FIRST DIVISION

NURHIDA JUHURI G.R. No. 182497

AMPATUAN,
Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - CORONA, C.J.,

Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. PEREZ, JJ.
MACARAIG, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MANILA,
BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR
GENERAL AVELINO RAZON,
JR., DIRECTOR GEARY
BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M.
CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF
INSPECTOR AGAPITO Promulgated:
QUIMSON,
Respondents. June 29, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------
- -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65[1] of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied the petition
for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in behalf of
her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan[2] (PO1 Ampatuan).

Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was
assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was
asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff
Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1
Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the
Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of
his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to
the General Santos CityAirport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane
bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan
was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim
by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was
then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the
killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then
detained at the Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1
Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan
was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group
in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.[3]

Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson

Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. [4] The Order
was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent
Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release
PO1 Ampatuan.

This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the RTC of Manila, Branch 37.[5]

Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They

narrated that at around 7:08 oclock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-
four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the
COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and
Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police
District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as
PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD
District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were
conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto,

rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding
probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and
recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against
PO1 Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of which reads:

CHARGE SHEET

THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby

charges above-named respondent of the administrative offense of Grave
Misconduct (murder) pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 8551 [6] in relation to
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as follows:
 That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in
M.H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named
respondent while being an active member of the PNP and within the
jurisdiction of this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds which
directly cause (sic) his death.

Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.[7]

Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General

Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital
Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive
custody, thus:

1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re

Arrest of PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty.
Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC
Legal Officers.

2. This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in

Section 52 of RA 8551, to place police personnel under
restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave
administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of
a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police
personnel.

3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1

Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig
and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers,
under your restrictive custody.

4. For strict compliance.[8]

 On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008,
respondent Police Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the
Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan.[9]

On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director
Edgardo E. Acua, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional
Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:

Restrictive Custody

PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive

custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008.
(Reference: Memorandum from CPNP dated 18 April 2008).

BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:

[10]

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended

that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the
latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal
grounds.[11]

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila Citys

Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April
2008. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and was
raffled to Branch 37.
On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan
and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or
restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.[12]

On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:

Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser

Ampatuan is being illegally detained by the respondents despite the
order of release of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21,
2008. They further claim that as of April 23, 2008, no administrative
case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan.

Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was

filed against PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under restrictive
custody since he is facing an administrative case for grave
misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge Evaluation
Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their position,
respondents cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R.
No. 178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP personnel
under restrictive custody. They claim that this is authorized under
Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to place
the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of
administrative case for grave misconduct.

Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1

Ampatuan was ante-dated to make it appear that there was such a case
filed before April 23, 2008.

The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of ones

detention, meaning, if there is sufficient cause for deprivation or
confinement and if there is none to discharge him at once. For habeas
corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom which must be actual and
effective, not nominal or moral.

Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the

Court cannot simply ignore the filing of an administrative case filed
against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the PNP has its own
administrative disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the
 respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan under
restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.

The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a

process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the
release of the subject police officer.
Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter
resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot
and academic, the same could not be accepted by this Court. It must be
stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate
police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed
while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas

corpus is hereby DISMISSED.[13]

Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition

for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the validity of the
RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN
WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE,
ILLEGAL;

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF
RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR.
4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE
CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;

III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL
DUTY TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN
FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG PULIS.
[14]
 Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.[15]

Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed
in the issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:

RULE 102

HABEAS CORPUS

SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise

expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.

SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any
time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances
authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof,
or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision
on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable
only within his judicial district.

xxxx

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it

appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
 charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or

detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of
the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the
filing of the application.[16]

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however,
should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial
process or a valid judgment.[17]

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or
placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
[18]
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.[19]

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether

or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for
a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal
or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient.[20]

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the
writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where
such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then
the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused.[21]

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course
or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion
is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the
court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.[22]

Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody
of respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against
him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served
upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case filed
against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1
Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest
issued by any judicial authority against him.

