Special Proceedings Rulings on Change of Name and Correction of Entries

Special Proceedings 2017
(Nature of the Petition of the Change of Name)

G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala,
Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old,
he was adopted by the Sps. Wong. At the age of twenty-two, he filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his
use of the surname Wong: a) embarrassed and isolated him from his
relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in
truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
nationality; and b) that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese
surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his
adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former
surname.
The matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the trial court
decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully
complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong
to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted.
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of

ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated
and cannot justify the petition for change of name. Further, the Solicitor
General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name
violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an
adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him
with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has
severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.
ISSUE
Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for
change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting
of said petition.
RULING
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute,
intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It
is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It
is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside
the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by
act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a

person involving his relation with others, that is, his legal position in, or
with regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem and,
as such, strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements,
particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction thereover. For this purpose, the only name that may be
changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; it is a
privilege which may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or
reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor.
The SC discern that said appellee was prompted to file the petition for
change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family
name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he
being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another
cause is his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been
held that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien
nationality which only hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and
reasonable cause for change of name.
Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social

standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or injury to
the interest of the State or other persons. Nothing whatsoever is shown
in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of
the state or of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's
name.
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of

name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as
a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid
confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change
of name would prejudice public interest.
The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of

relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of
name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident
than the object of the proceeding.
A change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing

family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not
alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is
only the name.
(Nature of the Petition of the Change of Name)

G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN,
HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and
KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents.
FACTS
Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed
before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries
in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective
birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor
children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their
birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate

of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well
as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of
marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania
Inchoco, were allegedly not legally married. The same request to delete
the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and
Heddy Moira. With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children,
he prayed that the date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from
April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage
certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally

prayed that Carlitos second name of "John" be deleted from his record of
birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his
marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and
"Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
The petition was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of

general circulation.
The trial directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the
entries in the record of birth of Carlito as well as the correction of the
birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of
marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc as January 21, 2000, instead of
April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as "Marivel." With respect to the
marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered
pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos father from "John
Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latters citizenship from "Filipino" to
"Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the

CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of
entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to
implead the minors mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to
offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the
questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings parents, and the
latters citizenship. In the present petition, petitioner contends that since
the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature, they
could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which
indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents parents, should
have been notified or impleaded.
CA denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE
Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the
trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial courts
judgment void.
RULING
NO.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary

proceeding.
In Republic v. Valencia, however, this Court ruled, and has since

repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not

for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it
is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court
adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding? One having

opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning
to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise

known as "An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without
Need of Judicial Order," has been considered to lend legislative
affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the
civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected
through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito observed that the obvious

effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative
correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or
nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed,
the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial
corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. The pertinent
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the

civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or

claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
The Court held that the publication of the order of hearing under Section
4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision
would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a

thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not
only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the
whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings

in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs

petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
Therefore, the petition is denied.
(Baptismal name vs. name in the Civil Registrar which would

