposed by any other person.
Soliven v. Makasiar 167 scra 393
FACTS
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was Forbes v Chouco Tiaco 16 Phil 534
charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a FACTS
complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot This is an original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition
file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He against the Hon. A. S.Crossfield, as one of the judges of the Court of First
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. Instance of the city of Manila, to prohibit him from taking or continuing
However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be jurisdiction in a certain case commenced and PENDING before him in which
placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to Chuoco Tiaco(respondent herein) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron Forbes, J. E.
be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may Harding, and C. R. Trowbridge (P) are defendants. The Plaintiffs are W. Cameron
not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and CHIEF OF POLICE
for contempt. J. E. Harding and CHIEF OF THE SECRET SERVICE of the city of Manila C. R.
Trowbridge. Defendant A. S. Crossfield is one of the judges of the Court of
ISSUE First Instance of the city of Manila. Defendant Chuoco Tiaco is a foreigner of
WON the such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the Chinese nationality and a resident of the Philippine Islands for the last 35 years
president. having a family in the country and some properties. Chuoco Tiaco filed a case for
DAMAGES (monetary) alleging that defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff
HELD to China and forcibly prevented his return for some months in violation of the
NO. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to remain in the Philippine Islands as
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free established bylaw. Crossfield issued an INHIBITION against Forbes et al from
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of spelling or deporting or threatening to expel order or deport Chuoco Tiaco.
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition against the judge
time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the
public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese
government in the Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not
War. The complaints were demurred to, but the Supreme Court overruled the be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such
demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed. The official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had,
judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of error, was made a particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
respondent, and the cases are here because the plaintiffs have been deprived of analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter
liberty without due process of law. is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that
he cannot be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether he had
ISSUE the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal
WON Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action. liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he
is without authority, provided he used discretion and judgment, that is, the
HELD judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority.
judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he If he decides wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his
may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and restrained. Such authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position,
a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is
law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In
wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, such a case, he acts, not as Governor-General, but as a private individual, and, as
either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable such, must answer for the consequences of his act.
under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it
means, simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and the
members of the legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for Chavez v. Sandiganbayan 193 scra 282
the consequences of an executed in the performance of his official duties. The FACTS
judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it The Republic of the Phil., through PCGG with the assistance of the Solicitor
and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General General Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint against
illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. and respondent Juan Ponce Enrile for reconveyance,
been deprived of his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. After the denial of his
every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory
property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.
The thing which the judiciary can not do is to mulct the Governor-General The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the
personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, counterclaim which Enrile opposed. The respondent Sandiganbayan issued a
any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine resolution: 1) the MTD is deferred until after trial; 2) re: the the additional
Assembly. Public policy forbids it. parties (eg Chavez), propriety of impleading them either under Sec. 14, Rule 6 or
even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires leave of Court to auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly
determine the propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought. Consideration and severally in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200
thereof cannot be entertained at this time nor may therefore, the Motion to employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions
Dismiss the same be considered. Respondent Enrile requested leave from the because of their party affiliations.
Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as defendants Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section
for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him which was granted. 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere
Respondent Sandiganbayan denied MR. Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being
their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided automatically dropped.
in Section 4 of EO 1. The petitioner comes to this Court assailing the In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea (159 SCRA
resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of 556 [1988]) then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the
jurisdiction. immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1
as follows: With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice
ISSUE Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish to point out two things: First, the
WON impleading the petitioner as additional party defendant in the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the
counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033 is proper; YES! Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the
WON he is immune? NO!! Commissions members immunity from suit thus: No civil action shall lie against
the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the
HELD discharge of the task contemplated by this order. No absolute immunity like
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is
for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the
where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the
We ruled in one case: A number of cases decided by the Court where the plundered wealth and the States exercise of police power was immunity from
municipal mayor alone was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members
dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in
applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals for instance, the the official discharge of the functions of their office. x x x (at pp. 581-582)
municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case: It may be further
had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 was
mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of intended merely to restate the general principle of the law of public officers
Civil Service to reinstate. In Nemenzo v. Sabillano, the municipal mayor was held that the PCGG or any member thereof may not be held civilly liable for acts done
personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary in the performance of official duty, provided that such member had acted in
civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and good faith and within the scope of his lawful authority. It may also be assumed
without any administrative investigation. In Rama v. Court of Appeals, the that the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction to determine whether the PCGG
governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial or any particular official thereof may be held liable in damages to a private
person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem constitutionally offensive confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to
to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to mention "Auring" who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office
testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the
complying with orders of this Court. head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware of this malpractice?
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited
nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. from appropriating confiscated items for their own consumption or use. Two
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad locked containers are installed at the Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated
faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, maliciously conspir(es) with items and the OPM evidence custodian controls access to these containers.
the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at their worksite
evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latters constitutional rights and due to heavy workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards
liberties (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages procedure or actions may be made directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal
may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a for immediate and necessary action. Specific dates and time along with details
license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by of suspected violations would be most appreciated. Telephone 4-3430/4-3234
Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken for further information or to report noted or suspected irregularities. Exhibits
against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of E & E-1.
respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right.
The respondent was the only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal and
the was proven that it was the same person in the feature when the petitioner
Wylte and Williams (P) v. Rarang and IAC (R) 209 scra 357 wrote a letter of apology. The respondent commenced an action for damages in
FACTS the CFI against Wylie, Williams and US Naval Base alleging that the article
Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to
Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred,
Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee contempt and ridicule and that the libel was published and circulated in the
in the office of the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard. English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel.
Wylie supervised the publicaction of "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was The defendants filed a motion to dismiss anchored on three grounds:
published daily by the US Naval Base station and featured important 1. Defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the
announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to performance of their official functions as officers of the United States Navy
military personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line and are, therefore, immune from suit;
inquiry." 2. The United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US
POD published, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" the following: government which cannot be sued without its consent; and
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/inspectress are 3. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the
(sic) consuming for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base parties in this case.
Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated by consuming such
The motion was denied and the defendants alleged the lack of jurisdiction of the publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for
court. The trial court ruled that the acts of the Wylie and Williams were not everything which goes wrong on the base. This may be true as a general rule. In
official acts of the US government in the operation and control of the Base but this particular case, however, the records show that the offensive publication
personal and tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule that a was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. The factual
sovereign country cannot be sued in the court of another country without its findings of the two courts below are based on the records. The petitioners have
consent. In short, the trial court ruled that the acts and omissions of the two shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the trial
US officials were not imputable against the US government but were done in the court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and
individual and personal capacities of the said officials. The trial court dismissed why their decisions should be reversed.
the suit against the US Naval Base. "Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by
The petitioners reiterated that they are immune from suit since the subject law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or
publication was made in their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy. negligent."
The respondent appealed the trial court's decision. The IAC modified the TCs Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered
decision ordering to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation . In effect, the
P175,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P60,000.00 as exemplary offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party
damages. The appelate court denied an MR by the petitioners. Hence, the moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or
petition. exemplary damages.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is
ISSUE a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent.
WON the petitioners are immune from suit? NO Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal
explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were
HELD Petition DISMISSED! published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their
The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring". Such
a certain "Auring" as ". . a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a
Provost Marshal." The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.
and appropriating for herself confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs.
There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the Article was the private
respondent as she was the only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal. Rama v CA 148 scra 496
Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent was investigated by FACTS
her supervisor. Before the article came out, the private respondent had been During the incumbency of Rene Espina as provincial governor of Cebu, Osmundo
the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance G. Rama as vice-governor and Pablo P. Garcia, Reynaldo M. Mendiola and Valerians
of her duties. S. Carillo as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, said officials adopted
It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the Resolution No. 990 which appropriated funds "for the maintenance and repair of
naval base is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive
provincial roads and bridges and for the operation and maintenance of the office dismissed employees and thereafter, Espina, Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo filed
of the provincial engineer and for other purposes." their own petition for review.
In said resolution, the provincial government of Cebu declared its policy "to
mechanize the maintenance and repair of all roads and bridges of the province ISSUE
(including provincial roads and bridges receiving national aid "JJ"), to economize WON Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo are personally liable for
in the expenditure of its Road and Bridge Fund for the maintenance and repair damages for adopting a resolution which abolished positions to the detriment of
of provincial roads and bridges receiving national aid "JJ" and to adopt a more the occupants
comprehensive, systematic, efficient, progressive and orderly operation and
maintenance of the Office of the Provincial Engineer." HELD: CA decision affirmed!
For implementation, the provincial board resolved to abolish around 30 positions A public officer by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages
the salaries of which were paid from the "JJ" Road and Bridge Fund thus doing in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith.
away with the caminero (pick-shovel-wheelbarrow) system Consequently around We hold that the petitioners in the instant three cases are personally liable for
200 employees of the province were eased out of their respective jobs and, to damages because of their precipitate dismissal of provincial employees through
implement the mechanization program in the maintenance of roads and bridges, an ostensibly legal means. The Court of Appeals, whose factual findings are
the provincial government purchased heavy equipment worth P4M. However, binding on this Court, found that the provincial employees concerned were
contrary to the declared policy the administration hired 1k new employees, "eased out because of their party affiliation." i.e., they belonged to the Liberal
renovated the provincial engineers office and provided him a Mercedez Benz Party whose presidential candidate then was Sergio Osmea, Jr. Such act of the
car. The employees whose positions were abolished filed separate petitions for petitioners reflected their malicious intent to do away with the followers of the
mandamus, damages and attorneys fees aimed at the annulment of Resolution rival political party so as to accommodate their own proteges who, it turned out,
No. 990, their reinstatement and the recovery of damages. Rama et al were even outnumbered the dismissed employees.
sued "both in their official and personal" capacities as a result of their alleged Indeed, municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously or
"unjust, oppressive, illegal and malicious' acts. The CFI declared the subject wantonly, and if the work which they perform is done rather to injure an
resolution void and ordered the respondent officials to re-create the positions individual than to discharge a public duty. As we have held in Vda. de Laig vs.
abolished, to provide funds therefore, to reinstate the 56 petitioners headed by Court of Appeals, a public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe honesty
Jose Abala, and to pay them back salaries. All the parties appealed to the CA and good faith in the performance of their duties as public officers or for
but it affirmed the LCs decision with the modification that respondents were wilfully or negligently causing damage to another (CC 20) or for wilfully causing
ordered to pay jointly and severally in their "individual and personal capacity" loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
P1,000.00 moral damages to each of the petitioners considering that the case and/or public policy (CC 21).
involved a quasi-delict. For their part, the dismissed employees are entitled to damages because they
Rama appealed to the Court, the province of Cebu and its Sangguniang have suffered a special and peculiar injury from the wrongful act of which they
Panlalawigan filed their petition for review questioning the decision of the complain. It is an undeniable fact that the dismissed employees who were holding
appellate court ordering for the reinstatement with back salaries of the such positions as foremen, watchmen and drivers, suffered the uncertainties of
the unemployed when they were plucked out of their positions. That not all of
them testified as to the extent of damages they sustained on account of their unclassified civil service, should be approved by the provincial board pursuant to
separation from their government jobs, cannot be used as a defense by the Sec. 2081 of the Administration Code, otherwise, their salaries would not be
petitioners. Suffice it to state that considering the positions they were holding, allowed. The provincial treasurer then indorsed the provincial auditor's advice to
the dismissed employees concerned belong to a lowsalaried group, who, if the governor and sent a letter to the provincial board requesting "approval or
deprived of wages would generally incur considerable economic hardships. disapproval" of the appointments of the forty-eight laborers. The minutes of
Justice demands that they be recompensed for the predicament they were the provincial board reveals that the provincial vice-governor and the two
placed in, apart from the back salaries which they are entitled to as a matter of present board members expressed the opinion that they were for the approval
right. We are inclined to agree that the amount of P1,000.00 damages granted of the appointments while the governor stated that he wanted to "abstain". The
to each of them by the Court of Appeals was fixed by that court judiciously and governor received a communication from the CSC advising him that all
is a reasonable sum (CC 2216). appointments in the unclassified or non-competitive positions in the provincial
Petitioner Rama's protestations that when he eventually became the governor of service must be approved by the provincial board to be valid. The action was
Cebu, he reinstated most of the dismissed employees through provincial board delayed because the governor was concerned with the coming local elections.
Resolution No. 392 cannot erase the fact that he had a hand in the adoption of After the elections, the governor decided to submit the appointments of the 48
Resolution No. 990. His subsequent benevolent act cannot sufficiently make up laborers. Some were approved and some were not including the petitioners.
for the damage suffered by the dismissed employees during their period of Thus, the petitioners sought the governors reconsideration of the resolution
unemployment. but was denied. Alinsugay et al filed a petition for mandamus and damages
against the governor, the vice-governor, the members of the provincial board,
Apropos the practice of victorious politicians to remove government employees the provincial treasurer and the provincial auditor praying for the continuance
who did not support them in their campaign for office, this Court has said: of their employment and approve funds for their salaries. The CFI dismissed
'There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein local elective the petition ruling that the provincial board must approve of their appointment
officials, upon assumption to office, wield their new-found power to be valid, that the approval of the provincial budget and plantilla by the
indiscriminately by replacing employees with their own proteges regardless of provincial board did not mean the approval of the appointments, that the
the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls should appointments were not completed through their attestation by the Civil Service
not be taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts." Commission, that the provincial board's disapproval of their appointments was
lawful, and that mere acquisition of a civil service eligibility by the petitioners
did not make their status permanent.
Alinsugay v CA 148 scra 521 Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the LCs decision. They filed for
FACTS an MR but was denied. Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for review on
Petitioners Eliseo Alinsugay, Purita Villaflor, Paz Gandiongco and Celso Remo certiorari.
were appointed laborers in various offices of the provincial government of Cebu.
Gov. Espina signed their appointments and were submitted to the CSC office for ISSUE
attestation. The Cebu provincial auditor advised their treasurer that said
appointments of the petitioners and 44 others whose positions belonged to the
WON petitioners could still be dismissed as laborers notwithstanding the
approval of their appointments by the Civil Service Commission and their having
collected salaries under audited payrolls

HELD
Notwithstanding that resolution, on July 24, 1981, a decision was promulgated in
G.R. No. L-47472 (105 SCRA 758). In said case and in affirming the Court of
Appeals' decision, this Court ruled that "it matters not that the appointments
of the petitioners had been attested by the Commissioner of Civil Service and
that they had served for several years because the appointments having been
made without the approval of the Provincial Board of Cebu, they were not valid
appointments" .
There is no compelling reason to depart from that ruling most especially because
the aforecited case and this case arose from the same factual milieu. We should
also add that the private respondents, who, as members of the Cebu provincial
board, disapproved the petitioners' appointments, may not be held liable for
such act. As correctly observed by the lower court, by force of logic, the power
and authority conferred by law on a body to approve appointments, carries with
it the corresponding power to disapprove. In the absence of proof of malice on
the part of private respondents, they cannot be held liable for their official act.
laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing
thereunder.
The COMELEC including petitioner Ortiz adopted Resolution No. 86-2364
approving the application for retirement of Commissioners Victorino Savellano
and Jaime Opinion. Seven days later, the same body passed Resolution No.
862370 approving the application for retirement of Commissioner Mangontawar
B. Guro.
The Deputy Exec. Secretary requested Acting Chairman Felipe to convey the
information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the
President had accepted their resignations. The new COMELEC was composed of
Chapter 8 Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. as Chairman and Commissioners Froilan M. Bacungan,
A. Expiration of Term or Tenure Leopoldo L. Africa, Haydee B. Yorac, Andres R. Flores, Dario C, Rama and
Ortiz v COMELEC 162 scra 812 Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., as members. It was to this body that Commissioners
Agpalo, Ortiz and Marquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective
FACTS applications for retirement. They were followed by Commissioner Layosa on
Petitioner Ortiz was appointed Commissioner of COMELEC by Pres. Marcos "for August 1, 1986.
a term expiring May 17, 1992 and took his oath of office on July 30, 1985. On 5 All 7 former COMELEC Commissioners invoked RA 1568 Sec. 1 to justify their
Mar 1986, the petitioner sent Pres. Corazon Aquino a letter stating that the petitions for retirement which provided:
commissioners were appointed to the COMELEC on 30 Jul 1985 and since at that SECTION 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the
time they have a revolutionary government, they are placing their position at her Commission on Elections retires from the service for having completed his term
disposal. The Freedom Constitution was promulgated through Proclamation No. 3 of office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, or
Article 3 which provides for the ff: dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be
to measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year
corruption. of service based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of
SEC. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 retirement incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be: Provided, That
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of the government; And provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable
their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of
1986. monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or
SEC. 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of resignation.
the reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the The COMELEC revoked the 2 resolutions and denied the applications for
retirement of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and Layosa on the ground
that they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. Verily, a courtesy resignation cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in
1568. Petitioner Ortiz moved for reconsideration alleging that he did not resign the legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public officials
but put his position at the disposal of the President, that he completed his intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the
tenure as Commissioner and invoked Proclamation No. 3. The MR was denied by will of the political authority and the appointing power.
