Armando Santiago Jr

Jurisdoctor

Section Number Section title Extend Coverage

1 Due process / Equal
Protection of laws clause
2 Search and Seizures Arrest
3 Right to privacy of RPC
correspondence
4 Freedom of Expression
5 Freedom of religion
6 Right to liberty of abode and
travel
7 Right to information
8 Right to association
9 Right to Expropriate Power of Eminent domain
10 Contract Clause / Non- Oblicon
Impairment laws clause
11
12
13
14
15

PONENCIA:
TOPIC:
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:
END POINT:
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor
BILL OF RIGHTS .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ...........................................................................................................................................................................7
CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 7

THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

SIMILARITIES, DISTINCTIONS, AND LIMITATION ............................................................................................................................................................... 7
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN, TAXATION) ...................................................................................... 9

POLICE POWER
REQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE POLICE POWER .....................................................................................................................................................9
LAWFUL SUBJECT ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9
LAWFUL MEANS .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
TO WHAT AREAS OF LIEE POLICE POWER HAS PERVASIVE REACH? .......................................................................................................................... 9

POWER OF TAXATION
DEFINITION AND SCOPE ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
PURPOSE ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................10
SCOPE AND LIMITATION ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

REQUISITES ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................14
IT IS THE RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY WITH JUST COMPENSATION..................................................................... 14
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
NECESSITY ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................15
PRIVATE PROPERTY ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................15
TAKING .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15
REQUISITES FOR A VALID TAKING .....................................................................................................................................................................................15
DUE PROCESS ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
TAKING VIA EMINENT DOMAIN VS. TAKING UNDER SOCIAL JUSTICE CLAUSE .................................................................................................... 15
EXPANSIVE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC USE ........................................................................................................................................................................16
JUST COMPENSATION ........................................................................................................................................................................................................16
DETERMINATION ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 16
NON-PAYMENT OF JUST ......................................................................................................................................................................................................17
EFFECT OF DELAY ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................17
ABANDONMENT OF INTENDED USE AND RIGHT OF REPURCHASE ............................................................................................................................. 17
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION ........................................................................................................................................................................................17

CASES
ORTIGAS & CO. V. CA ........................................................................................................................................................................................18
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ...................................................................................................19
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ VS EDGARDO PARAS ..................................................................................................................................................20
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., VS. JAC LINER, INC., ..............................................................................................................21
DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS MULTIPURPOSE ASSOCIATION ET AL VS DENR SEC ELISEA GOZUN ET AL ...................................................22

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS CLAUSE

REQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE OF INHERENT POWERS ......................................................................................................................................... 24
GIVE THE TWO ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS AND DISCUSS EACH ...............................................................................................................................24
DO LIFE AND PROPERTY ENJOY IDENTICAL PROTECTION FROM THE CONSTITUTION? ..........................................................................................24
DOES EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW PROHIBIT CLASSIFICATION? ...............................................................................................................................24
GIVE THE MEANING/RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO THE CASE OF US V. LING SU FAN ................................................................ 24
GIVE THE ESSENTIALS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ACCORDING TO THE CASE OF BANCO ESPANOL V.
PALANCA....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
GIVE THE CARDINAL PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS .............................................................25
GIVE THE MINIMUM STANDARS WHICH MUST BE MET BY THE SCHOOLS TO SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS .......25
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE PROCESS .......................................................................................................................................................25
EXPLAIN VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE ...................................................................................................................................................................25
CONCEPT OF EQUAL PROTECTION .................................................................................................................................................................................. 26
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON EQUAL PROTECTION ........................................................................................................................................ 26
RATIONAL BASIS TEST .........................................................................................................................................................................................................26
STRICT SCRUTINY TEST ......................................................................................................................................................................................................26
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TEST .......................................................................................................................................................................................26

Search and seizures

SECTION 2. DIGESTED PROVISION ....................................................................................................................................................................................28
REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT: .................................................................................................................................................................................. 28

Warrantless Searches
IS EVERY WARRANTLESS SEARCH AN ILLEGAL SEARCH? ............................................................................................................................................ 29
EXAMINATION OF APPLICATION (RULE 126, SECTION 4 OF THE RULES OF COURT) .................................................................................................30
PARTICULARITY OF PRESCRIPTION .................................................................................................................................................................................. 30
PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE (RULE 126, SECTION 2 OF THE RULES OF COURT) ......................................................................................... 30
ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE (EXCLUSIONARY RULE) ART. III, SECTION 3 PARAGRAPH 2 .....................................................31
DO THE ORDINARY RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES APPLY TO SEARCHES CONDUCTED AT THE AIRPORT
PURSUANT TO ROUTINE AIRPORT SECURITY PROCEDURES? ............................................................................................................................................ 31

Warrantless Arrest
RULE 113 ARREST ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 32
BOND (PYANSADOR) ............................................................................................................................................................................................................33
WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST...........................................................................................................................................................................34
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRESTS ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 34
SUBJECT OF THE OFFENSE;............................................................................................................................................................................................... 34

CASES
PEOPLE VS. SARAP ...........................................................................................................................................................................................37
ALIB VS. JUDGE LABAYEN ................................................................................................................................................................................39
PADILLA VS CA ...................................................................................................................................................................................................42

Privacy of communication and correspondence

SECTION 3. DIGESTED PROVISION ....................................................................................................................................................................................45
WHAT IS THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA? ............................................................................................................................................................................ 45
WHO MAY FILE A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS DATA?......................................................................................................... 45
WHERE CAN THE PETITION BE FILED? ............................................................................................................................................................................. 46

Right to privacy
DISCOVERY AND REVELATION OF SECRETS (CHAPTER THREE) .................................................................................................................................47

Freedom of expression
EXPLAIN PRIOR RESTRAINT AND SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT ....................................................................................................................................48
4 ASPECTS OF FREEDOM OF PRESS ................................................................................................................................................................................ 48
TESTS: EXPLAIN DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE, CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER, AND THE BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST ........................48
DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE .........................................................................................................................................................................................48
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE............................................................................................................................................................................... 48
BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST ........................................................................................................................................................................................48
FACIAL CHALLENGE AND THE OVER BREADTH DOCTRINE ........................................................................................................................................... 49
COMMERCIAL SPEECH ........................................................................................................................................................................................................49
PRIVATE VS. GOVERNMENT SPEECH................................................................................................................................................................................ 49

CASES
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO ...................................................................................................................................................................................49
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS .................................................................................................................51
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ V. RAUL M. GONZALES .................................................................................................................................................52
BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP .........................................................................................................................................................56

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Freedom of Religion (SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE)

SUPPORTED PROVISIONS .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 58
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 58
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 59
BALANCING OF INTERESTS ............................................................................................................................................................................................59
STRICT NEUTRALITY ............................................................................................................................................................................................................59

CASES
TARUC VS. DELA CRUZ .....................................................................................................................................................................................59
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ ..............................................................................................................................................................................................60
GERMAN VS. BARANGAN ..................................................................................................................................................................................61
EBRALINAG ET AL VS. DIV. SUPT. OF SCHOOL OF CEBU ............................................................................................................................63
(OTHER DIGEST VERSION) EBRALINAG ET AL VS. DIV. SUPT. OF SCHOOL OF CEBU ..............................................................................65
GERONA VS. SEC OF EDUCATION ...................................................................................................................................................................68

Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement

THE LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ..................................................................................................................................................................71
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 6 .......................................................................................................................................................................71
RIGHT CURTAILMENT/LIMITATIONS OF RIGHT ................................................................................................................................................................. 71
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT: LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL .................................................................................................................................71
THE LIBERTY GUARANTEED BY THIS PROVISION INCLUDES ........................................................................................................................................ 71
ALIENS AND RIGHT TO ENTRY............................................................................................................................................................................................72

CASES
VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN ................................................................................................................................................................................73
MARCOS,PETITIONERVS.MANGLAPUS,RESPONDENT (PART 2) .............................................................................................................76
MARCOS,PETITIONERVS.MANGLAPUS (PART 2)........................................................................................................................................78
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ, 217 SCRA 633 (1993)........................................................................................................................ 82

Right of Association
RELATED PROVISIONS ........................................................................................................................................................................................................84
LABOR UNIONISM ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 84
COMMUNIST AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS ...................................................................................................................................................................84
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES ..........................................................................................................................................................................85

CASES
PEOPLE VS. FERRER ........................................................................................................................................................................................86
BANGALISAN VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS .................................................................................................................................................90
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU) VS HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA ....................................................................93

Contract Clause / Non-Impairment clause

REQUISITES OF VALID IMPAIRMENT.................................................................................................................................................................................. 96
WHEN DOES, A LAW IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS? ..................................................................................................................................96
WHEN NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE PREVAILS ...................................................................................................................................................................96
APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE .....................................................................................................................................................................96
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE ......................................................................................................................................97
LIMITATIONS .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................98
NATURE OF PROTECTION ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 98
CONTRACTS AFFECTED ......................................................................................................................................................................................................98
LIMITATIONS ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................98
EFFECT OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION ON CONTRACTS.............................................................................................................................................. 98
CURRENCY LEGISLATION AND CONTRACTS ....................................................................................................................................................................98
IMPAIRMENT ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................99

CASES
ORTIGAS & COMPANY VS COURT OF APPEALS ..........................................................................................................................................101
MARIVELES VS. CA ..........................................................................................................................................................................................103
CLEMONS VS. NOLTING ..................................................................................................................................................................................105
PHILRECA VS DILG ..........................................................................................................................................................................................106
PHILRECA CASE WAS EXPLAINED BY JUDGE REYES .....................................................................................................................................................106

Access/Right to information
SUBIDO V. OZAETA ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................110
SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 111
LIMITATIONS .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................111
RIGHT TO INFORMATION RELATIVE TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS ................................................................................................112
DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS .............................................................................................................................................................................................112
COURT HEARINGS ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................112

CASES
CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY .................................................................................................................................................. 113

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor
CHAVES CASE WAS EXPLAINED BY JUDGE REYES ........................................................................................................................................................113

Legal Assistance and Free Access to Courts

RA 9406 (PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE LAW - PAO) .......................................................................................................................................................... 120
QUALIFIED FOR PAO SERVICE (LIMITATION) ....................................................................................................................................................................120
MERIT TEST ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................120

RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

SELF INCRIMINATION ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................123
SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 123
WHEN AVAILABLE TO INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.......................................................................................................... 123
WAIVER .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 124
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 124
R.A 7438 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................124

BAIL
EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT TO BAIL .................................................................................................................................................................................. 125
FORMS OF BAIL .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 125
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENCE................................................................................................................................................................................................ 125
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE .........................................................................................................................................................................................125
RIGHT TO BE HEARD............................................................................................................................................................................................................126
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 126
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................126
REQUISITE OF TRIAL IN ABSENTIA ....................................................................................................................................................................................126
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 127
COMPULSORY PROCESS .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 127
PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 127

CASES
COMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA .........................................................................................................................................................................128
PEOPLE VS. RIVERA ........................................................................................................................................................................................129
HONG KONG V. OLALIA ...................................................................................................................................................................................132
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG VS. OLALIA (OTHER VERSION) ...............................................................................................................134
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HON. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, MORALES, AND PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA AND MARK B. JIMENEZ A.K.A. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO .............................................................................136

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

BILL OF RIGHTS
set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing
limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Government is powerful. When unlimited, it becomes tyrannical. The Bill of Rights is a guarantee that there are
certain areas of a person's life, liberty, and property which governmental power may not touch.

Bill of Rights are generally self-implementing.

CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS
Political Rights granted by law to members of community in relation to their direct or indirect participation in the
establishment or administration of the government;

Civil Rights rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance of private individuals for the purpose of
securing them the enjoyment of their means of happiness;

Social and Economic Rights; and, Human Rights.

THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE

STATE
1. Police Power
2. Power of Eminent Domain
3. Power of Taxation

They are inherent powers because they belong to the very essence of government and without them no
government can exist.

SIMILARITIES, DISTINCTIONS, AND LIMITATION

Similarities:

they are inherent in the State

they are necessary and indispensable
they are methods by which the State interferes with private rights
they presuppose an equivalent compensation
they are exercised primarily by the legislature

Differences:
Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation

As to regulation regulates both liberty and regulates property rights regulates property rights
property only only
As to who may exercise only the government government and some only the government
private entities
As to the property taken destroyed because it is -wholesome -wholesome
noxious or intended for -taken for a public use or -taken for a public use or
noxious purpose purpose purpose
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

As to Compensation intangible altruistic full and fair equivalent of protection and public
feeling that the person the property expropriated improvements for the
has contributed to the taxes paid
general welfare

Limitations:

Bill of Rights

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN,

TAXATION)

POLICE POWER
is the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the
same.

SCOPE: Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the state and of the public to self-
protection.

REQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE POLICE POWER

Tests for Validity of Exercise of Police Power

LAWFUL SUBJECT
Interest of the general public (as distinguished from a particular class required exercise). This means that the
activity or property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare. [see Taxicab Operators v. Board of
Transportation, 119 SCRA 597]

LAWFUL MEANS
Means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and are not unduly
oppressive. [see Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730]

Least restrictions of individual rights.

Additional Limitations when police power is delegated

1. Express grant by law [e.g. Secs. 16, 391, 447, 458 and 468, R.A. 7160, for LGUs]
2. Limited within its territorial jurisdiction [for local government units]
3. Must not be contrary to law.

TO WHAT AREAS OF LIEE POLICE POWER HAS PERVASIVE REACH?

Police power has been used to justify enactments in the fields of:

Public health measures like make house repairs; compulsory connection to sewerage system; license to
practice medicine; regulation of cattle imports; sale of meat.

Public safety measures like building regulations; regulation of carrying deadly weapons; participation in
rotational patrol duty; regulation of gasoline stations and movie theaters; use of city roads.

Public moral like regulating the operation of public dance halls; prohibiting gambling; licensing of cock-pits;
prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; regulating the operation of motels and hotel; regulating
establishment of massage parlors.

General (public) welfare like regulating slaughter of carabaos; provisions for the suppression of agricultural
pests; regulating nuisances; rules for the deportation of aliens; regulating building construction; prescribing
registration of land under the Torrens System; zoning regulations; anti-graft laws designed to curb activities of
public officials
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

POWER OF TAXATION
the power to raise revenue for governmental purposes.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE

It is the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty, for the support of the government and for all public needs.
It is as broad as the purpose for which it is given.

PURPOSE
1. To raise revenue
2. Tool for regulation
3. Protection/power to keep alive

Tax for special purpose [Sec. 29 (3), Art. VI]: Treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only; when
purpose is fulfilled, the balance, if any shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. See:
Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703

SCOPE AND LIMITATION

General Limitations
1. Power to tax exists for the general welfare; should be exercised only for a public purpose
2. might be justified as for public purpose even if the immediate beneficiaries are private individuals
3. Tax should not be confiscatory: If a tax measure is so unconscionable as to amount to confiscation of
property, the Court will invalidate it. But invalidating a tax measure must be exercised with utmost caution,
otherwise, the States power to legislate for the public welfare might be seriously curtailed
4. Taxes should be uniform and equitable [Sec. 28(1), Art. VI]

The legislature has discretion to determine the nature, object, extent, coverage, and situs of taxation. But where
a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will not
hesitate to strike it down, for despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional
prescriptions. [Tan v. del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324]

Specific Limitations
1. Uniformity of taxation

GENERAL RULE: simply geographical uniformity, meaning it operates with the same force and effect in
every place where the subject of it is found

EXCEPTION: rule does not prohibit classification for purposes of taxation, provided the ff requisites are met:
(SNAGAE)
(a) standards used are substantial and not arbitrary
(b) if the classification is germane to achieve the legislative purpose
(c) if that classification applies to both present and future conditions, other circumstances being equal
(d) applies equally to members of the same class. [Pepsi Cola v. City of Butuan].

2. Tax Exemptions

No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
Congress [Sec. 28 (4), Art. VI]

A corollary power but must be for a public purpose, uniform and equitable and in conformity with the equal
protection clause

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Tax exemptions are granted gratuitously and may be revoked at will, except when it was granted for valuable
consideration

May either be constitutional or statutory

If statutory, it has to have been passed by majority of all the members of Congress [sec. 28 (4), Art. VI]

Constitutional exemptions [sec. 28(3), Art. VI]

A. Educational institutions (both profit and non-profit): Benefits redound to students, but only applied to
property taxes and not excise taxes

All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively
for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. xxx Proprietary educational institutions,
including those co-operatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to the limitations
provided by law including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. [Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV]

Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.

B. Charitable institutions: Religious and charitable institutions give considerable assistance to the State in the
improvement of the morality of the people and the care of the indigent and the handicapped
C. Religious property: Charitable Institutions, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. [Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI]

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

The ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but private property of all citizens
within the territorial sovereignty to public purpose.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Art. III, Sec. 9

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Art. XII, Sec. 18
The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish
and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation,
transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to
be operated by the government.
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof.

To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation.

In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of

small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land- sharing.

Art. XIII, Sec. 9

The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban
land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost,
decent housing and basic services to under-privileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas.
It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such
citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall
respect the rights of small property owners.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Art XIV, Sec. 13.

The National assembly may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided
into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.

REQUISITES
1. Private property
2. Genuine necessity - inherent/presumed in legislation, but when the power is delegated (e.g. local
government units), necessity must be proven.
3. For public use - Court has adopted a broad definition of public use, following the U.S. trend
4. Payment of just compensation
5. Due process [Manapat v. CA (2007)]

IT IS THE RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY WITH

JUST COMPENSATION
The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. It is
inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution. The
provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not, by
implication, grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without
limit. (citations omitted) [Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus, G.R. No. L-15870, December 3, 1919]

Specifically (LGUs, Sec. 19, Local Government Code)

1. Ordinance by a local legislature council is enacted authorizing local chief executive to exercise eminent
domain,
2. For public use, purpose or welfare or for the benefit of the poor and of the landless,
3. Payment of just compensation,
4. Valid and definite offer has been previously made to owner of the property sought to be expropriated but such
offer was not accepted [Municipality of Paraaque vs. VM Realty (1998)]

Jurisdiction over a complaint for eminent domain is with the Regional Trial Court. While the value of the property
to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms for the court is duty bound to determine the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the property it is merely incidental to the expropriation suit [Barangay San Roque,
Talisay, Cebu v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, G.R. No. 138869, June 20, 2000; Bardillion v. Barangay Masili
of Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003]

The issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial upon the (1) filing of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance, and (2) upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to 15%
of the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated per current tax declaration. [Biglang-Awa v.
Judge Bacalla, G.R. Nos. 139927-139936, November 22, 2000; Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba,
Laguna, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003]

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

All Private Property capable of ownership may be expropriated, except money and choses in action. Even
services may be subject to eminent domain. [Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620]

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights. Hence, strict construction will be made against the agency exercising
the power. [Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation v. Municipality of Pasig, G.R. No. 152230, August
9, 2005]

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

NECESSITY
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public
character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated.
[Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004]

When the power is exercised by the legislature, the question of necessity is generally a political question.
[Municipality of Meycauyan, Bulacan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 640]

The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it. [Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, G.R.
No. 146886, April 30, 2003]

PRIVATE PROPERTY
Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate of legislature acting under a
general grant of authority. [City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 349]

TAKING
The exercise of the power of eminent does not always result in the taking or appropriation of title to the
expropriated property; it may only result in the imposition of a burden upon the owner of the condemned
property, without loss of title or possession. [National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1]

REQUISITES FOR A VALID TAKING

(1) The expropriator must enter a private property
(2) Entry must be for more than a momentary period
(3) Entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority
(4) Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected
Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of
the property. [Republic v. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336]

DUE PROCESS
The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. In the case of Belen v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court declared two Presidential Decrees unconstitutional for violating due process because they did not provide
for any form of hearing or procedure by which the propriety of the expropriation or the reasonableness of the
compensation.

