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United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginian 22134-5068
TITLE:
OPERATION CHROMITE: A Case Study for the National Maneuver Force Exercise Concept
AUTHOR:
AY 12-13
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iii
List of Tables
Page
iv
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
Background .............................................................................................................................. 1
Overview .................................................................................................................................. 7
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................. 16
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 19
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................................21
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 26
v
Executive Summary
Title: OPERATION CHROMITE: A Case Study for the National Maneuver Force Exercise
Concept of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Thesis: This paper will examine the continuing need for robust amphibious capabilities for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in order to respond to the evolving threats and security
challenges of the country. To highlight this requirement, the paper will explore the historical case
study of Operation Chromite.
Discussion: The Philippines faces an ever-evolving and complex set of security challenges in a
highly globalized world. According to its National Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016, the country
continues to confront internal security threats coming from a protracted communist insurgency
and a secessionist rebellion in parts of Mindanao. Disputes over territorial claims among nations
in the region add to the complexity of the challenges. Considering the strategic environment,
maritime interest, and the country's archipelagic landscape, there is no capability more functional
and indispensable to the AFP than the full spectrum of amphibious operations.
Operation Chromite draws inspiration for the resurgence of the amphibious philosophy in
the AFP to examine the methods, means, and applications of this capability and the factors for
consideration amidst the nation's security environment. As the security challenges continue to
become complex and uncertain, the AFP cannot merely remain as a national defense force
designed for internal and ground-dominant operations. It needs transformation into a national
security force capable of protecting the sovereignty over its territories and provide protection to
its maritime and other strategic interests. The strategic security challenges discussed necessitate
the introduction of a National Maneuver Force Exercise Concept that would empower the AFP to
adapt to changes faster in the internal/regional security environment. Accordingly, the
fundamental operational perspectives of Chromite will help to conceptualize the NMF Exercise
Concept intended to promote the utility of amphibious operations and manage change in the
AFP.
Conclusion: By reviewing the historical case study of Chromite, important lessons on the need
to maintain a trained and ready force for amphibious operations, the synergies of inter-service
collaboration, and the effectiveness of multinational forces were considered into the NMF
Exercise Concept. Perhaps more than anything else, Operation Chromite demonstrated that
amphibious capabilities have to be available to the AFP at the time of national crisis and
emergency.
vi
Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge the guidance and leadership from my thesis adviser, Dr.
Craig Swanson. His high standard of academic excellence set the conditions for this challenging
yet fulfilling endeavor. His vast experience as a Lt. Colonel in the United States Marine Corps,
proved invaluable in guiding me to frame my thoughts about the future of the Philippine Marine
Corps in particular, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in general.
I am also profoundly grateful to Dr. Chris Harmon and the Leadership Communication
Skills Center staff who have demonstrated unfailing support in giving me positive feedbacks
during the initial outline and draft of this paper.
Most importantly, I am indebted to my wife, Ann, and our children Liana, Katherine, and
Nico, for their patience, love, and encouragement during this Command and Staff Course that
often took me away from them. Your understandings have been inspiring and your presence
always reminded me what is most important in life. Last but not the least; I thank God for this
opportunity to be here in Quantico, for the unforgettable memories and for always being there for
me. To Him I give all the glory, honor, and praise.