COMELEC and the petitioner appealed to Chairman of COA. COA referred the The curtailment of his term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the
same to the COMELEC. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. part of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to
have completed his term albeit much ahead of the date stated in his
ISSUE appointment paper. Petitioners case should be placed in the same category as
WON a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was accepted by the that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends
President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution upon his superiors loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service
may be entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568 entails no removal but an expiration of his term.
As he is deemed to have completed his term of office, petitioner should be
HELD considered retired from the service. And, in the absence of proof that he has
YES. Petitioners separation from government service as a result of the been found guilty of malfeasance or misfeasance in office or that there is a
reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be pending administrative case against him, petitioner is entitled to a life pension
considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is under Republic Act No. 1568 as amended and re-enacted by Republic Act No.
defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his 6118. He is, therefore, protected by the mantle of the Freedom Constitution
office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and specifically Article III, Section 3 thereof which was in effect when he was
operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear replaced by the appointment and qualification of a new Commissioner.
intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of Parenthetically, to a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form
relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some of deferred compensation for services performed and his right thereto
form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an
the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority. enforcible obligation in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioners resignation lacks the element to be paid. Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are
of clear intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in public
from his statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing
position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state therein them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to
that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that render faithful and efficient service while so employed.
said letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino
issued on February 25, 1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to Worth noting is the fact that, as originally enacted, Republic Act No. 1568
tender their courtesy resignation as a first step to restore confidence in required not less than twenty years of service in the government at the time of
public administration. the retirement, death or resignation of the Auditor General or the Chairman and
any Member of the COMELEC. The same length of service was required after
Republic Act No. 3473 amended the law. However, Republic Act No. 3595 Court Justice multiplied by 24 months as provided in Section 1, par. (c) of said
further amended Republic Act No. 1568 and the 20-year service requirement Republic Act No. 1616 which reads as follows:
was mandated only in case of resignation of the public official covered by the "(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has
law. Although Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, was inoperative and abolished rendered at least twenty years of service. The benefit shall, in addition to the
in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 4968, it was re-enacted under Republic Act No. return of the personal contributions plus interest, be only a gratuity equivalent
6118. to one month salary for every year of service, based on the highest rate
received, not to exceed twenty-four months. This gratuity is payable by the
Dispositive: employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the
The respondent Commission on Elections denial of petitioner's application for necessary appropriation or pay the same from savings in its appropriations."
retirement benefits is hereby reversed and set aside. The Commission on Audit
and other public offices concerned are directed to facilitate the processing and ISSUE
payment of petitioner's retirement benefits. WON Judge Britanico is entitled to retirement benefits upon termination of his
services

HELD
Republic Act No. 910, Sec. 3 provides:
In Re: Retirement of Justice Britanico 173 scra 421 Section 3. Upon retirement, a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
FACTS Appeals, or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court,
Justice Ramon B. Britanico wrote a letter to this Court requesting that he be Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, city or
granted retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 910, in addition to, or in lieu municipal court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically
of, the benefits he received under Republic Act 1616 upon the termination of his entitled to a lump sum of five years' gratuity computed on the basis of the
service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by Pres. highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation,
Corazon Aquino. Justice Britanico tendered his courtesy resignation pursuant to living and representation allowances he was receiving on the date of his
Proclamation No. 1 requiring "all appointive public officials to submit their retirement; and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of this period of
courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." five years, to a further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his
Justice Ramon B. Britanico served the Government in different capacities for natural life equivalent to the amount of the monthly salary he was receiving on
36.23 years, of which 10 years, 2 months, and 27 days were served in the the date of his retirement. Provided, however, that if the reason for the
Judiciary. retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in
Justice Britanico was 59 years, 8 months and 19 days old when he was "forcibly" office and prior to the date of retirement he shall receive only a gratuity
retired on July 31, 1986 or 3 months and 11 days short of 60 years. The GSIS equivalent to ten years' salary and allowances aforementioned with no further
approved his retirement under Republic Act No. 1616 which enabled him to annuity payable monthly during the rest of the retiree's natural life.
receive a retirement pay equivalent to his highest monthly salary as an Appellate
Section 3 provides that in addition to the lump sum of 5 years gratuity, the the duties of his office, the only requirement being that he should have
retiree, upon having survived 5 years after his retirement, shall be entitled "to a rendered "at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of
full annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the government, or in both." Neither is it mandated that the last five (5)
the amount of the monthly gratuity he was receiving on the date of his years of his service should have been rendered continuously in the judiciary.
retirement." However, if a justice or judge retires due to a permanent disability That requirement applies only to justices and judges in the third group - the
contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement, voluntary retirees who opt for retirement at age 60. Justice Britanico fills the
he shall receive a lump sum of 10 years gratuity with no further annuity payable bill for the second group (the resignees) in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 910.
monthly during the rest of his natural life. He had rendered more than 36 years of service in the Government, of which
Inasmuch as Justice Britanico rendered 36.23 years of service in the more than 10 years were served in the Judiciary. His "incapacity to further
Government, more than ten (10) years of which were served in the judiciary, he discharge the duties of his office" resulted from his forced resignation
is entitled to retire under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 910. He comes under pursuant to Proclamation No. 1 of the President. His long record of service is
the second category of justices or judges who, after having rendered at least unstained by scandal.
20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in Retirement laws should be liberally construed and applied in favor of the
both, have to "resign by reason of their incapacity to discharge the duties persons intended to be benefitted thereby, for, as We again held in the Ortiz
of their office." In the case of Justice Britanico, he was forced to resign when case: x x x. To a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of
his courtesy resignation was required by President Corazon C. Aquino under her deferred compensation for services performed and his right thereto commences
Proclamation No. 1 directing all appointive officials to hand in their courtesy to vest upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforcible
resignations. The acceptance of his courtesy resignation by President Aquino on obligation in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid.
July 31, 1986 resulted in his "incapacity to discharge the duties of his office," Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts
which otherwise he could have continued to discharge until he reaches the of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in public employment.
mandatory retirement age of 70 years. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to
As this Court held in Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, et al., a courtesy induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render
resignation cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense faithful and efficient service while so employed.
for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public officials intention to surrender
his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political Dispositive:
authority and the appointing power. The application of Justice Ramon B. Britanico for retirement benefits under
Neither is a "courtesy resignation" similar to a voluntary retirement under the Republic Act No. 910 is approved. GSIS is ordered to process his application and
third classification in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 910 of justices or judges the payment of his retirement benefits under that law, deducting the benefits
who voluntarily retire at age 60 after rendering "at least 20 years service in the he had earlier received under Republic Act No. 1616.
government, the last 5 years of which were continuously rendered in the
judiciary."
There is no age requirement for a justice or judge (in the second group in Lecaroz (P) v Sandiganbayan (R) GR 130872 Mar 25 1999
Section 1 of RA No. 910) who "resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge
FACTS accepted indicia, for they were the very same acts alleged in the informations as
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, constituting the crime of estafa through falsification. They cannot qualify as
Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent.
chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz,
and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the ISSUE
Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang WON Lenlie Lecaroz who was the incumbent KB representative could not hold
Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red over after his term expired because pertinent laws do not provide for holdover.
was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz HELD
informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until NO. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the
the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally office has a fixed term and incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is
received his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall
still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been
Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become
for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and
the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his
received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by
with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the law. In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian
Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case
the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory
through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his
information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of
Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making
respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted body favors the same. Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and
Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to
reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court. create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or
The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted both petitioners of all administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or
the thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded
The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is
Mayor certified the payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son and specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a
as a consequence thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions.
The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Sec. 3, upon retirement the retiree shall receive a 5 year lump sum and upon
Assemblywoman Reyes in 1985 Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB survival of the 5 year period, the retiree shall receive a monthly pension during
upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It should be noted however the rest of his natural life. Under RA 5095, which amended RA 910, the amount
that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically of the monthly pension was fixed at the value of the monthly salary of the
Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not retiree. RA 910 was amended by PD 1438 but its 2 versions were published in
authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA No. 6733 the Official Gazette bearing the same number and same date.
on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a newspaper of general Comparing the two versions (OG 30 & 41), it will be noted that the version of
circulation that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first Presidential Decree No. 1438 appearing in the earlier publication of the Official
time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this Gazette (74 O.G. No. 30) is silent as to the components of the monthly pension
circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the payable starting with the sixth year of retirement. Based on the copy of PD
Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and 1438 as published in OG 30 and in the aforesaid publication of Vital Documents
amounted to no oath at all. To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying on the Declaration of Martial Law, since 1978 the Government Service Insurance
requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the System (GSIS) had always computed the first five-year lump sum retirement as
office. Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that follows: (1) highest salary, plus (2) highest representation and transportation
his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he allowances (RATA) and longevity pay at the rate of five percent (5%) additional
has none at all. And for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is for every five (5) years of continuous service as a judge or justice. After the
the rightful occupant. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never five-year lump sum period, that is, on the sixth year of retirement, the GSIS
qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to computed the monthly pension for the rest of the retiree's natural life as
the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure follows: (1) highest salary, plus (2) highest RATA, plus (3) longevity pay. The
officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the longevity pay, granted by Section 42, BP Blg. 129, is considered part of the
emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an salary.
intruder and liable for encroachment of public office. The present question arose when the Commission on Audit (COA) issued a
memorandum, addressed to VP. Lourdes Patag of GSIS, informing her that
B. Reaching the age limit pursuant to PD 1438 amending Sec. 3 of RA 910, after the expiration of the
In re: Amount of Monthly Pension of Judges 190 scra 315 initial 5 year period of retirement, at the beginning of the sixth year of
retirement, the monthly pension of judges and justices shall consist only of the
FACTS monthly salary which the retiree was receiving on the date of his retirement. In
The matter of the financial components of the monthly pension to be paid other words, the representation and transportation allowances shall not form
retired judges and justices was brought before the Court by the Office of the part of the monthly pension of a retiree. Obviously, the COA was relying on the
Court Administrator in a memorandum filed by Court Administrator Meynardo A. version of Presidential Decree No. 1438 as published in 74 O.G. No. 41.
Tiro. Court Administrator Tiro recommends that the GSIS be allowed to continue
RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justices) granted a monthly paying the monthly pension consisting of the highest salary, highest longevity
pension for life to a judge or justice qualified to retire from the service. Under pay, and highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA) which had
always been the bases and components of the pension payments it had been retirement the monthly pension to be paid to the retiree shall consist of the
making since 1978 when the amendatory decree took effect. He invokes the highest salary, the highest longevity pay, and the highest representation and
liberal interpretation of the law adopted by the court. transportation allowances (RATA) the retiree was receiving on the date of
retirement.
ISSUE
WON the representation and transportation allowances shall not form part of
the monthly pension of a retiree? NO Profeta v Drilon 216 scra 777
FACTS
HELD Petitioner Dr. Lydia Profeta served as Exec. Dean of Rizal Technological Colleges
We find it more logical, just and equitable, under the circumstances, to hold from 24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30 April
that the monthly pension for retired judges and justices starting on the 1979, petitioner was the appointed Acting President of said College until her
sixth year of their retirement should include the highest monthly aggregate promotion to President of the same college on 1 May 1979. After the EDSA
of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was revolution or on 5 Mar 1986, the petitioner filed her courtesy resignation as
receiving on the date of his retirement. This is definitely more in keeping with President of the Rizal Technologies Colleges, she also applied for sick leave and
and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that, being her courtesy resignation was accepted on 21 Mar 1986. Profeta was appointed
remedial in character, retirement laws should be liberally construed and Acting President of Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as Technology (hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and was thereafter appointed
to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its its President on 29 March 1989. After reaching 65 years of age, the petitioner
humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men inquired from the GSIS as to whether she may be allowed to extend her
and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-
therefrom with relative security, not only for those who have retained their five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits
vigor but, more so, for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. under PD 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). GSIS
The present computation heretofore adopted by the GSIS and followed for advised her to return to the service until she shall have fulfilled the fifteen (15)
around twelve (12) years now, without any objection or reprobation by the then years service requirement pursuant of Sec. 11 of PD 1146 to qualify for the old-
lawmaking authority and any other functionary or entity, is correct and age pension retirement plan. As things stood, she could only claim one hundred
consonant with the avowed policy of the law on retirement, especially when it is percent (100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year of
considered that a pension is a form of deferred compensation for services creditable service or to a refund of her premium contributions with the GSIS.
performed. As recommended by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
Secretary and the Board of Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino extended
Dispositive: the term of petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall have completed
The GSIS is hereby directed to continue implementing Republic Act No. 910, as the required 15 years of service after reaching the age of 65 years on the date
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1438, in the same manner and on the same of her normal retirement. EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an
bases of computation as it has done since 1978, so that on the sixth year of administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of the President
(OP) for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and corrupt practices. 1. WON petitioner Profeta is compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991
In a memorandum, the OP furnished Profeta a copy of the complaint with a 2. WON GSIS has no jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory retirement
directive to file an answer thereto with the DECS Secretary, who was duly from the government service.
authorized to conduct a formal investigation of the charges against petitioner.
Pending investigation of the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive HELD
suspension for a period of 90 days. After serving the period of suspension, 1. To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of
petitioner re-assumed her duties and functions as President of EARIST. In a deferred compensation for services performed and his right to it commences
letter, DECS Secretary Cario recommended the compulsory retirement of to vest upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforceable
petitioner. obligation in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid.
An Ad-Hoc Committee was created by President Aquino for investigation Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts
purposes. The parties filed their respective pleadings and hearings in the case of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or
were conducted by the committee. Pending the resolution of the administrative employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing
charges, the petitioner was detailed with the DECS Central Office pursuant to a them is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public employment
memorandum signed by Deputy Executive Secretary Sarmiento III. Petitioner and render faithful and efficient service while so employed. Retirement laws are
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the RTC seeking liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide
her reinstatement as EARIST President. After trial, said petition was for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari. stamina to continue earning his livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve
Petitioner assailed her reassignment with DECS Central office before the CSC the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and
but the latter denied the complaint. Profeta filed an MR but was denied which well-being of government employees maybe enhanced.
prompted her to file a petition for certiorari before this Court but the latter In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory retirement
dismissed it. The OP dismissed the administrative complaint against petitioner age of sixty-five (65) years, she had rendered less than the required fifteen
for lack of substantial evidence rendering Profeta as compulsory retired from (15) years of service under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Thus, to enable her to avail
government service. Profeta requested via letter GSIS to determine the exact of the old-age pension benefit, she was allowed to continue in the service and
date of her retirement which the latter advised that it fell on 14 Aug 1992. her term as President of EARIST was extended until she shall have completed
Profeta filed a MR with the OP assailing the said decision and stated that said the 15 years service requirement, or for an additional 2 years, 7 months, and 12
office has no jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory retirement from the days, as determined by the Office of the President.
government service. However, the OP denied the MR and it clarified that there This period of extended service granted to petitioner was amended by the
was an over extension of petitioner's period of service with the government by Office of the President. In resolving the administrative complaint against
failure to reckon with the 62 working days during which petitioner went on sick petitioner, the Office of the President, ruled not only on the issues of alleged
leave (from 20 March to 17 June 1986) and the period of 2weeks during which irregular appointment of petitioner and of graft and corrupt practices, but went
petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. Hence, the petition. further by, in effect, reducing the period of extension of service granted to
petitioner on the ground that the latter had already completed the 15 years
ISSUE
service requirement under P.D. 1146, and declared petitioner as compulsorily petitioner should have been allowed to continue in the service to be able to
retired as of 15 October 1991. complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement; she was prepared to
In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until January 1992. render services for said period but was not allowed to do so; she should,
However, the Office of the President made a new computation of petitioner's therefore, the entitled to all her salaries, benefits and other emoluments during
period of service with the government, the Office of the President included as said period (16 October 1991 - 30 April 1992). However, petitioner's claim for
part of her service the 62 days sick leave applied for by petitioner covering the reinstatement to her former position to enable her to complete the fifteen (15)
period between 20 March to 17 June 1988 and her service as a lecturer of year service requirement for retirement purposes is no longer possible,
approximately 2 weeks, or a total of 3 1/2 months. As a result of this new considering that she is deemed to have completed the said service requirement
computation, petitioner's extension of service which was supposed to end in as of 30 April 1992.
January 1992 was reduced by the Office of the President by 3 1/2 months or
until 15 October 1991.