prevail)
[G.R. No. L-9203. September 28, 1956.]
In the matter of the petition to change and correct entry in the
Civil Registry of Manila. ALBERTO T. CHOMI, Petitioner-Appellant,
vs. THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, Respondent-
Appellee.
FACTS
The petition alleges that Petitioner is the son of Celerino Arellano Chomi
and Sotera Tan, both deceased; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he was
baptized and given the name of Alberto and since then had been known
by the following name, Alberto T. Chomi or Alberto Chomi; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat his birth certificate in the civil register of
Manila gives his name as Apolinario Arellano and his fathers name as
Celerino Arellano, instead of Alberto Arellano Chomi and Celerino
Arellano Chomi, respectively, the latter names being their corresponding
names.
Opposition was filed against the petition by the Solicitor General, who
claims that the changes sought to be made will involve a change in the
name of the Petitioner as well as that of his father, which changes are
substantial in nature and that since only mistakes clerical in nature are
authorized to be made under Article 412 of the new Civil Code, if the
Petitioner desires to change his name the appropriate remedy should be
by a petition under Act No. 1386 in relation with Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.
CFI denied the petition. Hence, the appeal.
RULING
The contention appears at first glance to be well founded, but upon
careful analysis it would seem to us, not that there was error in
Petitioners name in the register, but that his name was not complete
because the real surname of his father Chomi was not added. As to the
claim that his name should have been Alberto we also find that its
appearance in the civil register could not have been a mistake. It was
occasioned by the fact that upon baptism he was given a different name
and this baptismal name has since then been given to the Petitioner and
used by him.
We, therefore, find that there was no mistake or error in the record of
Petitioners entry of birth which justifies a change in said entry. If error
there can be, it is on the part of the parents of the Petitioner in giving
him a name different from that which they registered or ordered to be
registered. The omission of Chomi is not an error or mistake; the name
may be incomplete, not incorrect, but such incompleteness is deemed
insufficient to authorize these proceedings, especially because the
petition for correction was filed almost 40 years after the entry was made
and the change desired to be introduced is not of form merely, but one of
substance which may affect the status of the person, subject of the
entry.
For the purposes of the law, the official name of Petitioner is Alberto
Arellano. That is his name in the eyes of the law. The mere fact that he
was baptized by another name under which he has since then been
known and which he has used did not per se have the effect of changing
his name. The only way by which the name of a person can be changed,
legally, is by the appropriate proceedings established by the law and the
Rules of Court.
While the practice in this Catholic country is for individuals to adopt the
names given them at baptism, baptismal names have never been
recognized in the law and this practice has not been sanctioned by the
law. To adopt this practice would violate the rule and policy established
in the law and in Act No. 1386. We find it our solemn duty to overlook
this religious practice and enforce the provision of law and the policy laid
down by it, and in accordance herewith we declare that the real name of
Petitioner is that given him in the civil register, not the name by which he
was baptized in his church or by which he has been known in the
community, or which he has adopted, and that the only remedy left to
him in case he desires to change his name in the register, which is his
official name, is for him to file the special proceedings outlined in Act No.
1386 and now embodied in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
(Importance of Publication)
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to
be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG,
duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners, vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar
OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his
registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin
Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a
long time because they will let him study there together with his sister
named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not
carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be
asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different
surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language
since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as
"L." It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is
requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.
The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a
person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right
to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when
petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name.
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)
ISSUE
Whether the petition for a change of name be granted
RULING
NO.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so
that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such

change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper
and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.15 To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper
or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of

proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court.
The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all
the best evidence available.
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it

does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and
adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether.
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered
name? We have to answer in the negative.
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does
not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a
person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the
same given name and surname as he has.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of
name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
(Importance of Publication)
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN
MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE,
respondents.
FACTS
This is an appeal by certiorari which challenges, on pure questions of
law, the order of the RTC, Branch 158, Pasig City. Said court is faulted
for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of
the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his
adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p
petition 2 to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging
therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as
well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of
the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor
adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was
baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been
called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993
when he arrived at private respondents' residence.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the
change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was
lawful ground for the change of name.
RULING
I. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change
of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose,
are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
governed by distinct sets of law and rules.
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the

legal effects of adoption:
a) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate

child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights
and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;
b) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted
shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the
adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses; and
c) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other
blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the
adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of
adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in
fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian
name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the
civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer
upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered Christian
or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding,
such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as
in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used
in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to
hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the
court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person
as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or
legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The
purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is
simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping
with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made
should normally make its decree recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register
is the name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this
can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive
and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the
reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the
regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change
his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring
his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall
state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the
cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for.
An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published,
with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor
appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon
satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the
reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may
adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall
furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality
concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict

compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to
vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent

and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set
of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another
special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the
appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the
petition for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground.
Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name was the
fact of the adoptee's baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by
which he has been known since he came to live with private respondents.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a

word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and
distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and
the surname or family name. The giver or proper name is that which is
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the
civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil
register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a
person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same
Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory
restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under

Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103,
the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded
in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name
being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict
compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a
nullity.
(Requisite of a Valid Publication)