vii
INTRODUCTION
The Philippines faces an ever-evolving and complex set of security challenges in a highly
globalized world. According to its National Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016, the country
"continues to confront internal security threats coming from a protracted communist insurgency
and a secessionist rebellion in parts of Mindanao. This is further aggravated by the existence and
activities of the terrorist Al Harakatol Al Islamiyah (AHAI) or the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
with its links to international terror networks." 1 Competition for limited resources among nations
in the region adds to the complexity of the challenges. This paper will examine the continuing
need for robust amphibious capabilities for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in order
to respond to these evolving threats and security challenges. To highlight this requirement, the
Background
The National Defense Act of 1935 was originally called the Commonwealth Act Number
1. This formal legislation was passed by the Philippine National Assembly with the purpose of
creating an independent Philippine Army in line with the move towards Philippines
Independence and self-sufficiency. Together with its amendments, this is still the policy that
governs most defense matters in the Philippines. This law, although very thorough in its
1
specifications, deals primarily with the organization and administration of ground forces. This
land orientation may be explained by the circumstances of its formulation--the Philippines was
then under American rule and relied on the defense umbrella of the United States forces
After the Philippines gained its Independence in 1946, the country continued to rely on
the US defense umbrella (which in the Pacific was dominated by the US Navy) through the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the Military Bases Agreement (MBA). During these years until the
termination of the MBA, the Armed Forces of the Philippines remained ground force dominant
with counterinsurgency as its major mission. With the US forces and MBA gone, new policies
and concepts are needed to fill the gap and address the evolving internal and external security
During the last decade, positive developments continue to permeate in the Asia-Pacific
Region; that speak well for peace and stability. Cooperative interdependence further boosts
economic growth among countries, thus reducing suspicion and possibilities for conflict. The use
promote greater peace and economic stability. Unfortunately, economic growth has unleashed
powerful political, social, and religious dynamics that now lead to tension and threaten national
security. 2
2
According to the AFP's Office of Strategic and Special Studies (OSS), 1 threats to the
security of the Philippines can either use military or non-military means; and internal or external.
Internal threats may come from a variety of threat groups, not only armed rebels, but also
terrorists, criminal group syndicates, religious fanatics, and other dissident groups. Government
response could potentially involve military and non-military actions. On the other hand, external
military threat situations can come in varying natures and degreeslow level, mid level and high
1
The AFP OSS is a personal staff of the AFP Chief of Staff under the functional supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. The
Office is envisioned to be the Think-Tank of the AFP with the mission of conducting research and studies on national, regional, and international
strategic issues and communicate the significance and implications of these concerns to various internal and external publics.
3
Escalated terroristic actions.
High-Level Threat Military objectives transcend Attack and occupation of
Situation political objectives. remote islands with strategic
Aim is to gain significant value.
military that would lead to a Attack and occupation of
favorable political settlement or major islands and population
outright occupancy. centers.
Substantial build-up of forces
Declaration of war likely.
Table 1: Estimate of Future External Threat Situations, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, AFP.
The OSS study also claims that threat can be perceived in a number of ways including
traditional military threats or action, environment degradation, illegal intrusion, violations of the
Relatedly, the NSP identifies various issues and concerns that impinge on national
security. Among them is the multilateral dispute over the Spratly Islands (KIG), which is "a
source of intermittent tensions due to the build-up of suspected military structures by some
claimant countries in the area." 3 Furthermore, the NSP describes that there have been clear
"encroachments into the Philippine EEZ requiring a response involving multilateral as well as
With Chinas latest rise as the worlds second largest economy, attention has focused
towards its direction due to its belligerent behavior coupled with its giant population, large
territory, and rapid industrial and technological advancements. Given these considerations, the
NSP relates that "the rise of China generates policy considerations not only among developed
countries such as the US, Japan and Korea, but also among the ASEAN nations due to socio-
cultural interactions, significant trade and investments, as well as territorial claims in the West
Philippine Sea." 5
4
The Philippines has been a natural place for disasters and emergencies over the years.
The entire archipelago is constantly exposed to at least 20 typhoons per year. Furthermore, the
Philippines lie in intersecting geologic fault lines that threaten earthquakes and tsunamis.
Aggravating these natural disasters are man-made catastrophes such as oil spills, and a power
supply crisis, among others. These calamities and crises result in the loss of lives, destruction of
properties that eventually causes public anxiety and sometimes socio-political instability. In
order to confront these disasters and emergencies, it is significant to develop the capability for
disaster response and relief operations to deliver those critical basic services in time of need
The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 2013-2018 is a document that provides directions
for conducting the program and budget development process in the Department of Defense.
Under the DPG, it was determined that the following core defense and security issues are of
greatest concern: Challenges to Territorial Integrity; Maritime Security; Natural Disasters; and
Internal Security. While the countrys security concerns remain static, the DPG prescribes the
levels of priority given to each core concern in light of the recent developments in both the
national and regional environment. Accordingly, the DPG stipulates that the AFP needs to
enhance its capabilities not only for internal security challenges but also for externally related
threats. Paramount is the protection of the country's economic and maritime interests especially
in the West Philippines seas through flexible deterrent options. Among the defense initiatives
being explored is the development of a capability to respond within 48 hours anywhere in the
Philippine territory to a given threat or conduct of military operations other than war.