2. We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to GSIS v CSC 245 scra 179
determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension FACTS
benefit under P.D. 1146,based on its computation of a members years of service In our decision dated October 28, 1994 we held that government service
with the government. The computation of a members service includes not only rendered on a per diem basis is not creditable in computing the length of service
full time but also part time and other services with compensation as may be for retirement purposes. Thus, we reversed the questioned resolutions and
included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System. The sixty- orders of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) requiring the Government Service
two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17 June 1986 Insurance System (GSIS) to consider creditable the services of private
and her part-time service as a lecturer f approximately two (2) weeks, or a total respondents on a per diem basis.
of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months is not reflected in her service record. Said However, private respondent Matilde S. Belo in G.R. No 102449 filed a motion
period should be considered as part of her service with the government and it is for reconsideration insisting that the services rendered by her as Vice Governor
only but proper that her service record be amended to reflect said period of of Capiz, between December 31, 1975 to January 1, 1979, be considered as
service. creditable for purposes of retirement. The GSIS filed an MR in behalf of the
We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date respondents Belo and Dr. Baradero on the same grounds.
of retirement failed to take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months
service of petitioner which was not reflected in her service record. If we Issue
deduct this unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner WON regular service in government on a per diem basis, without any other form
from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30 April 1992. of compensation or emolument, is compensation within the contemplation of the
term "service with compensation" under the Government Service Insurance Act
The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as compulsorily of 1987.
retired as of 15 October 1991 defeats the purpose for allowing petitioner to
remain in the service until she has completed the fifteen (15) years service Held
requirement. Between the period of 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992,
Since it is generally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the diems for every regular or special session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
discharge of an office is not a salary of office, it follows that if the attended.
remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his duties 2. The CSC noted that: "[F]ormer Vice Governor Belo was on a full time
does not constitute a mere allowance for expenses but appears to be his basis when she served . . . on a hold-over capacity. . . As such provincial official
actual base pay, then no amount of categorizing the salary as a per diem she is (sic) legally and factually on call by the provincial people and the province
would take the allowances received by petitioner from the term service with more than eight hours a day, or at any time of the day beyond the prescribed
compensation for the purpose of computing the number of years of service working hours.
in government. Furthermore, it would grossly violate the laws intent to reward 3. She received no other forms of remuneration during the disputed
the public servants years of dedicated service to government for us to gloss period.
over the circumstances surrounding the payment of the said remunerations to The same could be said of the services rendered by respondent Baradero, who,
the petitioner in taking a purely mechanical approach to the problem by before and after the period in question had an unblemished record of service to
accepting an attached label at face value. the government as a member of the army and as a medical officer of the
In the sense in which the phrase per diem is used under the Government Philippine Medicare Commission. The disputed period was served on a full-time
Service Insurance Law, a per diem is a daily allowance given for each day an basis regardless of the denomination given to the compensation received by him.
officer or employee of government is away from his home base. This is its
traditional meaning; its usual signification is as a reimbursement for extra What ought to be controlling in the cases at bench therefore, should be the
expenses incurred by the public official in the performance of his duties. Under nature of the remuneration rather than the label attached to it. While there is
this definition the per diem is intended to cover the cost of lodging and no dispute that the law excepting per diems from the definition of compensation
subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside of is clear and requires no interpretation, however, since the term per diem may be
their permanent station. construed either as compensation or as allowance , it would be necessary for us
On the other hand, a per diem could rightfully be considered a compensation or to inquire whether the term per diem in the GSIS Law refers to one or the
remuneration attached to an office. Under the circumstances obtaining in the other signification.
case of respondent Belo the per diems received by her during the period that As explained above, it is plainly obvious that per diem as compensation, is not
she acted in holdover capacity obviously were in the nature of compensation or what the law contemplates. The clear intent of the Government Insurance Law
remuneration for her services as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz, rather was to exclude those extra incidental expenses or incurred on a daily basis
than as a reimbursement for incidental expenses incurred while away from her covered by the traditional definition of the term per diem. An important fact
home base. In connection with this, it is important to lay stress to the following missed from our earlier decision was that, while respondent Belo was paid on a
facts: per diem basis during her first holdover period as Vice Governor she was
1. Petitioner rendered service to the government continuously from subsequently paid a fixed salary, which apparently rectified an otherwise
January 25, 1972 to February 1, 1988 as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz. anomalous situation. The services rendered by respondent Belo having been
During a portion of the holdover-period, i.e., from December 31, 1976 to continuous, the disputed period should be credited for purposes of retirement.
January 11 1979, payment for her services to the government was through per Retirement benefits given to government employees in effect reward them
for giving the best years of their lives to the service of their country. This
is especially true with those in government service occupying positions of GSIS to consider creditable the services of private respondents on a per diem
leadership or positions requiring management skills because the years they basis AFFIRMED.
devote to government service could be spent more profitably in lucrative
appointments in the private sector. In exchange for their selfless dedication to
government service, they enjoy security of tenure and are ensured of a Conte v COA 264 scra 19
reasonable amount of support after they leave the government. The basis for
the provision of retirement benefits is, therefore, service to government. While FACTS
a government insurance system rationalizes the management of funds necessary Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of
to keep this system of retirement support afloat and is partly dependent on the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government service. They
contributions made by the thousands of members of the system, the fact that availed of compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660 and SSS
these contributions are minimal when compared to the amount of retirement financial assistance benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56 SSS
benefits actually received shows that such contributions, while necessary, are Resolution No. 56,[3] approved on January 21, 1971, provides financial incentive
not absolutely determinative in drawing up criteria for those who would qualify and inducement to SSS employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement
as recipients of the retirement benefit system. It cannot be convincingly benefits under RA 660 as amended, rather than the retirement benefits under
asserted that petitioners could not avail themselves of the benefits of the RA 1616 as amended, by giving them financial assistance equivalent in amount to
policy because no deductions were made from their salaries during the disputed the difference between what a retiree would have received under RA 1616, less
periods when they were paid on a per diem basis. what he was entitled to under RA 660. The said SSS Resolution No. 56 states: 1)
The situation as far as private respondents and the GSIS are concerned could SSS employees who are qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or for
be rectified by deducting a reasonable amount corresponding to the optional retirement at a lower age are entitled to either the life annuity under
contributions which should have been deducted during the period from the R.A. 660; 2) a retirement benefit to be effective must be a periodic income as
amount of retirement benefits accruing to them. It would be grossly inequitable close as possible to the monthly income that would have been due to the retiree
as it would violate the spirit of the government retirement and insurance laws during the remaining years of his life were he still employed; 3) life annuity
to permanently penalize both respondents Belo and Baradero by ignoring the being closer to the monthly income that was lost on account of old age than the
fact of actual period of service to government with compensation, and deny gratuity under R.A. 1616, as amended, would best serve the interest of the
them the retirement privileges that they, for their unselfish service to the retiree; 4) it is the policy of the Social Security Commission to promote and to
government justly deserve. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case at protect the interest of all SSS employees, with a view to providing for their
bench, the demand for equity prompts us to regard spirit not letter, and intent, well-being during both their working and retirement years; 5) the availment of
not form, in according substantial justice to both respondents, where the law, life annuities built up by premiums paid on behalf of SSS employees during their
through its inflexible rules might prove inadequate. working years would mean more savings to the SSS; 6) NOW, THEREFORE, BE
IT RESOLVED, That all the SSS employees who are simultaneously qualified for
Dispositive compulsory retirement at age 65 or for optional retirement at a lower age be
The instant motion is hereby GRANTED, our decision dated October 28, 1994 encouraged to avail for themselves the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended;
RECONSIDERED and the questioned resolutions and orders of the CSC requiring
RESOLVED, FURTHER, That SSS employees who availed themselves of the said The law referred to above is RA 4968 (The Teves Retirement Law), which took
life annuity, in appreciation and recognition of their long and faithful service, be effect June 17, 1967 and amended CA 186 (otherwise known as the Government
granted financial assistance equivalent to the gratuity plus return of Service Insurance Act, or the GSIS Charter), making Sec. 28 (b) of the latter
contributions under R.A. 1616, as amended, less the five year guaranteed annuity act read as follows:
under R.A. 660, as amended; (b) Hereafter, no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall
RESOLVED, FINALLY, That the Administrator be authorized to act on all be created by employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans
applications for retirement submitted by SSS employees and subject to heretofore in force in any government office, agency or instrumentality or
availability of funds, pay the corresponding benefits in addition to the money corporation owned or controlled by the government, are hereby declared
value of all accumulated leaves. inoperative or abolished; Provided, That the rights of those who are already
The respondent COA issued a ruling disallowing in audit all such claims for eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected.
financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56, for the reason that: -- The petitioners filed a letter-appeal protest with the respondent COA seeking
x x x the scheme of financial assistance authorized by the SSS is similar to reconsideration of its rulling disallowing claims for financial assistance under
those separate retirement plan or incentive/separation pay plans adopted by Res. 56. The petitioner Conte sought payment from SSS but was denied and
other government corporate agencies whichresults in the increase of benefits assured him that should the COA change its position, the SSS will resume the
beyond what is allowed under existing retirement laws. In this regard, attention grant of benefits under said Res. 56. Respondent COA rendered the decision
x x x is invited to the view expressed by the Secretary of Budget and denying the MR. Thus this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Management dated February 17, 1988 to the COA General Counsel against the Court.
proliferation of retirement plans which, in COA Decision No. 591 dated August
31, 1988, was concurred in by this Commission. x x x. Issue
Accordingly, all such claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56 1. WON public respondent abuse its discretion when it disallowed in audit
dated January 21, 1971 should be disallowed in audit . petitioners claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56
SSS Administrator Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. wrote a letter to Exec. Sec. Macaraig, Jr. 2. WON SSS Resolution No. 56 then within the ambit of and thus proscribed by
seeking presidential authority for SSS to continue implementing its Resolution Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968?
No. 56 granting financial assistance to its qualified retiring employees. But the
latter replied advising Administrator Cuisia that the OP is not inclined to Held
favorably act on the herein request, let alone overrule the disallowance by COA 1. Petitioners contentions are not supported by law. We hold that Res. 56
of such claims, because, aside from the fact that decisions, order or actions of constitutes a supplementary retirement plan. Res. 56 package is labelled
the COA in the exercise of its audit functions are appealable to the Supreme financial assistance does not change its essential nature. Retirement benefits
Court pursuant to Sec. 50 of PD 1445, the benefits under said Res. 56, though are, after all, a form of reward for an employees loyalty and service to the
referred to as financial assistance, constituted additional retirement benefits, employer, and are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of
and the scheme partook of the nature of a supplementary pension/retirement his life, lessening the burden of worrying about his financial support or upkeep.
plan proscribed by law. On the other hand, a pension partakes of the nature of retained wages of the
retiree for a dual purpose: to entice competent people to enter the government
service, and to permit them to retire from the service with relative security, interpret in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any
not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed resolution
been incapacitated by illness or accident. constrains us to rule against petitioners.
2. We answer in the affirmative. Said Sec. 28(b) as amended by RA 4968 in no We must admit we sympathize with petitioners in their financial predicament as
uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement planother a result of their misplaced decision to avail of retirement benefits under RA
than the GSISfor government officers and employees, in order to prevent the 660, with the false expectation that financial assistance under the disputed
undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56 Res. 56 will also materialize. Nevertheless, this Court has always held that
contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no equity, which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, is applied
effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of
every other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary procedure. In this case, equity cannot be applied to give validity and effect to
retirement benefit plan under the guise of such financial assistance. Res. 56, which directly contravenes the clear mandate of the provisions of RA
We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and the 4968.
positive results it must have had, not only in reducing costs and expenses on the Likewise, we cannot but be aware that the clear imbalance between the benefits
part of the SSS in connection with the pay-out of retirement benefits and available under RA 660 and those under RA 1616 has created an unfair situation
gratuities, but also in improving the quality of life for scores of retirees. But it for it has shifted the burden of paying such benefits from the GSIS (the main
is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain and insurance carrier of government employees) to the SSS. Without the corrective
implement such retirement plan, particularly in the face of the statutory effects of Res. 56, all retiring SSS employees without exception will be impelled
prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws to avail of benefits under RA 1616. The cumulative effect of such availments on
or worse, render them nugatory. the financial standing and stability of the SSS is better left to actuarians. But
It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative the solution or remedy for such situation can be provided only by Congress.
order, the former must prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to and be Judicial hands cannot, on the pretext of showing concern for the welfare of
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or government employees, bestow equity contrary to the clear provisions of law.
regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative body It is clear to our mind that petitioners applied for benefits under RA 660 only
is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the because of the incentives offered by Res. 56, and that absent such incentives,
authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its they would have without fail availed of RA 1616 instead. We likewise have no
power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions doubt that petitioners are simply innocent bystanders in this whole bureaucratic
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a rule-making/financial scheme-making drama, and that therefore, to the extent
body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It possible, petitioners ought not be penalized or made to suffer as a result of the
may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of subsequently determined invalidity of Res. 56, the promulgation and
the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or implementation of which they had nothing to do with.
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a And here is where equity may properly be invoked: since SSS employees who are
statute. Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or for optional retirement at a
interpreted in favor of the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to lower age are entitled to either the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, or
the gratuity under R.A. 1616, as amended, it appears that petitioners, being Petitioner Ortiz was appointed Commissioner of COMELEC by Pres. Marcos "for
qualified to avail of benefits under RA 660, may also readily qualify under RA a term expiring May 17, 1992 and took his oath of office on July 30, 1985. On 5
1616. It would therefore not be misplaced to enjoin the SSS to render all Mar 1986, the petitioner sent Pres. Corazon Aquino a letter stating that the
possible assistance to petitioners for the prompt processing and approval of commissioners were appointed to the COMELEC on 30 Jul 1985 and since at that
their applications under RA 1616, and in the meantime, unless barred by existing time they have a revolutionary government, they are placing their position at her
regulations, to advance to petitioners the difference between the amounts due disposal. The Freedom Constitution was promulgated through Proclamation No. 3
under RA 1616, and the amounts they already obtained, if any, under RA 660. Article 3 which provides for the ff:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given
Dispositive to measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and
The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, there having been no corruption.
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission. The assailed SEC. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Decision of public respondent is AFFIRMED, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
hereby declared ILLEGAL, VOID AND OF NO EFFECT. The SSS is hereby executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of
urged to assist petitioners and facilitate their applications under RA 1616, and their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25,
to advance to them, unless barred by existing regulations, the corresponding 1986.
amounts representing the difference between the two benefits programs. SEC. 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of
the reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the
laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing
thereunder.
The COMELEC including petitioner Ortiz adopted Resolution No. 86-2364
approving the application for retirement of Commissioners Victorino Savellano
and Jaime Opinion. Seven days later, the same body passed Resolution No.
862370 approving the application for retirement of Commissioner Mangontawar
B. Guro.
The Deputy Exec. Secretary requested Acting Chairman Felipe to convey the
information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the
President had accepted their resignations. The new COMELEC was composed of
Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. as Chairman and Commissioners Froilan M. Bacungan,
C. Resignation Leopoldo L. Africa, Haydee B. Yorac, Andres R. Flores, Dario C, Rama and
Ortiz v COMELEC 162 scra 812 Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., as members. It was to this body that Commissioners
Agpalo, Ortiz and Marquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective
FACTS applications for retirement. They were followed by Commissioner Layosa on
August 1, 1986.
All 7 former COMELEC Commissioners invoked RA 1568 Sec. 1 to justify their defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his
petitions for retirement which provided: office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and
SECTION 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear
Commission on Elections retires from the service for having completed his term intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
of office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, or relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some
dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish
years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year From the foregoing it is evident that petitioners resignation lacks the element
of service based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of of clear intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention
retirement incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be: Provided, That from his statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his
in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state therein
the government; And provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that
monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of said letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino
monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or issued on February 25, 1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to
resignation. tender their courtesy resignation as a first step to restore confidence in
The COMELEC revoked the 2 resolutions and denied the applications for public administration.
retirement of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and Layosa on the ground Verily, a courtesy resignation cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in
that they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. the legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public officials
1568. Petitioner Ortiz moved for reconsideration alleging that he did not resign intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the
but put his position at the disposal of the President, that he completed his will of the political authority and the appointing power.
tenure as Commissioner and invoked Proclamation No. 3. The MR was denied by The curtailment of his term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the
COMELEC and the petitioner appealed to Chairman of COA. COA referred the part of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to
same to the COMELEC. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. have completed his term albeit much ahead of the date stated in his
appointment paper. Petitioners case should be placed in the same category as
ISSUE that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends
WON a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was accepted by the upon his superiors loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service
President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution entails no removal but an expiration of his term.
may be entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568 As he is deemed to have completed his term of office, petitioner should be
considered retired from the service. And, in the absence of proof that he has
HELD been found guilty of malfeasance or misfeasance in office or that there is a
YES. Petitioners separation from government service as a result of the pending administrative case against him, petitioner is entitled to a life pension
reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be under Republic Act No. 1568 as amended and re-enacted by Republic Act No.
considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is 6118. He is, therefore, protected by the mantle of the Freedom Constitution
specifically Article III, Section 3 thereof which was in effect when he was FACTS
replaced by the appointment and qualification of a new Commissioner. The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and
Parenthetically, to a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form subsequent to the event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph
of deferred compensation for services performed and his right thereto E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as president and vice-
commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration began when
enforcible obligation in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his expos that
to be paid. Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of
valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in public money. After this expose, a lot of different groups and many personalities had
employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic
them is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of
render faithful and efficient service while so employed. Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon Aquino
who asked petitioner to make the supreme self-sacrifice. Respondent also
Worth noting is the fact that, as originally enacted, Republic Act No. 1568 resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services and
required not less than twenty years of service in the government at the time of also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic advisers of the
the retirement, death or resignation of the Auditor General or the Chairman and petitioner resigned and then Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47
any Member of the COMELEC. The same length of service was required after representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.
