Extinction Outweighs

Extinction Outweighs
Extinction OW US-Russia War (2AC)

US-Russia war is an existential risk four reasons
Bostrom, 2.
Nick, PhD, Faculty in Philosophy at Oxford, Existential Risks: Analyzing
Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,
http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html.
The US and Russia still have huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But would an all-
out nuclear war really exterminate humankind? Note that: (i) For there to be an
existential risk it suffices that we cant be sure that it wouldnt. (ii) The climatic
effects of a large nuclear war are not well known (there is the possibility of a nuclear winter).
(iii) Future arms races between other nations cannot be ruled out and these could
lead to even greater arsenals than those present at the height of the Cold War. The worlds supply
of plutonium has been increasing steadily to about two thousand tons, some ten times as much as remains
tied up in warheads ([9], p. 26). (iv) Even if some humans survive the short-term effects of
a nuclear war, it could lead to the collapse of civilization. A human race living
under stone-age conditions may or may not be more resilient to extinction than
other animal species.
Existential risks outweigh

Bostrom, 2.
Existential risks have a cluster of features that make it useful to identify them as
a special category: the extreme magnitude of the harm that would come from an
existential disaster; the futility of the trial-and-error approach; the lack of
evolved biological and cultural coping methods; the fact that existential risk
dilution is a global public good; the shared stakeholdership of all future
generations; the international nature of many of the required countermeasures;
the necessarily highly speculative and multidisciplinary nature of the topic; the
subtle and diverse methodological problems involved in assessing the probability
of existential risks; and the comparative neglect of the whole area. From our survey of
the most important existential risks and their key attributes, we can extract tentative recommendations for ethics
and policy: 9.1 Raise the profile of existential risks We need more research into existential risks detailed
studies of particular aspects of specific risks as well as more general investigations of associated ethical,
methodological, security and policy issues. Public awareness should also be built up so that constructive political
debate about possible countermeasures becomes possible. Now, its a commonplace that researchers always
conclude that more research needs to be done in their field. But in this instance it is really true. There is more
scholarly work on the life-habits of the dung fly than on existential risks.
Probability is at least 25% and even a 1% risk is terminal