On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment[23] filed by the Office of

the Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject
petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said
recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was
filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to other
legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the instant case, PO1
Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. They cited
the case of Manalo v. Calderon,[24] where this Court held that a petition
for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.[25]

The Solicitor General is correct.

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive

Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and
Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also
known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998),
clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the
disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly
designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal
discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:

Sec. 52 x x x.

xxxx

4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary
punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of
salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one
hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the Chief of
the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under
restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative
case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint,
grave in nature, against such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a
restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers
under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint
of liberty.[26]

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit
of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure
the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.[27]
 Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive custody is the administrative
case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.

We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody
since 19 April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should have
already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been
rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No.
8551, which provides:

SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of
a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and
one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however,
That if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant
and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension of the accused
PNP member even if the charge is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6)
years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That the preventive suspension shall not
be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the disposition of the case is
due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent: Provided, finally, That
such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency of
the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject
to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)

Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, we have to dismiss the petition.
 In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is
entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully
deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 178920 October 15, 2007

SPO2 GERONIMO MANALO, SPO2 LEO MORCILLA, PO3 RICO M.

LANDICHO, PO2 ROMEO MEDALLA, JR., SPO2 WILLIAM RELOS, JR.,
P/INSP. ROBERTO N. MARINDA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PNP CHIEF OSCAR CALDERON, HON. P/DIR. GEARY BARIAS,
Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, Camp Crame,
HON. REGIONAL DIRECTOR, POLICE CHIEF SUPT. NICASIO J. RADOVAN,
HON. POLICE SR. SUPT. AARON DEOCARES FIDEL, HON. POLICE SR.
SUPT. LUISITO DE LEON, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

ANG isang petisyon para sa habeas corpus ay bibigyan daan lamang kung
ito ay nagpapakita na ang nagpepetisyon ay ipinipiit o pinipigilan ang
kalayaan nang labag sa batas. Ang mahigpit na pangangalaga at ang pag-
monitor ng galaw o kinaroroonan ng mga pulis na sumasailalim sa
imbestigasyon ng kanilang pamunuan ay hindi isang uri ng ipinagbabawal
na pagpiit o pagpigil sa kanilang kalayaan.

A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that
petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive
custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of
liberty.

Filed on August 7, 2007, this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus assails the restrictive custody and monitored movements of petitioners
SPO2 Geronimo Manalo, PO3 Leo Morcilla, PO3 Rico M. Landicho, PO2 Romeo
Medalla, Jr., SPO2 William Relos, Jr., PInsp. Roberto D. Marinda, by the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Region 4-A, after they were implicated in the
burning of an elementary school in Taysan, Batangas at the height of the May
2007 national and local elections.
Petitioners were formerly police operatives assigned at the Regional Special
Operations Group, PNP Region 4-A, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City, Laguna.
When their petition was filed, they were detailed at the Regional Headquarters
Support Group at the same Camp under a restrictive custody status.

Respondents Oscar Calderon, Geary Barias, Nicasio Radovan, Aaron Deocares

Fidel, and Luisito De Leon were, at the time of filing of the petition, the Chief of
the PNP, the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, the
Regional Director and Police Sr. Superintendents, respectively.

The Facts

The facts, as reflected in the petition and its annexes, are as follows:

On May 15, 2007, at around 3:00 a.m., five unidentified malefactors bearing high-
powered firearms suddenly appeared at the Barangay Pinagbayanan Elementary
School in the Municipality of Taysan, Province of Batangas. Earlier, the entire
school grounds were converted into a polling area for the 2007 national and local
elections. The five armed men forcibly entered Polling Precinct 76-A, and poured
gasoline over a ballot box. Then they fired several rounds of ammunitions at the
premises, setting it ablaze.1