Republic Act No. 3473 amended the law. However, Republic Act No. 3595 By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had
further amended Republic Act No. 1568 and the 20-year service requirement transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the
was mandated only in case of resignation of the public official covered by the 21 senators took oath as judges to the impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario
law. Although Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, was inoperative and abolished Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one for the ages. It was a
in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 4968, it was re-enacted under Republic Act No. battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by the
6118. vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop
allegedly containing evidence showing that the petitioner had a secret bank
Dispositive: account under the name Jose Velarde containing P3.3 billion. The not opening
The respondent Commission on Elections denial of petitioner's application for of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people going to the streets and the public
retirement benefits is hereby reversed and set aside. The Commission on Audit prosecutors withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff
and other public offices concerned are directed to facilitate the processing and Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and declared on behalf of your Armed
payment of petitioner's retirement benefits. Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce
that we are withdrawing our support to this government. PNP Chief, Director
General Panfilo Lacson together with some Cabinet members made the same
announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for
Estrada (P) v Arroyo 353 scra 452 the peaceful transition of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as
the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the full
Malacanang. He issued the following Press Statement: support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her
20 January 2001 Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines. It also
STATEMENT FROM approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in
other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the the attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution.
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice
be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil president. On February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed
society. the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same day, the Senate passed
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the has been terminated. Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for as follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October
the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754
future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November
MABUHAY! 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds
letter: and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de
Sir: Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers 1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice- and corruption.
President shall be the Acting President. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said resolution confirmed the authority given by members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty.
the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking that happened on January Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an
20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the new president of the Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of
his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E.
aforementioned complaints against him. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.
with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman ISSUE
from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, WON the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as
1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of
his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if the Republic
legally warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No.
146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to HELD
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral.
Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon within a non- resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the Court In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of
filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15. January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and
resolution and press statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold
20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the that petitioner resigned as President.
Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution; In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President
comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
still pending decision by the Court, and was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving
respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude
the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution,
in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive retirement to avoid prosecution.
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20,
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos.
farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases
have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the
The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting
even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act
oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the
value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not
sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a
press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press sitting President.
release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative
reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We
circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable.
the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already
prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of
it commands scant legal significance. Petitioners resignation from the the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will, prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the
especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment
Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti- Sangguniang bayan of San Andres v. CA 284 scra 276
Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, FACTS
no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his Respondent Augusto Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay,
constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if he really Catanduanes and was later elected president of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC). In that capacity and pursuant to the Local Government Code of mandatory injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC. The TC
1983, he was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of rendered its decision holding that Augusto T. Antonios resignation from the
the Municipality of San Andres. DILG Sec. Santos declared the election for the Sangguniang Bayan was ineffective and inoperative, since there was no
president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of acceptance thereof by the proper authorities. The petitioners appealed to the
the same province, in which private respondent was a voting member, void for CA which affirmed the TCs decision and modified it. The CA held that the
want of a quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial council became respondents resignation was not accepted by the proper authority, who is the
necessary. DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary President of the Philippines. Moreover, granting that there was complete and
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes which effective resignation, private respondent was still the president of the ABC and,
prompted the latter to resign as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He as such, he was qualified to sit in the Sangguniang Bayan in an ex officio capacity
tendered his resignation to Mayor Lydia Romano with cc to the governor, DILG by virtue of Section 494 of R.A. 7160 and Memorandum Circular No. 92-38. In
and municipal treasurer. Pursuant to Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government view, the May 1994 elections in which a new set of barangay officials was
Code (B.P. Blg. 337), Nenito F. Aquino, then vice-president of the ABC, was elected, Antonios reassumption of office as barangay representative to the
subsequently appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sangguniang Sangguniang Bayan was no longer legally feasible and that he did not abandoned
Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on July 18, 1990 his office. Hence, the present recourse.
after taking his oath. The ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the
election of the FABC president was reversed by the SC. In the same case, the ISSUE
appointment of Private Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to the WON there is a complete and effective resignation?
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void, because he did not possess the
basic qualification that he should be president of the federation of barangay HELD
councils. Said ruling became final and executory. The respondent wrote to the NO. In Ortiz vs. COMELEC, we defined resignation as the act of giving up or
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres advising them of his re- the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further
assumption of his original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or
representative. The Sanggunian acted by the issuance of Resolution No. 6 implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and
declaring Antonio had no legal basis to resume office so the respondent sought the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete
from DILG a definite ruling to his right to resume his office. DILG stated that and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to
he became an ex-officio member in the Sanggunian and his position has not been relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance
vacated as he did not resign nor abandon his office. Incumbent ABC presidents by the proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the
are mandated by the Rules and Regulations Implementing the 1991 Local Revised Penal Code. The records are bereft of any evidence that private
Government Code to continue to act as president of the association and to serve respondents resignation was accepted by the proper authority. From the time
as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan. Despite this clarification, the that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned as a member
local legislative body issued another resolution reiterating its previous stand and of Sangguniang Bayan, the governing law was B.P. 337 or the Local Government
refused to acknowledge the right to resume office of the respondent. The Code of 1983. While said law was silent as to who specifically should accept the
respondent filed a a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary resignation of an appointive member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sec. 6 of Rule
XIX of its implementing rules states that the [r]esignation of sanggunian FACTS
members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned, and a copy of the Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995,
action taken shall be furnished the official responsible for appointing a winning over former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term,
replacement and the Ministry of Local Government. The position shall be deemed petitioner's office as Mayor was put to serious question when 1,057 Punong
vacated only upon acceptance of the resignation. Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan
It is not disputed that private respondents resignation letter was addressed chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall
only to the municipal mayor of San Andres, Catanduanes. It is indicated thereon Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted
that copies were furnished the provincial governor, the municipal treasurer and for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96,
the DILG. Neither the mayor nor the officers who had been furnished copies of expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of
said letter expressly acted on it. On hindsight, and assuming arguendo that the recall proceedings against him. PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the
aforecited Sec. 6 of Rule XIX is valid and applicable, the mayor should have COMELEC for appropriate action. Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with the
referred or endorsed the latter to the Sangguniang Bayan for proper action. In respondent Commission alleging that the recall process was deficient in form and
any event, there is no evidence that the resignation was accepted by any substance, and therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition
government functionary or office. devoid of merit and declared the recall proceedings to be in order. Mayor
Parenthetically, Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337 states: Malonzo filed a Petition for Certiorari With Prayer For Temporary Restraining
Sec. 146. Composition. - (1) The sangguniang bayan shall be the legislative body Order and Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the
of the municipality and shall be composed of the municipal mayor, who shall be COMELEC's resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
the presiding officer, the vice-mayor, who shall be the presiding officer pro Malonzo challenged the recall proceedings, essentially claiming that the notices
tempore, eight members elected at large, and the members appointed by the for the meeting of the PRA were not properly served. Moreover, he argued that
President consisting of the president of the katipunang bayan and the president it was the Liga ng mga Barangay and not the PRA which initiated the recall,
of the kabataang barangay municipal federation. x x x. contrary to the requirements under the Local Government Code. He also claimed
that the proceeding followed for adopting the recall resolution was defective
Under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory and therefore void.
provisions as to whom they should be submitted, should be tendered to the
appointing person or body. Private respondent, therefore, should have ISSUE
submitted his letter of resignation to the President or to his alter ego, the Whether or not the recall proceeding was valid
DILG secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the latter a copy of his
letter, there is no showing that it was duly received, much less, that it was acted HELD
upon. The third requisite being absent, there was therefore no valid and Yes. The recall process was valid. The notices were propery served to the
complete resignation. members of the PRA. Moreover, it was the PRA which initiated the recall and not
the Liga ng mga Barangay. The resolution was properly adopted in a meeting
conducted by the PRA.
Malonzo v COMELEC 269 scra 380
The COMELEC adequately ruled on the issue of the service of notices to the happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the
members of the PRA. In response to petitioner's request for a technical very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on
examination of the recall documents, the COMELEC directed its Election July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor
Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to resolve the matter of notices Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the
sent to the Preparatory Recall Assembly members. The ERSD in turn performed existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members
its task and reported its findings to the COMELEC. convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City
of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall
The ERSD and the COMELEC found that the notices were properly served. proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground.
At the time the PRA was convened, there were 1, 699 barangay officials. 1, 927 Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedings held during the recall
notices were sent. Service was done through personal delivery or by mail. Most assembly should be laid to rest. As the respondent COMELEC pertinently
of these were properly received while there were some who refused to accept observes:
the notice. These were all duly noted. The COMELEC found no irregularities in "The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated
the service of the notices. that there was a session held. Attendees constitute the majority of all
the members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on
Moreover, that Alex David, president of the Liga ng mga Barangay, sent the establish. Rules of procedure, simple they may be were formulated.
notices is of no moment. As a member of the PRA, he could validly exercise the Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was that of
prerogatives attached to his membership. petitioner's recall. The members were given the opportunity to
articulate on their resolve about the matter. More importantly, their
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA sentiments were expressed through their votes signified by their
members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a signatures and thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No proof was
function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious adduced by Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the signatures
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the
factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly resolution. The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding.
supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in Neither did it demand a specific procedure. What is fundamental is
the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. compliance with the provision that there should be a session called for
Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of
since it was convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner all the members of the preparatory recall assembly, in a public place
observes that "respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not an and that the resolution resulting from such assembly be adopted by a
organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented majority of all the PRA members."
in the Liga by the barangay captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local The charges of graft and corruption, violence and irregularities, before and
Government Code. It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the during the session of the preparatory recall assembly are largely
barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga Barangay is uncorroborated, and cannot override the substantiated findings of the
undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so respondent COMELEC.
"In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a Azurin that she would not comply with her new assignment because the Magna
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial Carta for Public School Teachers states that no principal/teacher could be
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable transferred without her consent and that the reasons for her transfer are not
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." plausible. Respondent Navarro appealed to the RD which rendered a decision
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might holding that the transfer was valid and in accord with law as it was done in the
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It means such evidence which exigencies of the service. Navarro appealed to Minister Onofre Corpuz but the
affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably latter denied stating that since it is the prerogative of the superintendent to
inferred. To overturn the presumption of validity of performance of official reassign personnel in his division in the exigencies of the service, and
duty, more than a mere scintilla of proof is needed, otherwise, one disgruntled considering that the appointment of respondent Navarro does not state any
fellow can destroy the foundations laid by the overwhelming majority, and this is specific school, her transfer could be effected without violating the law and rule
not the scenario envisioned by our democratic system of government. on transfer. Navarro refused to comply and filed a petition for Certiorari and
In sum, we are persuaded strongly by the principle that the findings of fact of Prohibition with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against Edna Azurin,
administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are Anastacio Ramonte and Honorable Onofre D. Corpuz before the RTC. Judge
afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing Tensuan issued an Order granting the petition for the issuance of the writ of
that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence preliminary injunction. The petitioner answered stating: 1) Navarro is not
presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction and her action deserved outright
governmental structure, should not be disturbed. dismissal since she failed to exhaust administrative remedies; 2) that her re-
assignment was being made in the exigencies of the service and does not
constitute demotion in rank and salary, hence, not in violation of R.A. 4670,
DECS v CA 183 scra 555 otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers; and 3) that her
FACTS reassignment was in accordance with MEC Circular No. 28, series of 1962,
Respondent Gloria Navarro was appointed Secondary School Principal II without directing transfer or reassignment after service of more than five (5) years in
any reference to a particular school. For some years, he station as high school one station to avoid the teacher's becoming stale or unchallenged and to avoid
principal had been at Carlos Albert High School. Petitioner Edna Azurin over-fraternization with associates which could be detrimental to the service.
(Schools Division Superintendent) effected a reshuffling of all high school The petitioner Gloria filed a MR which was denied. Thereafter, she filed a
principals in Quezon City in the exigencies of the service, as all of the principals petition for certiorari with the IAC which set aside the orders. The petitioner
had been overstaying in one station for more than five (5) years. As a result of moved for dismissal of the complaint due to Navarros petition has been
said reshuffling, respondent Navarro was reassigned from Carlos Albert High rendered moot and academic wherein it was stated that her reassignment is
School to the Manuel Roxas High School without demotion in rank nor diminution valid since she had not been appointed to a specific station and that Navarro's
in salary. Respondent Navarro wrote a letter to petitioner herein Edna B. petition states no cause of action as she failed to appeal her reassignment to
Azurin, requesting for a reconsideration of her transfer or re-assignment and the CSC. An order was rendered dismissing the case. Navarro filed a MR which
citing her achievements as an administrator of Carlos Albert High School as her was denied. On appeal by Navarro, the CA declared the orders as void. Hence,
reason but was denied by the latter. Respondent Navarro gave notice to the the present recourse.
It should be here emphasized that Azurins letter of August 12, 1982, clearly
ISSUE stated that Navarros reassignment is in the exigencies of the service. It was
1. WON the reassignment of Gloria Navarro as principal from Carlos Albert High explicitly mentioned that her reassignment is a recognition of her capabilities as
School to Manuel Roxas High School, both in Quezon City, is valid. YES! administrator in improving the Carlos Albert High School and that she should
2. WON Navarro is not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction and her action look at her new assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger projects
deserved outright dismissal since she failed to exhaust administrative remedies for Manuel Roxas High School. Moreover, her reassignment was the result of a
recognition/reshuffling of all principals in the Quezon City public high schools in
HELD the exigencies of the service pursuant to MEC Circular No. 26 , Series of 1972.
1. Republic Act 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof finds no application in the This circular refers to the policy of the Ministry of Education that principals,
case at bar as this is predicated upon the theory that the teacher district supervisors, academic supervisors, general education supervisors, school
concerned is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. administrative officers and superintendents are to be transferred upon
The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a completion of five (5) years of service in one station. Such policy was based on
specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot the experience that when school officials have stayed long enough in one station,
shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected there is a tendency for them to become stale and unchallenged by new situations
the officer's demand to remain even as public service dictates that a transfer and conditions, and that some administrative problems accumulate for a good
be made in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature number of years.
is expressed in the following statement in Ibanez vs. Commission on Elections: In the case at bar, the reasons given by Azurin in recommending Navarros
That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature reassignment were far from whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Navarro had been
of our Civil Service System, is not open to debate. The mantle of its protection assigned as principal of Carlos Albert High School for more than ten (10) years.
extends not only against removals without cause but also against unconsented She was ripe for reassignment. That she was a model principal was precisely one
transfer which, as repeatedly enunciated, are tantamount to removals which are of the reasons for recommending her for reassignment so that her management
within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee . However, the availability of that and expertise could be availed of in her new assignment. Apart from the
security of tenure necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon the nature of presumption of good faith that Azurin enjoys, We believe that her
the appointment. Such that the rule which proscribes transfers without consent recommendation for Navarros reassignmentfor the latter to share the
as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the benefits of her expertise in her new assignment plus the recognizable fact that
officer involved is appointednot merely assignedto a particular station. a relatively long stay in ones station tends towards over-fraternization with
The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station associates which could be injurious to the servicehas a substantial factual
or school. As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to basis that meets the requirements of the exigencies of the service.
stay permanently at any specific school. When she was assigned to the Carlos With the foregoing, the conclusion is thus inescapable that there can be no
Albert High School, it could not have been with the intention to let her stay in violation of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers in this case.
said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated.
Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the 2. Respondent Navarro has not exhausted administrative remedies as she did not
exigencies of public service require even without her consent. elevate the matter of her transfer to the Civil Service Commission in
accordance with Section 24 (c) PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service shall not result in the dislocation of existing personnel nor in the diminution of
Decree. By not appealing her case to the Civil Service Commission before filing rank and compensation and shall take into account pertinent Civil Service Law
Special Civil Action No. Q-37025, respondent Navarro is indubitably without and rules.
cause of action. The respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction. The Commissioner filed the present petition
Chato v. Natividad GR 113843 June 2, 1995 assailing the order alleging that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction because nowhere in the order was
FACTS it stated that private respondent had a right which was violated as a result of
Pres. FVR issued EO 132 entitled "Approving the Streamlining of the Bureau of the issuance the reassignment of regional revenue officers under of RTAO 80-
Internal Revenue." Commissioner Liwayway Chato issued AO 5-93, "Redefining 93.
the areas of jurisdiction and renumbering of regional district offices. "The
order subdivided the 19 revenue regions provided for under the National ISSUE
Internal Revenue Code into 115 revenue districts and renumbered the resulting WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
revenue district office (RDOs). In addition, it abolished the previous preliminary injunction
classification of RDOs into Class A-1, A, B, C, and D and provided that
henceforth all RDOs shall be treated as the same class. HELD
Petitioner CIR issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 80-93 (RTAO 80- Private respondent has shown no clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of
93), directing 90 revenue district officers to report to new assignments in the preliminary injunction but despite this fact the trial court issued his questioned
redesignated and renumbered revenue district offices nationwide. Among those order enjoining petitioner from transferring private respondent. The plaintiff
affected by the reassignment was private respondent Salvador Nori Blas, who must show that he has a clear legal right; that such right has been violated; and
was ordered to report to Revenue District No. 14 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In that he is entitled to the relief he demands, consisting in restraining the
turn, petitioner Solon B. Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas' former post in commission of the acts complained of.
San Fernando, Pampanga, now known as Revenue District No. 21. Indeed, private respondents transfer is part of a nationwide reshuffle or
The respondent wrote petitioner Commissioner requesting a reconsideration of reassignment of revenue district officers designed to improve revenue
his transfer but was not heeded upon. This he filed with the RTC a complaint for collection. More specifically the objective of the reassignment, as stated in
Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and TRO against the Commissioner and Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-93, is to strengthen the decentralization
petitioner Alcantara. Alleging that the transfer without his consent from the of the Bureaus set-up for the purpose of maximizing tax assessments and
revenue district in San Fernando, which was formerly designated as a Class "A," revenue collections, intensifying enforcement of revenue laws and regulations
to the revenue district in Tuguegarao, which was classified as a Class "C," would and bringing the revenue service closer to the taxpaying public.
cause his "dislocation" and demotion or "a diminution in rank, status, and span of Private respondent failed to show patent illegality in the action of the
duties and responsibilities." He invoked E.O. No. 132, that Commissioner constituting violation of his right to security of tenure. To sustain
2. Redeployment of Personnel. The redeployment of officials and other his contention that his transfer constitutes a demotion simply because the new
personnel on the basis of the streamlining embodied in this Executive Order assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects,
along with the great resources and efforts they entail, to the individual be deprived of their right to due process because the CSC was the complainant,
preferences and opinions of civil service employees. Such contention would the prosecutor and judge at the same time.
negate the principle that a public office is a public trust and that it is not the Director Bella A. Amilhasan issued an order denying the motion and the MR filed
private preserve of any person. In granting an injunction despite the absence was denied. Atty Dulce Cochon of the CSC was directed to conduct the formal
of any legal right to be protected, respondent committed a grave abuse of administrative investigation of petitioners' case which resulted to the decision
its discretion. finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from
Moreover, under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his the government service. Said report was forwarded to the CSC and the latter
transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Respondent judge issued a resolution affirmed it. The petitioners went up to the CA assailing the
should have dismissed the action below for failure of private respondent to CSC resolution but the latter dismissed the petition. The MR filed by them was
exhaust administrative remedies. denied. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Cruz v CSC GR 144464 Nov 27 2001 WON the petitioners right to due process was violated due to CSC has original
FACTS jurisdiction to hear and decide a complaint or charge
The Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) received a letter from
Carmelita Esteban claiming that during the non-professional CSC exams, the HELD: Petition DENIED
Municipal Treasurer falsely pretending to be the examinee Gilda Cruz, a co- Petitioners contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact
employee in the said office, took the examinations for the latter. Esteban that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the
requested the CSC to investigate the matter. Director IV Erlinda Rosas of the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained
CSC issued a memorandum to Director Eliseo Gatchalian of the Management that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases instituted
Information Office of the said Commission requesting the latter to furnish her by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal, including actions of its
with the picture seat plan of the room where Cruz was during the exam, to officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle
ascertain the veracity of the complaint. Gatchalian furnished Rosas with said A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
seat plan in 1989 and also in 1987 and 1988 sub-professional examinations. states:
Rosas wrote a memorandum to the Civil Service Commissioner Thelma Gaminde (11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
declaring that based on the record, she found a prima facie case against Zenaida directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and
Paitim and Gilda G. Cruz. A fact finding investigation was conducted and a actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and
"Formal Charge" for "Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be
the Best Interest of the Service" signed by Bella Amilhasan, Director IV of the liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be
Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 3 was filed against Gilda Cruz and final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the
Zenaida C. Paitim, with the CSC. The petitioners negated the allegations and Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from
declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. They receipt of a copy thereof;
filed a motion to dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will
The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it against the late Governor Arsenio A. Quibranza, thereby causing embarrassment
could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was to the Office of the Provincial Governor.
based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being In the meantime you are hereby suspended from work effective upon receipt
considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court. thereof, until after the termination of the investigation to be conducted in
The facts, therefore, that Paitim's photograph was attached over the name of accordance with law.
Gilda Cruz in the PSP of the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination, shows The respondents were informed in another memorandum that formal charges
that it was Paitim who took the examination. It can not be denied that the had been filed against them but these were separate memorandum issued on the
petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for same date that their services as equipment operators had been terminated.
dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. They Hence, the present petition on certiorari.
submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves.
Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process ISSUE
much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of WON there was no need of a formal investigation and no hindrance to their
the case. We do not find reversible error with the decision of the Court of summary dismissal.
Appeals in upholding the CSC Resolution.
HELD: Petition DISMISSED
The Court had earlier entertained serious misgivings about the constitutionality
Abalos v CSC 196 scra 81 of Section 40 as against strong protests that it was violative of due process in
FACTS so far as it deprived the civil servant of the right to defend himself against the
The CSC affirmed the order of Civil Service Regional Office No. 12 directing ex parte decision to dismiss him. While it is true that this section had been
the reinstatement in the Provincial Engineer's Office of Sergio Villabona and upheld in earlier decisions (albeit not very categorically), there was a growing
Eduardo Yap, Jr. on the ground that they had been illegally dismissed. Petitioner sentiment that the law should be re-examined more closely in deference to the
Francisco A. Abalos is now before us and prays that the resolution be reversed right to a hearing that it was foreclosing. Fortunately, the question has been
because it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. After assuming office as rendered moot and academic by the Congress of the Philippines, which has itself
Provincial Governor of Lanao del Norte, petitioner Abalos filed a complaint for seen fit to remove it from our statute books. The Court is happy to note the
malversation against Quibranza (predecessor) for having used for personal little-known fact that at the instance of Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, a
purposes several bulldozers belonging to the province. Cited as witnesses were recognized constitutionalist with a vigilant regard for due process, and
the operators of the bulldozers, respondents Villabona and Yap, who allegedly Representative Narciso D. Monfort, himself an avowed advocate of fair play,
executed affidavits in support of the complaint but was disowned by them. Section 40 was repealed by Republic Act No. 6654, which was approved on May
As a consequence, identical memoranda were issued by the petitioner to 20, 1988, and published in the Official Gazette on May 30, 1988.
Villabona and Yap on September 24, 1987, reading as follows: Fortunately, the question has been rendered moot and academic by the Congress
You are hereby ordered to explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt of the Philippines, which has itself seen fit to remove it from our statute books.
hereof why no disciplinary action be taken against you for having recanted your The Court is happy to note the little-known fact that at the instance of Senator
Sworn Statement which was made the basis for the filing of a criminal complaint Neptali A. Gonzales, a recognized constitutionalist with a vigilant regard for due
process, and Representative Narciso D. Monfort, himself an avowed advocate of petitioner asserted that an appeal to the CSC was not a plain, speedy and
fair play, Section 40 was repealed by Republic Act No. 6654, which was adequate remedy because: (a) the jurisdiction of Gordon to investigate, suspend
approved on May 20, 1988, and published in the Official Gazette on May 30, or dismiss petitioner relative to the charges against petitioner was squarely
1988. raised in issue; (b) the summary suspension and dismissal of petitioner were
The private respondents were dismissed on October 14, 1987, when Section 40 without just and lawful cause and without proper hearing before an impartial
was still in force. But as already explained, it was not applicable even then in the officer and were based on hearsay evidence and, therefore, patently null and
case at bar. void; (c) the validity or constitutionality of Section 40 of P.D. 807 was
There is no question that the repeal of Section 40 will further bolster the questioned; and (d) the need for relief was urgent. The case was overtaken by
independence and integrity of the Civil Service and protect its members from the Edsa Revolution of February 1986 which saw respondent Mayor ousted from
the arbitrary exercise of authority by officials with less than the proper office following a revamp of the entire government. Atty Teddy Macapagal,
respect for due process of law. Olongapo OIC Mayor vice Gordon, reversed the summary dismissal of petitioner
The right to be heard is one of the brightest hallmarks of the free society. We and ordered him to resume the performance of his duties as Chief of Hospital.
should be proud that in this jurisdiction every person who may be involved in The Court issued a resolution dismissing the petition for being moot and
controversy is entitled to present his side, no less than his adversary, at a academic considering that petitioner had been reinstated to his former position
hearing duly called for that purpose. This right is available to citizen and alien by Macapagal. The petitioner continued performing the functions of the Chief of
alike, from the humblest to the most exalted, and covers with its protection the the hospital. Macapagal was succeeded by Ildefonso Arriola as OIC. He issued
offer of arguments and evidence, from the profound to the absurd, in defense a directive to the petitioner to cease and desist from further executing the
of one's life, liberty and property. That is a right we must all cherish. duties and functions of Chief of Hospital and another physician Dr. Cava was
appointed as the OIC of the hospital. The petitioner sent OIC Mayor Arriola a
letter explaining that he was legally holding the position and he continued to
Rosete v CA GR 107841 Nov 14 1996 perform the functions as Chief of the hospital. The 1st local elections following
FACTS the EDSA Revolution were held and Gordon was re-elected as the Mayor. The
Petitioner Reino Rosete is a medical doctor by profession, with a masters degree respondent Mayor extended an appointment to Dr. Concordia A. Ligad as Chief
in Hospital Administration. He started his career as a Junior Physician then was of Hospital which was approved by the RD of the CSC and so Dr. Ligad
appointed as Chief of Hospital in the Olongapo City General Hospital. The commenced performing the functions and duties of said Office. Gordon issued a
respondent Richard Gordon, the mayor of Olongapo, filed a formal charge memorandum to the city treasurer enforcing and affirming the earlier dismissal
against the petitioner for grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best of petitioner, at the same time instructing the City Treasurer to implement the
interests of service, dishonesty, grave abuse of authority, violation of Anti- same. Petitioners office was padlocked and his things were removed therefrom
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, neglect of duty and gross negligence. Invoking by the Hospital Administrator. Petitioner Rosete instituted another petition for
Sec. 40 of PD No. 807, the Mayor found petitioner guilty as charged and mandamus praying that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued
summarily dismissed him for being notoriously undesirable. Petitioner directing respondents to pay petitioner's salary for February, 1988 and every
questioned his dismissal for being allegedly made without due process. In a month thereafter; and to restore him to his office and residential quarters and
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed directly with the Court, be reinstated as the Chief of the hospital.
The Court referred the petition to Exec. Judge of RTC of Olongapo and the 3. WON petitioner was not actually removed but his tenure expire due to loss of
case was raffled to RTC-73 but the presiding judge voluntarily inhibited herself trust and confidence? NO!
from hearing the case so it was given to respondent Judge Esther Nobles Bans
of RTC-72. Gordon asked for the inhibition of Judge Bans and filed a motion for HELD
dismissal of the petition stating that: (a) petitioner has no cause of action 1. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual,
because his summary dismissal by Gordon on 30 November 1985 was not peaceable, and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. The
appealed to the Civil Service Commission, hence, the same became final and subsequent appointment of Dr. Lingad and later of Dr. Mendoza as Chief of
executory; (b) petitioner had already been replaced by Dr. Concordia Lingad; and Hospital cannot be deemed part of the last actual, peaceable, uncontested
(c) mandamus is not a proper remedy. Both motions were denied by Judge Bans in status which preceded the controversy, because such was neither peaceable nor
an Order dated 9 September 1988. Gordon and the City Treasurer questioned uncontested. While it may be true that at the time petitioner filed his petition
the order of Judge Bans in a petition for certiorari/prohibition with writ of for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on 8
preliminary injunction filed with the CA but the latter dismissed it. Gordon and March 1988, he was not actually holding the position of Chief of Hospital, this
the City Treasurer challenged the CAs decision in a petition for certiorari but was not due to his own voluntary act or to any valid ground, but rather to his
the court denied the petition for lack of substantial evidence. Dr. Lingad forcible and illegal dismissal by respondent Mayor. Before his dismissal on 8
retired and Dr. Arturo Mendoza was appointed in a temporary capacity. Dr. February 1988, he had been actually occupying the contested position, having
Mendoza was subsequently issued a second appointment on 11 September 1989, been reinstated to the said office by OIC Macapagal on 19 March 1986.
which was approved by the Civil Service Commission. Dr. Mendoza then assumed Petitioners dismissal prior to 1988 could not be invoked to justify his second
said position and discharged the corresponding duties of the Office of Chief of dismissal. First, respondent Mayors successor in office after the EDSA
Hospital of the Olongapo City General Hospital. Mendoza thus filed a motion to Revolution, OIC Macapagal, reversed the first dismissal and manifested before
be allowed to intervene in the case. This motion, however, was denied. us that the charges against petitioner were unworthy of credence. On 20
Judge Bans, after hearing, issued the questioned Order in Civil Case, granting March 1986, petitioner resumed all the duties and responsibilities of the said
petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. MR of said order was office, as well as the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. On 18 May 1982,
denied by the RTC. Hence, Mayor Gordon et al filed a petition with the CA for we dismissed the first petition (G.R. No. 73449) for being moot and academic.
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary For all legal intents and purposes therefore, the first summary dismissal had no
injunction and/or temporary restraining order to review, annul, and set aside the legal force and effect: petitioners tenure of office was never interrupted by
RTCs orders. The CA granted the petition and the petitioners MR was denied respondent Mayors first order of dismissal. As we ruled in Taala v. Legaspi:
by the respondent court. Hence, the instant petition. When a government official or employee in the classified civil service had
been illegally suspended or illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had
ISSUE later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left
1. WON the CA erred in ruling that the status quo at the time of the petition for his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue
mandamus was that petitioner was not holding office as chief of the hospital to him by virtue of the office that he held.
2. WON the CA erred in ruling that the petitioner cannot claim a legal right to the This Court arrived at its resolution to dismiss the petition for being moot and
position of the Chief of the hospital academic after considering the pleadings and the annexes together with the
Comment filed by the successor or respondent mayor disagreeing with the acts allowed to raise a new theory this late in the pleadings. In any event, this is
of his predecessor and informing the Court that at his request the petitioner merely an afterthought.
had resumed his duties as Chief of Hospital on 20 March 1986. Hence, it cannot We note that respondent Mayor's claim that petitioner was occupying a
be validly asserted by respondents in their comment that the Court never had primarily confidential position was not actually invoked in the second dismissal of
the opportunity to pass upon the issues of x x x the illegality of the summary 8 February 1988. In his Memorandum dated 8 February 1988 to respondent
dismissal of the petitioner; and x x x did not even address itself to the issues Treasurer, respondent Mayor merely reiterated the first summary dismissal as a
and squarely pass upon the same. The Resolution dated 18 May 1987 did resolve ground for the second termination after he was reinstated on 20 March 1986.
the issues raised in the pleadings, except with respect to the constitutionality It is also significant to note that Sec. 40 of P.D. 807 under which petitioner was
of Section 40 of P.D. 807. Consequently, upon attaining finality on 8 June 1987, summarily dismissed has been repealed by RA No. 6654, approved on 20 May
the resolution became the law of the case and constituted a bar to any 1988 and published in the Official Gazette on 30 May 1988. While we did not
relitigation of the same issues in any other proceeding under the principle of res find it necessary to resolve the constitutional issue raised by the petitioner in
judicata. G.R. No. 73449, We have nonetheless expressed our view and sentiment on the
In fine, our 18 May 1987 Resolution was a final judgment on the merits. same issue in Abalos v. Civil Service Commission, thus: x x x The Court had
Respondents cannot be allowed now to invoke the summary dismissal of earlier entertained serious misgivings about the constitutionality of Section
petitioner on 2 January 1986 as justification for his second dismissal on 8 40 as against strong protests that it was violative of due process in so far
February 1988. as it deprived the civil servant of the right to defend himself against the
2. The records show that petitioner was appointed Chief of Hospital of the ex parte decision to dismiss him. While it is true that this section had been
Olongapo City General Hospital on 1 September 1971. As such, he is entitled to upheld in earlier decisions (albeit not very categorically), there was a growing
the basic constitutional rights to due process of law and security of tenure. sentiment that the law should be reexamined more closely in deference to the
Except for dismissal for just cause and in the manner provided by law, right to a hearing that it was foreclosing. Fortunately, the question has been
therefore, petitioner can neither be removed nor suspended without due process rendered moot and academic by the Congress of the Philippines, which has itself
of law. seen fit to remove it from our statute books. The Court is happy to note the
The law presumes, in protecting such rights, that a person acting in a little-known fact that at the instance of Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, a
public office was regularly appointed or elected to it and that official recognized constitutionalist with a vigilant regard for due process, and
duty has been regularly performed. Moreover, the law specifically requires a Representative Narciso D. Monfort, himself an avowed advocate of fair play,
special civil action of quo warranto in the name of the Republic of the Philippines Section 40 was repealed by Republic Act 6654, which was approved on May 20,
or in the name of the person claiming right or title to a public office or position. 1988 and published in the Official Gazette on May 30, 1988.