5
Considering the strategic environment, maritime interest, and its archipelagic landscape, there is
no capability more functional and indispensable than the full spectrum of amphibious operations.
operating concept that would empower the AFP to adapt to changes faster in the internal/regional
security environment.
The NMF is the strategic option intended to manage the issue on how the AFP will
address its core security challenges. In essence, the rationale for the NMF is to provide the
national leadership with the capability to counter its security challenges and respond to current
and future security and defense contingencies. This includes "securing offshore territories,
denying bases to an enemy posing a direct threat to the sovereignty, moving forces around the
archipelago, deploying to overseas operational areas and supporting disaster and humanitarian
Considering that the Philippines is a state composed of more than 7,000 islands,
watercraft are indispensable in inland waterways as much as in the internal sea waterways. This
is also because of the relative lack of railways, roads, and airfields in remote areas. This premise
conflict. The question then, is how the AFP with its culture of land warfare based around
infantry, is going to adapt its organizational culture and methods to operating within a maritime
environment. Further, after securing the concept documentation and approval, what program
6
One of the ways to overcome the cultural gap is to conceptualize the NMF Exercise
Concept that will integrate service forces together in order to develop a tradition and culture of
amphibious operations. This is no easy step given that the AFP as a whole, places little premium
ability to capture appropriate lessons, which can provide insights into a way forward in
Accordingly, the NMF Exercise Concept is also a strategic training intervention that
becomes the key element to support and influence the concept writing, force structure decisions,
and capability development programs of the NMF. Considering that the past is filled with many
of the lessons for the future, Operation Chromite will be used as a case study to examine the key
factors that are relevant to the Philippines' security challenges. Accordingly, the fundamental
operational perspectives of Chromite will also help to conceptualize the NMF Exercise Concept
intended to promote the utility of amphibious operations and manage change in the AFP.
Overview
The history of Korea's post-World War II division is full of intricacies. Both the Cairo
and Potsdam Conferences affirmed an agreement for a joint US-Soviet Union occupation force
to administer the country and plan for its eventual unification. 7 However, difficulties cropped up
when both the United States and the Soviet Union insisted on an independent state ideologically
compatible with their own views. This is reflective of the ongoing Cold War in Eastern Europe
7
Eventually, the 38th parallel that had previously been intended to be an administrative
demarcation line between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the
Republic of Korea (South Korea) became a physical barrier that was to have a major political
significance. By June 1949, both occupation forces left their respective sector. Unfortunately,
they left behind a divided country with two hostile camps in place of what was supposed to be a
unified nation. 8 As tensions continued to ensue between the Communist North Korea and the
US-supported South Korea, the US was content to leave to the United Nation's commission the
Years of reduced defense budgets followed the demobilization after World War II and
left US ground forces weak. According to Robert Heinl Jr., the majority of defense resources
were being channelled to strategic air forces in the belief that nuclear weapons would be the
main component of US defense policy and force structure. 9 This is understandable during the
given period because of the US monopoly on the atomic bomb. However, the outbreak of the
Korean War revealed the need for conventional ground forces to deal with a non-nuclear war.
Additionally, bitter rivalries to justify newly assigned component missions and lay claim to
scarce resources continued to hamper the unity of the US services. 10 Strategic reserves were
almost non-existent, which meant that in case of a Korean War, the initial stages would be
conducted with a depleted force. Therefore, the problem was on not only how much support the
US could give to South Korea but also on how much was necessary to maintain a capacity to
respond against potential communist aggression in the US mainland, Europe, and other areas of
strategic importance. In effect, the foreign policy was to minimize flashpoints with the Soviet
Union. This gave priority to those risks involved in the US defensive perimeter that
unfortunately did not include Korea. In a speech on January 12, 1951, Secretary Dean Acheson
8
indicated that Korea was not within the "defensive parameter" that the US would be willing to
fight and defend. 11 Many people later saw this as an open invitation to communist aggression in
Korea.
The Korean War was a complex integration of various conflicts. From the perspective of
Koreans on both sides, it was primarily a civil war. For the US and China in relation to each
other, it was a regional war. For the US and the USSR, it was a secondary theater of the Cold
War.