The conflagration caused the death of a school teacher, Ritchel (Nellie) Banaag,
who was then acting as an election supervisor. A poll watcher in the person of
Leticia (Letty) Ramos also perished while nine others were reportedly injured as
a result of the fire.2

In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses identified some of

petitioners as the perpetrators of the school burning.3 The investigation also
yielded that all six petitioners, who are all members of the PNP Regional Special
Operations Group (PNP-RSOG), failed to timely respond to the incident at the
Pinagbayanan Elementary School.4

Acting on the report, the PNP hierarchy issued three successive memoranda
dated May 18, May 22 and June 28, 2007, to wit:

A. MEMORANDUM

FOR : TDPRM
FROM : TDIDM
SUBJECT : Order for Restrictive Custody of
PCINSP ELPIDIO RAMIREZ, et al.
 DATE : May 18, 2007
-------------------------------------------------------------

1. Reference: Memo from TDIDM with subject: Special Report re Alleged

Arson in Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas which was
approved by the C, PNP.

2. This pertains to the investigation being conducted regarding the

reported involvement of personnel from PRO 4A-RSOG in the fire incident
in Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas on May 15, 2007
resulting in the death of two (2) teachers and wounding of several others.

3. In this connection, request issue orders putting in restrictive custody the

following PNP personnel:

PCINSP ELPIDIO A RAMIREZ

PINSP RUEL C DELA CRUZ
PINSP ROBERTO N MARINDA
SPO2 William Relos, Jr.

(SGD.)
GEARY L. BARIAS
Police Director5

B. MEMORANDUM

To : GD, RHSG
From : Regional Director
Subject : Monitoring of PCOs and PNCOs
Date : May 22, 2007
--------------------------------------------------------

1. References:

a. Verbal instruction of RD, PRO, CALABARZON, dated May 22,

2007; and

b. S.O. No. 274 dated May 17, 2007, PRO, CALABARZON.

 2. Above references pertains to the relief of PINSP ROBERTO D.
MARINDA, SPO2 William D. Relos, SPO2 Leo V. Morcilla, SPO2
Geronimo R. Manalo, PO3 Rico M. Landicho and PO2 Romeo E. Medalla,
Jr, from their respective unit assignment and subsequent reassignment to
that office.

3. In connection thereof, subject PCO and PNCOs should be properly

accounted from time to time taking into consideration the following:

a. All their movements within camp should be monitored;

b. When situation warrants their movement outside camp, they

should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and

c. A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said

PCO and PNCOs, their place of destination, name of escort,
Estimated Time of Departure (ETD) and Estimated Time of Return to
Station (ETRS).

4. Further inform the Regional Director and the Command Group thru
Chief, Regional Directorial Staff of any unusual incident or movement
involving subject PCOs and PNCOs.

5. This Order takes effect immediately.

BY AUTHORITY OF PCSUPT RADOVAN, JR.:

(SGD.)
AARON DEOCARES FIDEL, CSEE
Police Senior Superintendent (DSC)
Chief, Regional Directorial Staff6

C. MEMORANDUM

FOR : GD, RHSG 4A

FROM : Chief, RPHRDD
SUBJECT : Order for Restrictive Custody of
PINSP ROBERTO NAZ MARINDA and
SPO2 William Dizon Relos, Jr.
DATE : June 28, 2007
------------------------------------------------------
 1. References

a. Memorandum from TDPRM dated May 23, 2007;

b. Memorandum from Chief, RLS 4A June 19, 2007 noted by RD,

PRO 4A

2. This is in connection with the reported involvement of PRO 4A-RSOG

personnel to the fire incident on May 15, 2007 at Pinagbayanan
Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas

3. Please be informed that pursuant to reference 1.a., orders are being

issued by this Office placing following named PNP personnel
under Restrictive Custody (in view of the investigation being conducted
against them) effective this date, namely:

PINSP ROBERTO NAZ MARINDA

SPO2 William Dizon Relos, Jr.

4. In this regard, inform concerned personnel and adjust your records

accordingly.