This is a recourse which respondents should have taken but failed to do.

3. Nowhere is it alleged in the formal charges submitted by respondent Mayor that D. Abandonment
petitioner's dismissal was due to loss of confidence. Neither was such ground Municipality of San Andres Catanduanes v CA GR 118883 Jan 16 1998
alleged in respondent's comment in G.R. No. 73449. Respondent Mayor cannot be
from DILG a definite ruling to his right to resume his office. DILG stated that
Doctrine: Although a resignation is not complete without an
he became an ex-officio member in the Sanggunian and his position has not been
acceptance thereof by the proper authority, an office may
vacated as he did not resign nor abandon his office. Incumbent ABC presidents
still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment
are mandated by the Rules and Regulations Implementing the 1991 Local
which needs no acceptance.
Government Code to continue to act as president of the association and to serve
as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan. Despite this clarification, the
FACTS local legislative body issued another resolution reiterating its previous stand and
Respondent Augusto Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, refused to acknowledge the right to resume office of the respondent. The
Catanduanes and was later elected president of the Association of Barangay respondent filed a a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
Councils (ABC). In that capacity and pursuant to the Local Government Code of mandatory injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC. The TC
1983, he was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of rendered its decision holding that Augusto T. Antonios resignation from the
the Municipality of San Andres. DILG Sec. Santos declared the election for the Sangguniang Bayan was ineffective and inoperative, since there was no
president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of acceptance thereof by the proper authorities. The petitioners appealed to the
the same province, in which private respondent was a voting member, void for CA which affirmed the TCs decision and modified it. The CA held that the
want of a quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial council became respondents resignation was not accepted by the proper authority, who is the
necessary. DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary President of the Philippines. Moreover, granting that there was complete and
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes which effective resignation, private respondent was still the president of the ABC and,
prompted the latter to resign as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He as such, he was qualified to sit in the Sangguniang Bayan in an ex officio capacity
tendered his resignation to Mayor Lydia Romano with cc to the governor, DILG by virtue of Section 494 of R.A. 7160 and Memorandum Circular No. 92-38. In
and municipal treasurer. Pursuant to Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government view, the May 1994 elections in which a new set of barangay officials was
Code (B.P. Blg. 337), Nenito F. Aquino, then vice-president of the ABC, was elected, Antonios reassumption of office as barangay representative to the
subsequently appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sangguniang Sangguniang Bayan was no longer legally feasible and that he did not abandoned
Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on July 18, 1990 his office. Hence, the present recourse.
after taking his oath. The ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the
election of the FABC president was reversed by the SC. In the same case, the ISSUE
appointment of Private Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to the WON there is abandonment?
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void, because he did not possess the
basic qualification that he should be president of the federation of barangay HELD
councils. Said ruling became final and executory. The respondent wrote to the Even if the resignation is not valid for absence of an acceptance by the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres advising them of his re- proper authority, a public officer may be deemed to have relinquished his
assumption of his original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral office due to his voluntary abandonment of said post. Abandonment of an
representative. The Sanggunian acted by the issuance of Resolution No. 6 office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
declaring Antonio had no legal basis to resume office so the respondent sought holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.
Indeed, abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in servant to resign from his original post. Rather, the law allows him to
general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment concurrently discharge the functions of both offices.
through nonuser. Nonuser refers to a neglect to use a privilege or a right or to Private respondent, however, did not simultaneously discharge the duties and
exercise an easement or an office. obligations of both positions. Neither did he, at that time, express an intention
Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. His overt acts,
intention may be express or inferred from his own conduct. Thus, the failure to silence, inaction and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to his original
perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with the officers actual or position, show that Antonio had abandoned the contested office. His immediate
imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the office. Abandonment of an and natural reaction upon Aquinos appointment should have been to object or,
office is not wholly a matter of intention; it results from a complete failing to do that, to file appropriate legal action or proceeding. But he did
abandonment of duties of such a continuance that the law will infer a neither. It is significant that he expressed his intention to resume office only
relinquishment. Therefore, there are two essential elements of abandonment: on March 31, 1992, after Aquino had been deemed resigned on March 23, 1992,
first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or external act by and months after this Court had nullified his designation on August 12, 1991.
which the intention is carried into effect. From his passivity, he is deemed to have recognized the validity of Aquinos
Indeed, the following clearly manifest the intention of private respondent to appointment and the latters discharge of his duties as a member of the
abandon his position: (1) his failure to perform his function as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. In all, private respondents failure to promptly assert his
Sangguniang Bayan, (2) his failure to collect the corresponding remuneration for alleged right implies his loss of interest in the position. His overt acts plainly
the position, (3) his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his show that he really meant his resignation and understood its effects.
replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan, (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any
act to reassume his post in the Sangguniang Bayan after the Supreme Court had
nullified his designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Canonization v Aguirre GR 133132 Feb 15, 2001
On the other hand, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had effected FACTS
his intention: (1) his letter of resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan; (2) his Respondents Aguirre et al are seeking a reconsideration of the Courts decision
assumption of office as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful wherein Sec. 8 of RA 8551 to be violative of petitioners constitutionally
discharge of his duties and functions as member of said Sanggunian, and (4) his mandated right to security of tenure. As a consequence of our ruling, we held
receipt of the remuneration for such post. that petitioners removal as Commissioners of the National Police Commission
It must be stressed that when an officer is designated to another post, he is (NAPOLCOM) and the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead were
usually called upon to discharge duties in addition to his regular responsibilities. nullities and ordered the reinstatement of petitioners and the payment of full
Indeed, his additional responsibilities are prescribed by law to inhere, as it backwages to be computed from the date they were removed from office.
were, to his original position. A Supreme Court justice, for instance, may be Respondents insist that the Court should take judicial notice of then President
designated member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. In some Estradas appointment of Alexis C. Canonizado to the position of Inspector
cases, a public officer may be designated to a position in an acting capacity, as General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the Philippine National Police
when an undersecretary is tasked to discharge the functions of a secretary for (PNP) on 30 June 1998, and of Canonizados acceptance and of his having
a temporary period. In all cases, however, the law does not require the public qualified for such position by taking his oath before the DILG Undersecretary
Ronaldo Puno and another before the President, since these partake of official office, and with no willful desire or intention to abandon it, the public officer
acts of the Executive Department, which are matters of mandatory judicial vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute which is afterwards
notice, pursuant to section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. By accepting declared unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment
such position, respondents contend that Canonizado is deemed to have and the officer may recover the office.
abandoned his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM since the offices of It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts
NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible. another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and
his title is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding. Public
ISSUE policy considerations dictate against allowing the same individual to perform
WON there is abandonment when Canonizado accepted the position of an inconsistent and incompatible duties. The incompatibility contemplated is not the
Inspector General for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM mere physical impossibility of one persons performing the duties of the two
offices due to a lack of time or the inability to be in two places at the same
moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and relations of the two
positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and antagonism should one
HELD person attempt to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one toward
Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the incumbent of the other.
the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control There is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and
thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible with each other. As pointed out
under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. by respondents, RA 8551 prohibits any personnel of the IAS from sitting in a
There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the committee charged with the task of deliberating on the appointment, promotion,
law will infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas the NAPOLCOM has the power of
springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. There control and supervision over the PNP. However, the rule on incompatibility of
are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to duties will not apply to the case at bar because at no point did Canonizado
abandon and second, an overt or external act by which the intention is carried discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously. Canonizado was
into effect. forced out of his first office by the enactment of section 8 of RA 8551. Thus,
Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office when Canonizado was appointed as Inspector General on 30 June 1998, he had
by nonuser or acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or ceased to discharge his official functions as NAPOLCOM Commissioner. As a
privilege or to exercise an office. However, non-performance of the duties of an matter of fact, it was on this same date that Leo S. Magahum and Cleofe M.
office does not constitute abandonment where such non performance results Factoran were appointed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners by then President
from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform. Abandonment Estrada, to join Romeo L. Cairme and Jose Percival L. Adiongwho were earlier
may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or appointed and given a term extension, respectively, by then President Ramos
discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by an thereby completing the appointments of the four regular members of the
officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an NAPOLCOM, pursuant to section 4 of the amendatory law. Thus, to reiterate,
abandonment of the office. Where, while desiring and intending to hold the the incompatibility of duties rule never had a chance to come into play for
petitioner never occupied the two positions, of Commissioner and Inspector declaration of nullity of section 8 of RA 8551, then he is also entitled to
General, nor discharged their respective functions, concurrently. reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM pursuant to his appointment under RA 6975.
Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as Commissioner, not by an An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and
erroneous decision, but by an unconstitutional provision of law. Canonizado, like affords no protection. Therefore, the unavoidable consequence of the Courts
the petitioners in the above mentioned cases, held a second office during the declaration that section 8 of RA 8551 violates the fundamental law is that all
period that his appeal was pending. As stated in the Comment filed by acts done pursuant to such provision shall be null and void, including the removal
petitioners, Canonizado was impelled to accept this subsequent position by a of petitioners and Adiong from their positions in the NAPOLCOM and the
desire to continue serving the country, in whatever capacity. Surely, this appointment of new commissioners in their stead. When a regular government
selfless and noble aspiration deserves to be placed on at least equal footing with employee is illegally dismissed, his position does not become vacant and the
the worthy goal of providing for oneself and ones family, either of which are new appointment made in order to replace him is null and void ab initio.
sufficient to justify Canonizados acceptance of the position of Inspector Rudimentary is the precept that there can be no valid appointment to a non-
General. A contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his right to live, which vacant position. Accordingly, Adiongs appointment on 11 March 1998 for a term
contemplates not only a right to earn a living, as held in previous cases, but also a of two years, pursuant to section 8 of RA 8551, is null and void. However, he
right to lead a useful and productive life. Furthermore, prohibiting Canonizado should now be permitted to enjoy the remainder of his term under RA 6975.
from accepting a second position during the pendency of his petition would be to Therefore, based on our foregoing disquisition, there should no longer be any
unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which doubt as to the proper execution of our 25 January 2000 decision all the
under no circumstance can be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado Commissioners appointed under RA 8551 should be removed from office, in
can re-assume his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector order to give way to the reinstatement of petitioners and respondent Adiong.
General of the IAS-PNP.
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Respondents also raise some questions regarding the execution of the Courts Floresca v. Quetulio 82 Phil. 128
decision. They cite the fact that because there are three petitioners who were FACTS
ordered reinstated and four persons currently acting as NAPOLCOM Petitioner Floresca prays for his reinstatement as a justice of peace of Piddig,
commissioners, namely Romeo L. Cairme, Jose Percival L. Adiong, Leo S. Carasi and Nagpapalcan, Iloco Norte. It was alleged that he was not reappointed
Magahum and Cleofe M. Factoran, it is unclear who of the current commissioners either upon the restoration of the Commonwealth Government or upon the
will be replaced by petitioners. Respondents point out that the execution of the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines, in violation of his constitutional
decision becomes particularly complicated when it comes to Adiong, who was a tenure. Respondent Amaparo Quetulio admits her appointment to and actual
member of the NAPOLCOM under Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), but was incumbency of the position held before the war by the petitioner, but asserts
removed therefrom and subsequently re-appointed for a two-year term, her right to stay in view of petitioner's abandonment of said office.
pursuant to RA 8551. According to respondents, given Adiongs peculiar situation,
it is unclear whether the latter should also be entitled to reinstatement as a ISSUE
result of the assailed decision. Adiong, on his own behalf, filed a Motion for WON there is abandonment
Clarification with this Court contending that, if the Court should uphold the
HELD Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President
YES. It is undisputed that the petitioner, when required by the proper Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
authorities to assume his pre-war post after the liberation, refused to do so and Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought
pointed out that the salary of the position could not then sustain his family; that this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said
in the meantime the petitioner accepted the position, first, of junior legal office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the
assistant and, secondly, of civilian investigator of the Provost Marshal Office in province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that
the Gabu U. S. Army Air Base at Laoag, Ilocos Norte; that shortly after the within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and
inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines, or on July 27, 1946, the New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been
petitioner accepted the position of senior social worker, PRATRA, for Ilocos elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
Norte. Petitioner's refusal to go back to his old post and his subsequent
acceptance of other employments, without any pretense on his part that he ISSUE
simultaneously continued to perform the functions of justice of the peace, 1. WON a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
clearly show deliberate abandonment of the latter office , especially when Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
attention is called to the fact, likewise undisputed, that in the year 1946, the simultaneously
petitioner, in his application submitted to the committee in charge of passing 2. WON a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
upon applications for government positions in Ilocos Norte, made it clear that he Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
wanted to be appointed to any position other than that of justice of the peace. simultaneously
To now reinstate the petitioner would be to allow a government official to
subordinate public interest to personal comfort and convenience. HELD: Petition DISMISSED!
1. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
E. Acceptance of Incompatible Office Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall
Adaza v Pacana 135 SCRA 431 not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
FACTS agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the
the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started cabinet . . .
discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit
Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under of the people. As such, a holder thereof is subject to such regulations and
the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions
March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. It is
BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana states allows a local elective official to act as an elected member of the
lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty
and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices specifically cited
in the above-quoted constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the latter in
within the purely parliamentary system of government no Incompatibility exists the cases provided for in Section 48, paragraph 16 of this Code;
in the nature of the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is
understood in common law, the incompatibility herein present is one created by
no less than the constitution itself, In the case at bar, there is no question that Civil Liberties Union v. Exec. Secretary 194 scra 317
petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and FACTS
has been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284
constitutional provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions. secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union
2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent Pacana, as a (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
petitioners election to the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains that respondent submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
should be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice- provides:
governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
elections. The point pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors, mayors, members said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.'' Indubitably, franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest
election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in in the conduct of their office.
Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Civil Liberties Union (CLU) avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise
Government Code. provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice governor after the Batas office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
Pambansa elections, he was acting within the law. His succession to the namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in accordance with under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code, which reads as follows: member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges: Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par.
1] x x x (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and
2] He shall: Adaza vs. Pacana, Jr., 135 SCRA 431, No. L-68159 March 18, 1985 employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply
and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to
the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in
assistants. the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
ISSUE constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. government or elsewhere is concerned.
(2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: Unless Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment . Under
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- Section 13, Article VI, (N)o Senator or Member of the House of
owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . .. Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, (N)o member of the armed
forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a
civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled
HELD: Petition GRANTED corporations or any of their subsidiaries. Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B,
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying relied upon by respondents provides (U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the
the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be office or employment in the Government.
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the
the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be states that (T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. In the
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the
already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or phrase in the Government. The prohibition imposed on the President and his
employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another office or employment.
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice- Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: They
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No.
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. These 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold 1987 Constitution itself.