For the North Koreans, the objective of the war was to reunify the two Koreas. Since it
was difficult to accomplish this politically, the North Koreans resorted to military means to gain
a political end. It may seem that Secretary Achesons dismissive public posturing toward the
defense of South Korea had convinced Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin that the US would do little
to thwart a communist takeover of the entire peninsula. 12 Thus, on June 25, 1950, armed and
supported by the Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the North Koreans struck
and overwhelmed the unprepared South Korea. The invasion was composed of around 135,000
Soviet trained North Korean troops crossing the 38th parallel, accompanied by 150 Soviet tanks.
South Koreas 16,000-man constabulary force was ill-equipped to repel the invaders, and
Syngman Rhees government was forced to vacate the capital of Seoul on June 28th. 13 The US
initially turned to the United Nations for a response to the Korean crisis. Mr. Bryan Hardesty
narrates, "during the initial stage of the crisis, the White House ordered General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander of US Armed Forces in the Far East stationed in Tokyo, to
coordinate naval and air support for American evacuations from South Korea. The US Seventh
9
Fleet was also deployed to Formosa, preventing war from erupting between exiled Chinese
Nationalists and the communists on mainland China." 14 On June 29, 1950, Task Force Smith
composed of approximately 540 US soldiers who posted as clerks and sentries in Japan, were
assembled to assist the overwhelmed South Korean forces. With South Koreans fleeing in panic,
Task Force Smith faced the communist invaders alone and were quickly defeated. 15
The backdrop of Operation Chromite exposed a US that was ill prepared to react to a
major regional conflict banking on World War III. On June of 1950, its Armed Forces were in a
deplorable condition. Clay Blair commented that "in comparison, five years earlier the US had
spent $50 billion on its Army; in 1950, it only projected $13 billion." 16 He further compared that
during the height of World War II, there were 12 million men and women in uniform; in 1950,
there were less than 600,000 ground troops. 17 Politics and the economy were President Harry
Trumans administrative platform. This would remain so until the Korean War literally forced a
change wherein the US had to intervene but with limitations in order to prevent escalation of the
As the fighting in Korea escalated, the United Nations put out a call to arms from its
members to defend South Korea. In an astonishing act of humanity and selflessness, the
Philippines sent 7,500 soldiers to defend Pusan against the massive communist invasion despite
its having to contend with a communist rebellion of its own and the painful challenge of
rebuilding an economy crippled by World War II. The Philippines was the first Asian country to
send combat troops to the Korean War and kept its military position there until 1955.
By August of 1950, the US and UN forces in South Korea found themselves reeling back
into a tight perimeter defense at the south eastern tip of the peninsula called Pusan. Amidst the
determined onslaught of the North Koreans, the country faced the grim possibility of succumbing
10
to global communism. It was at this critical point that one of the most daring and successful
Operations Plan 100 B, with code name Chromite, was conceptualized as a bold
amphibious envelopment through Seouls western coastal port of Inchon on September 15, 1950.
From the beginning, General Douglas MacArthur, who was designated as Commander of the UN
Forces in Korea, already visualized a Marine Division assault force with a follow-on Army
Division to strike behind the enemy, sever its lines of communication, and end the war.
Americas wartime objectives were simple: dislodge the enemy out of South Korea; and re-
establish peace on US terms by ending the war as quickly as possible while keeping casualties to
a minimum.
Although completely victorious during the initial stages of their invasion, the North
Koreans encountered a standoff around the Pusan perimeter when the US Eighth Army and UN
forces gallantly made a determined stand against the communists' onslaught. The weakness of
the enemy's extended lines of communication became apparent to MacArthur very early on as
the North Koreans stalled and exposed its vulnerable rear to a decisive counterblow.
amphibious maneuver and interdiction to attack the enemy's centers of gravity. To accomplish
the mission, US and Allied forces would have to establish and maintain naval and air superiority
in the area of operations; conduct an amphibious assault on Inchon; secure a beachhead line and
seizure of Kimpo airfield; cross the Han River and recapture the capital; and establish blocking
11
positions around Seoul to provide the anvil against which the Eighth Army, advancing from the
The actual landing on September 15, 1950 was a masterstroke. According to intelligence
reports and MacArthur's intuition, Inchon proved lightly defended, resulting to the effective
execution of the landing and breakout phase. Thereafter, the recapturing of Seoul and the linkup
with the Eighth Army that had broken out from the southern defense perimeter was completed.