TAKING VIA EMINENT DOMAIN VS. TAKING UNDER SOCIAL JUSTICE

CLAUSE

Agrarian Reform (Art. XIII, Sec. 4)

This provision is an exercise of the police power of the State through
eminent domain (Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform) as it is a means to regulate private property.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the constitution. But in carrying out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also
taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation on the use of the
land, but the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to
the owner in favor of the beneficiary. [Sta. Rosa Realty & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
112526, October 12, 2001]

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Jurisdoctor

EXPANSIVE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC USE

Definition
The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. At present, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. [Heirs of Juancho Ardona
vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 220]

That only a few benefit from the expropriation does not diminish its public-use character, inasmuch as pubic use
now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage [Filstream International vs. CA, 284
SCRA 716]

Public use is the general concept of meeting public need or public exigency. It is not confined to actual use by
the public in its traditional sense. The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the
public has been abandoned. The term public use has now been held to be synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. [Reyes v. National Housing Authority,
G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003]

The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by Iglesia ni Cristo members than most others could well
be true, but such peculiar advantage still remains merely incidental and secondary in nature. That only few
would benefit from the expropriation of the property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of
public use [Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412]

JUST COMPENSATION

Definition
It is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by
reason of the expropriation.

Full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it is the fair market value of the property. It is settled that the market
value of the property is that the sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an
owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor [Province
of Tayabas vs. Perez (1938)]

DETERMINATION
BASIS: Fair Market Value
Price fixed by a buyer desirous but not compelled to buy and a seller willing but not compelled to sell.
Must include consequential damages (damages to other interest of the owner attributable to the expropriation)
and deduct consequential benefits (increase of value of other interests attributable to new use of the former
property).

CHOICE OF PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AS TO

REASONABLENESS:
Under Section 2, Article IV of the Philippine Constitution, the Republic of the Philippines can take private
property upon payment of just compensation. However, private property to be taken cannot be chosen arbitrarily
and capriciously, as the landowner is entitled to due process. The Department of Public Highways originally
established the extension in Cuneta Avenue, and it is assumed that they made extensive studies regarding it.
The change from Cuneta Avenue to Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets cannot be justified on the ground of social
impact, as the properties to be affected along Cuneta Avenue are mostly motels. [De Knecht vs. Bautista
(1980)]

The Presidential Decrees merely serve as a guide or a factor for the courts in determining amount of just
compensation (which should be the fair and full value of the property at time of taking). The courts have the
power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what the decrees state, and thus may
appoint commissioners to help in determining just compensation. [EPZA vs. Dulay, 148 SCRA 305]

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Jurisdoctor

While commissioners are to be appointed by the court for the determination of just compensation, the latter is not
bound by the commissioners findings. [Republic v. Santos, 141 SCRA 30; Republic (MECS) v. IAC, 185
SCRA 572]

The court may substitute its own estimate of the value of the property only for valid reasons: (a) the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them; (b) they have disregarded a
clear preponderance of evidence; or (c) where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
[National Power Corporation v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007]

NON-PAYMENT OF JUST

expropriation proceeding does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots,
but only to demand payment of the fair market value of the property. [Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002; Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, Janaury
29, 2003]

The Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice: first, in the expropriation and then, in the action for
recovery of possession but it never did. 57 years have lapsed since the expropriation case was terminated but
the Republic never paid the owners. The court construed the failure to pay as a deliberate refusal on the part of
the Republic. When the government fails to pay just compensation within five years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property. [Republic of the Philippines v. Vicente Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005]

EFFECT OF DELAY
Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also payment
within a reasonable time from its taking [Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001]

The filing of the case generally coincides with the taking. When the filing of the case coincides with the taking,
and the value of the property has increased because of the use to which the expropriator has put it, the value is
that of the time of the earlier taking. Otherwise the owner would gain undeserved profit. But if the value
increased independently of what the expropriator did, then the value is that of the later filing of the case. Also,
between the time payment is due and the actual payment, legal interest (6%) accrues. [NAPOCOR v. CA
(1996)]

ABANDONMENT OF INTENDED USE AND RIGHT OF REPURCHASE

If the expropriator (government) does not use the property for a public purpose, the property reverts to the owner
in fee simple. [Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan-Cebu International Airport (2005)]

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION
What the due process clause requires is that the landowner must be given reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to present his claim or defense. Although due process does not always necessarily demand that a
proceeding be had before a court of law, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and
reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to protect his property rights. Although there are
exceptional situations when in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the requirement does not need
judicial process, when it is alleged that the landowners right to due process of law has been violated in the
taking of his property, the courts can probe and check on the alleged violation. [Manotok vs. NHA (1987)]

The performance of the administrative acts necessary to the exercise of the power of eminent domain in behalf
of the state is lodged by tradition in the Sovereign or other Chief Executive.

Where the Legislature has expressly conferred the authority to maintain expropriation proceedings upon the
Chief Executive, the right of the latter to proceed therein is clear.

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Jurisdoctor

Once authority is given to exercise the power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The
executive authorities may then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent. (citations omitted)
[Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus, G.R. No. L-15870, December 3, 1919]

The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of utilities and other private
enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by
these programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes
like tourism and other development programs.

There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions' purposes as the construction of roads, bridges,
ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and
slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid.
However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public
use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded.

Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets and
highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of
store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose.
Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The
expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the
developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies,
and other private concerns. [Heirs of Ardona vs. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555, October 26,
1983)

CASES

ORTIGAS & CO. V. CA 1

Ponencia: Quisimbing J.
Topic: Police Power
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Instant petition was denied. Affirmed CA decision
End point of the case:

FACTS
Ortigas & co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in greenhills with several restrictions in the
contract of sale that the said lot be used exclusively for residential purposes
A zoning ordinance was issued by MMC reclassifying the area as commercial
Private respondent leased the subject lot from hermoso and built a single storey building for greenhils
autohouse sale company
Filed a complaint which sought the demolition of the constructed sale company o against Hermosa as it
violated the terms and conditions of the deed of sale
Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the court of appeals from which he sought
favorable ruling

1 G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000

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Jurisdoctor

ISSUE
Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD
Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any standing contract.
Hence, petition is denied.

RATIO
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. (TARGET OF THE CASE IN
RELATION TO THE TOPIC)

Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence.
Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by
the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people.

Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police
power measure.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS2
Ponencia: FELICIANO J.
Topic: POLICE POWER
Trigger of facts: Comelec promulgated a resolution which directing the petitioner to allocate space to their
newspaper for the public use without just compensation.
Trigger of issue: WON Comelec resolution is unconstitutional
Trigger of Ruling: Yes, Unconstitutional for it is not a valid exercise of police power. Use of space is not urgent
which means theres no need for taking property or thing without just compensation
Verdict:
End point of the case: Police power applied in the case at the bar when there is an urgency which requires the use
of newspaper. In this case, there was no showing of urgency in mandating a private sector to give space for public
use. Intent of comelec was inconsistent with the words which is directive and not appealing as asking for a donation
from the petitioner.

FACTS
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable
them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government.
The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void
on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print
media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

2 G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995

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Jurisdoctor

ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to
donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been
established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising
space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of
just compensation. Also, Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers.

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ VS EDGARDO PARAS3

Ponencia: FERNANDO, C.J
Topic: Police power / Public Policy
Trigger of facts: Ordinance were promulgated to prohibit
Triger of issue: WON Ordinance is a constitutional
Trigger of Ruling: Ordinance was unconstitutional
Verdict: Writ is granted, RTC ruling was SET ASIDE, Ord. 84 is declared void and unconstitutional, TRO issued
hereby made permanent
End point of the case: When the act is legal/lawful, the municipality can do only is to regulate and not to prohibit

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise

FACTS
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser.
of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan.
De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business.
That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS.
Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then
appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE

Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord
84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD
The SC ruled against Paras.

If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the
test of validity.
The cabaret followed the test provided, which tells that they should not be prohibit

3 G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

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Jurisdoctor

SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State.
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable.
The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does
not encompass too wide a field.
Certainly, the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth.
The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of
cabarets.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., VS. JAC LINER,

INC.,
Ponencia: CARPIO MORALES J.
Topic: Police Power / Public Welfare
Trigger of facts: There was a resolution for the decongest the traffic through having a one terminal in lucena city
Triger of issue: WON the said ordinance is unconstitutional
Trigger of Ruling: The court ruled that it was not a valid exercise of police power for it did not satisfy the
requirements of lawful means and lawful subject
Verdict: Petition was DENIED
End point of the case:

FACTS
The city of lucena enacted an ordinance which provides that all busses, mini buses and out of town
passenger jeepneys
Shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal for
picking up and or dropping of their passenger
All temporary terminals in the city of lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this
ordinances
It also provides that all jeepneys, mini busses and busses shall use the grand central terminal of the city.
Jac liner assailed the city ordinances as constitutional
Undue taking of private property
Violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies

ISSUE
WON the ordinance satisfice the requisite of valid exercise of police power lawful subject and lawful means

HELD
The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met:

(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State, and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of
Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State.
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Jurisdoctor

The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue
of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were
reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as
correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem
lies and then to stop it right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality.

If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified
whenever they happen to be effective.

DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS MULTIPURPOSE ASSOCIATION ET

AL VS DENR SEC ELISEA GOZUN ET AL
Ponencia: CHICO NAZARIO J.
Topic: POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN / MINING LAW
Trigger of facts:
Trigger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict:
End point of the case:

FACTS
Police Power Eminent Domain
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it
comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining.
In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an
FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company.
The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya
including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to
have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property.
In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim
allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment
of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without
payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a
valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.
This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment
curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property.
Public respondents concluded that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the
government to regulate by purchase.

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Jurisdoctor

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD

The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed, there is taking involved but it is not w/o
just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR.
To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as
a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing
rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the
surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of
the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly
compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition
and use of private lands.

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Jurisdoctor

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL

PROTECTION OF LAWS CLAUSE
Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

REQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE OF INHERENT POWERS

The yardsticks for the exercise of the inherent powers of the government are:
1. Due Process Clause
2. Equal Protection Clause

GIVE THE TWO ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS AND DISCUSS EACH

The two aspects of due process are:

Substantive due process

simply means that the law be reasonable and not arbitrary.

Procedural due process

meant a law that hears before it condemns; that proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.

DO LIFE AND PROPERTY ENJOY IDENTICAL PROTECTION FROM THE

CONSTITUTION?
NO. The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property rights can be lost through
prescription while human rights are imprescriptible.

DOES EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW PROHIBIT CLASSIFICATION?

NO, but the classification must be reasonable. To be reasonable, it;

1. Must rest on substantial distinction;

2. Must be germane to the purpose of law;
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions only;
4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

GIVE THE MEANING/RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO THE CASE

OF US V. LING SU FAN
In the case of U.S. v. Ling Su Fan due process simply means:

That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of
the Government;
That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
It shall be applicable alike to all citizens of a state or to all of a class.

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Jurisdoctor

GIVE THE ESSENTIALS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS ACCORDING TO THE CASE OF BANCO ESPANOL V. PALANCA
In the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca, the essentials of procedural due process in JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS are:

1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

GIVE THE CARDINAL PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, the Cardinal primary requirements in
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS were summarized as follows:

The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence thereof;
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
The decision must have something to support itself;
The evidence must be substantial (such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion).
The decision must be based on evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; and
The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

GIVE THE MINIMUM STANDARS WHICH MUST BE MET BY THE SCHOOLS TO

SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In Guzman v. National University, the Supreme Court provided the guidelines for the handling of disciplinary
cases in schools:

The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of an accusation against them;
They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE PROCESS

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws (Section 1, Art. III).

Statutory due process: Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided (Art. 2 Civil
Code of the Philippines).

EXPLAIN VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

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Jurisdoctor

In People v. Nazario 186, 195-196 (1088) the Supreme Court said:

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.

It is repugnant to the Constitution in two aspects:

it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.

CONCEPT OF EQUAL PROTECTION

In Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy), the Supreme Court said: The guarantee of equal protection means that
no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.

STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON EQUAL PROTECTION

RATIONAL BASIS TEST

A law that touches on a constitutionally protected interest must be rationally related to furthering a legitimate
government interest. In applying the rational basis test, courts begin with a strong presumption that the law or
policy under review is valid.

The classification should bear a reasonable relation to government's purpose, and the legislative classification is
presumed valid.

Notes:
! Important when there difference between the disadvantaged class and those not disadvantaged.
! Also important when the government attaches a morally irrelevant and negative significance to a difference
between the advantaged and the disadvantaged.

STRICT SCRUTINY TEST

This test is triggered when a fundamental constitutional right is limited by a law. This requires the government to
show an overriding or compelling government interest so great that it justifies the limitation of fundamental
constitutional rights (the courts make the decision of WON the purpose of the law makes the classification
necessary).

Applied also when the classification has a "suspect" basis (Suspect Classes classes subject to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.)

To pass strict scrutiny, the law or policy must satisfy three (3) tests:
It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest;
The law or policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve the goal or interest; and
The law or policy must be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest, that is, there cannot be a
less restrictive way to effectively achieve the compelling government interest.

INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TEST

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig. While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the
United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well. [White Light Corporation vs.
City of Manila (2009)]

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In Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City, Ormoc City imposes a tax on Ormoc Sugar Central by name. Ormos
Sugar Central is the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The Court held that such ordinance is not valid for it would
be discriminatory against the Ormoc Sugar Central which alone comes under the ordinance.

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Search and seizures

Section 2. Art. III.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

SECTION 2. DIGESTED PROVISION

GENERAL RULE: WHAT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and

EXCEPTION: HOW

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge

REQUIREMENT FOR EXCEPTION: HOW COME

after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

ASCERTAINMENT:

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Concept: It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. It is a guarantee of the right of the people to
be secure in their persons against unreasonable search and seizures. It is a guarantee against unlawful arrest
and other forms of restraint on the physical liberty of the person.
Warrant Requirement

REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT:

1. It must be issued upon probable cause;
2. probable cause must be determined personally by a judge;
3. such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce;
4. the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and person to be seized.

Probable cause meant such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in
the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper.

Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest mean such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.

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Personally, examine the complainant and his witnesses meant the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause

Probable cause for a search meant such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.

Particularity of description meant description that expresses a conclusion of fact not law by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure, or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued

John Doe satisfies the requirement of particularity of description provided it contains a descriptio personae
such as will enable the officer to identify the accused

Warrantless Searches
IS EVERY WARRANTLESS SEARCH AN ILLEGAL SEARCH?
NO. Not every warrantless search is illegal search. As a general rule searches and seizures must be
accompanied with a valid warrant except:
1. When the right is voluntarily waived;
2. When there is valid reason to stop and frisk;
3. When the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
4. Search of vessels and aircraft;
5. Search of moving vehicle;
6. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of sanitary and building regulations;
7. When prohibited articles are in plain view;
8. Search and seizure under exigent and emergency;
9. Areal target zoning or saturation drive (valid exercise of military powers of the President; Searches of
passengers at airport. R.A. 6235 provides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that hand-carried
luggage, etc., shall be subject to search and this condition shall form part of the contract between the passenger
and the air carrier.

Search incident of a lawful Arrest Arresting officer is authorized to search the arresting as long as the arrest
is valid

Search of a moving motor vehicle it must be based on probable cause (ex. There is a place where there is a
person who are known to habitually deliver drug, the police officer has a probable cause, he may search the car)

Search in violation of custom laws Pertains to Bureau of Customs (Ex. kapag naviolate mo yung laws ng
bureau customs)

Seizure of the evidence in plain view Seen without touching (ex. Robin padilla Case pagbaba nya ng kotse,
may nakatak na baril sa bewang nya, kahit hindi sya kapkapan kitang may baril sya.)

When the accused, himself waives his right against unreasonable search and seizures Gave consent to search
even if its illegally search

Stop and frisk it is a doctrine, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and
frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in the light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. (Ex. Malacat vs. CA nung time na
naganap yung Miranda bombing there is certain people na parang hindi sila mapakali na parang may
kahinahinalang gagawin, the police officer approached them, with the probable cause they made a search on
these people and found out that there is a bomb inside their belongings.)

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Exigent and emergency circumstances

Additional Exceptions (Not in the Rules):

(1) Estoppel: When the right is voluntarily waived
(2) Violent insanity.

EXAMINATION OF APPLICATION (RULE 126, SECTION 4 OF THE RULES OF

COURT)
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)

The judge, before issuing the search warrant, must personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any writers he may produce on facts personally known
to then, and attach to
the record their sworn statement together with any affidavit submitted.

The evidence offered by the complainant and his witness should be based on their own personal knowledge and
not on mere information or belief.

Affiant could be charged with perjury if the allegations contained therein are found to be untrue.

PARTICULARITY OF PRESCRIPTION
Constitution requires that the place to be searched on the persons or things to be seized be described
with such particularity as to enable the person serving the warrant to identify them.
The person sought to be seized should be identified by name if the warrant is issued without a name or
with the name in blank such that it can be enforced against any person, it is unquestionably void.
Where by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given.
Only the articles particularly described in the warrant can be seized and no other property can be taken
thereunder unless it is prohibited law.

PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE (RULE 126, SECTION 2 OF THE RULES OF

COURT)
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending, (n)

Property subject of the offense

Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense

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Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense where the search and seizures is
made only
for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against the accused the warrant is unlawful as it would violate
the constitutional rights against self-incrimination

ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE (EXCLUSIONARY RULE) ART.

III, SECTION 3 PARAGRAPH 2

Purpose of EXCLUSIONARY RULE: Kung ang gusto talaga ng authority ay makulong ang isang tao, pwedeng
nakawin nalang nya yung evidence, because of this exclusionary rule, hindi na nila pwedeng gawin yun dahil
lahat ng illegally seized evidence is inadmissible as an evidence of the case (for it is considered, fruit from the
poisonous tree)
Articles illegally seized are not admissible as evidence (EXCLUSIONARY RULE), pursuant to the doctrine
originally announced in the case of Stonehill vs. Diokno

Properties may have been seized in violation of the said provision, it does not follow that its owner shall be
entitled to recover it immediately. If the said property is the subject of litigation, like will remain incustodia legis
until the case is terminated

May nonetheless be used in the judicial or administrative action that may be filed against the officer responsible
for it illegal seizure

where the accused did not raise the issue of the admissibility of the evidence against him on ground that it had
been illegally seized, such omission constituted a waiver of the protection granted by this section

Warrantless searches and seizures (RULE 113) instance when a search or seizures may be validly made
notwithstanding noncompliance with the requisites disused above.

Peace officer or even a private person may without a warrant a person

when such person has in fact just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his
presence.
When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or a place where he is
serving his final judgement

DO THE ORDINARY RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES APPLY TO SEARCHES CONDUCTED AT THE AIRPORT PURSUANT
TO ROUTINE AIRPORT SECURITY PROCEDURES?
NO. Searches of passengers at airport. R.A. 6235 provides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that
hand-carried luggage, etc., shall be subject to search and this condition shall form part of the contract between
the passenger and the air carrier.

Warrant must refer to only one specific offense

Warrantless Arrest
A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or attempting to
commit an offense;

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When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving a final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

Warrantless Arrest a writ issued by a judge after finding of judicial probable cause, that there is necessity in
placing the accused in custody

RULE 113 ARREST

Section 1. Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. (1) purpose is to bind the person to answer an accusation of a crime;
referring to a criminal warrant of arrest.

Other instances of arrest:

Arrest or contempt by administrative and legislative bodies Ronnie dayan: he was arrested in La Union,
Pangasinan not on the basis of warrant arrest issued by the court and not on the basis of criminal court, but
issued warrant for he was cited in contempt by congress: house of representatives for not showing up.