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized services rendered. It has been held that in cases where there is no de jure,
by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office
lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary,
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,
their deputies and assistants. undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the
This being the case, the qualifying phrase unless otherwise provided in this public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem, allowances or
exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the
Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding F. Abolition of Office
other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Mama, Jr. v. CA 196 scra 489
Respondents interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the
exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the FACTS
distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the Petitioners, with the exception of Andres Mama, Jr., were either doctors,
high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant nurses, midwives or employees of the S.M. Lao Memorial City Emergency
Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank Hospital of Ozamiz City which was then engaged in rendering general medical
immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any services to the city residents. Respondent Jesus Sanciangco, Jr. and his co-
other office or position in the government during their tenure. respondents assumed office as newly elected local officials of the City of
Ozamiz. Jesus Sanciangco, Jr. was elected mayor, along with Antonio Caballero longer rendering general but only limited medical services specializing in
as vice-mayor, and Manuel Cortes, Bernardo Roa, Marcelian Tapayan, Olegario maternity and children's cases, and the number of officials and employees
Neri, Rodolfo Pactolin and Aniceto Ortega as city councilors. The city council therein was reduced from thirty-four (34) to only eleven (11).
passed its Resolution No. 61 abolishing the S.M. Lao Memorial City Emergency By reason of the structural reorganization and changes in the operational
Hospital of Ozamiz City allegedly due to losses incurred and poor services objectives, the present hospital cannot be considered as the same hospital that
rendered to the constituents. The said resolution was duly approved by was abolished. Substantial differences now exist between the old and the new
respondent mayor and vice-mayor. The city treasurer certified in writing that as hospital, although the name remains the same in honor of the late Dr. Santiago
of December 31, 1987, the City Government of Ozamiz General Fund had M. Lao, predecessor in interest of the donors, such being a condition of the
incurred a cash overdraft of P267,141.90 and its Retained Earnings Account donation. Hence, its opening alone, without proof that the positions created
reflected a deficit of P3,133,151.91. The petitioners filed a petition for carried exactly the same functions and duties as those abolished, is not
mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and sufficient basis for a finding of bad faith.
damages. The court referred the petition to the CA which the latter dismissed. It is within the legal competence of the City Council of Ozamiz, in the
The petitioner filed an MR which was denied by the respondent court, hence the exercise of its sound discretion, to create such other offices as may be
present recourse. necessary to carry out the purposes of the city government, or consolidate
the functions of any one of such offices with another in the interest of
ISSUE efficiency and economy. It may also create, consolidate, and reorganize city
WON the abolition of the S.M. Lao Memorial City Emergency Hospital is valid offices and positions wholly supported by local funds. The city council has no
obligation to keep a useless office or a position that is neither needed nor in the
HELD public interest by reason of, as in this case, financial losses and incapacity to
The opening of the hospital, this time with the avowed purpose of specializing in render adequate public services.
maternity and children's cases, was dictated by circumstances beyond the The city council may take such course as it may deem necessary, expedient or
control of respondents. The land whereon this hospital is constructed is a conducive to the public good. In the exercise of its discretionary functions,
donated property. The donation is subject to the condition that once the land is good faith is always presumed, and on the party alleging bad faith lies the
not used for a hospital, the same will revert to the donor or his successors in burden of proof. The failure of herein petitioners to present evidence to prove
interest. Hence, in order to prevent the reversion of the property, to the bad faith on the part of respondents leaves us no alternative but to declare
prejudice of the city, the opening of the hospital was imperative and necessary valid the challenged previous abolition of the hospital.
in order to serve the interests of the city residents. It must likewise not be lost sight of that, unless there is grave abuse of
By the subsequent opening of the hospital, it cannot be said that the reasons discretion, the courts may not review the discretionary act of a public officer .
advanced for its previous abolition were untrue and constituted a mere It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the actions of the executive
subterfuge for the removal without cause of herein petitioners. The indubitable branch unless there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of
fact is that with the opening of the hospital, structural changes were made in judgment or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
order to attain economy, efficiency and prevent further losses, which were the jurisdiction.
very purposes sought to be attained by its prior abolition. The hospital is no
Further, subject to well settled exceptions not present here, certiorari, and employees who opposed the Provincial Boards candidacy in the 08th
prohibition and mandamus do not lie against the legislative and executive November 1971 elections.
branches or the members thereof acting in the exercise of their official The respondents insisted that the abolition of the Office of the Provincial
functions, basically in consideration of the respect due from the judiciary to Engineer was motivated instead by a provision of Presidential Decree No. 17,
said departments of co-equal and coordinate ranks under the principle of which lowered the internal revenue allotment to the road and bridge fund of the
separation of powers. province from 50% to 17.5% thereby leaving an inadequate allotment for
materials, salaries and operating expenses of the Office of the Provincial
Lastly, on the procedural aspect, prohibition does not lie in this case there being Engineer. Also, they averred that the power of the provincial board to create an
no evidence of usurpation or exercise of a power which respondents do not office carried with it the power to abolish it. The lower court rendered a
possess, nor an exercise of power without or in excess of jurisdiction. Of decision in favor of the respondents holding that the "drastic decrease in the
course, neither will mandamus be available there being no showing of a clear legal amount available for appropriation" was the principal consideration that impelled
right of petitioners requiring the performance of a correlative ministerial act by the Provincial Board to abolish the Office. The court a quo also took note of the
respondents. All these are aside from the consideration that petitioners have resolutions of several municipal councils in Antique calling the attention of the
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law, but which legal avenues they Provincial Board to the neglect in the maintenance of provincial roads. An MR
have failed to avail of to protect such rights as they profess to have before was denied by the LC so the petitioners appealed to the CA which reversed the
resorting to the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus. courts decision and held that "the passage of Resolution No. 206 was prompted
Nonetheless, pursuant to Section 76 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local in the main by reasons other than those stated therein," and that the evidence
Government Code, herein petitioners who may be affected by the abolition of on record "adequately justified the charge that personal and political
their positions are entitled to be reinstated in other vacant positions without animosities on the part of petitioner Sentina, on the one hand, and respondents,
diminution of salary. Should such positions not be available, the official or on the other, had caused the respondent Provincial Board to enact said
employee affected shall be granted a separation pay equivalent to one (1) month resolution." The CA denied the MR. The provincial board instituted the instant
salary for every year of service over and above the monetary privileges granted petition for review on certiorari. Governor Zaldivar filed a motion to intervene
to officials and employees under existing law. which the court granted. He contended that should the displaced officials and
employees of the Office be reinstated and paid their back salaries from 01 July
1973, it would be to the great sacrifice of Antiques development programs.
Javier v. CA GR 49065 1994
FACTS ISSUE
Provincial Engineer Maximiano Sentina and 40 officials and employees of the WON Resolution No. 206 of the Provincial Board of Antique abolishing the
Office of the Provincial Engineer filed a petition for mandamus and damages Office of the Provincial Engineer is valid
against the entire Provincial Board of Antique alleging that the abolition of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer was a circumvention of the constitutional HELD
mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution did convey an authority
to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the
Government, recalling to mind General Order No. 3 issued on 22 September Given the peculiar factual settings heretofore expressed, we would have, under
1972, but this general provision could not have meant or envisioned an ordinary circumstances, simply issued an order of reinstatement. The Court
absolute proscription on local governments, if and when minded, from cannot, however, close its eyes to the multifarious and significant events that
themselves creating or abolishing positions, an authority that they have since taken place on, among other things, the national and local government
theretofore had under the then existing laws. One such law was Section 18 of structures, as well as their offices and incumbents; the law itself, both
Republic Act No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, which constitutional and statutory; as well as the personal and other circumstances of
empowered provincial governments to create, among other positions, the office concerned parties, including no less than petitioners and private respondents
of a provincial engineer. While the law did not expressly vest on provincial themselves. It is our considered view that in lieu of an order for reinstatement
governments the power to abolish that office, absent, however, any contrary of private respondents, an award for backwages, equivalent to five (5) years
provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by implication from the without qualification or deduction, should be paid to said respondents.
power to create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact, expressed that an implied
power of a province x x x should be liberally construed in its favor and any fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in Mendoza v. Quisumbing 186 scra 108
favor of local government and it should be presumed to exist. FACTS
We must rule then that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the After the February 1986 political upheaval, the political leadership decided to
office in question did exist at the time. The real debatable issue focuses on the proclaim the formation of a revolutionary government headed by President
real reasons behind the questioned action of the provincial board. An abolition Corazon C. Aquino. Immediately after the President was sworn into office, she
of office is not per se objectionable but this rule carries a caveat that the act issued Proclamation No. 1 declaring as policy the reorganization of the
is done in good faith. government. Thereafter, the President issued Executive Orders directing the
We have scrutinized closely the records, most especially in this case, in view of reorganization of various different departments of the government which
the disagreement between the trial court and the appellate court on their affected their employees, among those affected was Francisco Mendoza.
factual findings; the result of our examination is that there, indeed, appears to Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City
be evidence to support their own respective findings. On the one hand, valid who was reappointed by respondent Quisumbing as such with a "permanent"
reasons have been shown that tend to substantiate the need at the time for the status. He has served the Department of Education for forty-two (42) years,
abolition of the office in question by the Provincial Board. Upon the other hand, moving up the ranks in the public schools system. Then, the petitioner received
it cannot be discounted that personal and political motives did contribute in no the letter-order informing him that he would be considered separated from the
small measure in that final decision of the board. In sum, we see a situation service without prejudice to availment of benefits. The letter particularly
where the abolition of the office could have well been justified except for the stated that consistent with the mandate of reorganization to achieve greater
convexity of circumstances attendant to the decision process that clearly efficiency and effectiveness, all incumbent officials/personnel are on 'holdover'
appear to have greatly influenced the final action taken by the board . We are status unless advised otherwise. In the meantime, the petitioner, in a letter
not prepared, however, to conclude a clear case of bad faith on the part of wrote Secretary Quisumbing requesting reconsideration of the letter-order.
respondents. The letter was forwarded to the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB). The
motion for reconsideration remained unacted upon, hence the petitioner filed
the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary separated from the service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 [1986] or
injunction. Article III of the Freedom Constitution. Pursuant to the above provision,
around 400,000 school teachers, janitors, clerks, principals, supervisors,
ISSUE administrators, and higher officials were placed on hold-over status. When a
1. WON the various reorganization programs in different agencies and/or public officer is placed on hold-over status, it means that his term has expired
departments of the government implementing the orders issued pursuant to the or his services terminated but he should continue holding his office until his
Presidents proclamations were valid successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.
2. WON letter-order of Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) An examination of the facts of these cases invariably shows that the bonafide
Lourdes R. Quisumbing which terminated the petitioner Mendozas employment rule has been ignored or disobeyed. Except in the Office of the Press
as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City is valid Secretary, there have been significant increases in the number of positions in
affected Departments and agencies thus belying the claims of economy. Offices
HELD have been abolished but in their stead, offices performing substantially the
1. There is no dispute over the power to reorganizewhether traditional, same functions have been created. In some cases, e.g. the Science Promotions
progressive, or whatever adjective is appended to it. However, the essence of Institute in the Department of Science and Technology, an office has been
constitutional government is adherence to basic rules. The rule of law requires divided into two or more offices with a greater number of employees performing
that no government official should feel free to do as he pleases using only his the same functions. Incumbents have been replaced by persons less qualified in
avowedly sincere intentions and conscience to guide him. The fundamental terms of status, performance, and merit as in the Department of Tourism where
standards of fairness embodied in the bona fide rule cannot be disregarded. a driver with 27 years government service, a messenger with 14 years,
More particularly, the auto-limitations imposed by the President when she bookkeepers, and others with citations and honors have been replaced by
proclaimed the Provisional Constitution and issued executive orders as sole law appointees with lesser qualifications and seniority. It is a paramount principle in
maker and the standards and restrictions prescribed by the present Public Officers Law that the power to abolish public offices vested in the
Constitution and the Congress established under it, must be obeyed. Absent this legislature is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations that it be exercised in
compliance, we cannot say that a reorganization is bona fide. good faith, should never be for personal or political reasons, and cannot, be
A typical provision in all these challenged executive orders is the hold-over implemented in a manner contrary to law.
status of every single employee of the departments as a result of the 2. The petitioner was appointed in a PERMANENT STATUS besides having a
implementation of the reorganization. One such provision would be section 24 of rating of 79% for the rating period of May 1986 to April 1987, which is
Executive Order No. 117 reorganizing the DECS, to wit: SEC. 24, New considered Very Satisfactory under the Rating Sheet for Key MEC Officials.
Structure and Pattern.Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers There was grave abuse of discretion when the petitioners services were
(the term officer as used in this Executive Order is intended to be within the terminated by a mere letter-order on the justification that the petitioner,
meaning of the term `official as used in the Freedom Constitution and the together with the entire personnel of the DECS, was only in a hold-over
succeeding Constitution) and employees of the Ministry shall, in a hold-over capacity. If the petitioner is guilty of wrongdoing, it is an easy matter to file
capacity continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and charges against him instead of placing the entire DECS on hold-over status in
receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the meantime they are order to run after him.
As we stated earlier, ritual invocation of the abolition of an office is not The petitioners instituted the present proceedings questioning the legality and
sufficient to justify the termination of the services of an officer or employee in validity of the Resolution and Order aforesaid, alleging that the abolition of
such abolished office. Abolition should be exercised in good faith, should not their positions was done pursuant to an invalid delegation of power to the
be for personal or political reasons, and cannot be implemented in a manner Governor, that it was done in bad faith, in violation of their security of tenure
contrary to law. Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a under the Civil Service law, as shown by the creation of new confidential
constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case. (Dario v. Mison positions "bearing conclusive evidence of political accommodation." The Court
cases, p. 50). If an executive department is bloated with unnecessary employees, issued a RTO and required respondents to answer. The latter pleaded that the
there can be no objection to a law abolishing the useless or non-essential items. reorganization had been made within the powers of the Provincial government, in
In the instant case, however, all items, including the essential ones, were order to effect economy in view of the province's deficit of P3.714 million
declared vacant. There is absolutely no showing that the positions of tourism pesos; to promote simplicity and efficiency, and to provide for more essential
field coordinator, bus driver, bookkeeper, accounting clerk, librarian, nurse, services and activities; that the Governor's Executive Order No. 2 had been
telephone operator, messenger in fact, any of the items occupied by the approved and ratified by the Provincial Board on January 5, 1968, by its
petitionersare unnecessary and must be chopped off. Resolution No. 8, while the supplemental budget to provide for the newly
We have also discussed why the hold-over status of all employees/officers created positions was ratified by the Board's Resolution No. 50, of January 26,
provided for in the executive orders reorganizing the various departments in 1968; that the actions thus taken were immediately effective, without need of
government cannot be ordered and implemented during the effectivity of the the approval of the Secretary of Finance; and that the abolition and creation of
1987 Constitution (which was on February 2, 1987). Civil service eligibles can no new positions were made in good faith, the selection of retained employees had
longer be removed without cause as they already enjoy the constitutional right been made on the basis of seniority and fitness as required by the Civil Service
to security of tenure. This was the ruling in the Palma-Fernandez v. de la Paz law, those retained having been appointed earlier than the petitioners. The
decision and the Dario v. Mison cases which clarified and tempered the answer also urged that the petitioners should have exhausted their
abbreviated language of the Jose v. Arroyo decision cited by the petitioners. administrative remedies, by appealing to the Commissioner of Civil Service.

Cruz v. Primicias 23 scra 998 ISSUE


FACTS WON the abolition of offices is void
A petition for mandamus, with preliminary injunction filed by certain employees
of the Province of Pangasinan to declare Resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Board HELD
and EO 2 (reorganizing the office of the Governor and that of the Provincial It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither a removal nor
Board) of the Provincial Governor null and void, to have the abolition of separation of the incumbents. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an
petitioners' positions declared illegal, and compel their immediate office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle
reinstatement; to restrain respondents from excluding petitioners from the that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Where
enjoyment of their rights as civil service employees, and to recover attorneys' the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal reasons, or in order to
fees and costs. circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees, it is
null and void.
A review of the record herein satisfies us that the justifications advanced for preconditions for appointment or grounds for separation of eligibles in the Civil
the abolition of petitioners' offices (economy and efficiency) are but Service.
subterfuges resorted to for disguising an illegal removal of permanent civil The situation now facing the Court is four square with those of Briones vs.
service employees, in violation of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Osmea, and Ocampo vs. Duque, supra. And on the authority of these cases, and
Constitution. the rulings of this Court in other precedents, we have no alternative but to find
The claim of economy effectuated through the reorganization is belied by the and declare that the suppression of petitioners' positions was done in bad faith
fact that while 72 positions were abolished, 50 of these were actually vacant. and are, hence, illegal and unwarranted, null and void.
Only 22 stations were occupied at the time of the reorganization, carrying total As a consequence of this pronouncement, it is likewise held, that respondents
emoluments of P25,538.71 per semester, of which P6,120.00 per semester have unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the enjoyment of an office to
corresponds to the five remaining petitioners. As against these 22 positions which they are entitled; and that in failing or refusing to include in the 1968-
suppressed by the reorganization (EO 2), 28 new positions were simultaneously 1969 budget items required to cover appropriations for salaries of petitioners,
created, with a compensation of P87,600.00 per annum, P43,800.00 per respondents have unlawfully failed or neglected the performance of an act which
semester, for confidential personnel in the office of the Governor. In addition, a the law enjoins as a duty resulting from office.