In retrospect, despite various challenges and doubts from peers and superiors, MacArthur
remained undeterred in pursuing his war in Korea. As such, the preconditions for victory were
somehow in place early on the conceptualization and planning stages. The combination of US
and UN naval and air supremacy ensured that the outcome was a foregone conclusion. However,
the most critical element of the operation was General MacArthurs resolve to conduct an
amphibious operation at Inchon instead of the locations preferred by the Joint Chiefs and other
service leaders, which all seemed more prudent than Inchon. Indeed, reinforcing more troops into
the Pusan Perimeter, or envelopment from Kunsan, would not have ended up with the results
achieved: the complete disruption of the enemy's lines of communication and the liberation of
Seoul.
As a center of gravity, Seoul was the hub of all movement in the South and became the
most critical node in the supply line of the communist attack. MacArthur knew that the city had
immense symbolic value and retaking it would be psychologically demoralizing to the enemy.
Thus, instead of simply pushing the North Koreans to back off from Pusan, Operation Chromite
was designed to completely unhinge the enemy forces by hitting them from the rear.
12
MacArthurs timing and decision ensured a quick victory without resorting to a slow and bloody
engagement.
Operation Chromite was brilliant in its concept and execution with complete adherence to
the principles of war. The hastily organized 1st Marine Division and US Army forces that took
on and defeated the North Koreans were just a fraction of their size during World War II, but
were equipped and organized in the same way employing the same doctrines. Massive firepower
and superior leadership remained the centerpieces of US forces that checked the North Koreans.
On the other hand, the operation serves to reinforce lessons and illustrates various dynamics of a
military campaign that are relevant to the AFPs security challenges. The immediate results
highlight the need to maintain a trained and ready force for amphibious operations. It also
These assessments are to be considered into the NMF Exercise Concept in order to ensure the
The demands and success of Chromite demonstrated the need for US readiness and
capability to conduct amphibious operations. Prior to the landing in Inchon, there had been
pronouncements among many US military and political leaders that amphibious operations were
outdated. Critics judged that airpower was making this conventional operation obsolete. In
contrast, the Battle of Inchon demonstrates how decisive a force-in-readiness can be and
highlights the significance of amphibious warfare even in the advent of airpower. The Inchon
13
landing had a very high operational tempo as the 1st Marine Division advanced directly and
rapidly on to Seoul in order to ease the pressure from the Pusan defense perimeter. In ten days,
the North Koreans were broken and defeated whereby the Battle of Inchon was won.
Perceptions after the fact showed that even the Marine Corps was not ready during the
time when General MacArthur requested them for the Inchon landing. It was only through the
mobilization of many World War II combat veterans in the Marine Corps Reserve that the 1st
Marine Division was manned, thereby making the Inchon assault possible. 18 The US realized it
could no longer rely on wartime mobilization and expansion for national security. The crucial
determinant was not on the time, place, or method of Operation Chromite. What counted most
was the availability of highly skilled amphibious specialists and the rapidity by which they were
employed at a time when majority of US forces were unprepared for war. 19 Given that the
requirement still existed for the US to be capable of conducting amphibious operations and that
the Fleet-Marine tandem was the best trained and constituted for this mission. The implications
of these lessons draw inspiration for the resurgence of the amphibious philosophy in the AFP to
examine the methods, means, and applications of this capability and to consider the factors (both
men and materiel) to promote a force-in-readiness that is able to respond to crises and national
emergencies.
During the initial stages of the Korean conflict, senior officers constantly battled
colleagues among and within the different services over command and control. As the Army
advocated for close air support to forces in contact with the enemy, it was disputed by the Air
14
Forces position to first establish air superiority. Navy admirals also did not want to tie down
their forces to amphibious commanders and had their own understanding of how to use forces to
best effect. 20 However, MacArthur's dominance was able to provide the vision for staff and
execution, the maxim of current joint operations was being practiced. MacArthur authored the
concept development and then established supported commanders in their areas of operation
Lt. General Walton Walker within the Pusan Perimeter, Lt. General George Stratemeyer in
overall air support operations, and Vice Admiral Arthur Struble in the amphibious objective.
