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ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-3047 | May 16, 1951

FACTS: Acomplaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe
Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having
repeated sexual intercourse from the year 1946 to 14 March 1947, the date of
the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a
married woman.

The defendant-wife entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four
months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17
September 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous
acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17
September 1948, the date of the filing of the second. Each of the defendants
filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that they would be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the
contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the order
sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has appealed.

TRIAL COURT: The adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints
must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints
being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having
taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948, and
"that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery
complained of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that 'No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

ISSUE/S; W/N the second complaint for adultery should be dismissed because of
double jeopardy

HELD: For [a continuous crime] to exist there should be

1.plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time;
2. unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated;
3. and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim

In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the
culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need
not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last act
of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the
defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first
complaint and for which the second complaint was filed. It was held by
the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of adultery was committed, if the
defendants, after their provisional release during the pendency of the case in
which they were later on convicted, had sexual intercourse up to the time when
they were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them.

Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of

adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a
violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the
second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in
the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the
first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his
codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The
defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted
would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the
crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this
codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous
wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from
criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was
granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent
adulterous acts

The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is
hereby reversed and set aside, and the trial court directed to proceed with the
trial of the defendants in accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.

their grandmother DRA. MAIDA G. URIARTE as their Attorney-in-Fact,
GONZALES, respondents
G.R. No. 177667 [September 17, 2008]
TOPIC: Art. 94 Charges upon and obligations of the ACP

FACTS: Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U. Francisco are the

minor children of Cleodualdo M. Francisco and Michele Uriarte Francisco. In a
Partial Decision rendered by the RTC of Makati, for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, the Compromise Agreement entered into by the estranged couple was
approved. The property subject of the Compromise Agreement is a house and lot
in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco.

Meanwhile, in a case for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachment filed by

spouses Jorge C. Gonzales and Purificacion W. Gonzales (respondents) against
George Zoltan Matrai and Michele, the MeTC of Muntinlupa rendered a Decision
ordering Matrai and Michele to vacate the premises leased to them and to pay
back rentals, unpaid telephone bills and attorney's fees.

When petitioners' grandmother learned of the scheduled auction, she, as

guardian-in-fact of petitioners, filed with the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party Claim
and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale by Execution but this was denied in the
Order. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied per RTC Order. The CA
dismissed the petition. Hence, herein petition.

ISSUE: W/N the Conjugal Property belonging to the ACP could be held liable for
the judgment debt against the wife

The RTC should not have ignored that TCT is in the name of "Cleodualdo M.
Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco". On its face, the title shows that the
registered owner of the property is not Matrai and Michele but Cleodualdo,
married to Michele. This describes the civil status of Cleodualdo at the time the
property was acquired.

Records show that Cleodualdo and Michele were married on June 12, 1986, prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. As such, their property
relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership of gains.

A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that
purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; when
administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts
or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Failure
to establish any of these circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not
be bound to answer for the wife's personal obligation. Considering that the
foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this case as the
liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an
unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai.

Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the Notice of Levy on Execution there
was already annotated on the title. By order of the Court RTC declaring the
Marriage Contract between Michelle Uriarte and Cleodualdo M. Francisco, Jr. is
null & void ab initio and title of ownership of the conjugal property consisting of
the above-described property shall be transferred by way of a Deed of Donation
to Cleodia Michaela U. Francisco and Ceamantha Maica U. Francisco, as co-
owners when they reach 19 and 18 yrs. old to the condition that Cleodualdo,
shall retain usufructuary rights over the property until he reaches the age of 65
yrs. Old.

This annotation should have put the RTC and the sheriff on guard, and they
should not have proceeded with the execution of the judgment debt of Michele
and Matrai.

While the trial court has the competence to identify and to secure properties and
interest therein held by the judgment debtor for the satisfaction of a money
judgment rendered against him, such exercise of its authority is premised on one
important fact: that the properties levied upon, or sought to be levied upon, are
properties unquestionably owned by the judgment debtor and are not exempt by
law from execution. Also, a sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property
not belonging to the judgment debtor, and even incurs liability if he wrongfully
levies upon the property of a third person. A sheriff has no authority to attach the
property of any person under execution except that of the judgment debtor.

It should be noted that the judgment debt for which the subject property was
being made to answer was incurred by Michele and her partner, Matrai.
Respondents allege that the lease of the property in Lanka Drive redounded to
the benefit of the family. By no stretch of one's imagination can it be concluded
that said debt/obligation was incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
or that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the family.

To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the obligations of Michele and Matrai
would be going against the spirit and avowed objective of the Civil Code to give
the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. It is
clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership
of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The property should not
have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of legal basis.
[G.R. No. 184007. February 16, 2011.]
TOPIC: ART. 121 122 Charges upon and obligations of the CPG

FACTS: Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services,
Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI
as pilers or haulers tasked to manually carry bags of sugar from the warehouse
of Victorias Milling Company and load them on trucks. 4 In June 1998,
respondents were dismissed from employment. They filed a case for illegal
dismissal and some money claims with the National Labor Relations Commission

To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff Romeo Pasustento issued
a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property 10 over the property covered
by TCT in the name of "Paquito V. Ando . . . married to Erlinda S. Ando.

This prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the
property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could
not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the
judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latter's properties.

The CA affirmed the RTC Order in so far as it dismissed the complaint on the
ground that it had no jurisdiction over the case, and nullified all other
pronouncements in the same Order. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied.

Petitioner then filed the present petition seeking the nullification of the CA
Decision. He argues that he was never sued in his personal capacity, but in his
representative capacity as president of PACSI.

ISSUE: W/N the property belonging to the judgment debtors wife can be levied

HELD: Petitioner claims that the property sought to be levied does not belong to
PACSI, the judgment debtor, but to him and his wife. Since he was sued in a
representative capacity, and not in his personal capacity, the property could not
be made to answer for the judgment obligation of the corporation.

The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his
wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation and,
therefore, not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party
claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name of
petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of
execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to
deprivation of property without due process.

Moreover, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends
only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. 29 A
sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except
that of the judgment debtor. 30 Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff
ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation.
There is no doubt in our mind that petitioner's complaint is a third-party claim
within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a "third
party" in relation to the property subject of the execution vis--vis the Labor
Arbiter's decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner
and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs
to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to
a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very least, the Court can
consider that petitioner's wife is a third party within contemplation of the law.