Provincial Attorney and his staff, and a Personnel Division of five members,
importing P13,380.00 per semester were set up. Thus, against the suppressed Dispositive:
items of P25,538.71, new items carrying a total appropriation of P57,180.00 per The writ of mandamus prayed for by petitioners is hereby granted. The
semester (or P114,360.00 annually) were created, in addition to P8,000.00 for respondents, as members of the provincial board of Pangasinan are commanded
casual laborers at the discretion of the Governor. Where the economy lies is to immediately reinstate the petitioners (except Myrna Sison) to the positions
difficult to see. Significantly, this "economy" was the same excuse advanced by heretofore occupied by them, to pay them the salaries heretofore withheld
the preceding administration when it attempted to eliminate civil service since January 5, 1968, and to appropriate without unnecessary delay, the
eligibles upon its coming into power. amounts necessary for the salaries of the petitioners for the fiscal year 1968-
As to the alleged need for greater efficiency, it is well to observe that no 1969, and subsequent years, together with such amounts as may be necessary to
charge of inefficiency is lodged against petitioners herein. Their efficiency is pay the contribution of the Province of Pangasinan to the Government Service
attested by their promotional appointments in 1967. What can not be glossed Insurance System (GSIS) in connection with petitioners' insurance and
over is that respondent's reorganization replaced 22 civil service eligibles with retirement. Respondents shall further pay, personally and in solidum, to the
23 confidential employees. No further elaboration is required to show that in petitioners P3,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, and the costs.
truth and in fact, what respondents sought to achieve was to supplant civil
service eligibles with men of their choice, whose tenure would be totally G. Prescription of the Rights of Office
dependent upon respondents' pleasure and discretion. Thus the spirit of the Civil Tumulak v. Egay 82 Phil 828
Service law and of the Constitution are being purposely circumvented.
Here is proof that the true motivation for reorganizing out the petitioners was FACTS
"not only in their capacity for work but also in their personal fitness and The petitioner Tumulak filed a quo warranto proceeding seeking to wrest from
loyalty". Political loyalty or disloyalty are not statutory nor constitutional the respondent the position of justice of the peace of the municipalities of
Gigaquit and Bacuag, Province of Surigao. He alleged that he became the duly people's interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as
appointed judge of said towns and acted accordingly until August 1942, when the practicable.
Japanese seized the province. After the liberation, he received from Pres.
Sergio Osmea an appointment ad interim for the same position in Jan 1946. He
qualified and assumed the office May of that same year. Thereafter, he went Morales v. Patriarca 13 scra 766
to Cebu to fetch his family but upon returning he found that respondent FACTS
Protolico Egay occupying the post beginning July. In Feb 1948, he was informed Petitioner Toriano Patriarca filed a petition for relief praying that his 2nd MR
of the decision of this Court in Tavora vs. Gavina, that pursuant to said decision and the memorandum in support thereof be considered on the merits. The
he asked the DOJ for reinstatement. Having failed to obtain relief, he decision of the court ruled that the petitioner cannot be reinstated to the
instituted the litigation to vindicate his right to the office. office of justice of peace since his present action for reinstatement was filed
The respondent submits a motion to dismiss the case, asserting that the action more than one year from his removal. The petitioner argued that (1) he was not
has lapsed because it was commenced more than one year after the cause of removed at all, (2) that the present action is not for reinstatement; and (3)
action had accrued. that, at any rate, the one-year period should be counted from October 26, 1962
when respondent Patriarca assumed the disputed office, for only then could
ISSUE petitioner have initiated quo warranto proceedings with a view to reinstatement.
WON the action has lapsed and thus the petition cannot be entertained? YES!
ISSUE
HELD: Petition DISMISSED WON the one-year period should be counted from October 26, 1962 when
The Rules provide that: respondent Patriarca assumed the disputed office
SEC. 16. Limitations. Nothing contained in this rule shall be construed . . . to
authorize an action against an officer for his ouster from office unless the HELD: Petition for relief DENIED!!!!
same be commenced within one year after the cause; . . . (Rule 68, Rules of An action for reinstatement by a public official, whether it be quo warranto
Court , page 139.). or mandamus, should be filed in court within one year from removal or
separation, otherwise the action will be barred.
The petitioners right of action, if any, accrued in July, 1946, when respondent Petitioner could have brought his instant action for mandamus, to compel the
allegedly usurped the office. From that day to August, 1948, more than one year Secretary of Justice to reinstate him, even on April 3, 1962, that is, even
has elapsed. The petition, therefore, may not be entertained. before respondent Patriarca assumed office. In mandamus, unlike quo warranto,
Constitutional rights may be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one there is no requirement that the respondent be actually holding the disputed
year could be validly considered as a waiver, i. e., a renunciation which no office. The fact, therefore, that petitioner was not replaced by another for
principle of justice may prevent. some time after his dismissal could not have precluded him from filing an action
And there is good justification for the limitation period: it is not proper that for reinstatement.
the tile to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainty, and the
As pointed out in the decision, the one-year limitation for bringing an action for When the civil action filed by Raul R. Ingles, et als. was still pending in the CFI-
reinstatement has been applied as well to mandamus as to quo warranto Manila, the dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to their
proceedings. positions in the OP. With respect to the other employees who were not
Finally, examining once again the reason behind this period of limitation, we still reinstated, efforts were exerted by Secretary Mutuc to look for placements
find it equally obtaining in a case where no other incumbent has as yet been outside of Malacaang so that they may be re-employed. The herein plaintiff was
appointed to succeed, as where there is one. The rationale is stated in Tumulak one of those who had not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to any
vs. Egay, 46 O.G. 3693, 3695: "It is not proper that the title to public office positions as befits his qualifications.
should be subjected to continued uncertainty and the people's interest requires He waited for Secretary Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be
that such right should be determined as speedily as possible." After having been recalled to the service, until Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other executive
ordered to vacate his office and thereupon considered dismissed by the secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at
Secretary of Justice, petitioner could only have proceeded to discharge the "the opportune time." The plaintiff requested his reinstatement to his former
functions of the office at issue under "continued uncertainty" as to his title. position and payment of salary via letter to the OP but was denied repeatedly.
Consequently, he should have forthwith taken steps to question the legality of Jose Cristobal filed a complaint praying for the ff: 1. Declaring plaintiff's
the order of removal, and his failure to do so within the time prescribed by law dismissal as illegal and contrary to law; 2. Ordering defendant Executive
has rendered the present action untenable. Secretary Alejandro Melchor to certify the name of plaintiff in the payroll of
the Office of the President of the Philippines, to be retroactive as of January 1,
1962. the effective date that the plaintiff was illegally dismissed from the
Cristobal v. Melchor 78 scra 175 service; 3. Ordering defendant Federico Arcala to pay all the emoluments and/or
FACTS salary to which the plaintiff is entitled effective as of January 1, 1962, the date
Plaintiff Jose Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in the of his illegal termination from the service; and 4. Ordering the defendants to
President's Private Office, Malacaang. He was appointed 1 July 1961 to that allow plaintiff to continue with the performance of hi duties in the Secretary
position then in Jan 1962, the Exec. Sec. Amelito Mutuc informed him via a Office Staff, Office of the President of the Philippines.
letter that he is terminated and other employees received such letter containing The defendants represented by the Office of the Solicitor General alleged that
the same. The dismissed employees appealed to the President for a plaintiff Jose Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have
reconsideration of their separation but was denied by Sec. Mutuc, acting by abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert
authority of the President. 5 employees who were separated (not including the his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule
herein plaintiff) filed a civil action before the CFI-Manila against Sec. Mutuc 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to court only after the lapse of more
and the cash disbursing officer of the Office of the President praying for than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore
reinstatement and the payment of their salaries. Their complaint was dismissed he is not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment.
and so they appealed to the SC which reversed the dismissal of the complaint
and declared that their removal from office as illegal and contrary to law, and ISSUE
ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their salaries.
WON Appellant Cristobal his right to seek judicial relief for not having filed his concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the Office of the
complaint within the one-year period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the President to comply with its commitment, x x x Surely, it would now be the
Rules of Court height of inequity and cutting a deep wound in Our sense of justice, if after
Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the
HELD former Executive Secretaries who dealt with him and who preceded the herein
In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, this Court stated that in a general sense, laches is respondent Executive Secretary Melchor, We were to hold that he lost his right
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do to seek relief because of lapse of time. The doctrine of laches is an equitable
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; principle applied to promote but never to defeat justice.
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting Laches does not attach and failure to file quo warranto proceeding does not
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or operate adversely against a dismissed government employee where it was the
declined to assert it. act of responsible government officials which contributed in the delay of the
Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil, case, it is true, but his non- filing of complaint for reinstatement.
participation is not fatal to his cause of action. During the pendency of the civil
case Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement together with Applying by analogy the rulings of this Court in the matter of fixing backwages
the other employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised to employees who were victims of unfair labor practices of their employers so as
reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later. More importantly, Cristobal to obviate the necessity of a hearing on the point and avoid further delay, and
could be expectedwithout necessarily spending time and money by going to considering the lapse of almost nine years before appellant filed this suit, We
courtto relie upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to resolve, to grant back salaries at the rate last received by him only for a period
protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the of five (5) years without qualification and deduction.
plaintiffs therein and the identical relief being sought.
The evidence of Cristobal establish the following: After the Ingles suit was
filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal included, continued to seek K. Conviction of a crime
reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Executive Secretary Mutuc Monsanto v Factoran 170 scra 190
assured the employees that without prejudice to the continuation of the civil
action, he would work for their reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the
Doctrine: A public officer, like herein petitioner, who has been
dismissed employees were recalled to their respective positions in the Office of
convicted of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, though
the President among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case and several
subsequently pardoned, is deemed to have lost her right to public
others who were not parties therein. Secretary Mutuc even tried to place the
office, unless such right is expressly restored by the pardon
others outside of the Malacanang Office, x x x In the meantime, however,
Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other Executive Secretaries to whom
Cristobal over and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who FACTS
gave the same assurance that Cristobal would be recalled and re-employed at The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
the opportune time. It was this continued promise of the government officials treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a
to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. new appointment
They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in
the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to HELD
pay the costs proportionately. NO! Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly
affirmed the same. She filed an MR but while the motion was pending, she was grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost
extended an absolute pardon by Pres. Marcos which she accepted. Petitioner reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept
wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.
former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case,
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not
resolution. The Finance Ministry ruled that the petitioner may be reinstated ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished
and that the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly
Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied. Seeking reconsideration of the The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the
foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be
bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension and offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension. The Ministry cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone
of Finance referred the petitioners letter to the OP for review and action. deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason
Deputy Factoran, Jr. held disagreeing with the petitioner and Ministry of of the pardoned conviction.
Finance because the petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she was For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or
accused. Also, that Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in People v. Lising, that ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were
benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed.
pendente lite. Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was
petitioner filed the present petition in her behalf. forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and
suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and
ISSUE should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she
can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding petitioner appealed his case to the CA which modified the decision. The
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as petitioner was granted an absolute pardon by the PH president, restoring him to
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure 'full civil and political rights.' With this instrument on hand, the herein
required for a new appointment. petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government service, only to be
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his
imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability former position as Elementary School Principal I. Hence, the petition for relief.
arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not ISSUE
served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability WON petitioner can be reinstated by virtue of an absolute pardon by the
may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, president
namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the
rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. HELD: Petition GRANTED
In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., this Court held that the absolute disqualification
from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
Sabello v DECS 180 scra 623 prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all
FACTS the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
Petitioner Isabelo Sabello was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not
also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School. The barangay entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to
high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students could said office.
hardly pay for their monthly tuition fees. Since at that time also, the President In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the
of the Philippines who was earnestly campaigning was giving aid in the amount of service as a classroom teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and
P2K for each barrio, the barrio council through proper resolutions alloted the Sports.
amount of P 840 to cover up for the salaries of the high school teachers, with As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank,
the honest thought in mind that the barrio high school was a barrio project and justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of
as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in question. The Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.
only part that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized by the said However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1,
barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was subsequently 1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto this Court said he is not entitled
deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High to automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the
School. That was a grave error on the part of the herein petitioner as it involves government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his
the very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to
technicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally
were charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of
suffer a sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The the charge against them.
In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made WON petitioner is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been
continuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not. At any rate reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency
when he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate
retirement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere HELD
classroom teacher. From among the different acts of executive clemency spelled out above, the
clemency granted to petitioner in the instant case partakes of the nature of an
executive pardon.
Vicente Garcia v. Chairman COA GR 75025 Sept 14, 1993 Time and again this Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the
FACTS individual to whom it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran, we have firmly
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of established tae general rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded
Telecommunications in Lucena City. He was summarily dismissed from the as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the
service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does
Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case No. not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
975 for the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya- remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the
Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual
appeal from the decision. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights.
petitioner with the CFI-Quezon. The trial court rendered its decision acquitting Unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence, it cannot bring back lost
petitioner of the offense charged. The petitioner sought reinstatement to his reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender
former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case but was denied by regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by
the Bureau of Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally
of the Philippines for executive clemency which was granted. The petitioner result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for
filed a claim for payment of back salaries with respondent COA but was denied reappointment, he is not entitled to backwages.
on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual,
the payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service. it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had
It appears that petitioner was recalled to the service but the records do not not been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon
show whether petitioner's reinstatement was to the same position of because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from
Supervising Lineman. The petitioner filed a claim to recover his back salaries all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean
but COA denied the claim stating that the executive clemency was silent on the name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
payment of back wages and that he had not rendered service during the period In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty
of his claim. The petitioner appealed to the OP which the latter denied. Hence, and consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted
the petitioner filed the instant petition. by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts
for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was
ISSUE founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that
petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him dismissal of petitioner and relieved him from administrative liability. The
innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern separation of the petitioner from the service being null and void, he is thus
and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioners innocence is the primary entitled to back wages.
reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the After having been declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft, which also
favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry of served as basis for the administrative charge, petitioner should not be
Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission. considered to have left his office for all legal purposes, so that he is entitled to
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely all the rights and privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office held,
obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him including back wages.
guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be
inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the
administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is L. Filing of Certificate of Candidacy
rendered automatically by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner PNOC Energy Devt Corp. v. NLRC GR 100947 May 31 1997
need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored FACTS
to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy
Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC), as subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Co.,
back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the from September 17, 1981, when he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989, when
start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust his employment was terminated. While holding the position of Geothermal
dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan
the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to Geothermal Project, Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of
back wages is afforded to those who have been illegally dismissed and were Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections filed the corresponding certificate of
thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges candidacy for the position. Objection to Pineda's being a candidate while
against them. There is no doubt that petitioners case falls within the situations retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was shortly thereafter registered by Mayor
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages. Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte. Pineda was among the official candidates
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result voted for, and eventually proclaimed elected to, the office of councilor. Some
of any criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold vacillation appears to have been evinced by Pineda at about this time. Pineda
public office, but is the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a wrote to the COMELEC Chairman expressing his desire to withdraw from the
branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as its head, has political contest on account of what he considered to be election irregularities
the power of control. The President's control has been defined to mean "the and to the Secretary of Justice seeking legal opinion on the question, among
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate others, of whether or not he was "considered automatically resigned upon . . .
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to the judgment of the filing of . . . (his) certificate of candidacy," and whether or not, in case he was
former for the latter." In pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, elected, he could "remain appointed to any corporate offspring of a government-
the Chief Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of owned or controlled corporation." Pineda took his oath of office as councilor-
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the elect of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. He also continued working for
PNOC-EDC as the latter's Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. PNOC-EDC filed an
Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City. Dept. appeal with the NLRC which the latter dismissed. PNOC-EDC filed an MR which
Manager Marcelino Tongco of PNOC-DEC inquired to the latters Legal was denied by the Commission.
Department regarding the status of Manuel S. Pineda as employee in view of his
candidacy for the office of municipal councilor. The Legal Department rendered ISSUE
an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipso facto WON an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporations without an
resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987, in original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless
accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. Pineda appealed the falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
ruling of the Legal Dept. to the VP of PNOC-EDC invoking the "court ruling in the
case of Caagusan and Donato vs. PNOC-Exploration Corp. . . . (to the effect that) HELD
while the government-owned or controlled corporations are covered by the Civil Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a government-owned or
Service Law (as is taken to mean in Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of controlled corporation does not lose its character as such because not possessed
1985) (sic), the subsidiaries or corporate offsprings are not." In the same letter of an original charter but organized under the general law. If a corporations
he declared his wish to continue resign from his position as councilor/member of capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is operated and managed by
the Sangguniang Bayan. Pineda wrote a letter to the Dept of Local Govt about officers charged with the mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it
his status of employment and the latter replied that there was no legal has been organized, it is a government-owned or controlled corporation even if
impediment to his continuing his employment with PNOC-EDC while holding at organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute; and
the same time the elective position of municipal councilor. PNOC-EDC notified employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor
Manuel S. Pineda in writing (1) that after having given him "ample time" to make Code, are nonetheless employees in government-owned or controlled
some major adjustments before . . . separation from the company," his corporations, and come within the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus
employment was being terminated pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them ipso facto resigned from * * office upon the
Election Code, effective upon receipt of notice, and (2) that he was entitled to filing of * * (their) certificate of candidacy.
"proper compensation" for the services rendered by him from the time he filed What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to
his certificate of candidacy until his actual separation from the service. Pineda officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal impleading PNOC-EDC and the Manager of those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not
its Engineering and Construction Department, Marcelino M. Tongco. having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the
The LA rendered a decision declaring Pineda's dismissal from the service illegal, Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66
and ordering his reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set
rights and payment of full back wages corresponding to the period from his forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

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