Bostrom, 2.
In combination, these indirect arguments add important constraints to those
we can glean from the direct consideration of various technological
risks, although there is not room here to elaborate on the details. But the balance of evidence is such that it
would appear unreasonable not to assign a substantial probability
to the hypothesis that an existential disaster will do us in . My subjective
opinion is that setting this probability lower than 25% would be
misguided, and the best estimate may be considerably higher. But
even if the probability were much smaller (say, ~1%) the subject
matter would still merit very serious attention because of how much
is at stake. In general, the greatest existential risks on the time-scale of
a couple of centuries or less appear to be those that derive from the
activities of advanced technological civilizations. We see this by looking at the
various existential risks we have listed. In each of the four categories, the top risks are engendered by our
activities. The only significant existential risks for which this isnt true are simulation gets shut down (although on
some versions of this hypothesis the shutdown would be prompted by our activities [27]); the catch-all hypotheses
(which include both types of scenarios); asteroid or comet impact (which is a very low probability risk); and getting
killed by an extraterrestrial civilization (which would be highly unlikely in the near future). [19]
Extinction OW US-Russia War (Long)
US-Russia war threatens extinction this outweighs other risks
Bostrom, 2.
Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them
from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for
managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with
risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl,
Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black
plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have
been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately
affected, in the big picture of things from the perspective of humankind as a whole even the worst of these
catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They havent significantly affected the total
amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a
species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant
existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to
do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the
time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by igniting the
atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential
risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it
suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it
later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad
happening. If we dont know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it
is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.
[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3] A
much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the
US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial
probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as
global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at
the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy
human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation,
either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals.
Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk,
since it would not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local
terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and
comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21 st century. The
Our
special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points:
approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There
is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach see what happens, limit
we must take a proactive approach.
damages, and learn from experience is unworkable. Rather,
This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to
take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such
actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social
attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with
managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to
take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective
fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global
public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for
everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate
excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account
the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied
by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we
discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic
work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall
see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the
explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the
neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a
depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to
take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies
for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where
to focus our efforts.
Extinction OW US-Russia War AT: D
Even if everyone doesnt *immediately* die, an existential risk
still exists because human survival is imperiled
Bostrom, 2.
We shall use the following four categories to classify existential risks [6]: Bangs
Earth-originating intelligent life goes extinct in relatively sudden disaster resulting
from either an accident or a deliberate act of destruction. Crunches The potential of humankind
to develop into posthumanity[7] is permanently thwarted although human life continues in
some form. Shrieks Some form of posthumanity is attained but it is an extremely
narrow band of what is possible and desirable. Whimpers A posthuman
civilization arises but evolves in a direction that leads gradually but irrevocably to either
the complete disappearance of the things we value or to a state where those things are
realized to only a minuscule degree of what could have been achieved. Armed with this taxonomy, we can begin to
analyze the most likely scenarios in each category. The definitions will also be clarified as we proceed.
Extinction OW D-Rule
Preventing extinction is a d-rule below is the decision
calculus;
Bostrom, 2.
Previous sections have argued that the combined probability of the existential risks is very substantial. Although
there is still a fairly broad range of differing estimates that responsible thinkers could make, it is nonetheless
arguable that because the negative utility of an existential disaster is so enormous,
the objective of reducing existential risks should be a dominant consideration
when acting out of concern for humankind as a whole. It may be useful to adopt
the following rule of thumb for moral action; we can call it Maxipok: Maximize the
probability of an okay outcome, where an okay outcome is any outcome that
avoids existential disaster. At best, this is a rule of thumb, a prima facie suggestion, rather than a
principle of absolute validity, since there clearly are other moral objectives than preventing terminal global disaster.
Its usefulness consists in helping us to get our priorities straight. Moral action is always at risk to diffuse its efficacy
on feel-good projects[24] rather on serious work that has the best chance of fixing the worst ills. The cleft between
the feel-good projects and what really has the greatest potential for good is likely to be especially great in regard to
existential risk. Since the goal is somewhat abstract and since existential risks dont
currently cause suffering in any living creature [25], there is less of a feel-good
dividend to be derived from efforts that seek to reduce them . This suggests an offshoot
moral project, namely to reshape the popular moral perception so as to give more credit and social approbation to
those who devote their time and resources to benefiting humankind via global safety compared to other
philanthropies. Maxipok, a kind of satisficing rule, is different from Maximin (Choose the action that has the best
worst-case outcome.)[26]. Since we cannot completely eliminate existential risks (at any moment we could be sent
into the dustbin of cosmic history by the advancing front of a vacuum phase transition triggered in a remote galaxy
a billion years ago) using maximin in the present context has the consequence that we
should choose the act that has the greatest benefits under the assumption of
impending extinction. In other words, maximin implies that we should all start partying
as if there were no tomorrow. While that option is indisputably attractive, it
seems best to acknowledge that there just might be a tomorrow, especially if we
play our cards right.
Extinction OW Outweighs VTL
Human extinction is the greatest act of suffering imaginable
using scientific methods to forestall extinction is crucial
Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao 9 Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine,
University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and
Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse.
Human extinction is 100% certainthe only uncertainties are when and how . Like
the men and women of Shakespeares As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and
exits on the evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be
expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of
evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species
extinctionis as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence, to regard
extinction as catastrophicwhich implies that it may somehow never occur , provided
that we are all well behavedis not only specious, but self-defeating . Man is both blessed and
cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that the
process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by more suffering than
that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may
only be eased by the getting of wisdom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied
sufficiently early, postpone extinction. But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for
such foresight. Mans dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of
original sinthe doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our free will, thereby perpetuating our
creationist illusion of being at the center of the universebut rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is
incompatible with evolution. More scientific effort in propounding this central truth of our
species mortality, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in escapist fantasies,
could pay dividends in minimizing the eventual cumulative burden of human
suffering.
Extinction OW Turns the Alt
Even if we dont get to extinction, a limited nuclear war turns
and outweighs
Martin, Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media
and Communication at the University of Wollongong, 1982
(Brian, How the Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War,
Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-159)
In addition to the important physical effects of nuclear war there would be important indirect political effects. It
seems very likely that there would be strong moves to maintain or establish
authoritarian rule as a response to crises preceding or following
nuclear war. Ever since Hiroshima, the threat of nuclear destruction has been
used to prop up repressive institutions, under the pretext of
defending against the 'enemy'. The actuality of nuclear war could easily result in the
culmination of this trend. Large segments of the population could be manipulated to
support a repressive regime under the necessity to defend against further threats or to obtain
revenge. A limited nuclear war might kill some hundreds of thousands or tens of millions of people, surely a major
another tragedy could also result: the establishment, possibly for
tragedy. But
decades, of repressive civilian or military rule in countries such as Italy, Australia and the
US, even if they were not directly involved in the war. The possibility of grassroots mobilisation for disarmament and
peace would be greatly reduced even from its present levels. For such developments the people and the peace
movements of the world are largely unprepared.
Extinction OW Cummiskey
Lives that are lost as a result of not performing the plan