Deportation arrest - executive branch is authorized arrest securing a warrant any alien who has illegally entered
into the country or proven unfit to stay. executive department need not to apply or secure a judicial warrant to
arrest an individual
Both are subject to due process-must be exercise with the recognition of arrest

Section 2. Arrest;how made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to
a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a)

Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the
accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay. (3a)

Section 4. Execution of warrant. The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for
execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after
the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge
who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor. (4a)

Section 5. Arrest without warrant;when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; Reason for allowing POLICE warrantless arrest: because there was no time to for filing such
warrant (baka kapag nagapply pa ng warrant of arrest pagbalik nya wala na yung aarestohin nakatakas na!)

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

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In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112. (5a)

Section 6. Time of making arrest. An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. (6)

Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been
issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him,
or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be
shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a)

Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer
shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either
engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or
forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest. (8a)

Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the
person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in
the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly
resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest. (9a)

Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many
persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer
shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. (10a)

Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. An officer, in order to make an arrest either by
virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where
the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing
his authority and purpose. (11a)

Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure.Whenever an officer has entered the building or
enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate
himself. (12a)

Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person
may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. (13)

Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at
the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately
with such person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable
regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right. (14a)

BOND (PYANSADOR)
Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may
arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested by
a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.

An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from
the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. (23a)

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Ex. Accused He may maintain a premium to a surety company to assures the court that I will appear when so
requires,
failure to appear, the court will confiscate the bond. The bondsman may arrest the accused without obtaining a
warrant of arrest in court. (This bond serve a guarantor)

SEARCH WARRANT- An order signed by a judge directed to a peace officer to search seize and to bring to
court

2 kinds of search:
1. Searches with warrant
2. Searches Without any warrant (but only under certain circumstances)

Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)

WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST

1987 Constitution - Only the JUDGE may issue warrant of arrest (exclusive prerogative of Judge)
1973 (Martial Law Constitution) - A warrant of arrest may be issued by the JUDGE AND SUCH OTHER
OFFICER AS MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW Secretary of Defense may issue warrant without obtaining
from

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRESTS
General Rule: Only the judge has the power to issue a warrant after the proper procedure has been duly taken.

Exceptions:
(1) In cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. [Salazar v.
Achacoso (1990)]

(2) Warrant of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of carrying out a final
finding of a violation of law and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. It may be issued only
after the proceeding has taken place as when there is already a final decision of the administrative authorities.

Peace officer Police, NBI or PDEA

The warrant cannot be a "general warrant" meaning, it cannot be a fishing expedition. It must state the
suspected offense and only be limited to:

SUBJECT OF THE OFFENSE;

Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; o
Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
(Section 2, Rule 126, Rules of Criminal Procedure)

It cannot be issued if there is no suspected offense, like "I have not heard from him in over a month now."
Stone hill Case: Applies the use of general warrant which is not allowed by the law, as provides by our
constitution that it must be specific, otherwise considered fishing expedition which requires ascertainment of the
offense committed.

CASES

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People vs. Andre Marti4

Ponencia: BIDIN, J
Topic: Search and Seizures
Trigger of facts: Package of Marijuana to be sent abroad by unknown person for certain amount of 2000php
Triger of issue: Whether or not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized
Trigger of Ruling: inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a
precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.
Verdict: Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby affirmed
End point of the case: Inspection is different from search. It is valid it was just an inspection and not search

FACTS
Certain Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of he Manila Packing and Export Forwarders
Carrying with them four (4) gif wrapped packages
Anita Reyes, Proprietress attended them
Appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Switzerland
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number and
other information needed for forwarding and named certain Walter Fierz
Anita Reyes asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages
Appellant however, refused and state that the packages are simply books, cigars and gloves were gift to his
friend Zurich
Package were sealed by Anita and made ready for shipment

INTERACTION OF THE CASE

Before delivery of the appellants box to the Bureau of customs, certain Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and
husband Anita Reyes
Following the standard operating procedure
They had open the package for final inspection
Upon inspection, they got curious with the smell of the package with sting of dried leaves inside
Mr. Job Reyes forthwith made a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requested to undergone a
laboratory examination
Thereafter, examination result was positive of dried marijuana
Which leads to filing of information violation of R.A 6425 Dangerous Drugs Act

ISSUES
Whether or not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized.
Whether or not custodial investigation was not properly applied.
Whether or not the trial court did not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said packages
came to his possession.

HELD
No. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise, may an act
of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In
the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of
the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as
a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second,
the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not

4 G.R. 81561 Jan. 18, 1991

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search.

No. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed
that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full
faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.

No. Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that
things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131).
At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

Case Title: Stonehill vs. Diokno

Ponencia: CONCEPCION, C.J.
Topic: Seacrh Warrant / General Warrant
Trigger of facts: General Warrant / Exclusionary Rule / 42 warrants to seized corporations and residence
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Order was illegal and inadmissible as an evidence in the case
End point of the case: General Warrant is unconstitutional

Search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine

FACTS
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this
allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides
authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into (2) major groups, namely:

those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them;
the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to
be disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured
by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them.
In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE
Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD
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The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity
of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause
of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation.
The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides;

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision; and

(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar,
none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et
al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.

In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to
the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the
aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.

The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be
seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.

The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is
emphasized.

PEOPLE VS. SARAP

Ponencia: YNARES-SANTIAGO J
Topic: Search / Stop and Frisk / Drugs
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Sarap was acquitted
End point of the case:

FACTS
Armed with a search warrant
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raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte

relative to the reported sale of marijuana by its occupants
certain Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran and Pepe Casabuena. The three were apprehended for illegal
possession of marijuana and were detained
In the course of their investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly from Capiz and Roger Amar were
the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on March 4, 1996
Thereafter, caretaker of the house of Ricaforte informed Guarino that there were two strangers looking for the
Duran sisters.
Then they proceeded to the house and saw a woman, who turned out to be accused-appellant Melly Sarap.
Melly saw Guarino and Navida in police uniform and immediately threw away her black canvass bag, which
Roger Amar picked up.
Guarino Blocked Saraps path and grabbed from her the green plastic bag she was holding.
The plastic bag was found to contain two blocks of marijuana fruiting tops.
Navida pursued Amar and arrested him. The accused-appellant denied the accusations against her. The
Court fines accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES
Whether the warrantless search and arrest conducted is legal.
Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

HELD
A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge as
provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Warrantless
searches and seizures may be made without a warrant in the following instances:

(1) search incident to a lawful arrest,

(2) search of a moving motor vehicle,
(3) search in violation of custom laws,
(4) seizure of the evidence in plain view,
(5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
(6) stop and frisk and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

These instances, however do not dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. Without
the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient
evidence to convict her. That the search disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in appellants possession, and thus
confirmed the police officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search
cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search for being
a fruit of a poisonous tree.

All told, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required
moral certainty of conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the
presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained

Wherefore the Accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground
of reasonable doubt.

SYLLABI
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Instances where warrantless searches and seizures may be made
without a warrant; In warrantless search cases, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of
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Jurisdoctor

suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. A search may be conducted
by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution. Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Warrantless searches and seizures may be
made without a warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures, (6) stop and frisk and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances. These instances, however do not dispense with the requisite of probable cause
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to
be committed.

Same; Same; The search must be incidental to a lawful arrest in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. The Banga Police could not effect a warrantless search and seizure since there was no
probable cause and Sarap was not lawfully arrested. The law requires that the search must be incidental to a
lawful arrest in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.

Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; Conditions in order for the doctrine to apply. Contrary to the finding of the
trial court, the instant case did not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. In order for the doctrine to
apply, the following conditions must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Same; Same; An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence
yielded by the search for being a fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the
appellants conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict her. That the search
disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in appellants possession, and thus confirmed the police officers initial
information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an
arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.

ALIB VS. JUDGE LABAYEN

Ponencia: Gonzaga-Reyes J.
Topic: Invalid issuance of Warrant of Arrest
Trigger of facts: Judge labayen erroneously signed a warrant of arrest without her jurisdiction
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Judge was Fined 10,000 php
End point of the case:

FACTS
Charge was filed against Judge Emma Labayen for issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused
The accused filed a motion for re-investigation and recall of warrant of arrest
Alleging that the court has no jurisdiction as the crime of perjury is within the jurisdiction of MTC
Judge Labayen denied the motion thereof and ordered the remand of the case to the MTC
Considering that the case falls under the jurisdiction of the said court
Judge labayen is administrative liable for issuing an illegal warrant of arrest after admitting that she had no
jurisdiction over the case
Judge Labayen alleges that there was no malice nor bad faith when she signed the warrant of arrest and in
fact, she ordered the remand of the case to the lower court upon a finding that the case falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTC.
Judge prays for dismissal of the case

ISSUE
WON Judge Labayen there was a valid issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused
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Jurisdoctor

HELD
She is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for refusing to withdraw the warrant of arrest she
issued despite having admitted in her order that case was within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. He recommends
to fine in the amount of 20,000. Onset of criminal proceedings, Judge Labayen had no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the criminal case as the crime of perjury falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC, respondent cannot be
totally absolved, the issuance of warrant of arrest is ministerial function of the court.

Before issuing a warrant of arrest, a judge must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the prosecutor, he
must evaluate the report and the supporting documents which will assist him to make his determination of
probable cause. A finding of the existence of a probable cause is a pre-requisite to issuance of a warrant of
arrest and strict compliance therewith is required of judge.

Issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon
amounts to ignorance of the law. The fine was found excessive and reduced to 10,000 pesos.

MALACAT V CA
Ponencia: Davide Jr. J.
Topic: Search without warrant
Trigger of facts:
Miranda Bombing alert
Trigger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict:
End point of the case:

FACTS
allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police in
Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform).
They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men,
posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store.
These men were acting suspiciously with "their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes.
The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen
gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar
Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist line." Yu's
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was
recovered.
Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.
Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990,
Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866.
At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other
police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but
nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.
In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the
warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status
quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of the
grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of
illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not
less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum.
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Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record
of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.

HELD
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect
the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section
5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful
arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest
must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in
flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part
of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could
not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves
a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:

First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.

Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since
Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat
and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge,
assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal
then are blatant violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the
Constitution.

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Jurisdoctor

PADILLA VS CA
Ponencia: Francisco J.
Topic: Plain view doctrine
Trigger of facts: Applies Plain View Doctrine / Established Rule 113 section 5 (b) How SC applied this requirement
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Convicted
End point of the case:

FACTS
High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla:

(1)One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with
ammunitions;
(3)One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4)Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.
Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3.and a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one
short magazine.

PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office issued a Certification which stated that
the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver
Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C.
Padilla.A second Certification stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood
C. Padilla.

ISSUE
Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof
are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

HELD
No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but thatper sedid not make his
apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peaceofficeror aprivate personmay, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph

(a) requires that the person be arrested

(i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense,
(ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.

Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioners vehicle figured in a hit and run an
offense committed in the presence of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner.It must
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Jurisdoctor

be stressed at this point that presence does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but
also when he hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene. As testified to by
Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor),
reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in
order to apprehend its driver.After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to
the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned
near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run.We beg to disagree.That Manarang decided to seek the
aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioners
arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action
Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in
all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain
without endangering his own life.Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law
enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense
herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has
been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to
render aid or take action.The exigent circumstances of hot pursuit,a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the
public place and the raining nighttime all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay
improvident.The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since theyhad more than mere
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity.Moreover, when caught inflagrante delictowith possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson)
and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioners warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually
committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a
peace officer.

Besides, the policemens warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph
as he had in fact just committed an offense.

There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarangs
report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number
(PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the
arresting police officers personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioners Pajero was indeed the
vehicle involved in the hit and run incident.Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal
knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea.Petitioners belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to
quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to
assail the legality of his arrest.Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and
defects.

We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in
evidence of which, we uphold.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid,are as follows:

warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Courtand
by prevailing jurisprudence,

Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements ofwhich are:

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Jurisdoctor

aprior valid intrusionbased on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;

the evidence wasinadvertentlydiscoveredby the police who had the right to be where they are;
the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
plain view justified mereseizureof evidence without further search.
search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.
consented warrantless search, and
customs search.

In conformity with respondent courts observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioners firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson
revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within plain view of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioners waist and back pocket
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 arm

alite rifle which wasimmediately apparentto the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw
said rifle lying horizontally near the drivers seat.Thus it has been held that:

(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should
happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing
their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of thecorpusdelicti.

Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even
without a warrant.

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police.This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged
search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported
defect.

Even assumingthat the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on
the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified
under a searchincidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may
undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within
petitioners grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an
incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestees custody or area of immediate
control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible
evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third
instance).In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the
vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

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Jurisdoctor

Privacy of communication and

correspondence
Section 3 Article III.

(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

SECTION 3. DIGESTED PROVISION

GENERAL RULE: WHAT
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

EXCEPTION: HOW

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

TO STRENGTHEN THE GR:

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

US Supreme Court applicable only to the unlawful taking of tangible objects

Rules out eves dropping on private gadgets and thus covers with its protection even intangible things
US Supreme Court, letters and seated packages in the mails may be examined only as to their external
appearance and right and may not be opened except in accordance with the constitutional requirement of a
lawful search and seizures.

WHAT IS THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA?

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.

WHO MAY FILE A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS DATA?
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents;
Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

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Jurisdoctor

WHERE CAN THE PETITION BE FILED?

Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place
where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner;
Supreme Court;
Court of Appeals; or
Sandiganbayan, when the action concerns public data files of government offices.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Right to privacy
DISCOVERY AND REVELATION OF SECRETS (CHAPTER THREE)
Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. The penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any private
individual who in order to discover the secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and reveal the
contents thereof.

If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos

The provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the custody of minors with
respect to the papers or letters of the children or minors placed under their care or study, nor to spouses with
respect to the papers or letters of either of them.

Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee, or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the
secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.

Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge, employee or workman
of any manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the
secrets of the industry of the latter.

R.A. 4200 - Anti-Wiretapping Law

R.A. 10175 - Cybercrime law (Privacy to the internet)

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Jurisdoctor

Freedom of expression
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances
(Section 4, Article III)
EXPLAIN PRIOR RESTRAINT AND SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
PRIOR RESTRAINT
(THIS IS NOT ALLOWED) means governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication like licensing, judicial restraint in the form of injunction or taxes measured by gross
receipts for the privilege or flat license fee for the privilege of selling religious books. (Hindi mo pa ginagawa
yung expression mo pinigilan ka na which is UNCONSTITUTIONAL)

SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
(THIS IS ALLOWED) is an assurance so that an individual may not hesitate to speak for fear that he might be
held to account for his speech or that he may suffer the retaliation of the officials he may have criticized or cited.
(Ginawa mo muna yung expression mo tapos nung may nagawa kang violation tsaka ka binigyan ng punishment
which is CONSTITUTIONAL)

4 ASPECTS OF FREEDOM OF PRESS

Freedom from prior restraint
Freedom from punishment subsequent to publication
Freedom of access to information
Freedom of circulation

TESTS: EXPLAIN DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE, CLEAR AND PRESENT

DANGER, AND THE BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST

DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE

For speech to be punishable, there should be a rational connection between the speech and the evil
apprehended. Simply put, the determination by the question: Is the statute reasonable? (Exisiting dapat yung
evil sought or yung masamang mangyayari hindi pwedeng bumase sa BAKA dapat malinaw)

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE

The question in every case is whether the words used in such circumstances are of such nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is
a question of proximity and degree. (Kapag may malinaw na basahan na makakasama sa public dun pa lang
pwedeng pigilan)

BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST

If on balance it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such a character that it
outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid (may 2 Interest katulad sa
case ni Hello Garci, may individual interest at public people interest. In application sa case ni hello garci, public
interest na makakasira at ma-violate yung right to privacy since it was taken from wiretapping and the other
interest is interest of the people since they are the one who voted and have the right over election because we
are in a democratic country. On that case explain how SC apply this test.)

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Jurisdoctor

FACIAL CHALLENGE AND THE OVER BREADTH DOCTRINE

The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the
rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.

The over breadth doctrine is an exception to the prohibition against third-party standing. It permits a person to
challenge a statute on the ground that it violates the First Amendment (free speech) rights of third parties not
before the court, even though the law is constitutional as applied to that defendant. In other words, the over
breadth doctrine provides that: Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may
nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other
parties not before the court.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The Supreme Court of the United States has prescribed the four-prong Central Hudson test to determine
whether a governmental regulation of commercial speech is constitutional. This test asks initially:

whether the commercial speech at issue is protected by the First Amendment (that is, whether it concerns a
lawful activity and is not misleading) and
whether the asserted governmental interest in restricting it is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, then to be constitutional the restriction must;
directly advance the governmental interest asserted, and
be not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

PRIVATE VS. GOVERNMENT SPEECH

The Government Speech doctrine
establishes that the government may advance its own speech without requiring viewpoint neutrality when the
government itself is the speaker.

CASES

PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO

PRIOR RESTRAINT
Ponencia: Feria J.
Topic: Application of Prior Restraint in relation to clear and present danger / Necessity of obtaining permit
Trigger of facts: petitioner has no permit to rally because allegedly there is Clear and present danger / permit is
indispensable dahil ang pinagraralihan ay street/bridge and etc. which is used by public kasi dapat sila
makasagabal sa daan.
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Petition for mandamus was granted and, there appearing no reasonable objection to the use of plaza
Miranda for the meeting applied for, respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit as requested.
End point: you dont have to prohibit nor execute prior restraint unless there is clear and present danger. Kaya to
regulate lang in support sa clear and danger and not prior restraint because it is unconstitutional.
End point of the case:

FACTS
Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager for the coalesced parties, filed a petition for mandamus to compel
Fugoso, the mayor, to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of
petitioning the government for redress to grievances.

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Jurisdoctor

The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, which according to Administrative Code, grants the Municipal Board, among others
the following legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays,
disturbances, and disorderly assemblies
Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted Revised Ordinances of
1927 which prohibits as an offense against public peace,
Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanour,
which provides "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a
riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly.
Other section also contains, that the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is
prohibited
unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such occasion, determine or
specify the streets or public places
As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the holding of
public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of said section 1119 regarding the
holding of any parade or procession in any street or public paces may be applied by analogy to meeting and
assembly in any street or public places.

ISSUE
WON Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom of assembly

HELD
No. Petition granted.

RATIO
A construction of the law giving the mayor the power to prohibit the use of the streets for assemblies for the
reason that would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations.
As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the other public places,
and the word "regulate," as used in the said code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to
restrain
but cannot be construed a synonymous with construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" the Municipal Board cannot
grant the Mayor a power that it does not have.
Besides, the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are executive and one of them
is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance and execution of
laws and ordinances
a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and
refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes
cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason
that said general power is based upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses or
permits to be issued by the Mayor
Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon the
Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes.
The respondents reason for not granting the permit was because he believed that the participants would
speak against the government.
Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience in the
use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on
his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the
record discloses,
be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the
prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities.
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION INC. VS. COURT OF

APPEALS
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
Ponencia: Kapunan J.
Topic: Freedom of press / Sex Articles / who have jurisdiction over the said case = Mariam College
Trigger of facts: May publication ng school newspaper pero yung content nya ay orientation ng sex, inexpell ang
mga editors ng newspaper and alleged na may journalism act at walang jurisdiction ang school to expel the
students.
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: School has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent student / CA decision was
reversed and set aside / Mariam college ordered to readmit Joel Tan
End point: the school has the power to regulate against violation of their student. Freedom of Expression is a right,
even if its not absolute, which should be limited with decency
End point of the case: the school has the power to regulate against violation of their student. Freedom of
Expression is a right, even if its not absolute, which should be limited with decency.