5. For information and be guided accordingly.

(SGD.)
IRENEO DIZON BORDAS
Police Senior Superintendent DSG
Chief, RPHRDD7

Petitioners contend that the May 22, 2007 Memorandum "defines and
circumscribes the scope of petitioners restrictive custody" status;8 that "although
technically speaking, petitioners as PNP officer are not detained or imprisoned,
their physical movements are, however, limited only within Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba City, Laguna; they cannot go home to their respective families and if
they would leave Camp Vicente Lim they need to be escorted;"9 "that petitioners
restrictive custody status is illegal" and "not sanctioned by any existing provision
of our constitution and laws;"10 that "it is degrading," "summarily and arbitrarily
imposed on the basis of mere suspicion and it actually makes PNP members
enjoy lesser rights than what are actually enjoyed by ordinary citizens."11

Petitioners further posit that what is only sanctioned is preventive suspension

under which they can enjoy liberty and go home to their families pending
administrative investigation. Hence, they urge, this practice by the PNP
organization should be put to a stop.

In support of their petition, petitioners principally rely on the case of Moncupa v.

Enrile, et al.,12 where it was essentially held that the writ of habeas corpus applies
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty.

The ruling holds true even if petitioners are released but continue to be denied
one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom, originally valid has, in the light
of subsequent developments, become arbitrary.

They also cite Villavicencio v. Lukban,13 where certain women were illegally
transported against their will from Manila to Davao. There they were forced to
change their domicile and some of them returned to Manila. Yet, this Court
condemned the involuntary restraints on petitioners, fined the City Mayor of
Manila and hoped the decision would serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.

Petitioners thus pray that a writ of habeas corpus be issued, commanding the
respondents to produce the bodies of petitioners before the Court, to explain the
lawful cause of their detention and deprivation of physical liberties and,
thereafter, for this Court to adjudge their restrictive custody status as illegal and
to set them free.

Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court required
respondents to comment.

In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that by
Memorandum Order of August 30, 2007,14 respondent Radovan, Director of PNP
Regional Office 4-A, has recalled, effective immediately, the assailed restrictive
custody order embodied in the two Memoranda dated May 22 and June 28,
2007. In view of the recall, it is prayed that the petition be dismissed on ground of
mootness.

Issues

Two critical issues are thus posed for our determination. One, by petitioners, on
whether or not they are unlawfully detained or restrained of their liberty under
their restrictive custody status. Two, by respondents, on whether the Court
should dismiss the petition on the sole ground of mootness, the assailed orders
having been recalled, or proceed to decide the petition on the merits.

We shall resolve them in the reverse order, dealing with the procedural ahead of
the substantive question.

Our Ruling

I. This Court, By Way Of Exceptions,

Decides Moot Issues

Notwithstanding the mootness of the issues on restrictive custody and monitoring

of movements of petitioners, We opt to resolve them given (a) the paramount
public interest involved, (b) their susceptibility of recurring yet evading review and
(c) the imperative need to educate the police community on the matter.

Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa

mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody) at pagmonitor ng galaw
(monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a)
dahil sa nangingibabaw na interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito, (b) dahil
sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang
maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito.

The release of petitioners by respondents in a petition for habeas corpus does

not automatically abate a decision on the case. Similarly, a recall of the custody
order challenged by petitioners will not necessarily call for a dismissal on the
ground of mootness alone. Although the general rule is mootness of the issue
warrants a dismissal, there are well-defined exceptions.

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,15 twenty-six (26) petitioners
were released from custody and one withdrew during the pendency of the
petition. The fact that the petition was rendered moot and academic did not
prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one
of the most voluminous decisions ever.