Operation Chromite highlights that joint requirements and doctrine through inter-
normally misunderstood even today, is the thought that amphibious operation is a Navy-Marine
fight. However, Chromite has depicted that the range of amphibious operations might in fact be
the most joint of all military operations. There is an inherent interplay of the Fleet-Marine
tandem, but the Air Force, and the Army all had roles in the successful execution of MacArthur's
masterstroke. Additionally, the military operation in Inchon was not done in isolation. At the
high end of the intensity spectrum, the synchronization of air, sea, and land operations was
important in the theater in order to accomplish the strategic objective. In the final analysis,
Chromite was successful because the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps conducted it
jointly. This realization underscores the need for the AFP to employ a joint force to create
synergies among the services and yield greater combat power and capabilities to respond to
15
3. Coalition Forces
Twenty-two countries worldwide contributed coalition military forces to the Korean War
under the United Nations command. As mentioned, the United States was woefully unprepared
to confront the communist aggression. On July 1950, the coalition of democratic nations drew
the line and fought a military aggression for their collective security.
From the prospect of the United Nations, the Korean War was a success story how an
organization of multinational military forces led by the US, exercised its command, and
successfully reversed territorial incursions of an aggressor state. Although U.S. military power
remains supreme, it cannot be a substitute for coalitions and the effective use of local and
international forces. The critical readiness factor learned from Chromite is on the recognition of
the limits of US military power. Therefore, it is essential to leverage other capabilities from
partner-nations in order to achieve the desired end states. As Winston Churchill said, "the only
thing worse than having allies is not having them at all." 21 Former US Secretary of Defense,
Robert Gates, additionally stated that multinational partners provide balance, credibility, and
legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world. Therefore, the effective ability of the AFP and
multinational partners to collaborate and cooperate will have a profound impact on joint force
DISCUSSION
The NMF operating concept looks sound on paper but does not always prove effective in
the real world of moving parts. The synchronization of the joint/combined maneuver does not
come out naturally even for a small organization such as the AFP. Many problems and
challenges arise during amphibious operations especially in the areas of command relationships
16
and logistics. It is an accepted truism that forces fight as they have trained. Thus,
conceptualization of the NMF Exercise Concept will permit greater coordination, efficiency, and
availability of effects.
Traditionally, joint or combined exercises are generally a "cut and paste" endeavor from
planning to execution. It has not deviated from the traditional training areas nor traditional
schemes. In fact, AFP exercises have never been joint and bilateral engagements with foreign
can now incorporate and institutionalize responsive annual implementing schemes that will
maintain unit readiness. As the master construct, NMF Exercise Concept would more clearly
guide the individual services in training and equipping forces for the joint fight.
As the AFP struggles to adjust its force structure to the demands of national security, the
time for jointness has never been greater as depicted from Chromite. The need for jointness
based on the proven military theory and history, prescribes that the NMF concept employ of a
brigade-size contingent composed of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Units,
Consequently, the NMF Exercise Concept can take the lead in ending some inter-service
rivalry and competition for roles and missions in the AFP. Each service will now be guided to
focus on developing its unique capabilities rather than continuously shifting gears in response to
perceived threats. If this is done, then each service will then be better prepared when called on
for joint missionstruly reflecting unique force capability mix to the detriment of the enemy.
Lastly, based on the pragmatic assessment of the key considerations for the success of
Operation Chromite, the NMF Exercise Concept becomes a vehicle to harness interoperability
and strengthen camaraderie with the US and allies as part of the coalition tenets of Chromite.
17
The NMF Exercise Concept Proposal
The definition and evaluation of the NMF capability will continue based on the relative
merits of whether two or three different types of quick reaction forces (ground and air elements)
best serve its purpose. The proposals intent is to gain informed insights that will enable the
planning. The medium term decision is to acquire the capability to deploy two (2) National
address major contingencies in any part of the archipelago at the same time. Based on the
assessment from Operation Chromite and the policies of national government, an ideal NMF
In the long term, the stationing of an NMF in each major island group is the desired
solution.