are your first ethical duty
David Cummiskey, Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Bates College & a
Ph.D. from UM, 1996, Kantian Consequentialism, Pg. 145-146
In the next section, I will defend this interpretation of the duty of beneficence. For the sake of argument, however,
let us first simply assume that beneficence does not require significant self-sacrifice and see what follows. Although
Kant is unclear on this point, we will assume that significant self-sacrifices are supererogatory. Thus, if I must harm
one in order to save many, the individual whom I will harm by my action is not morally required to affirm the action.
I am faced with
On the other hand, I have a duty to do all that I can for those in need. As a consequence
a dilemma: If I act, I harm a person in a way that a rational being
need not consent to; if I fail to act, then I do not do my duty to
those in need and thereby fail to promote an objective end. Faced with
such a choice, which horn of the dilemma is more consistent with the formula of the end-in-itself? We must
not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the
sacrifice of individuals for some abstract social entity. It is not a
question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive
overall social good. Instead, the question is whether some persons
must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert
Nozick, for example, argues that to use a person in this way does not sufficiently
respect and take account of the fact that he [or she] is a separate
person, that his is the only life he [or she] has. But why is this not
equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to
act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we
act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many
other separate persons, each with only one life , who will bear the
cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent
motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent
recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that
rational nature exists as an end in itself. Rational nature as such is the supreme
objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an
equal value then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves
maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as
possible . In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian
needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even
most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints
require a non-value based rationale. But we have seen that Kants normative theory is
based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to
sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral
law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent
If I sacrifice some for the sake of
from maximally promoting these two tiers of value?
others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the
unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have dignity,
that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth that transcends any
market value, but persons also have a fundamental equality that
dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others .
The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we
may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit
others. If on focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration
suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many .
Extinction OW Sandberg
Extinction outweighs its the only irreversible impact