FACTS
Following the publication of Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing
Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho),
the members of the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog,
all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by the Chair of the Miriam College Discipline
Committee.
The Letter informed them that letters of complaint were "filed against you by members of the Miriam
Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five students have been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for
inquiry and investigation.
As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in the student handbook and compelled to
submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the initial date.
None of the students submitted their respective answers.
They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) which supposedly had jurisdiction over the case.
In a Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers.
In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter to the Discipline Committee
reiterating his clients' position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them.
According to the students lawyer, the Committee was "trying to impose discipline on his clients on account of
their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists."
Hence, he argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and its
implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the members of said Committee who
allegedly "had already articulated their position" against his clients. The Discipline Committee proceeded with
its investigation ex parte.
Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed disciplinary
sanctions upon the students, to wit:

(1) Jasper Briones [Editor-in-Chief of ChiRho, 4th year student]: Expulsion;

(2) Daphne Cowper: Suspension up to (summer) March 1995;
(3) Imelda Hilario: suspension for 2 weeks to expire on 2 February 1995;
(4) Deborah Ligon [4th year student and could graduate as summa cum laude]: suspension up to May 1995;
(5) Elizabeth Valdezco: suspension up to (summer) March 1995;
(6) Camille Portuga [Octoberian]: graduation privileges withheld, including diploma;
(7) Joel Tan: suspension for 2 weeks to expire on 2 February 1995;
(8) Gerald Gary Renacido [2nd year student]: Expelled and given transfer credentials;
(9) Relly Carpio [3rd year student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials;
(10) Jerome Gomez [3rd year student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials; and
(11) Jose Mari Ramos [Art editor of Chi-Rho, 2nd year student]: Expelled and given transfer papers.

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Jurisdoctor

Said students thus filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of
the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them.
In the long run of appeal
The students, excluding the 3 students elevate the matter to the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act precludes the schools right to discipline its students.

HELD
the Supreme Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in school premises.
The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute.
The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment. Thus, the Court did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviour - which
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
Provisions of law (such as Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act) should be construed in harmony with
those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in a manner that
would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental law.
A statute should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved by a narrower one. Thus,
Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to invade upon the school's right to discipline its students. At the
same time, however, said provision should not be construed as to improperly restrict the right of the students
to free speech.
Consistent with jurisprudence, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act is read to mean that the school cannot
suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article
materially interrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Further, the
power of the school to investigate is an assistant of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary result to
the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning.
That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. the Court therefore rule that Miriam College has the authority
to hear and decide the cases filed against the students.
Academic Freedom; Schools and Colleges; Academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to
decide for itself its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic freedom encompasses the
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,
(3) How it shall be taught, and
(4) Who may be admitted to study.

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., how it shall be
taught. A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ V. RAUL M. GONZALES

Ponencia: PUNO,C.J.
Topic: Hello Garci / explanation of 3 test / content based expression and content neutral expression
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: petition was granter / nullifying the official statement made by the respondent
End point of the case: 2 interest to be balance

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

FACTS
A year following the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye
disclosed to the public how the opposition planned to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of
a mobile phone conversation allegedly between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Commissioner
Garcillano of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
The conversation was alleged taken through wire-tapping.
respondent Secretary Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice (DOJ) warned reporters who are in
possession of copies of the said conversation, as well as those broadcasting companies and/or publishers that
they may be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
NTC issued a press release strengthening the prohibition on the dissemination of the same that the
broadcasting/airing of such information shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation
of the licenses or authorizations issued by the Commission.
Petitioner Francisco Chavez filed a petition against respondent Chavez and NTC, praying for the issuance of
the said writs, issuances and orders of respondents
as they were complete violations of the freedom of expression and of the press, and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.

ISSUE
Whether or not the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD
Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of
three tests,i.e.,

thedangerous tendency doctrine, which limits speech once a rational connection has been established between
the speech controlled and the danger intended;

the balancing of interests tests, a standard when courts balance conflicting social values and individual
interests,and

theclear and present danger rulewhich rests on the premise that speech may be controlled because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.

It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged
violation of the anti-wiretapping law. However, respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and
present danger test.

Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording.

Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two
versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version.

Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is uncertain,
especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its
commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.

Fourthly, given all these unsettled aspects of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the
anti-wiretapping law.

We rule thatnot every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the
press.

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Jurisdoctor

The need to prevent their violation cannot per setrump the exercise of freespeechandfreepress,a preferred
right whose breach can leadtogreater evils.For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the
clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press.
There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers thenational security
of the State.

What are the four aspects of freedom of the press?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. freedom from prior restraint

2. freedom from punishment subsequent to publication
3. freedom of access to information
4. freedom of circulation

What is the difference between content-neutral regulation and a content-based restraint?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A content-neutral regulation merely concerned with the incidents of the speech or one that controls the time,
place or manner and under well define standards (example BP 880). A content-based restraint or censorship is
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.

The first is subjected to an intermediate review. The other bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule.

Hello Garci CDs Case

In 2006, following the public release of the Hello Garci tapes, DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez and the NTC
issued a warning against reporters from airing the same. Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies
of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Are the official statements of the Gonzales and the NTC constitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The SC nullified the official statements made by DOJ Secretary Gonzalez and the NTC for constituting
unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. The Court held that the
challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are
content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one object a specific content fixed
as these were on the alleged taped conversations between President Arroyo and Garcillano.

The Court said that a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. visit fellester.blogspot.com This rule applies equally to
all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears, said the Court.

Same; Freedom of Expression; In line with the liberal policy of the Supreme Court on locus standi when a case
involves an issue of overarching significance to our society, the Court brushes aside technicalities of procedure
and takes cognizance of the instant petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil
rights, the freedom of expression.In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case
involves an issue of overarching significance to our society, we therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure
and take cognizance of this petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights,
the freedom of expression. The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to information of the public.
It is fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only the most decisive one which in the case

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Jurisdoctor

at bar is whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press. Chavez vs. Gonzales,
545 SCRA 441, G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008

Case Title: Bayan, et al., vs. Eduardo Ermita PRIOR RESTRAINT

Ponencia: AZCUNA J
Topic: Obtaining permit / freedom park / B.P 880 alleged to be unconstitutional
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and
Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in
every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the
giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition
in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law.
Furthermore, calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, the petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
End point of the case:

FACTS
The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines
and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is
a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger.
It also restricts the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The
words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the explanation of some cause not
supported by the government.
Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated.
As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions
raising factual issues
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies.

ISSUE
Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6,
12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the
exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

HELD
Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys authority in the range of constitutional protection. For this

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Jurisdoctor

rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic organization, without which all the other rights would
be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.
It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police
power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies.
B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion,
protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of
the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public
safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the
rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.

BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP

Ponencia: ESCOLIN J.
Topic: We FORUM / Closure of premise constitute virtual denial of press freedom / GENERAL WARRANT IS NOT
VAID WARRANT
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Search warrants issued were NULL and VOID, Prayer were granted to rescind all articles seized
End point of the case: Mere discontinuance due to the erroneous action of the state may constitute deprivation of
their press freedom.

FACTS
Executive Judge of Quezon City, issued 2 search warrants
where the premises building in Quezon Avenue, business addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum newspapers respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers
as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized.
A petition was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to
enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles
seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

ISSUE
Whether allegations of possession and printing of seditious materials may be the basis of the issuance of search
warrants.

HELD
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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Jurisdoctor

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and practical man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being
used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant.
Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

FREEDOM OF PRESS Yung mga kinuhang gamit for printing is considered deprivation of their freedom of
press.

Same; Same; Closure of the premises of a news publishing house constitutes a virtual denial of press freedom.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denied of petitioners freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political enlighten and growth of the citizenry.

ABAD SANTOS, J.: CONCURRING

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin. At the same time, I wish to state my
own reasons for holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.
The action against WE FORUM was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were issued
in gross violation of the Constitution.

The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126
Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace
officers. Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800, No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Freedom of Religion
(SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE)
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights
(Section 5, Article III)
SUPPORTED PROVISIONS
Art. 6 section 28 exemption of church taxation
Art. 14 section 3 Allowed catechism
Art. 6 section 24 (2) - Non-establishment clause means that the State cannot establish or sponsor an official
religion. The non-establishment clause prohibits the State from passing laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another

The values non-establishment seeks to protect are voluntarism and insulation of the political process from
interfaith dissension. Such voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from religion
and unless religion is insulated from politics.

Benevolent neutrality is summarized into four propositions or tests:

1. Government must not prefer one religion over another religion or irreligion because such preference would
violet voluntarism and breed dissension; walang kinikilingan
2. Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes because this too would violate voluntarism and
breed interfaith dissension; not allowed to build a church
3. Government action must not aid religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith
dissension; and giving funds to a church or religion under public funds
4. Government action must not result in excessive entanglement with religion because this too can violate
voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension. Forcing and prohibiting to join or not in a religion

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Freedom of conscience and freedom to obey to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen for of
religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts freedom to believe and freedom to act.

The judicial task in free exercise cases is one of balancing the secular interest of the state with the interest of
religion. The tests are:

Clear and present danger test - The question in every case is whether the action used in such circumstances
and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.

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Jurisdoctor

Compelling state interest test - effectuates the First Amendments command that religious liberty is an
independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon
this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling government interest of the highest
order

BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not anger, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of
religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically
into account not to promote the governments favoured form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate
the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.

BALANCING OF INTERESTS
In weighing the states interest and religious freedom, when these collide, three questions are answered in this
process.

First, has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion? The courts often
look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth;

Second, the court asks: is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious
liberty? In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the state and that they
are compelling; and

Third, the court asks: has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible
so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?
The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate state objective is the
least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as
possible on religious liberties.

STRICT NEUTRALITY
Strict neutrality holds that government should base public policy solely on secular considerations, without regard
to the religious consequences of its actions.

CASES

TARUC VS. DELA CRUZ

Ponencia: CORONA, J.
Topic:
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Petition were denied for lack of merit
End point of the case:

FACTS
The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao City.
Petitioners led by Taruc shouted for the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano for the reason that Fr.
Floranos wifes family belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs. Bishop De la Cruz found this
reason too weak so he did not give in to the request.

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Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta celebrated by Fr. Ambong who was
not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao.
Petitioners were then expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the reason of (1) disobedience to duly
constituted authority, (2) inciting dissension resulting in division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help
and (3) threatening to forcible occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety among the General Membership.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop De la Cruz and impleaded
Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for conspiring with the Bishop. They said that their rights to due
process were violated because they were not heard before the order of expulsion was made.

ISSUE
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members
of a religious institution NO

RATIO
Section 5 of Article III A form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is
insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical in
nature.
In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area, which the Court should not touch:
doctrinal and disciplinary differences.

To the power of excluding form the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters, which are outside the province of civil courts.

Comments: records show that Bishop De la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to commit acts
inimical to the best interests of PIC. They were also warned of the consequences of their actions yet these pleas
and warnings fell on deaf ears.

Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdictions; Religious Organizations; It is not for the courts to exercise control over
church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best
left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the
courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions.
Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which
the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences. In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of
Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one
area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences. Thus, the amendments of the
constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant,
having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and
having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ

Ponencia: LAUREL, J.
Topic:
Trigger of facts:alleged that these actions favour a religion which is violation of Separation of church and state
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict:
End point of the case: yung benefit ng church are merely accidental and not intended, hindi binabandera ang
catholic church but rather using it to advertise and encourage tourist.

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FACTS
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ against respondent Ruiz
the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic.
The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature,
contemplates religious purpose for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

HELD
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favour upon a particular sect or church
but the purpose was only to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist and the government just took
advantage of an event considered of international importance
thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover,
the Court stressed that Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence
for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Emphasizing that, when the Filipino people
implored the aid of Divine Providence,
they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.

GERMAN VS. BARANGAN

Ponencia: LAUREL, J.
Topic:
Trigger of facts: dinisperse dahil sabi ni barangan may imminent danger danger at ginamit lang nilang rason yung
freedom of religion para maka-access sila pero ang plano talaga ay magrally, ang duty ni barangan ay to protect the
leader from anyone.
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Petition were published
End point of the case: clear and present danger is binding to conceal to the point to use their freedom of religion

135 SCRA 514 Political Law Religious Freedom vs. Clear and Present Danger Doctrine

FACTS
Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel.
But they were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering the church because the same is within the
vicinity of the Malacaang.
And considering that Germans group is expressively known as the August Twenty-One Movement who were
wearing yellow shirts with compress fists,
Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoing
within the Malacaang.

ISSUE
Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Lukes is a violation of their freedom to
worship and locomotion.

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Jurisdoctor

HELD
No.In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion
but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.
There has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow German et al to practice their religious
belief but not in the manner that German et al impressed.
Such manner impresses clear and present danger to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it
even at the expense of curtailing ones freedom to worship.

DISSENTING OPINIONS
J. Fernando It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L.
Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to
the highest priority among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will
be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of
crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of
mankind. Without that faith, mans very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.

J. Teehankee The right to freely exercise ones religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7
Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly along with the
other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying
phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign
prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on
the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

J. Makasiar With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and
present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacaang and
the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public
disturbance or violence.

Constitutional Law; Exercise of right to religious freedom must be done in good faith without any ulterior motive,
e.g., political. The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in
invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond
debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and
of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties x x x x x observe honesty
and good faith.

Same; Reasonable restrictions in use of thoroughfares near the Malacaang Palace are valid as threats to lives
of heads of states are constant and real. Even assuming that petitioners claim to the free exercise of religion
is genuine and valid, still respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as
violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the
Malacaang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets
approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely
prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of
this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the
lives of the President and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats
Legislative Fun and foreign guests transacting business with Malacaang. The need to secure the safety of
heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their lives and safety is
constant, real and felt throughout the world Vivid illustrations of this grave and serious problem are the gruesome
assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of violence and terrorism that have been perpetrated against heads
of state and other public officers of foreign nations.

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Jurisdoctor

Same; Same. Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive offices within the
Malacaang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices include communications
facilities that link the central government to all places in the land. Unquestionably. the restriction imposed is
necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive branch of the government, which petitioners
mass action would certainly disrupt.

Same; Freedom to translate religious belief into action may be curtailed. In the case at bar, petitioners are not
denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they
had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this
Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education. German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, No. L-68828 March 27, 1985
a

Same; Freedom of locomotion may be curtailed. Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P.
Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of which have already been discussed, is allowed under the
fundamental law, the same having been established in the interest of national security. German vs. Barangan,
135 SCRA 514, No. L-68828 March 27, 1985

EBRALINAG ET AL VS. DIV. SUPT. OF SCHOOL OF CEBU

SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
Ponencia: KAPUNAN J.
Topic:
Trigger of facts: Jehovah Member was allegedly deprived with their right to free education
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Instant motion was DENIED
End point of the case: walang masamang tumayo at umatend ng flag ceremony hindi na sila kailangang i-expell as
long as they do not disrupt other in the performance of their freedom or as long as it did not violate the right of
others.

CAMEL STORY: una pinasok yung ilong sa tent, tapos sabi nung tao sa loob ng tent okay lang ilong lang naman.
Tapos pinasok nung camel yung ulo, hanggang sa pati leeg at buong katawan, ang ending ung tao na yung nasa
labas ng tent yung camel nasa loob. Yung ang negative side ng ruling of this case

Note: Please read GERONA, ET AL. vs. THE HON. SEC. OF EDUCATION and BALBUNA, ET AL. vs. THE HON. SEC.
OF EDUCATION first before reading this case.

FACTS
DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovahs
Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem,
salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools and her Assistant issued a Memorandum directing District Supervisors,
High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service
after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of
public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesnt obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and
choose not to obey.
Despite a number of appropriate arguments made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still
they chose to follow their conviction to their belief.
As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, ordering the
dropping from the list in the school register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to
Grade 6 who chose to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law
however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to
their letter.

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Jurisdoctor

students and their parents filed an action alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing,
hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom of
speech, religion and worship.
Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or dropping from the rolls issued
and enjoining respondent from barring them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons
acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.
Court lifted the TRO and immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.
the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion orders issued by
the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
external acts or behaviour that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through observance of the flag ceremony.
They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behaviour, there is no
warrant for their expulsion.

ISSUE
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools violates right receive free
education.

HELD
The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their
right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution
to receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV).
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to disturb such
patriotic exercises.
If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge,
we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the state has a
right and duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless
of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese
soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not object now about
saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set aside.

Same; Same; Same; Two-fold aspect of right to religious profession and worship; Scope. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The
first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare" (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law 1991
Ed pp 176-177).

Same; Same; Same; Prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom, sole justification thereof,
explained."The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom
(according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135
SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest', that the State has
a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the
schools is not justified.

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Jurisdoctor

Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; Administrative Code; Flag Salute Law; Compulsion to observe flag salute law
on pain of dismissal from one's job or expulsion from school is alien to the conscience of present generation of
Filipinos, being violative of their constitutional rights to free speech and free exercise of religious profession and
worship.Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year-old decision of this Court in Gerona upholding the
flag salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with. It is
somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the
Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to re-examine it. The idea that
one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag
ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience
of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free
speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV,
Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Jehovah's witnesses are accorded exemption to the observance of flag
ceremony in deference to their religious beliefs but said right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them the right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's
Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however
"bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does
not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs.
Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their
religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should
commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other
persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to free education; Expulsion from school by reason of one's religious
belief considered a violation of a citizen's right to free education.Moreover, the expulsion of members of
Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under
the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education x x x and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To force a religious group, through statutory compulsion, to
participate in a ceremony violative of its religious belief is not conducive to love of country or respect for duly
constituted authorities. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law,
to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or
respect for duly constituted authorities. Ebralinag vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219
SCRA 256, G.R. No. 95770, G.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993

(OTHER DIGEST VERSION) EBRALINAG ET AL VS. DIV.

SUPT. OF SCHOOL OF CEBU
Ponencia:KAPUNAN J.
Topic: Conflict with the freedom of religion to the power of the state
Trigger of facts: Jehovah Member was allegedly deprived with their right to free education
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict:
End point of the case: Mere standing, mere respected as long as the that person disrupts the ceremony, that person
should be

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Jurisdoctor

Note: Please read GERONA, ET AL. vs. THE HON. SEC. OF EDUCATION and BALBUNA, ET AL. vs. THE HON. SEC.
OF EDUCATION first before reading this case.

FACTS
1. The facts of these two consolidated cases are the same with the cases of Gerona and Balbuna, students
who are members of Jehovas Witnesses who refuse to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge based on their belief that the same are acts of worship or religious devotion which they
cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God.

2. Sometime in 1989, Division Memorandum No. 108 was issued by the Division Superintendent of Cebu.
Because of reports received, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in the daily flag
ceremony or to obey the flag salute regulation were considered removed from the service after due process.

3. Also, they quoted the rulings that if students refuse to comply, they forfeited their right to attend public
schools. Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children to obey the
memorandum. They were asked to sign an agreement and conduct confrontation meetings, however, to no
avail.

4. This led to the expulsion of the petitioning students. Appeal to the Sec. of Education was also unsuccessful
as he did not answer the letter. The succeeding Division Superintendent of School also did not recall the
orders and in fact, ordered verbally the expulsion of more students who refused to comply.

5. Hence, this present petition was commenced and a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to
their respective classes until further orders from this Court.

ISSUE
Should the Gerona and Balbuna rulings be reversed?

HELD
Yes. The petition was granted and the students were permanently reinstated.

1. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from ones job or of being expelled from school, is
alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which
guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship.

2. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator.

3. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to
act on ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

4. While Petitioners do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or
behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country. They quietly
stand at attention to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

5. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of
a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public

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Jurisdoctor

morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right and duty to prevent.
Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.

6. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovahs Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a small portion of
the school population will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation untaught and
uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes.

7. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn
not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession
and be taught the virtues of patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights
and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values as part of the curricula.

8. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court
had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a
ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully
constituted authorities.

9. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a
compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. When
they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. (West
Virginia vs. Barnette, Justice Jackson)

10. Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country assuming that such unity
and loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense
of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska)

11. The expulsion of members of Jehovahs Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their
right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the
State to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education
accessible to all.

12. However, while the highest regard must be afforded to their right to the free exercise of their religion, this
should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them if they should commit
breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons.
(German vs. Barangan)

13. Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944
when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and
bowed before every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history,
they would not quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own
flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made our hearts pound with pride
and joy over the newly-regained freedom and sovereignty of our nation.

14. Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners right under our Constitution to refuse to salute the
Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of
our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.

CRUZ, J., concurring: In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that
promulgated it was apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the right to determine what was
religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what he could and could not worship. In pronouncing
that the flag was not a religious image but a symbol of the nation, it was implying that no one had the right to
worship it or as the petitioners insisted not to worship it. This was no different from saying that the cult that

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Jurisdoctor

reveres Rizal as a divinity should not and cannot do so because he is only a civic figure deserving honor but not
veneration.

GERONA VS. SEC OF EDUCATION

Ponencia: MONTEMAYOR
Topic: Origin of the decision of Ebralinag case / EXPELLED FOR FAILURE TO FOLLOW FLAG CEREMONY
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict: Appealed decision was affirmed, Writ issued is ordered dissolved
End point of the case: Beliefs should not be conflict to the laws and constitution, even if its religious violation / SC
required them to salute and give respect as patriotism otherwise may be deprived of using public benefits like the
right to study in a public school.

FACTS
1. When RA 1265 (An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory in All Educational Institutions) took effect, the
Sec. of Education issued Dept. Order No. 8 prescribing the rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the
flag ceremony.

2. The said order mandates that a proper salute must be given, or at least standing still with arms and hands
straight at sides along with the singing of the National Anthem and recital of the pledge. However, petitioners
children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to do so.

3. This was because, as members of Jehovas Witnesses, they believe that the obligation imposed by law of
God is superior to that of laws enacted by the State. This is based on a verse which states:

Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is
in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve
them.

They consider that the flag is an image within this command and thus refuse to salute it. Because of this, they
were expelled from the school.

4. The counsel of petitioners wrote to the Sec. of Education that the children be allowed to just remain silent and
stand still with their arms and hands straight at their sides. This was, however, denied along with the childrens
reinstatement.

5. An action was then filed before the CFI with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction but the complaint was
dismissed. Hence, the present petition with the SC issuing a temporary writ subject to the result of the case.

ISSUE
Should the department order be upheld?

HELD
Yes. The CFI decision was affirmed and the writ of preliminary injunction was dissolved.

1. First, there was no question with the act of saluting since the department order allows that students can just
stand still with their arms and hands straight at their sides. The issue was focused on the singing of the
national anthem and the recital of pledge.

2. The court eventually held that if the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of
society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The reasons are:

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

a. the flag is not an image nor the flag ceremony a religious rite; the flag is a symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty.

b. the wordings of the patriotic pledge or the national anthem does not have anything that is religiously
objectionable as they speak only of love of country, patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying for
it.

c. the State was merely carrying out its constitutional duty to supervise and regulate educational institutions
and see to it that all schools aim to develop civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV,
section 5 of the Constitution).

d. considering the separation of the State and Church, the flag does not have any religious significance.

e. also, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the court;
it cannot be left to a religious group or sector to its follower as there would be confusion and
misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meaning to be given as there are religious
groups or sects or followers.

f. as emphatically stated, if a man lived on an island, alone and all by himself, he would normally have
complete and absolute rights as to the way he lives, his religion, including the manners he practices his
religious beliefs with no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to follow; but since man is gregarious by
nature and instinct and he gravitates toward community life, to receive and enjoy the benefits of society, he
becomes a member of a community or nation; thus, he has to give up rights for the benefit of his fellow
citizens and for the general welfare, just as his fellow men and companions also agree to a limitation of their
rights in his favor.

g. also, exempting the children will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population
which by far constitutes the great majority; other pupils would naturally ask for the same privilege because
they might want to do something else such as play or study; if this exemption is extended, then the flag
ceremony would soon be a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time
will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the
flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism a pathetic, even tragic situation,
and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an
exemption.

3. US jurisprudence made as basis:

a. Reynolds vs. US the law prohibited polygamy which was allowed for Mormons

Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself.

b. Hamilton vs. University of California the university requires military science and tactics training but the
objectioners believe that war and preparation for war is a violation of their religious belief

it was held untenable. The Court stated that California did not call them. They sought education in the
university and the due process clause secured by law will be violated if they are to be exempted from the
training.

In this case, having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right
to attend public schools.

c. Minersville School District vs. Gobitis same facts with present case; the US Supreme Court upheld the
conduct of flag ceremony but after 3 years, it was reversed in West Virginia State Board of Education vs.
Bernette. This was only because in the latter case, the parents are to be prosecuted criminally if their children

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Jurisdoctor

are not in school. It turned out as a dilemma with the authority against individual rights so the Court then
approved the exemption. However, it is not the rulingin the present case.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented in the latter case stating:

The constitutional protection of religious freedom gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma

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Liberty of Abode and Freedom of

Movement
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
court. Neither shall the right to travel, be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law
(Section 6, Art. III)
THE LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

1. National security
2. public safety; and
3. public health

RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 6

1. Freedom to choose and change ones place of abode.
2. Freedom to travel within the country and outside.

RIGHT CURTAILMENT/LIMITATIONS OF RIGHT

1. Liberty of abode
Lawful order of the court and within the limits prescribed by law.

2. Right to travel
May be curtailed even by administrative officers (ex. passport officers) in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

NOTE: The right to travel and the liberty of abode are distinct from the right to return to ones country, as shown
by the fact that the Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Human Rights have separate guarantees
for these. Hence, the right to return to ones country is not covered by the specific right to travel and liberty of
abode. (Marcos v.Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668).

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT: LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL

THE LIBERTY GUARANTEED BY THIS PROVISION INCLUDES

(1) freedom to choose and change one's place of abode and;
(2) freedom to travel both within the country and outside.

Freedom of movement is not absolute.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 13(2): everyone has the right to leave any country, including
ones own, and to return to that country.

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 12(4): no one shall be deprived of the right to enter his own
country.

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The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is the Court's well considered view that the right to
return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law, and under our Constitution, is
part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e. against being arbitrarily deprived thereof.
[Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760 (1989)]

Dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez in the Marcos case: Sec. 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically
that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon
lawful order of the court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Sec. 6 further provides that the
right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines are not absolute rights. It can be regulated by lawful
order. The order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by Section
6. The condition imposed by the CA is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to
ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. (Yap, Jr.
v. CA, 2001)

The liberty of abode may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court, and the court is to be guided by the
limits prescribed by law on the liberty itself.

The liberty of travel may be impaired even without court order, but the appropriate executive officer is not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. He can impose limits only on the basis of national security, public
safety, or public health and as may be provided by law.

The right to travel should not be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer.

ALIENS AND RIGHT TO ENTRY

While the right to travel of citizens covers both exit from and entry into the country, aliens cannot claim the same
right.

REFERENCE AND CITATION

In Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil 851, a maid has the right to transfer to another residence even if she had not yet
paid the amount advanced for her transportation from the province by an employment agency which was then
effectively detaining her.

Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778, the Mayor of Manila was not sustained by the SC when he deported
some 170 women of ill-repute to Davao, for the admittedly commendable purpose of ridding the city for serious
moral and health problems. These women are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the
same constitutional guarantees as are other citizensto change their domicile from Manila to another locality.

Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660, the respondents were justified in requiring the members of certain
non-Christian tribes to reside in a reservation, for their better education, advancement and protection. The
measure was held to be a legitimate exercise of police power.

Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, 50 Phil 595, health officers may restrict access to contaminated areas and also
quarantine those already exposed to the disease sought to be contained.

Zemel vs. Rusk, 381 US 1, the Secretary of State may regulate or even prohibit the travel of citizens to hostile
countries to prevent possible international misunderstanding and conflict.

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Section 26 of HAS of 2007cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime
of terrorism as therein defined is entitled to bail and if granted the same, the court, upon application by the
prosecutor, shall limit the right to travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or
where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety.

CASES

VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN
Ponencia: Malcom J.
Topic:
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict:
End point of the case:

FACTS
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons,
to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
The women (who were prostitutes) were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were
under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given
their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their
unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October
Just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and
friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of
the Supreme Court.

Writ of Habeas Corpus - An order issued by a court to a person detaining another, to produce the body of the
prisoner at a certain time and place, and to show sufficient cause for holding in custody the individual. - Habeas
Corpus: to bring the body

City fiscal (for the respondent): Admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that
the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have
been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not
extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila.

According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at
good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales.

SC first order: The court awarded the writ that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano
Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of
their liberty.
None of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents.

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Fiscal: offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not
wish to return to Manila.

Sales: answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women
had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had
married or signed contracts as laborers.

Yigo: answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was
impossible for him to obey the mandate.

SC second order: Since respondents did had not complied nor explained their failure to do so the 1st order, court
directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents unless:

1.) women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk
of that court, renounce the right, or
2.) the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible.

ISSUE
WON judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine
Islands.

By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these
persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands?

HELD
1.) Government of laws.

"No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man; we will not deny or defer to any man
either justice or right."

No official, no matter how high, is above the law.

"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions
is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes
upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."

2.) There is no law or ordinance permitting/authorizing such Mayor and Chief of police in deporting these
women.

These women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not
being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
Mayor Lukban was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the
same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the
Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return
of the unfortunate women to Manila.

His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of
habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

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The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of
court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme
Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100).

SYLLABI
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RlGHT OF DOMICILE; LlBERTY; HABEAS CORpus; CONTEMPT.One hundred
and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by
orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly
hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation authorized the
Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to
change their domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus was properly granted,
and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court
for his failure to comply with the order of the court.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression are three: (1) Civil action; (2)
criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. A civil action was never intended effectively and promptly to meet a
situation in which there is restraint of liberty. That the act may be a crime and that the person may be proceeded
against is also no bar to the institution of habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles,
but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.

4.ID.; ID.The privilege of domicile is a principle often protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in
American jurisprudence.

5.HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.

6.ID.; PARTIES. Where it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is
proper for the writ to be submitted by some person in his behalf.

7.ID.; JURISDICTION. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the Court of First Instance.

8. ID.; ID.The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforceable
anywhere in the Philippine Islands.

9.ID.; ID.Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests
in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances.

10.ID.; RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential objects and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

11.ID.; ID.The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.

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12.ID.; ID.The true principle should be that if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in
his power to obey the order of the court, and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so.

13.ID.; ID.Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person
before the application for the writ, is no reason why the writ should not issue.

14.ID.; ID.The place of confinement is not important to the relief if the guilty party is within the reach of process
so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp.

15.ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT. For respondents to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of habeas
corpus, three courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these,
persons could not safely be brought before the Court; or (3) they could have. presented affidavits to show that
the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.)

16.CONTEMPT OF COURT. The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in
order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.

17. ID.When one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid
excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order
him either imprisoned or fined.

18.ID.An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ -of habeas corpus, when he
has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.

19.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS. The Government of the

Philippine Islands is a. government of laws. The court will assist in retaining it as a government of laws and not
of men.

20.ID, ID.No official, however high, is above the law.

21.ID.; ID.The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors. Villavicencio vs. Lukban., 39 Phil., 778, No. 14639 March 25, 1919

MARCOS,PETITIONERVS.MANGLAPUS,RESPONDENT
(PART 2)
Ponencia: CORTES J.
Topic: Right to Domicile
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict:
End point of the case:

FACTS
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when
the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and
move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
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Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to
prove that they can stir trouble from afar
Honasans failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of
the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner
also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to theMarcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and
equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD
Noto both issues. Petition dismissed.

RATIO
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt,
dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),
inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has
to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of theMarcosesto be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of
case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that

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Jurisdoctor

context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is
proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision
are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of
the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring
The presidents power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract
theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the
President.
Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, its the executives
responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
We cant sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos wish to die in
the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.

Cruz, Dissenting
As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed by
the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
Military representatives failed to show that Marcos return would pose a threat to national security. Fears were
mere conjectures.

Residual powers but the executives powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.

Paras, Dissenting
AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos right to return to the Philippines. .
Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.
Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. Its w/in police
power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It
cant be absolute & unlimited all the time. It cant be arbitrary & irrational.

No proof that Marcos return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are speculative & military
admits that its under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos return.

Padilla, Dissenting

Sarmiento, Dissenting
Presidents determination that Marcos return would threaten national security should be agreed upon by the
court. Such threat must be clear & present.

MARCOS,PETITIONERVS.MANGLAPUS (PART 2)
Ponencia: CORTES J.
Topic:
Trigger of facts:
Triger of issue:
Trigger of Ruling:
Verdict:
End point of the case:

FACTS
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
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Jurisdoctor

former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.

President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the
death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and
society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.

A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:

Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and all other
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.

The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.
There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

ISSUE
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be
granted.

HELD
No. TheMarcoseswere not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.

RATIO
Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.
Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have
ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino illegal claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.

President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for
specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise
power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not
amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987
Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.

It is within Aquinos power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that
duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily

SYLLABI
Same; Same; The constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners are not absolute and inflexible, they admit of
limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests. The resolution of the
problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his
family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten
wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible.
For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute
terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988].

Same; Separation of Powers; Executive Powers; The grant of executive power means a grant of all executive
powers. The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], the
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Jurisdoctor

Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government. [At 157]. Thus, the 1987 constitution explicitly
provides that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines [Art. VI, Sec. 1], [t]he
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and [t]he judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law [Art. VIII, Sec. 1].
These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the
Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626, (1910)] pointed out a grant of the
legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the
judicial power which may be exercised under the government. [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative
power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members
and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power
which is vested in one officialthe President.

Same; Same; Same; The President; The powers granted to the President are not limited to those powers
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. It would not be accurate, however, to state that executive power
is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever
powers in here in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants
the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
countrys foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered
as within the scope of executive power. Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Commander-In-Chief Powers: The President can exercise Commander-In-Chief
powers in order to keep the peace and maintain public order and security even in the absence of an emergency.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter,
The American Presidency.] The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to
its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration
of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short
of the calling the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law,
in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning to our country.That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in
the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof
of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws. [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not question the Presidents power to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the Presidents sense of compassion to
allow a man to come home to die in his country. What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of
the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of
case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the

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President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

Same; Same; Same; Power of Judicial Review; Political Question Doctrine; The present Constitution limits resort
to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry. Under the Constitution, judicial
power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.]
Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. The present Constitution limits resort to the political
question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain
issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or
for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the Presidents
recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We
cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of
the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because
the power is reserved to the people.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In the exercise of the power of judicial review, the function of the court is merely to
check, not to supplant the Executive. There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners
show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to
settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or
by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution, defining judicial power, which specifically empowers the courts to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December
11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448] that: Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the
separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system
of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but
only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine
whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to checknot to
supplantthe Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. . . . [At 479-480.]

Same; Same; Same; Same; The President did not act arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare, and in prohibiting their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during
the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security
Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual basis for the Presidents
decision. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from
within by a wellorganized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to
mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country, as earlier narrated in thisponenciabolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time
would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. As
divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has
given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the
return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camels back. With
these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in

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determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return. Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ, 217 SCRA 633 (1993)

Ponencia: REGALADO J.
Topic: Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement (Right to travel)
Trigger of facts: Miriam was charged of graft and corruption and order of arrest was lifted to serve and Miriam post a
cash bond thereafter cancelled posted bond and did not recognized sandiganbayan but apparently, she filed a
motion which may deem recognition of jurisdiction and filed in the supreme court a TRO for sandinganbayan action,
hence it was denied by SC. Miriam was about to fly in the U.S to purse further studies in Harvard university in US.
And she was not allowed to travel and alleged that she her freedom to travel was deprived.
Triger of issue: WON Miriams right was impaired.
Trigger of Ruling: SC ruled in the negative. Such right is not an absolute right. Provided under art. 3 section 6 which
state the exception of lawful order of the court. Courts have jurisdiction over the case for These inherent powers are
such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the existence,
dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
Verdict: WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
End point of the case: Right to travel is not an absolute right. In addition, with the criminal cases person to be
prosecuted are not allowed to go out of the country.

FACTS
Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
An order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00.
She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond".
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the
amount of P15,000.00.
Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she
be allowed provisional release on recognizance.
The Sandiganbayan postponed the arraignment.
Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she made,
which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the U.S. to
accept a fellowship at Harvard University.
She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC.
She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person
as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered.
The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing.
She likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom
of speech.

ISSUES
1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?
2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without any motion from the prosecution
and without notice and hearing?
3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?
4. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

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HELD
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused
is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested,
the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary appearance of the accused,
whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits
(such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by thejudicialauthorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of
her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required
trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody" of said court. Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and
caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

2.The ex parteissuanceof a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the presiding courts inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every intention of
leaving the country allegedly to pursuehigher studiesabroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the
Sandiganbayan in takingjudicialnotice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua
sponte the hold departure order. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's
inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the accused.

3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court,
thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of
the case. Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts
which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon suchapplicationsand toimposethe appropriate
conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications
thereof.

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Right of Association
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged
(Section 8, Article III)
RELATED PROVISIONS

Sec 2(5), Art. IX-B

The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees.

Sec. 3, Art. XIII.

x x x. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.

LABOR UNIONISM
The right to form associations does not necessarily include the right to be given legal personality. However, if the
law itself should make possession of legal personality a pre-condition for effective associational action, involved
would be not just the right to have legal personality but also the right to be an association.Philippine Association
of Free Labor Unions vs Secretary of Labor (1969)

The right of association of managerial employees is denied because of Article 245 of the Labor Code which
provides that managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. This is
because Art III Sec 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise is for the purposes not contrary to law. [United
Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) vs Laguesma (1998)]

COMMUNIST AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS

This is a question of the constitutionality of the Anti- Subversion Act which declares the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and similar organizations illegal and outlawed. Although the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the statute, we cannot overemphasize the need for prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief. The basic guidelines for
prosecution under the Act, are the following elements for the crime to be established:

(1) In case of subversive organizations other than the CPP,

(a) that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a
foreign power;

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(b) that the accused joined such organization; and

(c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and
(1) In the case of the CPP,
(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectives which led Congress in 1957 to
declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegal
means for the purpose of placing the country under the control of a foreign power;
(b) that the accused joined the CPP;
(c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts. [People vs Ferrer (1972)]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Compulsory membership of a lawyer in the integrated bar of the Philippines does not violate the constitutional
guarantee. In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554

Right to Form associationsshall not be impaired without due process of law; guarantees the right not to join
an association. Sta. Clara Homeowners Association vs. Gaston5

This right is especially meaningful in a free society because a man is by nature gregarious. His disposition to mix
with others of the same persuasions, interests or objectives is guaranteed by this provision. It also expressly
guarantees to those employed in the public and private sectors the right to form unions.

This right is available also to those in the government sectors. It is a settled in jurisprudence that, in general,
workers in the public sectors do not enjoy the right to strike. The general rule in the past and up to present is that
the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof are governed by law. x x x. Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace
cannot be secured through compulsion by law.

Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. x x x In
government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.
Alliance of Concerned Government Workers vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment6

In the case of Jacinto vs. CA7, the SC held that petitioners were not penalized for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service
Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority, from their school during regular school days, in order to participate in the
mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non holding of classes and in the deprivation of students
of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free timerecess,
after classes, weekends or holidaysto dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities
within the bounds of law, no onenot the DECS, the CSC or even the SCcould have held them liable for the
valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting
from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government workers. Their act by their nature was enjoined by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.

GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS,8 it was against the backdrop of the provisions of the
Constitution that the Court resolved that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to

5G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002

6 124 SCRA 1

7 281 SCRA 657

8 G. R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006,

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the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. It may be, as the appellate court
urged, that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of
grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties. The right to form associations shall not be
impaired without due process of law and is thus an aspect of the right of liberty. It is also an aspect of the
freedom of contract. In addition, insofar as the associations may have for their object the advancement of beliefs
and ideas, the freedom of association is an aspect of the freedom of speech and expression, subject to the
same limitation.

- The right also covers the right not to join an association.

- Government employees have the right to form unions. They also have the right to strike, unless there is a
statutory ban on them (i.e. ban on public school teachers).

The right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law.
The instinct to organize is a very basic human drive.
The right to form an association does not include the right to compel others to form an association. But there
may be situations in which, by entering into a contract, one may also be agreeing to join an association.

A land buyer who buys a lot with an annotated lien that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of
a homeowners association thereby voluntarily joins the association.

One who becomes an employee of an establishment that has a closed shop agreement with the union
thereby becomes a member of the union.

The right to form associations includes the right to unionize.

The right of civil servants to unionize is also recognized in Article IX, B, Section 2(5) which says: The right to
self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The right is recognized whether such
employees perform governmental or proprietary functions.
The right of labor in general to unionize is also recognized in Article XIII, Section 3: The State shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
Employees of the SSS and public school teachers do not have a constitutional right to strike. But the current
ban on them against strikes is statutory and may be lifted by statute.

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor: Sec. 23 of RA 875 requiring the
registration of labor unions was challenged as violative of the Bill of Rights. The SC held that this contention was
untenable. The registration is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised
with or without said registration. It is merely a condition sine qua non to for the acquisition of legal personality by
labor organizations, associations, or unions and the possession of the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations.

Mere membership in the Communist Party and similar organizations may not be punished as a criminal
offense. Membership does not render the members either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit
rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle
without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it if coupled
with action or advocacy of action. (People v. Hernandez)

(Note: The Anti-Subversion Act has been repealed.)

CASES

PEOPLE VS. FERRER9

PONENCIA: CASTRO
TOPIC: Right to association

9 GR L-32613-14, 27 December 1972 First Division, Castro (J): 5 concur, 12 took no part, 1 dissented in a separate opinion
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TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: alleged that anti-subversive act is a bill of attainder considering as a ranking leader of
communist party.
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE: Anti-subversive law as bill of attainder
TRIGGER OF THE RULING: Anti-subversive law is constitutional.
VERDICT: the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to
the court a quo for trial on the merits.
END POINT: Mere membership is not violation but doing subversive activities, like attemp against government and
etc. is violative of Anti-subversive act.

FACTS
a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac.
Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co,
directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information.
The twice-amended information recites
"That an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to takeover the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University
the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist
Party of the Philippines. That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:

B. That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
C. That the crime was committed by a band; and
D. With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity." Co moved to quash on
the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970,
another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging Nilo Tayag and five
others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed. On
21 July 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds
that
(1) Republic Act 1700 is a bill of attainder;
(2) it is vague;
(3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and
(4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws. Resolving the constitutional
issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds
that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two
accused.
The Government appealed. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for
certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder.

HELD
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.
Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.
The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities,
and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed.

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The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.
Herein, when the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment.
What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed
organization.
The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes.
In fact, the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors."
Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be
totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure
their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established.
The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further
its basic objective
i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the
country under the control and domination of a foreign power. Further, the statute specifically requires
that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the
Party.
That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals
of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the
ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful
activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder.
It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it
enough that the statute specifies persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition
against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct.
This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if
one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be
demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposes are inescapable.
Section 4 of Anti-Subversion Act expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed
"After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,
become or remain members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any
subversive association" after 20 June 1957, are punished.
Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of
the law, were given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath
their membership in the Party.
The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability.
The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.

SYLLABI
Constitutional law; Bill of Attainder, defined.A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional
ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures
to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.

Same; Bill of Attainder, history of. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the -constitutional prohibition is directed.

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Jurisdoctor

The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize
a statute as a bill of attainder. People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382, Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

Same; Same; To be Bill of Attainder statute must not only specify persons or groups but also it must reach past
conduct. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of
the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past
conduct. This requirement ement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative legislative
adjudication of guilt.

R.A. 1700, other known as The Anti-Subversion Act, not a bill of attainder.When the Act is viewed in its actual
operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definition purposes. In
fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having
the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

Same;Same;Under the Anti-Subversion Act guilt of accused must be judicially established.Indeed, were the
AntiSubversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law
alone, without more would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to
be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic, objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other
illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

Same; Same; Same; Mere membership in Communist Party not punished.As to the claim that under the
statute organizational guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in
the Party, suffice it to say that that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragnet
device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the
statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals
of the Party. But the statute specifically requires that membership must beknowingor active, with specific intent
to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to
be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of
specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an
element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organizations unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.

Same; Same; Even if Anti-Subversion Act specifies individuals it will not be Bill of AttainderEven assuming,
however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of
attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or
employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative f inding that the persons mentioned would be subject to
the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty
to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains
a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the
Ku Klux Klan, In the Philippines, the validity of section 23(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, requiring labor unions to
file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the
Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods," was upheld by this Court.

Same; Same.Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be
"judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make
such determination.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Same; Same; Character of Communist Party as construed by Court.In the Philippines the character of the
Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist
Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was
the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist
form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." More recently, inLansang vs. Garcia,we
noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among
youth organizations such the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After
meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a
sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still
are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines."

Same;Same;To be Bill of Attainder statute must not
conduct. Nor is it enough that the statute specifies
of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also
conduct. This requirement ement follows from the
adjudication of guilt.
only specify persons or groups but also it must reach past
persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past
nature of a bill of attainder as a legeslative legislative

Same; Anti-Subversion Act not violative of constitutional freedom 'of speech and association.The legislative
declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippines is an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government is intended not to provide the basis for a legislative finding of guilt of the members
of the Party but rather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of
association are so fundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a "preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise must be justified by the existence of a
substantive evil. This is the reason why before enacting the statute in question Congress conducted careful
investigations and then stated its findings in the preamble of the Act. In truth, the constitutionality of the Act
would be open to question if, instead of making those findings in enacting the statute, Congress omitted to do
so.
Same;Act does not infringe freedoms of expression and association.Whatever interest in freedom of speech
and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party
of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding
considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country.

BANGALISAN VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS10

PONENCIA: REGALADO
TOPIC: Right to association
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: 800 public school teachers had a mass action for their benefits, they were dismissed by
DECS for the neglect of their duty as a teacher.
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion and petitioners exonerated that they are
deprived of their constitutional right.
TRIGGER OF THE RULING: No. CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Public employees are not allowed to
engage in a strike.
VERDICT: the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
Rodolfo Mariano shall be given back wages without deduction or qualification from the time he was suspended until
his actual reinstatement which, under prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years.
END POINT: The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike, mass leaves and demonstrations. because public teachers action
disrupts the public rights to service. they deal with public services.

FACTS

10 G.R. No. 124678. July 31, 1997

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass actions
to dramatize their protests concerning the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and
correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit.
the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order.
Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with grave
misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable
office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines.
They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.
Thereafter, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing
them from the service effective immediately.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration filed by some of the petitioners the Secretary subsequently
modified the penalty of dismissal to suspension for nine months without pay.
The other petitioners also filed individual appeals to the MSPB, but all of their appeals were dismissed for
lack of merit.
Petitioners then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) where it ruled that respondents were guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
It, however, modified the penalty of nine months suspension previously meted to them to six months
suspension with automatic reinstatement in the service but without payment of back wages.
All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were all denied,
except that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations because of his failure to inform the school of his intended absence and to file an application
for leave therefor.
This petitioner was accordingly given only a reprimand.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the resolutions of the
CSC that penalized petitioners whose only offense was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances

HELD
No, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from performing
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
work stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to
the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to realize their
demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation,
and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. To grant employees of the public sector the right to
strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation
allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right,
employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers
in the private sector

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but
the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but non-disruptive
avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress
of grievances.

It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the
public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded
that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the mass actions, but that will not
justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize
an illegal work stoppage. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees
was clearly recognized at common law.

SYLLABI
Civil Service; Administrative Law; Strikes; The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction
that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-
outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The
right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees
to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that
petitioners purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional
term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not
have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.

Same; Same; Same; Right of Assembly; The public school teachers who went on strike are penalized not
because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because
their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences produced adverse effects upon their students for whose
education they are responsible.Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because
they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their
successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for whose
education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.

Same; Same; Same; Suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the
public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It bears stressing
that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one
of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners
had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the mass actions, but that will not justify their absences to
the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.

Same; Same; Same; Even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6,
public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. As a
general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public
employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the
sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law.
Indeed, it is frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit such strikes, either by statute or by judicial
decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common-law rule.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Same; Same; Same; To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear and direct
legislative authority therefor. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear
and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing government
employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the
public service may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private
sector.

Same; Same; Preventive Suspension; Under Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292, it is the nature of the
charge against an officer or employee which determines whether he may be placed under preventive
suspension.Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292 provides that (t)he proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would
warrant his removal from the service. Under the aforesaid provision, it is the nature of the charge against an
officer or employee which determines whether he may be placed under preventive suspension. In the instant
case, herein petitioners were charged by the Secretary of the DECS with grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations, and reasonable office regulations, refusal to
perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence
without official leave (AWOL), for joining the teachers mass actions held at Liwasang Bonifacio on September
17 to 21, 1990. Hence, on the basis of the charges against them, it was within the competence of the Secretary
to place herein petitioners under preventive suspension.

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU) VS HON.

BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA11
PONENCIA: Mendoza
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: Petitioners impugn the intent of Art. 245 of the labor code, further, alleged that
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE: WON managers forming, joining and assisting labor unions is unconstitutional
TRIGGER OF THE RULING: Route manager is ineligible union membership
VERDICT: WHEREFORE, I vote, given all the foregoing, for the reversal of the resolution and the order of 22
September 1995, of public respondent. Petition dismissed.
END POINT: Route manager is ineligible union membership because even if they are not belong to the top managers
which their role is to lay down policies, route managers are the one who is carrying the policy made by the top
managers to supervise if these policies are followed properly and another reason was, they have a direct
connection with the company which have a conflict of interest. Prohibition was provided by the labor code.

FACTS
The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees.
Sometime of march, the union filed a petition for certification on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc.
However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for
union membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory Employees-
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

11 G.R. No. 122226, March 25, 1998

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art.
245 of the Labor Code, so far declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assit or join unions,
contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUE
Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor
unions, violates Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.

RULING
Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.
The real intent of Article III, section 8 is evident in Lerums proposal.
The Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees and
security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed.
By implication, no similar absolute constitutional rights to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to
have been granted to top-level and middle managers.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution encroach on by a ban
against managerial employees forming a union.
The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for the
purposes not contrary to law.
In the case of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining
labor organization.
For the reason that these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might
not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.

SYLLABI
Same; Same; The guarantee of organizational right in Art. 111, 8 not infringed by a ban against managerial
employees forming a union; There is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining labor organizations. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against
managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its
exercise should be for purposes not contrary to law. In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a
constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC: In the first
place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are
confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous
CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of
their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of,
persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the
ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally applies to them.

Supreme Court; Judgments; Prospective Application of Judgments; Natural Resources; Reliance on De

Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971) and Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 (1992), is misplaced,
as these cases would apply if the prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) was that a private corporation could acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and
the Decision annulled the law or reversed this doctrinethe prevailing law before, during and after the signing of
the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain.
Amaris reliance on De Agbayani and Spouses Benzonan is misplaced. These cases would apply if the
prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended JVA was that a private corporation could
acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and the Decision annulled the law or reversed this doctrine.
Obviously, this is not the case here. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were allowed to acquire

Page 94 of 138
 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

alienable lands of the public domain. But since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private corporations were
banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution continued this
constitutional prohibition. The prevailing law before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that
private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The Decision has not
annulled or in any way changed the law on this matter. The Decision, whether made retroactive or not, does not
change the law since the Decision merely reiterates the law that prevailed since the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. Thus, De Agbayani, which refers to a law that is invalidated by a decision of the Court, has no
application to the instant case.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Contract Clause / Non-Impairment

clause
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
(Section 10, Article III)
REQUISITES OF VALID IMPAIRMENT
1. Substantial impairment
A. change the terms of legal contract either in time or mode of performance
B. impose new conditions
C. dispenses with expressed conditions
D. authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in the terms
2. Affects rights of parties with reference to each other, and not with respect to non-parties.12

WHEN DOES, A LAW IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS?

1. If it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as to the time or mode of performance
2. If it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed
3. If it authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms.

WHEN NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE PREVAILS

(1) against power of taxation
(2) regulation on loans

New regulations on loans making redemption of property sold on foreclosure stricter are not allowed to apply
retroactively. Co v. Philippine National Bank13

Civil Code, Art. 1306.

The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.

APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is substantial impairment when the law
changes the terms of a legal contact between the parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that
provided in its terms. [Clements v. Nolting14]

12 [Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association v. Secretary, DILG (2003)]

13 [Co v. Philippine National Bank (1982)]

14 42 Phil. 702
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

As to Tax:

GENERAL RULE: Power of taxation may not be used to violate the constitutional right of every person to be
secured against any statute that impairs the obligation of contracts.

EXCEPTION: But if the statute exempts a party from any one class of taxes, the imposition of a different tax is
not an impairment of the obligation of contracts.

A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or
vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of the police power.
[Ortigas & Co. v. CA15]

New regulations on loans making redemption of property sold on foreclosure more strict are not allowed to apply
retroactively. [Co v. Philippine National Bank (1982)]

Limitations on the use of land imposed by a contract to yield to a reasonable exercise of police power are
affirmed. Thus, zoning regulations are superior to contractual restrictions on the use of property. [Presley v. Bel-
Air Village Association (1991)]

A separation pa law can be given retroactive effect to apply to existing contracts. [Abella v. National Labor
Regulations Commission (1987)]

The charter of a bank, even if a contract, is no obstacle to liquidation done under police power. [Philippine
Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Philippine Veterans Bank (1990)]

Contracts also yield to the requirements of the freedom of religion. [Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers (1974)]
Timber licenses, permits, and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced, or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause. [Oposa v. Factoran (1993)]

A rehabilitation plan approved by statute which merely suspends the actions for claims does not violate the
contract clause. [GSIS v. Kapisanan (2006)]

The SECs approval of the Rehabilitation Plan did not impair BPIs right to contract. The impairment clause is a
limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The SEC...was acting as a
quasi-judicial body, and its order approving the plan cannot constitute an impairment of the right and the freedom
to contract.

Besides, the mere fact that the Rehabilitation Plan proposes a dacion en pago approach does not render it
defective on the ground of impairment of the right to contract. The undertaking really partakes in a sense of the
nature of sale. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale must be present. Being a form of contract,
the dacion en pago agreement cannot be perfected without the consent of the parties involved. [China Banking
Corporation v. ADB Holdings (2008)]

The amount of rental is an essential condition of any lease contract. The change of its rate in the Rehabilitation
Plan is not justified as it impairs the stipulation between the parties. [Leca Realty v. Manuela Corporation (2007)]
The non-impairment clause is a limit on legislative power, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The
approval of the Rehabilitation Plan by the Securities and Exchange Commission is an exercise of adjudicatory
power by an administrative agency and thus the non-impairment clause does not apply. Neither does it impair
the power to contract. [BPI v. SEC (2007)]

15 G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000

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Jurisdoctor

Laws prohibiting premature campaigning are intended to level the playing field for candidates to public office, to
equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser- known or poorer candidates,
on the other, by preventing undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity. Such laws might affect advertising contracts, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield
to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. [Chavez v. COMELEC (2004)]

The Court has imposed 2 essential requisites in order that RA 7641 (Retirement Law) may be given retroactive
effect. First, the claimant for retirement benefits must still be in the employ of the employer at the time the statute
took effect. Second, the claimant must have complied with the requirements for eligibility for such retirement
benefits under the statute. [Universal Robina Sugar v. Cabaleda (2008)]

LIMITATIONS
It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition does not prohibit every change in existing laws.
To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the
impairment must be substantial. Moreover, the law must effect a change in the rights of the parties with
reference to each other, and not with respect to non-parties. [Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives
Association v. Secretary, DILG16]

NATURE OF PROTECTION
Purpose: Safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against unwarranted
interference by the State.
General Rule: Contracts should be respected by the legislature and not tampered with by subsequent
laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The will of the parties to
the contract must prevail.

CONTRACTS AFFECTED
Affects legal, executed and executory contracts, which must be valid.

LIMITATIONS
1. A contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a
subsequent law.
2. Strict construction. Charters, franchises and licenses granted by the Government are strictly construed
against the grantees.
3. If a law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. This is because public
welfare is superior to private rights (PNB v. Remigio, G.R. 78508, March 21, 1995). Into each contract
are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the
agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare.
4. Eminent domain and taxation may also validly limit the impairment clause.

EFFECT OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION ON CONTRACTS

In a national emergency, such as a protracted economic depression, the police power may be exercised to the
extent of impairing some of the rights of parties arising from contracts. However, such emergency laws are to
remain in effect only during the continuance of the emergency.

CURRENCY LEGISLATION AND CONTRACTS

1. The legislative department has complete authority to determine the currency of the state and to
prescribe what articles shall be used and accepted as legal tender in the payment of lawful obligations.
2. Private parties are bound to observe this governmental authority over the nation's currency in the
execution of their contracts.

16 G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003

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Jurisdoctor

IMPAIRMENT
In order to come within the meaning of the constitutional provision, the obligation of contract must be
impaired by some legislative act (statute, ordinance, etc.). The act need not be by a legislative office; but it
should be legislative in nature. Furthermore, the impairment must be substantial (Philippine Rural Electric
Cooperatives Assoc. v. DILG Secretary, G.R. 143076, June 10, 2003).

A mere administrative order, not legislative in nature, may not be considered a cause of impairment within
the scope of the constitutional guarantee. The guarantee is also not violated by court decisions.

The act of impairment is anything which diminishes the value of the contract. The legislature may,
however, change the remedy or may prescribe new modes of procedure. The change does not impair the
obligation of contracts so long as another remedy, just as efficacious, is provided for the adequate
enforcement of the rights under the contract. (Manila Trading Co v. Reyes, 1935)

NOTE:
A mere change in PROCEDURAL REMEDIES which does not change the substance of the contract, and
which still leaves an efficacious remedy for enforcement does NOT impair the obligation of contracts.
A valid exercise of police power is superior to obligation of contracts.
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations
must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or
the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against
unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, they should be respected by the legislature and not
tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and
obligations. The will of the obligor and the obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must
not be impaired. However, the protection of the impairment clause is not absolute. There are instances
when contracts valid at the time of their conclusion may become invalid, or some of their provisions may
be rendered inoperative or illegal, by virtue of supervening legislation.

Limitations:
1. Police powerprevails over contracts;
2. Eminent domainmay weaken obligation of contracts; and
3. Taxationcannot weaken obligation of contracts.

Impairmentanything that diminishes the efficacy of a contract There is impairment when there is change in the
terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions,
or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms. (Clemons vs. Nolting, No. 17959, January 24, 1922)

Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 162243, November 29, 2006, in unequivocal
terms, the SC have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys
forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked.

The law relating to the obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within
the prohibition the change must impair the obligation of the existing contract, and the impairment must be
substantial.

A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance,
or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something
different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null
and void. (Clemons v. Nolting)

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Jurisdoctor

Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs
the contract itself. (U.S. v. Diaz Conde)

Government of the Philippine Islands v. Frank: The terms of a statute had been made a part of the contract
between Frank and the Government. The Court said that a subsequent amendment of the statute could not have
the effect of amending the terms of the contract.

To come under the prohibition, the law must effect a change on the rights of the parties with reference to each
other and not with reference to non-parties. Moreover, what the prohibition envisions are enactments passed
by a governmental law-making body.

An additional tax imposed upon goods already contracted to be sold does not impair the contract
between the buyer and seller.
A change in the Catholic Churchs canon law which affects the contractual relation between parties with
reference to internal affairs of the church is not covered by the prohibition.

During the period of transition, a statute was passed providing that money judgments rendered in court
should be stated in terms of the new Philippine currency in an amount equivalent to the value of the old. The
law, when applied to contractual debts, was challenged as an impairment of the obligation of contracts. In
Gaspar v. Molina, the Court upheld the statute since it did not require the debtor to pay more nor the creditor
to receive less than they were required to pay or receive under the former law.

Clemons v. Nolting: An attempt by the government to satisfy an obligation to pay in U.S. dollars by the payment
of Philippine pesos at the rate of P2 = $1 when the commercial value of the U.S. dollar was much more, was
deemed an impairment of the contractual obligation.

The non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
power.

Police power is superior over the sanctity of contracts.

Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of police power, are
applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those
already established and in operation. (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission)

In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corporation, in upholding a statute granting to workers rights which they did not
have under existing contracts, the Court said that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment is limited by
the exercise of police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.

The contract clause did not preclude remedial legislation in the interest of the general welfare.
Primero v. Court of Agrarian Relations: The security of tenure guaranteed to an agricultural tenant by a
statute was challenged as impairing existing tenancy relations. The Court ruled that the law was unquestionably
a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise
of the police power of the State to promote the common weal.

New regulations on loans making redemption of property sold on foreclosure stricter were not allowed to
apply retroactively. (Co v. Philippine National Bank)

Limitations on the use of land imposed by contract yield to a reasonable exercise of police power and, hence,
zoning regulations are superior to contractual restrictions on the use of property. (Ortigas & Co. v. FEATI
Bank)

Contracts also yield to the requirements of freedom of worship.

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Jurisdoctor

A license or permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permittee, and is not a property
in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional prescription against the impairment of contracts may
extend. (Gonzalo Sy Trading v. Central Bank)

CASES

ORTIGAS & COMPANY VS COURT OF APPEALS17

PONENCIA: QUISUMBING, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: ortigas sold to hermoso only as a residencial area then hermosa lease to mathay who
build a commercial building which is not stated in the contract thereafter, the said area was converted by MMC to
become a commercial area.
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE: retroactive effect may impair contracts
TRIGGER OF THE RULING: Zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
VERDICT: the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
as well as the assailed resolution of August 13, 1996, in CAG.R. SP No. 39193 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
END POINT: Police power may impair contract retroactively

FACTS
Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision with conditions
duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia
the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now MMDA) enacted MMC Ordinance 81-01 (Comprehensive Zoning
Area for the National Capital Region),
which reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue where the lot is located.
Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.
The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease.
Thereupon, Mathay constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
company.
Ortigas filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the RTC Pasig
seeking the demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of
the Deed of Sale.
The complaint was later amended to implead Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.,
which have 10% interest in the lot.
In his answer, Mathay III denied any knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a cross-claim
against the Hermosos.
the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order,
but the trial court denied the motion.
Mathay III then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari
ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
He claimed that MMC Ordinance 81-01 classified the area where the lot was located as
commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise
of police power.
Ortigas & Company averred that restrictions duly annotated on the title must prevail over the ordinance.
the appellate court granted the petition, nullified and set aside the assailed orders.
The appellate court held that the MMC Ordinance effectively nullified the restrictions allowing only residential
use of the property in question.
Ortigas seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it.

17 GR 126102 04 December2000
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Jurisdoctor

Ortigas filed the petition for review.

ISSUE
Whether or notMMC 81-01 be given retroactive effect and impair vested rights and contracts?

HELD
Yes,in general, laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation.
Lex prospicit, non respicit.
Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not
later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract
necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.
One exception involves police power.
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts.
Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence.
Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise
by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people.
Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. MMC Ordinance 81-01
is a legitimate police power measure as previously held in Sangalang vs. IAC. Thus, following the ruling in
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on
the Torrens Title must yield to the ordinance.
When that stretch was reclassified, the restrictions in the contract of sale were deemed extinguished by the
retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced.
While Philippine legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the
contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs

SYLLABI
Contracts; Contract Clause; Police Power; Statutes; A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be
given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.
We agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit.
Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges,
abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily im pairs the contract
itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities
or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contractspolice
power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. The
foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of
police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may
reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts,
but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield
to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police
power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we already
upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.

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Jurisdoctor

Same; Same; Same; Same; Restrictions in a contract of sale limiting all constructions on the subject lot to single-
family residential buildings deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of a zoning ordinance reclassifying
the area as a commercial zone. Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94
SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield
to the ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified
as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of
sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential
buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer
be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between
the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void.

MARIVELES VS. CA
PONENCIA: QUISUMBING, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: Private respondents were illegally dismissed from their job because the petitioner was
unsatisfied with their work.
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE: WON petitioner has the liability over respondents
TRIGGER OF THE RULING: the court ruled in the negative. di pwedeng idismiss ng petitioner dahil wala silang right na
idismiss ito dahil under sila ng agency. si agency lang ang pwedeng magtangal sa kanila. accord to the SC ruling, they are
SOLIDARILY LIABLE which is not stated in the contract but this is under the labor code with valid police power they can
impair the contracts as long as it is against public police, order and etc.
VERDICT: the Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner and Longest Force are held
liable jointly and severally for underpayment of wages and overtime pay of the security guards, without prejudice to
petitioners right of reimbursement from Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. The amounts payable to
complaining security guards, herein private respondents, by way of total back wages and attorneys fees are hereby set at
P3,926,100.40 and P392,610.04, respectively. Costs against petitioner.
END POINT: GENERAL RULE Impairment of contract is PROHIBITED. pero inamend ng labor code yung laman ng contract
pero valid yung ginawa dito dahil sabi ng labor code solidarily liablity which is not stated on the contracts. (POLICE POWER
PREVAILS OVER CONTRACT)

*POLICE POWER - inapply dahil may violation ng law which is created by legislative which police power solely vested to the
legislative.

FACTS
Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency,
Inc.
to render security services at its premises.
Pursuant to their agreement, Longest Force deployed its security guards,
the private respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan.
According to petitioner, it complied with the terms of the security contract with the petitioner
promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter.
However, it found the services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate,
causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force.
Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had deployed at petitioners
shipyard.
private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal
underpayment of wages pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates,
non-payment of overtime pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees,
against both Longest Force and petitioner,
before the Labor Arbiter.
The case sought the guards reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights.
Longest Force admitted that it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the
premises of petitioner rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for the said period.

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Jurisdoctor

It likewise admitted its liability as to the non-payment of the alleged wage differential in the total amount of
P2,618,025 but passed on the liability to petitioner
The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal,
stressing that no employer-employee relationship existed between it and the security guards.
It further pointed out that it would be the height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary claims which it
had already paid.
Petitioner averred that Longest Force had benefited from the contract;
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment that Longest Force and Mariveles Shipping be jointly and severally
liable to pay the money claims of the complainants.
Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC.
The labor tribunal, affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this
was denied by the NLRC.
The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed it outright.

ISSUE
WON Longest Force should be held solely and ultimately liable.

HELD
Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the
Labor Code which provide as follows:

ART. 106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with
another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this
Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to
the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to
employees directly employed by him.

ART. 107. INDIRECT EMPLOYER. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to
any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent
contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.

ART. 109. SOLIDARY LIABILITY. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every
employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of
any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they
shall be considered as direct employers. (jointly - parehas silang pwedeng magbayad whereas in SOLIDARITY
pwedeng isa sa kanila ang magbayad. pero may right sila for reinbursement)

In this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the security agency that hired
private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation, petitioner became an indirect employer of
private respondents pursuant to Article 107 above cited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor
failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages.
This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory
minimum wage.

The security agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the
indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the agency to pay
them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and social justice
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the
compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. Labor standards are enacted
by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiralling costs of their basic
Page 104 of 138
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Jurisdoctor

needs. Labor laws are considered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are
considered null. Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the contract. Thus,
employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors or
subcontractors) liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage.

However, the court emphasizes that the solidary liability of petitioner with that of Longest Force does not
preclude the application of the Civil Code provision on the right of reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one
who paid. As held in Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, the joint and several liabilities
imposed on petitioner is without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement by petitioner against the security agency
for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants, the private respondents herein. The security
agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that the principals payments to it were inadequate for the guards
lawful compensation. As an employer, the security agency is charged with knowledge of labor laws; and the
adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any
others.

SYLLABI
Same; Indirect Employers; Security Guards; Joint and Several Obligations; When the security agency fails to pay
its guards, the corporation serviced, as principal, becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages.In
this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the security agency that hired
private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation, petitioner became an indirect employer of
private respondents pursuant to Article 107 above cited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor
failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages.
This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory
minimum wage. The security agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation
is deemed the indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the
agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and
social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

CLEMONS VS. NOLTING

PONENCIA: JOHNSON, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: there was this law changes the evaluation to something lower
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE: does the law impaired the contract
TRIGGER OF THE RULING: yes. invalid impairment.
VERDICT:For all of the foregoing facts and the law, we are fully persuaded that the remedy prayed for should be, and
is hereby, granted. And it is hereby ordered and decreed that the writ of mandamus be issued to the defendant
herein, commanding him to countersign, or cause to the countersigned the original of the warrant set forth in
paragraph 9 of the complaint, and to deliver the same to the plaintiff so that he may present it to the Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands and receive payment of said sum of P73.33 due him as averred in the complaint and without any
finding as to costs. So ordered.
END POINT: impairment of contract because it is unfair and less to what is written on the contract. lugi si clemons.

SYLLABI
Contracts; Use of Dollar Sign ($), Significance of; A Contract Payable in Dollars Must Be Paid in Dollars or Their
Equivalent. When the dollar sign ($) is used in a written contract made in the United States, it signifies dollars
in the money of the United States, and the contract can be discharged only by the payment of the required
amount in United States money or in Philippine pesos of an equivalent commercial value, unless otherwise
specifically provided in the contract. It would be ruinous to the commercial interests of the Philippine Islands to
declare that the payment of debts of money could be made in other specie than that stipulated in the contract.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

PHILRECA VS DILG
PONENCIA: PUNO, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: loan contract
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE: does PD impaired the contract
TRIGGER OF THE RULING: no it did not because there was no exemption of taxes in the contract
VERDICT:the instant petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is LIFTED.
End point of the case: ang issue talaga ng kaso kung sino ang magbabayad ng taxes pero walang exemption di sila
tatamaan nung pd 269.

PHILRECA CASE WAS EXPLAINED BY JUDGE REYES

PAYMENT

U.S Republic of the

AID Philippines and Private
(LENDER) cooperatives
! !

TAXES

Page 106 of 138

 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

D
ERE
D
UL
H O
S

U.S
AID
(LENDER)
!

*No tax exemption, tax remains due

*but lender pays nothing, as borrower payment of taxes
*law which removes tax exemption of electric cooperatives does not impair loan contract

*there is no tax exemption kahit na may PD 269 amendment which granted sa LGU CODE which removes the
tax exemptions enjoyed by electric corporation
*walang impairment of contract kasi wala namang exemption of taxes stated in contract ang meron lang ay kung
sino ang magbabayad ng taxes. dito sa case RP ang magbabayad.

FACTS
Under Presidential Decree (PD) 269, as amended, or the National Electrification Administration Decree, it is the
declared policy of the State to provide the total electrification of the Philippines on an area coverage basis the
same being vital to the people and the sound development of the nation.

Pursuant to this policy, PD 269 aims to promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged in
supplying electric service, particularly electric cooperatives by giving every tenable support and assistance to
the electric cooperatives coming within the purview of the law.

From 1971 to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the
Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic Council (now National Economic Development
Authority) and the NEA (National Electrification Administration), entered into 6 loan agreements with the
government of the United States of America through the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) with electric cooperatives, including Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO); Iloilo I
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I); and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I), as beneficiaries.

The 6 loan agreements involved a total amount of approximately US$86,000,000.00. These loan agreements are
existing until today.

The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property or
commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.

On 23 May 2000, a class suit was filed by the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc.
(PHILRECA); ANECO, ILECO I and ISELCO I; in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives
organized and existing under PD 269, against the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government

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Jurisdoctor

(DILG) and the Secretary of the Department of Finance, through a petition for prohibition, contending that
pursuant to the provisions of PD 269, as amended, and the provision in the loan agreements, they are exempt
from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax.

With the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been
invalidly withdrawn, in violation of the equal protection clause and impairing the obligation of contracts between
the Philippine Government and the United States Government.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Local Government Code unduly discriminated against electric cooperatives organized and
existing under PD 269 on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause.

HELD
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances. Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on
reasonable classification.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

There is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment
between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under RA 6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines).

First, nowhere in PD 269, as amended, does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital.
Under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be
accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the
subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of
the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be less than P2,000.00.

Second, another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant to this
principle, the government may only engage in development activities where cooperatives do not possess the
capability nor the resources to do so and only upon the request of such cooperatives. In contrast, PD 269, as
amended by PD 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the NEA, upon the happening of certain events, the
power to control and take over the management and operations of cooperatives registered under it. The extent
of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, is largely a function of the
role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred
loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of the electric cooperatives.

Consequently, amendments to PD 269 were primarily geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the electric
cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives
under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government
intervention or regulation.

Lastly, the transitory provisions of RA 6938 are indicative of the recognition by Congress of the fundamental
distinctions between electric cooperatives organized under PD 269, as amended, and cooperatives under the
new Cooperative Code.

Article 128 of the Cooperative Code provides that all cooperatives registered under previous laws shall be
deemed registered with the CDA upon submission of certain requirements within one year. However,
cooperatives created under PD 269, as amended, are given three years within which to qualify and register with
the CDA, after which, provisions of PD 1645 which expand the powers of the NEA over electric cooperatives,
would no longer apply.

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Jurisdoctor

SYLLABI
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Non-Impairment Clause; It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional
prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall
within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment
must be substantial. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change
must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. What
constitutes substantial impairment was explained by this Court in Clemons v. Nolting: A law which changes the
terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions,
or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. Moreover, to constitute
impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with
respect to non-parties.

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Jurisdoctor

Access/Right to information
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law
(Section 7, Art. III)
The standards that have been developed for the regulation of speech and press and assembly and petition and
of association are applicable to the right of access to information. Those are the dangerous tendency rule, the
clear and present danger and the balancing of interest test.

SUBIDO V. OZAETA
the citizen obiously has a right to know what is going on his country and in his government.

i.e. if he is denied examination of official vouchers. A citizen may not expose anomaly if those responsible for it
may validly prevent him from investigating their activities.

Art. 6, section 16(4)

Requiring publication of the legislative journals from time to time excepting such parts as may, in the judgement
from time to time excepting such parts as may, in the judgement of the house, effect national national security.

Art. 6, section 20
The records and books of accounts of the congress shall be open to the public in accordance with law, and such
books shall be audited by the comission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid
and expenses incurred for each member.

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Jurisdoctor

Art. II Section 28

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

Art. XVI Section 10

The State shall provide the policy environment for the full
development of Filipino capability and the emergence of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of
the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and
across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the
freedom of speech and of the press.

SCOPE
Right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, or if one is consummated, it
may be too late for the public to expose its defects. However, if the right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them at his expense. The exercise is
also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of public records and to minimize disruption of
government operations. [Chavez v. PEA and Amarii18 ]

LIMITATIONS
The right does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information rooted in separation of powers, nor to
information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused. [Chavez v. PEA
and Amari19 ]

Media practitioners requested information from the GM of GSIS regarding clean loans granted to certain
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa on the guaranty of Imelda Marcos shortly before the Feb 1986
elections. Request was refused on the ground of confidentiality.

The right to information is not absolute. It is limited to matters of public concern and is subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. That the GSIS was exercising a proprietary function would not justify its exclusion of
the transactions from the coverage of the right to info. But although citizens have such right and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to access to official records, the Constitution does not accord them the right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, summaries and the like in their desire to get info on matters of
public concern. [Valmonte vs. Belmonte (1989)]

Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as
well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases,

18 G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

19 Supra
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations and similar papers.

The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations
and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain
confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.

Decisions are matters of public concern and interest. Pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case
need not be matters of public concern or interest. They are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon
which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interest. Access to court records may
be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering
the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the
parties. [Hilado, et al vs Judge (2006)]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION RELATIVE TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACT

NEGOTIATIONS
The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract.
The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government, and should not cover
recognized exceptions. [Chavez v. Philippine Estate Authority (2002)]
The limitations recognized to the right of information are:

(1) National security matter including state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, inter-
government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements.

(2) Trade secrets and banking transactions

(3) Criminal Matters

(4) Other confidential matters. [Neri vs Senate

(2008) citing Chavez vs President Commission on Good Government]

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS
Diplomatic negotiations have a privileged character. [Akbayan vs Aquino cited in Neri vs Senate (2008)]

COURT HEARINGS
When the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand,
and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial race against another, jurisprudence tells us that the
right of the accused must be preferred to win. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also
the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely
on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of
credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle,
in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from
improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind unbridled by running emotions or
passions. [Re: Request for Live Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder
Cases against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001]

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

CASES

CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY20

PONENCIA: CARPIO, J.:
TOPIC: Right to Information
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: PEA and AMARI entered into a contract which was not disclosed in the public.
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
End point of the case: Public has the right to information. contracts or agreement between the government and
private corporation shall be accessible to the public. so that public may see if the law was violated.

CHAVES CASE WAS EXPLAINED BY JUDGE REYES

Government
office
1

CONCRETE PROPOSAL
20 403 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 133250 May 6, 2003
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

CONTRACTO

Govern
ment
office
2

Government office 1 and 2 will have an exchange evaluation of the practicality and substance of the contract.
Public has no right to demand an information from the evaluation contemplated by government office 1 and 2.
for it is confidential and information solely for government.
after the said evaluation, they will give a concrete proposal to the contractor
on this part. this concrete proposal can be seen by the public and demand for an information to see if this
contract did not violate any law or etc. dahil dito daw nagsisimula ang corruption kaya public has the right to
information.
allegedly, PEA at AMARI did not expose those information by public.

FACTS
The President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA21.
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."
On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the MCCRRP22
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total area
of 1,915,894 square meters.
Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title in
the name of PEA
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the
MCCRP

21 Public Estate Authority

22 Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project

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Jurisdoctor

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA 23 through negotiation without public bidding.
the Board of Directors of PEA confirmed the JVA, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the JVA.

INTERACTION
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report
Among the conclusions of their report are:
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands;
(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a
study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report
The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees.
petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition24.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void.

ISSUE
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of
courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations
BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain
lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous
to the government

HELD

ISSUE 1
We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot
operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.

PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended
JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation

23 Joint Venture Agreement

24 Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
Page 115 of 138
 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and
submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.

Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned corporation
performing public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold
to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the
possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under
the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the
reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.

ISSUE 2
The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

ISSUE 3
PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA
failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a
negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial
intervention.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely
legal or constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands
held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant
case.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply
with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to
insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

ISSUE 4
Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they
'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people.'

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights
to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public
importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

ISSUE 5
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that
the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise,
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too
late for the public to expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.

However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers,
which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to
protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.

ISSUE 6
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some
public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the
defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted
to public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to
use the property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of
public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the
territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-
executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer
needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private
parties.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be
classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other
than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands
for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the
government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always
reserved these lands for some future public service.

However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public
agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation
by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution,
agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified
private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State"
forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is
vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through
private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable
lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD
No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while
EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter,
however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and
sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87
(Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial
or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance
with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the
government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such
price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original
JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750
hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land
of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands
of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the
constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or
patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title
in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations
but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.

ISSUE 7
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

SYLLABI
Right to Information; Nothing can be more empowering than to compel access to all information relevant to the
negotiation of government contracts including but not limited to the negotiation of government contracts including
but not limited to evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to any proposed undertaking.
First, my concurrence. I am happy that this Court has stuck to a civil libertarians honesty and transparency in
government service when interpreting the ambit of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern.
Nothing can be more empowering on this aspect than to compel access to all information relevant to the
negotiation of government contracts including but not limited to evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and
expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or
minutes, all relating to any proposed undertaking. This to me encourages our people to watch closely the
proprietary acts of State functionaries which more often than not, because they have been cloaked in technical
jargon and speculation due to the absence of verifiable resource materials, have been left unaccounted for
public debate and searching inquiry.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Legal Assistance and Free Access

to Courts
Art. 3, Section 11
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.

Art. VIII, Section 5 (5) (Mandated by Constitution)

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under- privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

RA 9406 (PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE LAW - PAO)

Section 14 of chapter 5 title 3 book 4

PAO shall be the principle law office for the government in extending free legal assistance indigent persons
ONLY in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi judicial cases.

PAO clients - exempted from paying docket fees25

Privileges of PAO Lawyers have given the frunking privileges (in other words libreng mail, pwede silang
magsend ng registered mail hindi sila magbabayad) include legal representation in litigation, assistance and
counselling even if they do not hold the case.

QUALIFIED FOR PAO SERVICE (LIMITATION)

Indigent - Metero manila earning 14,000 a month
other cities (ex. Malolos) - earning below 13,000 a month
other town - earning below 12,000 a month

MERIT TEST
Only if there handle of the case furthers the interest of justice (if the case is guilty mostly the PAO will not handle
the case)

25 Docket fees are the court records

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Rules of Court Rule 141 Sec. 18

Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.Indigent
litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do
not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in
Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if
residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property
with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the indigent litigant, unless the
court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate
family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor they own any real property with the assessed value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading of
that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.

Rules of Court Rule 3 Sec. 21

Indigent party.A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim
or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application
and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSN) which the court may order to be furnished him.

The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on
any judgment rendered in the case favourable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial
court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the
clerk of court. If the payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment
thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

Those protected include low paid employees, domestic servants and laborers. [Cabangis v. Almeda Lopez
(1940)]

The difference between p aupers and i ndigent persons is that the latter are persons who have no property or
sources of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor though self- supporting when able to
work and in employment.[Acar v. Rosal (1067)]

The new rule applies even to litigation pending at the time of its enactment. The retroactive application of the
new rule has been found to be more in keeping with Section 11 of Article III. The previous rule, denied the right
to litigate as paupers in appellate courts. [Martinez v. People (2000)]

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Jurisdoctor

Note: The significance of having an explicit free access provisions in the Constitution may be gathered from
the rocky road which free access seems to have traveled in American jurisprudence. The American
constitution does not have an explicit free access provision and, hence, its free access doctrine has been
developed as implicit from both the equal protection clause and the due process clause. [BERNAS]

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

Bill of rights deals with the protection of the person facing criminal investigation or prosecution. The person
suspected or accused of a crime is entitled to the specific safeguards embodied in Section 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19
and 21 of the Art. 3 against his arbitrary prosecution or punishment.

Preliminary investigation - is not among the rights granted to the accused in the Bill of rights. it is purely
statutory. it is component part of due process in criminal justice. mere deprivation of such investigation will
constitute a deprivation of his right to due process.

in order to satisfy the due process clause, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the
sense of making sure that the trasgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation servess not
only the purpose of the state. it is part of the guarantee of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country.

basic ingridients of criminal due process is a trial conducted in accordance with the principles of fair play.

SELF INCRIMINATION

Section 17 of Art. 3
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
it is rooted and based on humanitarian and practical considerations.

Humanitarian - it is intended to prevent the state, with all its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect
testimony that may convict him.

This right is available not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings, including
civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations.

SCOPE
1. as long as the question tend to incriminate26 privilege may apply.
2. in all other cases, a person may not refuse to answer the question is RELEVANT and othrwise allowed even
if the answer may tend to embarrass the person or subject him to civil liability
3. Rights may not be invokes where the question ask related to a past criminality for which the person may no
longer be prosecuted.
4. A person may not refuse to answer where he has been priviously granted immunity under a validly enacted
statute

WHEN AVAILABLE TO INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

When and as the incriminating question is asked, since the witness has no way of knowing in advance the
nature or effect of the question to be put to him.

Ordinary Witness - when the question is asked

Accused - when asked to take a stand as witness

26 incriminate - to cause (someone) to appear guilty of or responsible for something (such as a crime)
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Jurisdoctor

WAIVER
right may be waived, either directly or by a failure to invoke it. waiver is certain and unequivocal27 and
intelligently, understandingly and willingly made.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Section 12. (1)

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims
of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Custodial investigation - questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or therwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

R.A 7438
custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law.

27 very strong and clear: not showing or allowing any doubt

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Jurisdoctor

BAIL
Section 13
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance28 as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Bail is the security (guarantee or deposit) and not a payment given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may be required.

only the person under detention or in custody may petition for bail for the purpose of bail is to secure
their provisional release.

EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT TO BAIL

1. Accused charged of offense punishable by reclusion perpetua AND the evidence of guilt is strong
(EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: even if the accused was charged of punishment reclusion perpetua" if
the evidence of guilt is NOT STRONG that person may petition for bail or he may be given the right to bail)
2. convicts has no right to bail (EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCEPTION: MTC convicts (convicted in first level
courts MTC, MCTC, MeTC, MTCC) they may petition for bail as a matter of RIGHT, a person may demand a
bail even id that person was convicted because the person convicted may only be given by the discretion of
the court and the convicted person can NOT demand for it)
3. Crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua (the constitution is silent when it comes to death penalty for it was
suspended) DILLEMA would be, if the death penalty will be reinstated the constitution should be amended
because 1987 constitution did not provide bail for death penalty. 1987 was specific and before it was
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT comprises of death and RP it must be bailable for it is more serious)

FORMS OF BAIL
1. Surety Bail - Pyansador (payment of premium)
2. offer of the property (property bond) - kapag di ka sumipot kukunin ng court yung property na inoffer mo
3. Cash Bond - magbabayad ng cash sa pay clerk to the clerk of court (magre-retrive yung nakadeposit na cash
bond whether
4. recognizance - it is allowed in certain instances (under custody of a prominent person) it is a species of
bailbond or security, given by the prisoner either on being bound over for trial on his taking an appeal

RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENCE

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

28 Recognizance - a legal promise made by someone before a court of law that must be kept to avoid being punished
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Jurisdoctor

Section 14 (2) 1st Premise

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved,
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt29 the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved

RIGHT TO BE HEARD

Section 14 (2) 2nd Premise

and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
This right is indispensable in any criminal prosecution where the stakes are the liberty or even the life of the
accused, who must for this reason be given a chance to defend himself
In the case of People vs. Lamague, the supreme court set a side the conviction of 3 co-accused after finding that
they were denied due process because they were not given a chance to testify and to present an evidence in
their behalf.

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

it has previously been observed that the right to counsel now begins from the time a person is taken into custody
and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime.

The duty of the court is not ended with such appointment, as it should also see to it that the counsel does his
duty by the defendant. counsel de officio should not merely make the motions of defending the accused but
exert his utmost efforts as if he were representing a paying client.

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

in the course of his trial the defendant escaped or otherwise failed or refused to appear.

REQUISITE OF TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

1. the accused has already been arraigned

2. he has been duly notified of the trial
3. his failure to appear is unjustified

29 people vs. dramayo, 42 SCRA 59

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
it has also been held that if a prosecution witness dies before his cross-examination can be completed, his direct
testimony cannot be stricken off the record, provided the material points of his direct testimony has been covered
on cross.

COMPULSORY PROCESS
the accused is entitled under the constitution to issuance of subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the
purpose of compelling the attendance of witness and the production of evidence that he may need for his
defense.

PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

CASES

COMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA30

(as chief of staff of the AFP) Right to bail of Military Personnel

PONENCIA:
TOPIC:
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:
END POINT:

FACTS
The case involves 4 consolidated cases of the officers of the AFP who are facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup d etat on December 1-9, 1989:

G.R. No. 93177-petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus- questioning the conduct of the pre-trial panel and
the creation of General Court Martial (GMC No. 14)

G.R. No. 96948-certiorari against the ruling denying them the right to pre-emptory challenge (or that the
Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate
for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof.)

G.R. No. 95020-certiorari- against the respondent judge on the ground that he has no jurisdiction of GCM No. 14
and no authority to set aside its ruling of denying bail to private respondents

G.R. No. 97454-certiorari- against the decision of RTC in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the
private respondents. Jurisdictional objection are also raised.

Charges against them include mutiny, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and various
crimes in relation to murder
The pre-trail investigation (PTI) panel issued several letters of notice to the petitioners for counter-
affidavit and of the affidavits of their witnesses. All were moved to delay and the petitioners contend that there
was no pre-trail investigation done
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail and it was denied by GMC No. 14. The RTC
granted him provisional liberty but he was not released immediately, pending the final resolution of the appeal to
be taken. Then the RTC ruled that the right to bail covers military men facing court-martial proceedings

ISSUES
Whether there was violation of due process
Whether or not the military personnel are entitled to bail, thus, WON there was a violation of the right to
bail

HELD
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to be heard when they
were asked to submit their counter-affidavits to the PTI. They cannot claim that they were denied due process.

30 G.R. No. 93177, G.R. No. 96948,G.R. No. 95020,G.R. No. 97454
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
(their) right to submit controverting evidence."
"even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of
jurisdiction."
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not
been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights.
However, a right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military, where the right to bail does not
exist.
Solicitor Generals explanation of the exception:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the
people.
the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result
in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,
Neither does it violate equal protection because the military is not similarly situated with others.
Dispositive part of the case:
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts
complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the
right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the
private respondents should not have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of
peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are
also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SYLLABI
Constitution; Bail; Constitution grants the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and
covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment
inter alia: (a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with
the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the
assailed orders of General Court-Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken
assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is
no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is
hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may
as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.

Constitution; Bill of Rights; Bail; Equal Protection; That denial from the military of the right to bail would violate
the equal protection clause is not acceptable.The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of
persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military
are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right
that is extended to civilians.

PEOPLE VS. RIVERA31

31 GR 139180, 31 July 2001 En Banc, Mendoza (J): 9 concur, 4 on official business, 1 on leave
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

PONENCIA:
TOPIC:
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:
END POINT:

FACTS
Erlanie Rivera's younger sister, Zaira
was taken by their parents to the Hospital in Pampanga
Erlanie's mother stayed with her sister in the hospital
but her father, Rolando Rivera, went back home to pampanga
Erlanie was awakened as Rolando started kissing her and fondling her breasts.
Erlanie tried to resist by kicking and pushing Rolando, but her efforts were to no avail
Rolando removed her shorts and panty, touched her private parts, and then had sexual intercourse with her.
After he was through with her, Rolando told complainant not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill
Erlanie's mother and sister.
when her mother came home the following day, Erlanie did not tell her what had happened because she was
afraid of Rolando.
Erlanie, in the presence of her mother, told her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and her grandmother, Maxima
Payumo, that she had been raped by Rolando.
she was referred to Dr. Barin for physical examination.
filed an action against rivera by means of violence, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously succeeded in having carnal knowledge [of] his 13 year old
daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latter's will and without her consent.
rivera pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
trial court rendered a decision, finding Rolando Rivera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
charged.
For having violated Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, with the
attendant circumstances that the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is the father of the victim
and absent any circumstance that could mitigate the commission thereof,
the Court sentenced Rolando to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection, and ordered him, in
line with established jurisprudence, to indemnify the offended party Erlanie Rivera in the sum of P75,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Rolando appealed.

ISSUE
Whether the right to speedy and adequate justice of one party necessary limits the right to competent
and independent counsel of choice of another, and whether the speedy disposition of the case (a day after the
memorandum was filed) denies due process to the accused.

HELD
While the Constitution recognizes the accused's right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice,
his option to secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering the State's and the
offended party's right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict the accused's option to retain a
private counsel if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member
of the bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason. The trial court appointed Atty.
Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent Rolando on 6 October 1998 because his regular counsel, Atty. Anselmo
Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had previously been granted several
postponements. As held in People v. Serzo, Jr. (274 SCRA 553, 568 [1997]), the Courts are not required to wait
indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the speedy and
orderly administration of justice. Nor should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed,
public policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately
represented by counsels who were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent
him. Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the prosecution witness, on that day. Dr.
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Jurisdoctor

Barin's testimony on direct examination was simple, containing primarily a discussion of her finding son the
hymenal laceration sustained by complainant. Her testimony did not require considerable study and
extraordinary preparation on the part of defense counsel for the purpose of cross-examination. It seems Atty.
Bansil no longer found it necessary to cross-examine Dr. Barin. Further, Rolando was not denied due process
considering the speed with which the trial court rendered judgment against him, which judgment was
promulgated one day after he filed his memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear
account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the court's findings on the credibility of
both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both parties. As held in the
analogous case of People v. Mercado (GR. 116239,

29 November 2000.), the speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot be attributed to the
injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the
pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case
long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between the
filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider
their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly
administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for
rendering his decision with due dispatch.

SYLLABI
Right of Confrontation; The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose
falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully
suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses
against him.The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution
which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, l(f) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. The cross-examination of a witness is
essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct
examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters
which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right
of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.

Same; The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not without limits but is subject to the
rules on the admissibility and relevance of evidence.The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is,
however, not without limits but is subject to the rules on the admissibility and relevance of evidence. Thus, in
People v. Zheng Bai Hui, this Court upheld the ruling of the trial judge disallowing the questions propounded by
the accuseds counsel on the ability of the arresting officer to distinguish between tawas and shabu without a
laboratory examination, the academic degree of his training instructor, and the officers authorship of books on
drug identity and analysis for being irrelevant, improper, and impertinent.

Right to Counsel; Considering the States and the offended partys right to speedy and adequate justice, the
court may restrict the accuseds option to retain a private counsel if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot
afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused
for a valid reason.While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds right to competent and independent
counsel of his own choice, his option to secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering
the States and the offended partys right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict the accuseds
option to retain a private counsel if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel
is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason.

Alibis and Denials; Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes negative self-
serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who
testified on affirmative matters.Accused-appellant also raises the defense of denial and alibi. But the bare
denial of accused-appellant cannot overcome the positive declarations of complainant. Denial, when

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes negative self-serving evidence which deserves no
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters.

Same; Witnesses; The defense of alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives,
and not by credible persons.Accused-appellants sister, Concepcion Sayo, testified that accused-appellant
lived with her family in Bulacan at the time of the rape. No other witness not related to accused-appellant,
however, was called to corroborate her claim. We have already held that the defense of alibi cannot prosper if it
is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons. It is not improbable that
these witnesses would freely perjure themselves for the sake of their loved ones. Accused-appellants defense
thus fails to convince this Court.

HONG KONG V. OLALIA32

PONENCIA:
TOPIC:
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:
END POINT:

FACTS
The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.

Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court. Department of Justice (DOJ) received
from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent Muoz. The
DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The NBI agents arrested and
detained him.

Muoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. holding that there is no Philippine law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high flight risk. After Judge Bernardo, Jr.
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was
granted by respondent judge.

ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
allowing private respondent to bail?

HELD
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing
private respondent to bail.

Accordingly, although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it does

32 G.R. No. 153675

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these rights
are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, particularly the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines is a party.

We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed clear and convincing evidence
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If not, the trial court should order
the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings
with dispatch.

SYLLABI
Same; Same; Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.At first glance, the above ruling applies
squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international
law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has
gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international
sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the
individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the
past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace,
and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted
for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show
that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While this Court in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan,
389 SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.The Philippines, along with the other
members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words,
the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While
this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.

Page 133 of 138

 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition casesclearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for
bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights.In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v.
Commission of Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 A(1951), this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal
criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the
detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also
be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right
of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG VS. OLALIA (OTHER

VERSION)33

PONENCIA:
TOPIC:
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:
END POINT:

This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extradite in an extradition proceeding.

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.

The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice

The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz

FACTS
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by
the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against
private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

33 G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Private respondent filed a petition for bailwhich was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr.
issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing
the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the
instant petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

HELD
No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus
bears theonus probandiof showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

RATIO
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of
the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.Nor is it a full-blown
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the
purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence"should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should
order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch.

Page 135 of 138

 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HON.

GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, MORALES, AND PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA AND MARK B.
JIMENEZ A.K.A. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO34
PONENCIA:
TOPIC:
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:
END POINT:

FACTS
The United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as
Mario Batacan Crespo.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. After the hearing, the
court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an
alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued
its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued,
and

2. Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending.

HELD
1. No. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
The case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action; therefore it is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused.

2. No. The constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

34 G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

SYLLABI
Same; Same; Same; Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.Persons to be extradited are
presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested
state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Treaty, uses the word immediate to
qualify the arrest of the accused, a qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance
of the arrest warrantarrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate.It is significant
to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant.
Hearing entails

sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Same; Same; Same; By using the phrase if it appears, the law fur ther conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage.By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive
determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impressiona
prima facie findingsufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.

Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Grave Abuse of Discretion; A judge gravely abuses his discretion when he sets
for hearing the application for the issuance of an arrest warrant in an extradition proceeding after having already
determined from the petition itself and its supporting documents that a prima facie finding exists.We stress that
the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when
he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The silence of the Extradition Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings.Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon
failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word hearing is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that
stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings.

Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; As suggested by the use of the word conviction in Art. III, Section 13
of the Constitution, the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal lawsit does not
apply to extradition proceedings where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.We agree with petitioner.
As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is
not at issue.

Page 137 of 138

 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Same; Same; Same; Same; The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.The provision in the Constitution stating that
the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does
not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be
noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence, the second sentence in
the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature.

Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any provisionin the Constitution, the law or the treatyexpressly
guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a
general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade
their prosecutors.Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who,
instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy
to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment,
persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any
provisionin the Constitution, the law or the treatyexpressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition
proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards
deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.

Same; Same; Same; To best serve the ends of justice, the Court holds that, after a potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon
a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the
judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due
process is broad enough to induce the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation
calling for its application. Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when
it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Same; Same; Same; Since the exception to the grant of bail in extradition proceedings has no express or
specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness.Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its
barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial
prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by
caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the
limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

Page 138 of 138