As the need for exercise remains relevant to the readiness of the AFP, other lessons-
learned from Operation Chromite helped in the conceptualization of the NMF Exercise Concept
Framework (Annex A)
18
CONCLUSION:
dynamic experience and leadership understood the need to have highly skilled amphibious forces
ready to undertake the Inchon landing. Readiness refers to more than manning and equipment. It
also centers on unit leadership and the proficiency of the men in the operational art. Second, joint
forces were employed, creating synergies among the services and yielded greater combat power
to respond to the North Korean threat. Finally, the conflict brought to the fore a demand for
coalition forces to respond to the crisis. UN forces allowed for a better understanding of the
conflict and provided novel ways and resources to approach and win in conjunction with military
capabilities.
Operation Chromite draws inspiration for the resurgence of the amphibious philosophy in
the AFP to examine the methods, means, and applications of this capability and the factors for
consideration amidst the nation's security environment. As the security challenges in the
environment continue to become complex and uncertain, the AFP cannot merely remain as a
national defense force designed for internal and ground-dominant operations. It needs
transformation into a national security force capable of protecting the sovereignty over its
territories and provide protection to its maritime and other strategic interests.
readiness, joint operations and coalition forces were considered into the NMF Exercise Concept,
thus, ensuring the effective utility of amphibious operations within the strategic framework in
which NMF has been conceived. This will also serve as the AFP's contribution to the
joint/combined force of the PH-US Theater Security Cooperation Strategy deemed essential in
achieving or facilitating the achievement of both US and Philippines strategic and policy goals.
19
Perhaps more than anything else, Operation Chromite demonstrated that amphibious capabilities
have to be available to the AFP at the time of national crisis and emergency.
20
Appendix A
i. Organization
1. Ground Component
2. Surface Component
3. Air Component
ii. Capabilities
1. Ground Combat
2. Special Operations
3. Surface Action
4. Air interdiction
5. Sea Lift
21
d. Exercise Construct
22
e. Implementing Schemes
i.Fleet-Marine Exercise
ii.Joint Exercise
iii.Combined Exercise
f. Benefits
23
END NOTES
1
Philippine National Security Policy 2011-2016.
2
Philippine NSP, p. 15.
3
Philippine NSP, p. 30
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Peter J. Dean. Amphibious Warfare: Lessons from the Past for the ADF's Future. Security
Challenges Journal (Autumn 2011). p 18.
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePages/vol8no1Dean.html
7
James F. Schnabel. Policy and Direction: The First Year. Washington D.C.: 1972. p 12-14.
8
Ibid., p 17-18.
9
Robert D. Heinl Jr. Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign. New York: The
Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1982. p. 56.
10
Schnabel, p. 246.
11
William Stuech. The Korean War: An International History. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press. 1995. p. 30.
12
Bryan Hardesty. The Cold War Years: The American Testimony, Book 7. Texas: 2007.
http://www.history2u.com/book7_cold_war.htm
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Warren Hickey. The Korean War: West Confronts Communism. New York: The Overlook
Press, 1999. p. 85
16
Clay Blair. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953. New York: Times Books, 1987.
17
Blair, p. 7-8.
18
Montross, Lynn and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC. US Marine Operations in Korea Vol.
1. Washington D.C.: 1955. p. 49.
19
Ibid.
24
20
Jacob Neufeld. Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War 1950-1953. Maryland: 2002. p. 44-
45.
21
Piers Brendon. Sir Winston Churchill: Biographical History. Cambridge, U.K: 1984.
http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/churchill_papers/the_papers/
25
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cagle, Malcolm W. and Frank A. Manson. The Sea War in Korea. Annapolis, MD: 1957.
Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953. New York: 1961.
Montross, Lynn and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC. US Marine Operations in Korea.
Washington D.C.: 1955.
Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953. New York: 1961.
Schnabel, James. Policy and Direction: The First Year. Washington D.C.: 1972.
Neufeld, Jacob. Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War 1950-1953. Maryland: 2002.
Brendon, Piers. Sir Winston Churchill: Biographical History. Cambridge, U.K: 1984.
http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/churchill_papers/the_papers/
Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953. New York: Times Books, 1987.
Hickey, Warren. The Korean War: West Confronts Communism. New York: 2000.
Dean, Peter J. Amphibious Warfare: Lessons from the Past for the ADF's Future. Security
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http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePages/vol8no1Dean.html
Hardesty, Bryan. The Cold War Years: The American Testimony, Book 7. Texas: 2007.
http://www.history2u.com/book7_cold_war.htm
26