Even petitioners cite Tibo v. The Provincial Commander16 and Toyoto, et al. v.
Ramos, et al.,17 where respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that petitioners had been temporarily released and
their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. This Court, as
in Moncupa, chose to decide the said cases. The Court sustained petitioners
plea that their case be considered moot and academic only "if their release would
be permanent."
In Acop, et al. v. Guingona, Jr.,18 petitioning PNP officers questioned, via petition
for injunction, the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela
Cruz into the Witness Protection Program. Petitioners contended that under
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers like the said SPO2 are
disqualified from being admitted into the program, though they may be testifying
against other law enforcement officers.

In its comment, the OSG claimed that the petition lacked merit and that the same
was rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes
and SPO2 dela Cruz under the program was already terminated on December 3,
1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director
of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated February 10, 1999. In their
comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agreed
with the OSG.

Denying the OSG motion, this Court held:

Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by
reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the
coverage of the Program. However, we find it necessary to resolve the merits of
the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future
guidance of both bench and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R.
A. No. 6981. As we have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol, and Viola vs. Alunan
III, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court then sustained the RTC observation that law enforcement officers
may be admitted into the Witness Protection Program in cases where they are
witnesses in legislative investigations.

In the recent landmark cases of David, et al. v. Arroyo, et al.,19 involving seven
petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the President lifted the declaration of a
state of national emergency during the pendency of the suits. In effect,
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 were withdrawn.
The OSG thus moved and prayed for the dismissal of the petitions, arguing there
is no more justiciable controversy as the issue has been mooted.

This Court denied the motion and proceeded to declare the constitutional infirmity
of the Presidential issuances. On the issue of mootness, the Court summed up
the four exceptions to the rule, thus:

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption
of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the
issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the peoples
basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover,
the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench
and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent
of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents
contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
judicial review. (Emphasis supplied).

Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified
under the foregoing exceptions. Every bad, unusual incident where police officers
figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done or not
done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erode public
confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the
restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice,
hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable
of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the
education and guidance of all concerned.

II. There Is No Illegal Restraint In The Restrictive Custody and Monitored

Movements Of Police Officers Under Investigation

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity,
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint and as the best and efficient defense of personal
freedom.20

Ang mataas na pinapahalagahang writ of habeas corpus, na ang pinagmulan ay

nuon pa mang matandang panahon, ay ginawa at umiiral bilang kagyat at
mabisang lunas upang paalpasin ang tao sa labag sa batas na pagkakapigil at
bilang pinakamaigi at mahusay na sanggalang ng sariling kalayaan.

The main thrust of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of one's detention. More specifically, its vital purpose is to obtain
immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause and to deliver them from unlawful custody.21

Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty will
a petition for habeas corpus be granted and the person detained released from
confinement.22 If respondents are not detaining nor restraining the applicants or
the person in whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed, the petition
should perforce be dismissed.23

Ang kahilingan para sa habeas corpus ay maari lamang pagbigyan at ang

taong pinipigilan ay pawawalan sa pagkapiit kung masisiyahan ang
Hukuman na labag sa batas ang pagkakait sa kanya ng kalayaan. Kung
hindi ipinipiit o pinipigilan ang mga taong naghain ng kahilingan para
sa habeas corpus o ang mga kinakatawan nila, ang petisyon ay dapat
pawalang saysay.

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, the petition, on its face, fails to convince us
that petitioners are actually and unlawfully detained and restrained of their
liberty. Sombong v. Court of Appeals, et al.24 teaches us that for the writ of
habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. More importantly, the prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.25

To the mind of the Court, petitioners are not illegally and involuntarily deprived of
their freedom of action. Walang illegal na pagpipigil o pagkakait ng kalayaan
sa nagpepetisyon.

Firstly, the assailed memoranda dated May 22, 2007,26 June 28, 200727 and May
18, 2007,28 decreeing the monitoring of their movements cannot, by any stretch of
the imagination, be considered as a form of curtailment of their freedom
guaranteed under our Constitution. Ang ipag-utos na subaybayan ang kanilang
mga kilos ay hindi maituturing na pagbabawas ng kanilang kalayaan na
ginagarantiyahan sa ilalim ng ating Konstitusyon.