G.R. No. 160597 July 20, 2006
ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA
BRINGAS BOLANTE, respondent.
FACTS
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
Republic of the Philippines assails and seeks to set aside the decision of
the CA affirming that of the RTC of Bangued, Abra in Special Proceeding
Case No. 1916, a petition for change of name thereat commenced by
herein respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria
Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to

the name she has always carried and used to prevent confusion. She had
been using the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante on all her school as
well as in her other public and private records and that her married
name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella. Also, that per records in the
Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, the respondent's
registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as
she can remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa
Bringas Bolante.
Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction
over the case, respondent took the witness stand to state that the
purpose of her petition was to have her registered name changed to that
which she had actually been using thru the years. She also categorically
stated she had not been accused of any crime under either her registered
name or her present correct name. On cross she stated that the purpose
of filing the petition is that, she wanted to secure a passport and wanted
that the same be issued in her correct name and that she would not have
filed the petition was (sic) it not for the passport.
The trial granted her petition for a change of name. the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUES
A. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH SEC. 3, RULE 103 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO
VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE PETITION A QUO.
B. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY,

UNSUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME IS NOT RESORTED FOR ILLEGAL
PURPOSES.
RULING
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the
procedural and jurisdictional requirements for a change of name. As we
articulated in Republic v. Hon. Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu,

citing pertinent jurisprudence, non-compliance with these requirements
would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and
determine a petition for change of name.
The provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall

be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or
some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in

form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of
the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing
at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, . The
date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to
an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of
the notice. (Underscoring added.)
On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of

name cannot be set within four (4) months from the last publication of
the notice of such hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for want or defective
publication.
The SC is not persuaded.

As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was
filed on October 18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via
an Order issued on November 13, 2000. The notice of hearing was
published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000
issues of the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the last day, December
7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled on
February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period
prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the
CA, must emphasize, however, that the trial court, evidently upon
realizing the error committed respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no
time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all
concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for
September 25, 2001.
The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves
as notice to the whole world that the proceeding in question has for its
object to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection
of any and against the right sought to be established. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in
the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if

the following requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order
indicating the date and place for the hearing must be published; (2) the
publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks; and,
(3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best. Another
validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being heard
within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice of the hearing.
In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of

Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were,
the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of
the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a
republication of the initial notice of the hearing. The prosecutor of Abra
interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or
sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional

requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore, the
petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of
the trial court.
On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided

by decisional law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification,
and that changing one's name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly,
a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his
certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the
corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on
the sound discretion of the court.
With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change
of name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since
she started schooling, used the given name and has been known as
Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth
record. Her scholastic records, as well as records in government offices,
including that of her driver's license, professional license as a certified
public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission,
and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her
having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas
Bolante.
The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to

show that the requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose
and/or in avoidance of any entanglement with the law deserves scant
consideration. Surely, the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like
certification, while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG suggests, be a
convincing norm of one's good moral character or compelling evidence to
prove that the change of name is not sought for any evil motive or
fraudulent intent. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in
a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to

prove that the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until
such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused by
oppositor-appellant.
At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance

of the basic petition is whimsical or based on a consideration other than
to avoid confusion. The trial court appears to have exercised its
discretion judiciously when it granted the petition. Like the CA, the
Court loathes to disturb the action thus taken.
(Whom to Implead as An Indispensible Party in a Petition of Change

of Name of Minor)
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN,
HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and
KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents.
FACTS
Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed
before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries
in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective
birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor
children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their
birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate

of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well
as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of
marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania
Inchoco, were allegedly not legally married. The same request to delete
the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and
Heddy Moira. With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children,
he prayed that the date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from
April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage
certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally

prayed that Carlitos second name of "John" be deleted from his record of
birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his
marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and
"Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
The petition was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of

general circulation.
The trial directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the
entries in the record of birth of Carlito as well as the correction of the
birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of
marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc as January 21, 2000, instead of
April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as "Marivel." With respect to the
marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered
pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos father from "John
Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latters citizenship from "Filipino" to
"Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the

CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of
entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to
implead the minors mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to
offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the
questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings parents, and the
latters citizenship. In the present petition, petitioner contends that since
the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature, they
could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which
indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents parents, should
have been notified or impleaded.
CA denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE
Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the
trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial courts
judgment void.
RULING
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed,
the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial
corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. The pertinent
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the

civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or

claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
The Court held that the publication of the order of hearing under Section
4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision
would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a
thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not
only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the
whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings
in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs

petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
Therefore, the petition is denied.
(Change of Name of Unrecognized Child)

G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of
her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September
9, 1998.
The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni was born and
up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities on matters of
financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. Giovanni is now
fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his
surname changed to that of his mothers surname. His mother might
eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued
use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may
complicate his status as natural child; and
The change of name from GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI

NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect
the change of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having found
respondents petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for
three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered. The trial court also
directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order. Since
there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of
court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did
not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision

ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni
Nadores.
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the

OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo
erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as

required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision which
granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties.
RULING
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change
of name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, a separate
and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and
correction of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with
innocuous or clerical errors thereon).
Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. xxxx
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and
the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they
may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized

by the father bears only a given name and his mother surname, and
does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate
child therefore identifies him as such.
It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent

marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
child.1aw
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. A change of name will erase the impression that he was
ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will
facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son.
In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an

adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation
notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG
a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the
petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did
not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still
expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is
meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments
propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor
the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity
to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were not adversarial enough.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as
required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed
notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein.
In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy
of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner
as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the
petition.
(Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Record of Birth)
G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF
ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-
ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK,
MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL,
VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K.
LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
FACTS
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11
children.
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan
(Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. Shortly after Keh died in 1989,
the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee claimed that
they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh
children to request the NBI to investigate the matter.
NBI found that the hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs
declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly
gave birth to such other children, numbering eight. On the basis of this
report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one
of them before the RTC of Caloocan City in Special Proceeding for the
deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one
of Lees other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the
name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request
for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma
Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC quashed the
subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering
that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the
subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lees
mother.
Lee-Keh children filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court
of Appeals. The CA rendered a decision, setting aside the RTCs Order.
The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad
testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable
under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also
held that Tius advanced age alone does not render her incapable of
testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must
prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial,
something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu
to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children
filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to
show that she is not Kehs daughter.
RULING
The SC held that CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable
and oppressiveare proper for subpoena duces tecum or for the
production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a
command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of
privacy.
Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court
of Appeals that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for
correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children,
Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the
suit was to establish the fact that Lees other children were not children
of Keh.
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action,

obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother
of Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and
so could not give testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The
Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius
testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to
compel the attendance of such a material witness.
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to
come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in
court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b)
it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against
her stepdaughter.
1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be

inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to come to
court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the
satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time
the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear
before the trial court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine
if Tius current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of
coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the
subpoena issued to her.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to
badgering by adverse counsel. The trial courts duty is to protect every
witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially
true where the witness is of advanced age.
2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her
stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence, which reads:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be

compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other direct descendants.
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the

Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the
Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of
actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents
and other direct ascendants or descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them
because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants; a
family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother.
(How may correction of Entries be effected; Kind of Proceedings)

G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001
MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE,
HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU
CHUAN, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man
but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private
respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful
wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly
children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous
entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or
canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by
substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the
petitioners' true birth mother.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu
Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek
Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by
making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
The private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and
verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that
pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of
petitioners.
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions
for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of
birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions SP. PROC. NO.
92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 on the grounds that: (1) resort
to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the
legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially
an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action
to impugn has already prescribed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed their petition.
ISSUE
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the
following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the
legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) the action to impugn has already
prescribed.
RULING
I. It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one
outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by
private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners'
records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth
records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the
lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer
therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh
Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's
children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all
between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
In the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia where the SC affirmed the
decision of CFI of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality
and civil status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of
birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate" to "illegitimate",
respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought
to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous
nature, the Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial
errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case, the SC also laid down
the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in
the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and
takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when
all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the
suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.
If all the procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for

correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if
filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no
longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an
opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any
person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the
proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may

be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or
motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only
has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what
is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108
requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as
parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by
the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person
in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may
make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court
shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec.
7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs.

Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements
thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
II. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had

already prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the
registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the
filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an
obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can
be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private

respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this
case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply because they
had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common
father at a much later date. This is especially true in the case of private
respondents who, as their father's legitimate children, did not have any
reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them
and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother's (Keh
Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private
respondents' suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that time
until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.
(Law applicable in Registration of Divorce decree)

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work
and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
the wedding. When he returned to the Philippines, he found out that his
wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign

divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as
a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was
not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.
Hence, the direct appeal of the RTC decision via a petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends

to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING
The SC held that alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. Art. 26 thus provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed
the marital bond between the spouses. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
The RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, the SC note that the Pasig City

Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need

to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not
ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out
of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982
both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.
Another point is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of
the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and
place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met
in the present case, the SC cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
(Change of Name; Civil status)

G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.
FACTS
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna
Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live
birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married,

respondent filed at the RTC of Quezon City a Petition to change his name
to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the

National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does
not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." Respondent also

submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing
that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his
child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and
2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon
Citys 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was
published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-
November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.
And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General.
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default
was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present
evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the respondent's petition and
directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to make correction of the
respondent's entries.
The Republic assails the decision and contends that the deletion of the
entry on the date and place of marriage of respondents parents from his
birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Hence, the appeal.

RULING
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF

NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name
is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public

interest.17 Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
In the present respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought
in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation
to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy.
Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may

affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial
and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings . . ."
Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies.
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status
should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and "all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby"
should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in

Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And
as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the
RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and
mother were made parties thereto.
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule
108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for
the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would
render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change
of ones name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring
supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of

these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have
sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from
improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all
affected parties as respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador mandates that "a petition for a substantial

correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or
claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." It cannot be
gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a
substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential

oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the
petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets
of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by
the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two
periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the

civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated.
Therefore, the petition was granted. The decision of the RTC was
nullified.
(Change of First Name and Gender in the Certificate of Live Birth by

Reason of Sex Change)
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in
the RTC of Manila, Branch 8. The petition impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to
the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4,
1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in
his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he
had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female." An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in
the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks. Copies of the order were sent to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila. On
the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
RULING
NO.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form
and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change
of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction
as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided
under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his
true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in
so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments
of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that
it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their
effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex

reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
(Change of name by reason of sex change)

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Respondent.
FACTS
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the decision of the RTC,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and
ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth
certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff
Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have
clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she
has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development.
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for

three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the
sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of

Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH, a rare
condition that is permanent, that respondents uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period.
The RTC granted respondents petition.Thus, this petition by the Office of

the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to
male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her
name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.
RULING
NO.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a

legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected

without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended
by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there

is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development

showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or

naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks
of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels
of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he
did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course
in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality
and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. In so ruling
we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we
respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be
a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help
make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion,
to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences
that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name
from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine

name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry
in his birth certificate from female to male.

Special Proceedings Rulings on Change of Name and Correction of Entries

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Special Proceedings 2017

(Nature of the Petition of the Change of Name)

CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of

A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a

Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social

It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of

The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of

A change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing

(Nature of the Petition of the Change of Name)

G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007

In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate

Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally

The petition was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the

Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary

In Republic v. Valencia, however, this Court ruled, and has since

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding? One having

The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise

Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito observed that the obvious

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or

Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a

sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings

Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs

Therefore, the petition is denied.

(Baptismal name vs. name in the Civil Registrar which would

CFI denied the petition. Hence, the appeal.

The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.

reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the

a) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict

vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent

It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a

Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under

(Requisite of a Valid Publication)

Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to

B. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY,

articulated in Republic v. Hon. Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu,

The provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in

On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of

The SC is not persuaded.

In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if

In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of

sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional

On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided

The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to

a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to

At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance

(Whom to Implead as An Indispensible Party in a Petition of Change

In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate

The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.

Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally

The petition was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the