Sandberg, 8 Anders Sandberg, James Martin Research Fellow at the
Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, et al., with Jason G.
Matheny, Ph.D. candidate in Health Policy and Management at the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and Special Consultant to the
Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, and
Milan M. irkovi, Senior Research Associate at the Astronomical Observatory
of Belgrade and Assistant Professor of Physics at the University of Novi Sad in
Serbia and Montenegro, 2008 (How can we reduce the risk of human
extinction?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 8th, Available
Online at http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-
risk-of-human-extinction)
The facts are sobering. More than 99.9 percent of species that have ever
existed on Earth have gone extinct. Over the long run, it seems likely that humanity will meet the same
fate. In less than a billion years, the increased intensity of the Sun will initiate a wet greenhouse effect, even without any human
interference, making Earth inhospitable to life. A couple of billion years later Earth will be destroyed, when it's engulfed by our Sun
as it expands into a red-giant star. If we colonize space, we could survive longer than our planet, but as mammalian species survive,
on average, only two million years, we should consider ourselves very lucky if we make it to one billion. Humanity could be
extinguished as early as this century by succumbing to natural hazards, such as an extinction-level asteroid or comet impact,
supervolcanic eruption, global methane-hydrate release, or nearby supernova or gamma-ray burst. (Perhaps the most probable of
these hazards, supervolcanism, was discovered only in the last 25 years, suggesting that other natural hazards may remain
the probability of any one of these events killing off our
unrecognized.) Fortunately
species is very lowless than one in 100 million per year, given what we know about their past
frequency. But as improbable as these events are , measures to reduce their
probability can still be worthwhile. For instance, investments in asteroid detection and
deflection technologies cost less, per life saved, than most investments in medicine. While an
extinction-level asteroid impact is very unlikely, its improbability is
outweighed by its potential death toll. The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at
present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the
number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the
possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter . We
may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer
pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are
more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a
small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species.
Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in
multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high
transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the
likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law. Farther out in time are technologies
that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating
machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in
cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human
extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as
they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society's ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted,
Such remote risks may
"Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe."
seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global
poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems
are, they do not threaten human existence . In discussing the risk of nuclear winter,
Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all
of our descendants , for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population
remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the
biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about
some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one
million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars
that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other
possible measures of the potential lossincluding culture and science, the
evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of
our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants.
Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity
between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity
and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all
humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we
value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should
dominate our considerations . Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security
against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction. These
measures include: Removing nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert and further reducing their numbers; Placing safeguards on
gene synthesis equipment to prevent synthesis of select pathogens; Improving our ability to respond to infectious diseases,
including rapid disease surveillance, diagnosis, and control, as well as accelerated drug development; Funding research on asteroid
detection and deflection, "hot spot" eruptions, methane hydrate deposits, and other catastrophic natural hazards; Monitoring
developments in key disruptive technologies, such as nanotechnology and computational neuroscience, and developing
international policies to reduce the risk of catastrophic accidents.
Extinction OW AT: K
Existential risks outweigh their impact and justify our
scholarship
Bostrom, 2.
Existential risks have a cluster of features that make it useful to identify them as
a special category: the extreme magnitude of the harm that would come from an
existential disaster; the futility of the trial-and-error approach; the lack of
evolved biological and cultural coping methods; the fact that existential risk
dilution is a global public good; the shared stakeholdership of all future
generations; the international nature of many of the required countermeasures;
the necessarily highly speculative and multidisciplinary nature of the topic; the
subtle and diverse methodological problems involved in assessing the probability
of existential risks; and the comparative neglect of the whole area. From our survey of
the most important existential risks and their key attributes, we can extract tentative
recommendations for ethics and policy: 9.1 Raise the profile of existential risks We need more
research into existential risks detailed studies of particular aspects of specific
risks as well as more general investigations of associated ethical, methodological, security and policy issues.
Public awareness should also be built up so that constructive political debate
about possible countermeasures becomes possible. Now, its a commonplace that researchers
There
always conclude that more research needs to be done in their field. But in this instance it is really true.
is more scholarly work on the life-habits of the dung fly than on
existential risks.
Extinction OW AT: AIDS
AIDS and pandemics arent existential risks
Bostrom, 2.
managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience
with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents,
Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of
influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have
occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by
trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the
people immediately affected, in the big picture of things from the perspective of
humankind as a whole even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on
the surface of the great sea of life. They havent significantly affected the total
amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our
species.
Extinction OW AT: Bio-D
Biodiveristy isnt an existential risk
Bostrom, 2.
Existential risks are distinct from global endurable risks. Examples of the latter
kind include: threats to the biodiversity of Earths ecosphere , moderate global warming,
global economic recessions (even major ones), and possibly stifling cultural or religious eras such as the dark
ages, even if they encompass the whole global community, provided they are transitory (though see the section on
Shrieks below). To say that a particular global risk is endurable is evidently not to say
that it is acceptable or not very serious. A world war fought with conventional weapons or a Nazi-
style Reich lasting for a decade would be extremely horrible events even though they would fall under
the rubric of endurable global risks since humanity could eventually recover . (On the
other hand, they could be a local terminal risk for many individuals and for persecuted ethnic groups.) I shall use
the following definition of existential risks: Existential risk One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate
Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. An existential risk is
one where humankind as a whole is imperiled. Existential disasters have major
adverse consequences for the course of human civilization for all time to come .
Extinction OW AT: Bioweapons
Biological super diseases arent an existential risk
Bostrom, 2.
species.
Extinction OW AT: Cycle of Violence/Tech
Technology *may* usher in risks but it *certainly* solves
extinction
Bostrom, 2.
In combination, these indirect arguments add important constraints to those we can
glean from the direct consideration of various technological risks , although there is not
room here to elaborate on the details. But the balance of evidence is such that it would appear
unreasonable not to assign a substantial probability to the hypothesis that an
existential disaster will do us in. My subjective opinion is that setting this probability lower
than 25% would be misguided, and the best estimate may be considerably higher.
But even if the probability were much smaller (say, ~1%) the subject matter
would still merit very serious attention because of how much is at stake . In general,
the greatest existential risks on the time-scale of a couple of centuries or less
appear to be those that derive from the activities of advanced technological
civilizations. We see this by looking at the various existential risks we have listed. In each of the four
categories, the top risks are engendered by our activities. The only significant existential risks for which this isnt
true are simulation gets shut down (although on some versions of this hypothesis the shutdown would be
prompted by our activities [27]); the catch-all hypotheses (which include both types of scenarios); asteroid or comet
impact (which is a very low probability risk); and getting killed by an extraterrestrial civilization (which would be
highly unlikely in the near future).[19] It may not be surprising that existential risks created by modern civilization
get the lions share of the probability. After all, we are now doing some things that have never been done on Earth
before, and we are developing capacities to do many more such things. If non-anthropogenic factors have failed to
annihilate the human species for hundreds of thousands of years, it could seem unlikely that such factors will strike
us down in the next century or two. By contrast, we have no reason whatever not to think that the products of
advanced civilization will be our bane. We shouldnt be too quick to dismiss the existential risks that arent human-
generated as insignificant, however. Its true that our species has survived for a long time in spite of whatever such
risks are present. But there may be an observation selection effect in play here. The question to ask is, on the
theory that natural disasters sterilize Earth-like planets with a high frequency, what should we expect to observe?
Clearly not that we are living on a sterilized planet. But maybe that we should be more primitive humans than we
are? In order to answer this question, we need a solution to the problem of the reference class in observer selection
theory [76]. Yet that is a part of the methodology that doesnt yet exist. So at the moment we can state that the
most serious existential risks are generated by advanced human civilization, but we base this assertion on direct
considerations. Whether there is additional support for it based on indirect considerations is an open question. We
should not blame civilization or technology for imposing big existential risks.
Because of the way we have defined existential risks, a failure to develop
technological civilization would imply that we had fallen victims of an existential
disaster (namely a crunch, technological arrest). Without technology, our
chances of avoiding existential risks would therefore be nil. With technology, we
have some chance, although the greatest risks now turn out to be those
generated by technology itself.
Extinction OW AT: Death Drive/Genocide
Even if the plan somehow leads to erasure of a population,
global terminal threats outweigh local personal threats
Bostrom, 2.
We can distinguish six qualitatively distinct types of risks based on their scope
and intensity (figure 1). The third dimension, probability, can be superimposed on the two dimensions plotted
in the figure. Other things equal, a risk is more serious if it has a substantial
probability and if our actions can make that probability significantly greater or
smaller. Personal, local, or global refer to the size of the population that is
directly affected; a global risk is one that affects the whole of humankind (and our
successors). Endurable vs. terminal indicates how intensely the target population
would be affected. An endurable risk may cause great destruction, but one can
either recover from the damage or find ways of coping with the fallout. In
contrast, a terminal risk is one where the targets are either annihilated or
irreversibly crippled in ways that radically reduce their potential to live the sort of
life they aspire to. In the case of personal risks, for instance, a terminal outcome
could for example be death, permanent severe brain injury, or a lifetime prison sentence. An
example of a local terminal risk would be genocide leading to the annihilation of a
people (this happened to several Indian nations). Permanent enslavement is another example.
Extinction OW AT: Discourse First
The 1AC is necessary discourse combating complacency is
crucial to halting certain and inevitable extinction
We shall not speculate here as to the how and when of human extinction;
rather, we ask why there remains so little discussion of this important topic . We
hypothesise that a lethal mix of ignorance and denial is blinding humans from the
realization that our own species could soon (a relative concept, admittedly) be as
endangered as many other large mammals (Cardillo et al. 2004). For notwithstanding the
overgrown Petri dish model of human decline now confronting us, the most sinister menace that we
face may not be extrinsic selection pressures but complacency . Entrenched in our
culture is a knee-jerk boy who cried wolf skepticism aimed at any person who
voices concerns about the futurea skepticism fed by a traditionally bullish, growth-
addicted economy that eschews caution (Table 1). But the facts of extinction are less exciting and
newsworthy than the roller-coaster booms and busts of stock markets.
Extinction OW AT: Economy
Economic collapse isnt an existential threat its endurable
Bostrom, 2.
kind include: threats to the biodiversity of Earths ecosphere , moderate global
warming, global economic recessions (even major ones), and possibly stifling cultural or religious
eras such as the dark ages, even if they encompass the whole global community, provided they are transitory
(though see the section on Shrieks below). To say that a particular global risk is endurable is
evidently not to say that it is acceptable or not very serious. A world war fought with
conventional weapons or a Nazi-style Reich lasting for a decade would be extremely horrible events even though
they would fall under the rubric of endurable global risks since humanity could
eventually recover. (On the other hand, they could be a local terminal risk for many individuals and for
persecuted ethnic groups.) I shall use the following definition of existential risks: Existential risk One where an
adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its
potential. An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled.
Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course of human
civilization for all time to come.
Extinction OW AT: Global Warming
Global warming isnt an existential risk
Bostrom, 2.
kind include: threats to the biodiversity of Earths ecosphere , moderate global
warming, global economic recessions (even major ones), and possibly stifling cultural or religious eras such as
the dark ages, even if they encompass the whole global community, provided they are transitory (though see the
section on Shrieks below). To say that a particular global risk is endurable is evidently
not to say that it is acceptable or not very serious. A world war fought with conventional
weapons or a Nazi-style Reich lasting for a decade would be extremely horrible events even though they
would fall under the rubric of endurable global risks since humanity could
eventually recover. (On the other hand, they could be a local terminal risk for many individuals and for
persecuted ethnic groups.) I shall use the following definition of existential risks: Existential risk One where an
adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its
potential. An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled.
Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course of human
civilization for all time to come.
Extinction OW AT: Influenza
Influenza pandemics arent existential risks
Bostrom, 2.
species.
Extinction OW AT: Social Death
Social death isnt equivalent to physical death, which

outweighs
Jonas 96 (Hans, Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin
Visiting Prof. U. Munich, Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz, p. 111-112)
With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of
freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis
that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing
pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try
to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I
shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a
tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an
alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have
are we not contradicting ourselves in
created with the main argument of this essay. For
prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was
the condition of our capacity for responsibilityand that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?;
By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are
we not violating the principle we established: that the How of
existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make
a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the
conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as
it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only
temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be
supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that
even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the
part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews
our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as
there are human beings who survive , the image of God will continue
to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new
hour. With that hopewhich in this particular case takes precedence over fearit is
permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a
temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This
is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment
in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one
concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead
to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future
At stake is the preservation
generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved.
of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence
is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without
philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for
this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with
arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to
take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.
Extinction OW AT: Structural Violence
Portraying eco-damage as extinction-level is a crucial
communication act that forestalls complete extinction it
solves their turn because it sparks a new social ethic
Final ends for all species are the same, but the journeys will be different. If we
cannot influence the end of our species, can we influence the journey? To do so
even in a small waywould be a crowning achievement for human evolution and
give new meaning to the term civilization. Only by elevating the topic [End Page 121] of human
extinction to the level of serious professional discourse can we begin to prepare
ourselves for the challenges that lie ahead. Table 3. Human Thinking Modes Relevant to
Extinction: from Ego-Think to Eco-Think The difficulty of the required transition should not be underestimated.
This is depicted in Table 3 as a painful multistep progression from the 20th-century
philosophical norm of Ego-Thinkdefined therein as a short-term state of mind valuing individual material self-
interest above all other considerationsto Eco-Think, in which humans come to adopt a
broader Gaia-like outlook on themselves as but one part of an infinitely larger
reality. Making this change must involve communicating the non-sensationalist
message to all global citizens that things are serious and we are in this togetheror, in blunter language,
that the road to extinction and its related agonies does indeed lie ahead . Consistent
with this prospect, the risks of human extinctionand the cost-benefit of attempting to reduce these riskshave
been quantified in a recent sobering analysis (Matheny 2007). Once complacency has been shaken
off and a sense of collective purpose created, the battle against self-seeking anthropocentric human instincts
will have only just begun. It is often said that human beings suffer from the ability to appreciate their own
mortalityan existential agony that has given rise to the great religions but in the present age of religious
decline, we must begin to bear the added burden of anticipating the demise of our species. Indeed, as argued here,
there are compelling reasons for encouraging this collective mind-shift. For in the best of all possible
worlds, the realization that our species has long-term survival criteria distinct
from our short-term tribal priorities could spark a new social ethic to upgrade what we
now all too often dismiss as human nature (Tudge 1989). [End Page 122]
Extinction OW AT: VTL
Existential risks threaten everything about life we value
Bostrom, 2.
We shall use the following four categories to classify existential risks [6]: Bangs
Earth-originating intelligent life goes extinct in relatively sudden disaster resulting
from either an accident or a deliberate act of destruction. Crunches The potential of humankind
to develop into posthumanity[7] is permanently thwarted although human life continues in
some form. Shrieks Some form of posthumanity is attained but it is an extremely
narrow band of what is possible and desirable. Whimpers A posthuman
civilization arises but evolves in a direction that leads gradually but irrevocably to either
the complete disappearance of the things we value or to a state where those things are
realized to only a minuscule degree of what could have been achieved. Armed with this taxonomy, we can begin to
analyze the most likely scenarios in each category. The definitions will also be clarified as we proceed.

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Extinction OW US-Russia War (2AC)

Existential risks outweigh

Probability is at least 25% and even a 1% risk is terminal

Lives that are lost as a result of not performing the plan

Extinction outweighs its the only irreversible impact

Social death isnt equivalent to physical death, which

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