Perusing the assailed memoranda, it is evident that petitioners are not actually
detained or restrained of their liberties. What was ordered by the PNP is that their
movements, inside and outside camp be monitored in the following manner, to
wit:

a. All their movements within camp should be monitored;

 b. When situation warrants their movement outside camp, they should be
properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and

c. A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said PCO

and PNCOs, their place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time of
Departure (ETD) and Estimated Time of Return to Station (ETRS).29

It is crystal-clear that petitioners are free to go in and out of Camp Vicente Lim as
they please. The only limitation imposed upon them is that their movements
within the premises of the camp shall be monitored; that they have to be escorted
whenever the circumstances warrant that they leave the camp; and that their
estimated time of departure and arrival shall be entered in a logbook. Even
petitioners themselves admit they are not actually detained or imprisoned.30

Secondly, the "restrictive custody" complained of by petitioners is, at best,

nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual
nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police
officers concerned are always accounted for. Ang restrictive custody o mahigpit
na pangangalaga, na inirereklamo ng mga nagpetisyon, ay bahagyang
paghihigpit lamang na labas sa saklaw ng habeas corpus. Itoy hindi aktuwal o
mabisang pagpigil para mangailangan ng remedyong hinihiling. Itoy isang
pinapayagang hakbang ng pag-iingat upang makatiyak ang pamunuan ng PNP
na ang mga naturang pulis ay maaring iprisinta anumang sandali.

If said custodial procedure were not taken, respondent police superiors

themselves would have been exposed to charges of conspiracy, negligence or
laxity in the enforcement of internal discipline. If petitioners get lost or are able to
go abroad or figure in another untoward incident, respondents would have to
explain why they did not observe the needed precaution, else they would also be
administratively liable.

Thirdly, petitioners reliance on Moncupa31 is misplaced. In said case, petitioner

was ordered released by respondent but his release was saddled with
restrictions. There, petitioner was required to secure prior approval for: (a) any
travel outside Metro Manila; and (b) a change in residence. His freedom of
speech was likewise muffled by a prohibition on granting interviews to local or
foreign media. He was likewise ordered to report regularly to respondent.32

In the case at bench, no restrictions in the nature of those imposed

in Moncupa exist. To reiterate, petitioners are merely held to account for their
1wphi1

movements inside and outside the camps premises. They are not required to
secure prior approval before they can move out of the camp, only that each of
them be accompanied by an escort and their time of departure and arrival
noted. Ang mga nagpepetisyon ay pinipigil lamang upang masubaybayan
ang kanilang ikinikilos sa loob at labas ng kampo. Hindi nila kailangan ang
permiso bago makalabas ng kampo, kailangan lang na may kasamang
bantay at ang kanilang pag-alis at pagbalik ay nakatala.

Fourthly, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), as amended by R.A.
No. 8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that
members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary
machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary
actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated
supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline,
to wit:

(b) Internal Discipline. On dealing with minor offenses involving internal

discipline found to have been committed by any regular member of their
respective commands, the duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of
the PNP shall, after due notice and summary hearing, exercise disciplinary
powers as follows:

(1) Chiefs of police or equivalent supervisors may summarily impose the

administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand; restriction to
specified limits; withholding of privileges; forfeiture of salary or suspension;
or any of the combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the
total period shall not exceed fifteen (15) days;

(2) Provincial directors or equivalent supervisors may summarily impose

administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand; restrictive custody;
withholding of privileges; forfeiture of salary or suspension, or any
combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total period
shall not exceed thirty (30) days;

(3) Police regional directors or equivalent supervisors shall have the power
to impose upon any member the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from
the service. He may also impose the administrative punishment of
admonition or reprimand; restrictive custody; withholding of privileges;
suspension or forfeiture of salary; demotion; or any combination of the
foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total period shall not exceed
sixty (60) days;

(4) The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary
punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of
salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred
 eighty (180) days: Provided, further, That the chief of the PNP shall
have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him
or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature,
against such police personnel.33 (Emphasis supplied)

It can be gleaned from the memoranda issued by the PNP hierarchy that an
investigation is being conducted on the reported involvement of police personnel
from PRO 4A-RSOG in the fire that gutted the Pinagbayanan Elementary School,
Taysan, Batangas during the wee hours of May 15, 2007. The initial investigation
report appended to the petition discloses that all petitioners are members of the
Region 4 Special Operations Group who failed to timely respond to the incident.
Some are even tagged by key eyewitnesses as the primary suspects in the
burning of the school. As a result of the blaze, two persons, including a school
teacher performing election duties, were killed. The incident sparked a national
uproar, and rightly so, considering that it was a direct attack on the countrys
already much-maligned electoral process. Evidently, the PNP is well within its
authority to relieve petitioners from their former positions and place them under
tight watch, at least until the termination of the said investigation.

Clearly, placing police officers facing a grave administrative case under restrictive
custody is a disciplinary measure authorized under the PNP law. Malinaw na ang
paglalagay sa mahigpit na pangangalaga sa mga pulis na nahaharap sa isang
grabeng kasong administratibo ay isang pandisiplinang hakbang na
pinahihintulutan ng batas ng PNP. Thus, petitioners claim that their restrictive
custody is an illegal practice "not sanctioned by any existing provision of our
constitution and laws" is not true. It must necessarily fail.

Lastly, petitioners contend that by placing them under restrictive custody, they
are made to suffer lesser rights than those enjoyed by private citizens. On this
score, the Courts pronouncement in Canson, et al. v. Hidalgo, et al.34 is
categorical. It was held there that although the PNP is civilian in character, its
members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief, Philippine
National Police, under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by
injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere with valid acts of police
officials. The police organization must observe self-discipline and obey a
chain of command under civilian officials.35

Elsewise stated, police officers are not similarly situated with ordinary civil
service employees. The PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism
different from those of other government employees. Sa ibang salita, ang
kapulisan ay hindi katulad ng karaniwang kawani ng pamahalaan. Ang PNP ay
may sariling mekanismo ng pagdisiplina na kaiba sa ipinatutupad sa ibang
empleyado ng gobyerno.

In Fianza v. The Peoples Law Enforcement Board, et al., 36 we ruled:

x x x although respondent policemen continue to be citizens, as public

respondents contend, they are not the "private citizens" referred to in the laws
cited above. Clearly, the term "private citizens" does not ordinarily include men in
uniform, such as the respondent PNP men. This is particularly evident in the PNP
law which uses the term "members of the PNP" as well as "private citizens" to
refer to different groups of persons and not interchangeably. The "plain meaning
rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this situation. When
the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
interpretation. The term "private citizen" in the PNP Law and PLEB Rules is used
in its common signification and was not meant to refer to the members of the
PNP, such as respondent policemen.

In sum, petitioners are unable to discharge their burden of showing that they are
entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for. The petition fails to show on its face
that they are unlawfully deprived of their liberties guaranteed and enshrined in
the Constitution. No unlawful restraint is foisted on them by the PNP authorities
under the questioned memoranda.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person

from unlawful restraint. The writ cannot and will not issue absent a showing that
petitioners are deprived of their liberty. Neither can it relieve petitioners, who are
police officers, from the valid exercise of prescribed discipline over them by the
PNP leadership.

Ang pangunahing layunin ng writ o utos ng habeas corpus ay ang pagsaklolo sa

isang tao mula sa pagkapiit o pagkapigil nang lisya sa batas. Ang writ ay hindi
makakamit kung walang pagkakait ng kalayaan. Hindi rin ito mapanghahawakan
ng mga nagpepetisyong kapulisan upang makaiwas sa takdang paraan ng
pagdisiplina sa kanila ng mga pinuno ng PNP.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice